HISTORY MECHANICS
(textual version of Web page)

This Web site presents the history theory developed in 1990-2002. Mechanics of History is a collection of models and laws that explain the strongest historical, and economic processes.

You will not find here many facts from history (except some links to historic sites). This page is devoted to present my work, so if you search for important information, you better click out.

But: 
Ø	If you are interested in mechanisms that drive the history, and want to see some explanations, why our history was as it was. 
Ø	If you are interested what would happen if history  took another path, and moreover when these “alternative variants of history”  were possible, and when not. 
Ø	If you are interested in scientific explanation of history. 
Ø	If you want to learn tools that helps to predict events like South-Asia Crisis (1997) or fall of president Fujimori in Peru (2000).
This page will probably satisfy you. 

Apology:
·	I presented here only about 1% of whole theory (or even less). 
·	Because of that I have to use many simplifications, and I am not saying a word about many doubts I still have, and phenomena I do not understand.
·	I have not enough space here to present all consequences of presented laws, and every connection between them. You have to do it by your own. 
·	And the last but not least, sorry for my weak English.
 
The theory consists of  five important parts:

Introduction
Some basics foundations, and some author's remarks about basic powers that drive history are shortly described here.
Political Systems
Classification of political systems (feudal system, populistic system, democratic system), and related tools (like GPI). This page explains why the ancient Athens democracy was not a democracy, but ancient Rome was, why Rome and Great Britain built great empires, and where dictatorships and totalitarian systems come from.
Laws for History
Description of the basic historical schemas, and processes. This page explains reasons that stands behind the rise, and fall of historical countries, and reason for upspring, and domination of Europe.
Economics Tools
Description of the basic economics tools used here. This page presents the classification of economic crises (stagflation crisis, overproduction crisis), and mechanics that stands behind them. Explains when economy should be stimulated by government, and when not. Why sometimes a free trade will not work - the flaws of Comparative Advantage Theory. 
The World History Rewritten 
Short world history as from the point of view of author. This page contains more facts from history (and links) than other pages presented here, and is probably the most readable part of this site. 

The basic knowledge you should have to read this material:
·	Basic knowledge of economy (including microeconomics, and macroeconomics). Material from the first year of college course should be enough.
·	Terminology used in the institutional economics (institutions, transaction costs, etc.).
·	Comparative advantage theory used by economists to explain rationality of free trade.
·	Complete knowledge about general world history.
·	At minimum history of: England, Ancient Rome, USA, Ancient Greece, France, Italy, Switzerland, Poland or Hungary, Russia, India, and China. Each book you need to read should have about 400-500 pages (shortest books will not work) an should include economic, and institutional background, plus a few words about social conflicts (should not be only a description of wars, and battles).
·	Knowledge of the history of other countries will not hurt.
·	It also be good to know the base terminology used by major scientist that writes about processes that drives the history, for example: Karl Marx, Max Webber, Immanuel Wallerstein or Paul Kennedy. 
·	A short contact with political game like Avalon Hill “Diplomacy”, and with game theory could help to understand some elements I present here.

Special thanks to Sławomir Maszewski 

Introduction

I strongly advise you to read this material in sequence, page-by-page, because I will introduce some concepts gradually. First simple definitions, then in World History Rewritten section, more exact explanations, substantations and examples. History Mechanics is extremly comprehensive, so I will start from easiest problems and then gradually go to more complicated. Moreover I sometimes have to present only half-true intermediary explanations (“lies for children” using terminology of Ian Stewart and Jack Cohen) at first, and correct them later to make this lecture more user-friendly.

History processes aredriven mostly by economic factors
To be more precise: economy is not the only power that drives history, but economic factors are the most important in macroscale, and in long run. Good analogy could be the gravity in physics. Gravity does not explain every physical process but is the easiest factor to eliminate, observe, and examine.
That doesn't mean that people behaviors are driven ONLY by economy. Often people acts according to ideologies they believe or motivated by some other reasons. Rationality of social behaviors is a statistical rationality like in biological evolution. Moreover, actions of people, parties, countries and other players ALLWAYS depends on available resources, and economics concrentrate on the problem of limited resources.

Exceptions
Of course, there are “critical points” (or history turning points) when two or more opposite processes acts against each other. These times other, weaker factors like ideologies, institutions, personal decisions of a single man (or even a casual nexus of coincidences) could prevail. The set of laws presented here helps to locate that critical points, and lets us ignore events that are not important.

Institutions, and ideologies evolve according to economic factors
It is easy to predict emergency of a new ideology or institution (and its "shape" or "economic core") if we understand an economic process running in the background.

And vice versa, knowing the economic background of particular ideology we can say what economic processes are working behind the scenes simply by observing ideologies, and changes in ideologies.

Of course, we must remember about the historical background of a country where the ideology evolves. When there is a time (economic need)  for an ideology that promotes an religious dictatorship in Islamic country, its obvious that we should expect Muslim religious dictatorship, and not for example Buddhism religious dictatorship.

When a few ideologies compete with each other, the winner will be the ideology that is the cheapest to promote (and is convergent with community economic needs).

History laws are universal, and works in every country, every culture, and every human community
All “cardinal” differences between cultures are more an effect of poor knowledge about history of Non-European countries (forgetting about Muhammad al-Khwarizmi), and a very poor knowledge about European history (forgetting about Savonarola). Some times that “differences” are simply an effect of interpreting temporary historical process as an immanent element of Non-European culture.

Laws presented here will be true everywhere the second law of thermodynamics is true.
All laws presented here should work everywhere, where the second law of the thermodynamics (simply speaking: entropy always grows) works. There are many low-level laws that rules systems (saying “system” I mean every complicated being: living beings, species, institutions, technology, computer programs, etc.) evolution in competitive environment. I will not present all of them here. Except a few most important:
·	The more complicated system is, the faster it evolves, and faster reaches a next levels of complication.
·	More complicated systems that evolved in competitive environment, are (usually) more effective.
·	Systems evolve faster, when competition is stronger (but not too strong).
·	The more numerous is the population, the more predictable is its behavior.
·	The more complicated is the system, the more rationale (predictable) it acts, and works.

Political Systems

A new classification of political systems presented here is an answer for one question that obsessed me since 1986 (as I recall):
“Why a small city-state of Rome for a few hundred years won almost every war step-by-step building an empire. (What was the reason for such aberration of the statistics?)”
The answer came after Autumn of Nations (1989) when I found that there are strong analogies between XVIIIth century Great Britain and Rome in IVth century BC. 

There are only three political systems: feudal, populistic, and democratic
Natural route of evolution for a political system of any state (country) is from feudal system thorough populistic to democratic. It is the consequence of increasing percentage of people living in cities. 

Generally, the more people live in cities the “higher” the political system is.

So the process is reversible. Populistic state can turn back to feudal. Democratic state can turn back to populistic (however this happened only once! See the political evolution of Roman Empire). 

Every higher political system is more effective than lower ones. Country with higher political system usually have more effective economy, more effective institutions, more effective army, and diplomacy. Moreover, country with higher political system have a higher ability to expansion.

When you will read definitions below, please remember: dolphin is not a fish, even it likes as one. Its internal construction proves that this fish-looking animal is actually a mammal. The same is true for definitions of political systems presented here - the key element of this definition is the internal mechanics of political system - so read carefully and make an effort to understand them.

Short definition of feudal system
Definition of feudal system is very similar to the definition presented by Karl Marx. The ruling class is a noble class. Political power comes from land. Usually only nobles have citizens laws, and have political monopoly. Social hierarchy have a shape of pyramid with a monarch on the top. Social mobility between different classes is very limited (or not possible).

Feudal system have a few sub-systems including despotism, absolute monarchy or noble-democracy with strong parliament (like in England, Hungary or Poland).

Not only medieval countries were feudal states. Many ancient states like Egypt or Assyria or Persian Empire were feudal too.

Short definition of populistic system
Like previous system, populistic system have many varieties: starting from totalitarian ones thorough authoritarian ones, many kinds of dictatorships (including military ones like junta or religious dictatorships), tyrannies to varieties that have republican or quasi-democratic form of government. 

They are look so different. So, why put them together in one basket?
Because internal mechanics of changing government, and laws of ruling are the same for every one of sub-systems I have mentioned. Under some conditions one variety could easily evolve into another. Quasi-democratic republic could become totalitarian state, and vice versa. 

In populistic states political power comes from cities. But there are still many poor peasants, and poor people living in cities who are very susceptible to populistic ideologies, and often becomes political clients of strongest group of political interests (GPI) like: rich plantation owners, rich traders, religious fanatics or government bureaucracy. In consequence the ruling group could easily dominate the rest of community using ideologies, money, some administrative means (tools) or terror.

Some important characteristics of populistic system include:
è	There are no effectively functioning institutions that protects the laws of political opposition, that guarantees the freedom of speech or citizens laws. 
è	Mobility between different social classes is higher than in the feudal system but is still often restricted.
è	Government often changes in a very dramatic way: with revolution, coup d`etat, political upheaval.
è	Even if populistic state has democratic-like or republican form, all political discussions are strongly saturated with ideology and emotions.

Sometimes, when the strength of different political groups are almost equal, and country economy prospers, populistic system could have form very similar to democracy. I will refer to this variety of populistic system as “quasi-democratic”.

Examples of populistic states include: 
n	almost all ancient city-states including Sparta, Athens, Carthage or Corinth.
n	medieval, and renaissance “merchant republics” like Venice, Florence, Genua, Switzerland or Great Novogorod
n	post “merchant-revolution” (or “burgeois revolution” using Marx terminology) states like Netherlands, England (1642-1689) France (1789-1876), Spain (1810-1976) Germany (1848-1948), or Japan (1868-1948) 
n	and many XXth century dictatorships, and quasi-democratic countries like India (1947-1998) or Mexico (1822-1997)

Short definition of democratic system
Democratic system usually emerges  when most of the country population live in cities. There are a strong group of middle-income citizens (we can call them “middle class”). There is a STABLE balance between the major political powers. Because of that balance, a political group that holds government cannot dominate over other political groups, and thus cannot restrict or shrink political laws of opposition parties and individual citizens.

That balance is responsible for birth of institutions like freedom of speech, civil rights, free press, independent court system, etc. which preserve democratic system, and thus made it very stable. 

So stable that democracy NEVER falls (actually there was one exception). All examples of “fallen democracy” are actually examples of quasi-democratic form of populistic system changing to more repressive form of populistic system (case of Mussolini or Hitler are great examples here).

IMPORTANT NOTE: Democratic system is not “the rule of majority” it is the system where “minority rights are well-protected”, and politicians (especially government) are well controlled.

