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On Hegel’s The Life of Jesus

Glenn Mason-Riseborough (7/6/1999)

 

1.0 Introduction

Twelve years before Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel published Phenomenology of Spirit, the work he is perhaps most well known for, he wrote a manuscript entitled The Life of Jesus[1].  This essay of his was started on the 8^th of May 1795[2] and completed on the 24^th of July 1795, just over a month before his 25^th birthday.  The Life of Jesus shows us a picture of a much younger Hegel.  A Hegel who had still yet to formulate his system of thought that came to dominate German thinking during the first half of the 19^th century.  We may understand this Hegel who wrote The Life of Jesus as a person very much in the grips of (and indeed still coming to terms with) the system presented by Kant[3].  In his telling of the story of Jesus’ life, Hegel emphasises Jesus as a man and a teacher.  What Hegel’s Jesus teaches is essentially Kantian ethics.  In Hegel’s eyes, Jesus is not seen as a miracle worker and the unique Son of God, but as a man, born of human parents, who through his prodigious insights into humanity taught the universality of reason.  In what follows I will discuss Hegel’s interpretation of Jesus in The Life of Jesus.  Firstly, I will discuss Hegel’s aims in writing The Life of Jesus, that is, the desire to recreate Christianity as a living religion and to show Christianity as rational.  I will then formulate Hegel’s conception of God before comparing and contrasting Hegel’s view of Jesus with what we might call an “orthodox” Christian interpretation.  That is, the approach that sees Jesus as uniquely divine.

 

2.0 Hegel’s Aims in Writing The Life of Jesus

According to Harris (in Christensen, 1970), Hegel’s early theological writings (including The Life of Jesus) are concerned with two main issues.  These are:

 

1.      He wished to resurrect Christianity as a Volksreligion and,

2.      He wished to show that Christianity was a thoroughly rational religion at heart.

 

The Greeks were the inspiration for Hegel’s desire for a Volksreligion and the French and German enlightenment was the inspiration for Hegel’s desire for a rational religion.  Harris makes it clear that these two aims are completely distinct in their theoretical inspiration.  They are both very different aims, but (again, according to Harris), resolve into one and the same thing.  This takes the form of reason (Vernunft), such that it is through reason that morality has its authority and thus it is through reason that one lives one’s life.

 

2.1 Living Religion

Hegel aimed to make religion more real to people of his own era.  He wanted religion to be present in one’s everyday life as inwardly meaningful.  Hegel saw that the Christian religion (both Catholic and Protestant) in his era had become ritualistic and had lost the essence of a living religion (Volksreligion).  Hegel, like many people of his day looked back at the ancient Greek culture as a culture with a living religion.  The Greek culture was thus an ideal that one should use as a model when examining ones own culture.  Unlike some, Hegel did not want to return to a Greek world or to create a new Greek world, rather he aimed to modify Christianity and incorporate into it the Greek ideals of a living religion.  Hegel thus saw it as his task to reinterpret the Biblical story of Jesus in the gospels and hence to inject new life into a dead religion.  In this respect he was not so concerned with what Jesus actually said and did, but what Jesus meant (or to be cynical, what Hegel wanted Jesus to mean).  Thus, throughout The Life of Jesus, Hegel constantly put words into Jesus’ mouth[4].  Hegel’s retelling of Jesus’ life was a deliberate attempt to show Jesus’ teachings in a new light.  Hegel focused in on certain parts of the gospels, emphasising some aspects and de-emphasising others in order to make his point.  In an essay written probably within a few months after The Life of Jesus, entitled The Positivity of the Christian Religion, Hegel set out explicitly what he saw within the Christian religion as an authority externally imposing laws.  Hegel thought that the laws of the Christian religion were “positive” laws rather than “natural” laws.  The distinction being from legal theory where positive laws are “man-made” laws and natural laws are “God-given” laws.  Hegel thus saw himself as criticising the Christian Church in the same way that Jesus has criticised the Pharisees for emphasising the Torah.  In both cases the powers that be had become too legalistic, emphasising the letter of the law at the expense of its essence (i.e. universal reason).  Through emphasising the letter of the law, Christianity had died as a religion.  Christianity was no longer an everyday part of people’s lives.  When seen in this light, The Life of Jesus is a strong critique of Christianity and the Christian Church of the day.

