Under these conditions, with the ship steaming 9 knots, the wind rather on the starboard quarter and the sea ahead, a comparatively good balance was obtained and in some ways was a little easier than in the first half of the hurricane as there was less racing. This was maintained for about half-an-hour, during which time the ship's head was roughly S.S.E.
9. Just before 1300, a series of squalls struck the ship on the port side with a fury that beggars all description. The ship was thrown....
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VALERIAN
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on her beam ends, heeling 70 degrees over to starboard. The helm was hard-a-port, to keep her head to sea, but this was evidently holding her over and on letting go the helm and putting it hard-a-starboard, the ship righted and came slowly up to the wind, wallowing heavily in the trough of the sea as she came round. It was at this moment the mainmast and wireless were carried away. The ship was brought within about 6 points of the wind, but these tremendous squalls kept forcing her over to leeward and it seemed only a matter of moments before the ship must go. Soon after the engines stopped and the report came up that the ship was ashore but this seems more than doubtful as nothing was felt on the bridge, and although the ship was in a mass of blinding spray, nothing in the nature of breakers was seen. At the time the engines stopped the ship was heeled overto about 60 and then went slowly over.
10. There was little to be done except to order everyone from below, let go the rafts and try and make an S.O.S., but as the mainmast was gone it is unlikely that any message could have ben sent.Within about one minute the ship was over, the funnels went under and when the boilers burst a black wave came up and swept me away from the bridge, to which I was hanging, and carried me under. I came up part of the way and bumped my head and after going down again a little, finally came up alongside a raft to which I clung.
11. There was a lot of wreckage all round and such men I could as see had hold of something.The raft to which I held had 28 men in all and we were swept away in a mass of spray and foam.
Unfortunately the bottom of the raft got kicked out and this entailed much greater effort in holding on. The experience of clinging to this raft for 21 hours, with only a problematical chance of being picked up was indeed trying enough for the hardest. Luckily the water was warm, but the N.W. wind felt bitterly cold to those parts which were exposed, Sunset came and as it grew dark we looked for Gibbs Hill Light or some other Light, as we had no idea of our position, but nothing was seen, not even the glare. The twelve hours of night, with waves breaking over us, were an experience never to be forgotten and many gave up during that time. They got slowly exhausted and filled up with water and then slipped away. The raft was slowly losing its bouyancy and as everyone wanted, as far as possible, to sit on the edge, it capsized about every 20 minutes, which was exhausting; we all swallowed water in the process and the effort of climbing back again began to tell. Twelve held out until the end, when H.M.S. "Capetown" was most thankfully sighted at about 1000 the following day. The bouyancy of the raft was then very small and in another hour it is thought would not have supported anyone. The men picked up were most carefully looked after by "Capetown" and every kindness shown.
12. I should like to bear witness to the brave and calm way in which the ship's company bore themselves to the last and upheld in every way the finest traditions of the Service. While deeply regretting the loss of the ship and sp many gallant lives I do not feel that by any act of mine it would have been in any way possible to have averted this terrible disaster; the forces of nature being as they were overwhelmingly powerful, nor could the loss of so many lives have been in any degree minimized. By the greatest ill-luck the ship could not quite reach her goal, just one hour, away, where she could have ridden out the storm with good prospects of success, and where in any event the safety of so many valuable lives would have been assured.
13. The following is a list of the survivors:-
Commander William Arthur Usher, R.N.
Lieutenant Frank George Hughes, R.N.
Harry Arthur Tandy, Petty Officer O.N.J. 21089
Charles George Marshall, Petty Officer J. 17931
George Archibald T. Lindsey, Ldg. Seaman, 216088
Lloyd George Webb, Leading Seaman, J. 84421
Harold Morley, Able Seaman, J. 25758
Albert Bell, Able Seaman, J. 25328
James Francis Smith, Able Seaman, J. 111524
George Smith Howell, Able Seaman, J. 90675
Arthur Henry Card, Able Seaman, J. 95510
Albert George Hughes, Signalman, J. 35582
Laurence Godfrey Saunders, Telegraphist, J. 81166
Albert Thomas Matthews, Stoker, P.O. K. 16841
Reginald William Drinkwater, Ldg. Stoker, K. 1962
John Francis Hill, Stoker 1st Class, K. 59422
Alexander Patrick Webster, Stoker 1st Class, K. 61612
Thomas George ?, Stoker 1st Class, K. 36577
Edgar George Bone, Stoker 1st Class, K. 18368
All the above ratings are attached to the Portsmouth Port Division, excepting Able Seaman Card whose Division is Chatham.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Sgd. W. A. USHER
Commander, late in command of
H.M.S. "Valerian."
Giving evidence, Commander Usher enlarged on paragraph 1 of his report to the extent of saying that it was only by the personal influence of the Administrator of Nassau that he was able to obtain 31 tons of coal to replenish his bunkers. The nearest Florida port was Jacksonville, 350 miles away, but he considered he had sufficient to bring him back to Bermuda, having regard to the possibility of encountering hurricanesin October. His supply all told was 105 tons, and on the day of the loss he estimated he had 46 tons left.
With regards to the movements of the storm, Commander Usher pointed out the difficulty of estimating the speed of a hurricane.
As to a report supposed to have emanated from the engine room that the ship was aground, he did not believe that the ship did touch. The condition of the wind and sea was such as to account for the loss of the ship.
With regard to the seaworthiness of the vessel, the wind had a great effect on her heeling, and when the ship heeled over to 70 degrees he was quite sure that the leeward battery (I.e. a vacant space on deck bulwarked in) must have been full of water. The coal in the cross bunkers might also have shifted, and the water in the boilers would also go to leeward. All these things, combined with the hurricane force of the wind, were quite sufficient to destroy the stability of the ship.
In cross-examination, Cdr. Usher said that if the coal were Welsh, it would take 60 tons from Nassau to Bermuda, but very often the coal was inferior.
The last he saw of the land was 4 miles beyond Gibbs Hill lighthouse, 4 miles towards the Narrows, the lighthouse being on the port quarter. Some time prior to that he had picked up the light at 26 miles visibility.
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