Democratic system is not the system where all citizens have right to vote (in many populistic systems all citiziens also have voting rights). Actually some times voting rights in democratic countries could be more restrictive to protect community against the danger of “political clientelism”.

Here are some most important characteristics of democratic system:
è	There are set of civil rights like Bill of the Rights or first 10 amendments to USA Constitution
è	There are effective and functioning institutions that protect civil and political rights of citizens
è	Parliament has a control over government spending and income
è	Political system changes in an evolutionary way. There is NO revolutions, coups d`etat or serious political upheavals. Democratic institutions and political balance are too strong so this is impossible.

Examples of democratic states:
First democratic state, and only one example of democracy before the modern times was:
n	Roman Republic since 449 BC to more or less 133 BC
There was only one case when democracy had fallen. In modern times every country that become democratic stays democratic till now. Here are the oldest democracies in order of appearance: 
n	England since 1689 
n	Sweden since 1809 
n	Belgium (probably since 1830)
n	Netherlands, and Switzerland since 1848 (but Protestant cantons of Switzerland was democratic a few years before)
n	USA since 1865 (but New England states of USA was democratic since more or less 1780)
n	France since more or less 1875

Basic laws for political systems
There are many laws linked with political systems. Here are a few most important:
·	Democratic countries do not wage war against each other. (Best example is the war of 1812 between Great Britain, and USA when New England states of USA effectively did not wage war against Great Britain, and vice versa).
·	Moreover, democratic countries are often in one alliance during the war that are great threat to one of them.
·	Machiavellian politic tricks are effective in populistic state, and are not working in democratic state. Of course it not means that they are not used by politicians. People are free to make mistakes. It only means that this kind of tricks which are standard political techniques in the populistic system, are exceptions in democratic system. 
·	Because of stronger mechanisms of public control of the government, political scandals are more often observed in democratic countries - in populistic states most of them remains hidden. Watergate in USA becomes a scandal but the same time eavesdropping the opposition was a “standard procedure” in a country like for example Poland, Chile or USSR.
·	The “higher” is the country political system, the greater ability to expansion has that country. As a rule of thumb we can expect that feudal country could conquer lands with population from 0.5 to 1 times its population, populistic country could conquer lands with population from 3 to 4 times its population, and democratic country could conquer lands with population from 30 to 40 times its population. Then the country’s political system is starting to decompose. As you can see populistic system ability to expansion about 6 times exceeds feudal system ability to expansion, and democratic system ability to expansion about 10 times exceeds populistic system ability of expansion.

There are three basic reasons, why democratic system is more effective than populistic.
·	First, all important groups of citizens have real political laws, and thus they are protected from overexploitation by some other group of citizens. Democratic country works like an living organism, where all vital organs gains enough share of common resources to make organism work as effective as possible. Especially, there is no way in democratic system to create a situation when some part of community pays all cost of country policy (for example a war), and the other part gains all benefits of this policy.
·	Second, freedom of speech, and “the free market of opinions” usually protects democratic country from making major mistakes. 
·	And finally, there is a “positive selection” of politicians, so the political class of the democratic country (even it is hard to believe) is usually made of quite intelligent humans. Brainwashed fanatics, megalomaniacs that don’t see natural limits, or outright idiots are always a margin.
Similar argumentation we can use when comparing the efficiency of feudal system, and populistic system.

Differences between populistic system, and democratic system
First I have to mention that more than 50% countries that are commonly called “democratic” were (and are) really a “quasi-democratic” populistic states. Sometimes is very hard do differentiate real democratic country from quasi-democratic. So, here I present some flaws of quasi-democratic countries that help us to distinguish “quasi-democratic (really populistic) system from true democratic systerm.

First, and most important:
Quasi-democratic populistic states often have the same institutions as real democracy have: free election, officially independent courts, freedom of speech, civil rights. But they are not working (are not “active”), they are only printed on paper - so these guaranties really do not protect citizens, and political opposition from government abuses.

The best illustration could be this short political joke from Poland (popular when Poland was under communists rule, before 1989):
 - What is the difference between the Constitution of Poland, and the Constitution of USA? 
- Our Constitution guaranties the freedom of speech, and the Constitution of USA guaranties the freedom AFTER the speech.	

So, If we want test whether some country is really a democracy or acually a populistic state pretending to be a democracy, we have to look how the democratic institutions really work in that country. 

Here a list of a few, more common flaws of political system in quasi-democratic countries:
§	Government could have a special (usually secret) funds to buy votes in parliament
§	Voting districts could be intentionally constructed, so the ruling group (GPI) will always win 
§	Different social classes could have very different voting rights
§	Political opposition have no real opportunirty to control votes counting during elections
§	Opposition politicians or journalists are continuously killed or terrorized
§	Opposition politicians are blocked from public functions by the government using the administrative means
§	Opposition politicians are forced to emigrate
§	Parliament have no real control over the government finances
§	There is a group in parliament, we can call “swamp” (term taken from French history) that have no strong political backbone, and always votes in an opportunistic way. Usually according to the wishes of the power that is the strongest at the moment 
§	Government have financial control over all important mass-media
§	Government control all paper plants, and printing houses, and thus could threat the free press
§	Large groups of peoples could be financial-dependent from local oligarchs (it is the “political clientelism”), so they will always vote according to the wishes of their patrons
§	Government could control (position “our people” here) most courts, so courts will be not really independent, and courts' verdicts will be always against political opposition.
§	Discussion in parliament focuses on abstractive ideas like: “honor”, “national proud” or “imponderabilies”, not on real problems like a country budget 
§	All political life (i.e. for example political comments in mass-media, political alliances, political programs of major parties, etc.) are strongly saturated with ideology
§	Political parties have their own paramilitary organizations
§	Parliament is permanently threaten by political demonstrations organized by some political party or politicians
§	Parliament is permanently threaten with army or paramilitary organizations
§	Major political parties hates each other so much that can't cooperate at all (its a consequence of great role of ideologies in political life)
§	There is an extended political censorship 
etc.

Important note:
When populistic system changes to democratic system, there is often (especially in times of economic crisis) a few years long “intermediary period” when is hard to say if that particular country is yet a democracy or is still populistic.
Example: Spain is democracy since more or less 1976 but in 1979 an unit of Guardia Civil (Spanish gandarmerie) tried to take a rule over the country (as I said before coup d’etat is nearly impossible in a democratic country).

Tables

Here some tables showing dates of the beginning of populistic system (end of feudal system) in first column, and beginning of democratic system (end of populistic system) in second column. Third column shows how many years a country was populistic.
Some dates are presented as a ranges, because often a change of political system is a few years long process and a chain of small, gradual changes.
First table is an introduction, and shows some more important (or interesting) countries. Second and third are more complete, and show dates for many European, and Non-European countries respectively.

Table 1. The most important countries
Country	Start of  populistic system	Start of democratic system	How long that country was populistic	
England	1642	1689	50 years 	
Brazil	1821	1994	175 years	
China	1910	Estimated 2010	Estimated 100 years	
France	1789	1872-76	85 years	
Spain	1808-1812	1976	165 years	
Netherlands	1566 	1848	not applicable	
India	1947	1997-2000	50 years	
Iran	1898	1897-	100-105 years	
Japan	1868	1946-50	80 years	
Germany	do 1848	1945-48*	100 years	
Poland**	1791(1848)	1945-(81)-89	190 years	
Russia	1905	Estimated 2005	Estimated 100 years	
Switzerland	1291	1848	not applicable	
USA***	1776	1865	90 years	
Latin America countries****	1815-1825	1989-2004	175-185 years	
African countries****	1960	-	-	
* Without West Germany.
** Poland history (same as Czech, and Hungary) is little complicated, so I will not explain here that strange dates.
*** USA (same as Switzerland, and India) is a federal country. Some states (New England) was democratic probably in 1780, and some southern states becomes democratic in times of president Eisenhower.
****There are some regions where political evolution will go more or less the same way for each country in that region.

Table 2.  Table for Europe
Country	Start of populistic system	Start of democratic system	How long that country was populistic	
Austria 	1848	1948	100 years	
Belgium	1789*	1830*	40 years*	
Bulgaria	1878	1997	120 years	
Czech	1860*	1968-89	130 years	
Denmark	1849	1905	55 years	
England	1642	1689 	50 years	
Finland	1809	1941-45	135 years	
France	1789	1972-76	85 years	
Germany	1848	1948 West; 1953(89) East	100 years	
Greece	1821	1975	155 years	
Hungary	1848	1956-89	140 years	
Ireland	1921*	1973	55 years	
Italy	1848**	1943-45	100 years	
Netherlands	1566	1848	not applicable	
Norway	-	1905	-	
Poland	1791(1848)	1945-(81)-89	190 years	
Portugal	1820	1974	155 years	
Romania	1848	1989-97	145 years	
Russia	1905	Estimated 2005	-	
Serbia	1878*	2000	130 years	
Spain	1808-181210	1976	165 years	
Sweden	1719	1809	90 years	
Switzerland	1291	1848	not applicable	
Ukraine	1905	2003-	100 years	
* I could be wrong here.
** Whole peninsula, some Italian countries (city-states) were populistic since XIth century. 	

Table 3. Table for the World
Country	Start of populistic system	Start of democratic system	How long that country was populistic	
Afghanistan	1840	2001-	160 years	
Algeria	1955	-	-	
Argentina	1816	1989	175 years	
Brazil	1821	1994	175 years	
Chile	1817	1989	175 years	
China	1910	Estimated 2010	-	
Egypt	1882	-	-	
Ethiopia	1890	1995-2002*	105 years	
Philippines	1898	1986	85 years	
India	1947	1997-2000	50 years	
Indonesia	1945	1997-2000	55 years	
Iran	1898	1997-	105 years	
Israel**	-	1948	-	
Japan	1868	1946-50	80 years	
Colombia	1819 	1997-2003	185 years	
South Korea	1895*	1995	100 years	
Mexico	1821	1994(98)	175 years	
Nigeria	1960	-	-	
Pakistan	1947	-	-	
Peru	1822	2000	180 years	
South Africa	1881***	1991-1994	110 years	
Syria	1944	-	-	
Thailand	1868* 	1995*	125 years	
Taiwan	1910	1995	85 years	
Turkey	1909	1995-2002	90 years	
USA	1776	1865	90 years	
Vietnam	1945	-	-	
Venezuela	1810-20	2003-	195 years	
* I could be wrong here.
** There is possible that some countries that were the colonies of democratic country have no populistic period at all. Other examples are: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway.  
*** Oranje (Orange), and Transvaal. 

