However, whereas Suber is a professional academic, I am not. Before reading any further, read my disclaimer and warning on my My Writings page.
Is Art Dead in Modernity?
Glenn Mason-Riseborough
(4/6/1999)
1.0
Introduction
In The Origin of the Work of Art
(Heidegger, 1971), Martin Heidegger maintains that history seems to consist in a
succession of epoch-defining “worlds,” each “world” established in being by an
“artwork.” Yet modernity, while a
distinct epoch, is said to be the age in which art is “dead.” In this essay I will examine this puzzle in
more depth and suggest a number of solutions.
In doing so, I will initially give a brief exposition of Heidegger’s use
of the term “artwork” and elucidate what Heidegger considered to be the
paradigm artwork in pre-modern (thriving) times[1].
In presenting my solutions to the puzzle before us, I will formulate my
critique around two main issues. The first issue I will address concerns what
we mean by modernity. Only by
understanding what we mean by the modern world can we hope to appreciate the
possible characteristics of a modern artwork.
I will then suggest a number of objects that may be considered
“mini-artworks” for subcultures of modernity, and give my own solution as to
what I think may be the artwork of modernity.
Secondly, I will address the question of why we should care whether or
not an epoch has an artwork. Heidegger
thinks that it is a problem that modernity lacks an artwork, I am not convinced
that this is the case.
What is
Heidegger’s conception of an artwork?
This in itself is a deeply problematic question in which there are no
clear answers. Julian Young presents
three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of the Heideggerian
artwork. These conditions are:
1. The artwork brings “world” out of background inconspicuousness into
foreground salience.
2. The artwork allows “world” to be transparent to “earth” in such a
way as to allow the former to appear as “holy.”
3. The artwork gathers together an entire culture to witness this
numinous salience of “world.”
It is not within
the scope of this essay to examine in depth these conditions (and whether we
should accept this definition of an artwork), however a brief explanation is
necessary for what follows. A “world”
is a fundamental epochal horizon of disclosure; it is a particular way of
seeing things for a particular culture.
It is both ontological and ethical.
That is, when we understand our “world” we understand both who we (and
others) are and also how we ought to act in relationship with others in our
“world.” Heidegger acknowledges that
there are many possible ways of seeing an object (many “worlds”), but we are
only ever able to see it in one way at one time (our “world”). He introduces the term “earth” to signify all the other possible ways of seeing
objects. “Earth” is the background set
of all possible, mutually exclusive “worlds.”
“Earth” is unsayable, ineffable, ungraspable, and unmastered. To use an analogy, “world” is the lighted
disc of the moon and “earth” is the hidden spherical depth that cannot be
seen. When we look at the moon all we
see is the lighted disc, although in reality the moon has a far greater depth
to it.
The
third condition needs some clarification.
What do we mean when we say that an artwork gathers together the entire culture? Surely, if we were to be pedantic about this
condition we would have to say that art is dead in all “worlds.” My rationale
for this is that in all cultures there will always be individuals who do not
fit in to the system. There are
criminals, loners, the insane (however
we choose to define this term[2]), children, and untimely artists and
thinkers. All of these people are not
gathered by the artwork. But surely
this is not what we mean. In many
situations we generalise about a cultural group while realising that not every
member of that group fits the criteria.
For example, “the French love food,” or “American tourists are fat and
loudmouthed.” The danger here is that
we are creating false stereotypes. What
we may question is whether it is ever accurate to generalise about a
culture. There are many grey areas that
may be swept under the carpet in our attempts to “define” a culture or
people. Thus, is our generalisation
valid, or is it a dangerously mistaken supposition (from which the only
solution is to talk about individuals only,
never about groups)? To enable this
essay to progress I will assume the former, but in my mind the answer is by no
means clear. Hence, let us suppose for
the purpose of this essay that an artwork must only gather most of the members of the culture, not all. Hence, an artwork
according to Heidegger does three things.
Firstly, it shows us who we are and how we ought to act, secondly it
shows us that there is a deeper reality than what we can superficially see, and
thirdly it does this for its entire culture.
An object may be an artwork for one culture, but not for another.
The paradigm
artwork for Heidegger is the Greek temple.
According to Heidegger, the Greek temple fulfilled all three conditions
of an artwork for the Greeks. “The
temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this
world back again on earth” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 42). “The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things its
look and to men their outlook on themselves” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 43). “Truth happens in the temple’s standing
where it is. This does not mean that
something is correctly represented and rendered here, but what is as a whole is
brought into unconcealedness and held therein” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 56). We must bear this in mind as we address the
issue of the artwork for modernity, constantly referring back to check that our
putative modern artworks live up to the paradigm artwork as Heidegger
represents it. The issue of whether the
Greek temple should be considered as
a true Heideggerian artwork will not be considered in this essay.
