RESPECT EOR WORKERS IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER SWEATSHOPS Denis G. Amold and Norman E. Bowie Abstract In "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons" we argued on Kantian grounds that managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have the following duties: to adhere to local labor laws, to refrain from coercion, to meet minimum health and safety standards, and to pay workers a living wage. In their commentary on our paper Sollars and Englander challenge some of our conclusions. We argue here that several of their criticisms are based on an inaccurate reading of our paper, and that none of the remaining criticisms successfully challenge our main arguments. By highlighting the shortcomings of their arguments we hope to advance discussion of the ethical treatment of workers in global supply chains. One of the principal human rights victories in recent years has been the transformation of the factories of many large multinational enterprises (MNEs) from sweatshops into safe and healthy places to work. Prompted by public outrage over the widespread abuse of worker rights in these factories, MNEs such as Nike, adidas-Salamon, Mattel, and the Gap have implemented numerous measures to help ensure that the workers who manufacturer goods in their supply chains are treated with dignity and respect. In so doing, they have joined companies with longstanding policies of respect for workers in their supply chains, such as Levi Strauss and Motorola. In both their own factories, and in those of their contractors, these MNEs have enhanced compliance with local labor laws, implemented new and improved health and safety standards, improved wages, and created a variety of additional benefits such as after-hours educational opportunities and microenterprise loan programs.' For the past several years we have argued that MNEs' managers have duties, both in their own factories and in their contract factories, to ensure that the dignity of workers is respected.^ In "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons"' we argued that these duties include the following: to adhere to local labor laws, to refrain from coercion, to meet minimum health and safety standards, and to pay workers a living wage. We are gratified that many MNEs, especially those in the apparel and footwear sector, are now meeting these duties (though we claim no responsibility for these changes). In their commentary on our paper, Gordon Sollars and Fred Englander challenge some of our conclusions."* In what follows we argue that several of their © 2007. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 17, Issue 1. ISSN 1052-150X. pp. 135-145 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY criticisms are based on an inaccurate reading of our paper, and that none of their remaining criticisms successfully challenges our main arguments. /. The Obligations of MNEs Regarding Subcontractors In many cases, MNEs do not directly employ some or all of the workers who manufacture the goods that they design, market, and sell. For example, none of the 10,000 workers in the Tae Kwang Vina factory—discussed in "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons"—work for Nike, although Nike is the only MNE that the factory supplies. In our paper we argued that MNEs have a duty to ensure that the dignity of such workers is respected. Sollars and Englander dispute this conclusion, but they misunderstand our line of argument.' We began by endorsing Michael Santoro's claim that the moral duty of MNEs in this regard is similar to the legal doctrine of respondeat superior.^ We then argued that this duty has a two-fold justification. First, we argued that MNE managers are constrained by the categorical imperative in general, and the doctrine of respect for persons in particular. Second, we argued that individuals have unique duties as a result of their unique circumstances. In reply to our first argument, Sollars and Englander rightly point out that much depends on the implications of respecting others. We addressed that issued in some detail in "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons." In that essay, after quoting Kant on human dignity, we summarized an argument by Hill regarding the implications of this, and then provided our own elaboration of the issue as based on Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Thomas Hill Jr. has discussed the implication of Kant's arguments conceming human dignity at length. Hill argues that treating persons as ends in themselves requires supporting and developing certain human capacities, including the capacity to act on reason; the capacity to act on the basis of prudence or efficiency; the capacity to set goals; the capacity to accept categorical imperatives; and the capacity to understand the world and reason abstractly. Based on Kartt's writings irt the Metaphysics of Morals, we would make several additions to the list. There Kant argues that respecting people means that we cannot be indifferent to them. Indifference is a denial of respect. He also argues that we have an obligation to be concemed with the physical welfare of people and their moral well being. Adversity, pain, and want are temptations to vice and inhibit the ability of individuals to develop their rational and moral capacities. It is these rational and moral capacities that distinguish people from mere animals. People who are not free to develop these capacities may end up leading lives that are closer to animals than to moral beings. Freedom from externally imposed adversity, pain, and want facilitate the cultivation of one's rational capacities and virtuous character. Thus, treating people as ends in themselves means ensuring their physical well being and supporting and developing their rational and moral capacities.'' [Italics added] Sollars and Englander's criticism of our interpretation of Kantian respect for persons is constituted mainly by a long exegesis of the passage from Hill, together with the claim that the passage from Hill does not support our position.