Maps

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Maps courtesy of <a href="http://www.theodora.com/maps">www.theodora.com/maps</a> used with permission. 
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Here, in a chronological order I would like to present a few maps that shows political systems of different countries at various moments of history.

If you are looking for historical maps, you can find useful links in The World History Rewritten section. Plus here is the link to Historical Atlas of XXth Century. http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/20centry.htm It is useful to compare classification of political systems in this Atlas with the classification shown below. And then to read again classification of political system I propose.	

Here is the basic legend for the maps: 
·	YELLOW indicates feudal system 
·	RED indicates populistic system 
·	BLUE indicates democratic system 
·	WHITE means "no reasonable data" or "no country" (pre-feudal barbarian lands). 
·	GREEN means that there is very hard to determine political status, because of the dependent status of green-marked countries. 
Map shows today's borders to simplify overall pattern for those of readers who are not accustomed to historical maps and are little schematic (look at eastern border of Poland on the map of Europe, it looks rather strange), as most of the maps form www.theodora.com/maps <http://www.theodora.com/maps> are. 
There could be some mistakes in classification, but (I hope) only a few. 
First map presents the first ancient civilizations
[map]
As you can see, firsts civilizations were feudal like Egypt and China, or populistic like Sumer civilization, Minoan civilization, Mohenjo-Daro & Harappa civilization (probably), and Majan civilization. 
·	Brown arrows indicate the major directions of expansion of populistic civilizations 
·	Blue arrows shows migrations of the Indo-European tribes launched  (probably) by the expansion and fall of Minoan civilization 
Important note: civilizations presented here are not contemporary, especially American civilizations are about 2000 years younger than civilizations of the Old World 
Here is a map of Mediterranean region during Greek colonization (850 - 450 BC)
[map]

·	Red arrows indicates directions of Greek city-states expansion. 
·	Blue arrows indicates directions of Phoenician city-states expansion. 
·	Gray arrow indicates directions of Etruscan city-states expansion. 
·	Green arrows shows expansion of the Celtic tribes launched by the fall (crisis) of Etruscan city-states. 
·	Orange is used to mark Macedonia that was feudal state but in times of Philip II (father of Alexander the Great, about 360 BC) became populistic. 
And now the map of Roman Empire at the end of the democratic period
[map]
 
·	Dark blue color indicates the city-state of Rome (the core of the empire). 
·	Light blue color indicates all the countries conquered or incorporated by Rome before 133 BC. 
·	And many neighbouring feudal countries marked yellow were clients or allies of Rome. 
Next map show populistic Roman Empire at the peak of its power
[map]
i.e. end of IInd century AD.
·	Red indicates populistic lands inside of the borders of Roman Empire (generally Italy nad Greece were the core of Empire). 
·	Orange indicates feudal lands ruled by Rome. 
Dusk of the Medieval dawn of the Renaissance
[map]
In the Medieval Ages most of the countries (except periodically populistic Byzantine Empire, and some Italian city-states) were feudal states, so next maps shows Europe in XV century. 
There were few populistic states in northern Italy, populistic Switzerland Union, and one big populistic country: Turkey that was just about to build a great empire (the Osman Empire - red border show its conqueries in the middle of XVth century). Plus there were some populistic free cities in northern Europe. It is important to note that this map is little simplified, and some populistic countries should be drawn as the Republic of the Great Novogorod (in northern Russia) was: a small red populistic city-state, and lands conquered by that state marked using a red border line. 
Orange indicates Bohemia that was populistic for a short period (since the Hussites heresy, about 1419-1436). 
I am not sure about the political system of Portugal in XVth century.  	

Next map shows Europe in the second half of the XVII century (1642-1689)
[map]
There were only a few populistic states (but they are larger than former city-states): England (since The English Revolution, more or less 1642), Netherlands, Switzerland, and city-states of the Northern Italy (that had fallen into stagnation because of trade route shift at the beginning of XVI century - a concequence of great discoveries). Turkey (Ottoman Empire) was no longer populistic, because large conquered territories launched diffusion process that turned Turkey back into feudal state. The most powerful populistic state were Netherlands. 
Map of the XVIII century Europe (before the Great French Revolution)
[map]
This map looks almost the same as previous one, but there is one important change: England after the Splendid Revolution (1689) became the first democratic country (in modern times), and therefore is marked blue. 
New agricultural technologies, and "industrial revolution" at the end of XVIIIth century allows cities to grow ever bigger than before, so since then all changes of political systems are irreversible (we can no more observe situation when democratic system turns back to populistic or populistic country turns back to feudal). 
And here is the World in 1845 
[map]
This map shows the World after The Great French Revolution (1789) that made France a populistic country, and national revolutions in Latin America (1815-1830). But just before the Spring of Nations (1848) when most of the Central European Countries (ex. Germany, Austria, and Southern Italy) become populistic. There were only a three democratic countries these tmes: Great Britain, Sweden, and (probably) Belgium. Plus two federal countries which were partially democratic, and partially populistic: Switzerland and USA (generally. southern states and frontier states were populistic). 
There were some feudal countries in Africa but I have not enough data to draw their borders, so these states are not marked here. 
Next map shows the World in 1875
[map]
There were a few new democratic countries: Netherlands, Switzerland (both since 1848), USA (since 1865) and French (after the war with Germany that was ended in 1871). One relatively new (since 1868), and important populistic country is Japan. Countries marked brown in Balkans are just going to become independent populistic countries. 
Here the World before the First World War
[map]
Three big populistic states (Russia 1905, Turkey 1909, and China 1910) destroyed the balance between democratic, and populistic countries. Furthermore the end of colonial expansion (including USA expansion) made wars relatively more profitable option for great non-democratic powers, so the World War was unevitable. 
I have no data to determine status of some Arabic countries, so they are marked white. 
Since 1911 there were no more independent, feudal countries. I will use orange to mark populistic countries that are changing to democratic system. 
 
Now there is a map of Europe after the Second World War
[map]
After the Second World War a few new democratic countries appeared in Europe: Germany, Italy, Austria, and Finland. 
Poland was marked orange because it could become democratic (after 1944) but Soviet Union domination freezes the political changes for a few decades. The same happens to other Central European countries: West Germany (after 1953), Hungary (after 1956), and Czechoslovakia (after 1968). I should mention here that I have a little problem with the classification of political system of Czech (Bohemia) between World Wars (1919-1939).
And map of the World after the Second World War
[map]
You propably noticed two more democratic countries: Japan, and Israel, and there were several new populistic countries in the Middle East, in East Asia, and of course India (the biggest of them). 
World in 1963
[map]
Then came the end of European colonial domination in Africa (except a few Portuguese colonies), so I should present the map of World in 1963. 
Since then there are (probably) no more feudal countries.

Here is the map of Europe in 1978
[map]
In the middle of 70-ties a few populistic countries in Europe became democratic (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland). It was a prelude to more dramatic political changes that will start after 1989. 
After the 1989 we can observe probably the greatest changes in the World history. Several dozens of countries which were populistic become democratic (and this process continues). Before 1989 only about 850 millions of people lived in democratic countries (about 15% of the World population). Today in democratic countries live about 3000 millions of people (over 50% of the World population). Below a few maps illustrating these changes. Of course, I was not able to trace situation in all countries of the World, so there could be some mistakes, especially in classification of African, and Central American countries. 

Here the first map documenting these changes
[map] 
Europe in 1992 (after the fall of Soviet Union). Compare that picture with the map above. 
And the World in 1992
[map]
As you can see, there are several new democratic countries, mainly in Central Europe, and Latin America. A few countries: Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand became democratic in South East Asia. An of course South Africa in the very south end of Africa. 
Next map shows the World in 1997 (the year of the Asian Crisis)
[map]
In 1997 most of the Central European and Latin America countries were democratic (or have been started to change into a democratic system). And we can't of course forget about some countries like: Indonesia, Iran, and (the most important) India, which started to change to a democratic states more or less that year. I have marked orange Turkey, but here (similarly like ex. in South Korea or Brasilia) the process of changes was very gradual, so there is hard to point out when a democratic system begins. 
World at the beginning of XXI century (2000/2001)
[map]
End of the millennium deserves a separate map.
And finally, map of the World today (2003)
[map]
In a very short time we could expect that a few other countries will become democratic. For sure Russia, and maybe some countries from Middle East, and southern coast of Mediterranean Sea. I have marked these countries with yellow dots. And there is a slight chance that I am mistaken about Iraqi.
All maps here were prepared before July 2003. But the first five maps were little corrected when I was writing "General  History Rewritten". 

Political strength of a single human or institution
The useful tool that helps understand historical processes is a political strength of a man (human). Every person that is involved in some market (or market-like) transaction with other member of the community, gets some political strength. 

Capital-owners get some political strength when they are offering capital, labour-workers get some strength when they sell they work, consumers get some strength when they are buying goods, shop-owners when they are selling goods, traders when they make transactions, managers when they manage the factories or corporations, and government bureaucrats when they administrate the country’s resources.

Political strength is higher when demand for the “things” that a man offers is high, and is lower when that demand is low. So, sometimes merchants or capital-owners could have a great political strength, but another time labour workers or government administrators will have greater political strength.

When someone is not involved in market transactions of any kind, he (or she) have no political strength.
Therefore, poor peasants that consumes most of the food produced on their farms have a very low political strenght. Similarly, women before XX century had very low political strength, because they were overloaded by household work, and had almost no contact with market.

Remember - political strength is only a theoretical construct (like ex. energy in physics) that helps to understand internal distribution of political power in human communities (like country) and the pattern of political alliances. 

Groups of Political Interests (GPI)
When a group of people have common political interests, they form Group of Political Interests (GPI). Because groups of political interests could be very variable, and sometimes are only temporary alliances, I don’t use here a term social class. Using the concept of political strength, and having a basic knowledge about current economic situation, and historical processes, we can estimate future strength of each GPI that will be present on the political scene of particular country. 

As you can see now, the political system is not really a function of urbanization of the country, but rather a function of percentage of citizens involved in market exchange.

However cities are high organized systems, where people are involved in many market transactions, and even the poorest city-dwellers have to buy food, and some other goods. In consequence, differences in political strength between the rich, and the poor city-dwellers are not so great, and could be neutralized by the mass character of organizations that represents political interests of poor people. So cities "helps" higher political systems.

On the other hand, farmers could be easily pushed down to the status of peasants (which not sell anything on the market) in the times of crisis, and then easily dominated by the great land-owners.

But I have seen countries that became democratic when there was a little more than 30% of city-dwellers, and countries that became democratic when they have over 70% of city-dwellers (average is about 50% of city-dwellers for democratic system and about 30% of city-dwellers for the populistic system). 

