The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 unified the German people to a degree previously unheard of. With the Kaiser's proclamation of Burgfrieden, or peace within the castle, "a new sense of national community was forged." (Herwig 200) Traditional rivalries between social classes and political parties were set aside in "an all-embracing feeling of unity that sent tens of thousands...to volunteer and millions to wave them on." (Stern 62) The romantic experience of 1914 that swept across Europe was soon eclipsed by the shadow of the slaughter and suffering that characterized the Great War. When the war ended on 11 November 1918, the shock of an unexpected defeat and the political disorder which followed struck the German people who still clearly remembered the exhilaration of 1914. The contrast between the euphoria of 1914 and the traumatic disappointment of 1918-19 was to shape the German cultural landscape in a manner which would facilitate the rise to power of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) by political means in 1933. The effects of the Great War, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Weimar Republic on German culture was to greatly affect the German political arena of the 1920's. Therefore, the rise of National Socialism can be attributed to political consequences of underlying cultural events.

The political miasma that surrounded the signing of the Armistice in 1918, was to be a great shock to many Germans. The German propaganda machine had been extremely effective in shielding the home front from the true nature of the war on the Western Front, thus the German civilian population was unprepared for both the announcement of defeat and the confusion that would accompany the returning soldiers. In the ensuing power struggle, political extremists both on the right and the left took to fighting in the streets. (Beyerchen) The disorder of political street fighting was to change the view of politics in the eyes of the Germans. Beginning in the winter if 1918-19, Germans began seeing their political battles being fought in the streets rather than debated in the Reichstag. When the NSDAP sent brown-shirted Sturmabteilung (SA) men into the streets in the years before 1933, the German people were already familiar with associating roving street gangs with legitimate political parties. The political violence of 1918-19, cresting with the "Battle of the Marne of the German Revolution" in December 1918 and January 1919, had irrevocably altered that perception of politics in the minds of the German population. The National Socialists, although viewed as extreme in their positions, were perceived as acting in a manner that the German people had grown to expect their political parties to act. The events of the winter of 1918-19 changed the German perception of how politics were carried out. The National Socialists managed to capitalize mainly because, by the 1920's, their tactics had become commonplace.

The creation of the Weimar republic in the summer of 1919 brought into being a political structure for which the German people were unprepared. The German nation had not been the beneficiary of a lasting democratic tradition. The German people, accustomed to the monarchy, were unprepared for the slow speed, constant bickering, and fragmentation that characterized the Weimar system. Additionally, there was a prevailing perception that the "Weimar coalition" of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the German Democratic Party (DDP), and the Catholic Center Party, had sold out the German people by signing the Treaty of Versailles, despite the fact that the settlement was only signed under pressure of renewed fighting. (Beyerchen) The cultural stigma of the Versailles settlement, especially Article 231, the "War Guilt" clause, was difficult for the Germans to bear, particularly considering the living memory of 1914. The consequence of this was a 50% drop in support for the SPD, DDP, and Center party by the German voters from the election of the National Assembly in January 1919 to Reichstag elections of June 1920 (Pinson 603). The very parties who were the strongest supporters of the Republic were vilified in the eyes of the German people for the role that they played in the peace agreement. This can be viewed as a cultural rather than a strictly political consequence because the most vehement opposition to the Versailles Treaty was not initially for economic reasons concerning the Commercial Clauses, or for the political implications of the Territorial and Military Provisions, but rather for the implications of the Moral Clauses and how they affected both German pride, and the reasons for going to war in 1914. The Moral Clauses of the Versailles Settlement included requirements such as the surrender of German nationals to be tried by foreign courts and the acceptance by the Germans for total responsibility for the war. Although the National Assembly had voted 209-116 in favor of merely signing the Treaty without the Moral Clauses (Beyerchen), the German delegates to the Paris Peace Conference were coerced into signing the entire Treaty by the threat of continued military conflict, a prospect for which the German army was not prepared. In the eyes of the people, the so-called "Weimar Coalition" had signed the treaty, therefore bringing the stigma of War Guilt on the German people, resulting in the loss of Weimar Coalition votes. Those lost votes went to the parties to the left and right of the Weimar coalition, many of which were outright opponents of the Republic itself. This culture of political opposition to the Versailles settlement and the Weimar republic as a result of cultural leanings was to greatly benefit the NSDAP who were vehement opponents of both the Versailles Treaty and the Weimar Republic.

