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However, this was just a cover for the creation of one of the most advanced game machines ever Another member was added with the employment of Dave Morse as project manager for the new game machine. He code named the machine 'Lorraine' after his wife. Soon after Larry Kaplan became impatient with the amount of time need to develop the game console and left Hi-Toro. His role as Vice President was quickly replaced by Jay Miner. Soon after, Hi-Toro changed its name to Amiga Corporation, to avoid confusion with the Japanese lawnmower, Toro. The choice was made after looking in a dictionary for a name that sounded 'friendly'. Amiga is the Spanish word for female friend. It was also meant to attract people- 'Amiga' was therefore a marketing gimmick. Of course, the fact that it came before Apple and Atari in listings also helped! Although Miner did not like the name at first he soon realized the importance of it. .
As the machine developed, there was increasing conflict between the financial backers and the developers. The Amiga team wanted to create a computer but the management simply wanted a game console. Amiga were under obligation to create a console, leading to the addition of a cartridge port in the Lorraine prototype. Alongside this a number of 'features' were added, including a keyboard interface and room for expanded memory. There was also concern that information on the new machine would leak out. The company were in a vulnerable position meaning any company could buy them and use the technology to their advantage. To avoid suspicion they gave each chip a woman's name, such as Agnus and Paula. If anyone overheard conversations all they would learn is that Agnus wouldn't let Daphne do her work!
By September the custom chip prototypes were mostly finished- there were 3
in all: Agnus (Address Generator), Daphne, that would later be renamed Denise
(Display Adapter) and Portia, eventually called Paula (Ports and Audio). The
only problem was shrinking them, they looked more like something from a mainframe
rather than the next generation of microcomputer.
Unfortunately, by this time the Amigas secret had moved beyond the four walls
of their building and a number of corporations were eyeing the company with
a vultures gaze...
After a redesign the bread boards were eventually replaced by real Amiga chips and demonstrated the machine again. By this time debts were piling up and the Amiga team were forced to place all they owned on the line, Dave Morse took out a second mortgage on his house. Amiga Inc. appealed to Sony, Apple, Silicon Graphics, Atari, and many others, but only Atari were interested, making a deal on the Amigas custom chips. Under the control of the former Commodore boss, Jack Tramiel, the Amiga became his rising star and he loaned Amiga $500,000. However, Atari only wanted the Amiga technology in an attempt to get into the 16 bit market before Commodore, who were working on a Unix box, and had no interest in the team that created it. Dave Haynie stated later that Atari knew that Amiga, Inc. could not pay back the money and started to play dirty, reducing the amount offered to just 98 cents per share for the company. Amiga grudgingly accepted the offer but, unknown to Atari, was still looking around for potential investors. On Tuesday, July 3rd, Atari employees were informed all 8-bit projects have been canceled and the Amiga project was on hold. Facing cancellation the Amiga team began to look around for other options in an attempt to find a buyer.
On Monday, August 13th, Atari filed a $100 million suit in the Santa Clara
County Superior Court against Amiga Corporation charging breach of contract.
Atari suggest that Amiga fraudulently dealt with other potential buyers after
agreeing to negotiate licensing specific microprocessors to Atari Inc. in return
for a $500,000 advance payment. The tentative plans between Amiga and Atari
incorporated terms that Atari would purchase one million preferred shares of
Amiga at $3 each by September 1st. Although Amiga had returned the $500,000
advance by the end of June, Atari sought damages as well as an injunction preventing
Amiga from delivering or selling chips except to Atari.
Two days later, on the 15th of August, Commodore International Ltd. announces
they will purchase Amiga Corporation. The Amiga team manage to get Commodore
to raise its bid to $4.25 a share, and just before the deadline ended C= gave
them $1,000,00 to pay back Atari, on the condition that they would get to buy
Amiga Inc. The Amiga and its creators moved to the newly created subsidiary,
'Commodore-Amiga Inc.' and continued to develop the newly renamed Amiga computer
with 27 million dollars of extra development money. The Amiga had been saved!!!
However, the Commodore management became dissatisfied with what they saw as
a lack of progress, the operating system was still quite far from completion.
Originally intended as an entirely mouse driven system, Intuition as it is rumoured
to have been called at the time, was behind schedule. They decided to employ
an outside developer, MetaComCo to port a version
of Tripos and incorporate it into the existing code (Note the similarities to
the Linux decision during 1999!). The result was far below the expectations
of Jay Miner and his team, lacking many of the features that they had intended
(resource-tracking, etc.).
The dream machine had become spoiled, tainted, all in the name of business...
At £1500, the A1000 did not compete favorably with the ST and things went quiet for the time being. Commodore missed out on a golden opportunity to sell the Amiga as a professional machine, encouraging the game image that had made the C64 so popular. The Atari ST's lead makes it a difficult adversary, with the Amiga playing second fiddle to the ST regarding game releases. It is difficult to indicate just how advanced the Amiga was compared to other systems. Apple had a graphical interface but was largely restricted to the black and white monitor display, whilst PCs were still horrible text based systems. The Amiga also had an ace up its sleeve by the fact that it was TV compatible and could be used for editing footage. A task that even now the Mac and PC cannot do as standard. Soon after the release of the A1000, the world's first Amiga magazine, Amiga World, was released. The juggler demo was also coded - the world famous scene of a character juggling reflective balls in a 3D environment. The graphical hardware of the machine spurred Electronic Arts to rewrite their IBM PC package, Prism (which was an enhanced port of Doodle for Xerox machines) and release it for the Amiga during September. The rewrite was christened Deluxe Paint and the rest is history.
In the Commodore boardroom dramatic events were unfolding. On April 22, Chairman Irving Gould replaced Rattigan who was currently in control of Commodore. It is unclear as to why he was replaced after turning the company around. The company had posted $28 million in profits over the four quarters ending in March 1987. Rattigan claimed that Chairman Gould forced him out due to personality conflicts and that Gould was upset about Rattigan getting credit for the company's turnaround. Gould argued that the profits in the U.S. were nothing compared to the drop on market share overseas where 70% of its market was. Under Gould's control, the North American operation was changed from an independent operation to a sale and marketing division. The payroll was also cut from 4,700 to 3,100, including half the North American headquarters' corporate staff, and five plants were closed.
It is widely agreed that the A600 should never have been launched, especially as a machine with a new chipset was just around the corner. Excitement grew as news of the A4000 reached the public- a new chipset titled AA (Advanced Amiga). It was finally confirmed at the World of Commodore, held in Pasadena, USA on September 11th. They hailed it as:
"the company's most significant new technology advancement
in its Amiga line since the product's introduction in 1985."
At last the Amiga was being upgraded to compete with the latest generation of PC clones and Apple Macs. An updated version of the Amiga operating system was also announced. The AmigaDOS TM Release 3 Operating System included CrossDOS (allowing access to PC disks), datatypes (an attempt at adding system-wide plugins), localization (allowing multi language configuration), a standard installer utility, improvements to the file system (increased speed using directory caching as well as better support for international, non-English characters) ,and much more...