* They ignore ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER SWEATSHOPS 137 our discussion of the Metaphysics of Morals (partially quoted above in italics) and Bowie's discussion of the issue in Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective."^ Since we do not believe Sollars and Englander engage the first part of our argument in a substantive manner, we will put aside their remarks on that part of argument and instead tum our attention to their comments on the second part of our argument. We argued that MNEs have distinct duties regarding the employees of their contract factories because of the power they have over the owners and managers of such factories, and because of the substantial resources at their disposal.'" MNEs typically dictate to their contractors such terms as price, quality, quantity, and date of delivery. This imbalance in power means that they have the ability to either hinder or enhance the ability of contract factory managers to respect employees. For example, if MNE supply chain managers know, or have reason to know, that the factory cannot meet the terms of the contract while adhering to local labor laws, providing safe working conditions, or paying a living wage, then they are properly regarded as partially responsible for those disrespectful practices. Sollars and Englander's main criticism of this position is stated as follows: Our point is that the subcontractor or supplier has done something via the bargain to reduce pain, adversity, or poverty, while other actors may have done nothing. It is unreasonable to expect any bargain struck between two parties to redress every issue of fairness or desert that may apply to one party. MNEs are in some sense "taking advantage" of background conditions in the Third World when they outsource their production, but this alone does not make them responsible for the poverty that makes their sourcing decisions profitable." So, because the subcontractor has improved the situation of employees by em ploying them via their contract with the MNE, and because the contract between the supplier and the MNE cannot reasonably be expected to "redress every issue of fairness or desert" that may apply to one party, MNEs have no distinctive du ties regarding subcontractors of their employees. Note that on this account, if an MNE's management knew that the terms of the contract made it impossible for an employer to pay even the legally mandated wages and benefits of workers while fulfilling the contract, the MNE would not be responsible, partly or entirely, for the failure to pay such wages and benefits, nor would the MNE or its managers have violated any duties. The only justification that Sollars and Englander provide for this claim is the implicit reference to a reasonable person standard in the passage quoted above'^—a standard that wefind unreasonable. By contrast, in our view, any ethically justifiable contract between two parties must be consistent with respect for the dignity of the two parties and those they represent. We acknowledge that this is a prima facie moral standard, one that could be superseded under special circumstances, or with the genuine consent of relevant parties. However, Sollars and Englander have provided no reason for thinking that this standard ought not apply when MNEs negotiate contracts with their suppliers. BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY Nonetheless, we do think that there are good objections to the brief argument regarding the duties of MNEs to subcontractors that we provided in "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons." But these are not Sollars and Englander's arguments. For example, some companies are too small to contract for use of all of a subcontractor's capacity, but must instead place orders that represent a small percentage of a supplier's capacity. In such cases, it is unreasonable to believe that the company can exert the sort of influence over the subcontractor that we assume above. This is especially true if the subcontractor is dealing with multiple companies at the same time, each with somewhat different standards or codes for the treatment of workers. Our response to such an objection would be to point out that companies genuinely interested in ensuring that workers in their supply chains are treated with dignity at work can collaborate with one another in order to ensure that uniform standards are adapted and implemented. Indeed, such collaborative efforts have been in place for several years.'' Universalizability At the conclusion of their discussion of the obligations of MNEs regarding subcontractors, Sollars and Englander attempt to undermine our Kantian analysis of MNEs' obligations regarding subcontractors by deploying Korsgaard's interpretation of the conceptual contradiction test of the first formulation of the categorical imperative. This interpretation holds that conceptual contradictions are best understood "by imagining, in effect, that the action you propose to perform in order to carry out your purpose is the standard procedure for carrying out that purpose."'" Their argument, in essence, is that demonstrating respect for workers by providing them with a living wage constitutes a conceptual contradiction. It does so, in their view, because living wages always increase unemployment, thus harming the class of persons that living wages are intended to benefit. First, we note that Korsgaard's interpretation of the categorical imperative has been persuasively criticized by Barbara Herman, but for present purposes we will ignore this.'