SECOND PART:     THE DYNAMIC OF THE SENSE.

 

            In the first part of the course, we treated the knowledge of being as the accomplishment of the unity of being and the spirit. We have shown how, in this perspective, being is a unity. We said that knowledge, in proportion to being, is in tension towards it. Knowledge moves from idea to concept. The access to being, by way of transcendentalization, leads thinking to the ontological affirmation in all the power of the spirit is exercised. It does not only stop at understanding which affirms by means of concept, the objective determinations of that which is.  In fact, if the ontological affirmation depends only from understanding, it does not see itself in which way the idea can be overcome by the concept. It does not see in what manner that the synthetic concept would be affirmed without being reduced to the determination of the idea. The act of judgement implies therefore the exercise of spiritual disposition, which surpasses the work of the understanding. The assent of being is the property of reason, which exercises a voluntary aspect of the same act of affirmation.

 

            We will explain the rhythm of the fundamental disposition of judgement, meaning to say the assent of being. Our point of view will integrate the voluntary dynamism of subjectivity; in fact, it treats itself of determining the accompanying voluntary disposition with which the spirit opens itself to being which it transcends. This disposition is essential to the act of judgement. It opens a space of welcoming where being radiates; it has a metaphysical decisive sense, and therefore a meaning more subjective-objective than solely objective.

 

            First of all, we will analyze the fundamental disposition, which we have evoked. We will describe the ontological behaviours that express it.

 

I.          THE FUNDAMENTAL DISPOSITION.

 

            The intelligence tends towards that which is. Being presents itself before the spirit according to its proper intelligibility. Knowledge does not complete its work without exposing itself to that which is. The meaning of this disposition is that knowledge is in accord itself with that which is. Through the disposition, it intends itself the spiritual opening to what is possible, taking a particular aspect of the being in general. To dispose oneself to something is putting oneself in a position that which would be accessible. Thus, the disposition is more determined for being than for the spirit. The disposition evokes from the principle an accord. Now consciousness, ultimately, sees being as being while understanding attains it in a manner diffracted.  And it is because of that disposition that it accomplishes the work of understanding.

 

1.         A Voluntary Disposition Internal to the Intelligence.

 

            Finally putting the ontological affirmation, the intelligence exposes itself to being. It is proper of intelligence being exposed to that which it affirms. This disposition consists of a negative moment and positive moment. It is detachment by abstraction and by division of being mediating the understanding. The addition of the spirit to the unity of that which is is accomplished at the moment of transcendentalization.

 

            The recognition of being is in the measure of an interior work, which prepares it. This interior work is not the work of reason. Reason is not the source of attraction. In fact, the intelligence assimilates the being as it abandons itself finding there a point of contact. The overcoming of the idea to the concept orients the intelligence towards being, responding to the gift which the being makes of the unity proper. The work, through which the spirit exposes itself to being, is a voluntary work to the same internal of the act of intelligence.

 

            For this reason there is an effort of the will in the activity of knowledge. Nothing is known well without being interested in it. Knowledge of something occurs because the spirit so desires it. An object of the whole indifferent to whatever interest does not exist for the spirit. The real is, from this point of view, that which provokes the spirit and stimulates it.

 

            The intelligence tends towards being through the mediation of the ideas and concept. Which means that there is a need of mental representation otherwise accessibility is impossible. Such presence is in proportion to the spirit, which exercises itself according to the power of understanding. In other words, the intelligence looks at that which it cannot contain in its one representation, but which is there present. The intellectual act is carried to fulfillment by the moment of the spontaneous affirmation. The spirit recognizes already the proper power approving that which it surpasses, and expressing it as it can. It cannot be said that the transcendence of being would be unknowable, because it is proper for such being that it presents itself in the affirmation, but it transcends that which affirms, as it is a good, which is continually attracting.

 

            2.         The Reciprocal Correlation between Knowledge and Will.

 

            The will is internal to the intelligence. The intelligence and the will have a parallel relation to being. A correspondence can be recognized between them, considering them as faculty. The one and the other have in fact an ontological power; they look at being, intentionally, with an immanent finality of their act. To know is to know a being. In the same way, to will is to will a being. This intention, or this finality, cannot be opened indefinitely, neither from the side of intelligence nor from the side of the will. The intelligence tends towards being which it really reaches, but in the singular mode. Similarly, the will tends toward being, which can not be situated in indefinite term of a desire without end, but which must be interior to the will and to its particular choices which attracts itself; willing nothing is not willing. Ultimately, as knowledge does not exhaust itself in particular knowledge, so the will is exposed a priori to a multiplicity of objects; its proper object is not a determined object, but a being as being in the singular mode.

