CHAPTER VII

THE SIGNIFIED THING

(THE QUESTION OF REFERENCE: LOGIC)

 

 

Introduction:

 

            In the process of signification, what is more often beyond the distinction of sign and meaning, is the “referent”[1], the object[2], the Bedeutung,[3] - that is to say, the real thing, which is talked about, or more in general, to which the sign signifies. Meaning is different from the object (the referent).

 

Bernard Lonnergan sees four functions of a meaning and distinguishes accordingly. These functions are:   1.      cognitive, i.e. what is really meant; 2.      constitutive, i.e., it constitutes part of reality, its horizon, assimilative powers and knowledge; 3.      meaning must be communicative, i.e. it induces in the hearer some share in the cognitive, constitutive or effective meaning; 4.      the effective function being to persuade or command others. The communicative function call for a common field of understanding of symbols, of experience, of judgments etc. This common meaning, however, is not satic, it is an “ongoing process of communication, of people to share the same cognitive, constitutive and effective meanings” and only this common meaning constitutes community.   [ The text is sourced from Franz-Josef Eilers, svd. Communicating Between Cultures ( Manila: Divine Word Publication, 1992), p. 165]

 

 

            The distinction between sign and meaning has been the problematic. Later, this problem was eliminated through the concept of the  “sign-function”, which unites both. Sausurre pointed out this intimate union between the signifier and the signified as a structure of sign. Which, later on, elaborated by Peirce in his triad. We have discussed this in the chapter on semiotics.  It was demonstrated that the process of signification, actualized in “sign-function”, determined by a code, is fully autosufficient. It does not refer to any extra-linguistic reality, or in general, extra-semiotic[4]. The reference to a “signified thing” became an intra-semantic relation and the “signified thing" itself into linguistic reality, respectively a cultural reality.

 

            However, this does not mean that the language or generally the signs do not have any relation at all to an extralinguistic reality or in general towards an independent reality from the “sign-function”. We only wanted to say that the process of signification as such does not comprise this relation. Umberto Eco gives an elaborated explanation, a pragmatic perspective, in the Chapter on “Produzione Segnica” (Sign Production). He puts the whole process in the context of culture.

 

            Here, there is a need to discuss if this elimination of relation to the reality would be total in the process of signification. Certainly, the philosophical reflection on language and on its relation to the reality, in general, can never be reduced to a “theory of codes”. We shall, therefore, go back to the discourse on sign and on signified thing - in this case Eco has reason[5] - to the question: What is “the thing” off which it is refered? Or, What thing am I saying, if I am saying it?

 

            We shall see later, but always in this context, that neither language nor some signs in general could exist if a non-linguistic and non-semantic reality does not exist: the reality is a transcendental condition of the language and of the signs. In the language of Alfred Korsybski, the territory is larger than the map.

 

            The problem in this chapter is therefore the question of talking. We will investigate if the signs have something to do with reality. If they do, in what way. Still, our discourse starts inside the problematic of the “sign-function”. We take the content of the preceding chapters as our head start. But gradually our attention would shift outside the theory of the process of signification. We will focus on the problem of the relation between language and signs in one part, and the extra-linguistic reality on the other.

 

A         -           THE ELIMINATION OF THE “SIGNIFIED THING” IN THE PROCESS OF  SIGNIFICATION.

 

            1          -           The Referential Fallacy.

 

            This “referential fallacy” consists in the following position: If it is talked about, if a sign exists, then also something of which is talked exist necessarily, to which the sign is referred.[6] This error is committed only in identifying the meaning of a word with its reference, already evidenced with the famous example of Frege: the expressions “Morning Star” - and “Evening Star”, have different meanings but has identical reference.

 

            Not all talking, in general, necessarily refer to an existing reality. The existence of a word, or of a name, does not guarantee the existence of the named thing. The slogan of Meinung: “unum nomen, unum nominatum” - the blessed memory of the medieval ultra-realism, is a big mistake. Otherwise not only the ontological argument for the existence of God, in the form which de Bonald has given to this argument,[7] would be valid, but it could do a similar argument for the existence of whatever thing. The phrase or name "mountain of gold" does not guarantee the actual existence of the reality mountain of gold.