^ Second, in developing this argument, Sollars and Englander do not accurately characterize the position we defend in "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons.'"* This is evident when they describe the maxim necessary for their position: "The maxim of paying a subsistence wage could have the purpose of helping persons, whose lot is among the very worst, have some means to use their rationality to achieve 'moral perfection.""'' In "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons" we argued that MNE managers have duties regarding adherence to local laws, coercion, health and safety standards, and wages. However, in seeking to undermine our position Sollars and Englander focus only on the wage issue. Our position regarding wages is as follows: It is our contention that, at a minimum, respect for employees entails that MNEs and their suppliers have a moral obligation to ensure that employees do not live under conditions of overall poverty by providing adequate wages for a forty-eight hour work week to satisfy both basic food needs and basic non-food needs. Doing so helps to ensure the physical well-being and independence of ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER SWEATSHOPS employees, contributes to the development of their rational capacities, and provides them with opportunities for moral development. This in tum allows for the cultivation of self-esteem.'* We argued further that employers should voluntarily raise wages to this level, and that they should do so without laying-off employees, seeking instead to cover any increased costs in other ways: Our contention is that it is economically feasible for MNEs to voluntarily raise wages in factories in developing economies without causing increases in unemployment. MNEs may choose to raise wages while maintaining existing employment levels. Increased labor costs that are not offset by greater productivity may be passed on to consumers, or, if necessary, absorbed through internal cost cutting measures such as reductions in executive compensation." A maxim that would correspond to our position is as follows. In order to satisfy the basic food needs and basic non-food needs of employees and provide them with opportunities for the development of their rational capacities and moral development, we will ensure that all employees are paid the following wage for a forty-eight-hour work week (whichever is greater): The minimum wage required by law, or the wage necessary to allow them to live above the overall poverty line, for a forty-eight-hour work week, covering any additional costs by means other than employee layoffs. Sollars and Englander provide no reason for thinking that such a maxim is not universalizable. Indeed, their only basis for challenging the universalizability of such a maxim is the stipulation that improving employee wages must cause increased unemployment. While they never take up a maxim that corresponds precisely to our view, even their truncated version of a maxim regarding wages is consistent with Korsgaard's interpretation of the conceptual contradiction test of the categorical imperative if one allows that voluntarily raising wages while maintaining existing employment levels does not lead to greater unemployment. Their retort at this stage must be that one cannot raise wages without increasing unemployment, but as we shall argue below, such a view is untenable. In concluding this section it is worth noting that in seeking to undermine our position regarding wages, Sollars and Englander ignore our arguments in "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons"^" regarding the rule of law and health and safety conditions. However, since adhering to local labor laws and ensuring decent health and safety conditions can be costly, we find their implicit acceptance of our defense of the duties of MNEs regarding the rule of law and decent health and safety standards puzzling. In other words, if, as they suppose, raising wages will cause inevitable increases in unemployment, isn't the same true of adhering to local labor laws and improving working conditions? Why focus on the wage issue alone? A more consistent view would seem to be that MNE managers have duties to ignore local labor laws, ignore working conditions, and pay the lowest possible wages, so long as none of these practices deterred employees from working in MNE factories. We have argued that such a view is indefensible on Kantian grounds. BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY //. Coercion In "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons" we argued that MNE managers have a moral obligation to prevent the use of coercion for certain purposes within factories. In particular, we argued that "[u]sing coercion as a means of compelling employees to work overtime, to meet production quotas despite injury, or to remain at work while in need of medical attention, is incompatible with respect for persons because the coercers treat their victims as mere tools."