The new A4000's power lay in the newly renamed AGA chipset (renamed for the European market to avoid confusion with the Automobile Association). AGA (Advanced Graphics Architecture) supported 256 colours on screen out of a palette of 16.7M colours, as well as an advancement on the HAM mode devised by Jay Miner. The new screen mode, known as HAM-8 allowed 256,000 colours on screen at once. The system also used the latest 68040 processor, allowing it to compete with the latest version of the Apple Mac. Commodore had pulled off an amazing trick by upgrading the system to full 32-bit whilst retaining compatibility with most OCS/ECS software. A problem that would destroy Atari's market lead when they released the Falcon. By ensuring compatibility with most 16-bit titles the Amiga had ensured its continuation. However, developers were looking at it bitterly after seeing the pre-production models that had been produced, that in most cases were significantly better than the A4000. Commodore really seemed to be taking the Amiga community seriously producing development tools to tap into the multimedia market, announcing the AmigaVision Professional Authoring System.
The second AA (AGA)-based machine to be released was the A1200. Although significantly delayed until December of that year it was to be one of the most popular Amigas ever. Aimed at the low-end of the market it was a similar design to the A500, but it included the new AGA chipset, PCMCIA slot, 68020 processor as standard and 2Mb ram. It became the object of desire for many users and a great deal of units were sold even before the machine was released. The Amiga star seemed to be rising at last but trouble was just around the corner.
The A1200 remained the most highly desired machine of 1993, but the PC was looming from behind like a vulture, ready to attack the traditional Amiga market- the home.
"There should be no impact in the UK marketplace... The brand is too strong to die: we're confident that Commodore and the Amiga will come out of this a better, stronger company."In the month before they went bust a new A4000 machine was unveiled called the A4000T. It offered more expandability and Workbench 3.1, but was too late and only a few were manufactured.
As time passed and the final stock of Amigas ran out it became increasingly clear that they may not be able to afford too buy the company, At one point it was claimed that a large bank was supporting them but this appears too have come to nothing. Time slipped away and the PC took over the Amigas position in the home.
Escom quickly separated the Commodore name and the Amiga from each other, badging new PCs, as well as speakers, keyboards, and anything else that they could think of with the redesigned Commodore logo. A new subsidiary was set up by Escom called Amiga Technologies, headed by a number of Amiga people, including Jonathan Anderson. There was even discussions of Amiga set-top Internet boxes from a company called VISCorp, who had became the first company ever to license Amiga technology. However, Amiga owners became increasingly skeptical as Amigas failed to materialize into the shops. It was finally a rainy day at the end of October when the new Amiga Magic pack appeared. A4000 wannabes had to wait until February of 1996 just to buy their machines. Escom appeared to be making losses from their expansion into the UK but were playing down any concerns. History looked set to repeat itself.
As Escom entered its final stages in July they attempted to raise capital by negotiating a deal with VISCorp too buy the Amiga. VISCorp announced they would abandon the Walker and continue with their Amiga Internet set-top box. Any other company who wished to develop the Amiga technology would be licensed the operating system. However, as the year progressed stories increased of VISCorp not being able to pay their own employees, casting their Amiga acquisition into even more doubt. In October they quietly dropped out of the Amiga buyout. December saw a surprise announcement from Quikpak, communicating their intentions to buy the Amiga. These events, however, could not stop the Amiga falling behind even further.
Meanwhile, phase 5 were busily working upon the PowerUP boards they had developed in conjunction with Amiga Technologies. The death of Escom left the short term patches to the existing AmigaOS as a long term development plan. Cautious that there may not even be a future for the official Amiga, phase 5 set about channeling the Amiga market into their own A/Box machine. If the Amiga was to die the market would continue with a PowerPC computer that represented many of the ideals. The Retargetable Graphics market was also picking up with the release of CyberVision 64 and Picasso IV. At the time the competition between graphics cards was as fierce as the PPC kernel would be in future years. The effects of VISCorp's brush with the Amiga was also being felt. The good news was that Carl Sassenrath, creator of EXEC & CDXL was busy developing a language called Lava. The name would soon change its name to Rebol, showing that the ideals behind parts of the Amiga were not dead. The language would play an important part in the counter-Amiga movement two years later. The good news was tempered by the announcement that Almathera Systems Ltd. had gone out of business. The company blamed cash flow problems as a result of non-payment by VIScorp for their work on the ED. Village Tronic were also involved in litigation with Amiga Technologies over their sale of Amiga OS3.1 Upgrades, leaving the upgrade in short supply.
March was also the month that kick-started the second wave of Amiga games. The unofficial Myst slideshow released on Aminet had shown such a game was possible on the Amiga, and it was quickly picked up by clickBOOM. This was soon followed by an illegal port of Quake to the Amiga. It was slow, only managing four frames a second but the game had a certain attraction. This would eventually lead to the release of Quake for 68k Amigas.
After months of waiting the fate of the Amiga was settled and the winner was Gateway 2000. At the last minute Dell had decided against the purchase and had registered a no-bid. At the time they described the purchase as a box marked 'Stuff'. They were surprised to find that the box included millions of loyal users. Gateway's relationship with Microsoft was going through a rough patch at the time and in an attempt to tweak the nose of both Intel and Microsoft they set up a new subsidiary, renaming Amiga Technologies to Amiga International. For the moment, Petro Tyschtschenko remained in charge of the company. At the World of Amiga 97 in Novotel, London, the new company outlined their plans for the rebirth of the Amiga. First on the agenda was the development of a new version of the operating system by spring of 1998. Petro indicated they would take the majority of the software from the existing Amiga market, incorporating PD enhancements such as MCP, as well as standardized support for Retargetable graphics and sound. It was also planned to include a TCP stack and Universal Serial Bus (USB) support. Two years later when AmigaOS 3.5 was finally released, Amiga owners were still waiting for USB ports. Beyond the 68k processor, Amiga International committed themselves to the PowerPC once again, promising to port the AmigaOS and release it during the second half 1998. The company were not intending to develop the hardware themselves, but would license it to others, such as phase 5 and PIOS for use with the A/BOX and TransAM. Amiga International soon had their first turnaround, deciding against their software-only policy and announcing they would also be developing a 'Power Amiga'. It was a decision the company would agonize over for some time.
The purchase of the Amiga by Gateway 2000 invigorated the market more than
Escom had ever done. The first sign of Amiga International's influence was felt,
with the licensing of the Amiga technology to a range of companies. For the
first time Amiga Clones were making their way onto the shelves under a new logo,
"Powered by Amiga". The clones were simply repackaged A1200's in a tower case
but it was a start. There was also news of Index Information developing a new
Amiga called the Access, aimed at Point of Sale platform. The company had a
hard time developing expansions for the Amiga (see CD32x)
during the Commodore time so it was good to see them finally using the Amiga
to their advantage.
Later, at the Computer '97 show, Petro Tyschtschenko would expand on the reasoning
behind this policy, revealing two tiers to their plans for the Amiga. The main
functions of these were:
The sale of the Amiga to Gateway was followed on July 17th by a press release announcing the acquisition of the far east rights by Lotus Pacific. Surely Gateway had not sold the Amiga already? The confusion continued when the company announced the release of the WonderTV A6000 multimedia computer. The purchase was quickly refuted by Gateway. As the story unfolded it became clear that the acquisition was based upon a deal made with Escom two years previous. An examination of the original Escom press release indicates a license was only given for production and trading, not complete ownership of Amiga patents in that area of the world. At the time there appeared to be a huge court battle looming over the Amiga again, until the two companies reached an agreement.