This motivation of Hegel’s has itself been strongly criticised.  It has been argued that Hegel was creating a strawman argument in his formulation of Christianity.  Steinkraus, (in Christensen, 1970) in his reply to Harris points out that Hegel ignored numerous instances of Volksreligion in various sects of Christianity in his day.  In his scathing criticism Steinkraus suggests, ironically, that Hegel derived his idea of a living religion from the dead Greeks.  Hegel, in ignorance or self-imposed blindness, ignored (what Steinkraus considered to be) the living religions of the Moravians, the Mennonites and the Quakers for example.  These people already had a living religion, and thus Hegel was arguing against only a small part of Christianity.

Perhaps, at best, we can say that Hegel was justified in arguing against some forms of Christianity, but it seems clear that there were other sects of Christianity in Hegel’s day that could be fairly considered to be Volksreligions.  If we assume Harris’ analysis of Hegel’s motives, then I may suggest that Hegel’s fault was in his overgeneralisation of Christianity.

 

2.2 Rationality

Hegel’s second aim in his early theological writings was to show religion as purely rational.  His ideas, in this respect, follow other enlightenment thinkers in emphasising a “religion of reason.” Hegel thought that while the principles of the religion of reason are simple and few, they are impossible to express in words.  This is because these principles are not dependent on any acquired knowledge; they are completely innate.  Hegel’s Jesus says:

My doctrine is no human contrivance requiring painstaking effort on the part of others to learn.  Anyone who has resolved without prejudices to follow the unadulterated laws of morality will be able to tell at once whether what I teach is an invention of my own (Hegel, 1984, p. 125).

 

In addition, Hegel put the following words into the mouth of Jesus:

Do you really believe that the deity threw the human species into the world and left it at the mercy of nature without a law, without awareness of the purpose of its existence, and without the possibility of discovering within itself how it might become pleasing to him? … This inner law is a law of freedom to which a person submits voluntarily, as though he has imposed it on himself.  It is eternal and in it lies the intimation of immortality (Hegel, 1984, p. 127).

 

At the very heart of Hegel’s interpretation is the very orthodox Kantian notion of morality as a completely rational and universal truth.  Hegel aimed to show that the basis, the very essence of Christianity, was dictated by a completely eternal, universal moral law.  This moral law is a law that is written on the hearts of all of humanity and is the very spark of divinity within each and every one of us.  Hegel wrote that Jesus was “determined to remain forever true to what was indelibly written on his heart, i.e. the eternal law of morality” (Hegel, 1984, p. 106).  Hegel believed that this rationality is something that is present in all systems of belief in all societies.  While certain trivial details differ from society to society, the essence of rationality remains true in them all.  The cultural differences result in different articulations of rationality, but the essence of the message will remain clear.  Anyone, regardless of his or her culture, will be able to see the truth of whatever is spoken as long as he or she examines the truth that is in his or her heart.  Thus, the young Hegel took a very ahistorical approach in his writings.  He was not at all concerned with historical contingencies, rather he was only concerned with the unchanging essence.  He considered these cultural variations merely positive (not natural) characteristics of religion and society.

As a parenthetical note, we may contrast this view with Hegel’s later (post 1800) approach, which realises the importance of the historical context.  This later view accepts the importance of particular religious practices in their day, and considers the possibility that what is appropriate in one culture may be considered outdated in another.  What may be natural in one culture may be positive in another.  This is the beginnings of Hegel’s development of his theory expressed in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

In his account of the universality of reason, Hegel attacks the idea of faith.  While this is more directly addressed in some of his other early theological writings, Hegel also mentions this idea in The Life of Jesus, where he writes:

But do I demand special respect for my person?  Do I demand that you believe me?  Do I seek to impose on you some standard devised by me for appraising and judging the value of men? No.  Respect for yourself, belief in the sacred law of your own reason, and attentiveness to the judge residing within your own heart – your conscience, the very standard that is the criterion of divinity – this is what I have sought to awaken within you. (Hegel, 1984, p. 148).

 

Hegel shows in this passage that Jesus did not wish to be the object of faith.  He did not want to be seen as the Messiah.  Rather he wanted people to realise their own spark of divinity within themselves.  However, as Harris (1972) points out, Hegel’s Jesus was forced to accept himself as the object of faith because the Jews of the day had lost their awareness of reason as an autonomous faculty. Hegel wanted to show that faith was unnecessary in the presence of reason.  He argued against faith as being “above” reason, and in addition argued against faith in Jesus since Jesus’ life was a matter of historical contingency.  It is impossible to know something necessarily simply because of some a posteriori event.  Jesus taught universal principles, knowable a priori, and Jesus as a person was essentially unimportant in comparison.

