AS HISTORY

 

SPECIMEN PAPERS – UNIT 1 (WITH MARK SCHEME)

 

General Certificate of Education

SPECIMEN PAPER

Advanced Subsidiary Examination

 

HISTORY HIS1E

Unit 1

Absolutist States: The Reign of Louis XIV, 1661–1715

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For this paper you must have:

• A 12-page answer book

Time allowed: 1 hour 15 minutes

 

Instructions

• Use black ink or black ball-point pen.

• Write the information required on the front of your answer book. The Examining Body for this paper is AQA. The Paper Reference is HIS1E.

• Answer two questions.

• In answering the questions you must use your own knowledge and understanding of the period, in particular you should:

�� refer to relevant historical information

�� show an understanding of change and continuity

�� show a knowledge of historical interpretations

 

Information

• The maximum mark for this paper is 72.

• The marks for questions are shown in brackets.

• There are 36 marks for each question.

• You will be marked on your ability to use good English, to organise information clearly and to use specialist vocabulary where appropriate.

 

 

 

Answer two questions.

1

(a) Explain why the French financial system was so inefficient at the start of Louis XIV’s personal rule in 1661. (12 marks)

(b) How successful was Colbert in strengthening the finances and economy of France in the years 1661 to 1683? (24 marks)

 

2

(a) Why did France declare war on the Dutch in 1672? (12 marks)

(b) How important was the pursuit of defensible frontiers in explaining Louis XIV’s foreign policy in the years 1679 to 1715? (24 marks)

 

3

(a) Explain why Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685. (12 marks)

(b) How successful was Louis XIV in achieving the objectives of his religious policies in the years 1661 to 1715? (24 marks)

 

 

Specimen Mark Scheme

GCE AS History Unit 1: Change and Consolidation

HIS1E: Absolutist States: The Reign Of Louis XIV, 1661–1715

Generic Mark Scheme

Question 1(a), Question 2(a) and Question 3(a)

L1: Answers will contain either some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. 0-2

L2: Answers will demonstrate some knowledge and understanding of the demands of the question. They will either be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question or they will provide some explanations backed by evidence that is limited in range and/or depth. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. 3-6

L3: Answers will demonstrate good understanding of the demands of the question providing relevant explanations backed by appropriately selected information, although this may not be full or comprehensive. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. 7-9

L4: Answers will be well-focused, identifying a range of specific explanations, backed by precise evidence and demonstrating good understanding of the connections and links between events/issues. Answers will, for the most part, be well-written and organised.  10-12

 

Question 1(b), Question 2(b) and Question 3(b)

L1: Answers may either contain some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or they may address only a part of the question. Alternatively, there may be some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. There will be little, if any, awareness of differing historical interpretations. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. 0-6

L2: Answers will show some understanding of the focus of the question. They will either be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question or they may contain some explicit comment with relevant but limited support. They will display limited understanding of differing historical interpretations. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. 7-11

L3: Answers will show a developed understanding of the demands of the question. They will provide some assessment, backed by relevant and appropriately selected evidence, but they will lack depth and/or balance. There will be some understanding of varying historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. 12-16

L4: Answers will show explicit understanding of the demands of the question. They will develop a balanced argument backed by a good range of appropriately selected evidence and a good understanding of historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, show organisation and good skills of written communication. 17-21

L5: Answers will be well-focused and closely argued. The arguments will be supported by precisely selected evidence leading to a relevant conclusion/judgement, incorporating well-developed understanding of historical interpretations and debate. Answers will, for the most part, be carefully organised and fluently written, using appropriate vocabulary.  22-24

 

Question 1

(a) Explain why the French financial system was so inefficient at the start of Louis XIV’s personal rule in 1661. (12 marks)

 

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)