As had been suspected, the promises of an upgrade to AmigaOS 3.1 by the end of the year were exaggerated. Amiga International simply acted as a representative of Amiga, they were unable to develop software themselves. The first signs of progress from Gateway came in September with another subsidiary being set up called Amiga Inc. Taking its name from the first Amiga company, their primary concern was the future development of the Amiga, leaving Amiga International to take care of sales and marketing. The new general manager of the new subsidiary was Jeff Schindler. He had worked for Gateway for some time, developing the Destination for them and had a knowledge of Commodore products. Along with the announcement Petro Tyschtschenko made another release date for the newly named AmigaOS 3.5 during Spring 1998 at the latest, with new hardware following in the Winter. Yet another unrealistic release date was set, surprising few when it was broken.
Amiga Inc?
The company got off too a good start, meeting members of the ICOA to brainstorm
ideas for the new Amiga and show the world that there were people in charge
of the Amiga that actually cared about the product. Andy Finkel, who many will
remember from the Commodore days, was invited to give his view on the future
of the Amiga, as well as introducing Joe Torre and Fleecy Moss. Names that would
go down in Amiga history.
As the year drew to a close, optimism was high in the Amiga market. The purchase of the Amiga by Gateway 2000 had given developers new hope and a range of new software and hardware was being developed. The promised PPC boards from phase 5 were also finally arriving, allowing the Amiga to start the transition from 68k to another platform. Problems relating to Amiga emulation and piracy were finally confronted with the licensing of the Amiga OS and ROMs by Cloanto. The revelation of new 68k Amigas appearing for the first time since 1994 (BoXeR, DCE A5000, Micronik A1500) was showing that the Amiga was not dead yet. Behind the scenes, talks between Amiga Inc. and Be were going on, regarding licensing part of the BeOS, but no one was saying anything yet. Behind them was a successful year that had allowed the company to keep the Amiga market alive and provide fresh supplies of Amiga parts. In front of them lay the future- a future that would move the Amiga into higher circles and once again take on fresh challenges. But as current Amiga owners know, it took them a while to work everything out...
The software market was also particularly buoyant. The source code to Doom and Descent had been released, leading to a series of Amiga ports, Myst had already been announced, and now Quake was getting the official treatment. The game was worth the wait when it was finally released but the lack of PowerPC support resulted in many people downloading an illegal copy (FastQuake, etc.). The release of the Netscape Navigator source code also lead to suggestions it could be ported to the Amiga. After a few months of nothing, FreeAmiga picked it up and began the arduous task of rewriting the code to work on Amiga. Finally after being left in the cold for so long, the Amiga seemed to be attracting new software to fill the gap.
In a separate announcement, 'Gateway 2000' shortened their name to just 'Gateway' and announced a shift in how customers use PCs. In a press release, Ted Waitt stated,
"More than ever before, consumers and business users are looking for solutions that are tailored to their specific requirements - technology that adapts to them, rather than forces them to adapt."It soon became clear that this unrelated announcement would play a major part in Gateway's role with the Amiga, lining it up as the successor to the desktop market.
At the time it was indicated that the first stage would be the release of a x86-based developers system, running a beta version of the final OS. Confusingly this was to be called AmigaOS 4.0, although it had little to do with previous versions and would only act as a predecessor to the finished product, AmigaOS 5.0. This developer system was planned for release in November, leading many to dub it the "November Box". The choice of an x86 processor angered many Intel-phobics. At the time Usenet and mailing lists were awash with angry words of betrayal or comments that they would no longer support the Amiga. Amiga Inc. immediately issued a damage control explaining that AmigaOS 4.0 (later becoming OS5Developers, AmigaSoft, and then Amiga OE) was to be a transitionally platform that would only be used to allow developers to produce software for the machine in time for the release during the year 2000. This would then make way for the final product, based upon an advanced hardware. The clean break away was seen by some as a betrayal and others as the only way for the Amiga to survive. If Amiga Inc. were to develop new products based on open standards as they had planned, the Amiga must die and be born again rather than hanging onto the past.
The effect of this quickly became clear for many Amiga users at the show. As far as Amiga Inc. were concerned AmigaOS 3.x legacy systems would go into "graceful" retirement once the new Amiga was released. To avoid confusion with the new Amigas existing 68k and PPC systems were dubbed "Classic Amiga". Recognizing the announcement would mean an end to the Amiga market altogether phase 5 and Haage & Partner buried the hatchet over the PPC kernel debate and produced a unified alternative to the development system. Working until early in the morning, they proposed to develop a Classic Amiga PPC development system. Under the new deal, phase 5 would produce the hardware, while H&P produce the software. The move may have single handily saved the Amiga market leading to the development of 'Pure' PowerPC systems, running the AmigaOS through emulation that are gradually appearing towards the year 2000. The "Classic" Amiga will retain its unique charm, attracting new developers years after the final one has been produced, just as the C64 has in the past.
Over the next few months information and speculation about the new Amiga began to come out. It soon became clear that the specifications were not set in stone and things were liable to change. Towards the end of 1998 the 'MMC' took the back burner, and the specifications were claimed to be the target rather than associated with a particular card. Fleecy Moss stated at the time that it was no longer important as the OS would be the major driving force. However, he would comment just a year later that there was a 'MMC' graphics card in existence but the company that produced them had been bought. The producer behind the Mystery chip seemed to be clear, it was Chromatic. They had been bought by ATI soon before the announcement that the OS was the driving force. Meanwhile the Amiga community were growing impatient over the lack of news regarding an OS partner. While it had become common knowledge that a deal had fell through, the 30 day limit on a new announcement had long since past. An announcement was finally made at the Computer '98 show on November 15th, revealing the new OS partner as QNX (pronounced Q-Nix). The QNX Neutrino kernel was welcomed by the Amiga community, although very few knew anything about it at first, the OS was seen as a true successor to the AmigaOS. The highly efficient design meant the kernel was just 50k in size. It could even run a web server as well as a number of utilities from a single disk. A task that even the AmigaOS cannot perform! The good news was soon followed by the bad, when it was announced that Fleecy Moss had been sacked from Amiga Inc. Fleecy was in control of a number of projects, leading to fears that AmigaOS 3.5 was canceled. After much discussion this was eventually contracted to Haage & Partner allowing it to continue. However, Fleecy's treatment led turned many developers away from Amiga Inc. damaging the OS3.5 project.
The year represented the Amigas move towards developing a new product. No longer would it be the damned offspring of Commodore. For the first time in 5 years plans were being made to turn the Amiga around. However, the development had come at a cost that would eventually lead to the market being split between QNX and Amiga. The company had been burnt a few times but had come out wiser and stronger. Once the Amiga market accepted the current situation, the merits of QNX became clear. The future looked promising but would soon become tarnished with poor choices as the Amiga was grasped as a marketing concept.
The mess that had been made of the Be announcement and the sacking of Fleecy Moss led Gateway to evaluate the subsidiary. For a time it seemed the company would have been closed altogether. It was only with the introduction of proper leadership in the form of Jim Collas that saved them from extinction. Recognizing the philosophy behind the Amiga, he took a significant pay cut to drive it forward. This came in the form of a fast track plan to develop a new Amiga. As part of the move Gateway recognized their part in the lack of action, allowing it to become an entirely independent subsidiary rather than controlled by the slow movement of their parent company. This would allow Amiga Inc. to develop the technology needed for the expanding convergence market. This was followed by news that Amiga Inc. were planning to develop an Amiga computer themselves. The announcement was promising but it would soon become clear that Gateway did not want its child to stray too far.
