28 October 2001

Once the non-CC members of the TPLF were deprived of their rights to express their opinion, Meles concentrated himself on the internal struggle for power within the leadership of the TPLF. He has murdered two of them (Atsbeha Dagnew and Teklu Hawaz) and purged 13 others including the latest ten so far. 

We concluded Part Two of our article with the observation that the brutal measures taken by the CC of the TPLF in 1978 to deal with the stage-managed crisis wrongly known as factionalism forced non CC members of the TPLF to political passiveness and enhanced the power of Meles, thus paving the way for the present tyranny. Internally, the TPLF leadership recognises the passiveness that followed the crisis. However, the CC used to cover up the actual cause, which is fear of repression, by trying to attribute the passiveness to some sort of a worship i.e. the alleged belief of the fighters that the leadership does not make mistakes. 

The non-CC members were simply turned to slave-like creatures and treated likewise. These slave-like creatures, who heroically struggle against those whom they consider to be their enemies can in small groups or individually be purged, isolated, imprisoned, tortured or liquidated by the TPLF leadership without any institutional or legal possibility of defence or appeal, The CC members can commit any sort of crime without transparency, accountability and with impunity. Therefore the purging and incrimination of the 12-2 dissenters by Meles is in line with the tradition of the TPLF in its aggravated form. Meles is doing what he used to do during the armed struggle i. -e. intrigues, arbitrary measures, false accusations and purges by using the Stalinist organisational structure under the present situation, a situation under which the maltreatment of the victims cannot be hidden from the public simply because the victims are well known due to their participation in the government.

The campaign which was launched to silence and destroy critical members in 1978 followed by brutal administrative measures proved to be a turning point in the organisation in that it made criticism, the expression of grievances and opposition from down upwards a taboo. Ironically, many members of the CC did not seem to realise that they, by taking a united stand to suppress the freedom of expression of the non-CC members were at the same time creating a situation under which they would be the next victims. The logic is very simple: Either there is a system, which accommodates differences of opinion, or no differences are permitted and therefore a single person prevails over all others. Since the TPLF leadership practically opted for the second alternative as of 1978, the question of who prevails had to be decided in an internal power struggle with nasty intrigues, purges and liquidation as we are trying to show as follows. 

The preparation for the formation of a party

Meles’ instruments for the power struggle were the MLLT with the cadre school and Abay Tsehaye along with the political committee.

Since the founders of the TPLF and most of the student members of the Front were socialist oriented, the wish to form a leftist party had a consensus amongst the active members of the TPLF. Therefore the delegates in the first congress of the TPLF in 1979 (1971 Eth.C) principally agreed that the necessary preparations to form a socialist-oriented party be made within the TPLF. Soon after, the CC of the TPLF delegated the responsibility to make the preparations for the formation of the party to Meles Zenawi. Therefore Meles got the golden opportunity to avoid his nightmare i.e. the danger of physical participation in the civil war. He had the whole time to engage himself in the collection of quotations and empress other CC members who had no time for reading. He had the possibility to disseminate his point of view as a teacher of cadres and above all the possibility to train and organise his loyal cadres as his own troop for the struggle for power within the organisation. 

An article in the constitution of the MLLT makes the previously unwritten but applied law clear that only Meles had as an individual the monopoly to disseminate his anachronistic views in the form of political education to his cadres by stating the following: "any member who wants to disseminate a new idea has to get a permission from the Central Committee to do so". (MLLT constitution. in Tigrigna July 1985, p 9). There was no discussion on the introduction of such an article in the TPLF but some members of the EPDM like Getatchew (Yared Tibebu) opposed the concept that members were required to get permission to express a new idea. Tamrat Layne argued for the introduction of the article and prevailed with the intervention of Meles. 

This, according to experience means taking care not to express any new idea or an idea that opposes an existing one. If one member does not share one’s idea with another individual, one would not get a feedback, if one shares the idea without a permission from the CC, it would be seen as factionalism because it is against the Stalinist centralism. If one applies for permission to express one’s idea, one cannot be sure that the idea in the application would not be distorted by the self- proclaimed leader for one reason or another and used to incriminate the applicant. And finally, if one is harassed, imprisoned or even liquidated for entertaining a certain idea, nobody except the perpetrator would, due to the total absence of transparency, know what happened and why.

