However, whereas Suber is a professional academic, I am not. Before reading any further, read my disclaimer and warning on my My Writings page.
Personal Identity Scenarios
Glenn
Mason-Riseborough (21/8/2000)
1. Teletransportation Machine: Suppose a teletransporter was developed such that it could scan your body and store all the information, destroy your body, send the information to some destination, and then create an exact duplicate of your body at the destination from material nearby.
(a) Would the being at the destination be you? Why or why not?
(b) Suppose the teletransporter did not create a duplicate immediately, but waited some length of time, for example 10 years. If you said yes to (a), would you still say yes? Why or why not?
(c) Suppose instead of destroying the original and making a duplicate out of different material at the destination, the teletransporter sent the same matter to the destination and ‘reassembled’ you. If you said no to (a), would you still say no? Why or why not?
2. Malfunctioning Teletransporter: Suppose the teletransporter malfunctioned and did not destroy the original you, yet still created a duplicate. Thus, there are now two beings (‘you’) that are exactly the same. (Note: there are many variants of the duplication scenario, and they all pose problems for many of the theories of Personal Identity.)
(a) Which one is you – the original, the duplicate, both, or neither? Why?
(b) What about if the malfunction caused the creation of numerous ‘yous’ at multiple destinations, how would you answer?
(c) If you answered the original, because it is the original, how would you answer if the original is destroyed, but there are two (or more) copies created at multiple destinations?
3. Brain (Body) Transplant: Suppose that medical science develops such that it becomes possible to have brain (body) transplants. That is, person A’s brain is put into person B’s body. Presumably, the survivor would look like person B, but act like, think like, and remember being person A. After the operation, would the survivor be person A, person B, some new person (person C), or not a person at all? Why? Would you prefer to be person A or person B?
4. Life after Death: Suppose that after our bodies die, ‘we’ go on living in some way. On what basis could we say that the surviving person is the same person as the one who died?
5. Anticipation: If we believe that we are going to the dentist tomorrow we anticipate pain; this is very different from the sympathy we might feel for someone else’s pain, even if we care for them so much that we would take the pain on ourselves instead. Do we anticipate the person’s pain because they will be us, or will they be us because we anticipate the experience?
6. Memory: Suppose someone had a head injury, and as a result lost their memory and are also unable to form new memories. What does the memory theory of Personal Identity tell us about this case? Is the person the same person as the one prior to the injury? Is the memory theory correct in this case? (Also, what should we say about the identity of those who are in comas, suffering from senile dementia, etc?)
7. Foetuses: (a) If you think that physical continuity is the correct story about Personal Identity, then when does a foetus become an independent person separate from his/her mother? (b) If you think that psychological continuity is the correct story about Personal Identity, then when does a foetus/infant have the appropriate psychology and become a person?