Laws for History

Here I present only the very basic laws. More detailed concepts and models (with historical examples) will be presented in The World History Rewritten section (list of topics).

In times of growth people tend to cooperate, in times of crisis people tend to fight with each other
It is a trivial observation but its consequences are not always obvious for historians, and economists.
When we have period of economic growth, people are eager to cooperate, conflicts are rare, and problems are solved in peaceful ways. People looks like they were good, and rational-acting beings.
When we have economic crisis, economy, and politics is a “zero-sum game” (or niegative-sum game), so there are much more conflicts, which are solved with more brutal methods. We can expect strikes, revolutions, wars, and “irrational” ideologies. People looks like they were bad, and irrational-acting beings.

When we are analyzing history (or economy) of “good times”, we can use scientific tools that assume the people are good, and will tend to cooperate. Good example of that kind of tools is the liberal economy, especially free-market theories.
When we are analyzing history (or economy) of “bad times” we should use scientific tools that assume the people are bad, unhonest and the history is driven by conflicts. Examples of such theories could be: game theory, Marxism (with its “class struggle”), or the monopoly theory, and other economic theories that describe flaws of free market.

If we forget this basic truth, we could repeat the mistake of Nicolo Machiavelli, who believed that only unhonest (“dirty”) strategies are effective in politics. Or opposite, we could repeat the mistake of young Winston Churchill, who had prophesied (as a young journalist at the beginning of XXth century) that democracy and liberal economy soon dominate the whole World.  

This rule is a consequence of very simple economic mechanism: When the economy is in the phase of growth, the middle-income citizens (for simplicity middle class) grow in number and wealth and thus in political strength. When the economy is in the crisis phase, the group of middle-income citiziens shrinks, and opposite GPIs from the left wing and right wing of political scene (conflicted with each other) grow in strength. Economic mechanism responsible for destroying the group of middle-income citizens is very similar as in polarization effect, which destroys the economic prosperity of middle-income countries (described in more detail on the economics tools page, when I will write about flaws of the comparative advantage theory). 

Now you can see, why the observation that was made by Alexis de Tocqueville:
Revolution usually happens when the crisis comes after the phase of growth is true. 
When the country ruled by a privileged GPI (group of political interests) is in the phase of growth, the middle-income citizens (which have no political rights at all or have very limited political rights) grow in strength. When the crisis comes, the dominant GPI usually tries to increase the rate of exploitation of other citizens. In a self-defense middle-income citizens can (if they are strong enough) made an alliance with low-income citizens group and made a successful revolution.

Of course, if the crisis not come (or middle-class is strong like in democratic system), the changes in political system will be gradual (system will be developing in an evolutionary way).
The Law of Connected Vessels
It is the law formulated by polish historian Pawel Jasienica.
When a country with higher-developed political institutions conquers (or unites with) a country that have less-developed political institutions, institutions in the first country starts to degenerate ad institutions in the less-developed country start to develop until “political levels” in both countries will become almost equal.
The reasons are economic and will be explained in more detail later.

Expansion and fall cycle in states before the industrial revolution 
Every feudal state goes (sometimes many times) through specific life-cycle: 
1.	Expansion, and a phase economic growth, 
2.	Decline, because of diffusion processes launched by conquered lands.
3.	Final fall - country breaks into a few smaller countries or is completely conquered by barbarians or some other country, or civil war changes the ruling GPI.
4.	Eventual rebirth. After the crisis a new phase of economic growth begins, country unites, and the cycle starts from the beginning. (Technology level are little higher than at the beginning of previous cycle).

Here a short description of social mechanics that stands behind this cycle:

There are basically tree most important GPIs in feudal states:
·	Soldiers faction. Nobles who want to increase their wealth using military ways, by conquering or plundering some other country.
·	Priests faction. Nobles who wants to increase their wealth by increasing the rate of exploitation of local peasant (or introduce new, more effective methods of production).
·	Planters faction. Nobles who want to increase their wealth by selling their products abroad (usually to some richer country).
·	Plus there are merchants. They are usually have no political rights, but sometimes could be an important ally for factions mentioned above.

Depending on situation, one of these faction is the strongest, and dictates the policy of the country. When planters are on the top, we can see so-called “noble democracy” - a feudal state (only nobles have political rights) with some elements of parliamentarism (ex. England, Hungary, Poland) - but it is a very rare case. When priests are on the top, we can see a religion driven state, often with great religious buildings (like cathedrals or pyramids). When soldiers are on the top, the feudal country is expansionistic, and tries to conquer its neighbours.

Usually the most effective (most profitable) way to increase wealth of dominating nobles is a military expansion, so feudal country tries to conquer the weakest of his neighbours. At the beginning, that kind of “government investment” is quite profitable. New conquered countries give a monarch extra lands that he could use to revard his warriors, officials and supporters, and opens new markets for local traders. Until the volume of the long-range internal trade (ie. trade between different provinces of kingdom) is high, country is united, because profits from trade makes stronger these GPIs that are interested in unity of the country. Long range trade is a glue that keeps different provinces together.

Then, after the long growth, comes the slow economic fall. There are numerous causes of such crisis. Maybe too many conquered lands consume to many military resources of the country. Maybe too intensive exploitation of natural resources makes country vulnerable to natural disasters. Maybe long-range trade becomes less profitable because differences in wealth levels between provinces became smaller. Maybe the reason is the shift of trade routes because of some external processes.

As a result the volume of the long-range internal trade loses its power to glue country together, and local feudal lords grow in power (in comparison with the monarch). Eventually that process disunites the country into several (or even hundreds of) pieces - feudal domains.

Crisis in a relatively rich country makes some economic problems to their neigbours too. If that country trades goods with some barbarian tribes (or some other country with lower income), population, wealth, and technology level of these tribes increases rapidly when the rich country is in expansion phase. When the crisis comes, rich country would try to protect its trade balance using numerous protective means: its merchants will start buy little less goods, dictate lower prices or try to find other barbarian tribes that could sell the same goods cheaper. In consequence that middle-income barbarian tribes suffers from poverty because their “export” drastically decreases (see “polarization effect”). 

In consequence, a war becomes a very good alternative for these barbarian tribes: they are well equipped, and numerous, and have no other option to protect their social status. Moreover army of the rich country is quite weak because of economic crisis. So, we can observe a great nomadic expansion and migration. Middle-income tribes attacks (and in most cases conquer) the rich country, and also some low-income barbarian tribes in their neighbourhood.

Country falls under the rule of barbarians (or some times a middle-income country), and the cycle starts from the beginning. (But barbarian lands join the civilized states.) As you can see, great barbarian empires (like Mongol or Arabian) emerge because of the weakness of conquered feudal countries.

Of course this is only one of many possible paths of this rise-and-fall cycle. Depending on GPI which rules the feudal country (warriors, priests or planters), and many other factors, the schema of growth, and fall could be little different. Actually there are probably at least a two dozens variants of this rise-and-fall cycle. 

„The Peninsula Schema” 
When countries exists in a relatively open geographic region, and borders with many barbarian countries, its overall development is rather slow. Feudal countries go through many cycles of expansion and fall, and size of civilized (non-barbarian) area increases rather slowly. 

But when several countries are bundled together in a relatively enclosed peninsula-like region, and this region have some natural internal borders like mountains, forests, swamps, then theschema of historical evolution  is a little different. (These borders prevent any singular country from permanently conquering or dominating the whole region - because there are many equally strong sub-regions that have very different economical interests.)

In such region there are several countries with comparable strength competing with each other. Even when one country grows in power, its neighbours immediately made an alliance to bring that country down. Countries have very little place to expand, so economic falls (and thus political regressions) caused by immoderate expansion are not so deep. Costs of war increase dramatically, because there is no longer “easy prey” in close surroundings (every new military discovery is very quickly implemented by neighbours). So, the alternative ways of increasing country wealth like trade, technology development an investments become relatively more profitable (we can construct curves illustrating what is the best choice for a country: war, trade expansion, technology-intensive investments, etc. - or to be more precise: what is the best choice for GPIs that rule the country - using similar curves like in the theory of utility in economics).

For all those reasons technology development speeds up, and volume of trade grows. Technology development (especially in agriculture) helps cities to grow, and trade growth gives cities economic reason to growth (cities become important centers of trade exchange). So, we can observe appearance of first populistic city-states (like Sparta, Corinth and Athens in Ancient Greece, or Venetia, Milano anf Genoa in Medieval Italy). And their appearance makes technology, and trade development even faster.

Expansion of these city-states, and diffusion of new technologies imported by other (feudal) states on “peninsula”, eventually make all counties on peninsula populistic. And there is a chance that after some time one of populistic countries eventually become democratic - which makes technology development even faster.

We can observe the peninsula schema a few times in history: in Ancient Greece, in Medieval Italy, in Modern Europe, and in XV-XVIII centuries in India. (But before the southern parts of India subcontinent - for example Kerala - could evolve into populistic states, whole region was colonized by Europeans.)

Populistic system can also evolve in a country on an island that is located at the crossroads of important trade routes, and have limited ability to expansion (You should remember that overseas military expansion is much more costly than land expansion, because of logistic reasons, so all alternative methods of increasing the island country’s wealth are more profitable). Good examples of that kind of countries could be Ancient Minoan Crete or modern England and Japan.

Economics Tools

Classifications and rules presented here are only subtle modifications of modern theory of economics, so is good to study at least the basic theory of microeconomics, macroeconomics and international trade to better understand the Mechanics of History.

Few links to online resources about economics: 
Lectures on economics at Digital Economist http://www.digitaleconomist.com/dar.html Lectures on Economics and Game Theory by William King http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/eco/game/game-toc.html International Trade Theory http://internationalecon.com/v1.0/toc.html History of Economic Thought http://homepage.newschool.edu/%7Ehet/home.htm Library of Economics http://www.econlib.org/library/classics.html	

There are two kinds of economic crisis: overproduction crisis, and stagflation crisis
Basically there are two kinds of economic crisis:

The stagflation crisis (or underproduction crisis) is the final effect of government-stimulated growth (or the war, which is no more that a special kind of government investment). 
Just before the crisis (in the hidden phase) we can observe: shortage of goods,  government regulation of the market (like rationing coupons or fixed prices), and the black market. These are signals of the increasing market unbalance.
When the crisis starts (in the evident phase) we can observe: unemployment, decline of the production, and inflation (or even hyperinflation), because publicity no longer believe in money offered by the government.

