AUTHOR: Johannes Han-Yin Chang

TITLE: Culture, State and Economic Development in Singapore

SOURCE: Journal of Contemporary Asia 33 no1 85-105 2003

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ABSTRACT[Within 35 years after independence, Singapore is transformed into a developed city-state. To a substantial extent, this transformation may be explained in terms of the role of the Singapore state, which in part may be attributed to the regulation of certain cultural values -- those reconstructed by the Singapore government under the influence of both Western and Oriental cultures. This empirical case poses a challenge to the validity of Weber's interpretation of the cultural causes of capitalistic economic development, especially his critique of Oriental cultures including Confucianism. It equally questions the adequacy of the contesting argument that highlights only the positive role of Confucianism in accounting for Asian economic change. This article proposes an alternative cultural model to transcend their limitations in explaining the economic transformation in Singapore. The inherent problems of the values of the Singapore government are also analyzed].In about three decades after independence, Singapore advanced from a third-world city-state to a respectable industrialized country. Its per-capita GDP reached US$28,472 in 1996, equivalent to that of Japan in terms of purchasing power parity and ranked 5th in the world (Lianhe Zaobao, 20 May 1997). Consequently, in 1997 the IMF classified it as an advanced economic entity (Lianhe Zaobao, 21 May 1997). According to Max Boisot's (1997:1025) observation, "Singapore has become something of a role model for those who challenge the idea that the Western path to modernization is the only one on offer."This article attempts to construct a partial explanation of Singapore's achievement story from the viewpoint of culture.(FN2) It also uses the same cultural approach to examine the major forms of inherent strain embodied in Singapore's model of development.The Singapore experience is one of the most controversial topics in today's world. Many people strongly dislike it; there are also many who genuinely appreciate it. This article is not intended to make a value judgment on the basis of ideology-driven appreciation or hate. Nor is it meant to assess (and then to put down or advertise) Singapore's experience as a contrast to the experience of the West. The purpose of the article is to address a major lasting concern in theoretical conceptualization -- culture and its impact on economic development. Thus, Singapore is treated as a unique empirical case (or a case of a unique cultural and social species) for this neutral, understanding-oriented examination. The case of Singapore is of special significance because it has emerged in a particular Asian context and because the trajectory of development of this island state is substantially different from the Western experience.I start my examination of this case from a constructive critique of two existing theoretical models on Asian economic development, namely the Weberian model and its counterpart, the pro-Confucian model.(FN3) The Weberian model attributes capitalistic development in the West to the alleged trend of rationalization that emphasizes acquisition, efficiency, technical rationality, individualism, and mastery (Tai 1989). These cultural values, partly resulting from Protestantism, especially the Puritan version of Protestantism (Weber 1958), have been firmly consolidated in the West. They constitute a sharp contrast with oriental cultures, such as Confucianism. According to Weber (1951:243), under the influence of Confucianism, "[t]he Chinese lacked the central, religiously determined, and rational method of life which came from within and which was characteristic of the classical Puritan." To elaborate on this, Weber said,

The true Christian ... wished to be nothing more than a tool of his God; in this he sought his dignity. Since this is what he wished to be he was a useful instrument for rationally transforing and mastering the world. The decisive factor was that [in Confucianism the celebrated] "cultured man" (gentleman) was "not a tool"; ... in his adjustment to the world and in his self-perfection he was an end unto himself, not a means for any functional end. This core of Confucian ethics rejected... training in economics for the pursuit of profit... Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world (Weber, 1951: 246,248).

For many decades since Weber, Confucianism and oriental cultures in general have been interpreted as the cultural reason why China and other Asian countries lagged behind economically (cf. Hill, 2000).Since the late 1950s, however, this view has been seriously challenged by the remarkable economic achievements of Japan and the "four little dragons," all being Confucian or somewhat Confucian. MacFarquhar (1980:67) observed:

For the 200 years since the onset of the industrial revolution, the west has dominated the world. Today that dominance is threatened, not just by the Russians, who are any way heirs, at least in part, to the western tradition; nor by the Arabs whose stranglehold will relax as the sands run dry; but more fundamentally by the East Asian heirs to Confucianism, who have so far provided the only real economic... challenges to the Euro-American culture.

Myrdal (1968:16) pointed out that "Western theoretical approaches have assumed the role of master models." But in his judgment, this is an untenable approach, "[for] the very concepts used in their construction aspire to a universal applicability that they do not in fact possess." To make the point more explicit, Edward Said (1979) noted that Western scholarship on the Orient was often based on questionable assumptions: The "European" is treated as "rational, virtuous, mature, "normal"; whereas the Oriental is perceived as "irrational..., aberrant, underdeveloped, inferior." In echoing to these criticisms, Peter Berger (1983, 1988) has also stated that East Asia, especially Japan, has developed a non-individualistic capitalism, which is shaped by a culture unique to the region; it is therefore not true to claim that only individualism can breed capitalism as expressed in the Weberian model. Many other scholars have made a similar argument (Bellah, 1957, 1965; Chan, 1996; Hofheinz and Calder, 1982; Inoue, 1999; Kaln, 1979; Kaln and Pepper, 1979; Kuah, 1990; Morishima, 1982; Tai 1989; Vogel, 1979; Yang and Chang, 1987).The experience of the four little dragons (and Japan) suggests that at least some components of Confucianism (and Oriental cultures in general) may contribute significantly to modern economic development. In the pro-Confucian model these components have been identified as group identity, priority of collective interests, diligence, frugality, emphasis on education, and pragmatism (Chung, 1989; Goh, 1990; Hofheinz and Calder, 1982; Kahn, 1979; Tai, 1989; Wong, 1989).Singapore's experience shows that both the Weberian and pro-Confucian perspectives are relevant for understanding some important aspects of its economic transformation. However, these two perspectives only relate cultural influence to the individual in understanding capitalism, industrialization and modernity; consequently, they shed little light on how culture may affect modern economic development through its impact on the state. To the Weberian perspective, this neglect is understandable, for the perspective was initially developed in the West when the emerging market-oriented culture tended to depress and minimize the involvement of the state. To the pro-Confucian perspective, however, the neglect is rather puzzling, for it addresses the countries where state regulation has proved to be a major factor contributing to economic achievements (cf. Barr 2000). Second, both perspectives take cultures for granted. They delineate individuals as followers of culture and their behavior in economic transformation as pre-determined by their cultures. Third, because of their analytical focus, both perspectives are exclusive of each other without mentioning the feasibility of a third alternative -- one that captures empirical integration of elements from both Western and Oriental cultures. Finally, some important cultural elements, especially values at the philosophical level that are relevant to economic transformation, are not included in these two perspectives.In exploring the impact of culture on Singapore's economic development, the article intends to address these inadequacies and exclusions, using a more realistic model to characterize Singapore's experience, a model that is constructed through an expanded integration of the Weberian and pro-Confucian alternatives. This model focuses on the mediation of the state in the process of objectifying cultural effects on economic development. The article treats the Singapore government as it is a reflective dynamic group -- a group capable of re-constructing values against the background of a unique cultural milieu and using the product of this reconstruction to regulate its own behavior in guiding the country's industrialization and post-industrial development. To accomplish the reconstruction the Singapore government has selectively used and modified resources from both Oriental and Western cultures. The article identifies the most fundamental values the government has shaped in this way, most of which falling beyond the list provided by the two existing perspectives. The article also demonstrates how these values have substantially affected Singapore's success achieved in its post-independence economic transformation and how some aspects of these same values are generating tension and challenging the viability of Singapore's existing mode of development.