Just a month later the first signs of the Amiga's rebirth could be seen,
with recruitment adverts appearing to attract developers to the new Amiga operating
system. The first of those appointed was Richard Lipes who became software engineer
for graphics and Audio/Video, and Dr. Rick Lefaivre, the new CTO. Both had an
established background, working for the likes of Apple and Silicon Graphics.
The duplication of effort that came from having two separate Amiga companies
was also improved, leading to the merging of the German Amiga International
and the American Amiga Inc. into one company, simply called 'Amiga'. On the
17th March, the Amiga.com and amiga.de sites merged. Previously both sites had
been updated separately, leading to differing reports and news on each site.
However, the merger was never entirely convincing for the user and it soon dissolved
when Jim Collas left a few months later.
March was also the month that the first unofficial support for the next generation
Amiga was revealed. Com-Digit Journal published an article on the Amigas rebirth,
indicating Corel would support the Amiga. This caused a great deal of excitement
at the time. The company were known for their Wordperfect suite, leading to
speculation that it would soon be ported to the new OS. There was also speculation
that Transmeta, the mysterious hardware company was also working with Amiga.
At the time both of these rumours were rejected by Amiga as completely untrue,
but just a few months later Corel officially announced
support for the Amiga.
Meanwhile, Amiga had quietly contacted Corel and many other companies in a desperate
search for support for their new QNX-derived operating system. Each time they
were turned away. Developers were still afraid of committing to a non-Windows
operating system. The only alternative they would support was Linux. This lead
Amiga Inc. to evaluate Linux for the third time to see if it could be made to
fit in with their plan, while keeping the front they were still committed to
QNX.
On the Classic Amiga front, events were not going to well. Siamese Systems were finding the market too small to develop their products. As developer of the Siamese PCI card, money was needed to build prototype units. The planned support from Amiga International had been withdrawn. It soon became evident that Amiga's plans had changed. They had been planning to use the Siamese PCI card as an expansion to the AmigaNG for legacy compatibility. Unless something was done quickly, it was feared the "Classic" market may not survive long enough for anyone to care.
The Convergence market began to hot up with the announcement by IBM on 28th March that the PC era was over, Information Appliance type devices were be the next big thing. Suddenly the people that were laughing at Amigas plans for Internet Appliances stopped and began to take notice of the company. Over the next few months the eyes would widen with shock and amazement at every twist and turn.
The year was also a milestone for those seeking to expand their Amigas. The first commercial Amiga PowerPC game was announced during April. Unfortunately, Eat The Whistle from Hurricane Studios was delayed and the PPC-only WipeOut 2097 became the first of many. Power Computing released a version of the Power Flyer able to read DVD disks and announced a Zorro USB card. Although the hardware would require a PowerPC and an MPEG decoder to make the most of it, the expansion opened a range of possibilities. This was followed a few days later by the announcement of Shogo for the Amiga by Hyperion and Digital Images. The port of the LithTech 3D engine used in the game also opened the possibility of similar games making their way onto the Amiga. Digital Images also opened talks with Binary Asylum about the possible development of Zeewolf 3, the sequel to the 1996 classic helicopter game. Those who thought the PowerPC was an expensive doorstop were finally being forced to reconsider.
Meanwhile, Amiga had not been standing still. The company had previously decided
upon a monthly update on their web site, detailing the events of the month.
The May edition indicated the concept designs were almost complete, and showed
the first of several. Dubbed "Kyoto" the design showed little that had not been
seen before. Jeff Schindler's influence was clear, the device looked more like
a PCTV than an Amiga. In the first of the magazine-first policy, Amiga revealed
all of the images in the August issue of Amiga Format. These demonstrated an
assortment of designs, ranging from webpads to kitchen-top devices.
Despite Amiga's demonstration that they were finally meeting their goals, shadowy
figures at Gateway were beginning to question the actions they were taking.
In an interview with the UK Guardian newspaper, Ted Waitt Gateway CEO indicated
Amiga were not a computer company. The sentence released a stream of email to
Jim Collas, president of Amiga. Accusations ranged from deliberately misleading
the community to personal insults. Jim Collas attempted to repair the damage
suggesting that this was Gateway's interest in the company, but Amiga was working
with a range of companies to provide a wide ranging solution. The assurance
worked but it could hide the cracks that were beginning to appear in the Amiga
armour. Gateway were taking great interest in the direction of their subsidiary
and were making efforts to control their direction. It soon became clear that
Gateway were reasserting control. Events were leading to a breaking point but
few would predict it would come so quickly.
Of course this did not affect the Classic market. Excitement was growing for the release of Fusion PPC. The emulator would finally allow Amiga users to run PowerMAC software. The latest specifications for the Boxer were also released. The project first began as an OEM Amiga clone based upon the AGA chipset, but after a fallout with Amiga International, led to the hardware being redeveloped, using technology from the AA+ and Boxer 2 designs. This turned out to be a wise move. After years of pushing the A1200 motherboard to its limit, a new "Classic" Amiga based upon a new design would blow the old bottlenecks away. The specifications promised AGA on a chip, no Chip RAM restrictions, a port for 64-bit PPC expansion, and 4x Active PCI slots. Many people committed themselves to buying one even if the Amiga market died.
July- the second half of the year. Known to Americans as the month of Independence
day. The name is quite apt as July 1999 marked the beginning of a move away
from the official Amiga owner and the beginning of what became a new age of
independence and a stand for the community's goals that would eventually lead
to Amino buying the Amiga. The month began with news of a Java-like technology
called AmigaObjects. Indications of the time suggested it was an object-orientated
language that existed in an object-orientated environment. The company's expansion
continued with the hiring of Dave Curtis as Director of Object Technology
and Transaction Services, and Dr Jim Miller in charge of Amiga User Interface(s).
The press attention to the Microsoft case reveals their relationship with Gateway.
Jim Von Holle, a former Gateway employee, describes how the company tried to
punish Gateway for the type of software they shipped. Although largely in the
background, it became increasingly clear why Gateway chose to develop
an alternative to the Windows market. Unfortunately, just a few months later
Gateway's relationship with Microsoft regarding their set-top box would have
a dramatic effect upon Amiga's plans. Who could have guessed Microsoft would
once again play a major part in the Amigas downfall?
"Delivering on our Promise to the Amiga community"
On July 8th, Dan Dodge posted an announcement to their web site stating they
had silently been working over the last 7 months to bring the Amiga community
a new and exciting system. The project was now ready for beta testing, leading
QNX to open, what they described as the "Developers system for Amigans".
The news was greeted with enthusiasm as screenshots were finally released of
the new environment. But for many users the announcement was curiously low-key.
Only QNX made an announcement, Amiga were expected to make it first or at least
on the same day. Also, the screenshots did not represent an Amiga look and feel.
The Voyager web browser shown on one image would refer to the Amiga web site
rather than QNX's own if the product really was a joint effort. This hinted
that there was something seriously wrong and partnership had been over for some
time.
