NB : These notes are the
first draft and will be updated. EVERYTHING that will be on these notes -- even
after updating -- will have been covered in at least one of the three following
ways:
(a) In lessons
(b) On worksheets handed out
(c) In the textbook -- you
are expected to have undertaken the reading
SECTION 1 : LOUIS AND THE NOBILITY
NOTE : SECTION A CONTAINS NOTES; SECTION B A MODEL ESSAY
SECTION A : THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CROWN AND
NOBILITY
The Crown had certain
advantages. The French were a monarchically-minded nation. They equated the
state with the crown. People remembered the chaos and bloodshed of the
sixteenth century religious wars, when the crown was weak. Far better that
the crown should be strong. The French people’s reverence for their king
was rooted in history and myth. No French king had ever been deposed.
Even nobles recognised that
it was best to remain in the royal favour. The king was the most influential
source of patronage. Promotion not only at court but in the armed forces,
the government and the church was in his gift. He was the fount of money and
power. Rank, status, privilege were his to bestow. Even the most prestigious
nobleman knew that in the last resort he was dependent on the king’s
favour, for the royal nod could make or break him. Needless to say these
impressive powers could rebound disastrously on an unwise ruler. An
insecure, unapproachable king could alienate his nobles – Louis XIII’s
misfortune. But a flexible, gregarious, self-confident monarch such as Louis
XIV demonstrated what a strong hand the king had if only he knew how to play
it. In any case – however inept the royal wielder of patronage and power
– the potential was there, and everybody knew it. When it came to
promotion the king was indispensable.
It used to be believed that
from Henri IV onwards the crown progressed from abject subordination to the
nobles through conflict to ultimate triumph. Indeed Richelieu was forced to
fight and win battles against France’s great nobles, Mazarin was forced to
flee during a noble rebellion and Louis XIV certainly dominated his nobles.
But recent research has shown that apparent conflict between crown and
nobility ended in compromise rather than royal victory and it was punctuated
throughout with mutually profitable arrangements and alliances. For most of
the time monarch and aristocracy recognised that they had far more to lose
than to gain from confrontation. Certainly in Bourbon times co-operation
between the two was the norm and not the exception.
Kings and nobles shared
same backgrounds, privileges and prejudices. Even Richelieu, often seen as
the hammer of the nobility, was a nobleman, keen to promote the welfare of
his own relations through advantageous marriages with other noble families.
The last thing such a man desires was the degradation of the nobility. The
fact is that seventeenth century France was not dominated by conflict
between crown and nobility but by in-fighting involving patronage and
clientage. Both at the centre and in the provinces society was hierarchical,
revolving round rival, aristocratically-dominated factions. Great interest
groups thrived or withered depending on the manipulative skill of
highly-placed patrons and the loyal support of their clients. Subordinate
only to the king, the leaders of aristocratic society were the greatest
patrons. Such men were provincial governors, army commanders, archbishops,
royal ministers. Their time would be divided between attendance at court and
involvement in local politics. A nobleman’s clients would expect him to
procure the king’s approval for their schemes where this was necessary; so
he had to know his way round court. Similarly the government would expect a
nobleman to defend the king’s interests in his locality; therefore he
would need to keep an eye on local affairs.
In addition to nobles who
inherited their titles (nobles of the sword), there were the nobles of the
robe (men elevated to nobility). Faction between two groups escalated under
Bourbons. First, the kings increasingly used latter nobles in high office
– a practice intensely resented by sword nobility. Secondly, while
inflation made a nobleman’s life-style harder to maintain, recently
ennobled merchants and financiers were able to afford it more comfortably
than an impoverished noble of the sword.
The nobility also resented
any interference in their traditional rights and practices. Gentlemen
settled disputes between themselves by fighting duels but the king and his
ministers saw this as lawless action. Richelieu, whose elder brother was
killed in a duel, felt especially strongly that this practice should stop,
but some members of the nobility were prepared to go to the scaffold to
defend their right to duel. The nobility resented Richelieu’s alternative
method of settling disputes, that is to say, the law.
The nobility also resented
the increasing use of sale of office. Even the posts of secretaries of state
had to be bought. The system arose from the crown’s need for cash. When
Richelieu came to power France contained about 40,000 office-holders all of
whom had bought their positions; by the time of Mazarin’s death there were
60,000. These posts were invariably bought by wealthy merchants rather than
by the impoverished ancient nobility.