The overproduction crisis (or deflation crisis) is the final effect of growth stimulated by private financial institutions (like banks or investment funds). 
Just before the crisis (in the hidden phase) we can observe: rocketing increase of prices on the stock market, and a periodical increase of inflation. These are signals of the increasing market unbalance.
When the crisis starts (in the evident phase) we can observe: sharp fall of the stock prices, unemployment, decline of the production, problems with selling goods (overproduction), and thus deflation.

Of course in the real world things are more complicated, and sometimes crisis is some combination of two basic kinds of crises mentioned above.
For example: when a country with government-stimulated economy borrows money from an external and free financial market (i.e. from abroad financial institutions abroad), the crisis usually begins with a drastic fall of the national currency (Mexican crisis of 1994 is a good example here). The reasons for the crisis are the same like in stagflation crisis but the course of the crisis resembles rather an overproduction crisis - because of free financial markets involved. 

There are two basic economic strategies for countries: free trade, and protectionism 
As there are two kinds of economic crisis, the same way there are two dominating economic strategies for a country. When most of the countries choose one of these two strategies, we can say that this trade strategy (economic schemas or phases) dominates in the world economy: 

When economic growth in most of the countries is stimulated by private financial institutions, we can say that the World economy (or economy of a region) is in the free trade phase. Less-developed countries are financing their economic growth from external resources (usually using capital from high-developed countries). We observe, usually short, overproduction crises, that easily propagate from one country to another, so crisis usually affects the whole world or large region.

When economic growth in most of the countries is stimulated by government, we can say that the World (or a region) economy is in the phase of protectionism. Countries are financing their growth from internal resources (like country savings). We observe, usually long (sometimes even a hundred years long) stagflation crises, that in most cases affect only one or a few countries.

Chronology of free trade (liberal periods), and protectionism periods:

Because for most of the history war was the most effective way to increase country wealth, the human history is generally the history of protectionism, and government-stimulated economy. There were only a short periods of time, when the trade was profitable enough to support “liberal” economy. Good example could be the Greek colonization in the Mediterranean region in ancient times. Moreover before the age of great geographic discoveries, there was no true global market but many local trade zones. Also, economic data are very fragmentary, so I start this simplified classification from the XVIth century.

After the 1500 AD, thanks to technology advances and global trade, liberal periods are longer:
è	In XVIth century there was a stagflation-like crisis (price revolution), as an side-effect of government spendings of Spanish Monarchy, and economic stagnation in Mediterranean region (because of trade routes shift). 
è	In the first half of XVIIth century Netherlands promoted a free trade policy (with great fall on tulip market - a classic example of overproduction crisis).
è	The end of XVIIth century and most of XVIIIth century was the age of protectionism (and domination of mercantilism).
è	There was a short period of liberal economy between 1776-1789, ended with the Great French Revolution, and wars waged by France.
è	Years of 1820(30) -1929 were the age of liberal economy (laissez-faire) and the free trade. There were many short overproduction crises (more or less every 10 years).
è	Years of 1934 -1972 were the age of protectionism (domination of keynesism, substitution of import, etc.), ended with the stagflation crisis in 1973.
è	Since 1982 till know we observe a beginning of new free trade period (globalization).

Of course this is very simplified classification. Starts and ends of each period of protectionism and free trade were different for different countries (example South Sea Bubble [http://www.stock-market-crash.net/southsea.htm] - stock market crisis in Great Britain when European economies were generally government driven), and some countries were outside the main cycle. 	

Free trade schema is more effective, but high-developed countries must have enough capital to support this schema. 

There will be no economic growth without the virtual money
Exact mathematical proof could be quite long, so here is a short (very simplified) descriptive substantiation:

As every economist know, there is a closed circulation of money in a country economy: Firms pays households for means of production (as work, capital, knowledge), and then households are buying goods and services from firms paying with money earned before.
Lets try to build an simple example: there is only one factory manufacturing 100 cars a month, and all people work in this factory. Let say that this factory gains a new technology, and is able to increase production to 150 cars. But we have a problem. Households have money only to buy 100 cars (money earned last month), so if the factory increase its production, it will gain exactly the same amount of money as for 100 cars a month before. So, board of directors will see no reason to increase production. An thus there will be no economic growth...
see Virtual money, descriptive explanation

Solution of this problem are the virtual money. Money that are completely fictional, taken from nowhere. Money to buy that extra 50 cars. Using a metaphor, we can say that the virtual money are borrowed from the future (I mean: we are hoping that our GDP grows,  and we will be able to repay our debts). Simple speaking virtual money are nothing more than a credit. 

There are two basic ways to generate virtual money: 
·	Government could print some paper (fiat) money (or spoil the metal coins), spending more money that gains from taxes, and thereby borrowing money from citizens. In this case growth is government-stimulated.
·	Financial institutions like for example banks could lend more money that they have deposits or give credit too easy. In this case growth is stimulated by financial institutions (government could help here with low interest rates).

Which of those stimulation is better? It depends. 
But there will be no economic growth without any stimulation (or the growth will be slow).
And sometimes because of other factors, no mater as strong, and well-constructed it is, none of methods  of economic stimulation is effective. 

And moreover, this is a very simplified classification of methods used to produce virtual money. Some others include: credit cards, stock market options (and other derivatives), overvalued national currency rate, etc.

Basic scheme of economic crisis 
At the beginning, when economy is in growth phase, growth is financed using virtual money. (Today’s debtors are borrowing money that have to repay tomorrow.) When the base for the economic growth is firm, debts made today will be repaid without any problem in the next period from the new, bigger GDP (income). Volume of virtual money is matching the expected future growth of income quite good (compare with the model of rational expectations).

But sometimes the parameters of economic environment (and thus the conditions for economic growth) could change in an unpredictable way. There are many reasons for these changes, but generally speaking most of them spring from politics, and political changes, or from changes in the volume of available resources. 

When the change happens, such a high rate of growth, (as we expected before the change) will be no longer possible. However because of virtual money, there are debts that were made, when the expected rate of growth was higher. Because of natural inertia of political, and economic institutions, the rate of growth is still high for a some period of time, but it creates an extra cost of rapidly increasing debt. Publicity still believe in the virtual money. We can observe some symptoms of increasing market unbalance. This is the hidden phase of crisis.

Then comes a shock. It could be some unpredictable event or even a gossip. Publicity loses its belief in virtual money. This launches a rapid fall of prices of money, assets or goods, whose prices were partially created by the virtual money. We can observe a great fall of stock market prices, rapid fall of national currency value (inflation, and even hyperinflation) or rapid changes of currency exchange rates (when the growth was stimulated by money borrowed abroad).

Then comes the crisis - because the possible rate of growth is lower than before - and even the recession - because of the debt, that must be repaid. When debts are repaid, or reduced by some political means, and there are natural conditions for growth, the crisis ends. 

Wealth redistribution between high income and low income countries
When we have “rich”, and “poor” country, then under normal conditions there will be a continuous diffusion of wealth from the “rich” country to the “poor” country. Levels of wealth in both countries will equalize to finally end at more or less the same level.
This is the economy counterpart of the Law of Connected Vessels presented before.

Rate of this diffusion of wealth will be faster when:
·	Gap between the income levels of “rich” and “poor” country (measured for example as GDP per capita) is greater 
·	Diffusion channel (i.e. volume of trade, and capital flows, etc.) between two countries is wider

However there are a few important reservations, we must consider here:
·	Protectionism makes the diffusion channel “narrower”, and thus could slow down the diffusion rate.
·	According to the Solow’s Model, the final barrier for economic growth is technology level of the country.
http://www.digitaleconomist.com/cap_4020.html
Solow’s model consequences
Ø	When the level of technology in a country is constant, there is a point where economy stimulation will have no effect, because costs of the stimulation will be greater than the resulting increase of wealth. Only way to increase the country’s wealth in long run is to increase its technology level.
Ø	A country with low technology level could be under the stronger “diffusion pressure” (i.e. could be relatively richer), than a country that have nominally bigger GDP, but with higher technology level.

So, if we have one country with higher political system (which speed up technology development), and a country with lower political system, and government of both countries believe in protectionism, the technological gap, and thus the wealth gap between these countries may increase. Even when diffusion forces are still working. 

But under normal conditions, the diffusion powers are the main reason, why economy stimulation is sometimes ineffective. And because of them, no matter what the government will do, the country’s economy will stagnate or even fall into recession. 

Important conclusion is that the rate of economic growth depends strongly from its neighbourhood. If a small, poor country borders with a big, rich country, it will develop very fast. If a rich country borders with many quite large (i.e. very populated) poor countries, its economy will probably stagnate or even decrease - because of diffusion powers.

Four major flaws of the Comparative Advantage Theory
The Comparative Advantage Theory is the model used by economists to explain, why the free trade is more effective than protectionism. It is generally true, but there are cases when it will not work. Here are three major weakness of that theory:

*** First, it ignores merchants transporting goods from one country to another. The Comparative Advantage Theory assumes that merchants gain no profit, and have no ability to control prices in both countries to maximize their revenues. It is very dangerous assumption, especially when merchants from one country monopolize international trade. Everyone interested in history, knows that many wars were waged only to gain a privileged position in international trade.
 
*** Second, according to the Comparative Advantage Theory, large country (i.e. country with large market share) could maximize its profits manipulating the prices (natural ability of a big market-player). Under the normal conditions it does not matter, because free trade (for both large, and small country) will be still more profitable than protectionism. 
But when the World economy is shrinking (it is in crisis phase), it could be very important, how large is a market share (and thus profits from international trade) of each country, because both the large and the small country have debts to pay (see the description of economic crisis above).
 
*** Third weakness is the Polarization effect. The Comparative Advantage Theory is true only when the number of traded goods is GREATER than the number of countries participating in international trade. If this number is smaller, one (or more) countries will not be able to sell any product on the world market (see Polarization effect, descriptive explanation).
Normally this is not a problem, because the number of tradable goods is almost always much larger than the number of countries. But when the global economy is in the crisis phase, protectionist efforts of rich, and poor countries, taken to prevent their global market shares (see above), will form two large groups of goods: capital-intensive plus capitals (sold by rich countries), and labour-intensive (sold by poor countries). In consequence the middle-income countries will have serious problems with selling their products on the global market (there are 3 groups of countries but only 2 groups of goods). So, their economic situation may become critical, and this could effect in political chaos.

This effect is for example responsible for Argentina trade problems in 1997-2002. Polarization have also an impact on political balance inside country - could destroy the prosperity and political power of middle-class (more or less the same way as described above: no one want to buy goods and services sold by middle income-citizens). Social processes launched by the polarization effect are responsible for most of barbarian expansions in medieval and ancient times, and also for the expansion of France in times of Napoleon, or for NSDAP (Adolf Hitler’s party)  successes in elections in Germany. 

