AS HISTORY
SPECIMEN PAPERS – UNIT 1
(WITH MARK SCHEME)
General Certificate of Education
SPECIMEN PAPER
Advanced Subsidiary Examination
HISTORY HIS1E
Unit 1
Absolutist States: The Reign of Louis
XIV, 1661–1715
]
For this paper you must have:
• A 12-page answer book
Time allowed: 1 hour 15 minutes
Instructions
• Use black ink or black ball-point
pen.
• Write the information required on
the front of your answer book. The Examining Body for this paper is AQA.
The Paper Reference is HIS1E.
• Answer two questions.
• In answering the questions you must
use your own knowledge and understanding of the period, in particular you
should:
refer to relevant
historical information
show an understanding
of change and continuity
show a knowledge of
historical interpretations
Information
•
The maximum mark for this paper is 72.
•
The marks for questions are shown in brackets.
•
There are 36 marks for each question.
•
You will be marked on your ability to use good English, to organise information
clearly and to use specialist vocabulary where appropriate.
Answer
two questions.
1
(a)
Explain why the French financial system was so inefficient at the start of Louis
XIV’s personal rule in 1661. (12 marks)
(b)
How successful was Colbert in strengthening the finances and economy of France
in the years 1661 to 1683? (24 marks)
2
(a)
Why did France declare war on the Dutch in 1672? (12 marks)
(b)
How important was the pursuit of defensible frontiers in explaining Louis
XIV’s foreign policy in the years 1679 to 1715? (24 marks)
3
(a)
Explain why Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685. (12 marks)
(b)
How successful was Louis XIV in achieving the objectives of his religious
policies in the years 1661 to 1715? (24 marks)
Specimen Mark Scheme
GCE AS History Unit 1: Change and
Consolidation
HIS1E: Absolutist States: The Reign Of
Louis XIV, 1661–1715
Generic Mark Scheme
Question 1(a), Question 2(a) and
Question 3(a)
L1: Answers will contain either some descriptive
material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or some
explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to
be generalised and assertive. The response will be limited in development and
skills of written communication will be weak. 0-2
L2: Answers will demonstrate some knowledge and
understanding of the demands of the question. They will either be almost
entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question or they will
provide some explanations backed by evidence that is limited in range and/or
depth. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. 3-6
L3: Answers will demonstrate good understanding of
the demands of the question providing relevant explanations backed by
appropriately selected information, although this may not be full or
comprehensive. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show
some organisation in the presentation of material. 7-9
L4: Answers will be well-focused, identifying a
range of specific explanations, backed by precise evidence and demonstrating
good understanding of the connections and links between events/issues. Answers
will, for the most part, be well-written and organised.
10-12
Question 1(b), Question 2(b) and
Question 3(b)
L1: Answers may either contain some descriptive
material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or they may
address only a part of the question. Alternatively, there may be some explicit
comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be
generalised and assertive. There will be little, if any, awareness of differing
historical interpretations. The response will be limited in development and
skills of written communication will be weak. 0-6
L2: Answers will show some understanding of the
focus of the question. They will either be almost entirely descriptive with few
explicit links to the question or they may contain some explicit comment with
relevant but limited support. They will display limited understanding of
differing historical interpretations. Answers will be coherent but weakly
expressed and/or poorly structured. 7-11
L3: Answers will show a developed understanding of
the demands of the question. They will provide some assessment, backed by
relevant and appropriately selected evidence, but they will lack depth and/or
balance. There will be some understanding of varying historical interpretations.
Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation
in the presentation of material. 12-16
L4: Answers will show explicit understanding of the
demands of the question. They will develop a balanced argument backed by a good
range of appropriately selected evidence and a good understanding of historical
interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, show organisation and good
skills of written communication. 17-21
L5: Answers will be well-focused and closely argued.
The arguments will be supported by precisely selected evidence leading to a
relevant conclusion/judgement, incorporating well-developed understanding of
historical interpretations and debate. Answers will, for the most part, be
carefully organised and fluently written, using appropriate vocabulary.
