• A brief description of the injured person’s injuries or illness and reason for compromise

 
• Prognosis for the injured person Injured person’s disability (temporary, permanent) and degree (or percentage) of disability

 
• Future medical treatments expected to be required

 
• Brief description of accident and litigation risks bearing on recovery prospects (contributory negligence, assumption of risk, likely trial outcome)

 
• Post accident work history of the injured person

 
• Amount of settlement offer

 
• Medical payments made by automobile liability carriers, if any

 
• Attorneys’ fees, including any proposed reduction

 
• Attorneys’ costs and expenses

 
• Names of other entities asserting liens against the settlement, and “their compromised amounts.”

    Cases citing the statute:

    Department of Medical Assistance Services v. Huynh, Infant, Record Number 001881 (June 6, 2001) (Mr. Majette's case) (holding that because the statute uses the word "apportion," and the trial court placed all of the settlement funds in the special needs trust approved by the trial court while refusing to reduce the attorneys' fee claim:

"the trial court erred in failing to award some portion of the recovery to the Commonwealth while providing Huynh's attorneys the full amount of their contractual fee.  This is particularly true in light of the fact that both the Commonwealth and Huynh's attorneys concede that the portion of the recovery afforded to Huynh under the trial court's apportionment provided her with less than complete relief, and was inadequate to meet her expected future needs.  Indeed, the trial court's use of a "Special Needs" trust to preserve Huynh's share of the recovery was predicated on the inescapable conclusion that her future medical expenses would rapidly exhaust the money awarded to her if it were not sheltered in a manner that would allow her to continue receiving assistance from the Commonwealth.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court on this issue and remand this case to the trial court to make an appropriate apportionment."

    Commonwealth v. Lee, 239 Va. 114, 387 S.E.2d 770 (S.Ct. 1990).

    Commonwealth v. Smith, 239 Va. 108, 387 S.E.2d 767 (S.Ct. 1990).

    Barreca v. Tillery, 13 Cir. LW202B (Richmond Circuit Court 1994).

    Emery v. Fletcher, 23 Cir. CL9348 (1995) (Roanoke Circuit Court, 1995) (Medicaid lien reduced by approximately 75%, balance held in trust for child).

    In Re: Travis Alan Ashe, 13 Cir. 001 (Richmond Circuit Court 1995) (approving payment of funds of injured person to Medicaid special needs trust, refusing to reduce liens of MCV or Medicaid) (It must also be noted that plaintiff's net recovery in this case will be placed in a "special needs trust" to be established under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, and the Virginia Plan for Medical Assistance, § VR 460-03-2.6109. What that means is that none of the proceeds will be available to pay for plaintiff's future medical needs. Thus, it is very likely that the Commonwealth, either through Medicaid or one of its other programs, institutions, or departments, will be called upon again to provide services to plaintiff, or to pay for services provided by others. It is appropriate, then, that while funds are available, and in light of the fairly significant net recovery which plaintiff will receive even without a reduction, that the Commonwealth be reimbursed for the services already provided, and for the payments already made. Neither of the Commonwealth's liens will be reduced.")

    In Re: Wood, 13 Cir. LE26674 (Richmond Circuit Court 1999) (refusing to reduce lien of the Commownealth but limiting liens of private entities to statutory maximums)

    Terry v. Harris, 13 Cir. LM17814 (Richmond Circuit Court 2001) (reducing lien by 25%, the same amount that counsel for the Plaintiff reduced fee)(citing Huynh).

    Diaz v. Arlington Anesthesia, Inc., 17 Cir. CL97662 (Arlington County Circuit Court 2001) (reducing plaintiff attorney's contingent fee from forty percent to thirty three and one third percent, reducing Commonwealth's lien from 866,000 to $85,000; disallowing certain "office overhead" related expenses of counsel for Plaintiff)(citing Huynh and Barreca v. Tillery, supra).