*** And Fourth and most important : The Comparative Advantage Theory DO NOT PROVES that a country, where the prices of all goods are higher, will export any of these goods to the country where prices of all goods are lower. In this case we have to take into consideration another, special kind of goods: money. A very rich country will have comparative advantage AT MONEY, and will be exporting money (either as “pure money” - it means will have a negative trade balance - or as a capital). In other words: we cannot use relative prices in economic models of trade exchange.

Why the free market is better?
Here some most important advantages of the free market in comparison to government-regulated economy:

Advantages of free market
Ø	Competition eliminates the weakest, and most ineffective firms.
Ø	Line of control (distance) between capital-owners, and people, who use capital to production is shorter, so it is easier to control if the capital is used in a reasonable way (i.e. is not wasted or stolen). 
As you can see, great private company with monopolist position on the market could be the same way ineffective, as government owned companies are. On the other hand government-owned companies that have to compete on a free market could be very effective.
Ø	Small firms are exploring economic opportunities that are too expensive for large companies.
Ø	Diffusion of new technologies, and scientific knowledge is faster.
Ø	Time of reaction to unpredictable external events is shorter, and the economy faster revives after external shocks.

Disadvantages of free market
Ø	Transaction costs are higher than in government regulated market.
Ø	Market companies tends to ignore external costs that they generate for the common environment. 

Protectionist advantage of government-regulated market
When the tax rate is very high (and taxes are progressive), and government generally buys goods manufactured in the national economy, that policy will have an extra protectionist effect, because it lowers tendency to import. (Money that normally could be spend by the richer citizens on goods imported from abroad, now will be spend on goods manufactured in our country.) 

Protectionism makes diffusion channel narrower, thus slowing the technology diffusion between rich, and poor countries. 

Government-stimulated economy could lead to overexploitation of natural resources and thus could be very vulnerable to catastrophic natural disasters. 

Government-regulated works like a monopoly, and thus could give a country all advantages of scale. It is especially important in some sorts of economic activities like for example: export of natural resources or waging a war.

Reassuming:
Government-regulated economy has all strength and weakness that a monopoly has. Usually is less effective than a free-market economy, but not always. Argumentation that free-market is always more effective than a government-stimulated economy is like proving, that Microsoft has no advantage over smaller computer firms.

Laws for science and technology development
Here, a few basic laws that are explaining the rate of scientific, and technology development:
·	The higher are expenditures for science the higher is the rate of development (well, its a very trivial law).
·	The higher is the volume of gathered knowledge, the faster it increases. Science evolves in geometric progression (warning: this is a simplification, obvious when you think of the math behind).
·	Rate of science, and technology development is faster in every higher political system (i.e. it is faster in populistic system than in feudal system, and faster in democratic system than in both two other systems).
·	During the free market (liberal) periods the rate of science, and technology development is faster than during the periods of protectionism. 
·	When the country made a transition from government-regulated economy to free-market economy, we can observe a “scientific evolution” which is a consequence of practical implementation of theoretical knowledge gathered before (i.e. during protectionism period). That was the reason for “industrial revolution” in England in late XVIIIth century, and “computer & Internet revolution” in USA in last two decades of XXth century. 

Virtual money, descriptive explanation

If the short description of the concept of virtual money is not enough for you, here is a more descriptive explanation (with illustrative pictures).

Let’s start from the beginning i.e. from the Say’s Law (Jean Baptiste Say was the French economists from the beginning of XIXth century). According to this law:

The total amount of money in economy will be always equal to the total amount of goods and services sold. In other words: "Supply creates its own demand" - all money people have earned will be spent for manufactured goods and services, even treasured money (i.e. saved for future) will be eventually spent. Therefore the aggregate supply will be always equal the aggregate demand. So, in a free market economy will be no such phenomena like: oversupply, underconsumption, overproduction...

Here is the graphical illustration of this law (probably the first illustration in every Macroeconomics book):

There is a closed circulation of money and goods in the country economy:
[picture]

Consumers (households) are earning money selling means of production they have (i.e. labour, capital) and spend whole money on goods and serviced sold by firms. Firms are earning money from selling production, and spending the whole income on means of production.

There are two problems wits Say’s law:
·	First, it must have some flaw, because we can for time to time observe overproduction, underconsumption, inflation and other examples of situations, when supply of goods do not equals with supply of money.
·	Second, all contradictory explanations (like for example explanation given by Keynes) are very weak and are not explaining what is wrong with Say’s law. 

So, If we want to understand economic crises, we first have to understand, why Say’s law is not true. 
Let’s add the time to our schema of money circulation in economy:

Circulation of money in economy with timeline taken into account 
[picture]

This schema of circulation looks better, because this time the stream of money doesn’t look like snake eating his own tail. We can see that the money does not have a quantum nature, and could not be present in two places the same time. Money paid by firms (and spent by households) doesn’t come from nowhere, but have to be earned in antecedent period and the same is true for money spent by firms - they have to be earned before they are spent (even if that mean only one or two seconds before). Still everything is okay - the supply equals the demand. But the economy is stagnated - there is no economic growth at all. Let see what will happen, if we have economic growth:

Circulation of money in economy with timeline and economic growth 
[picture]

This time the country’s national product (ex. gross national product, GNP) increases - this is represented by increasing sizes of Households and Firms squares.
But the volume of money earned in antecedent period (blue arrows) is too small to buy all the goods and services produced in next period. Without some extra money, economic growth will be damped down by the undersupply of money.
So, the extra money are needed (marked with red arrows). Money that was not earned in antecedent period, and are taken from nowhere - the virtual money.  

The virtual money are really a kind of magic trick (or accountancy trick). They have no real value, they was not earned by selling some real good or service - simply someone spends more money than he (or she or institution) really has. Publicity (other market players) accepts this extra spendings because they believe that a player (I will call him debtor), who offers virtual money is solvent. To be more precise: they believe that the future growth of income will allow debtor to repay the debt (i.e. repay virtual money).

So, the virtual money is really the debt or the money borrowed from the future. And have value only when we have economic growth. If the rate of growth is not as high as the publicity (and debtors) expected, the virtual money will became worthless. 

Virtual money can be created using any kind of money:
·	Can be created in bank, when the bank lends more money than have deposits.
·	Can be created by the government, when government prints some fiat money or “paper money”.
·	Can be created by monarch, when he mints coins that have smaller percentage of precious metals than the monarch states.
·	Can be created by a corporation, when firm sells bonds or stocks.
·	Can be created by the government selling government bonds.
·	Can be created by households (ordinary people), when they make debts using credit cards, or borrow money from banks, or take mortgage credit.
·	Can be created by the government, when government revaluates national currency to make easier borrowing money from abroad (and then repaying external debt).
etc.

Virtual money is only a small part of the particular “kind of money” inside which virtual money was created (small part of fiat money, small part of coin value, or stocks value). But when the crisis comes and the publicity loses belief in virtual money, the whole kind of money loses its value - its price falls. So, we can observe a spectacular fall on market (an effect of the collapse of value): 
·	People go to the bank to take their money away and the bank bankrupts. 
·	Price of fiat money falls and high inflation (or even hyper-inflation) starts.
·	We can observe a rapid fall on the stock market.
·	The national currency rapidly depreciates.
   
To recapitulate:
1. There will be no economic growth without some reasonable amount of virtual money - i.e. without some economic stimulation. 
2. Generally the reason for crisis is almost always the previous growth. Or to be more precise, some unexpected change in economic environment that slows down the rate of economic growth (or starts the recession) and thus causes problems with repaying debts taken in antecedent periods. There are many possible reasons for this kind of changes in the economic environment:
·	Some natural disaster
·	Political changes in neighbouring state
·	Change of economic policy in neighbouring state
·	Important shift of trade routes
·	Some changes in size of neighbouring economies or volumes and directions of market flows (the South-Asia crisis of 1997 is a good example here)

Of course, some times (especially in ancient times) great natural disasters like flood, plague, or drought could be only one reason for crisis, and these times we don’t need the concept of virtual money to explain the crisis.

To simplify the whole pattern you should know that, generally speaking, there are three most important ways to create virtual money:
1. Expansive fiscal policy of government - when economy is government-stimulated.
2. Expansive actions of private firms and financial institutions - when free market (laissez-faire economy) dominates.
3. Too highly revaluated national currency (or “over-valued”) - when the poor country borrows money from abroad.  

But of course there are a hundred and one ways to create virtual money. Recalling the first picture presented here - we can complicate it a little, and add a few more players:

Money circulation in economy, advanced schema
[picture] 
We have added the government, financial institutions (banks, stock market, etc.) and the abroad. And marked the money flows between all players. Virtual money can be created on any of these flows: ex. between financial institutions and households (like credit cards). And we can still add more players. Moreover, economy could be concurrently stimulated with two or more types of virtual money. I hope this picture clarifies, why the reasons for economic crises are so complicated.

Three elements that wasn’t mentioned here:

1. First there are other methods to create additional supply of money without using the virtual money. 

If you recall the Fischer’s Equation of Money, which states that the price level in economy and the velocity of money are also important factors for the money supply: 

The Fischer’s Equation of Money: P ´ Q = M ´ V where: P = the current price level (the implicit price deflator of GNP) Q = the current level of output (real GNP) M  = the current money supply V = the velocity of money (the number of times each banknote or coin is spent each year)	

You can easy notice that the higher velocity of money circulation also increases the money supply. This was the reason for inventing: the credit, coins, banks, paper money, stock market, derivates, internet transactions, etc. 

2. Second - I skipped here the diffusion of wealth from richer countries to poorer ones. This diffusion is one of the most important reasons for economic crises and economic growth.

3. Third - one of consequences of the virtual money is that no one economic equation is absolutely true, because most equations describe the static economy only. 
 
-----
Clarification
Model of virtual money presented here is (using the words of Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart) no more than “a lie for children” - i.e. is a simplification needed to present this concept to unprepared reader.

I have assumed here that prices are not changing (see Fischer’s Equation of Money above), because models with the changing prices are much more complicated. A careful analyze of models with changing prices proves that the economic growth without the virtual money is sometimes possible, and the reasons for virtual money are more sophisticated than I stated here.

Remember: the virtual money are not the reason for economic growth, and creating a stream of “unreal money” will not start the economic prosperity. Virtual money are only a tool that makes possible to consume (or to be precise to consume faster) the increase of productivity, which is an effect of some real factor like discovering new technologies, new mineral resources, or new countries to conquer, etc. 