Meles practically formed an organisation within the TPLF under the cover of the preparation for the formation of a party. He included all veteran members of the TPLF in a grouping of a so called "vanguard elements" of the TPLF, which was the forerunner of the MLLT to avoid dissent amongst the veterans, before the position of his cadres was consolidated. He simply prepared a list of names and read it out for all to hear during the congress of the TPLF in 1983. He later became the head of the ideology and propaganda activities of the organisation under the cover of which he gave key positions to his own cadres. 

The mystification of the MLLT and power struggle

The CC of the TPLF tried to avoid the emergence of a personality cult from among its ranks and claimed to exercise a collective leadership. This exercise was the logical outcome of the fact that the founders of the Front were at a more or less similar educational level as well as degree of experience in the struggle. They were in one clique before the crystallisation of their differences and had to agree to be equal in front of their subordinate new comers. 

No member was supposed to write his/her name in connection with an article or any writing so that some may not be more known than others, thus leading to the development of a cult. Differences of opinion within the CC were kept so secret to non-CC members, that the expression of any basic critical opinion of non-CC members was blocked. Since the members of the CC stood en block, as if they were reading from the same book (according to Meles reiterated this Phrase even as a head of government, Addis Zemen July 1998), there was no room of manoeuvre for the opinion of the rank-and-file-members, lest they be branded sectarians and be dealt with correspondingly as counter-revolutionaries, anti people etc. Conformity and discipline became therefore synonymous. Consequently the choice of agenda and discussions were rituals of top-down-indoctrination which had to be accepted.

One of the consequences of the above system of leadership was that decisions and explanations of the CC members were attributed to that of the Front as a whole. As individual opinions of the CC members were hidden, so were also their responsibilities. Concrete individuals became abstract in the name of the Front. The Front was personified and thus mystified. If something went wrong or was simply declared to be wrong, there was somebody to blame for being allegedly against the Front and not for opposing a certain idea or action from a certain member of the CC, because in the final analysis the CC was the Front until the power struggle within the CC could no more be kept secret. 

Although the process of differentiation within the CC of the TPLF was not openly discussed by non CC-Members, it became gradually evident in the distribution of power. The four committees, the political, military, economic and foreign committees were first led each by a politburo member. The five initial CC members (Abay, Aregawi, Gidey, Sebhat and Seyoum) had become Politburo members after the first congress in 1979, as if they wanted to move away from the new CC members. Since none of the five could impose his view on any other, they had a phase of collective leadership. Meles as the deputy of Abay, the political head of the Front, sought a loophole and followed the strategy of curbing the power of the other politburo members and subordinating them to the political committee under Abay, because on the one hand Abay was respected as a person and on the other hand politics was supposed to lead all other activities. But the concept of subordinating all other activities to politics was misused to such an extent that it became structural.

After some time, Seyoum, who was the head of the foreign relations committee and the weakest of the five, partly owing to his detachment from the field became the first victim. He was subordinated to the political committee. Seyoum practically became less important, whereas Meles was gaining more power indirectly behind Abay. Interestingly, it was Meles who, breaking the show of solidarity amongst the members of the CC, spoke about the need of curbing the power of Seyoum. Seyoum had on the advice of Professor Richard Greenfield changed the concept of a united front of the TPLF. The change put the U.S.A. as an enemy of the Ethiopian people parallel with the Soviet Union. Meles on hearing of the change said: (in the presence of one of the authors) "the TPLF had no need of a Sabe". Usman Salih Sabe was responsible for the foreign relations of the EPLF and said to be growing independent of the EPLF leadership in the field. Seyoum accepted his demotion and appeared to be so eager to adjust himself to the wishes of Meles at all costs that his demotion seemed not to have taken place at all. Therefore Seyoum's recent interview in Demtis Weyane (TPLF radio) is a manifestation of his continuous servile allegiance towards Meles, even to the extent of repeating the latter’s ugly expressions.

The strategy of Meles in the power struggle that politics were to lead the military was again used against Aregawi, who was the head of the military committee to be subordinated to the political committee, as if the structure were more decisive than the political concept. Therefore Meles used first Abay and the political committee to win influence and then the MLLT, as a second instrument. Since he could not use only the MLLT to get rid of his seniors in the hierarchy, he won the tacit support of Abbay Tsehaye and the active co-operation of Sebhat Nega, the chairman of the TPLF then, to launch his intrigues to destroy Aregawi Berhe, and Gidey Zeratsion, the deputy chairman of the TPLF. 

