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A Menu of Positions in Philosophy of Mind

Glenn Mason-Riseborough (7/8/2000)

 

Dualism: the world (in particular the mind) is made up of two fundamentally different types of substances/events/properties.  These are often referred to as physical and mental (or non-physical or spiritual) respectively.  There are two main ways of carving this up, based on type and causal interaction respectively:

 

Substance Dualism: the two types are of different substances

Attribute (or Property) Dualism: there are no non-physical substances, but some physical substances have non-physical (mental) attributes (or properties or characteristics)

 

Interactionist Dualism: the two types causally interact with each other

Epiphenomenalist Dualism: the causal link is unidirectional – physical to mental only

Parallelism: there are no causal interactions between the physical and mental

Occasionalism: God is the only true causal agent, and causal interactions between types are because of Him

Pre-established Harmony: physical and mental are synchronised at the initial set-up of the world

 

Monism: the world is made up of just one fundamental type

Idealism: the fundamental substances/events are all mental/spiritual

Neutral Monism (or Double Aspect Monism, or Panpsychism): the fundamental substances/events are all neutral, or contain both aspects

Materialism: the fundamental substances/events are all physical (explained or explainable by the physical sciences)

Non-Eliminativism: mental states/events/processes exist

Philosophical Behaviourism: mental states are behavioural dispositions

Identity Theory: mental states are brain states/processes

Functionalism: mental states are functional states (inputs, processes, outputs)

Analytic (or Common Sense) Functionalism: functional roles are specified based on our common-sense intuitions about mental life (Folk Psychology)

Empirical Functionalism: functional roles are specified in a way that is related to what the current sciences tell us (spelled out in a number of different ways)

Eliminativism: mental states/events/processes do not exist

Eliminativist Behaviourism: it is more accurate to talk about sensory stimuli and behavioural responses (rather than talk of a mental life – beliefs, desires, etc)

Neurophysiological Eliminativism: it is more accurate to talk about neurophysiological states (rather than talk of a mental life – beliefs, desires, etc)

Instrumentalist Eliminativism: it is still useful to talk about mental states to predict behaviour, but strictly speaking, we do not have them

 

Note 1: These are the basic categories that most current philosophers of mind identify.  However, sometimes different people use different terminologies for the same (or very close to the same) idea.  Or alternatively, different people use the same word to mean different ideas.  Example 1: some people use ‘Physicalism’ as synonymous with ‘Materialism’ while others use it as equivalent to ‘Identity Theory’.  Example 2: often ‘soul,’ ‘spirit’ and ‘mind’ are used interchangeably, especially for Dualist theories.

Note 2: Further more fine-grained distinctions between theoretical positions are sometimes made (for example, some six different varieties of Empirical Functionalism have been identified in one book!), but you don’t need to worry too much about these for now!

Note 3: Make sure you understand the various positions on offer – how they differ and how they are similar.  For our purposes, to some extent this is more important than detailing the arguments for and against the various positions.

Note 4: See the notes in the course book for more detailed explanations of these positions.