Having examined
in the previous section what it takes to be an artwork according to Heidegger,
I will now turn my attention to modernity.
Firstly, what is it, and secondly, can we find any artworks in
modernity.
Modernity,
according to Heidegger, is the epoch of Enframing (Ge-stell). In modernity we are forgetful of “earth” and
our “world” is seen as all that there is.
To return to the moon analogy, in modernity we look at the moon and
think of it as only a disc, forgetting that there is hidden depth. That is, in modernity the “world” is not
transparent to “earth” and hence the second Condition in the section above does
not apply. So if we accept this, then
by definition alone we can say that art is dead in modernity. But should we accept this claim prima facie? It seems to me that there are many areas of modernity in which
“earth” is visible through “world.” I
will address a number of these in this section. It seems to me that each subculture of modernity has what we may
call a “mini-artwork” for it. Before
turning to modernity’s artwork proper I will discuss a number of these
mini-artworks.
When we think of
modernity, we may easily bring to mind certain icons of “consumerism” such as
the Coke can or McDonalds. It is within
this frame of mind that we ask the question as to whether or not these objects
and their ilk are Heideggerian artworks for modernity. Certainly we may say that both the first and
the third conditions are satisfied. It
is not too much stretch of the imagination to suppose that a Coke can brings
“world” out of background inconspicuousness.
These objects allow us to know our “world” and to participate in it
ethically. In addition, the Coke can
and McDonalds are familiar universal icons of modernity. However, it is the second condition that is
perhaps open to the strongest doubt. It
is with great difficulty that we may say that a Coke can allows us to see
“earth.” I am not saying it is
impossible, but it is generally not the case that when we drink from a can of
Coke we feel awe and mystery and a sense of holiness about our “world.” Hence we must strongly doubt that the Coke
can or McDonalds are Heideggerian artworks.
By “Church” I
don’t just mean the “Christian Church” in all its multitudinous variety, but
also the religious gatherings of all the various other religions, cults and
sects that make up modernity. We must
not just take into account the traditional “Western” religions (such as
Christianity and Judaism), but we must also recognise Middle Eastern religions
(such as Islam), Eastern religions (such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism,
Jainism, Taoism, Shinto, and Confucianism), and numerous other provincial
religions and their mixes. In
modernity, all of these religions have their place. It is not within the scope of this essay to address each of these
in turn, but suffice to say, religion is alive and well in modernity. Attending the places of worship and talking
with believers gives one a sense that for these people the first and second
conditions are well and truly met.
These people are aware of their “world,” they live in the modern world,
and yet for them “world” is indeed holy and transparent to “earth.” In addition, these people are gathered
together within the Church (in both the physical and communal definitions of
the word). Of course this does not mean
that the third condition is met for modernity as a whole, but it is met within
this subculture of modernity.
The Internet
presents an interesting case as an example of a Heideggerian artwork and, as I
see it, a strong case. The first
condition is satisfied because an Internet user is aware of the “world” s/he is
in, both ethically and ontologically.
The user understands the Internet’s unique ethics (“netiquette”) and the
appropriate language (smilies, acronyms, etc) to use. Not only this, but for many users (I am not suggesting that this
is true of all users) the second
condition is also satisfied. This may
be a controversial issue, but for many Internet users the “world” is indeed
seen as holy and is transparent to “earth.”
This is because there is a sense of wonder and awe at being a small but
valuable piece in a large interconnected network of people. Just as the Greeks were in awe while in the
presence of the gods in the temple, so too is the Internet user awed at being
interconnected and close to others, being part of a greater whole. It may be argued that the third condition is
not satisfied because Internet users are not gathered together to witness this
– they are sitting alone at their computers.
But this is perhaps precisely the point, the Internet does indeed gather
together everyone to witness, despite their physical separateness. This gathering is a cyber-gathering –
non-physical, non-local (unlike the Greek temple) yet a gathering none the
less.
There are countless other mini-artworks
for subcultures of modernity. Due to
space constraints it is not within the scope of this essay to discuss any of
these to the depth that they deserve.
However, I will just briefly mention that other mini-artworks may take
the form of such things as the Modern Scientific laws (taking into account the
limits of scientific knowledge in such fields as quantum physics and chaos
theory), the Political Constitution (eg the American constitution or the Treaty
of Waitangi), the University, and the TV or Theatre.