UNDER LOUIS XIV (1643-1715)
1 – CARDINAL MAZARIN AND THE FRONDES, 1643-61
Louis XIII was determined
that his despised wife should not rule France and set up regency council to
include Gaston, Conde, the senior prince of the blood, Anne and four
ministers -- decisions were to be taken by majority vote. Four days later it
was announced that Louis XIV wished only his mother to rule and she became
sole regent.
Anne made Mazarin chief
minister and dealt with her rivals. Conde was sent off to the wars, whilst
Gaston was fobbed off with resounding titles like Lieutenant General of the
Kingdom.
Between 1648 and 1653
France was disrupted by the revolts and disturbances known as the Fronde.
The Fronde was the most dangerous challenge to royal authority between the
Wars of Religion and the French Revolution.
The Frondes were caused by
resentment against Mazarin as chief minister and the system whereby the
chief minister monopolised power and patronage to the exclusion of the
aristocracy. In 1643-4 indignant and self-regarding aristocrats, denied both
power at the centre of the state and provincial governorships, plotted
Mazarin's assassination. Their attempted coup, known as l'affaire des
importants, was led by the duc de Beaufort, the son of Vendome. The
revolt failed because spies found out about it. Judicious arrests proved
that Mazrin could protect his own back. Nevertheless the importants
served notice that high-born Frenchmen would not accept their exclusion from
office. Beaufort escaped from prison four years later to play a leading part
in the Frondes.
Resentment grew as a result
of the continuation of the war, the ever-increasing taxes, Anne's own
high-handedness, and the monopoly of power held by Mazarin.
In 1648 Mazarin made the
fatreful mistake of attempting to arrest the leaders of the criticisms. The
Fronde began. Mazarin merely turned the leaders of the coalition into heroes
and martyrs, and the situation was exploited by Mazrin's aristocratic
enemies.
It has been customary to
distinguish between the Fronde Parlementaire (August 1648-March 1649) and
the Fronde des Princes (January 1650 - February 1653), but in reality the
aristocracy were involved in the revolt in the autumn of 1648.
During the first Fronde --
led principally by magistrates and the parlements -- nobles fought on both
sides. Conde returned to command the royal army, whilst nobles such as
Beaufort and Conti fought for the rebels. Eventually a compromise was
reached. The nobles who had fought for the Parlement and who expected
promotions to be extracted from the regent were indignant. Beaufort, for
example, wanted to be governor of Brittany. They felt betrayed.
Mazarin continued to make
mistakes. Unrest continued across France. Mazarin and Anne had two
alternatives : form a coalition with the Frondeurs or play the various
factions off against each other. They chose the latter. Conde had fought for
the Crown and saved Paris but had been angered about his treatment
afterwards. He was an arrogant and ambitious man and Mazarin decided to
destroy him. After a secret pact had been negotiated with Gaston and the
Frondeurs in 1650 Mazarin arrested Conde and two other nobles on a charge of
treason. Mazarin hoped to follow up this coup by defeating Conde's armies
and capturing his provincial strongholds. He hoped that this display of
authority would restore the regime's credibility and overawe its enemies.
Historians generally agree
that Mazarin had to move against Conde if he wished to remain chief
minister. Orest Ranum writes : "It was either arrest the princes or
totally capitulate to Conde and give him control of the Council of State and
the power to appoint governors". But the arrest of Conde generated
sympathy for him and public opinion turned against Mazarin and Anne.
Conde's supporters took to
their arms. Conde exercised vast powers of patronage. People who lived on
his estates, garrison commanders in the provinces which he controlled,
clergy who owed their promotions to him, magistrates and lesser officials
who were his creatures -- all rallied to his cause. It was an impressive
demonstration of the patron-client relationship.
Initially the tide went
Mazarin's way and he defeated the rebel army, but his victory generated
fear. Gaston became jealous and Parlement alarmed at how Mazarin would now
act -- would further arrests follow? Gaston joined the noble rebels and
Parlement petitioned for the release of the princes and the dismissal of
Mazarin. Mazarin was forced to capitulate and went into exile. The princes
returned to Paris in triumph.
There followed nine months
of anarchy. Conde managed to alienate virtually everyone with his
high-handed attitude. Then on 7 September 1651 Louis XIV came of age and
recalled Mazarin. Mazarin returned with a body guard of 6000 German
mercenaries.
Parlement protested about
Mazarin's return but Conde came to the government's rescue by alienating
everyone. He entered Paris and committed atrocities and set up a puppet
regime under Beaufort. Conde quarrelled with everyone, including Gaston and
the citizens of Paris. A few weeks later he left France to serve the king of
Spain. He was finished.