PRIMARY VALUES OF THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENTThe most fundamental values of the Singapore government that are related to economic development consist of seven components, namely neo-social Darwinism, connectionism, Golden-Means-seeking rationalism, pragmatism, communitarianism, conservative liberalism, and elitism (cf. Barr, 2000; Chang, 1997; Chua, 1995; Han et al., 1998; Josey, 1997; Lee, 1993; Minchin, 1990).(FN4) They are all philosophical values. These values generate as well as regulate a variety of more specific values. Therefore, they may be referred to as primary values.Given the authority of Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister, and his style of selecting ministers and leading his cabinet, it is probably not unreasonable to assume that his primary values largely represented the dominant primary values of his cabinet,(FN5) although each member of it might have differed from him to some degree in one or more respects. Furthermore, it may also be argued that the primary values of Goh Chok Tong's cabinet are basically a continuation of those of Lee Kuan Yew's. Consequently, we can identify the seven primary values of the Singapore government mainly by examining Lee Kuan Yew's values. This article derives the characterization of Lee's values from his own statements(FN6) whose validity is checked against his colleagues' comments, scholars' observations and analyses and descriptions of the interviewees from the general public.

NEO- SOCIAL DARWINISMThe Singapore government's version of social Darwinism emphasizes high-standard achievement orientation, vision, far-sighted planning, conviction, competitive excellence, "hardheadedness," and adaptation; at the same time, it tempers the "hardiness" with a measure of compassion to ensure that those who are less successful in competition "will not fall through the floor" (Han el al., 1998; Straits Times, 9 August 1998:6, 16 Feb. 2000:1; Lianhe Zaobao, 23 August 1999:1; 17 Sept. 1999:14). Lee places special emphasis on the achievement orientation. At the national level, this orientation implies a "first world vision" (BBC, 13 May 2000) and the goal of attaining the status of a respectable "have nation":

I think you must have something in you to be a "have" nation [developed nation]. You must want. That is the crucial thing. Before you have, you must want to have. And to want means to have means to be able first, to perceive what it is you want; secondly, to discipline and organize yourself in order to have the things you want..., and thirdly, the grit and the stamina,... (Han et al., 1998:396).

Lee believes that an average level of "grit," "discipline" and 'stamina" will not be sufficient; one must exercise one's highest degree of determination and toughness. This is applicable to every nation, every organization, and every individual. Taking himself as an example, he said,

... if I decide that something is worth doing, then I'll put my heart and soul into it. I'll give everything I've got to make it succeed. So I would put my strength, determination and willingness to see my objective to its conclusion. Whether I can succeed or not, that's another matter - but I will give everything I've got to make sure it succeeds. ... If you have decided something is worth doing, you've got to remove all obstacles to get there (Han et al., 1998: 16)(FN7).

CONNECTIONISMThe second value component of the Singapore government is connectionism. This connectionism can best be understood in terms of Lao Zi's (1994[?BC]) philosophy of emergence. Lao Zi, a contemporary of Confucius and one of the most influential philosophers in Chinese history, maintains that every form of existence in the universe and the universe itself are products of interaction (or connection) between yin and yang. "Yin" and "yang" stand for any two properties or two sets of property which, although differing from and even conflicting with each other, can interact/connect in various ways to generate one or more new forms. They are close to the philosophical concepts of 'thesis" and "antithesis" that Hegel coded (Houlgate, 1998). For example, Lao Zi would perceive the molecule as originating from interaction/connection between a nucleus (with yang) and one or more electrons (with yin), and a business firm as emerging out of interaction/connection between capital (with yang) and labour (with yin). Further, every type of yang has the potential to be connected with numerous types of yin (and vice versa) and thus to give rise to an infinite number of new forms of existence (both novel and reproductive). Before a certain connection between yin and yang is materialized, it is called "wu" (non-existence, i.e., existing only in potential or possibility). Once the connection is materialized, it is called "you," namely "materialized existence."(FN8)Thus, in Lao Zi's thinking, the nature of the end result of each case of interaction/connection between yin and yang depends on: (1) the particular pattern of the interaction/connection, and (2) the nature of the particular yin and yang involved. Furthermore, the materialization of an end result and the emergence of its particular nature is always a process evolving from "non-existence" to "existence" (or from possibility to reality). For every form of existence, the potential of its emergence is predetermined. The specific properties of this form of existence are also predetermined, for they originate from the set potential. However, the materialization of such potential is not always automatic. In numerous cases it is subject to human intervention. Thus, it takes an art, sometimes a brilliant mind, to discover certain potential and transform it into desirable types of yin-yang connection.Lee and the Singapore government are constantly interested in identifying the "right" type of yin and yang and building the "right" type of interactive/connective patterns for the purpose of maximizing their chance of success in transforming Singapore into a respectable "have nation." For them, this, too, is a process from "non-existence" to "existence." Thus, the concept of connectionism refers to their positive attitude toward the construction of the right kind of interactive/connective patterns in favor of this process. These interactive/connective patterns include desirable relations between Singapore and the world system, between foreign capital and Singapore's receiving conditions, between the government and the public, between social classes, between ethnic groups, and between particular individuals.For example, when relating to his interest in constructing profitable connection between individuals for the benefit of Singapore, Lee (Sunday Times, 31 July 1994:4) told his audience:

I cannot overemphasize the importance of knowing people... I've spent one term in Harvard... In the process I met a whole series of people, who later became very important. One of them was Henry Kissinger... I became a computer hack, if you like, I hack on to their connections and build up.

GOLDEN-MEANS-SEEKING RATIONALISMWhen adopting connectionism, the Singapore government is not just concerned about producing connections that "work," but rather about producing connections that presumably work the best.

I'm prepared to look at the problem and say, all right, what is the best way to solve it that will produce the maximum happiness and well-being for the maximum number of people? (Han et al., 1998:130)

This aiming-at-the-best rationalism constitutes another major component of the value complex of the Singapore government.Lee and the Singapore government seem to believe that policies reflecting such rationalism can be developed on the basis of critical learning - through indirect learning by observation and direct learning by practice. It attaches special importance to learning from other politicians' and other countries' errors and lessons. Thus Lee commented,

If we do not learn from other people's errors, costly errors, we would be ruined, wouldn't we? We have got very little margin to spare (Han et al., 1998: 391; also see pp.113, 121,131 and Lee, 1993:234).

The actual learning approach adopted by the Singapore government would be classified as a Golden-Means-seeking approach in Confucianism (zhongyoung). The Confucian philosophy of the Golden Means contends that the best solution to every problem, the "Golden Means," is located between two sets of non-optimal alternatives - the conservative (buji) and the excessive (guo); therefore it can be identified by excluding both the excessive and the conservative.(FN9) Since "other people's errors" have been caused by either their "conservativeness" or "excessiveness," by avoiding their errors, the Singapore government may expect to develop a set of more effective policies. Of course, the actual policies adopted by the Singapore government are not necessarily the best. Some of them are even infeasible (cf. Barr 2000). There is no doubt, however, that the Singapore government believes in formulation of best policies through systematic investigation, comparison, and selection.

PRAGMATISMStill another value component is pragmatism (Chua 1995; Han et al. 1998). For the Singapore Government, this refers to plausibility, reality testing, and progressive adjustment. Lee had this to say:

I'd read up the theories and maybe half-believed in them. But we were sufficiently practical and pragmatic enough not to be cluttered up and inhibited by theories. If a thing works, let's work it, and that eventually evolved into the kind of economy that we have today. Our test was: Does it work? Does it bring benefits to the people? (Han et al., 1998:109)

In Lee's view, any effective policy must match human nature as well as the country's life conditions. Therefore, if a policy has been proved in practice not to have the matching qualities, it should be altered or abandoned. Furthermore, as life conditions keep changing, a policy that operates effectively today may not function productively some years later; policies, then, must be reviewed and adjusted as life conditions change. For example, when talking about how many engineers to train each year in Singapore, Lee said:

In five years, we make a review and another ten years, we make a second review. And the guiding factors will be what is the best possible way, given our peculiar, almost unique circumstances, to mobilize our manpower and train them (Han et al., 1998:114).

COMMUNITARIANISM AND CONSERVATIVE LIBERALISMGiven the specific circumstances of Singapore and on the basis of the Golden Meansoriented learning, the government concludes that one of the best ways (the supposed Golden Means) to ensure Singapore's survival and development is to pursue communitarianism combined with conservative liberalism. Communitarianism has three major aspects: (1) to define the interest of the whole nation as of paramount importance and perceive individuals' interest derivable from the well being of the nation; (2) to take the interest of the whole society as the point of departure for policy making (contrasting with what he called the Western "atomistic approach" built upon individualism); (3) to use society's interest to integrate and adjust individuals' interest and in some cases, check the perceived anti-social tendencies arising from individuals or interest groups (cf Chua 1995; Tamney 1996). Lee put it this way:

[T]he principle which guides our actions is that the paramount interest of the whole community must prevail (Han et al., 1998: 38).

Placing the interest of the individual above that of society is a "non-gentleman" approach. It directly violates a basic moral principle of Confucianism. This kind of deviance must be corrected (Lianhe Zaobao, 8 October 1999:5).

By conservative liberalism is meant a policy to ensure an equal opportunity of competition for every citizen regardless of his class and ethnic background - competition for all kinds of social privileges (cf. Lenski 1984) within the general framework of law and order and governed by a strong and effective state (Han et al., 1998:158). This competition must be conducted on the basis of meritocracy rather than politics or "unfettered expression" (Han et al., 1998:206).For Lee and his colleagues, Singapore's economic development is preconditioned by the stability and order of this city-state. But the way to achieve stability and order must adapt to the country's unique life conditions. Therefore, Singapore cannot afford to borrow an existing model from any other country. The Singapore model needs to be based on context-specific role awareness and commitment, law, and governance.With regard to role awareness and commitment, Lee believes that the essence of the Confucian thinking on the ethical relations between sovereign and subjects, between parents and children, between husband and wife, between brothers, and between friends is still applicable in contemporary society. It is helpful for developing a harmonious relationship both within and between families as well as between families and the government. A major aspect of this essence is respect for elders and authority (Lianhe Zaobao, 8 October 1999:5).Governance refers to government control on behalf of the general interest of society. In Lee's and his colleagues' conception this general interest requires non-negotiable religious harmony, ethnic harmony and inter-class harmony (Singapore Government, 1991). Politics of interest groups, "politics of envy," and the use of confrontational strategies ought to be depressed (Lee 1993:542). Opposition parties should be checked and mass media must be responsible for the whole society (Lee 531-588).(FN10)

ELITISMLee Kuan Yew is a firm believer in elitism:

In any given society, of the one thousand babies born, there are so many percent near geniuses, so many percent average, so many percent morons. I am sorry if I am constantly preoccupied with what the near-geniuses and the above average are going to do. But I am convinced that it is they who ultimately decide the shape of things to come. It is the above average in any society who sets the pace (Lee 1990).

