However, whereas Suber is a professional academic, I am not. Before reading any further, read my disclaimer and warning on my My Writings page.
Two Arguments for the
Existence of God
Glenn Mason-Riseborough (25/9/2000)
Note 1: There are many arguments for the existence of God; in this course we are just focusing our attention on two of them. More specifically, as a philosophical exercise, our task is to evaluate the arguments, and not (at this stage) to address the wider issue of God’s existence.
Note 2: It is important to distinguish between arguing against arguments for the existence of God, and arguing against the existence of God (next week we will be looking at an argument that falls into the latter category, namely the Argument from Evil). It is possible to say that these are not good arguments and yet still claim that God exists.
Note 3: There are many different conceptions of God, and, even within the same broad understanding, different people will choose to focus on different purported properties. As a first-off reading, we might assume that these arguments we are looking at are defending a conception of God that is known as ‘omniGod.’ That is, a being who is an intentional agent, who holds the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence, and is the creator ex nihilo of all else that exists. The Ontological Argument focuses in on the greatness (omni-) properties, while the Design Argument focuses in on the creation/design properties.
Note 4: When writing about ‘God’ or ‘god,’ it is common practice to use a capital ‘G’ for the proper name of an actual or supposed being and a small ‘g’ for the general term. E.g., ‘the god of the Christians is called God.’
Ontological Argument
There are a number of different versions of the Ontological Argument; historically the two most noteworthy are by St. Anselm (Proslogian, Ch. 2 – 4) and Rene Descartes (Fifth Meditation). More recently Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity, 1974, Ch. 10) and others have attempted modal versions. We are focusing on Anselm’s version. Immanuel Kant’s critique of Descartes’ version is found in Critique of Pure Reason, Second Div., Bk. II, Ch. III, Sect. 4. J. L. Mackie (The Miracle of Theism, 1982, Ch. 3) gives a good analysis of the various versions (and concludes that all fail).
The Ontological Argument is an a priori argument. The claim is that if we have a proper
understanding of what we mean by ‘God,’ then we must realise that God
exists. According to the theist who
puts forward the Ontological Argument, the atheist’s mistake is that s/he
misunderstands the nature of God. But
consider: Surely it can’t be such a simple matter to show that God exists based
only on our definitions.
The formal argument is (taken from Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 1967):
1. God exists in the understanding, but not in reality [reductio]
2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone [premise]
3. A being having all of God’s properties plus existing in reality can be conceived [premise]
4. A being having all of God’s properties plus existing in reality is greater than God [from 1, 2]
5. A being greater than God can be conceived [from 3, 4]
6. It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived [definition of ‘God’]
7. Hence it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality [by reductio]
Questions:
1. The argument given above is in the form of a reductio ad absurdum. What does this mean?
2. What is a great-making property? That is, what does it mean to say that God is that which none greater can be conceived? Even if we assume the Ontological Argument works, what type of being does it show to exist? Must we say that it is the Judeo-Christian god? Must we say that ultimate greatness requires omni-properties, or creation, or even intentionality?
3. Is ‘existence’ a real (or determining) predicate (and what does this mean)?
4. Do you think that the Ontological Argument proves the existence of God? If you think the Ontological Argument must be wrong, where, precisely, does it go wrong? (Consider some of the objections raised in the lecture, and whether they are fatal objections)
Design Argument
The Design Argument (also called Teleological Argument, Argument from Design, Argument to Design, or Argument for Design) falls into a category of theistic apologetics known as Natural Theology. The aim of this approach is to prove the existence of God based on natural features of the world. Other types of natural theological arguments include the Cosmological Argument and the Argument from Consciousness. The Design Argument starts by focusing on the complexity of the natural world, and the intuition that it could not have come about without the assistance of a supranatural intentional agent (or agents). There are two main versions of the Design Argument, the argument by analogy and the inference to best explanation. Historically, William Paley is most well known for his watch analogy; more recently, William Dembski has made a name for himself through defending what he calls “Intelligent Design” (as an inference to best explanation).
Questions:
1. The argument by analogy starts by looking at objects of human construction that are intricate and complex (e.g. a watch), observes that natural organisms are also intricate and complex, and concludes that natural organisms must also have a designer. The assumption necessary for this analogy to work is that there is a high degree of similarity in the right respects between human-made objects and natural organisms. Do you think that this assumption is warranted? Why or why not?
2. An inference to the best explanation is a common method within scientific disciplines, used to decide between competing theories of explanation given certain evidence. Those who support this version of the Design Argument claim that, given our current evidence, the most plausible explanatory story includes some reference to some supranatural intentional agent who is a creator (i.e., God). Try to come up with, and flesh out, as many potential explanatory stories as you can (bear in mind that evolution and design need not be incompatible). Given current evidence, which story do you think is most plausible? Why?
3. In The Panda’s Thumb, Stephen Jay Gould writes about Charles Darwin’s book on orchids and also (unsurprisingly) panda’s thumbs. What is his point, in the context of evolution and the Design Argument? Which version of the Design Argument is this specifically aimed against?
4. In Metaphysics, Richard Taylor identifies a further version of the Design Argument. He claims that randomness implies a lack of information, and conversely the existence of information implies no randomness and hence also implies purposefulness. Now, we rely upon our faculties of sense and cognition for the discovery of truth. But if these faculties came about through chance, then they could not have really told us anything. So, since we do rely on these faculties to supply us with information, there must be a purposefulness behind it (see end of p. 118). The author of this purposefulness is God. Is this a good argument? Where might we question it? (Consider evolution as a form of purposeful design)
5. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we accept that one or more of these Design Arguments above work (and accept that the universe has a designer), can we learn anything more about the designer (such as goodness, power, intelligence, etc)?