 

            Intelligence and will therefore have a parallel structure. However, they do not arrive at being in the same manner. Every faculty maintains its specificity. The intelligence tries to know that which is, objectively, and the will tends to unite itself there. The dynamism of the intelligence and the will follow therefore parallel ways, but the result of their activity is in a sense inverted as related to being with the spirit. The being known, also if it is internal to the spirit, is known according to its transcendence, while the will wishes to unite with it.1 This parallelism and this inversion render possible a reciprocal supremacy of the intelligence and of the will.

 

            From the point of view of the use of the faculty, it can be said that one has the priority over the other. The intelligence, in fact, precedes the will, and inversely. It cannot will itself without knowing that which it wills, meaning to say without knowing that towards which it tends the willing. In the same way, the intelligence specifies the will; it has therefore a priority from the point of view of the researched ends. Moreover, the intelligence, putting being so as it is in its proper unity, offers to the will the true end which it can take effectively; the intelligence recognizes, in fact, that which is through that which it is.

 

            Nevertheless, always from the same point of view, it can be said that the exercise of the intelligence supposes an exercise of the will. We can know nothing, in fact, if we do not desire to know. The tension, which consists the intellectual search, is supported by the will. The will specifies the intelligence by means of an interest, which corroborates the spiritual desire; this interest determines some points of view on being. The effective determination of knowledge corresponds to a particular interest, meaning to say to an internal decision to the dynamism of knowledge.

 

            Thus, on one part, being as known in its proper unity, gives space to the dynamism of the will which, on the other part, specifies it by means of its decision or its proper desire. Inversely, the desire of being animates the intellectual investigation and leaves itself to determine by this, so as it is known. The relation of the intelligence and of the will is so indissoluble strictly from the point of view of the effective exercise of the diverse faculty towards their particular structuration.

 

3.         The Relation of Knowledge and of the Will in Being.

 

            The movement of the will carries in itself a determination, the end that attracts it. In fact, it can conceive itself an absolute indeterminate tendency. If the will is determined by that which the intelligence proposes them, this proposition can not be totally exterior to it, but it must resonate internally. Any dynamism is oriented by that which determines it. The will could not tend towards an end if it would not tend towards an absolute end. Nevertheless, this tension towards an absolute end is never excised than singularly. And it is on account of this that we say that the will tends towards being as being, in its proper unity, in the singular manner.

 

            Thus, when we speak of a tendency, of an immanent desire to the intelligence, or of a rational desire, we recognize, in the act of the intelligence, a transcendence which avoids the order of the immanence, which animates the intelligence according to a gift never reducible to only a mechanical fact, offered to the spiritual consensus. The act of the intelligence is animated interiorly by a desire, opened towards that which transcends it, and which the exercise is that of the will. The voluntary consensus gives to the act of the intelligence a fecundity and a splendour which it would not have otherwise.

 

            The voluntary moment of the knowledge perfects the movement of the affirmation. Inversely, the affirmation perfects the voluntary act. The rational desire, in fact, opened to being as being, accords itself and rests on that which it affirms. In fact, it is in the same act of the affirmation that being offers itself to the term of the desire as its effective realization. It is in the affirmation that the spirit links itself and consigns itself to being, in answer to that which invites it to bind an alliance with it. Now the intelligence goes towards that which is as towards that which transcends it. And it is on account of this that the alliance indicated fills up or overwhelms the spirit if this transcendence makes itself present and offers itself to uniting itself with it, and if moreover the spirit concedes and responds the invitation. The affirmation, the perfection of the rational desire, through which the intelligence fulfils its movement and satisfies its interior tension, consents the radiation of that which is, in the spirit, there it accords itself and there it establishes itself in alliance attracting it in the intimacy of its act of being.