There were two incidents, which led to a personal animosity between Meles and Aregawi. Firstly, Aregawi had ordered imposed on Meles physical punishment such as carrying water, cooking and push ups for failing to discharge his duty during the exchange of fire in a military operation at Adwa in 1977. He had participated as a deputy commander next to Aregawi in the operation; it means that Aregawi confirmed the validity of the accusation of cowardice against Meles, which was an embarrassment for the latter in front of fighters trimmed to be selfless.

Secondly. Aregawi wrote a letter to Sebhat reminding him of some factional activities by Meles. Sebhat secretly showed the letter to Meles instead of expressing his agreement or disagreement with Aregawi’s suggestion. Meles and Co. prepared for the final coup against Aregawi. Gidey who was approached in the course of the preparation and did not agree to become an accomplice became the next target.

When the founding congress of the MLLT took place in July 1985, the power struggle within the leadership of the TPLF was openly known only to the CC members and the cadres prepared by Meles. As a result of this system of destructive secrecy, differences of opinion, which both perpetrators and victims claim to have had, were not openly discussed before and during the congress. The protagonists were elected to the CC of the MLLT in the tradition of the TPLF (the old leadership, those appointed by it as deputies, those suggested by it as candidates and those for whose candidacy the members of the election gremium made up of CC members demonstratively raise their hands, get elected). 

After the congress, a meeting of the members of CC of the MLLT and TPLF took place. Aregawi and Gidey were demoted, isolated, harassed and they had to accept political tutors just to humiliate them till they were forced to leave Tigray altogether. Even private letters of Gidey were read in some units and used for ridiculing and cracking jocks. Once a small group picked by Meles and co reached decisions, the remaining members of the TPLF had to hear the decisions with corresponding explanations. Aregawi and Gidey did not have basic differences even with Meles. It was simply a power struggle that ended up the phase of the collective leadership. 

There was a stage-managed podium discussion between Gidey and Meles, in which the participants either applauded Meles or had to keep quiet. Meles demagogically portrayed Gidey as "a gangrene of the organisation. And as an infected limb must be amputated to save the life of a person, Gidey must be amputated to save the organisation". Meles declared: "Gidey is not a political animal" and ordered the latter to get out of the meeting. Abay Tsehaye, who was nominally the General Secretary of the MLLT, expressed his pride that there were people like Meles who defended the line of the organisation. Abay’s reverence for Meles could not be overlooked and this showed that he had given up his role in the political leadership of the TPLF/MLLT. 

The thesis of amputation from Meles says a lot about the taboo of having different opinions in the organisation. Amputation in this connection is the justification for liquidation, purges and isolations. If a member is declared to be gangrene or an unwanted person by Meles, he is automatically an outcast. Such a person, if not killed is all of a sudden an alien amongst his/her former friends, because the former friends do not want to be associated with the outcast out of fear. Meles Bezabeh had to commit suicide after such a dirty experience that made him an outcast.

Here is an example of what happens to those who do not respect this rule of getting rid of an outcast: Teklu Hawaz, a member of the CC of the TPLF, who did not agree with the measures taken against Aregawi and Gidey was sent to a military operation near Adigrat and arrested on the way. Addisalem Balema, the most loyal cadres of Meles who (after receiving an English language course in London) later became the Ethiopian Ambassador first to Italy and then to the People’s Republic of china, explained in 1988, in London that: "Fighters who chat with Aregawi always reported what Aregawi told them, but Teklu who was seen with Aregawi more often than any other person, did not report. Therefore he was sent to a battle with Samora and arrested because he was suspected of planning to escape. And he was suspected because he looked absent-minded". Teklu was murdered. There are several versions as to how and when he was liquidated, but there is no doubt that he was sent to the battle as part of the plan to murder him.

An interesting aspect of the mystification of the TPLF is, how Meles tried to transfer the mystification of the TPLF to the MLLT. He had to dismantle the myth around the TPLF in order to discredit the leaders of the TPLF he wanted to get rid of. Therefore, he wrote that the TPLF were not only not showing any progress, that it were not even only stagnating at what it had achieved but rather deteriorating and loosing the level it had reached. He declared the TPLF to be on the brink of collapse, a phrase, which he always employs to justify liquidation and purges, or amputations in his own words as in 1978 so also in 1985 and now in 2001.