Polarization effect, descriptive explanation

Here, I will try to explain why the Comparative Advantage Theory not works, when the number of goods are lower than the number of countries. Let’s see the simplest comparative advantage model as it was presented by David Ricardo (British economist from the beginning of XIXth century, models used today are more sophisticated, but they are still based on David Ricardo assumptions and premises).

Let’s assume that we have two countries: Antigua (A) and Barbuda (B), which produce and trade two goods: avocado (A) and bananas (B). On Antigua prices are high: banana costs 100 $ and an avocado 200 $. On Barbuda prices are lover: an avocado costs 100 $ and a banana costs 10 $. Moreover, let’s assume (as Ricardo did) that prices are money-neutral, so we can use relative prices (i.e. not nominal - in dollars - but we will measure the price of one good using the number pieces of another good, you can buy for it - this is a very dangerous assumption, scroll down for explanation). On Antigua we can buy one avocado for two bananas (avocado is relatively cheap, bananas are relatively costly). And on Barbuda we can buy one avocado for ten bananas (avocado is relatively costly and bananas are relatively cheap).

A merchant from Antigua who have one avocado can buy 2 bananas here on Antigua but also can go to Barbuda, and sell the same avocado for 10 bananas, then go back to Antigua, and sell bananas to buy 5 avocados, then go to Barbuda again...

[picture] Comparative advantage at work

The merchant goes richer and richer, and everything started from one avocado. Moreover, citizens of Antigua will consume more bananas and citizens of Barbuda will consume more avocado than without a trade. Everybody is happy, and the most important observation: international trade is profitable, even if prices of both goods are much higher on Antigua than on Barbuda.  And that was Ricardo’s point. 

Warning: there is a major mistake in this reasoning, see below.	

Now let see, what will happen if we add a third country - Montserrat (M) - but we do not add a third good that can be traded (there is no mango). On Montserrat island prices are medium (intermediate): an avocado costs 160 $ and a banana 40 $ (we can buy 1 avocado for 4 bananas).

And what our merchant with one avocado will do this time? Will he go to Montserrat to buy 4 bananas and go back to Antigua to sell these bananas for 2 avocados? Or will he go straight to Barbuda, where the relative prices are better? The same is true for a merchant from Barbuda. She will not try to sell bananas on Montserrat, if she can get better prices on Antigua.

[picture] A country eliminated from international trade 

As you can see, when the number of traded goods is lower than the number of countries, it is pretty possible that a country with intermediate relative prices will be completely excluded from international trade. I did not write that the country will be always excluded, because there are at least two little exceptions here. See frames below.

First: When the demand in a rich country is very high and neither the poor and the middle-income country alone can’t satisfy demand in the rich country, then the middle-income country is not eliminated from trade by polarization effect. So, the volume of export and import also matters.	

Second: Prices in the international trade aren’t stable and can be manipulated. If the trade itself gives the country’s merchants great profits (net profit from buying at lower prices in one country and selling at higher prices in another), merchants sometimes could manipulate prices to increase the volume of trade. Even if the “bare” trade balance of their country will be negative, the net profit from trade (when we add the income of merchants) could be positive.	

What is the polarization effect?
Usually the number of traded goods is much more higher than the number of countries. But when the global economy shrinks, every country take some protectionist measures to make its comparative advantage (relative prices) better. It is unavoidable, because every country has some debts - money borrowed when the global economy was growing - that have to be repaid (see also virtual money).

Rich countries take efforts to make the export of capital-intensive goods (or the capital, which is an important element of their export) relatively more profitable and try to make import of labour-intensive goods less profitable. Poor countries take the opposite strategy: promote the export of labour-intensive goods and try to protect its economies against the import capital-intensive goods. Middle-income countries have these times very serious problems, because their export rapidly shrinks. Moreover, middle income country couldn’t take any of those two strategies described above, because right-winged GPIs (groups of political interests), which are interested in “capital-intensive” strategy have almost the same political strength like left-winged GPIs, which are interested in “labour-intensive” strategy. 

A side-effect of this polarization of international trade is a very deep crisis in middle-income countries and therefore very serious social conflicts. Not only the polarization effect launches the economic crises in middle income countries but also a very similar “internal” polarization effect destroys the economic prosperity and safety of middle-income citizens (internal demand for their work, services, and goods thy manufacture, also shrinks). The best examples for democratic countries are the Argentina collapse (2001) or crisis in France (1934). True democratic country survives polarization crisis but in populistic countries these times a quasi-democratic system changes into true dictatorship (or authoritarian, or totalitarian system)  — good example is the history of Germany, Austria, Poland, Spain, Hungary and Latin America between two World Wars (1919-1939).

Here is the picture showing the normal distribution of goods (plus capital) in the international trade. Vertical axis represents the net income from export (revenue minus costs) of different goods. Horizontal axis orders goods from capital-intensive (right) to labour-intensive (left).

[picture] Distribution of goods in the international trade in times of prosperity 

Middle-income countries have a privileged position. The reason is all traded goods usually have the normal distribution (statistic term) - i.e. the group of medium goods (with more or less the same costs of labour and capital used to produce them) is most numerous.

And here is another picture, this time showing the “polarization effect”. Now traded goods forms two large “mountains”, and the number of medium goods rapidly shrinks. Number of traded goods do not decrease but they form two groups (capital-intensive and labour-intensive) and the effect is more or less the same as we had only two traded goods - so middle income countries suffer.

[picture] Distribution of goods in the international trade in times of crisis

The "top" of the "mountain curve" is

The most typical protectionistic measures take are:
·	The increase of interest rates (for rich countries to increase the income from capital) 
·	The devaluation of national currency (for poor countries to increase the income from labor-intensive goods) 

Again, middle-income countries have problem to chose the right protectionist strategy, because supporters of right-winged strategy (high interest rates, strong national currency, low taxes, reduction of government spendings, especially social spendings) and supporters of left-winged strategy (devaluation of national currency, expansive fiscal economic policy, protection of social spendings) have almost equal political strength. When crisis lasts for a few years, debt of middle-income country increases because of export problems. Eventually we can observe very serious crisis like Argentina collapse (of course institutional weaknesses, and corruption inside government mattered too). 

But there are many other protectionistic measures possible: trade duties, more intensive exploitation of labour workers, etc. Moreover there are many variants of the polarization effect. When the top of the mountain (normal distribution of goods) is little shifted - i.e. is over capital-intensive goods or labour intensive goods (not over medium goods) - then the polarization crisis, and protectionistic measures taken may be different. And the crisis may affect middle income countries at different times, depending on their position on X (horizontal) axis. This explains (for example) different variants of oppressive populistic systems that evolved in Italy, Japan, Spain, Germany, Poland and other Central European or Latin America countries between 1919 and 1939.

Major flaw of the Comparative Advantage Theory

Please look carefully at the first (“Ricardo”) example. We actually have really three goods here: avocado, bananas and money. If you look closely, you will find that Antigua really have the comparative advantage in money - money are cheap and fruits (avocado and bananas) are costly. On the other hand, on Barbuda money are costly and fruits are cheap. No one merchant will be so stupid to transport avocados bought on Antigua for 200$ and try to sell these avocados for 100$ on Barbuda, if he could simply buy avocados for 100$ on Barbuda, and sell for 200$ on Antigua. As you can see, Barbuda will export both kind of fruits and Antigua will export the third good - money. 

So, the comparative advantage theory is actually no more than a David Ricardo’s mistake. I feel little ashamed that I haven’t spot that before (i.e. before 23 Aug 2003), and knowledge that for nearly 200 years no one of thousands economists found that, doesn’t help.

Exception: Ricardo’s model of Comparative Advantage could still work in case of internal exchange inside the monopoly (for example when some country monopolizes the international trade).	

Of course rich countries still can export goods to poor countries, but the reasons for that are different (i.e. export is not the effect of comparative advantage as classic model describes it):
·	rich countries are exporting “bare” money, like precious metals
·	rich countries are exporting capital
·	rich countries are exporting goods that could not be manufactured in other countries because of the lover technology level (like advanced software)
·	rich countries could export trade and financial services (like insurance, transport, etc.)
·	rich country could export “international currency service” (like USA exporting dollars)
·	If the prices are not much higher, goods could be exported to the country where the prices are little lower, because without the international trade local market in the second country could be dominated by some local monopoly (and thus without the trade, prices here would be higher, not lower).

Taking all these reservations into account I have to say that the real mechanism of the polarization effect is little more complicated than presented above. But the real mechanism is not very different. The most important thing to remember is that in case of very rich income countries, raising of interest rates could be a way to protect their trade balance.

--------------
Comparative Advantage in money - consequences 

Knowing that a very rich country have a comparative advantage in money - not in any “normal” good - we have to make three reservations about economic models derived from the Comparative Advantage Theory:
1.	When analyzing trade exchange in a model with two goods we can’t use relative prices and have to use absolute prices.

2.	Model with relative prices and two goods will be applicable only for analysis of natural trade exchange (i.e. before the invention of money).

3.	Or one of two analyzed goods (when we consider relative prices) have to be money.

These precautions apply to all economic models explaining the trade. For example to the Edgeworth box - when analyzing a trade exchange between two countries that trade two different goods, we have to use three‑dimensional Edgeworth box (one dimension for each of two goods and one for money). Moreover, even the three-dimensional Edgeworth box will not give us unambiguous answer when there are more than two countries!

Rich country usually exports money in one of three forms:
·	As the pure money - rich country has a negative trade balance (its supplies of precious metals or currency reserves will shrink)
·	As the capital - country lends some money to governments or firms from abroad, gaining some extra income from interest rates.
·	As the international currency service (like US Dollars today, British Pound in XIXth century, Florence or Venetia coins in Renaissance), gaining this way some extra income. 

We can formulate a quick-and-dirty law: 
§	When a income from exporting capital and international currency service is higher than an outflow of pure money, a very rich country will promote (even using military ways) a free trade.
§	When a income from exporting capital and international currency service is lower than an outflow of pure money, a very rich country will take some protectionist measures (duties, subsidies, increase of interest rates, etc.).

Increase of interest rates have two effects:
§	Increases the income from exporting capital
§	Increases the costs of capital-intensive goods production. So, it works against all countries which are specialized in exporting capital-intensive goods and importing capital - i.e. some middle-income countries (like Argentina 1997-2001).

Devaluation of national currencies launched by poor countries will have a similar, but not exactly symmetric effect (like polarization picture above may suggest).

Of course, these effects appear only when a very rich country is so important supplier of capital, so can enforce (dictate) the prices of capital  - i.e. interest rates. Moreover, we have to remember that some times interest rates are increased because of some actions taken by countries borrowing capital (like nationalization of property of foreign investors), or simply because of falls on world stock markets (when overproduction crisis comes). These times effects mentioned above are simply side-effects and increase of interest rates is not intended to be a tool of a protectionist trade policy.