The problem with
all of these mini-artworks above (excluding the Coke can and McDonalds, of
course) is that while they gather together members of their respective
subculture, they do not gather together modernity as a whole. Not everyone in modernity goes to Church and
not everyone is connected to the Internet, for example. In Greek society everyone was intimately involved in the temple (ignoring my
concerns of generalisation above).
However, modern society encompasses a far greater diversity than any age
before it. This is the problem of
modernity, according to Heidegger.
There is a fragmentation of beliefs to such an extent that nothing is
seen as universally holy any more by
everyone. In the next section I will
elaborate on why this should be a
problem, but in this section I want to examine in more depth the form that the
modern artwork must take.
Firstly,
modernity is spatially far vaster
than any previous age. Thus, the modern
artwork must take this into account. The Greek temple was able to physically gather its members under a
single roof; this is no longer possible in modernity. But this, as I mentioned above in the context of the Internet, is
not the end of it. More than likely,
the modern artwork will not be a specific building or object. It may exist cybernetically or conceptually
rather than physically. Hence, it is
more difficult to locate than other Heideggerian artworks, but this ultimately
gives it greater power to gather.
Heidegger commented that modernity is an age where everything is
equidistant. Heidegger saw this
equidistance as a negative fact about modernity, but on the other hand, this
may mean that being gathered is even easier in modernity than in any previous
age. Rather than seeing everyone as
equally far away, we may see them as equally close. We are all gathered.
Bearing
this in mind, what I want to suggest now as a putative modern artwork is the idea of modernity. So, what do I mean by the idea of modernity? When we talk of modernity we have some
conception of it as something. This, in itself, is a trivial idea, but at
the same time it gives us a point of focus.
When we talk about modernity, we do so with a conception of what it is in our minds (as opposed to what it
isn’t) and this unifies us. Even though
we are all involved within our own subcultures,
we still like to think of ourselves as in some way connected in the greater
scheme of things. Thus, the idea of modernity gathers together and
subsumes all mini-artworks of all subcultures of modernity. The Greeks were gathered together by the
temple in such a way that they knew who they were. They were able to look outside the Greek world and see other
societies (eg the Persians) as the other
(barbarians). Can the idea of modernity gather together
modernity in such a way that we know who we are (in contrast with the other)?
Hence, can the idea of
modernity gather us together to make modernity appear holy? As I interpret Heidegger, the concern
regarding modernity is that there is
no other. As I understand it, this is
another point to consider in the context of equidistance. Everything is totally equidistant, including the other. Modernity is, more than ever, the age of pluralism, and as a
consequence the “other” vanishes. When
the other vanishes, so does the holiness of our world.
Thus,
under this interpretation, the central issue of concern is whether or not the
“other” exists as a counterpoint for the “us” of modernity. If it does, then the idea of modernity is a conceptually understandable entity and thus
may be considered as the modern artwork.
We all know that we belong to
modernity, so the third condition is met.
We all know who we are and how to act ethically in modernity[3] and so the first condition is met. It is the second condition that is at
stake. Thus, in a roundabout way we
have arrived back at the beginning. But
it is a more conceptually complex beginning because we are now in a position to
appreciate Heidegger’s point, that artwork is dead in modernity because
modernity as a whole has lost the conception of the other (in modernity,
modernity is all that there is) [4].
If we think that there is the “other” as a counterpoint to modernity,
then we can accept that the second condition is met. If this is the case, then the idea
of modernity may indeed be the artwork of modernity. On the other hand, if we (like Heidegger) think that the “other”
is not seen in modernity then art is dead in modernity. On this issue I tend to side with
Heidegger. Modernity is an age of
pluralism, it is an age where all is included and nothing is excluded. There is
no “other” in modernity, just various manifestations of us. “Earth” is not visible and our “world” is
not holy because our “world” is all that there is. But unlike Heidegger I do not think that this is a bad thing, and
I will discuss this in the next section.
4.0 Why do we
Care that Modernity has no Artwork?
In this section
I wish to point out that perhaps this entire task I have been investigating is
a mistaken one. Why should we be
concerned with the fact that modernity has no artworks? There are two distinct points to be made
here.
Firstly,
is it not sufficient that the subcultures
of modernity have their own artworks?
Rather than concerning ourselves with the fact that modernity has no
artwork we should emphasise the fact that subcultures of modernity have
artworks. Hence, it seems to me that it
is a mistake to talk about the Modern Age in the same way as we talk about the Greek
Age, for example. The reason that art
is dead in modernity is that modernity is not an epoch in the same way that the
Greek Age was an epoch, for example. We
are talking about two very different concepts.