Therefore, Lee contends, Singapore must have an effective system to spot and cultivate "the above average" for leading roles in all walks of life. Most importantly, Singapore needs a group of most talented people to form a "good government" to "decide the shape of things" for the public. In Lee's conception a good government is one that is clean, honest, capable, efficient, forward-looking, and firm. The availability and operation of such a government is the key to the needed success of Singapore as well as of many other less developed societies. It is even more crucial than democracy to the survival and development of these societies (Lee, 1993:567-579). As such it should act in line with the long-term interests of the people rather than operating according to the opinion poll:

The whole ground can be against me, but if I know it is right, I'll do it. That's the business of a leader (Han et al., 1998).

In contrast to a "good government," "You elect duds, you get a dud government" (Lee quoted from Straits Times, 31 July 1994:4).

CULTURAL ROOTSThe above seven values perform different functions. Neo-social Darwinism sets the long-term goal and the "first world" standards of achievement for the Singapore government; it also supplies the drive for achieving the goal. Connectionism and Golden-Means-seeking rationalism provide two methodologies for goal attainment. Pragmatism, communitarianism and conservative liberalism define principles of action for effectiveness. And finally, elitism specifies what kind of agents to fundamentally rely on to adopt these methodologies and principles to attain the goal.Faith in God, a leading factor driving for capitalistic cconomic development in Weber's conception, is not relevant here. But what Weber emphasizes about rationality and mastery in general is clearly reflected in the above-mentioned neo-social Darwinism and Golden-Means-seeking rationalism. Similarly, what are highlighted by the pro-Confucian argument such as priority of collective interests, hardworking, and pragmatism also has a significant place in the value complex of the Singapore government.Indeed, for each of the seven values we can identify a similar value in Western as well as in Oriental cultures, although the distribution of the salience of these values for the Singapore government is not identical to the distribution of the salience of their counterparts either in Western culture or in Oriental cultures outside Singapore. The emphasis of the Singapore government on neo-social Darwinism corresponds to the emphasis of the West on it. On the other hand, Lee's and his colleagues' preference for elitism, good government, harmony, and social order, and their appreciation of communitarianism and Golden-Means-seeking rationalism are close to the appreciation of these values in Confucian and Lao Zi's thoughts (Feng, 1980; Lao Zi, 1994; Zhu, 1994). The conservative liberalism of the Singapore government is a combination of revised Western individualistic liberalism and Oriental communitarian control (Chambers et al. 1995). The saliency of the remaining values of the Singapore government, namely connectionism and pragmatism correspond to almost an equal emphasis in Western and Oriental cultures (Lao Zi, 1994; Peirce, 1931-35; Wang, 1998).Singapore, a former British colony, is a spot of extensive culture contact -- contact between Western and Oriental cultures. Lee received most of his formal education under a British education system and obtained his law degree in London. He and his cabinet ministers are familiar with Western as well as some of the Asian cultures. Consequently, these cultures have turned out to be exploitable sources from which they can select a variety of value elements for modification, integration, and use. In acknowledging the impact of these cultural sources, Lee (Lianhe Zaobao, 16 September 1998:7) put it this way:

If I had not been cultivated in such a [Chinese] family, my view of life and my values would have been different. Then Singapore would not have been like what it is today. However, if I had not received Western education, I don't think Singapore could have developed so fast... I do not entirely reject Western culture, a culture that has its own strengths.

CONNECTIONISM: RELATING THE HEART TO THE BODYThe above seven values have played a crucial role in regulating the policy formulation of the Singapore government. And they tend to exert themselves in each major case of decision-making. For parsimony and analytical clarity, I will focus on two of them, namely connectionism and neo-social Darwinism. In this and the following section I will illustrate how they each have regulated a particular aspect of Singapore's policy formulation.(FN11) I should note, however, that the other five values, although receiving only fleeting attention in the following paragraphs, are by no means less consequential in affecting the policy making of the Singapore government and eventually in shaping Singapore's post-independence economic development.Singapore was forced to leave Malaysia for independence in 1965 (Barr 2000; Lee 1998). At that time it was nothing but a poor city-state with little capital reserves, no hinterland, and almost no natural resources. Furthermore, it was burdened by mass illiteracy, a high unemployment rate, bitter tension between ethnic communities, and troublesome relations with communism. Lee Kuan Yew could not help shedding tears when declaring Singapore's independence. He and his cabinet knew that independence had made it extremely difficult for Singapore to survive, let alone to pursue industrialization and modernization. When recalling this crisis 33 years later, Lee provided the following account:

For 100-plus years the British ran Singapore and Malaysia as one unit with Singapore as the administrative and commercial center. When the Tunku [Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's first prime minister] and Razak [Abdul Razak Hussain, Malaysia's deputy prime minister] asked us to leave in '65, it was radical surgery, as if you amputated the heart from the body and we have to keep the heart pumping and alive... They wanted to teach us a lesson, so that we would come crawling back on their terms (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1998:11).