Meles described what he called the basic mistakes of the TPLF in Leninist polemical categories as "empiricism" and "pragmatism". The point of the mystification is not whether the TPLF had committed mistakes or not. It is rather the claim that the mistakes were corrected not because some individuals perceived certain mistakes, but because the MLLT came into being and corrected the mistakes of the TPLF, as if the MLLT had a certain magical power to do so. Accordingly, the TPLF was declared to have made the mistake of pragmatism by for instance, concealing its Marxist nature out of sheer opportunism, in order to get money from the West, thereby hiding its Marxist program and identity to its Marxist-Leninist strategic allies and hence missing the opportunity to start and cement its relationship with its strategic allies (a report to the Congress of the TPLF and MLLT in Tigrigna, 1989). 

Meles suddenly started counting the mistakes of the TPLF and called them pragmatic on the eve of the formation of the MLLT. He then picked some members for reproach. But none of the reproached, like Seyoum and Asfeha was working in opposition to the guidelines of the leadership as a whole in which Meles was a key part. As no one was running one’s own policy the reproached were taken by surprise and could neither defend a pragmatic approach for which they were supposed to be responsible nor themselves. It could on the surface appear that Meles stood for textbook Leninism but he was simply using it to attack others in the power struggle. This can clearly be seen in the contradiction between calling relations with imperialists opportunist (pragmatic) but ordering and driving around 200,000 peasants* to the Sudan (13,000 died on the route) so that the TPLF could get aid from those characterised as class enemies. Every argument used against pragmatism was reversed after the Meles group prevailed in the power struggle.

Pursuant to the above change of policy before it was again changed, extremely small and pro Albanian ML-Parties all over the world and the Labour Party of Albania were contacted as a correction of this alleged opportunistic mistake. TPLF members responsible for foreign relations were reprimanded for not doing so much earlier. Asfeha (Mulugeta) Hagos, a member of the CC of the TPLF, in the department of foreign affairs left the Front and sought asylum in Norway. Asfeha complained about his isolation. When he was supposed to organise the invitation of the ML Parties to the founding congress of the MLLT, he complained that he did not himself take part in any discussion about the MLLT. 

Many of the victims of Meles had similar grievances, but we did not exchange them as we were not open to each other, because we had gone through a nasty period of recriminations and were witness to imprisonment and killings. We were used to repeating what was already said, in order to be on the safe side. This atmosphere of keeping quiet on serious matters had the effect that we who devoted our full-time for political activities and even our lives were forced to avoid unauthorised political discussions. We were at ease only when we talked about issues, which did not involve political risks, like battles, journeys, hardships, hunger, thirst etc. We were conditioned to mutually suspect each other, which made it easy for Meles to disseminate his ideas through his robot-like cadres with an official blessing and with little challenge.

The TPLF was also said by Meles to be on the brink of collapse due to "empiricist" mistakes, because it, according to Meles, depended on its own practical experience instead of adopting scientific theories. The theory was supposed to have been discovered due to the formation of the MLLT, which was destined to lead the TPLF, which it allegedly saved from collapse. On the surface, the TPLF was being discredited to make place for the MLLT. But it was part of the leadership of the TPLF, which was practically being discredited, while the other part, which was controlled by Meles was taking the credit for "saving" the TPLF. Culprits had to be found for the imagined threat of collapse and "amputated" (in the words of Meles) Meles concentrated himself primarily on the struggle for power against those who took him for a friend within the TPLF, but his victims were not aware of this fact till it was too late! The former CC members of the TPLF and later victims of Meles behaved like a child who understands that fire hurts, only after making a personal experience!

To be continued

Tesfay Atsbeha

Kahsay Berhe, E-mail: [email protected]

Further information on this and other similar issues:

-A book by Kahsay Berhe: Ethiopia: Democratisation and Nation-Building - Documentation and Critical Analysis, which will soon be published,

-Can One Accuse a Tyrant in Ethiopia?, 1997, by Kahsay Berhe and Tesfay Atsbeha,

-The National Movement in Tigray: Myths and Realities, February 1991, by Kahsay Berhe,

-Die positiven und negativen Aspekte der TPLF-MLLT, Maerz/April 1990, by Tesfay Atsbeha

-Mystifizierung der Partei zur Glorifizierung einer Person, 1990, by Tesfay Atsbeha, 

-Hizbawi Woyane Harnet Tigray: Nabeyn Kemeyn?, March 1989, by Kahsay Berhe,