The next day (9/7/99) Amiga issued an announcement that QNX were no longer the
OS partner for the AmigaNG. Instead they would use the Linux kernel. The day
was quickly dubbed BLACK FRIDAY by Amiga users everywhere. Why had Amiga traded
the scalable and highly acclaimed QNX for the monolithic Linux kernel? Fingers
pointed at Amiga and accusations ranging from professional malpractice to personal
insults, and even some death threats were made. The community split between
those that supported Amiga and those supporting QNX. Jim Collas quickly issued
an open letter hoping that the community would one day understand the choice
made and pointing towards the release of the Technology Brief during the following
week for answers. The words did nothing to stop the anger and over the next
week web site editorials expressed a sense of betrayal at the decision.
The Brief turned out to be misnamed. As a Technology Brief it was lacking in
any real information on the technology. The AmigaObjects section consisted of
sales jargon, making it almost impossible to guess its working. There was nothing
more added to support the use of Linux over QNX. Apart from statements upon
increased performance under Linux the reason seemed to be a marketing, rather
than technological move. Linux was chosen to link in to the momentum it has
created. Mainstream developers would not support QNX. Of course the Technology
Brief did confirm a number of things, including the existence of an Amiga computer,
based upon an ATX board. Despite their desperate attempts, loyalty had split
between QNX and Amiga, with QNX appearing to win for the moment.
Out of the ashes rose a new partnership consisting of QNX and phase5. Both had been jilted by Amiga in the past. The two companies promised to develop the Neutrino OS for phase5 PPC cards. This would allow owners to use legacy Amiga applications and develop for QNX. It was a cunning move to shift the Amiga userbase onto the QNX OS. This announcement was followed a few hours later by another, indicating the developing of a new QNX-based PPC system called AMIRAGE K2. Sympathy for QNX gave them the upper hand, potentially damaging Amiga's image. Here was a company that really cared about Amiga users. Dan Dodge and a number of other QNX employees even took it upon themselves to join Amiga mailing lists and newsgroups. Although Amiga had promised to port the Amiga OE to PowerPC platforms, at the time it seemed an alternative would move the tide if released before them.
Weeks later arguments were still raging whether Amiga could regain their tattered image. Anxious to move the community onto their side again, Amiga made an announcement confirming their relationship with Corel. This came as no surprise but an official declaration of support bolstered morale. This was followed by the publics first look at the the Amiga MCC (Multimedia Convergence Computer) prototype case at the World of Amiga and AmiWest shows. Visually it confirmed the company's move away from the computer into the convergence market, looking more like a video recorder than a computer. The appearance of the Transmeta name also caused surprise at the show, seemingly confirming the relationship between the two companies. Despite the name dropping Transmeta denied they had anything to do with Amiga. It was known at the time that Linus Torvalds was working for Amiga on the Linux kernel so a link between the two seemed fairly strong.
Amiga users thought they had seen it all. Unfortunately fate had chosen Amiga as the fools of 1999. On the 16th of August an unknown company called Iwin Corporation announced the release of two new Classic Amiga clones. The clones supposedly offer either an 68060 or 604 CPU, 8Mb of Chip RAM, 3D acceleration, 16bit sound, USB, and much more. Amiga users were mystified, but how could a company produce a machine that seemed to have been impossible for so many? The Amiga is more than simply an 68k processor- the custom chips are the very foundation of the machine. As Dave Haynie commented upon the prospect, it would be impossible to create an emulation of the chips without breaching patents, which Iwin claim not to. Furthermore no one had heard of the company before. Contact with some of their past customers revealed nothing, only that the president of the company had worked as a programmer. It seemed a simple hoax, but in this time of desperation many people believed in it.
As August drew to a close, Amiga felt the repercussions of publishing the Technology Brief so early. Gateway ordered the company to withdraw major product announcements from their web site and take a vow of silence. Their web site announced,
Speculation on what the company were doing indicated that this was quite normal. Jim Collas had referred to Gateway's concern on Amiga giving away too much information away before the product was launched. This was quickly confirmed by Amiga vice-president, Petro Tyschtschenko stating they have decided to modify information politics to prevent too much detail of AmigaNG development spreading to competitors. No one thought anymore about it, but behind the scenes dramatic events were unfolding that would lead the company to change direction again."For the next several months, the Amiga staff be focused on implementing our business and product plans. We will not be discussing or commenting on future company directions during this time."
On August 30th the first of Amiga's post-Commodore
patents came to light. This confirmed what many had thought. Amiga were moving
towards multi-processor systems. The patent described multiple CPU clusters
passing tasks between themselves. This was soon followed by 17 TV-related patents
making it increasingly clear that Amiga were moving towards digital TV.
It is coincidental, whenever there is a high note with the Amiga it is soon
followed by a loss. The liquidation of Commodore was followed by the death of
Jay Miner, and the QNX announcement was tempered by Fleecy Moss being 'let go'.
Along with the news of the Amiga patents came the announcement that Bill McEwen
had left Amiga. He has been described as one of the last people sympathetic
to the old Amiga community, even describing himself as an Amiga evangelist.
At the time he was working on Amiga's PR, developing a number of links to the
community, including a regular newsletter (Amiga Insight) and working closely
with the newly formed Amiga Advisory Council (AAC). For a few weeks he had been
expecting a promotion to a more permanent position (he was working under contract),
but was given a days' notice that he would no longer be working for Amiga. A
Gateway employee, who cannot be named, indicated Bill was let go because of
his hostility to some of Gateway's orders. He would tell it as it is, when sometimes
a businessman would have to lie. Sacked for being too honest? A strange occurrence,
but as the history of the Amiga shows, it seems to attract bizarre behaviour.
Bill's departure was followed just a few hours later by that of Jim Collas,
just nine months after taking on the job. The reason behind his leaving slowly
began to slip out, with stories of internal disagreement over the company direction
and role of the community were major points that led to his resignation. According
to sources at Gateway on many occasions Jim Collas was overruled by others who
would go over his head. The growing intervention of Gateway regarding the direction
has also been cited as a reason for his departure. Suddenly it all became clear
why the company had taken a vow of silence. As part of Jim's fast track plan
in February, it was intended to spin Amiga as a separate company, with some
financial support from Gateway. When it became clear the convergence market
would be a sure-fire success, Gateway realized they could not let this happen
and took control. The news was soon eclipsed by the removal of the "Amiga Insight"
bulletin board and the US staff bios. In the darkness that had surrounded Amiga,
whispers of other departures and a change of direction to embrace the digital
market.
The unfolding events have more in common with a Shakespeare play than a computer company. The removal of the bulletin board and email addresses cut the company off from the rest of the world. The only forthcoming information was that Amiga had a new president, Thomas J. Schmidt. His original intentions were to continue the previous efforts of developing the Amiga MCC, but with a very limited staff, even less in resources, and no monetary backing from the board of directors of Gateway, he was forced to prepare the Amiga IPO for buyouts or proposals. The first news of Amiga's change in direction came on September 10th with a comment by BusinessWeek that the MCC had been scrapped. Just a few days before, a news story revealed that Gateway were to sell a Microsoft low-end system called the X-Box. Given the timing of the announcement it is no surprise that many Amigans considered the two to be linked. Is it possible that Gateway canceled the Amiga MCC because of their relationship with Microsoft? A few days later Amiga stepped out of the darkness to confirm they would no longer be developing an Amiga computer. Their new focus would be upon software, with hardware being left to 3rd parties. The new update also suggested that Amiga software would now run "on top" of many operating systems, indicating that the Amiga OE had morphed into a standard Linux distribution and that AmigaObjects were the only revolutionary technology to come from Amiga. Once again, the Amiga was dead...
