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| Bush's Missile Shield: Will it Work? (page 2) The simplest and most likely is to overwhelm the system with more missiles than it can intercept. This is the basis for much of the recent talk of ballistic missile proliferation by those who oppose the system. The current plan is to send about 100 interceptors to hit one target because of all of the possibilities for evasion and limited success. Considering the costs of those interceptors, it is likely that any country with 20 missiles with multiple warheads on each missile would easily overwhelm such a system. Therefore, countries that want to maintain deterrence will simply build more missiles and make the system obsolete. There are three basic countermeasures for evasion of interceptors, with multiple variations of each. These countermeasures simply have to prevent interception until they breach the atmosphere. Once through the atmosphere, whatever the warhead contains (nuclear materials, chemical or biological weapons) will be spread over a large area causing devastation. The first countermeasure is the use of submunitions. It isn�t too difficult to create smaller submunitions that will allow for reentry into the atmosphere. Once the missile reaches the spot where it releases a warhead, instead it releases hundreds of the submunitions, which then penetrate the atmosphere and rain down on the target. They are nearly impossible to track or intercept, and clearly outnumber the interceptors even if they could hit them. When using chemical or biological weapons, this is actually preferable to using warheads. The second countermeasure is the use of decoys. There are dozens of possible decoy options. When traveling in space, lighter warhead replicas will look like and travel at the same speed as warheads. It is impossible for radar to tell the difference between the two. Another decoy used is to wrap the warhead in Mylar and release balloons at the same time. The radar is reflected and thus makes it impossible to see the warheads and confuses interceptors. The balloons can also have heaters inside them to fool infrared detection. A third decoy strategy is to release many different shapes and sizes of objects with heaters to fool infrared and radar as to which targets to intercept, making it less likely the warheads will be hit. The third countermeasure is the use of cooled shrouds. By putting coolant around the warhead, it makes them invisible to infrared scans. The combination of any of these countermeasures only increases the likelihood of hitting the target and evasion of interceptors. None of this assumes the use of Information Warfare which could make radar and infrared satellites useless (Knight, 5/10/01, GFI), or Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs) to eliminate or distort the guidance information for interceptors. With so many ways to evade interceptors, it is clear that until a missile defense shield can intercept a target in the �boost phase� of the launch, there is little hope of destroying targets. Because of the speed of interceptors, there is little to no chance of interceptors hitting a target in the boost phase. Along the same lines, until the U.S. has means to defend against ASATs and Information Warfare, there is little hope of controlling information necessary to intercepting a target. Considering the improbability of hitting the target, what are the political implications to deploying such a system? The obvious is the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and building of ballistic missiles to beat the shield by overwhelming it. There is little doubt of China doing exactly that, and others following suit. Because it would undermine the ABM Treaty that was the foundation for START 1 and 2, it would probably undermine the reduction of nuclear weapons in Russia, as well as cause Russia to shift more missiles to a �rapid launch� status. Because they know they will have some ICBMs shot down, they would ensure a second strike capability that would overwhelm any missile shield the U.S. would deploy. This puts more missiles at risk for accidental launch. The decrease in trust as a result of undermining the ABM Treaty and the need for more �rapid launch� missiles would also hurt the transfer of systems to decrease accidental launch (such as Permissive Action Links or PALs) and destruct after launch devices that the U.S. currently gives to the former Soviet republics to prevent accidental launch. Because the U.S. must deploy intercepting missiles to allied countries around the world, it would send a perception that only the U.S. can distribute arms around the world, creating a greater perception of hypocrisy. This would decrease the cooperation with efforts to decrease proliferation and arms sales around the world. Therefore, the world becomes a more dangerous place as arms and proliferation escalates. While America wants to show off its technology to the world and make its citizens feel better, the Bush Missile Shield only provides a false sense of security with little to back it up. In truth, it makes the world a more dangerous place, as enemies are more likely to test such a system in time of war. America needs to show patience and finish the development of a more comprehensive system that makes sense if it is going to put the world at increased risk of conflict. --Tony McWilliams 5/15/01 Previous Page Return to Main Page Additional Missile Defense Links Tony McWilliams is a Sr. Policy Analyst at the Global Freedom Insitute |
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