Plaintiff hereby respectfully requests that the Court re-enter the default of SkyCar Inc. which was vacated and set aside. In support of this request please consider the previously submitted declarations. This Memorandum Of Points And Authorities is be submitted in support of the request submitted on 3-4-2005. Attached are three exhibits which support this request and show that Defendant Laura Nelson was an official or general manager of Skycar, Inc. on the day that she was served with a summon on behalf of Skycar, Inc. Exhibit A shows that as of March 4, 2005 the California Secretary of State�s website identifies Skycar, Inc. as being an active California corporation. Exhibit B shows that a 1995 Dodge was registered on 6-30-2004 as a commercial vehicle and that the registered owner is Skycar, Inc. at 7135 W. Manchester Ave., LA CA 90045. Exhibit C shows an insurance identification card and that the name of the insured is Laura Nelson dba Metropolitan Express and that the insurance was purchased on 6-29-2004. Note that exhibit B and C refer to Vehicle Identification Number 2b7hb15y6sk524124.

Memorandum of Points and Authorities

Plaintiff submits the following points and authorities in support of the motion for reconsideration of the courts vacating and set aside of Defendant Skycar Inc�s entry of default.

PLAINTIFF IS IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF CCP �416.10. FOR SERVICE OF A SUMMONS TO A CORPORATION

The service of process upon Laura Nelson as an official of Skycar Inc. conforms to the above requirements. If there is any problem it is that original summons as filed did not have the appropriate boxes marked. Nonetheless, the copy that was served did have the appropriate boxes marked as can be seen on the conformed copy..

the discrepancy between the conformed copy of the summons as served and the original summons as issued and filed does not render the service of process defective. The courts have ruled that the standard for service of process is "substantial compliance" (see Cory v. Crocker National Bank (1981) 123 Cal. App .3d 665, 669) and "a mere technicality does not render it �substantially defective�" (see Ystrom v. Handel (1988) 205 Cal. App. 3d 144, 152) In Cory the court found that the plaintiff was in "substantial compliance" despite the fact that the summons did not have the appropriate boxes marked to indicate that a corporation was being serviced. In Ystrom, the court held that a summons lacking the clerk�s signature and the courts seal was not "substantially defective." In Plaintiff�s case the summons as served contained all the appropriate boxes marked and contained the court�s seal and clerk�s signature.

SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS UPON A PERSON SPECIFIED BY CCP �416.10

In Roehl v. Texas the court found that service is valid if the person served as "general manager" is apparently in charge of the cooperation�s office or head quarters, as long as the person served is of such rank to make it reasonably certain that the corporation will be apprised of service.(Roehl v. Texas Co. (1930) 107 CA 691). Furthermore, the authority to accept service need not be actual. It may be implied or ostensible, if the defendant caused it to appear that the person served had such authority. (Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v Golden West Music Sales (1974) 36 CA3d 1012)

Here, Laura Nelson was running Skycar at the time of service and fits the definition of a general manager. Even if Laura Nelson were, as she claimed during the hearing on 2-18-2005, running a sole proprietorship called Skycar (not inc.), Skycar Inc. did nothing to prevent someone from believing that she was a general manager of Skycar, Inc. Skycar, Inc. is owned by Laura Nelson�s mother Ruth Kardashian. It is reasonably certain that the daughter would apprise her mother of the suit. No motion to quash the service of process was made by Skycar, Inc and since no default judgement had been entered, a motion to set aside a default judgement was premature. Skycar, Inc. therefore never alleged that the service of process was made on someone not specified in CCP �416.10(b). Laura Nelson is not an attorney and therefore can not represent Skycar Inc. in court. She has no right to argue on behalf of Skycar, Inc.

The court exceeded its jurisdiction when it denied Plaintiff�s request of entry of default of Skycar, Inc. when there were no defects on the face of the Summons and proof of service. The court denied Plaintiff�s request for entry of default based on the allegation made by Defendant Nelson that she was not an official of Skycar Inc. because Skycar, Inc. went out of business. The court based its decision on unsworn testimony from Skycar Inc.�s codefendant Laura Nelson. Plaintiff�s due process rights were denied when the court refused to allow Plaintiff a hearing to make a factual determination of whether Defendant Nelson fit the definition of CCP� 416.10(b).

The fact that Defendant Nelson claims that she was not an official does not make it not so. Defendant Nelson claims that Skycar Inc. went out of business and that she is now running a business called Skycar that is not a corporation but her sole-proprietorship. Nonetheless, the Secretary of State�s office shows that Skycar Inc. is an active corporation.(see Exhibit A) Merely saying that your business is no longer a corporation does not make it so. The dissolution of a corporation is a formal process which includes a �winding up� procedure and notification of creditors.(Corp. Code (� 2009) Also Exhibits B and C show that Laura Nelson dba Metropolitan Express purchased insurance on a vehicle and that said vehicle�s registration was issued to Skycar, Inc. at 7135 Manchester Ave. Exhibits B and C show that the insurance and vehicle registration were paid less than one month before this action was filed with the Superior Court of California. It is unlikely that Defendant Laura Nelson would pay for insurance on a commercial vehicle for a corporation that had gone out of business. It is also unlikely that she would purchase under her name insurance for a vehicle registered to a corporation if she were not an official or general manager of that corporation.

For all of the forgoing reason, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the court enter a default against Defendant Skycar, Inc. and that a default judgement be entered against said defendant at an amount to be proven at a later hearing.