Commentary on

“Normal Science and its Dangers”[1]

 

Gamel Wiredu

January 2003

___________________________________

 

This essay is a brief commentary on Karl Popper’s responses to arguments raised by Thomas Kuhn[2] in which Kuhn seemed to emphasise that the history of science has been ‘normal’: that scientific discovery has been characterised by less critical thinking and more responsiveness to fashion, ruling dogma and a ‘common framework’. By the ‘Psychology of Research’, Kuhn – according to Popper – seems to claim that apart from occasional revolutionary periods of ‘extraordinary science’, the dominance of particular theories (or paradigms) within any particular scientific domain act as ruling dogmas over considerable ‘normal’ periods; this stultifies bold conjectures and criticism, inhibits innovation, establishes what he calls ‘historical relativism’, and presupposes the acceptance of a ‘common framework’. 

 

In developing his arguments, Popper attacked Kuhn’s idea that scientific revolution is exceptional and occurs outside ‘normal’ times (times of crisis), and argued in favour of ‘revolution’ as a feature that must have permanence and pervasiveness in scientific research. In the end, Popper refutes the relevance of sociological and psychological thinking – grounded in relativistic ontology and subjective epistemology – in the realm of scientific research.

 

Popper, although not unequivocally refuting the occasional instances of ‘normal science’ in scientific research, sounds critical of Kuhn’s typology of scientific discovery. While Popper sites examples of revolutionary theorists such as Charles Darwin and Albert Einstein to substantiate his arguments that the history of science has been less ‘normal’ and more ‘revolutionary’, he is fast to agree with Kuhn on the importance of dogmatism. Using successful theoretical parameters like boldness, conjectures and criticism, he stressed:

 

“I believe that science is essentially critical; that is consists of bold conjectures, controlled by criticism, and that it may, therefore be described as revolutionary. But I have always stressed the need for some dogmatism: the dogmatic scientist has an important role to play. If we give in to criticism to easily, we shall never find out where the real power of our theories lies.” (p. 55).

 

On the other hand, Popper does not concur with Kuhn on the importance of fundamental theories shaping the logic of science. According to Kuhn, rationality in research, discussion and criticism depend on social psychological phenomena such as ‘common language’, ‘common set of assumptions’, and is only possible if agreements on fundamentals are established. Popper interpreted these as a fashionable thesis of relativism – though logical. These statements bring to bear the fact that Popper agrees with Kuhn only on ‘normal’ scientific issues – such as dogmatism – which induce critical scientific thinking towards the ‘Logic of Discovery’.

 

Whether these two ideological arguments suffice in discussions on the history of science, and hence which one should inform current and future scientific research is a critical issue in social science research. Although I agree with Popper on his refutation of Kuhn’s idea of the framework and fundamentals, I also subscribe to Kuhn’s frank elucidation of the tradition of ‘normal science’ in shaping and directing the history of scientific discovery. ‘Normal science’ is not as dangerous as Popper wants to portray because adherence to the ‘normal’ is an initial discourse from which one can gain firm grounds to ‘break out’ through critical discussion and well-informed comparisons.

 

Indeed Popper’s hypothesis that the ‘normal’ framework is a stricture that is irrational and can exaggerate a difficulty into impossibility is an exaggeration in itself. Is Popper suggesting that ‘revolutionary’ scientific outcomes are accidental? I hope not. They are not accidental in the sense that they are logical outcomes of ‘normal’ processes.  In a rather ruthlessly critical tone, Popper describes sociological and psychological science as spurious and argued that the suggestion that, within sociology and psychology, we can find anything like ‘objective, pure description’ in answering the question ‘what is science?’ is mistaken. He concluded:

 

“I cannot conclude without pointing out that to me the idea of turning, for enlightenment concerning the aims of science, and its possible progress, to sociology or to psychology is surprising and disappointing.” (p.57).

 

Within the purview of arguments on social reality forwarded by John Searle[3], Karl Popper can be described as an ontological realist with a strong belief in epistemic objectivity. Analysing his arguments against Kuhn, his ontologically objective stance exemplified by “I do believe in ‘absolute’ and ‘objective’ truth” (p.56) seems to imply that sociological issues of subjectivism and relativism do not appeal to him. Gareth Morgan[4] will call him a Radical Structuralist because he believes in ontological real structures in science on the one hand, and intrinsic tensions and contradictions between opposing frameworks which inevitably lead to scientific truth on the other hand. In my view, Popper’s insistence on the exclusion of sociology and psychology in scientific thinking is perilous. While it is true that scientific phenomena are largely real, issues of application of scientific artefacts and ideas as well as the social construction of reality makes consideration of human perception and cognition critical for scientific success.

 

Indeed the Logic of Discovery has much more to learn from Psychology of Research.