 

            At the moment the intelligence and the will are united by being which, irreducible in its transcendent being in regard to the spirit, it is nevertheless present to in the manner of being expressed. Being can be affirmed and is good through the spirit affirming it, because it is good through the intelligence linking itself to it. Now, the will is not the origin of the known being. It is therefore this that, through the known being, it provokes the spirit a disposition, which we attribute formally to the will. The intelligence and the will are so united in being, which, in its transcendent being, it leaves itself nevertheless to know in the desirable manner.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

II.        THE STRUCTURE OF BEING.

 

A.        THE INITIAL BEHAVIOUR.

 

            The ontological disposition of the act of knowledge is lived according to the diverse ontic behaviours. We will determine these spiritual behaviours departing from the knowledge of experience.

 

1.     The Inexhaustible Unity of Being.

 

            Knowledge addresses being in its transcendent and objective unity. This objective unity is desirable. Knowledge interiorizes the being giving it almost a home in the spirit, while the will tends always towards the end which transcends it, towards the desirable being, which allies itself to it in the stillness of judgement. In the unity of the act of judgement, the immanence and transcendence of being reach themselves, its presence and its absence which sustains the faculty considered according to their nature. And it is for this that being, although known, is not totally given.2 The experience of knowledge is that of the investigation which the end is never reached and exhausted. All our affirmations seem partial and they require a foundation never clear and distinct. First, the unity of being constantly slips out of our understanding, which untiringly tends to there is (Levinas: il y a), driven by the desire that animates reason.

 

            The dynamism of intellectual investigation is sharpened by the being, which is always more abundant than what is grasped. There is the profundity of being, which escapes the grasp of the understanding, but of which the spirit carries in the exigency itself. The desire of the spirit is deepened by the presence of that which overcomes it and seduces it. The unity of being, inaccessible through our words, must therefore be already given. The measure of the profundity of being is the same to that of its desirability. The intelligence unveils what is concealed in that which is. Through understanding, that which is hidden presents itself to the spirit. The measure of the comprehension of being is at that moment the measure of the answer of the spirit and of the dynamism, which assumes its comprehension of that which is.

 

2.     The Astonishment, the Problem and the Mystery.

 

The reality, as presence, is astonishing, problematic, and mysterious. The experience of astonishment refers to the original wonder of the human subject confronted with the givenness of the reality. Reality is astonishing because of its immensity, its "excess of otherness, that it is at all. Astonishment is an ambiguous attitude, a disquieting experience brought about by sensation. The immensity of reality overwhelms the human subject (spirit). The spirit cannot totally dominate it. It is dominating rather being dominated.

 

In response to this astonishing experience, the spirit (human subject) moves outside itself and follows the call of the reality which provokes and fascinates it. The spirit cannot forever remain completely being astonished by it. She begins to search for the foundation of that which is, the reality. The spirit investigates the cause of the reality which provokes the astonishment. In her investigation, the spirit proceeds in a scientific mode. This means that she attempts to systematize or thematize the reality in order to overcome her astonishment. In other words, she articulates the reasons that explains the reality that astonishes her from the very start.

 

However, the reality, as we have seen, is inexhaustible. It can never be explained entirely. Thus, the reality is much of a mystery rather than a problem to be solved. The reality continues to astonish the human subject (spirit) manifesting new possibilities of intelligibility. And as it continues to astonish, the spirit also continues to investigate to find scientific solutions to scientific problems. But even if the human subject (spirit) is able to find solutions to the problems that she encounters now, the mystery of reality still remains precisely because it continues to astonish her. The solutions of problems do not extinguish the mystery.

 

            3. Astonishment[1] and Ontology.

 

            The spirit then re-experiences the first astonishment, and marvels itself of its ignorance and its errors. Her common ways of knowing the reality reveal themselves to be inadequate or false. The human subject realizes the limitations of her explanations vis-à-vis the "too muchness" about the givenness of the reality. It is a humbling experience. But also the beginning of new methods of work and inventions. The spirit constinues to improve his method of work with his critical mind and with sustaining effort. This indicates that no one method can give access of the reality, which astonishes precisely because it is. No rational way can deduce it.

 

            Therefore, this leads us to the understanding of the difference between the spirit (human subject) and the reality. The reality constantly astonishes us and in response we also continue to make sense or an understanding and a discourse on that reality. Our specifications and discourse on that reality is what we call Ontology.

