Review of Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War by Akira Iriye

November 7, 2005

 

In his compilation of notes, correspondence and analysis, Iriye’s thesis was to expand the readers education and interpretation of contemporary issues by providing the primary sources relating to the negotiations between Japan and the United States prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and presenting them for open interpretation.  By selecting key military and political documents, “they provide crucial raw material for comprehending what was on the minds of Japanese and U.S. leaders in those hectic days”[1] prior to the start of war.  In addition, Iriye provided a comprehensive review of a wider context of the status of international liaisons prior to World War II from various perspectives.  Iriye’s use of primary resource materials and supporting secondary essays and analyses provided the evidence for this book and allowed us to view the culmination of conflict between the United States and Japan within the scope of lectures, readings, and associated episodes of Peoples Century.

 

By the winter of 1941, Germany had launched Operation Barbarossa, and turned against his one-time ally, the Soviet Union.  Japan was engaged in military expansion against China since 1931[2] and had formally entered into a non-aggression treaty with Germany and with Italy that formed the Tripartite Pact.  Japan’s alliance with Germany and Italy reflected their belief that Hitler and Mussolini understood their dynastic rational for expansion[3].  Throughout the 1930s, a worldwide economic crisis hit Japan[4]. By 1932, “Half of Japan’s factories were idle and working class standards of living had fallen dramatically”[5].

Both Communist and Nationalist groups leveraged for their hold over the Chinese mainland and tore China from within. In 1937, China’s internal political leaders “believed that this time the nation would have the support of other countries”[6] and solidified their alliances with the United States and Great Britain.  The United States acted not only to protect the intrusion of Japan into mainland China, but also to defend their position in the Pacific. The United States restricted Japan economically, through sanctions and tariffs to a point that in order to secure their raw materials requirements, Japan developed plans to remove the west from controlling their move toward a New Order in East Asia[7].

 

Throughout his compilation, Iriye assembled several documents and essays outlining Japan’s need for petroleum as an underlying source of expansionist policy as well as the core of political and military preparedness.  Japan’s need for oil in civilian and military operations required a preemptive strike against the nations who held them from their pursuit throughout the Pacific – especially the United States[8].  In correspondence within the Japanese Military, Imperial Conference, and later between Japanese Ambassadors and Secretary of State Cordell Hull prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, Japan specifically required access to oil from the United States as an avenue of peace between the two countries[9].

 

As negotiations continued between Japan and the United States prior to December 1941, issues of expansion, trade restrictions and anti-discrimination policies, and Japan’s alliance with Axis powers were the basis for discussion between the two governments. Iriye placed unique Japanese interpretations within his compilation to provide a wider scope of understanding and expression.

 

For Japan, many of the outlined points for peace negotiations represented a “double-standard” imposed by the United States and revealed collusion with Great Britain and China in establishing the limits for peace.  After World War I, Japan felt that, their position in the world was second-class to western powers due to patronage and discrimination[10]. Their image suffered as western powers blocked several political and military issues of Japan during the 1920s.  At the Paris Peace Conference, Japan requested a statement of racial equality, which the United States rejected.  Now, in early 1940s, the last attempt at peace called for “the principle of non-discrimination in International commercial relations”[11].  In addition, Japan’s expansion into mainland China, originally blocked by Theodore Roosevelt after the Russo-Japanese War, supported Japanese ideology that the United States did not want Japan as a world leader, despite their victory over Russia.  Again, Japan viewed this move as a “double-standard”, as American interests and those of Great Britain and France reflected maintaining their colonies and foreign interest throughout the world[12].  In his final memorandum to the United States on December 7, 1941, Kichisaburo Nomura concluded that areas of East Asia fell to “Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations.  The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation”[13]. 

 

To the United States and Great Britain, the outline for peace reflected their desire to maintain a status quo in relations with Japan.  Britain was at war in Europe and required the resources and manpower offered by their colonial possessions to end the war.  Prior to war, British colonies in India, Asia, and Africa exposed to independence movements shifted perspective away from colonial rule and discontent continued to grow prior to the outbreak of war. 

Further, Britain needed the United States to support its growing war machine.  The United States provided Britain with much needed armament as early as 1940.  After examining the essays and documentation presented by Iriye, Japan believed “it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establishment of peace”[14].  Later, “Churchill expressed his satisfaction and delight at the news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor”[15] to secure the United States open participation in the war.

 

In the United States, public opinion against the war required the advancement of Japanese hostilities for President Roosevelt to act on behalf of the British and Iriye’s documentation suggests that Roosevelt welcomed the war with Japan[16].

In his compilation of primary and secondary sources, Akira Iriye provided the tools necessary to support the ideas and images presented through additional readings, lectures, and episodes of Peoples Century for understanding the various motives and perspectives leading toward the United State’s involvement in World War II as a result of failed negotiations prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor.