Copyright © 2003, Glenn Mason-Riseborough - where what I mean by "copyright" is spelled out eloquently by Peter Suber on his Copyright page (and taking it as read, in the context, that where Suber refers to his documents, pages, and site I am referring to my documents, pages, and site).

However, whereas Suber is a professional academic, I am not. Before reading any further, read my disclaimer and warning on my My Writings page.

Back to My Homepage | Back to What is Philosophy? (in a nutshell) | Back to My Writings

Buddhist Economics vs. Modern Western Economics: Some Assumptions

Glenn Mason-Riseborough (6/1/2003)

 

Commentary on E. F. Schumacher (1973) “Buddhist Economics” in W. H. Shaw and V. Barry (2001) Moral Issues in Business, pp. 175-179.

 

Schumacher compares and contrasts the differences between two economic outlooks, which he labels Buddhist economics (BE) and modern Western economics (MWE), respectively.  Those who practice the former are called Buddhists and those who practice the latter are called materialists.  Schumacher assumes that there must be such a thing as Buddhist economics, given that one part of the Buddhist Noble Eightfold Path is “Right Livelihood”.  Schumacher’s aim is to show that the Buddhist approach is the better of the two, for all who consider the issue, including those who think that economic growth is of primary importance.  It is also to show Buddhist countries that they need not blindly adopt modern Western economics when engaging in economic development.  There is very little in the way of direct argumentation, but the author’s preferences are made clear through the use of sophistry and biased descriptive language.  The version that I have commented on is an abridged copy of the original, and has also had the footnotes removed.  I have summarised then commented on Schumacher’s main points, under three subheadings.

 

1. The purpose of human labour/work

MWE: Goods and production are seen as having primary importance, with respect to work.  The employer sees labour as of benefit only inasmuch as it provides a means of producing goods.  Otherwise, labour is an unwanted expense (“necessary evil”), to be eliminated (at best) or reduced, where it is financially beneficial to do so.  The employee sees labour as of benefit only inasmuch as it provides wages.  The more one works, the more one sacrifices one’s leisure and comfort, and wages are a kind of compensation for the sacrifice.  The aim of the employee is to reduce labour as much as possible, while still maintaining a sufficient wage.  Thus, both employer and employee are in agreement that labour should be reduced as much as possible.  The employer wants “output without employees” and the employee wants “income without employment”.  The consequence is to aim to reduce labour via, for example, (i) non-human automation, or (ii) more efficient division of labour, in which production is divided into smaller, less skilled, repeatable parts.

 

BE: People are seen as having primary importance, in the context of work.  What is essential to Buddhists is the “purification of character”.  There are at least three functions of labour: (a) to develop and utilise one’s faculties; (b) to enable one to overcome one’s ego-centredness by joining in communal activities; (c) to provide appropriate goods and services.  Good character is developed primarily through work.  It provides discipline and encourages one to do the best one can, developing one’s personality and allowing one to display one’s values.  If one does not work then one lacks this “nourishment”, which nothing else can replace.  Mechanisation/automation must be managed, and factors other than production efficiency need to be considered, such as those listed above.  There are two types of mechanisation: (1) tools, which enhance one’s skill and power, and (2) machines, which force one to serve “mechanical slaves” that do the work of people.  In practice, craftsmen are best at distinguishing between these two types.  For example, the carpet loom is a tool, whereas the power loom is a machine.  Consequently: (i) Work should not be “meaningless, boring, stultifying, or nerve-racking”, but should be managed with human character development in mind. (ii) Work and leisure are complimentary, and one should not aim to reduce or eliminate work.  Similarly, one should not aim to have only leisure.  It is thus not an option to run an economy at less that full employment, even if it is financially better to do so.  The implication is that jobs should actively be created, even at the cost of a loss in efficiency or profit.  (iii) Tools are permissible, but machines should be avoided, even at a loss in efficiency or profit.  (iv) Full employment, which is aimed for, is more likely to be achieved if women do not have “outside” jobs.  Thus, women generally should not have an outside job, and their job is primarily to look after the home and children.  (This better explains Schumacher’s non-gender-neutral terms, as he uses the word “man” exclusively when describing workers.)

 

Comments:

(i)              Presumably many modern Western workers would not subscribe to MWE, as described.  Consider the workaholic who enjoys work so much that work takes over his life.  Or the millionaire who still chooses to work.  Or, more moderately, the many who get pleasure from work—from learning skills, social interaction, meeting challenges, and even simply filling one’s time.  That is, most Western employees would surely not just consider monetary gain when considering paid work, but would also consider other values and purposes, including some of those mentioned in the context of BE.  Perhaps, at best, Schumacher is thinking primarily of factory production-lines, when describing the modern Western view of labour.  And in this narrow sense, the description and implicit criticisms seem more plausible.

(ii)            Against the BE view, more work needs to be done to show that paid labour is the best means for developing character (as opposed to social activities or labour more generally, for example).  This claim is very strong, yet it is essential to the whole of BE.  If it is shown to be false, then the central characteristics of BE fail.  I wonder also if this is really essential to Buddhism, as it seems that Schumacher equivocates at times between labour in the more general sense, and, more narrowly, paid labour.  I don’t see why Buddhism should be committed to the stronger claim, as Schumacher seems to think.  Whatever the interpretative issue, in opposition to BE, we might argue instead that character development is best achieved through education, social activities, or voluntary work, which are not the sorts of activities that are compatible with paid labour.

(iii)           This leads to the thought that both views described are extremes, and there are other, more plausible, options available.  Both views focus too much on an impoverished set of values.  One need not consider only goods and money; alternatively one need not just consider character development.  Perhaps both have a place, in a considered system of values.  One needs to have and develop good character, but one also needs efficiently created goods and money for sustenance.  Presumably, following BE and contra MWE, we need to consider, to a certain extent, character development and mental health through work and social services in the workplace.  Employers have a moral responsibility towards the mental well-being of their employees, and, unsurprisingly, there has been some recent legal and social development in this area (Schumacher can be forgiven here, since the paper is 30 years old).  But arguably, contra BE, character is better developed elsewhere, and paid work is not the primary means to achieve this end.  People should also look to other non-work related activities for personal development.  And so, contra BE, full employment is not such an important goal.  Those not in paid labour can still develop their character, through other activities.  Further, following MWE, this approach is compatible with also aiming for labour efficiency and developing appropriate automation.  If one does not need to work for so long, then one has more time to devote to personal development.

(iv)          The Buddhist distinction between tools and machines seems based merely on a nostalgia for the past (note: this seems similar to Martin Heidegger’s discussion of technology, and the same criticisms apply).  In response, consider, for example, at one end of the technological timeline, the specific human skills that were lost when humans first started using the carpet loom.  Most likely, the older generation craftsmen of the day were equally concerned about modern machinery that replaces human effort.  At the other end, consider the new human skills required to run power looms.  Surely these can equally enhance one’s skills and power, and moreover, they are more useful skills for modernity.

(v)            The view that women should not have outside jobs seems like unjustified discrimination.  While it is true that children need proper parental supervision, this could be given by either parent, and not necessarily the mother.  Moreover, if it is indeed true that it is from work that one develops one’s character, then it seems that, under BE, women do not (and presumably do not need to) develop their character.  Why this is so is left unexamined.  To find this more plausible, one might have to buy into a whole bunch of (arguably) Buddhist metaphysical claims, such as reincarnation and hierarchies of incarnations, where females are lower than males.  Otherwise, it just comes across as sexist.

(vi)          The labels by Schumacher may be misnomers.  Consider Taiwan (which has a large Buddhist influence).  Most Taiwanese have a modern Western view, in the senses described above.  The Taiwanese I have talked with think of work as a necessary evil, which one must accept.  Like the modern Westerner, the Taiwanese I have talked with would ideally like to get paid for doing little or no work.  I have not heard anyone there say that they work primarily to develop their character.  Well-paid jobs bring prestige, and most think it strange when I say that I study and teach because I enjoy learning, and that money is not the driving force for me.  Perhaps Schumacher’s Buddhism is a more idealized academic or monastic Buddhism than one that is actually practiced, at least by everyday Taiwanese.  But even then, there are numerous forms of Buddhism, and depending on which Buddhist texts, ideas, sects, or strands we focus on, we may get very different sets of assumptions regarding an appropriate economic approach (consider in contrast, for example, the sorts of assumptions we could derive from the Buddhist idea of impermanence, or alternatively, the more anarchistic forms of Zen Buddhism).

 

2. Measures of success

MWE: The standard of living is measured by the amount of annual consumption.  One is better off if one consumes more, as the assumption is that as consumption is increased so too is satisfaction.  Consumption is the sole end of all economic activity, and land, labour and capital are the means.  An increase in the transportation of goods implies an increase in consumption, and is thus seen as positive progress.

 

BE: The key words are simplicity and non-violence.  The aim is to attain a maximum of well-being with a minimum of consumption.  Consumption is merely a means to well-being, but is not an indicator in itself of success.  The aim is for ideal consumption, not maximal consumption.  Physical well-being and pleasure generated from it are not avoided, but craving for this is seen as unhealthy and wrong.  In other words, it is not wealth that is wrong, but attachment to wealth.  Simply put, the aim is for one to reduce one’s desires, and reduce the amount of effort exerted towards achieving anything.  One uses small means to achieve satisfactory results.  This results in far less pressure and strain of living, and also less violent competition.  Violence occurs when there is competition for scarce resources, so if one does not desire so much, violence will be less frequent.  For example, the purpose of clothing is to maintain a certain amount of temperature comfort and also an attractive appearance.  This should be achieved with a minimum effort, and a minimum destructive impact.  The time, resources and effort can then be put into other activities (such as artistic activities).  The clothing should be long lasting, and should not be ugly, shabby or mean.  Consequently, complicated tailoring is out, and it is preferable to use skilful draping of uncut material.  Consequences: (i) Smaller, self-sufficient communities are more preferable than larger multi-national corporations.  This is because this results in less violence.  It is also because long-distance transportation is seen as inefficient—why consume goods transported from a long distance away when one could have adequate goods that are locally made?

 

Comments:

(i)              Again, it seems like many modern Westerners would not accept MWE, at least in this strong form.  What is stated may be an abstract economic assumption, used in a narrow context, but it is not an assumption about life in general (at least for most people).  Stated in this way it is extremely implausible, and I doubt anyone would actually think to herself or himself that s/he is successful in life simply because s/he consumed a large quantity of goods.

(ii)            Schumacher compares Burma with the US, and claims that the strain of living is less in Burma than in the US, despite the higher consumption in the US.  I would be interested in seeing the empirical evidence with respect to this claim of psychological health.  And if it is true, why is it that so many people from poorer countries wish to move to the US or other Western countries?  Whatever the empirical data, the claim seems to be that if we have fewer resources and labour-saving devices then we will be psychologically healthier, and hence have less violence.  I am unconvinced why having few resources should necessarily lead to less violence, for BE.  True, if one’s daily life is simply taken up with subsistence survival, then there is little time and energy for recreational violence.  It is also true that, once one’s basic needs have been met, if one does not strive for scarce luxuries, then there will be less competition for resources than if luxuries are a goal.  And in this sense there would be less pressure in life.  But this second point does not follow from one having few resources, but rather it is from one reducing one’s desires.  The issue of the amount of resources seems unrelated.  If it is just an issue of desires, then surely one could be at least equally healthy and satisfied with more resources and labour-saving devices than with fewer resources.

(iii)           One of the assumptions behind BE is that one is psychologically healthier and has a better character if one has fewer desires and also if one does not make such an effort in one’s activities.  This might be questioned.  At the very least it would have to be qualified, since too few desires and too little effort may be better described as the vice of slothfulness.  Perhaps, at best, it is just some desires that should be reduced or eliminated, not all.  But, at least in some strands of Buddhism, there is an emphasis on eliminating all desires.

(iv)          The clothing example seems weak, and not necessary to the main point with respect to BE.  Firstly, surely the making of clothes can itself be an act of artistic expression.  Secondly, the production of clothes could also be a way of developing character.  Thirdly, beauty is highly subjective, and why should we unquestioningly assume that skillful draping is more beautiful that any other style of clothing?  Fourthly, it may be that in some situations other styles of clothing are more practical than draping, because of weather or lifestyle (image those who ride horses or motorbikes wearing draped clothing).

(v)            Why is simplicity better than not, for BE?  Is it simplicity in all respects, or just in some respects?  This is not clear, and no answer is given.  Schumacher has only argued for simplicity in the narrow sense of lessening desires for scarce resources.  Also, something may be highly complex, yet not be based on a consumer approach.  Surely Schumacher would not be suggesting that Buddhists reject, for example, snowflakes or detailed philosophical arguments.

 

3. Use of natural resources

MWE: Natural resources are there to use as one wills, and destroying and wasting matter is unimportant.  The ecosystem is ignored, as is the distinction between renewable and non-renewable materials.  Everything is quantified in terms of a money price.  The cheapest option is always preferred.

 

BE: There is an assumption of reverence for and non-violence towards much of life, including all sentient beings and also trees.  There is an awareness of the distinction between renewable and non-renewable materials, and an importance placed on the ecosystem.  Non-renewable goods must only be used as a last resort, and with care, awareness and a mind for conservation.  Consequences: (i) One ought, for example, to plant a tree every few years and look after it.  If universalised, this action would help economic development.

 

Comments:

(i)              Once again, I suspect that only a very few modern Westerners would accept MWE as described.  Firstly, business-wise, one needs to be at least moderately aware of which goods are non-renewable, if one’s long-term business depends on such goods.  For example, many (though admittedly not all) forestry companies engage in reforestation practices, and it is also considered to be a form of investment.  Secondly, a growing number of legal and social regulations are in place to stop excessive abuse of the ecosystem, both nationally and internationally.  Thirdly, I suspect very few people would actually be so excessively money-oriented as that which is described (though admittedly some are).

(ii)            Again, looking to Taiwan, the ecosystem there has been ignored to a far greater extent in this semi-Buddhist country than in the non-Buddhist country of New Zealand.  This again makes me wonder if the labelling is appropriate.  In response, Schumacher may agree that Taiwan does not practice BE and New Zealand does not practice MWE, but if this is the case, we need some real-life examples of economies to show what is a Buddhist economy and what is a Western economy.

(iii)           The tree-planting emphasis seems a little odd (in the absence of discussion of any other eco-policies), but it is a useful start.  Otherwise, an eco-friendly approach to economics, as described in BE, seems very sensible.

 

Conclusion

Schumacher explicitly identifies a number of assumptions that may be made in the context of business and economics.  This is useful as it enables one to start the process of identifying and critiquing one’s own assumptions about how one does business, and, more generally, lives one’s life.  It is also a useful method for beginning a dialogue on what should go into an ethically sound economics.  In addition, with respect to BE, some of the substantive positions articulated or defended (or slightly modified versions of the positions) seem plausible.  In particular, the points with respect to preserving the ecosystem, considering mental health in the workplace, and not blindly assuming that unrestricted consumption is good.  But these need not be, nor are, exclusively Buddhist practices.  However, the praise with respect to this worthwhile endeavour must be qualified.  My main concern is that Schumacher has created a false dichotomy between MWE and BE.  There would seem to be other, more moderate, positions available, which steer a middle way between the two extreme positions described.  This may seem somewhat strange, since, as Schumacher points out, Buddhism is itself supposed to be the middle way.  My other main concern is that Schumacher’s depiction is somewhat artificial, in the sense that the positions as described do not match what typically happens in the actual world.  At best they are oversimplifications.  A stronger criticism of this type is that all Schumacher has done is set up and criticise a strawman account of MWE, and jumped too hastily to an overly naïve and idealised form of Buddhism.

 

(3213 words)

 

Hosted by www.Geocities.ws

1