Mazarin tried to save the
day by going into exile again and allowing Louis to enter Paris in triumph.
Once the dust had settled he returned.
Whilst Louis XIV faced
great problems in 1661, potentially he was in a stronger position than his
predecessors had been. Over the preceding half-century significant victories
had been achieved against the forces of disruption. Time and time again the
nobles had been defeated, culminating in the failure of the aristocratic
Fronde. Late-medieval bastard-feudalism had succumbed to the early-modern
state. No longer could noblemen lead their own retainers or hijack royal
armies against the crown. Also the military reforms of Le Tellier under
Mazarin meant that the king now had a professional and loyal army, led by
his men rather than the aristocracy.
2 – LOUIS' PERSONAL RULE, 1661-1715
Louis set the tone for his
reign in 1661 by announcing he would be his own chief minister.
Under Louis nobody was a
member of the royal council by right. Louis summoned men whose opinions he
valued or whom he wished to honour. Louis copied Mazarin by excluding royal
princes, members of the high nobility and prominent churchmen.
It used to be believed that
Louis emasculated the French nobility, but this was largely due to the
negative view created by Saint-Simon.
It is certainly true that
with the single exception of one all of Louis' ministers were members of the
new nobility who had made their names as administrators. There
certainly was a spectacular increase in the numbers and influence of the
nobility of the robe during Louis XIV's reign -- a process intensely
resented by the ancient nobility of the sword.
It would, however, be wrong
to believe that Louis emasculated the nobility by confining them to
Versailles. For one thing the nobles who witnessed the king's levee or him
at Mass were but a fraction of the nation's ancient aristocracy. The court
only settled at Versailles in 1682; before that date there would have been
no room for droves of aristocrats as the king moved around his various
houses. Even after the move to Versailles only 4000 members of the nobility
at most could be accommodated in the cramped quarters; but there were about
100,000 aristocrats in France as a whole.
Life at Versailles involved
nobility in endless ceremony and ritual, all of it designed to emphasise the
majesty of Louis. The never-ending public ritual involved Louis and his
nobles in stringent rules of etiquette. It was an offence to turn your back
on even a portrait of the king and it was customary to take your hat off in
the presence of the king's dining table whether he was there or not.
Yet it would be wrong to
assume that Louis set out to destroy the nobility. In fact, involvement at
court was only one of the nobility of the sword's activities, for Louis XIV
welcomed their co-operation in the higher echelons of church and state.
Provincial governors were invariably noblemen. Military and naval commanders
were almost invariably noblemen. During Louis' reign there was an increase
in the proportion of aristocratic bishops. In the diplomatic service whilst
mere noblemen of the robe went as ambassadors to republics like Venice,
noblemen of the sword monopolised the embassies at the courts of
Louis' fellow monarchs, like London. So it is nonsense to suggest that the
French nobility were given no responsibility.
Louis was a champion of
nobility. He believed profoundly in the importance of rank, order and
deference. He enjoyed the company of men of birth, playing cards or
billiards with them, safe in the knowledge that they would not presume on
his condescension. The last thing which he wanted to do was to undermine the
prestige of the nobility or blur class distinctions.
Yet Louis did annoy some
ancient nobles by reinforcing a trend dating back to Henri IV, that of
creating a new aristocracy, the nobility of the robe. Although it was
socially subordinate to the nobility of the sword, it exercised influence in
government. The sword nobles looked askance at this process, objecting to
the very idea that these upstarts should be considered nobles at all.
Why then if he was such a
snob did Louis encourage this growth of the nobility of the robe, which was
such a marked feature of his reign? Why did he treat them with such respect,
vetoing for instance Colbert's wish to abolish the paulette? For two reasons
: he needed the robe nobility's services and he needed their money. Louis
preferred his ministers to be noblemen of the robe; because they were not
members of long-established families, they were dependent on his favour --
his 'creatures'. Furthermore, during his personal rule, both central and
local government became more bureaucratic and he needed more administrators.
Service of the Crown brought ennoblement. However, Louis ennobled far more
members of the wealthy bourgeoisie than he needed for royal administration.
These new-rich social climbers paid for the posts which the
Controller-General dreamed up, so desperate was the Crown for money. So
Louis' expensive foreign policy explains the rise of the robe nobility.
It was indeed a great life
for the nobles, both of the sword and of the robe. Both at court and in the
localities they dominated the social scene, basking in the envy of their
inferiors. For the most part they were rich enough. The sword nobility
monopolised the best jobs in Church and State apart from the royal
bureaucracy, where the robe nobility came into its own. Despite the rule
that they were not allowed to involve themselves in trade, the nobles were
well integrated into the complex spoils system of tax-collection. Not only
were they exempt from the payment of tax; many of them actually made
fortunes out of the exploitation of the poor who had to pay taxes.