Light in the darkness
In times of old when the ship was in danger of being dashed against the rocks
in the storm, there were always people there to light the way and guide the
ship to safety. Similarly, out of the confusion of the AmigaNG came two organizations
intending to lend a hand. Formed from conversation on the Team Amiga Mailing
List they were created to ensure the Classic Amiga had a future beyond the World
of Amiga 98 announcement. The Phoenix Consortium
and A.Q.U.A both appeared to provide a clear
transition path from the Amiga to another Amiga-like operating system. The acronymic
A.Q.U.A. (Amino Qnx United Architecture) was a partnership between three companies;
Amino, QSSL, and Rebol.
All three seemed to be the living embodiment of the Amiga spirit- QSSL represented
the past as the former OS partner; Rebol were the present, a multi-platform
language that relied upon its simplicity; and finally, Amino were the future.
The guiding force that would turn these disparate pieces into a solution worthy
of the Amiga. The alliance was short-lived, when Amino unexpectedly dropped
connection with the other two.
Under the guidance of Fleecy Moss and Bill McEwen, and with the financial assistance of Tao Group, Amino Developments were able to buy the remains of Amiga Inc. and take the Amiga forward once again. A leaked announcement on the 31 of December indicated that Gateway had sold all rights to the Amiga (with the exception of the patents). The Amiga Inc. team, headed by Tom Schmidt, was integrated into Gateway product development. As panic over the 'Millenium Bug' reached fever pitch the Amiga community had taken an unexpected breath to consider what the next year would hold. The dead and the dying lay scattered around the scene, cynicism had overcome the remaining Amiga users' and developers. It would take a miracle to save the Amiga market now.
Miracles sometimes happen.....
The news of the Amigas' purchase came too late for many parts of the market. Longtime developer, Phase 5 finally filed for liquidation on January 26th, and the writers behind the Amiga Web Directory (1/1/2000) and Amiga Yellow Pages announced they would retire their services. This was soon followed by news that Amiga Format would finally close after 12 years.
If Amiga Inc. had been told that the Amiga market was dead, they probably would have laughed in your face. During February Amiga Inc. announced their move to the Snoqualmie Ridge Business Park and the hiring of several known Amiga developers and community figureheads. Andreas Klienert (AK Datatypes), Wouter Van Oortmerrsen (Amiga E), Gary Peake (Team Amiga), and Dean Brown (several Amiga accelerators) were hired to develop Tao Group's Elate into a consumer operating environment. This was coupled with news that the company had initiated three market relation programs:
Amiga Advisory Council - the assorted group of Amiga developers, journalists, user groups, and dealers that were selected by Gateway-Amiga Inc. a year previous are back. Amiga Inc. will be using these people to assess their position in the market, providing a vocal point for Amiga users.During a keynote speech at the 'Amiga 2000' show in St. Louis (April 1st), Amiga Inc. dispelled rumours that they were April fools by announcing their future plans. Amiga CEO, Bill McEwen indicated that the company would move away from the Amiga's hardware heritage, by producing an operating environment that would support a range of devices. The concept, similar to Sun Microsystem's Java, would allow Amiga software to be written and executed without the need for recompilation on a different processor.Amiga Dealer's Network - a channel for Amiga distributors and dealers to communicate with Amiga Inc.
Amiga Developer Support Network - Amiga will be providing support (documentation, bug fixes, etc.) to Amiga developers.
As the first part of their plans for the Amiga DE, Amiga Inc. announced their Software Development Kit (SDK) and unveiled the Amiga Developer box - a standard AMD x86 box - that would be sold by several Amiga dealers. It was originally indicated that Amiga Inc. would only provide the SDK with the Amiga-approved developer kits, but this rule was changed a few days later. As the developer box was basically a standard PC, the dealer or user was able to configure the exact specifications according to their need. This resulted in several interesting variations of the machine.
During the last few months the Classic Amiga market had continued to shrink,
becoming a fraction of its former size. However, Amiga Inc's example appeared
to have created a sense of adventure. Several long-promised hardware and software
announcements/launches made 2000 a fantastic year for the Amiga. In particular,
the first of two OS releases during the year created a stir.
Announced in April, The MorphOS team (former Phase
5 employees) had performed a feat that Haage & Partner were legally
unable to perform - develop a clean Amiga-compatible operating system
for PowerUP boards. Any doubt that MorphOS was a fake were dispelled when beta
versions were released on the MorphOS site. The MorphOS kernel owes many ideas
to the existing AmigaOS, but implements them in a clean fashion. This will avoid
many of the problems encountered when updating the 68k AmigaOS source, allowing
the implementation of virtual memory, resource tracking, and many other capabilities.
In the absence of an official AmigaOS PPC port, MorphOS will become an interesting
method of continuing the Classic Amigas' development
to a standalone PPC system.
The Amiga hardware market was also going through a long awaited revolution, moving away from outdated Commodore standards to cheap, available hardware. Antigravity bought the Boxer and hired Mick Tinker to continue its development. The extra injection of cash may hurry development for a 2001 release. A1200 & A4000 were also treated to a range of expansion opportunities. For Zorro fans, the Apollo Z4 bridgeboard was launched, providing a cheaper, faster method of using Zorro 2 and nubus-style 'Z4' cards. This was followed by the announcement of two PCI bridgeboards for the A1200 & A4000; the Elbox Mediator, announced in June, was launched just three months later. The potential for empowering existing Amigas is astronomical. Instead of the costly Zorro cards, Amiga users' can now take advantage of cheap, standardized PCI cards. Several graphic (such as Voodoo 3) and network cards can be used with suitable drivers. The Mediator PCI announcement was followed by a similar one from Eyetech. The Predator promises PCI and, more surprisingly, AGP support for Classic Amigas. It soon became obvious that the existence of two competing products in a shrinking market would cause some problems. Both companies attempted to sabotage the others' campaign to promote their product, resulting in a situation reminiscent of the PPC kernel war of 1997. The war is set to escalate further during 2001 when Eyetech and Elbox launch their respective G3 PowerPC cards.
Whatever, the outcome of this war, the influx of new PPC owners will benefit the remaining software developers. While the Amiga gaming market produced half the number of games in a year than was released in any given month during 1990, the games were of an incredible quality. For the first time, the vast majority of announcements and reviews focussed upon PPC boards. The sale of Wipeout 2097 (the first commercial PPC game) had encouraged developers to take the plunge and release other games that would use the hardware. Several ports of the newly-open sourced Quake appeared, followed by Heretic 2 (March), and the long-awaited Simon the Sorceror 2 (December). High-end 68k gamers could enjoy a new version of Foundation Gold, and Nightlong (November), Bubble Heroes, and several other original titles. The Amiga has not been a games machine for many years, so it was not unexpected that it would so few titles. However, several announcements indicated that 2001 would be an interesting time for PPC Amiga and AmigaOne gamers.
Over the year two ghost from the Amiga's past reared their heads as a reminder
of what the Amiga may have become. The first, QNX Real-Time Platform (the official
name for QNX Neutrino) was made available for noncommercial
use as a free download during May. Two years previous the OS kernel was announced
to be the basis of the Gateway Amiga OE. Since the cancellation of the Amiga
MCC, the Phoenix Consortium has been working with QSSL to prepare their OS for
release. Amiga users' were finally able to try the OS that could have been the
next Amiga.