 

            The constant astonishment which the spirit (human subject) continues to overcome propels the invention of new methods of dealing or understanding the "too muchness" of the givenness of the reality.

 

 

 

 

4.         Being and Its Phenomena.

 

            The experience of astonishment is the origin of all philosophy. And it accompanies every step of philosophizing. It is by this that it derives the distinction between being and appearance. It is also from this experience that we make the distinction between being and its appearance. Of course, the task of understanding the distinction is not easy. At first glance, it evokes the difference between being which truly is, and that which could be subjected to every kind of possible errors which must be overcome on the process - its appearance.

 

            In our common understanding, appearance evokes what is not truly the foundation of things. Appearance hides than reveals what is genuine. It cannot be trusted. That is why, being opposes itself to appearance or to the sensible which dies. There is also the need not only to understand the distinction between being and appearance, but their connection. This is where the role of the spirit comes in. The spirit digs into the distance between that which is (being) and that which appears.

 

            The spirit (human subject) does not deal with two appearances: the appearance of that of appearance, and the other appearance that of being. When the spirit (knowing subject) perceives that which appears, it perceives as being also that which appears. The appearance and that by which the appearance becomes are inseparable in our experience. The spirit experiences that which appears and perceives it as it appears. But, what is perceived is not all of reality. The spirit has still to deal with all that remains to be known. Appearance, therefore, is a partial point of view on that which is. It is only a manifestation of reality or being from a certain point of view which is partial. This means that the appearance or phenomenon, is that in which being is. It presents itself before the spirit according to what the spirit (human subject) can grasp. Thus, the phenomenon as grasped is properly the phenomenon of being.  The spirit is oriented towards being, the foundation of appearance. If the spirit cannot discern being which manifests by its appearance, then it could not leave itself be astonished by the superabundance of being which is a unity in its appearances.

           

B         -           ONTOLOGY OF INTELLIGIBLE BEING.

 

            Now, we can explain some essential categories of traditional ontology. These categories stand as reflected, in which the exposition of the movement of the spirit recognizes itself. They ground themselves in being. They express themselves by way of the spirit towards being, investigating in it their necessity. Through this same fact, they explain in their foundation the necessary intelligence of the spiritual movement. The classic ontological language articulates being and its appearing, being in itself and being for us. The comprehension of this language becomes accessible for us if its meaning is constructed following the rhythm of the experience of the astonishment. This experience rests essentially on being in its intelligible form.

 

            The astonishment has origin from a movement in the appearance of being. It presupposes that the change does not touch the whole being, but concerns essentially its appearances. The being which was this becomes that. The change of this into that concerns the appearance of being, but to the eyes of the intelligence, that which seems remains that which is.

 

1.     Substance.

 

            The word “substance” etymologically means “that which stands under”, meaning to say that which remains under. However, the change of the appearances which happen  indicates being in its proper and unique focal point, which radiates itself in diverse manner. Therefore, substance is in itself. Our intelligence, as consequence, must not resort to the concept of another thing to know it as such. And it is on account of this that substance tends to take the sense of the idea limited of being.

 

            Being ‘under”, the substance is not anywhere else than in its appearances. In fact, the substance cannot be without its accidents. The Greek word “ipostasi” conveys precision on that which it treats itself in “substance”. “I am on foot, I stand erect.” It evokes the idea of consistency, of  firmness, of solidity. However, the substance cannot be identified solely with that which would be identical through the differences. The substance gives unity actively to its multiple appearances and presents itself in any of them. Thus, a partial manifestation of being. In that case, it is worthy of trust.

 

            However, the substance is expressed inadequately in its manifestations: the reflection cannot hide the changing diversity of its appearances. All our access to that which is are particulars: being joins them to other points of view and unites them in its being simple and one. The problem is therefore that of articulating the manifestation and that which manifests itself. Now, that which manifest itself becomes object of the investigation. It does not place more in evidence the immediate appearance, but it is placed to the term of a mediate activity from the behaviour of reason. The substance is a reasonable mission or task for the sprit. Because, the substance is characterised principally by its intelligible notes.

 

2.     Essence.

 

            The manifestation of being consigns intelligibility to the spirit. The astonishment supposes intelligibility intrinsic in being. Of course, the intellectual investigation could not circumscribe entirely the substance, which it attempts to overcome, in some way, its manifestations. It is proper of the substance to manifest itself and its manifestations must be intelligible. Therefore, the substance must be intelligible. Even though the intelligible elements do not exhaust the substance itself.