22-24
Question 1
(a) Explain why the French financial
system was so inefficient at the start of Louis XIV’s personal rule in 1661. (12
marks)
Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)
Indicative content
In theory, the French economy should
have been doing relatively well, and certainly France had emerged from a
turbulent period of European history with less damage to its infrastructure and
towns than many other states. However, the taxation system struggled to collect
in money even before the expense of Louis’ domestic and foreign policies.
Privileged exemption from direct taxation and especially the Taille meant
that the wealthiest paid little tax. The Church, despite being a wealthy major
land owner, paid the voluntary contribution Don Gratuit every five years, but it
did not come close to raising the money that direct taxation might have. The
burden of direct taxation thus fell on the Third Estate, 90% of whom worked on
the land and struggled at subsistence levels. The system of assessment was
inconsistent and inefficient, with the pays d’état allowed to set
their own levels of taxation, and there were even two different types of taille;
the taille personnelle, assessed on the individual, and the taille réelle,
assessed on land holdings, thereby causing further confusion in correct
assessment. Indirect taxation was less contentious, but the gabelle illustrates
the failure to tax luxury items as effectively. The system of collecting the tax
led to further losses, and the use of Farmers General seemed to encourage
corruption and the siphoning off of money in the many layers before it reached
central government. Other forms of raising money, such as the selling of
offices, gave a short-term boost to royal finances, but not only removed the
wealthiest and most ambitious from taxation, but also obliged the crown to make
regular salary payments in the future. The absence of a national bank meant that
the crown relied on personal loans that often carried much higher levels of
interest due to the inherent danger of lending to a monarch, and the system of
annuities again tied the crown to making long-term interest payments.
(b) How successful was Colbert in
strengthening the finances and economy of France in the years 1661 to 1683? (24
marks)
Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)
Indicative content
Colbert’s reform of the taxation
system, and especially the shift in emphasis away from the Taille towards
the less contentious indirect taxation, brought notable success, as did his
attempt to extend direct taxation to the pays d’état and to the
Church. His efforts to introduce statements of royal income and expenditure,
plus estimates for the coming year, made it possible for clearer financial
planning, and the introduction of the chambers of justice combined with the
trial of Fouquet saw some reduction in the corruption inherent in the system of
tax collection. Yet Colbert was clear that greater money would be collected in
if the economy were improved. The introduction of foreign, skilled craftsmen
such as cloth workers from Flanders and the establishment of the state-sponsored
companies were partially successful attempts to compete with foreign
manufacturers. This was reinforced by close state quality control. Mercantilism
gave the excuse for the establishment of strong trade barriers that may have
protected fledgling French industries, and the creation of overseas trading
companies stimulated some commercial activity abroad. Colbert’s development of
the navy not only boosted trade but in itself gave employ to a variety of
industries such as hemp, and forestry. The development of infrastructure such as
the canal des deux mers and the postal system made it easier to trade
within France. However, when Colbert died in 1683 France was close to
bankruptcy. Whilst reforms to the financial system had been effective, they had
done little to attack the fundamental problem of privilege. The state regulation
of manufacturers was counter-productive in many instances as it simply
restricted free enterprise, and of the overseas trading companies only the
French East India Company survived his death. Local tariff barriers had
remained, symptomatic of France’s provincialism. The national trade barriers
had simply led to retaliation from foreign powers and especially from the Dutch.
Colbert’s very support of war against the Dutch had led to the damaging war of
1672–1679 which had undone much of his good work. Colbert also failed to
address the largest area of the economy, agriculture, as he felt that it was
unproductive – this may well have been his greatest failure. However, it is
possible to argue that the failure of the French economic and financial system
was not the work of Colbert, and that ultimately he did provide for the
ambitions of a vainglorious and spendthrift king.
Question 2
(a) Why did France declare war on the
Dutch in 1672? (12 marks)
Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)
Indicative content
There was a combination of reasons for
the Dutch War of 1672–1679; however, the main factor was probably Louis
XIV’s desire to avenge the perceived Dutch treachery during the War of
Devolution, 1667–1668. The Dutch admission into the Triple Alliance had been
an obvious attempt to limit the gains of France, and this had been despite the
pre-existing arrangement between the two countries. Strategically Louis also
wished to ensure that the Dutch never felt able again to launch incursions into
the Spanish Netherlands, especially considering his own dynastic connections.