Indicative content

In theory, the French economy should have been doing relatively well, and certainly France had emerged from a turbulent period of European history with less damage to its infrastructure and towns than many other states. However, the taxation system struggled to collect in money even before the expense of Louis’ domestic and foreign policies. Privileged exemption from direct taxation and especially the Taille meant that the wealthiest paid little tax. The Church, despite being a wealthy major land owner, paid the voluntary contribution Don Gratuit every five years, but it did not come close to raising the money that direct taxation might have. The burden of direct taxation thus fell on the Third Estate, 90% of whom worked on the land and struggled at subsistence levels. The system of assessment was inconsistent and inefficient, with the pays d’état allowed to set their own levels of taxation, and there were even two different types of taille; the taille personnelle, assessed on the individual, and the taille réelle, assessed on land holdings, thereby causing further confusion in correct assessment. Indirect taxation was less contentious, but the gabelle illustrates the failure to tax luxury items as effectively. The system of collecting the tax led to further losses, and the use of Farmers General seemed to encourage corruption and the siphoning off of money in the many layers before it reached central government. Other forms of raising money, such as the selling of offices, gave a short-term boost to royal finances, but not only removed the wealthiest and most ambitious from taxation, but also obliged the crown to make regular salary payments in the future. The absence of a national bank meant that the crown relied on personal loans that often carried much higher levels of interest due to the inherent danger of lending to a monarch, and the system of annuities again tied the crown to making long-term interest payments.

 

(b) How successful was Colbert in strengthening the finances and economy of France in the years 1661 to 1683? (24 marks)

 

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)

Indicative content

Colbert’s reform of the taxation system, and especially the shift in emphasis away from the Taille towards the less contentious indirect taxation, brought notable success, as did his attempt to extend direct taxation to the pays d’état and to the Church. His efforts to introduce statements of royal income and expenditure, plus estimates for the coming year, made it possible for clearer financial planning, and the introduction of the chambers of justice combined with the trial of Fouquet saw some reduction in the corruption inherent in the system of tax collection. Yet Colbert was clear that greater money would be collected in if the economy were improved. The introduction of foreign, skilled craftsmen such as cloth workers from Flanders and the establishment of the state-sponsored companies were partially successful attempts to compete with foreign manufacturers. This was reinforced by close state quality control. Mercantilism gave the excuse for the establishment of strong trade barriers that may have protected fledgling French industries, and the creation of overseas trading companies stimulated some commercial activity abroad. Colbert’s development of the navy not only boosted trade but in itself gave employ to a variety of industries such as hemp, and forestry. The development of infrastructure such as the canal des deux mers and the postal system made it easier to trade within France. However, when Colbert died in 1683 France was close to bankruptcy. Whilst reforms to the financial system had been effective, they had done little to attack the fundamental problem of privilege. The state regulation of manufacturers was counter-productive in many instances as it simply restricted free enterprise, and of the overseas trading companies only the French East India Company survived his death. Local tariff barriers had remained, symptomatic of France’s provincialism. The national trade barriers had simply led to retaliation from foreign powers and especially from the Dutch. Colbert’s very support of war against the Dutch had led to the damaging war of 1672–1679 which had undone much of his good work. Colbert also failed to address the largest area of the economy, agriculture, as he felt that it was unproductive – this may well have been his greatest failure. However, it is possible to argue that the failure of the French economic and financial system was not the work of Colbert, and that ultimately he did provide for the ambitions of a vainglorious and spendthrift king.

 

Question 2

(a) Why did France declare war on the Dutch in 1672? (12 marks)

 

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)

Indicative content

There was a combination of reasons for the Dutch War of 1672–1679; however, the main factor was probably Louis XIV’s desire to avenge the perceived Dutch treachery during the War of Devolution, 1667–1668. The Dutch admission into the Triple Alliance had been an obvious attempt to limit the gains of France, and this had been despite the pre-existing arrangement between the two countries. Strategically Louis also wished to ensure that the Dutch never felt able again to launch incursions into the Spanish Netherlands, especially considering his own dynastic connections. However, mercantilist principles also played a role. The Dutch maintained a position as a major trading nation and consequently French desire to seize their lucrative trade was not insignificant. This was especially true after Colbert lent his support to the principle of a short war, although it remains unclear whether Colbert was genuinely convinced of the need for war or whether he simply feared that his position in government would be seriously weakened if he did not support the projects of the king. There was also considerable support for this war from Condé who believed it would be short and easily won. The death of the foreign minister, de Lionne, in 1671 made it much more likely that arguments for restraint would be ignored. However, many candidates might suggest that of all Louis XIV’s wars, the Dutch War had the least clear military objectives.