 

            This intrinsic intelligibility of the substance is that which is called essence. The essence indicates the substance as knowable. It is that which constitutes a being in its  particular intelligible nature distinct from any other nature. The word “essenza” is the substantive of the verb “esse”. The verb, when it is connected to the indicative, designs an act, the origin of an activity in the act of doing. The essence, substantive, indicates this activity, this production as computed, produced. It is through the finite production that it can know that which produces itself. This knowledge is mediated by serious scientific work. The astonished spirit opens itself to a new activity when it adheres to being which is the origin of its act. From this adhesion, the spirit feels itself capable. It recognizes the fact by expressing being which animates the investigation and which constitutes the question on the thing. The essence defines therefore the substance in its original clearness through the spirit which affirms and proclaims it.

 

3.     Quiddity.

 

            The substance is vulnerable of being understood. It offers itself in its essence in proportion to the spirit. Now, the spirit, as it knows, universalises by means of its concepts. The substance offers itself therefore as universal; it finds itself in its appearances. The universality of the substance shows itself in the appearances enunciated in the definition. The definition of the substance constitutes the quiddity. “Quiddity” is a substantive formed in answer to the interrogative “quid”, “what thing is this”. The quiddity is constructed when the spirit refers itself to the substance through the mediation of its intelligibility immanent in its appearances. The definition of the substance seems thus to result from a double movement: the substance give itself into intelligibility to the spirit, and the spirit goes towards the substance according to this or that possible point of view. The quiddity indicates therefore the substance in its intelligible essence, as it assumes the understanding in its conceptual definitions.

 

4.     The Dialectics[2] of Substance and of Its Intelligibility.

 

            Substance, essence, and quiddity are therefore united in the intelligibility of being.  The question is if it exists in adequate proportion among these three moments, what unites these three moments. The substance is defined in terms of the discursive intelligence. It conditions intelligence in accordance to the condition of the intelligibility of a being. The substance slips from the power of the concept. It is for the spirit a value, the end of an adhesion, of an assent in which it recognizes further the unique character. The substance cannot enter therefore into the definition of the essence of that which present itself to the spirit according to the essence. It is not an intelligible element among other intelligible notes. It rises from any intelligibility. The difference between the substance and the essence guarantees incompleteness of the intelligibility. The substance is not exhausted in any intelligibility.

 

            Nevertheless, the substance is intelligible, because the essence is the essence of the substance. The substance comes therefore from the transcendental unity of being towards which the spirit tends, and which manifests itself through the accessible appearance. The essence indicates only the capacity, which the substance has given itself intelligibly in its individual unity. The effectivity of the essence gives way to the universalizing quiddity.

 

            The quiddity concerns however the effort of the spirit to understand that which is. Now, between the substance and quiddity there is no identical measure. The definition of being, in fact, universalises it, while its substance resists such universalization. A personal name, the only word which can express the substance adequately, it is not a definition, but a designation. The definition is always universal. To define is to understand, and to understand is to collocate in an ensemble which contains the individual substance and surpasses it in this or that aspect; the definition refers therefore always to the individual substance to that which it is not.

 

            And it is on account of this that there is no identical measure between the substance and the Quiddity. Now, the Quiddity is the definition of the substance of which the essential character is recognised. The substance offers itself in its essence. The essence serves as intermediary between the substance and the Quiddity; it is therefore related at the same time to the unity of the substance and to the universality of the Quiddity. It is universal for the spirit and singular as to the substance.

 

            On account of this, the essence has as such a symbolic function. Its work consists in “putting together”, to connect the unity of substantial being and its intelligibility accessible in practice mediating the sprit. Offering to the spirit the intelligibility of being, the essence is often confuse with the quiddity. But the quiddity is constructed with the help of a conceptual context in which the terms are not proper of the substance. For this motive, the quiddity is never the essence itself, as it presents the unity of substance. However, the quiddity defines also the substance in its essence; the intelligible essence does not ignore the quiddity. In the measure in which it confuses itself the quiddity with the essence, there is a risk of not thinking that through pure definitions, without that thought would be entirely formal. If from the other part they confuse themselves so little by negating intelligibility of the substance, as the relation of the essence and of the quiddity, it runs itself the risk of not anymore able to render account the intelligibility of being, or of denying simply this intelligibility, meaning to say the efficacy of our judgements. The difference and the unity of the substance and of the quiddity of essence prevent of exhausting the movement of the spirit in the affirmation of the sole conceptual quiddity or of the sole transcendent substance.