Instead of trying to compare “the Greek” with “the Modern Person” it may
be better to compare “the Greek” with “the Internet User,” or “the Churchgoer,”
etc. The fact that there may often be
overlap between subcultures of modernity need not be a problem in itself. All we need to say is that for each
subculture there is an object that fulfils all three conditions of being an
artwork for that subculture. Thus, while art is dead for modernity, it is
alive and well for its subcultures.
Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly in my opinion is the issue of why we should care
whether or not any culture (or subculture) has an artwork. Thus, if we take this view, the solution to
the puzzle posed at the outset is a simple dissolution. We simply say “yes art is dead in modernity
– so what?” It does not matter that we
are forgetful of “earth,” or that we all not gathered together such that we all
see things in exactly the same way. In
fact, it is conceivable to suggest that a Heideggerian artwork is an oppressive
force that should be overcome. A
Heideggerian artwork, by its very presence in a world, dominates that world and
sets a specific way of living. It does
not allow deviation and deviants are consequently punished or shunned[5].
We may even suggest that Modernity is preferable to the Greek Age
because in modernity we have more choice in deciding which subculture we would
like to participate in.
Retrospectively, the Greek culture was a very oppressive one. While a very small percentage of the male
aristocracy was comparatively “free,” the majority (slaves, women, etc) were
not free at all. Ancient Greece is not
the utopia Heidegger would have us believe.
Thus, the very fact that our “world” is not seen as holy may be a
desirable feature; it gives us our freedom to reject our “world” (in the case
of modernity, our subculture) should we so desire it. As I see it, the positive aspects of existential choice far
outweighs any claim regarding the holy.
In this essay I have addressed the issue
of the death of art in modernity. The
puzzle before us was that epochs throughout history all seem to have artworks
that define them, yet modernity (which is supposedly a separate epoch) does
not. In building up my essay above I
addressed a number of related issues, and implicitly addressed each of the main
premises in the puzzle. I spent the
majority of the essay examining whether or not modernity has a defining
artwork. I started out initially
hopeful that it would be the case that modernity indeed has an artwork, but I
conclude this essay extremely doubtful.
The second condition of the artwork is not satisfied for modernity
because modernity is pluralistic and there is no “other” to show “earth” and
make modernity appear holy for us. I
was therefore forced to consider the possibility that modernity is not an epoch
in the same sense that the Greek Age, for example, is an epoch. One solution is then to emphasise the
similarity between the Greek Age and subcultures of modernity (which have
mini-artworks) rather than the Greek Age and modernity as a whole. In my view this is the most plausible
solution to the puzzle. Whether or not
we consider modernity to be an epoch depends on our definitional understanding
of the term “epoch” (whether or not we consider that an epoch must have an artwork). The important point is that modernity is of a
fundamentally different type than the Greek Age. Finally, (and peripherally) I briefly mentioned that it need not
be a bad thing that modernity has no artwork.
In this respect I differ markedly from Heidegger who considered epoch
defining artworks to be of the utmost importance. I think that it is a good thing that we are not enslaved by a set
way of thinking (given by the artwork).
The loss of the holy is not such a drastic loss, in my opinion.
Bibliography
Dreyfus,
H. (1993). Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and
politics. In C. Guignon (ed.), The
Cambridge companion to Heidegger, (pp. 289-316). Cambridge: Cambridge
University.
Foucault,
M. (1988). Madness and civilisation. (R Howard, trans.). New York: Vintage
Books. (Original work published 1961).
Heidegger,
M. (1959). An introduction to metaphysics (R. Manheim, trans.). London:
Yale University
Heidegger,
M. (1971). Poetry, language, thought (A. Hofstadter, trans.). New York:
Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1977). The question
concerning technology and other essays. (W. Lovitt trans.). New York:
Harper & Row.
Young,
J. (1999). Lectures given for
University of Auckland paper 280.757FC.
[1]In this essay I am avoiding the issue of artwork in needy times and how it differs in form from artwork in thriving times.
[2] See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, for example.
[3] There are exceptions to this such as the recent school shootings in the USA, but these are exceptions, and as discussed above in the context of generalisations, this is not a problem in itself. The Greeks, too, had incidents of horrific crime.
[4]As a parenthetical note I may suggest that the “other” will only show up for modernity when/if alien intelligence is found. Only then will we once again have an “other” to contrast “us” with.
[5]Foucault, in Madness and Civilisation elaborates on the specifics of this in various cultures.