However, mercantilist principles also played a role. The Dutch maintained a
position as a major trading nation and consequently French desire to seize their
lucrative trade was not insignificant. This was especially true after Colbert
lent his support to the principle of a short war, although it remains unclear
whether Colbert was genuinely convinced of the need for war or whether he simply
feared that his position in government would be seriously weakened if he did not
support the projects of the king. There was also considerable support for this
war from Condé who believed it would be short and easily won. The death of the
foreign minister, de Lionne, in 1671 made it much more likely that arguments for
restraint would be ignored. However, many candidates might suggest that of all
Louis XIV’s wars, the Dutch War had the least clear military objectives.
(b) How important was the pursuit of
defensible frontiers in explaining the reasons for Louis XIV’s foreign policy
in the years 1679 to 1715? (24 marks)
Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)
Indicative content
Whilst there remains some evidence to
support the idea that Louis was seeking natural frontiers for France, such as
the Rhine on the eastern border, there is more truth in the suggestion that what
he really required was frontiers that could be easily defended. The North
Eastern frontier with the Spanish Netherlands was seen as being especially weak
and a potential base for invasion. In addition there was a number of border
anomalies, such as the status of Strasbourg, that seemed to further weaken
France’s military position. The Wars of the Reunions, 1679–1685, allowed for
the creation of fortresses to protect from Hapsburg attack. However, a number of
other factors influenced foreign policy, most obviously the character of the
king himself and especially his pursuit for glory and reputation. Louis’
triumphant entry into Strasbourg and the sheer opportunism of the Reunions,
combined with the deliberate fostering of imagery, did much to convince foreign
powers that it was Louis who had become the major threat to European stability.
Yet the pursuit of glory was closely linked to the defence of the kingdom and
much of what Louis did might be interpreted simply as an opportunistic king
taking advantage of the weakened state of much of Europe in the immediate
aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War. The Turkish threat was another example of
Louis using fortuitous circumstance, in this case to strengthen his eastern
borders. Whilst the War of Spanish Succession certainly involved Louis in the
defence of his reputation, this also was a war that was necessary for the
defence not only of borders but also of dynasty. Indeed, the longest war of his
reign was one that to some degree was forced upon him, and the partition
treaties prove a desire to avoid costly conflict. To this extent, it was the
unexpected terms of Carlos II’s will that was a significant reason for the
outbreak of war. Possibly the aggressive methods of achieving essentially
defensive objectives also rallied a range of foreign powers into opposition to
Louis, which in turn forced his hand, e.g. such as during the Nine Years’ War.
Candidates may also mention religion as a notable motive for Louis and certainly
his desire to quieten the seditious, Protestant, literature of the Dutch was
obvious. However, it is doubtful if Louis ever really had plans for the
establishment of a universal monarchy and religion, although his desire to be
named ‘the most Christian king of Europe’ might be mentioned. Ultimately, it
is difficult to identify consistent principles as such, partly because Louis
tended to react to circumstances as they arose. In addition it is increasingly
difficult to separate individual motives, especially considering that the
pursuit of defensible frontiers was merely an element in the pursuit of glory,
dynastic security, and economic well-being.
Question 3
(a) Explain why Louis XIV revoked the
Edict of Nantes in 1685. (12 marks)
Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)
Indicative content
There was a number of clearly
identifiable reasons for the revocation. Louis XIV had obvious personal motives
for removing the religious rights of the Huguenots. At his coronation Louis had
promised to extirpate heresy and this, combined with his increasingly
deep-seated Catholic beliefs, encouraged him to view the Huguenots as misguided
subjects whom he had the duty to guide to the salvation apparently offered by
the Roman Catholic Church. However, this in itself is not enough to justify the
delay between the start of his personal rule in 1661 and the eventual revocation
in 1685. The increasing influence of Madame de Maintenon played a key role in
convincing Louis that his previously hedonistic life could only be compensated
for by acts of extreme piety in his later years. Indeed, such increasing
religious observance was reflected in the gradual decline in the number and the
scale of royal functions at Versailles. It may also be possible that Louis had
always considered the revocation to be a central objective, but had simply been
too heavily occupied by the establishment of his authority and by foreign wars
in his early years to devote much energy to the Huguenot problem. In addition to
religious motives there are other factors to consider.