 

            To sum up, the substance is immanent in, involved in and expressed in its changing appearances. But the multiple appearances cannot exhaust everything in that is the substance in as much as it transcends every specification of it in terms of its appearances.

 

5.     Substance, Essence, Accident.

 

            If the essence has the symbolic function, if through a part of itself transcends the quiddity, it has a rational sense or meaning. It is intrinsically definable, other wise its intelligibility would be vane. Now, its quiddity is stability with the help of its effective appearances, diverse and multiple. The appearance in the sensible is that which is called accident. “Accident” comes from the participle accidens”; the participle indicates actuality present of an action. This actuality present is that in which the act produces itself, it is the manifestation of the substance.

 

            A restrictive idea of the accident considers it through its sole contingent aspect. It is accidental that which comes to the substance and which could not arrive there to the limit. This conception insists on remaining of the substance, which bears the accident without engendering it. However, if it can construct a conception similar only to itself, it conceives itself the substance as a static unity, immutable, to which it could happen or no this or that event. To know of being would consist in the case in going beyond the accidents, which the mobility would characterize the appearance and would hide being.

 

            This conception which separates the mobile appearance from the immobile being ignores the fact that the accident, also casual, concerns being, and that being, as it is, integrates its accidents. We must therefore articulate the accident and the substance in the more consistent. The essence is the substance in as much as it is knowable; the accident is that by means of which the substance manifests itself and gives itself to knowledge and to definition. The accident, however, has an ontological power than logical, while the essence, evoking intelligibility, is more logical than ontological. The relation of the essence to the substance subordinates the logical to the ontological, while the relation of the accident to the substance explains the ontological in the abundance of its manifestations. The binary of essence - accident refers therefore, one to the other, the logical order and the ontological order; to comprehend accident according to the essence allows to integrate the essence with the accident, giving thus free way to the construction of the quiddity, while to comprehend the essence according the accident strengthens the knowledge of the substance on the ontological level, departing from that which the logical order will have roots.

 

6.     Accident and Quiddity.

 

            The experience of astonishment unites the logical and the ontological, inviting to reformulate our approach to being when this slips outside of its first appearance. Being appears diversely, but it remains in its substance and presents itself really itself in diverse mode. This experience is proper that which allows to distinguish the substance and accident. The spirit wonders itself which the perceived being in such manner would become other, remaining itself being. It concludes itself very rapidly from this experience that there are in being, so to say, two levels, one sensible and the other intelligible, while it would need to conclude more simply that, through the spirit, there is substance without accident, that inversely the accident has no autonomous existence, but that it is accident of the substance. The accident is inherent to the substance and receives from this of being.

 

            Now, because the accident is the appearance in a mundane context which overcomes it. The logical quiddity is rendered possible by the ontological accident; by means of this the substance one and unique  is caught in the fabric of relations by which it receives the possibility of being definite. The substance which actuates by itself its accidents departing from its being itself, enters in the order of the universal where it determines itself essentially. However, the first substance, in which the universal accidents come to unite themselves, remains outside from whatever definition passes towards the universality of the accidents; but the definite substance mediating that which it transcends, therefore inadequately, is proper the individual substance which manifests itself really in its accidents, realising with this its intelligible essence.

 

            The accident is that in which the individual substance gives itself really, being able in such mode of being caught in the universal intelligibility. There is no other than the real space opened to the understanding. Thus, it operates a mediation in the essence between the universal and the singular. In what way does the accident allow such mediation? On one part, there is no accident without substance, there is no real universality without that which the substance renders itself in the singular manner; on the other part, the accident renders to the substance the universality which rather requires with insistence the knowledge, at the same time in which it fixes this universality in the singular reality of the substance. The articulation of the first substance and of its universal intelligibility comes so guaranteed ontologically and not only logically, being the universality of the essence immanent to the substance through the relation of the immanence of the accident with the substance.