A major strategy that Lee and his government adopted to overcome the crisis was to resort to connectionism and relate the heart (with yang) to a new body (with yin), namely the world system, especially its core countries such as the United States, Japan, and West Europe. The central concern of building this connection was to solve Singapore's key problems -- those of resources and market, for when these problems were under control, many others such as unemployment, poverty, industrialization and confrontation with communism would become manageable.In order to construct such a connection, the Singapore government followed the principle of Golden-Means-seeking rationalism to "buck the [conservative] Third World trend" by inviting foreign capital into Singapore on the one hand (Straits Times, 16 Feb. 2000:1) and on the other, to keep distance from the risky money-borrowing practice of some countries in South America by avoiding heavy foreign loans. Thus, it adopted a safer and more effective alternative -- to attract multi-national corporations (MNC) to invest in Singapore. It hoped that the MNCs would not only bring capital but also advanced technology and management skills into Singapore. Besides, they would help Singapore to gain access to part of the worldwide marketing networks.Thus, the Singapore government designed a whole set of strategies to woo MNCs. First, it offered a low tax rate, low wage rate, and other attractive perks to them, especially those committed to value-added industries. Second, it built a highly efficient infrastructure to facilitate their operation. Third, it enforced the principle of communitarianism and pragmatism and created a semi-planned, industrialization-oriented meritocratic educational system to produce a competent labor force to meet the needs of the MNCs for professionals, managerial personnel and skilled workers. Fourth, under the regulation of the values in favor of conservative liberalism (including priority of harmony and order), it managed to hold under check politics of interest groups and successfully achieved ethnic harmony and religious harmony. In the same way, it also promoted co-operation between capital and labor, for instance, using the NTUC (National Trade Union Congress) as a vehicle to co-ordinate the relationship between the two parties. Moreover, it took a firm policy against the former communist party and eliminated it when the latter instigated strikes and riots. After the communist forces collapsed, it went further to minimize the competitive influence of the opposition and prevent mass media from adopting a Western liberal approach. In this way, the Singapore government created a controversial Singapore style of peaceful environment for the MNCs to smoothly manage their business operations.Finally, the Singapore government decided to join the camp of capitalism and side with the core countries in this camp. For example, it made itself a staunch ally of the United States (Straits Times, 13 Nov. 1996) in the Cold War era. It also made deliberate efforts to develop friendship with its neighboring countries. In order to keep good terms with its Malay neighbors, it was even willing to preserve Malay, the mother tongue of a local minority, as Singapore's national language and English (rather than Chinese, the mother tongue of the overwhelming local majority) as the dominant working language. One of the purposes of forging close ties with core countries as well as neighboring countries was again related to the MNCs -- to create a favorable regional and international niche to facilitate their operation.These strategies have proved effective. Foreign investment in gross fixed assets in Singapore's manufacturing sector increased from S$157 million in the period of 1960-65 to a cumulative total of S$49,341 million by 1998. In 1998 the net fixed assets owned by wholly foreign companies alone reached S$20,574 million, constituting 55% of the total net fixed assets of the manufacturing sector (as compared with the 19% owned by the wholly local companies). In 1962, the wholly foreign-owned establishments accounted for 31% of Singapore's gross output, 25% of its value added, 14% of its employment and 26% of its direct exports in this sector. By 1980 these percentages had increased to 59%, 54%, 40% and 72% respectively; and by 1998 they further increased to 70%, 68%, 44%, and 81% respectively. In contrast, the contributions of the wholly local-owned establishments to the national gross output and direct exports in this sector decreased from 46% and 45% in 1962 to 16% and 7% respectively in 1980 and have remained at similar levels since then (reconstructed from Report on the Census of Industrial Production, Singapore, various years; also cf. Chia, 1989).The dominance of the MNCs in capital and productivity in the manufacturing sector has substantially helped to promote Singapore's overall economic development. It is also a major contributor to Singapore's increasing access to the market of the core countries as well as of the less developed and developing countries. The "heart" has survived and is healthier than ever before.

NEO-SOCIAL DARWINISM: BUILDING A COMPETITIVE EDGEWhile making an effort to invite foreign investors, the Singapore government has also tried hard to mobilize Singapore's own limited resources and use them as effectively as possible to build a competitive edge as well as to promote Singapore's economic development in general. The policies made in this regard are geared toward four general instrumental objectives: (1) Maximizing income savings for economic investment; (2) ensuring the most efficient use of the government-controlled resources for direct as well as indirect economic investment; (3) developing world-class key industries with government stakes; and (4) stimulating the growth of local enterprises with no direct government stakes. Neo-social Darwinism, especially the ambition and eagerness of striving for the best "fitness" in the regional as well as global context, underlies all these policies.To encourage people to deposit their money in the government-controlled bank, the POSB, the government offers to exempt from tax all interest that the depositors earn from this bank. In the meanwhile, the government also directly transforms a large proportion of their income into savings for economic investment. Singapore's savings rate was higher than that of all developed countries and also higher than the savings rate of H.K., Taiwan, and South Korea (Lianhe Zaobao, 18 June 1996:4).One of the most effective ways the Singapore government uses to transform income into developmental fund is to require every employee to contribute a large percentage of his/her income to his/her Central Provident Fund [CPF] account. The person's employer is asked to make an additional contribution to his/her account. In 1998, for example, the total CPF contributions for an employee (age 55 or younger) were equivalent to 40% of his/her salary/wages. The owner of a CPF account may use his/her CPF money for investment in housing, stocks, and education or for medical treatment. But s/he is not permitted to use his/her CPF money for other purposes until the age of 55. All CPF funds are subject to the management of the government and the government uses a substantial part of them for economic investment.The Singapore government is extremely careful about how to use its income efficiently to promote economic development. After observing problems of the welfare states in a Golden-Means-seeking manner, it came to the conclusion that Singapore should not adopt the same approach as those countries. Consequently, Singapore has become one of the countries in the world that are most reluctant to spend tax money on social security and welfare. The money saved in this way is heavily used for investment in the economic and educational sectors as well as in R & D, which the government believes are responsible for the growth of productivity. Further, the investment in these sectors is allocated in such a way that economically non-productive spending is reduced to the minimum. In education, for example, the government adopts a communitarian approach (in contrast to the Western individualistic approach) to control the scale of tertiary education as well as the proportion of humanities and social sciences students. The purpose is two-fold: one is to prevent the assumed waste of Singapore's limited resources on producing graduate unemployment and underemployment, and the other is to maximize training of professionals who can directly contribute to economic growth.The Singapore government has used a considerable amount of its investment funds to develop key industries such as Changi Airport, Singapore Airlines, the Port of Singapore, the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), and the housing construction system under the Housing Development Board (HDB). To ensure the quality of these projects, it has selected some of its most capable and committed civil servants to take charge of them.A case in point is Sim Kee Boon, who was picked by the cabinet in 1975 to supervise the construction of a modern Changi airport. Sim devoted an enormous effort to the project and within a tight five years, the airport took shape, costing about S$1.3 billion. And afterwards, Sim never stopped his attempt to expand, revamp and upgrade the airport and airport service until he retired in 1999. Even a diagnosis of cancer of the abdomen ten years ago did not weaken his commitment. His leadership and the cooperative effort of his employees made Changi a leading international airport, one that has won consecutive World's Best Airport awards from Business Traveler and Travel Trade Gazette (Straits Times, 12 September 1999:2).Similarly, Singapore's port and airlines have also established a high status on the international scene. In 1998, the Port of Singapore handled a total of 15.1 million Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) of container volume and became the world's number one container port. In the same year, it was voted "Best Container Terminal Operator (Asia)" for the tenth time at the Asian Freight Industry Awards organized by CargoNews Asia (PSA 1998:5-7).While developing key industries with government stakes, the Singapore government has also tried to create a favorable environment for the growth of local enterprises with no government stakes. Market regulation and low tax rate are among the various means that have been used to achieve the aim. The maximum rates of corporate and individual income tax levied in Singapore are considerably lower than those in Europe, North America, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Lianhe Zaobao, 18 June 1996:4).Partly because of these policies, local private enterprises have also gained significant development since 1965, although their achievements are not as salient as those of the key industries with government stakes. They have substantially contributed to Singapore's success in striving to become a regional financial center. And local entrepreneurs such as Sim Wong Hoo are beginning to make an impressive presence in the regional dot.com world as well.In its World Competitiveness Report released in April 2000, the Swiss-based International Institute for Management Development ranked Singapore for a sixth time as the second most competitive economy in the world -- next only to the United States (Straits Times, 19 April 2000:1).As globalization is accelerating its pace at an amazing speed along with the continuous breakthroughs of digital technology, global competition is becoming much more dazzling and intense. Facing this reality and driven by its pragmatism, Lee and the Singapore government have come to the conclusion that Singapore must change the way it operated and face up to the competition:

Now we must buck the Third World trend to be nationalistic. We must be international in look and practice (Lee quoted from Straits Times, 16 February 2000:1).

What is meant by "international" is to be open to international competition and to get ready to participate in it -- this time 'to take on the world" (Lee quoted from Straits Times, 16 February 2000:1).In the judgment of the Singapore government, the local banks are relatively weak. In an effort to stimulate and pressurize for the growth of their competitive strengths, it has decided to 'shift gear," for example, in relaxing restrictions on competitive transactions of foreign banks. Similarly, restrictions on competition and on foreign investment in local telecommunication are also being lifted (Sunday Times, 26 July 1998:32). Further, for the first time, the Singapore government is attempting to develop a leading role in some aspects of technological development by taking on a "hit-or-miss" approach. For example, in anticipating life sciences to become the most important industry of this century, it has recently decided to spend billions of dollars to develop life sciences in order to build an additional competitive edge. "Not to take the risk [of this gamble] means we may see a big field of business completely bypassing Singapore," said Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan (Straits Times, 16 April 2000:1).

EMERGING CHALLENGESDespite the positive role performed by the above-said values in promoting Singapore's economic development, it would be na"ive to believe that these values have only produced positive consequences for Singapore. Empirical evidence suggests that they have generated at least two kinds of unintended negative consequences because of their inherent strain.First, elitism, together with its logical companion of high demand for conformity and compliance from the subordinate, has led to the emergence of a considerable level of passivity, excessive dependence, and lack of grand ambition, strong desire for self realization, critical and constructive imagination, and courage for entrepreneurial undertaking. Consequently, many people in Lee's "average" category and even in his "above the average" category have their potential depressed or underdeveloped.(FN12)Indeed the Singapore government itself has noticed that this island state suffers from a relative shortage of entrepreneurs, for example, in contrast to Hong Kong. To this we may add that Singapore is also short of original, world-class technological inventions. So far, all the major technologies used by Singapore have been bought from other countries.In Singapore's first stage of development (industrialization), this problem of lack of local entrepreneurs and inventions was overshadowed by the government's smart economic policies, the leading role of the MNCs, the limited local/regional space of Singapore's economic transactions, and the fact that technologies for industrialization were readily available for Singapore to purchase. The same pattern can no longer work effectively when Singapore has to perform on the global stage and compete with the core developed countries in its second stage of development (the post-modern stage). This situation has given rise to a new societal demand, a demand that is going to seriously challenge the Singapore government's elitism and its imbalanced emphasis on conformity and dependence.The second problem with the Singapore government is that its conservative liberalism has generated a mode of political control that is in part already beyond the limit of voluntary acceptance of the public. Singapore's political control is multi-faceted, involving control over relations among races, religions and classes, over political parties, mass media and interest groups, and so on. By justification, this control is meant to ensure social order and stability as well as effectiveness of the government -- for Singapore's economic and social development. Evidence suggests that although Singapore's public generally support most aspects of this control, a considerable proportion feels unhappy about the way the ruling party treats the opposition, especially the way it uses law suits and other means to crush its representative figures such as Jayaratnam and Tang Liang Hong (Barr, 2000).A survey conducted in 1999 studied 811 students aged 14-22 and 811 of their parents.(FN13) Part of the study was to find out to what extent the general public identified with the primary values of the government. Those values were operationalized by using major policies of the Singapore government as their indicators. The responses are reported in Table 1. The measurement of the responses is coded as follows: 0 = completely reject, 5 = neutral, 10 = fully support. Table 1 shows that for the parents surveyed, the average score of their attitude toward the ruling party's treatment of Jayaratnam and Tang Liang Hong was only 5.75, just above the neutral point. Only 47% of the respondents supported the government. The students' responses were similar (5.78). These results were consistent with the finding in a separate random survey of 711 Singaporeans aged 21-65. These findings suggest that a considerable proportion of the general public does not approve the way the government controls political opposition. This also implies that they have serious reservations with certain aspects of the current type of conservative liberalism of the government.This tension between the public and the government has given rise to a challenge to the legitimacy of the governing of the state as well as to the legitimacy of using the existing pattern of political control to check the opposition as an assumed precondition of Singapore's economic development.Based on the government's punishment of the opposition representatives and some other observations, Barr (2000:229) concludes:

In Singapore, power resides in people rather than in institutions or the law, and the main restraint on the exercise of that power is the ideological restrictions of the regime. There are certainly no effective constitutional, institutional or judicial constraints. The parliament is unicameral and is totally subservient to the Executive ... The press is compliant ... Even the law is a tool for the exercise of power ... Most people avoid trouble successfully by refraining from expressing opinions in public, but the widespread pervasion of the culture of insecurity has ensured that ordinary Singaporeans have earned the reputation for risk-aversion, circumspection and indecision.

While Barr's statement may be controversial, no one can deny the problem of legitimacy related to the crushing of opposition representatives. This problem has not reached the point of crisis. However, two basic questions remain: (1) Is Singapore's stability and economic development really dependent on the current approach to political opposition? (2) How long will the public continue to keep silent?Currently, while seeing little hope in changing the existing pattern of political control and some components of the values of conservative liberalism behind it, a significant proportion of the well-educated have chosen or are considering emigration. A recent survey conducted by Singapore's two radio stations reveals that of the 633 tertiary students surveyed in 2000, 5% said that they would definitely emigrate and 31% stated that they might emigrate too. Twenty percent of those who considered emigration claimed that their consideration was based on the desire for a better political and social system.(FN14)Tertiary students in Singapore belong to Lee's category of "the above average" or a better part of his "average." Needless to say, the emigration of these people not only indexes a social cost but also implies a loss to Singapore's economic development.There are other forms of critique as well. For example, Tremewan (1994) offered a Marxist assessment. In his view Singapore's economic achievement is built on an enormous sacrifice of the working class: "in its own class interest, the [ruling party] PAP ... exposed the workers of Singapore to massive exploitation." Most of the radical critique has been formulated within the framework of Western liberalism. For instance, US columnist William Safire described Lee Kwan Yew as "a tin-pot tyrant with dynastic pretensions" (Straits Times, 16 Nov. 1996:2) (also see Lingle 1996). For these critics, the Singapore government and the Asian components in its value complex are basically a burden for Singapore's society. However, because of cultural differences, these opinions and that of Tremewan's do not seem to be fundamentally shared in the judgment of the majority of Singapore's general public (Table 1). Eighty eight percent of the students and 86% of their parents surveyed believed or strongly believed that the social and economic system in Singapore is one of the best systems in the world. Perhaps we need an Alfred Schutz or Herbert Blumer to decode the puzzle?

CONCLUSIONThrough about thirty-five years of effort after independence, Singapore has advanced from a poor entrepot city to a respectable industrialized state. Its government has played a crucial role in materializing this transformation; but the role is grounded in a set of state values. These values include neo-social Darwinism, connectionism, Golden-Means-seeking rationalism, pragmatism, communitarianism, conservative liberalism, and elitism. We can, therefore, reasonably argue that to a certain extent, Singapore's achievement may be regarded as the product of these state values. We can also argue that, in that sense, these state values may be perceived as Singapore's "cultural capital."This cultural capital is the outcome of articulating and modifying various existing values from Western and Oriental cultures. And this re-construction has been performed against the background of intensive culture contact between Asia and West in the "locale" of Singapore. The scope of these reconstructed values has extended far beyond the contents of Weber's pro-Protestant depiction as well as those of the contesting pro-Confucian claims. Thus, generically, the complex of Singapore's state values as a whole is neither purely Western nor purely Oriental. It is a new species, a hybrid that we may refer to as a Singaporean type of state culture.Many people believe that Lee and the Singapore government reject or belittle Western culture. A close examination of some components of the Singapore state values suggests that they actually appreciate a considerable proportion of salient Western values, for example, social Darwinism, rationalism, meritocracy-based liberalism, and preference for law-based social order.(FN15) Even conservative political control is a continuation in form (if not for the same objectives) of much of the administrative practice of the British colonial authorities in Malaya and Singapore (Barr 2000; Xu 1998). It is no exaggeration to argue that the values they uphold are at least half rooted in the West. Tamney (1996) even refers to the ideology of the Singapore government as "Western conservatism Asian style." Lee's critique of Western culture is no more than selective. This same attitude he adopts toward Asian cultures.There are also many who insist on denying positive relevance of any Asian values to the social and economic development of Asia in the contemporary world. Some prefer to dismiss the concept of "Asian values" altogether, for they assume "Asian values" to be either "uniformly shared values in Asia" or values that exist in Asia but that cannot be found to any extent in the West (Hill, 2000). In this article I treat Asian values as those which Asian people believe in and which do not have a contemporary origin in any other continent. Asian values do not have to be universally shared by Asians. Nor are they exclusively those that do not have any similar counterparts in other continents. The case of Singapore shows that some components of the Singapore state values correspond more to salient Asian values than to their counterparts in Western culture. These values include communitarianism, Golden-Means-seeking rationalism, giving priority to harmony and elitism with an emphasis on quality government. Without the working of these components, Singapore's economic transformation (and social order and environmental beauty) would not have been achieved within such a short period of time.The claim that Singapore's type of state values may be perceived as Singapore's cultural capital for economic development will become more meaningful if we compare the experience of Singapore with that of the other Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines or contrast it with the other former British colonies such as India, Pakistan, and Malaysia.It is necessary to note that the values of the Singapore government, especially some aspects of its elitism and conservative liberalism, have shown significant limitations. These limitations have led to the emergence of at least two major challenges to the continuation of their operation. First, some aspects of the elitism have contributed to considerable passivity, excessive dependence, and lack of creativity and entrepreneurial spirit. Second, the government's conservative liberalism has resulted in some forms of political control beyond the limit of voluntary acceptance of the general public. This has generated political alienation, tension as well as reaction that is inconsistent with the need of Singapore's development. Whether the Singapore government is able to respond to these and other limitations and whether it can modify its primary values accordingly will determine the relevance and utility of its values to Singapore's survival and development in this new century.ADDED MATERIALJohannes Han-Yin ChangDept. of Sociology, National University of SingaporeTable 1: Singapore: Attitudes of Students and Their Parents Toward Government Values and Policies, 1999(FN+)