The revocation was the culmination in a long programme
of intolerance towards the Huguenots and was intended as the culmination of a
previously successful policy rather than of the beginning of a new one.
Intendents, possibly motivated by the desire not to displease a monarch that had
appointed them to their positions, reported the virtual absence of Huguenots in
their areas, and consequently it may well be that Louis XIV was convinced that
revocation was simply the removal of laws that no longer had any relevance.
Alternatively, Louis was unlikely to continue with a policy of toleration that,
although successful, would not actually eradicate all Huguenots until well into
the 18th century. Certainly, Louis would have been well
aware that a more militant policy aimed against the Huguenots would be popular
amongst the vast majority of his subjects, who had witnessed Protestants who
converted receiving tax concessions. Colbert’s efforts to encourage foreign
craftsmen probably protected the Huguenots to some degree, a protection removed
with his death in 1683. In addition, Louis’ own desire to be the ‘most
Christian King of Europe’ and his attempts to repair the damage done to his
reputation by the Siege of Vienna in 1683 were also possible motives.
(b) How successful was Louis XIV in
achieving the objectives of his religious policies in the years 1661 to 1715? (24
marks)
Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)
Indicative content
Louis XIV’s religious objectives can reasonably be
limited to a few key areas, namely the Huguenots, Jansenism and relations with
the papacy. Effective answers will establish clear criteria for success and will
possibly start with some definition of Louis’ religious objectives. Very
effective answers may argue that Louis’ religious objectives can be said to
have shifted during the course of a very lengthy reign, or may identify the greatest
areas of failure or success. Louis’ early relationship with the papacy was
poor. Early attempts by the king to extend the regale to all parts of the
realm and the subsequent publication of the Gallican Articles in 1683 did little
to establish a good relationship. This proved especially destructive when the
Pope subsequently refused to consecrate any further bishops. The tit-for-tat
retaliation that included Louis XIV’s seizure of Avignon was only really ended
on the death of Pope Innocent in 1689, although it was Louis’ increasing
concerns over Jansenism that prompted his removal of the Gallican Articles in
1693. Relations were further strained during the controversy over Unigenitus and
especially Louis XIV’s insistence that the papal bull would be easy to
introduce within France. That Pope Clement felt bullied into this move and that
his initial fears proved well founded meant that relations with the papacy were
probably no better at the end of the reign than they had been at the start –
although both papacy and monarchy were now linked in a struggle for authority
within France. Unigenitus might be argued to represent Louis’ greatest
failure, certainly in the context of problems that Louis XIV bequeathed to his
successors. The failure to register Unigenitus was to prove one of the greatest
challenges to France domestically during the reign of Louis XV. Perhaps as
significant was the damage that Louis XIV had done to his own authority and
international reputation in relying on the papacy to provide reasons for his
domestic policies, especially as in 1683 the Gallican Articles had roundly
condemned the Pope’s attempts to extend his authority within France. Attempts
to address the question of the Huguenots were initially successful, and were
especially helped by the demographic decline of the Protestants within France
anyway. Indeed, the policy of gentle coercion, typified by the Caisse de
Conversions, may well have seen the virtual eradication of the Huguenots at
some stage in the 18th century. This was his area of success – it was the more
radical policy of persecution that led to failure. If Louis’ objective was to
convert all Huguenots in France, then this plainly failed. The Camisards’
revolt during the War of the Spanish Succession is sufficient to prove this. If
Louis was seeking to establish his international credentials as a Christian
king, especially in competition with the Emperor, then again he plainly failed,
for even the papacy expressed concern at the persecution of the Huguenots and
this was a key factor in the alignment of Protestant states against Louis.
Whilst the economic effect of the Huguenots’ flight has perhaps been
exaggerated, there can be little doubt that Louis largely failed in this area of
his policy. Overall there is little that by 1715 can be said to have been
achieved and Louis’ religious policy is often cited as his greatest failure.
However, it is worth noting that if the early part of his reign were solely
considered then Louis had done little but stick to his coronation oaths and own
religious beliefs, and also his belief in the authority and dignity of his
office – in this area perhaps he succeeded.