In the aftermath of the Amiga sale, many people wondered what had become of
the technology developed by Amiga Inc. Over the course of 2000, it was revealed
that it would form the basis of the AOL TV set-top box, and related products.
The product bears much resemblance to the current plans of Amiga Inc, aimed
at the convergence market. However, early reports are critical of the device.
Perhaps it is fortunate that the Linux-based MCC
was never launched.
Meanwhile Amiga Inc. had performed a minor miracle by releasing an actual software developer kit. The launch of the Amiga SDK 1.0 for Linux on the 3rd of June symbolizes the end of the failed announcements that have characterized the Amiga's recent history, a turning point that will attract developers and users' in the long-term. Though incomplete, buggy, and containing a confusing license agreement, the Amiga SDK provided developers' with the opportunity to produce software for the new platform at a fraction of the cost demanded by other corporations e.g. Sony. This was soon followed by the announcement that they had a hardware partnership with Infomedia (8/2000) & Meternet (20/9/00) to produce set-top boxes, and news that Amiga Inc. had entered into a partnership with Matrox. The company has placed a great deal of emphasis upon this relationship for their future goals, providing indications that they have access to current and future plans for their technology.
By October Amiga Inc. were preparing for the consumer launch of the Amiga DE. As a guide to dealers, the company issued a minimum specification for the desktop market. Codenamed Zico, it provided a guideline to the type of machine the Amiga DE was intended for. As expected, there was no mention of a specific processor, only a mention of an unnamed 'Next Generation Matrox graphics card' and various USB, Firewire, and PCI slots. This was followed by announcements that Eyetech and bPlan would produce AmigaOne PPC motherboards, as upgrades to existing A1200/A4000s and as standalone units. The Windows version of the SDK and an update to the Linux version were also launched. The scope of Amiga Inc and Tao Group's relationship with other corporations was growing dramatically, engulfing several large Japanese corporations and technologies.
In between the announcements of new relationships, partnerships, and products, Amiga Inc. were quietly scaling down their German business, Amiga International with the retirement of Petro Tyschtschenko and closure of the Langen Office. The subsidiary was the last remains of the Escom management that had been set up 5 years previous. Since 1998 it had become a European distribution network for existing Amiga dealers and played little part in the Amigas' development. For many years it had been run almost single-handedly by Petro himself, who was its sole employee during Escom's liquidation.
A second ending came in the form of AmigaOS3.9. The operating system was launched in December 2000 to much surprise. No one had expected an OS upgrade and given the amount of time they had been given, no one expected much from the product. While the OS upgrade offered enhanced PPC support, drivers, and media players, it did not provide any single ground breaking feature. Instead it appeared to be a tiny OS3.5 update and a few shareware utilities to fill the CD. At the time it was indicated this would be the final 68k AmigaOS release to provide support for the Classic Amiga market who do not upgrade to the Amiga DE.
By the end of 2000 Amiga Inc. had laid the groundwork for its parasitic move
into the mainstream. Several developer machines had been launched, the operating
environment was in development, and consumer units had been announced. The combined
efforts of Bill McEwen, Fleecy Moss, and Randy Hughes had surpassed the efforts
of the previous Amiga owners by bringing a product to market.
The next year would continue the company's expansion plans by moving into the
PDA. It would also be the year that the numerous announcements became reality.
However, the Classic Amiga market was in its final death throes, the market
had continued to shrink to minuscule proportions. During the next year it would
take its final breath....
The second year of Amiga Inc's reign was an eventful period that would change the world order forever. The events of 2001 would force the world's governments to forge new alliances and develop a diplomatic solution to many problems. In the Amiga's microcosm many of these events would be played in miniature, creating new relationships between Amiga developers and new divisions between the user community.
The new year celebrations were overshadowed by the announcements that Amiga Inc. were struggling for funding. This would be a major theme for the technology sector as a whole so it was predictable that the Amiga market would suffer the effects to a certain extent. In spite of these problems, Amiga Inc. predicted a successful year for the company. On the Amiga Support Network web site, the company made a prediction for the coming year:
"There is tremendous potential for distribution of your applications, games and other content for one of the world's largest manufacturers of PDA hardware. The projection is for more than 7 million units to be sold by the end of 2001 and there are already several million units on the market at this time."
Although the announcement was intended to create confidence that Amiga Inc.
were actually developing the Amiga DE, the announcement
caused further confusion.
The figure quoted is significantly higher than any single manufacturer - over
two million more than the current market leader Palm sold in 2000. The only
way to achieve this degree of market penetration would be through several PDA
developers using the Amiga DE.
The questionable statements made by Amiga Inc. were quickly becoming an annoyance for many developers, resulting in fierce competition between the official owner and several third parties who did not take kindly to the new kid on the block. Although Amiga Inc. have the right to control their property, the absence of a central organization for so long has resulted in several 3rd parties making a personal investment in shaping its direction. The accusation that Amiga Inc. sought to disrupt these efforts through the threat of legal action (as stated by Ralph Schmidt of MorphOS) did not create a positive image for the company. In addition to these claims, there was also serious criticism regarding the company's desire to run Amiga DE as a desktop operating system: the implementation of a memory management system was proving to be more difficult than expected, leading to fears that the new Amiga would suffer from the same stability issues as the original. In an attempt to solve these problems, Amiga Inc. looked to the past...
Announcements at St. Louis: AmigaOS4 and beyond
The announcements at the Amiga 2001 show on April 1st took many by surprise. Although there had been an indication that Amiga Inc. were examining solutions to their problems, few suspected that it would result in the resurrection of the AmigaOS. As part of their plans to resurrect the 68k operating system, Amiga Inc. took control of the OS development and proposed a novel timeline that suggested it would be available for the PowerPC by the end of the year, and available for 64-bit processors by Winter 2002. In preparation for the announcement Fleecy Moss met with bPlan, Eyetech, Haage & Partner, Hyperion and several others in an attempt to unify the disparate entities and create a unified AmigaOS. Under the new arrangement, Eyetech would provide AmigaOne-branded hardware, while Haage & Partner and Hyperion would work to port sections of the AmigaOS to PPC. For many Amiga users' the sense of deja-vu was overwhelming: both Escom and Gateway had announced plans to port the AmigaOS to PowerPC during 1996/7. While Gateway were developing the Amiga MCC, Petro Tyschtschenko had evangelized the idea, and Haage & Partner had been given the PPC contract by Gateway at the tail-end of 1999. The irony that, five years after the original announcement, the PowerPC platform was still a goal was almost unbearable.
In the midst of the AmigaOS4 news, Amiga Inc. announced that they had formed an agreement with Sharp and Psion to develop Amiga DE software for their respective devices. Both companies were market leaders, producing technically-interesting devices that distinguished them from competitors - Sharp were developing a Linux-based handheld for the US market, based upon the Japanese Zaurus M1-E1, while Psion were market leaders in the palmtop market. It was hoped these deals would propel the Amiga into a prominent position, acting as a limpet-like entity that would be carried by these products. However, the news was short-lived when it was indicated that Psion, driven by disappointing fiscal 2000 results, had chosen to cancel the agreement and exit the consumer market. Although clearly embarrassing for Amiga Inc. it was evident that the technology market was spiraling into recession, forcing several Commodore-sized businesses into receivership. Metabox, the Germany-based maker of digital TV set-top boxes was one such casualty declaring insolvency, putting an end to hopes that they would release a PowerPC card for the Amiga.