^' On our account, psychological coercion is properly understood to take place when three conditions hold: First, the coercer must have a desire about the will of his or her victim. However, this is a desire of a particular kind because it can only be fulfilled through the will of another person. Second, the coercer must have an effective desire to compel his or her victim to act in a manner that makes efficacious the coercer's other regarding desire. The distinction between an other regarding desire and a coercive will is important because it provides a basis for delineating between cases of coercion and, for example, cases of rational persuasion. In both instances a person may have an other regarding desire, but in the case of coercion that desire will be supplemented by an effective first-order desire which seeks to enforce that desire on the person, and in cases of rational persuasion it will not. What is of most importance in such cases is that P intentionally attempts to compel Q to comply with an other regarding desire of P's own. These are necessary, but not sufficient conditions of coercion. In order for coercion to take place, the coercer must be successful in getting his or her victim to conform to his or her other regarding desire. In all cases of coercion P attempts to violate the autonomy of Q. When Q successfully resists P's attempted coercion, Q retains his or her autonomy. In such cases P retains a coercive will.^^ Sollars and Englander accept this account of psychological coercion, but deny that we have provided a clear example of coercion. In their view, what we described as coercion is merely a case of an employer enforcing a job requirement. They claim that "In the case of a routine job practice X, the supervisor need not have a desire to compel a worker to do X, although the supervisor might well prefer that the worker do X to save the expense of finding a new worker. The desire of the supervisor may simply be that some worker or other do X."" It is unclear what further point they are attempting to make about coercion or sweatshops, but one might read them as maintaining that coercion seldom, if ever, takes place in sweatshops. In making their case, Sollars and Englander refer to only one of the three examples of coercion that we offered (example one, below). Since the explicit point of their discussion of coercion is to deny that we provided a persuasive example of coercion in sweatshops, we think it reasonable to consider each of the three examples of coercion that we provided. [1] Bangladesh, El Salvador, and other developing economies lack the social welfare programs that workers in North America and Europe take for granted. If workers lose their jobs, they may end up without any source of income. Thus, workers are understandably fearful of being fired for noncompliance ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER SWEATSHOPS with demands to work long overtime hours. When a worker is threatened with being fired by a supervisor unless she agrees to work overtime, and when the supervisor's intention in making the threat is to ensure compliance, then the supervisor's actions are properly understood as coercive.^"* [2] Similar threats are used to ensure that workers meet production quotas, even in the face of personal injury.... We do not claim that production quotas are inherently coercive. Given a reasonable quota, employees can choose whether or not to work diligently to fill that quota. Employees who choose idleness over industriousness and are terminated as a result are not coerced. However, when a supervisor threatens workers who are ill or injured with termination unless they meet a production quota that either cannot physically be achieved by the employee, or can only be achieved at the cost of further injury to the employee, the threat is properly understood as coercive. In such cases the employee will inevitably feel compelled to meet the quota.^' [3] [W]orkers report being threatened with termination if they seek medical attention. For example, when a worker in El Salvador who was three months pregnant began hemorrhaging she was not allowed to leave the factory to receive medical attention. She subsequently miscarried while in the factory, completed her long work day, and took her fetus home for burial. Other workers have died because they were not allowed to leave the factory to receive medical attention. In cases where workers suffer miscarriages or death, rather than risk termination, we believe that it [is] reasonable to conclude that the workers are coerced into remaining at work.^"" We think these examples illustrate well our account of coercion, and nothing Sollars and Englander have written undermines that judgment. It may well be that the practices described in each of these examples are routinely found in sweatshops. However, such a claim by itself does not constitute an objection to our view, for coercion may well be routine. What Sollars and Englander seem to be claiming is that overtime (i.e., hours worked beyond the forty-eight-hour work week we specify in our essay), quotas, and a strict attendance policy (one banning absence for medical reasons) are conditions of employment that employees may accept or reject, rather than informal practices coercively enforced by callous supervisors. There are numerous problems with such a view. First, Sollars and Englander provide no reasons that would lead one to beUeve that coercion is not routinely used by supervisors in the ways that we describe. Indeed, all that need be the case is that the supervisors intend to compel the worker to, e.g., remain