 

(b) How important was the pursuit of defensible frontiers in explaining the reasons for Louis XIV’s foreign policy in the years 1679 to 1715? (24 marks)

 

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)

Indicative content

Whilst there remains some evidence to support the idea that Louis was seeking natural frontiers for France, such as the Rhine on the eastern border, there is more truth in the suggestion that what he really required was frontiers that could be easily defended. The North Eastern frontier with the Spanish Netherlands was seen as being especially weak and a potential base for invasion. In addition there was a number of border anomalies, such as the status of Strasbourg, that seemed to further weaken France’s military position. The Wars of the Reunions, 1679–1685, allowed for the creation of fortresses to protect from Hapsburg attack. However, a number of other factors influenced foreign policy, most obviously the character of the king himself and especially his pursuit for glory and reputation. Louis’ triumphant entry into Strasbourg and the sheer opportunism of the Reunions, combined with the deliberate fostering of imagery, did much to convince foreign powers that it was Louis who had become the major threat to European stability. Yet the pursuit of glory was closely linked to the defence of the kingdom and much of what Louis did might be interpreted simply as an opportunistic king taking advantage of the weakened state of much of Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War. The Turkish threat was another example of Louis using fortuitous circumstance, in this case to strengthen his eastern borders. Whilst the War of Spanish Succession certainly involved Louis in the defence of his reputation, this also was a war that was necessary for the defence not only of borders but also of dynasty. Indeed, the longest war of his reign was one that to some degree was forced upon him, and the partition treaties prove a desire to avoid costly conflict. To this extent, it was the unexpected terms of Carlos II’s will that was a significant reason for the outbreak of war. Possibly the aggressive methods of achieving essentially defensive objectives also rallied a range of foreign powers into opposition to Louis, which in turn forced his hand, e.g. such as during the Nine Years’ War. Candidates may also mention religion as a notable motive for Louis and certainly his desire to quieten the seditious, Protestant, literature of the Dutch was obvious. However, it is doubtful if Louis ever really had plans for the establishment of a universal monarchy and religion, although his desire to be named ‘the most Christian king of Europe’ might be mentioned. Ultimately, it is difficult to identify consistent principles as such, partly because Louis tended to react to circumstances as they arose. In addition it is increasingly difficult to separate individual motives, especially considering that the pursuit of defensible frontiers was merely an element in the pursuit of glory, dynastic security, and economic well-being.

 

Question 3

(a) Explain why Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685. (12 marks)

 

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)

Indicative content

There was a number of clearly identifiable reasons for the revocation. Louis XIV had obvious personal motives for removing the religious rights of the Huguenots. At his coronation Louis had promised to extirpate heresy and this, combined with his increasingly deep-seated Catholic beliefs, encouraged him to view the Huguenots as misguided subjects whom he had the duty to guide to the salvation apparently offered by the Roman Catholic Church. However, this in itself is not enough to justify the delay between the start of his personal rule in 1661 and the eventual revocation in 1685. The increasing influence of Madame de Maintenon played a key role in convincing Louis that his previously hedonistic life could only be compensated for by acts of extreme piety in his later years. Indeed, such increasing religious observance was reflected in the gradual decline in the number and the scale of royal functions at Versailles. It may also be possible that Louis had always considered the revocation to be a central objective, but had simply been too heavily occupied by the establishment of his authority and by foreign wars in his early years to devote much energy to the Huguenot problem. In addition to religious motives there are other factors to consider.