What is interesting here however, is that Hegel himself appears to have a faith in reason.  While it is true that throughout his work Hegel is writing with the assumption of the truth of Kant’s theory in his three Critiques (which is not within the scope of this essay to address), there is also a certain amount of faith involved in the view that rationality is a universal law.  Contrary to this perspective we may suggest the view that the world is fundamentally absurd.  With respect to the question that Hegel (through Jesus) posed (quoted above) in the context of the deity throwing us into the world without the possibility of discovery of the truth or the meaning of existence, we may simply reply that yes, we are thrown into this world in such a way.  We may reply, as Kierkegaard did, that there is no way of knowing rationally what is true and what we should do.  We may reply that the only solution to our condition is the existential “leap of faith.”  Whether we jump one way or another way is completely arbitrary.  Indeed, we may reply that Hegel’s “leap of faith” was towards Kantian morality and reason, yet just as correctly one may make a “leap of faith” towards Jesus as Messiah, Jesus as the unique son of God.

 

3.0 Hegel’s Conception of God

Hegel opens The Life of Jesus with:

Pure reason, transcending all limits, is divinity itself – whereby and in accordance with which the very plan of the world is ordered (John 1).  Through reason man learns of his destiny, the unconditional purpose of his life.  And although at times reason is obscured, it continues to glimmer faintly even in the darkest age, for it is never totally extinguished (Hegel, 1984, p. 104).

 

As I stated in the previous section, Hegel argues for the universality of reason.  However, this universality of reason is not simply a characteristic of humanity (although it is a characteristic), but it is also, according to Hegel, the divinity itself.  This pure reason is the spark of divinity within each and every one of us as human beings.  Thus, Hegel gives us a very different interpretation of God from the usual Judeo-Christian view of God as a personal, individual being ruling in heaven, separate and distinct from the world.  Hegel’s interpretation of God in The Life of Jesus is derived primarily from Schelling.  God in this sense is what Schelling labelled the Absolute Ego.  Harris (in Christensen, 1970) quotes an excerpt from Schelling in which he describes the Absolute Ego.  In brief, Schelling describes the Absolute Ego as Ego not yet conditioned by objects.  It “embraces an infinite sphere of absolute being in (which) finite spheres form themselves, which arise through the limiting of the infinite sphere by an object. … Personality arises through the unity of consciousness.  But consciousness is not possible without an object” (Schelling, cited in Harris, in Christensen, 1970, p. 67).  Schelling then asserts that we must above all strive towards the destruction of our personality, and thus transcend to the absolute sphere of being (i.e. emerge out of the finite spheres into the infinite one)[5].

Harris (in Christensen, 1970) suggests that while Hegel most probably had problems accepting the idea that the moral aim in life is the destruction of our individual selves[6], Hegel nonetheless accepted the idea of God as impersonal.  Hegel appreciated this idea of God as rationality itself, and (according to Harris) even started using the terms Absolute Ego and Finite Ego.  In this sense, Hegel clearly rejected the orthodox (Biblical) conception of God as a personal, loving father.

 

4.0 Hegel’s Conception of Jesus

As I have shown above, Hegel’s Jesus was a teacher of the universality of reason and morality.  But in emphasising this aspect of Jesus, Hegel completely minimises the aspect of Jesus as the miracle worker, saviour, and unique Son of God.  Most notable in this reinterpretation is Hegel’s retelling of Jesus’ birth and death.  In the context of Jesus’ birth, Hegel spares only a sentence, saying: “In the Judaean village (Matt1:2) called Bethlehem Jesus was born to Mary and Joseph, who could trace his lineage (it being Jewish custom to put stock in family trees) back to David” (Hegel, 1984, p. 104).  Hegel thus completely ignores the Biblical account of the prophesies of Jesus’ birth, the virgin birth, and the visits by the angels.  Hegel’s account of Jesus’ death is absent of arguably the most important facet of Christianity, that of the Resurrection.  Hegel ends his essay with the death of Jesus on the cross and his burial in the tomb.  There is no mention at all of the Biblical account of Jesus’ Resurrection on the third day, Jesus’ consequent appearances to his disciples and his ascension into heaven.  Where Hegel does mention incidents of miracles, he rewrites them in terms of metaphorical or psychological experiences rather than physical incidents.  The miracles are often subjective realisations on the part of the individuals, for example the blind man sees the truth, he is not healed physically.  This, in itself, is a telling indication of the power of the religion of reason in Hegel’s day.  It was simply not seen as conceivable that miracles could happen.  Also, when we refer back to Hegel’s motives for writing The Life of Jesus, this rejection of miracles is unsurprising.  As I mentioned above, the emphasis is on the teachings of Jesus regarding the universality of reason.  Hence, it is not necessary (or desirable) for the reader to be distracted from the essential message by spectacular incidents.