 

7.     Form[3] and Matter.

 

            The binomial form-matter articulates in the complex manner the universal and the particular. Directly, the form is the universal and the material the particular. The form is universal; it is that which is in the substance, it renders it knowable by means of the concept; with the concept comes the universal definition. But the form is no other than universal; it refers itself to the substance in as much as it is this substance, distinct from that other substance. Thus, it arrives of the first substance, meaning to say the real substance, or of the second substance, as the specie to the genus, meaning to say the beings of reason. However, the ideal substances are present to the first substance as the multiple forms abstracted and universal, although a sole form refers itself adequately to the real being in its proper unity; this form is constitutive of the singular individual. The form indicates here an intelligible unity, the substantial form.

 

            The form comes closer therefore to a group of terms: eidos, morphe, paradeigma which denote interior unity and intelligible of a given being; and it is on account of this that the definition of substance according to the each essence expresses its form. Then, the form is singular in its intention; but when it comes definite, it is universal through its concept. This content originated from the experience of the accidents. The category of the matter does not concern these effective experiences; the matter is definite, directly, through its opposition to the form and not according to the popular sense for which matter is composed of positive universal atomic elements. The form tells intelligibility of the individual; now, it does not include this in the name of which the individual is individual; it is called matter the principle through which the form can see to the individual substance. Therefore, matter means the opacity of the formal substance confronted with the understanding, meaning to say that which surpasses and founds the universalizing form in the real existence, that through which the substance is not only a form accessible to the concept.

 

            And it is on account of this that substance is form and matter. If it is not than form, it does not contain in itself or through itself its principle of individuation; without matter, the substance of itself would be pure abstract universal. If it is not than matter, it would be entirely intelligible. The substance, in this sense, must include at the same time and indissolubly the form and matter; it gives itself in an intelligible unity, resisting the complex penetration of the understanding.

 

7.     Individuation by Means of Matter.

 

            Matter individualises the substance in which the form is purely rational and universal. But the form of the first substance, although universal, is one, individual; it is in fact the form of an individual substance, real or ideal; in it the second substances unify themselves, derived from the concrete relations of the individuals in a singularity which these elements does not know themselves. From this point of view, matter universalizes the substance, situating it in a cosmic group consistently. Matter here as considered is not a principle to compliment the form, but empirical matter, complex through the established relations among its chemical elements. Now, this chemical matter is already constituted on one part of the atomic elements formally universal, and on the other part by the form which the relations among these elements assume. So, if it is said that matter universalizes, it intends itself with that which the form that individualizes that body is in material relation with the totality of the world, in which the material group can be constituted rationally, susceptible of being placed in form. Matter understood does not associate itself with its opposition, the form, of which it is not than a specie.

 

            Matter is not however a “material” principle, but a “formal” principle. Matter in fact testifies the irreducibility in confrontation of the form, of being with respect to its manifestation. Matter which associates itself with the form in the substance is purely transcendental, its elaboration responds to a necessity of reason. But there is nothing in common between this transcendental matter and chemical matter? Why call it “matter”? Proper because matter individualizes, if at least it conceives it not according to the abstract unity of its quality ( this type of matter, this chemical group), but according to the unity, unique and marvelous, of the elements which compose it. This object, absolutely similar to that other, is however numerically different through the matter that constitute it. To the formal principle of matter it does not correspond therefore to the abstract matter, but the matter “signified” in this body, in this one substance, in this existent. Matter designates that which, in the individual substance, corresponds to that which the qualitative form cannot justify.

 

            The binomial form-matter assures therefore the relation between the logical order and the ontological order of the substance. The appearance of the substance is at the same time from and matter in the unity constituted by the determined group with which the accident integrates itself.  So it can be thought that the intelligibility of that which is a unity, in itself, while the intelligibility concerns the universal and not the unique, and form is intelligible form in a unique substance, distinct from whatever other substances composed of by one same type of matter.

 

            The lexicon of the classical ontology on intelligible being is therefore profoundly unified. However, here have we not reduced the opacity of the substance, that which renders it unique,  irreducible to whatever rational enterprise? In the experience of the astonishment, have we not accounted an aspect only of the approach to the substance, that of the intellectual investigation, which has the means for saying that which is and that which it is?