As you can see, free trade is not always profitable for every player in international market. This is mostly because of diffusion powers (reason for protectionism in rich countries) and because of political factors (trade policy that is best for the country is not always the best choice for ruling GPI - i.e. ruling group of political interests). But generally we can assume that free trade is rationale in times of prosperity, and protectionism may be rationale policy in times of global economic crisis. 

Polarization effect, quick summary: 

1.	When the overproduction crisis comes (i.e. after the series of falls on world stock markets, usually starting from emerging markets), rich countries increase interest rates to protect their income from abroad investments. 
2.	When the price of capital increases, poor countries devaluate their currencies to increase income from exporting labour-intensive goods, and this way compensate higher costs of credit.
3.	Therefore middle-income countries (which imports capital and specialize in exporting labour-intensive goods to rich countries and capital-intensive goods to poor countries) face serious problems with their trade balance. It is the reason for fierce political conflicts between left-winged GPIs and right-winged GPI, especially in populistic countries.

This is true when world economy is in a free trade phase. Polarization crisis for a protectionist economy will be little different. Mechanism of crisis is not exactly symmetric, because economy of capital is little different than economy of labour. Although some protectionist strategies may look similar: ex. nationalization of foreign capital investments in countries exporting labour-intensive goods and deportation of immigrants in countries exporting of capital. Capital usually has a privileged position because it have to be accumulated again and again (I will explain this in The World History Rewritten section). 

And a final note: probably I should completely rewritten that page when I found the major mistake in the comparative advantage theory, and make text under the horizontal line an integral part of this explanation, but science develops thorough mistakes and only half-true answers, so I decided to present you one of mines. Both elements mentioned here (problem of trade when the number of goods is smaller than the number of countries and comparative advantage at money) are important when we try to understand periodical trade problems of middle-income countries (ex. Argentina collapse 2001).

Chronology of the theory

1990 (Nov-Feb) 	Classification: three political systems
1991 (Autumn)		End of the work on classification after the elimination of some initial mistakes
1991/1992 		Definition of the “political strength”, and GPI
1993 (May-Jun) 	Two kinds of crisis: stagflation, and overproduction crises
1992-94 		The Law of Connected Vessels, and logistic problems
1995 (Feb) 		Protectionism, and free trade schemas
1995 (Spring) 		Virtual money, and time-shift of the market balance
1998-2000 		Social processes launched by economic crises
2001 (Dec) 		The Polarization Effect, and other flaws of the Comparative Advantage Theory

Contact with author
To contact with author you should send e-mail to one of following addresses:
amber@terramil.pl
slawekd@chomiczowka.net.pl
holygraal@pf.pl
birthright@pf.pl

And please, write in plain English. That will speed my answer.

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Cost of that investment are very low and potential benefits could be quite reasonable:
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Rules of quotation
You can freely quote any part of this work if you
a)	put the link (http://www.geocities.com/historymech/) to this page at the beginning of quotation
b)	put the name of the author (Slawek Dzieniszewski) at the beginning of quoted fragment
You should also remember that maps presented here are taken from page (http://www.theodora.com/maps/), and if you want to use them you should follow the rules of quotation, you can find on page (http://www.theodora.com/maps/mapuse.html).

Rules of scientific thinking

Paweł Jasienica
Paweł (Paul) Jasienica is the pen-name of Leon Lech Beynar (November 10, 1909 - August 19, 1970), a Polish amateur historian. He was born in Simbirsk in Russia as a son of Poles: Mikołaj (Nicholas) and Helena (Helen) Maliszewski. His father was a Russian official. Until the Russian Revolution of 1917 he lived with his family in Russia and the Ukraine. After the Revolution Beynar's family returned to Poland (1920). Leon Beynar a was soldier of the Polish army during the Polish Campaign at the beginning of World War II (September 1939). After the fall of Poland, he was a soldier of the Polish underground resistance army AK (Armia Krajowa - Army in Country) fighting against the Germans. Following the war he a was a member of resistance organization WiN (Wolność i Niepodległość, Freedom and Independence) fighting against the Soviets and Polish communists under the command of Major Zygmunt Szendzielarz (called "Łupaszka"). He took his pseudonym from the name of the place where he had received treatment. Then as a civilian, he worked as a journalist and writer. He was famous for condemning nationalism and for his personal civil courage. There are numerous anecdotes about how he was congratulated for his courage by the censors. These acts led to his being labeled a political dissident, for which he suffered government persecution.

Piast Poland 
History of Poland, Xth-XIVth centuries (Piast dynasty)

Jagiellonian Poland
History of Poland, XVth-XVIth centuries (Jagiellonian dynasty)

The Commonwealth of Both Nations, vol. I : 
The Silver Age
The Commonwealth of Both Nations, vol. II: 
Calamity of the Realm 
The Commonwealth of Both Nations, vol. III: 
A Tale of Agony
History of Poland, 1572-1795 (elected kings and "feudal republic")
Most important as a background for thesis presented here.
Translated by Alexander Jordan.

 Thought on Civil War - theoretically about Civil War in France, Bretony 
History of brutally pacified guerilla against revolutionary government of France (1793). Really not in Bretony but in Vendée (region south from Nantes).

Based on Wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pawel_Jasienica

Some of his books you can find at
 <http://www.alibris.com/search/search.cfm>http://www.ampolinstitute.org/
http://www.alibris.com/search/search.cfm

Simplified pronunciation some of Polish letters: Ł = English W (or L) SZ = English SH W = English V CH = English KH Ś = English very short SH' (more or less) Ć = English very short TSCH' (more or less) J = English Y like in („key”) I = English EE or E Y = English Y (like in „lynch”) Generally Polish vowels E, A, I, O, U and Y have different length than English vowels (English vowels have irregular length, on the other hand Polish vowels, the same as in German, Italian or Spanish, have stable length), and thus could be represented using different vowel every time. So (more or less): Paweł Jasienica = Pav-aw Ya-see-nee-tsa  Leon Lech Beynar = Leon Lekh Beynar Mikołaj (Nicholas) = Mee-koh-way Maliszewski = Ma-lee-shav-skee Łupaszka = Woo-pash-kah Wolność i Niepodległość = Vol-no-sh'tch' e Nye-pod-leg-wosh'tch'	

Why Ancient Athens democracy was not really a democracy?

Here a list of few (most important) reasons:
·	Government of Athens was very often changed, by coup d`etat. Especially in times of the Peloponnesian War.
·	There was plenty of political lawsuits. Many opposition politicians was forced to leave Athens or killed based on very doubtful evidences.
·	Meeting of all citizens (Ecclesia) was no more than a crowd (or mob) that was easy to control by some skillful demagogue: the number of people was to great for conducting typical responsibilities of parliament: creating law (legislation), and controlling the government or state administration. Few thousand of people couldn’t work effectively to conduct those responsibilities. Costs of communication between members of such a large group are to high.
·	In real democratic country there is no need for institution like “ostracism”. Democratic system is too strong to have such “special protections” against ambitious politicians. Ostracism was the easy way to eliminate from politics those of Athenian politicians, who were dangerous for a people that had power, and ruled Athens.
·	There was no strong, and stable “political parties” like plebeians, and patricians in Rome, but many relatively unstable groups of interests built around charismatic leaders.  
·	Procedures of election to other Athens institutions (like Aeropagus, Heliaia), and their competencies was very often unclear (so there was a chance to political manipulations) or outright promoted some group of citizens (but I am not going to describe all their flaws because election procedures, and competencies were changed many times).
·	City state of Athens was responsible for many war crimes - Athens soldiers many times were ordered to murder all men in a country (and to sell women, and children as a slaves). That kind of “holocaust” was a kind of standard in wars waged by Athens.
·	And at last but not least: If Athens city-state had been really democratic, there would be a second empire like a Roman Empire in a eastern part of Mediterranean Sea. Athens would not loose war against Sparta. Real democratic system is too effective. 
It is also good to compare some Athenian politicians (like Pericles) speeches with the ones of modern dictators for example Mussolini or Castro. They contains plenty rhetorical tricks used to turn listeners to speaker side, but a very few facts related to current problems of the country. 

Political evolution of Ancient Rome

Ancient Rome was the first democratic state, and also the only one case when democracy had fallen. So there would be advisable to present its political evolution.
·	First, Rome was feudal state. Probably Rome was an important exporter of crops to Etruscan city-states, and thus noble families have some political privileges under the rule of a few last Etruscan kings. It is very likely that kingdom of Rome was another example of “feudal democracy”, but I have only clues here.
·	About 509 B.C. last king Tarquinius Superbus (Tarquinius the Proud) was defeated by revolution, and Rome started to be populistic republic. These times emerged the two major political powers patricians, and plebeians that fought with each others sometimes using very “dirty” methods. Generally these times Rome was ruled by patricians or some dictators.
·	About 499 B.C. there was the Second Secession, when plebeians went out of the city, and refuse to fight in wars conducted by patrician government. The effect of that  strike was “Lex dudecim tabularum” (the Laws of Twelve Tables) - the special law codex that regulated political system of Rome, and organized Rome law system, thus protecting plebeians against patricians abusing poorer citizens thanks to unclear law regulations that have been used before.
·	Since then Rome was democracy with two strong political parties: plebeians, and patricians which have very balanced power. Political system was a little complicated but guaranteed good control over state officials. An effect of democracy was very stable expansion of Rome. About 133 B.C. this small city-state ruled or dominated almost all lands in the Mediterranean region.
·	In 133 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, and many of his political partisans were killed by his opponents. Since then political murder started to be an accepted tool in politics, so we can use this date as the end of democratic system an the beginning of populistic system. Roman democracy had fallen because of the too many conquered countries. Extra income from conquered countries made the richest citizens even more richer, and thus gave them extra political strength. And the agrarian crisis destroyed Roman “middle-class”. Finally, after the civil war in 90-89 B.C. all Roman allies in Italy became Roman citizens. As you can see, democracy in Rome have fallen a few decades before Julius Caesar.
·	From 133 B.C to more or less end of II century A.D. Roman Empire was an populistic country. These times Roman Empire had no reasonable opponents, so continued expansion as long as it was possible.
·	At the end of II century A.D. diffusion powers launched another crisis that made Roman Empire an feudal country. The final element of this fall was the edict of emperor Caracalla (212 A.D.), that gave citizens rights all free people who lived in the Empire.
·	Since then till the final fall, the Roman Empire was an feudal country.