However, it may be argued against Hegel that rewriting the gospels without the miracles and without Jesus as saviour is missing the whole essence of Christianity.  The devotional aspect of Christianity is a fundamentally important feature of the religion.  It may even be said that it is this aspect of a religion that turns it into a living religion.  This is because it allows the people to focus in on a particular person as a perfect exemplar and saviour, relating it to their everyday existence rather than some abstract notion of rationality.  In fact, we may consider that Hegel’s two aims discussed above are, as a consequence, totally irreconcilable.  It seems to me that discussing rationality alone and purporting to reject both faith and devotion is going to result in a non-meaningful religion for its followers.  It is an exceptionally cold and unforgiving belief structure.  As I see it, an abstract rationality at the expense of the personality is not going to result in a religion that is more real to the people.  Even the Greeks had countless personified deities to worship.  Hegel, who praises the Greeks, is denying modernity even that.  He is expecting that one should look within ones heart seeing the universality of reason and perform ones duty alone.  This ignores an arguably important aspect of humanity and religion, namely love[7].

 

5.0 Conclusions

Hegel’s The Life of Jesus essay is a central text in understanding Hegel’s early thoughts.  We see within him a rebellious streak as he criticises the state of Christianity of his time.  The young Hegel was not afraid to recreate Jesus (perhaps in his own image), in order to argue his point.  However, perhaps what is most difficult in analysing The Life of Jesus is that it is essentially a story.  Hegel does not directly address philosophical issues and does not directly insert his own comments into the essay.  In order to make his point, Hegel puts his own words into the mouth of his Jesus.  We are left therefore with primarily analysing Hegel’s aims and assumptions.  As I have shown, Hegel’s aims are twofold, recreating Christianity as a living religion and showing it as a purely rational religion.  With respect to the first aim, it seems that Hegel is at best arguing against one particular form of Christianity and not the religion as a whole.  With respect to the second aim, we may suggest that Hegel is in fact merely showing his faith in reason.  I also suggest that these two aims of Hegel are irreconcilable.  Reliance on reason alone creates a coldness not present in one’s everyday existence, it is a form of alienation.  Hegel’s interpretations of God and Jesus are not in themselves problematic, one can define things any way one sees fit.  However, it seems to me that (despite Hegel’s assertion that he is merely saying what Jesus meant to say) Hegel departs radically from the Biblical account of Jesus and God.  In my opinion, the only similarity between Biblical Christianity and Hegel’s interpretations is in the similarity of names and terminologies.  Too often Hegel picks and chooses sections of the gospels that support his aims, ignoring sections that contradict him.  Hegel’s Jesus is a different Jesus from the Jesus of the Bible.

 

Bibliography

Adams, G. P. (1910). The mystical element in Hegel’s early theological writings. University of California Publications in Philosophy, 2(4), 67-102.

 

Christensen, D. E. (ed.) (1970). Hegel and philosophy of religion: The Wofford symposium, Section II, pp. 61-91.  The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

 

Dickey, L. (1987). Hegel: Religion, economics and the politics of spirit, 1770-1807. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Harris, H. S. (1972). Hegel’s development: Towards the sunlight 1770-1801. Oxford: Clarendon.

 

Hegel, G. W. F. (1984). The life of Jesus. In Three essays, 1793-1795 (P Fuss & J Dobbins ed. and trans.) pp. 104-165. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.

 

Kaufmann, W. (1959). The owl and the nightingale: From Shakespeare to existentialism. London: Faber and Faber.

 

Reardon, B. M. G. (1977). Hegel’s philosophy of religion. London: Macmillan Press.

 

Wicks, R. (1999). German Idealism: Kant and early 19^th century German philosophy. Unpublished manuscript. University of Auckland.