The revocation was the culmination in a long programme of intolerance towards the Huguenots and was intended as the culmination of a previously successful policy rather than of the beginning of a new one. Intendents, possibly motivated by the desire not to displease a monarch that had appointed them to their positions, reported the virtual absence of Huguenots in their areas, and consequently it may well be that Louis XIV was convinced that revocation was simply the removal of laws that no longer had any relevance. Alternatively, Louis was unlikely to continue with a policy of toleration that, although successful, would not actually eradicate all Huguenots until well into the 18th century. Certainly, Louis would have been well aware that a more militant policy aimed against the Huguenots would be popular amongst the vast majority of his subjects, who had witnessed Protestants who converted receiving tax concessions. Colbert’s efforts to encourage foreign craftsmen probably protected the Huguenots to some degree, a protection removed with his death in 1683. In addition, Louis’ own desire to be the ‘most Christian King of Europe’ and his attempts to repair the damage done to his reputation by the Siege of Vienna in 1683 were also possible motives.

 

(b) How successful was Louis XIV in achieving the objectives of his religious policies in the years 1661 to 1715? (24 marks)

 

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)

Indicative content

Louis XIV’s religious objectives can reasonably be limited to a few key areas, namely the Huguenots, Jansenism and relations with the papacy. Effective answers will establish clear criteria for success and will possibly start with some definition of Louis’ religious objectives. Very effective answers may argue that Louis’ religious objectives can be said to have shifted during the course of a very lengthy reign, or may identify the greatest areas of failure or success. Louis’ early relationship with the papacy was poor. Early attempts by the king to extend the regale to all parts of the realm and the subsequent publication of the Gallican Articles in 1683 did little to establish a good relationship. This proved especially destructive when the Pope subsequently refused to consecrate any further bishops. The tit-for-tat retaliation that included Louis XIV’s seizure of Avignon was only really ended on the death of Pope Innocent in 1689, although it was Louis’ increasing concerns over Jansenism that prompted his removal of the Gallican Articles in 1693. Relations were further strained during the controversy over Unigenitus and especially Louis XIV’s insistence that the papal bull would be easy to introduce within France. That Pope Clement felt bullied into this move and that his initial fears proved well founded meant that relations with the papacy were probably no better at the end of the reign than they had been at the start – although both papacy and monarchy were now linked in a struggle for authority within France. Unigenitus might be argued to represent Louis’ greatest failure, certainly in the context of problems that Louis XIV bequeathed to his successors. The failure to register Unigenitus was to prove one of the greatest challenges to France domestically during the reign of Louis XV. Perhaps as significant was the damage that Louis XIV had done to his own authority and international reputation in relying on the papacy to provide reasons for his domestic policies, especially as in 1683 the Gallican Articles had roundly condemned the Pope’s attempts to extend his authority within France. Attempts to address the question of the Huguenots were initially successful, and were especially helped by the demographic decline of the Protestants within France anyway. Indeed, the policy of gentle coercion, typified by the Caisse de Conversions, may well have seen the virtual eradication of the Huguenots at some stage in the 18th century. This was his area of success – it was the more radical policy of persecution that led to failure. If Louis’ objective was to convert all Huguenots in France, then this plainly failed. The Camisards’ revolt during the War of the Spanish Succession is sufficient to prove this. If Louis was seeking to establish his international credentials as a Christian king, especially in competition with the Emperor, then again he plainly failed, for even the papacy expressed concern at the persecution of the Huguenots and this was a key factor in the alignment of Protestant states against Louis. Whilst the economic effect of the Huguenots’ flight has perhaps been exaggerated, there can be little doubt that Louis largely failed in this area of his policy. Overall there is little that by 1715 can be said to have been achieved and Louis’ religious policy is often cited as his greatest failure. However, it is worth noting that if the early part of his reign were solely considered then Louis had done little but stick to his coronation oaths and own religious beliefs, and also his belief in the authority and dignity of his office – in this area perhaps he succeeded.

 

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