Given that German support for the Weimar republic itself was compromised from the beginning by the association of the SPD, DDP, and Center Party with the signing of the Versailles Settlement, and given that as a consequence of the political street fighting of the winter of 1918-19 the German people had grown accustomed to seeing political parties take to the streets, one more major factor was to contribute to the rise of national socialism: the Great Depression. By the Stock Market Crash of 1929, the NSDAP had asserted itself as a political force. Hitler's Bier Halle Putsch of 1923 had elevated him and the SA to national stature and the NSDAP had nominal representation the Reichstag (Pinson 603). It was, however, the Stock Market crash and the ensuing economic turmoil that was to set the stage for the rise of National Socialism to power. Between 1924 and 1929 the Weimar system was beginning to show signs of a lasting stability. The diplomatic and economic policies of Gustav Stresemann had staved off the hyperinflation of 1923, and had sought to return Germany to superpower status through diplomatic efforts (Herwig 249). Additionally, through the personality of Stresemann, the moderate right, for the first time, had a stake in the survival of the Republic. Stresemann's German People's Party (DVP) represented the German Bourgeoisie, a group heretofore opposed to the republic, but now willing to entertain participation in the Republic through the personality of Stresemann. Stresemann's untimely death in 1929 was to be the first of two major blows that year to the German people and, consequently, the Republic. The second blow was the onset of the Great Depression. The economic woes of the Depression, exacerbated by the constant dilemma of reparations payments, were to contribute to the rise of the NSDAP. The microcosm of the rise of National Socialism in the town of Northeim in old Hanover, as depicted in William Sheridan Allen's The Nazi Seizure of Power, is an example of exactly how the NSDAP was able to flourish in the climate of economic depression. "The Depression not only created the climate of fear in which the Nazis throve, it also embittered political processes. Political rivalry in turn prevented the cooperation that was needed to mitigate the effects of the depression." (Allen 140) Without cooperation across party boundaries, the democratic system failed. Since support for the Weimar system was lukewarm at best, the reality of the failure of the system to alleviate the economic woes of the Depression led many Germans to abandon "the system" entirely and vote for the parties that openly opposed the Republic, mainly the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the NSDAP. For the disenchanted in the middle class, the KPD was not a viable option, as it advocated the redistribution of middle and upper class property. (Beyerchen) For the majority of frightened middle class voters, the NSDAP was the party of choice after 1929 because of its marked anti-Bolshivism and its aura of determination that seemed to many people the answer to the political gridlock that characterized the Great Depression. Thus, the failure of the democratic system to act in the face of economic depression caused the German people to lose hope in the democracy entirely, and therefore vote for the parties that were determined to destroy it, primarily the National Socialists.

The rise of National Socialism cannot be attributed to strictly cultural factors, as the NSDAP's efforts appeal to the Germans' national pride, religion, and opposition to the Versailles Settlement were matched by the German National People's Party (DNVP) and the DVP, two parties, on the right, opposed to the Weimar republic, but not attached to the personality of Adolf Hitler. The strictly political argument of the failure of the Weimar Constitution to protect itself can be discounted because it was President von Hindenburg, himself opposed to the Republic, who allowed Chancellors to rule by decree under Article 48, a power that President Ebert had used successfully and relinquished in the past. Likewise, a strictly socioeconomic argument is not entirely sound because such an argument discounts the opposition to the Moral Clauses of the Versailles settlement, the cultural impact of the acceptance of "War guilt" and the loss of popular support for the "Weimar Coalition" as a consequence. The rise of National Socialism in Germany can, therefore, be attributed to cultural factors which directly affected politics. The experience of the Great War, including the enthusiasm of 1914 and the disillusionment of 1918 created a cultural condition that would remain with the German people throughout the Weimar period. The political instability of the winter of 1918-19 and the political street fighting between legitimate political parties revolutionized the perception of the Germans of politics. The association of the "Weimar Coalition" of the SPD, DDP, and Center Party with the signing of the Versailles Treaty, led to the initial rejection of the Republic by the Left and Right. The instability following the 1929 stock market crash led Germans to abandon democracy in favor of extremism, which split the working class between the KPD and the SPD, but left the middle and upper classes to seek the NSDAP. These factors, which can be described as political conditions, heavily influenced by underlying cultural issues, are what led to the rise of National Socialism.

Allen, William Sheridan. The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1922-1925. New York: Franklin Watts., Inc. 1984.

Beyerchen, Alan. In-class lectures. The Ohio State University. Columbus: January-February 1998.

Herwig, Holger H. Hammer or Anvil? Modern Germany 1648-Present. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company. 1994.

Kaiser, Georg. Gas I. Trans. Herman Scheffauer. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company. 1989.

Pinson, Koppel S. Modern Germany: It's History and Civilization. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc.

Stern, Fritz. Dreams and Delusions: National Socialism in the Drama of the German Past. New York: Vintage Books. 1989.

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