at work longer than forty-eight hours in a week and that the worker acquiesce to the supervisors' threat. One can easily imagine a scenario in which an employee who thought she was signing on for a forty-eight-hour work week freely chooses to work many additional hours in order to improve her earnings. However, one can also easily imagine a working mother declining to work overtime so that she can care for her children, and a supervisor coercing her into working overtime. It is equally easy to imagine scenarios in which quotas are met despite the exacerbation of an employee's work BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY related disability, or in which an employee attends work despite a grave illness, only because they are coerced into doing so. Second, Sollars and Englander seem to regard coercion as morally unjustified in all circumstances. This is why, one suspects, they object to the idea that employees can be coerced into working overtime. In their view, overtime of any length and duration appears to be a reasonable expectation of factory owners and managers, especially when the worker is fortunate to have the job at all. However, coercion is only prima facie objectionable.^' For example, if a supervisor threatens an employee with termination unless he stops sexually harassing fellow employees, the supervisor is coercing the harasser. However, such coercion is morally justified insofar as the supervisor is seeking to stop one employee from disrespecting other employees in an especially harmful manner. A claim that might be more consistent with the view of Sollars and Englander is that supervisors coerce employees into working overtime, meeting production quotas, and attending work despite serious illnesses, but that such coercion is justifiable. In "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons" we argued that such coercion is not morally justifiable on Kantian grounds. It remains up to Sollars and Englander to argue the contrary thesis. Without such an argument, their position is untenable insofar as those types of coercion occur in the workplace. ///. Wages and the Inadequacy of Mere Economic Analysis In "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons" we advanced the thesis that employers have a duty to pay workers the minimum wage required by law, or the wage necessary to allow them to live above the overall poverty line, for a forty-eight-hour work week, covering any additional costs by means other than employee layoffs.^'* We did not take a position on whether or not such a duty should be enforced via legislation. Instead, we argue that such a duty should be voluntarily embraced by MNEs and their contractors. In reply to this thesis, Sollars and Englander argue that the body of empirical research in economics supports the following conclusions: (1) that there is significant controversy over whether or not legally mandated minimum wages cause increases in unemployment;^' and (2) that the effect of efficiency wages on worker productivity is indeterminate.'° For the sake of argument, we grant these conclusions. Neither claim undermines our main thesis regarding wages. Sollars and Englander's fundamental mistake is their failure to distinguish between legally mandated wages and the voluntary fulfillment of duties regarding wages. In particular, they fail to link their discussion of the literature on minimum wages, and the controversy among economists on that issue, to the claim that MNE managers have an obligation to pay a living wage without covering additional costs via layoffs. Furthermore, they ignore our claim that if enhanced efficiency alone cannot compensate for increased labor costs, other strategies can and should be utilized. We suspect that Sollars and Englander would respond by arguing that even if living wages were implemented via voluntary actions on the part of MNE managers, rather than via minimum wage legislation, the result would still be increased ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER SWEATSHOPS unemployment. While we recognize the relevance of economic analysis to this debate, their analysis of wages appears to be grounded in the attribution of a purely instrumental account of practical reasoning to MNEs managers. In their discussion of wages, at least, they seem to view managers as subject to overwhelming economic forces such that if wage are increased, employees must be laid off in order to compensate for increased costs. However, once it is acknowledged that MNE managers are capable of acting on their duties to a variety of stakeholders, it is not difficult to see how competent managers could meet their duties to workers by voluntarily raising wages without laying off employees. Indeed, one recent study found that when wages were voluntarily increased in the Indonesian apparel and footwear sector as a result of anti-sweatshop campaigns, employment levels actually increased resulting in a "win-win" situation.^' The increased wage costs for MNEs were so small that they appear to simply have been absorbed as operating expenses. In cases where such increased costs cannot be easily absorbed as operating expenses, and where increased productivity and loyalty do not completely offset increased labor costs, available evidence demonstrates that these costs may be passed on to consumers.