Versailles fairly
represents the domination of France by the nobility. There was the fount of
patronage where nobles had to come in order to receive jobs, lands, money.
Not to be known at court could be fatal. From Versailles too went the orders
for the governing of France and her empire. Contrary to the traditional
picture, the recipients of these orders were as likely to be noblemen of the
sword as of the robe.
SECTION B : A MODEL ESSAY
HOW EFFECTIVELY DID THE
CROWN DEAL WITH THE NOBILITY UNDER LOUIS XIV?
It use to be believed that in 1589 the Crown was totally
subordinate to the nobility and that, during the next hundred years, rulers such
as Henri IV, Richelieu and Mazarin weakened the nobility, allowing Louis XIV to
totally emasculate them. This interpretation has a certain degree of validity,
but overstates the case, for although the Crown was certainly exposed in 1589,
the nobility were not emasculated under Louis. The Wars of Religion certainly
weakened the authority of the Crown and permitted the emergence of powerful
families, like the Guises, who challenged the Crown’s position. Henri IV
undoubtedly had major problems with the nobility at the start of his reign, with
the Catholic League waging war against him. The constant plots against Richelieu
and the Frondes against Mazarin demonstrate how destabilising the nobility could
become. The relative peace and stability under Louis does appear to suggest that
they had been tamed by the time he was at the height of his power. Yet this
interpretation of history is flawed. There was not a gradual reduction in noble
power during this period, leading to their total subservience to Louis. During
this period the norm was compromise between nobles and monarch, with unrest and
rebellion being the exceptions.
There can be no doubt that when Louis came to power in
1661 potentially he was in a stronger position than his predecessors had been.
Over the preceding half-century significant victories had been achieved against
the forces of disruption. Time and again noble plots had been defeated,
culminating in the failure of the aristocratic Fronde. Louis’ position had
also been enhanced by the creation under Mazarin of a professional and loyal
army, due to the military reforms of Le Tellier, and the declining importance of
private noble armies.
It use to be believed that Louis emasculated the French
nobility, but this was largely due to the negative view created by Saint-Simon.
It is certainly true that with the single exception of all but one of Louis’
ministers were members of the robe nobility, the numbers of which increased
dramatically under Louis.
Yet at no time did Louis seek to emasculate the sword
nobility. Louis continued to employ them in the higher echelons of church and
state. Provincial governors were invariably noblemen. Military and naval
commanders were almost invariably noblemen. During Louis’ reign there was an
increase in the proportion of aristocratic bishops. In the diplomatic service
whilst mere noblemen of the robe went as ambassadors to republics like Venice,
noblemen of the sword monopolised the embassies at the courts of Louis’ fellow
monarchs, like London. So it is nonsense to suggest that the French nobility
were given no responsibility.
Louis was a champion of nobility. He believed profoundly
in the importance of rank, order and deference. The last thing which he wanted
to do was to undermine the prestige of the nobility or blur class distinctions.
Yet he did encourage the growth of the robe nobility for two main reasons : he
needed their service and their money. Louis continued policy of Richelieu of
keeping leading nobles and princes of the blood off his council since he wanted
ministers who were dependent on his favour. Furthermore, during his reign, both
central and local government became more bureaucratic and he needed more
administrators. However he ennobled more people than he needed. These new-rich
social climbers paid for the posts created for them, so desperate was the crown
for money. So Louis’ expensive wars explain the rise of the robe nobility.
Louis dominated rather than controlled his nobility.
Louis demonstrated what a strong hand a flexible, gregarious, self-confident
monarch had if he knew how to play it. Louis ensured that he had no chief
minister and so had control over all royal patronage. When it came to promotion,
therefore, the king was indispensable and nobles were keen to maintain royal
favour. Also Louis ensured his brother Philip was never in aposition
to be as troublesome as Gaston had been and by having no chief minister it made
it hard for the nobles to criticise policy without appearing disloyal directly
to the king.
Louis certainly knew how to be flexible. He might need
money desperately but he never challenged the noble privilege of tax exemption;
he socialised with them at Versailles, used them in key positions and gave
orders to Intendants not to antagonise them.
It is wrong, therefore, to argue that the nobility became
weaker. They could still pose a considerable threat, but Louis XIV was able to
show them the advantages of working with the monarch rather than against him.