Bluffer's Guide to the Future
The next few months were particularly interesting for Amiga fans. After years of waiting AmigaOS PPC would be a reality. On mailing lists and web forums, the individual elements of the St. Louis announcement were dissected. New terms, such as Ami2D, Ami3D, AmiFFS2, EXEC-SG, and Amiga Component Model, were entering the language, promising new solutions to long-standing problems. Excited discussion focused upon the AmigaOS timeline and the individual components that would be part of the final product. Several announcements were made by bPlan, Merlancia and Matay announcing new PPC hardware and support for the Zico specification. Although these companies would not reveal their products until 2002, it was a good omen that, for the AmigaOS, the future was almost here!
The Sharp deal was also producing results with the first sign of Amigas role in Sharp's plan. At the Tokyo Business Show 2001 on May 23-25, the AmigaDE received its first public showing as part of the Sharp Zaurus. This event placed the company in a position to be noticed by an estimated 400,000 attendees and would produce some interesting subsequent partnerships during the next year. This news was tempered by the current economic climate. The technology recession was in full swing, leaving hundreds of companies in its wake. Although the Sharp deal had given Amiga Inc. a much needed boost and extra publicity it could not pay contractors. Their earlier decision to manage AmigaOS 4.0 development was also reversed with the news that Amiga Inc. were handing project control over to Hyperion. As a result, AmigaOS development was significantly delayed, pushing the initial release date back to November. Over the next few months the deadline would gradually extend until the first quarter of 2002. Relations between Amiga Inc. and bPlan had also failed, resulting in pie throwing matches on public forums. Although Amiga Inc. attempted to maintain the image that events were progressing as expected, Ralph Schmidt of bPlan publicly criticized the company's attempt to unify and control Amiga development. In a repeat of the WarpOS Vs. PowerUP arguments of 1997, the Amiga 'community' divided into two camps - those who supported AmigaOS4 and those who supported MorphOS. Both groups would criticize the other, regularly provoking arguments that would quickly degrade into personal insults.
Meanwhile...
While these events were unfolding the usual software and hardware releases were appearing. Although the 68k market had almost completely collapsed, a few companies were still developing products. Hardware development was a major area, producing two new PCI solutions to accompany the previously launched Mediator - the G-Rex appeared in April, followed by the Prometheus a month later. Elbox had also released software drivers that allowed the use of Voodoo 4 4500 & 5 graphic cards, SoundBlaster AHI drivers, and TV cards. After years of waiting Amiga owners could finally take advantage of cheap PCI graphics and sound solutions. Several new USB solutions were announced, including the A1200-based Subway and Zorro2-based Highway, a third card was announced by AmiSoft, who promptly closed a few months later. Low-end Amigas were also supported by the hardware-based MP3 player 'MAS Player'. At last CDTV owners could listen to MP3s!
Software products were thinner on the ground with only a few notable exceptions - iFusion, the iMac emulator for PPC-based Amigas was finally launched. Unfortunately a bug in the WarpUP software restricted its use to A4000 PPC owners, alienating Mac friendly A1200 users. This was followed by the long-awaited GTA clone, Payback in March, followed by Earth 2140, Shogo, and the award winning Photogenics 5 art package. The shareware scene was also producing impressive results with the news that AMP - the PPC movie player - supported DVD playback for the first time on the Amiga.
In a tradition established in 1995, 2001 was not without its share of canceled products. The closure of Metabox and Amisoft ended any hope that they would release their respective products for the Amiga. The continued delay of the AmigaDE, AmigaOS 4.0, and AmigaOne also forced the closure of Amiga Active - the only remaining UK newsstand magazine. This was followed by the news that the BoXeR had been officially canceled after four years of development. To fill this gap (Amiga Active's, not the Boxer), the subscription-based 'Clubbed' magazine announced it would moving to a bimonthly publication and changing its name to 'Total Amiga'.
In contrast to the dimming Classic 68k/PPC market, the Amiga DE was finally getting some attention. On June 11th, Amiga Inc. launched a limited-edition release of the Amiga DE package, available in two variations for the Linux and Windows platform. The Party Pack provided an insight into Amiga development at the time, while providing a $100 discount on purchase of AmigaOS 4 or AmigaOne at a later date. This was soon followed by the launch of a standalone Amiga DE Player in October, allowing Windows/Linux users to play Amiga DE games using their existing operating system. Several games were included with these packages, with the ability to purchase more at the new AmigaDE shop. The majority of these were simplistic puzzle games, the type that you would expect on the C64. However, the release of Ami3D in 2002 will open the market to more complex games, such as the DE port of Payback.
Emulation: The post UAE future
For years Amiga owners had denied the existence of UAE. The thought of a Mac
or PC emulating their beloved platform had become a sore point since it appeared
in 1996. Over the years, as more people migrated to other platforms, disbelief
had become acceptance that the Amiga could be emulated. However, there remained
a die hard minority who rejected the idea that an x86 PC could multitask as
efficiently as their Amiga. These people almost died when screenshots of a new
unknown Amiga emulator appeared in the August 2001 issue of Amiga
Active. The Quake speed test indicated that the emulator could operate at
ten times the speed of a 68060 Amiga. The emulator would later become known
as AmigaOSXL, developed for the QNX
x86 operating system by Haage & Partner.
This was followed by a second emulator announcement by Amiga Inc. that a competing
emulator, written by Bernd Meyer (the developer of the UAE JiT engine) and Harald
Frank (VMC) existed. The emulator, called Amithlon,
uses a modified version of the JiT engine running on a custom ISOLinux kernel.
At the time it was indicated that Amiga Inc. would be selling the emulator in
competition to the still unnamed, unannounced AmigaOSXL emulator. However, in
a moment of divine inspiration previously unseen in the Amiga market, both developers
decided to sell their respective emulators in the same package. Amiga users'
would not have to choose between AmigaOSXL or Amithlon. They could purchase
both and choose between them according to their ability to run a specific application.
However, the spirit of cooperation did not prevent the formation of a third
group in the userbase - those who supported x86 and Amiga emulation. Work on
the open source operating system, AROS also progressed
during 2001, replacing over 75% of the original code. The authors of Amithlon
and MorphOS are both working with the development team to use sections of AROS
code and highlight potential bugs, providing a mutual benefit. It will be interesting
to see how this relationship will benefit all parties.
In retrospect, 2001 had not been a successful year for anyone. The AmigaOne and AmigaOS 4.0 had not be released and there were still major issues with the Amiga DE to be resolved. However, it could have been much worse. The economic crisis and fears experienced in the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Centre could have finished easily a small business like Amiga Inc. The hacking of the Amiga.com, Eyetech, and Amiga.org web sites in November/December have also done little damage to their image. One year after the final death of the 68k Amiga, the AmigaOSXL/Amithlon emulation package resurrected its silicon ghost, allowing Amiga users' to experience an advanced version of their machine before PowerPC rendered it obsolete. After six years in the wilderness the next year would produce the next generation AmigaOS and take the AmigaDE into a new and completely unexpected direction.