^^ If cases arise where this is not possible, internal cost- cutting measures, such as reductions in executive compensation and perks, are an attractive means of compensating for the cost of treating workers with dignity. In our view, the costs of respecting workers must be regarded as a necessary condition of doing business. rV. Conclusion In "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons" we argued that MNEs have duties to adhere to local labor laws, to refrain from coercion, to meet minimum health and safety standards, and to pay workers a living wage. All, or nearly all, of these duties are now being fulfilled by many MNEs. Sollar and Englander have, in our judgment, failed to undermine any of our main theses. We acknowledge that much work yet remains to be done in order to advance theoretical discussion of the "sweatshop" problem. We hope that by demonstrating the shortcomings of the arguments discussed above, we have made modest progress toward that goal. Notes 1. For detailed case studies of the current practices of companies such as Nike, adidas- Salomon, Levi Strauss, and others, see Rising Above Sweatshops: Innovative Management Approaches to Global Labor Challenges, ed. Laura P. Hartman, Denis G. Amold, and Richard Wokutch (Westport, Conn.: Praeger 2003). 2. Denis G. Amold and Norman E. Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," Business Ethics Quarterly 13(2) (April 2003): 221-42; Denis G. Amold and Laura P. Hartman, "Moral Imagination and the Future of Sweatshops," Business and Society Review 108:4 (Winter 2003): 425-61; Hartman, Amold, and Wokutch, Rising Above Sweatshops; Denis G. Amold and Laura P. Hartman, "Beyond Sweatshops: Positive Deviancy and Global Labor Practices," Busi BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY ness Ethics: A European Review 14(3) (July 2005): 206-22; and Denis G. Amold and Laura P. Hartman, "Worker Rights and Low Wage Industrialization: How to Avoid Sweatshops," Human Rights Quarterly 28(3) (August 2006): 676-700. 3. Amold and Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons." 4. Gordon Sollars and Fred Englander, "Sweatshops: Kant and Consequences," Business Ethics Quarterly 17(1) (January 2007): 115-133. 5. Sollars and Englander actually take our statement of agreement with Micbael Santoro to be an argument unto itself, which they then criticize. This is odd, for we wrote that "We concur with Santoro's judgment and offer the following twofold justification for the view that MNEs have a duty to ensure that the dignity of workers is respected in the factories of subcontractors," Amold and Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," 226. We put aside this confusion and consider Sollars and Englander's objections to the two arguments that we provided in defense of our view. See Sollars and Englander, "Sweatshops: Kant and Consequences," 116. 6. Ibid. See also Michael A. Santoro, Profits and Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press, 2000), 161. 7. Amold and Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," 223-24. 8. Sollars and Englander, "Sweatshops: Kant and Consequences," 117-21. 9. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 192-93,196-97,230,245, 255; and Norman E. Bowie, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective (Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999), esp. chap. 2. 10. Amold and Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," 225-27. 11. Sollars and Englander, "Sweatshops: Kant and Consequences," 119. 12. Ibid. 13. Here we refer to the Prince of Wales Intemational Business Leaders Forum Vietnam Business Links Initiative. For discussion, see Laura P. Hartman, Richard E. Wokutch, and J. Lawrence French, "adidas-Salomon: Child Labor and Health and Safety Initiatives in Vietnam and Brazil," in Hartman, Amold, and Wokutch, Rising Above Sweatshops, 220-26. 14. Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 92. 15. Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), chap. 7. 16. Amold and Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," 233-39. 17. Sollars and Englander, "Sweatshops: Kant and Consequences," 121. 18. Amold and Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," 234. 19. Ibid., 239. 20. Ibid., 227-28, 231-33. 21. Ibid., 231. 22. Ibid., 229. 23. Sollars and Englander, "Sweatshops: Kant and Consequences," 123. 24. Amold and Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," 230. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., 230-31. 27. Coercion is prima facie objectionable because it treats victims of coercion as objects to be controlled by the will of another and thus undermines individual freedom. However, because coercion is best understood as a psychological phenomenon, rather than as a moralized concept, its use may be either moral or immoral depending upon the context. See Amold and ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER SWEATSHOPS Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," 228; and Denis G. Amold, "Coercion and Moral Responsibility," A/nen'can Philosophical Quarterly 38(1) (January 2001): 53-67, esp. 53-54. 28. Amold and Bowie, "Sweatshops and Respect for Persons," 233-39. 29. Sollars and Englander, "Sweatshops: Kant and Consequences," 123-28. 30. Ibid., 128-29. 31. Ann Harrison and Jason Scorse, "Improving the Conditions of Workers: Minimum Wage Legislation and Anti-Sweatshop Activism," California Management Review 48(2) (2006): 144-60, esp. 158. 32. A recent study of this issue found that consumers are willing to pay increased prices for products made under good working conditions. See Robert Pollin, Justine Bums, and James Heintz, "Global Apparel Production and Sweatshop Labour: Can Raising Retail Prices Finance Living Wages?" Cambridge Journal of Economics 28(2) (March 2004): 153-71.