Government Government Students' Parents'

values policies response response

(mean) (mean)

Social Darwinism Emphasis on vision and 8.1 8.4

forward looking

Active involvement in region- 8.2 8.3

alization and globalization

Free competition 7.7 8.0

Connectionism Inviting foreign investments 7.6 8.0

Fostering harmonious 8.5 8.3

relations with core countries

Golden-Means- Learning from other countries 8.3 8.2

seeking rationalism experience and failures

Communitarianism Society's interest first(FN++) 6.6 7.2

Treating English as the 7.9 8.0

first working language

Conservative Racial harmony, religious 8.8 8.7

liberalism harmony, & capital-

labor cooperation

Prosecuting Tang Liang Hong(FN*) 5.8 5.8

Prosecuting Jeyaratnam(FN*) 5.7 5.7

Repressing communist and 7.1 7.4

pro-communist leaders

Meritocracy 7.7 8.0

Pro-employers 7.9 7.9

Pragmatism Promoting globalization 8.2 8.3

Changing school system 8.0 8.1

to promote thinking

Promoting knowledge- 8.1 8.1

based economy

Elitism Singapore's type of election 8.1 8.1

system

Strong government 8.4 8.3

Employing foreign talent 7.3 7.1

N 811 811

FOOTNOTES+ Measurement: 0 = completely reject, 5 = neutral, 10 = fully support.++ Measurement: 0 = not important at all, 10 = extremely important.* Representatives of opposition parties.

FOOTNOTES1. The data collection for this research is partly supported by a grant from the National University of Singapore (R-111-000-011-112).2. Alternative explanations may be formulated as well. For example, we can account for Singapore's developmental experience in terms of environmental conditions (following the tradition of structualist or ecological persuasion), power and institution (Weberian persuasion), input of the people (Marxist or post-structural persuasion), or meaning and interaction (symbolic interactionist persuasion). These alternatives can each shed some light on a particular aspect of Sinapore's experience; but none of them is capable by itself of fully explaining the development of this island state. Similarly, the cultural explanation offered in this paper is only meant to capture a particular aspect of the issue in question.3. The impact of culture on action is widely recognized in sociological theories. Marxist concepts of "ideology" (Marx 1972) and "cultural capital" (Bernstein 1977; Bourdieu 1977), Weber's (1958) "Protestant ethic," Schutz's (1976) "recipes," Mead's (1962) "attitude" of the "generalized other," Berger's (1963) 'society in man," Parsons's (1966) "cultural determinism," and Landes's "culture makes almost all the difference" are all related to this impact. In this article I take this broadly shared recognition of the impact of culture as a starting point and construct my analysis from a particular angle in the context of Singapore.4. Scholars have studied different components of the values of the Singapore government. For example, Chua (1995) has discussed its pragmatism and communi-tarianism, Barr (2000) its progressivism and elitism, Josey (1997) Lee's beliefs and personality traits (related to his neo-Social Darwinism), and Tamney (1996), Lingle (1996), and Minchin (1990) Singapore's conservative liberalism. In this article I incorporate their insights and try to transcend them in order to present a fuller picture of the primary values of the Singapore government.5. The differences between Lee and his former cabinet colleagues regarding Lee's elitism did not change the dominant attitude of the cabinet in favor of elitism.6. Lee's statements are treated as empirical data in a similar way as are respondents' statements in some of the sociological value surveys. These statements are used as indicators of values that are assumed to be relatively stable. The duration of Lee's commitment to his values reflected in his statements should not be reduced to the very point of time when he made these statements; nor should it be interpreted as starting from the point when each of his statements was made. This duration has a "history" which started before he made the statements cited in the paper.7. Also see Barr (2000) and Josey (1980).8. Lao Zi's conceptualization of the roles of "yin" and "yang" in his philosophy of emergence is not fundamentally reflected in the classic book Yi Jing, which also touches on these two concepts.9. See "The Golden Means," pp. 23-56 in Zhu Xi (ed.) The Four Books (Shanghai: Shanghai Classics Press, 1995).10. The belief of the Singapore government in political control and its corresponding practice is most controversial. It has been widely criticized by politicians, scholars and journalists in many corners of the world.11. There is dynamic interaction between values and action. On the one hand, values guide and regulate behavior; and on the other hand, action affects the formation, consolidation or change of values. In this paper the analytical emphasis is placed on the first aspect of this relationship.12. The family institution and the school system in Singapore largely adopt a similar pattern of emphasis on dependence and obedience in socialization. This only reinforces the negative effects of the government's elitism.13. A systematic approach was used for the sampling (mainly because of my budget constraint). First, the names of 270 residents were randomly chosen from the 1999 residential telephone directory of Singapore. For those who lived in private houses, their streets were identified and for those who lived in Housing Development Board (HDB) flats or private condominiums, their residential buildings were determined. Then, three Singaporean students aged 14 or older were located from three different levels of each such building or from each such street -- for a face-to-face interview based on a uniform questionnaire. For each student interviewed, one of his/her parents was interviewed as well.14. The other two major reasons they offered were related to their desire for a more leisurely lifestyle (68%) and for a better career (52%). The results have not been published. The survey was conducted by RCS Capital Radio 95.8 and Radio 93.8.15. Much of these values is reflected to varied degrees in the policies of Western leaders, for example, in those of the former British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher.

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