 

It is not true that every word is referred to something real. As we have already seen existing; only those that can serve for a lie, namely to which eventually nothing corresponds, can be a sign or be meaningful. The “sign-function” has no need of the extra-linguistic reality. It has a degree of autonomy as a structure. The question of reality is itself placed, when the question of truth and falsity wants to be placed, namely: when the “sign-function” is used as a proposition in the proper sense of this term.[8]

 

            Lastly, the object of the “sign-function” - the so called reference is not qualitatively different from the meaning. The “planet Venus” is only another expression for the two others “Morning Star” and the “Evening Star”. This is true also if only the identification of the first term with the two others applies to the identification among themselves. But this process of identification is a semantic process, not a factual verification. Also “ the planet Venus” is a cultural unity as with the other two.[9]

 

            These are valid not only for the general term or for some names which have evidently the so called “informative content”, but proper also for all proper nouns.

 

 

            Consider - in this order - the following example:<

1.      Dante is the author of the Divine Comedy.

2.      Ramos is the president of the Republic of the Philippines.

3.      Moses is the leader who guided the Hebrews.

4.      Elena is the wife of Menelao.

5.      Jesus is the Son of God.

 

            All these identification belong to a process of significations and functions as part of a code, independently from the fact. Under the Semantic aspect all these “realities” are cultural unity and their identification is a cultural process.[10]

 

            Add to example no. 5, for another exemplification, the following identification:

 

(Jesus) = the Messiah = the Servant of Yahweh = the Son of David = the Son of Man.

 

            In this case, it is evident, that the identification of these titles of the Lord is a Semantic operation, namely of codes, based in the reading of the Bible.

 

            Naturally, it is of importance for the same meaning that the codes used in the examples from 1-5, are not of the same type. In fact, they can be found in lexical definition for all the names are of historical personalities, but also of mythical personalities - or even literary[11]. They take past in culture - knowing to recognize and use the diverse types of codes.

 

            At this point, it is understandable, why the belongingness or the choice of a specific culture - for example in Italy that of the lay culture or that of the catholic culture - it is inevitably a political choice, namely a choice, what cultural socialization is accepted and what eventually is wanted to be imposed. Such choice implies always a denouncement, rather than the acceptance of a linguistic incompetence in the alternative fields, namely, a “partial analphabitism”.

 

            On the other hand, it is clear that the meanings of the religious language especially the word “God” - is still more than the meanings of the Christian revelation, they are understood as  cultural unity in the process of signification, that is socialization.

 

            In the sense of De Bonald and the traditionalist of the first Vatican Council they are right: the meaning of the word “God” we receive from the tradition of language, namely through cultural socialization.

 

            2          -           The Extensional Fallacy.

 

            A similar problem is placed if one considers the enunciated linguistics from the point of view of the logic of the classes, meaning the extensional logic. It  itself could, in fact, be distinguished from semantic, with respect to an intentional logic, which occupies the conditions of signification. It is semantic with respect to an extentional logic, which occupies the conditions of truth. Thus, it will be a theory of the values of truth, and a theory of reference, respectively mentioned.

 

            The logic of classes distinguishes terms, which in this context, are all names of classes. It can be empty classes, or not empty classes. In a semantic context, this distinction does not have meaning. It presupposes the description between truth and falsity, and thus - a determined use of language.

 

            Therefore, the fallacy of extension is committed,, if it is not renounced to consider the extensional value of the propositions as a category of the theory of codes.[12]

 

            3          -           The Grammatical Truth.

 

            Many statements which are commonly made, do not refer to real facts , but to linguistic facts, namely - cultural. They express some parts of the code in propositional form. They say: sign has this meaning, or this expression can be substituted with this other expression.

 

            This is the case not only, just as we have just seen, with the identification of the meanings of proper names, but with all the definitions, and thus with all that are found in a linguistic dictionary.

 

            It follows then that these propositions are not true or false in the factual sense. They seem to be true or false necessarily and apriori, not in contingent and a posteriori mode. Their truth is not in the correspondence, but in the coherence. They are made similar to the propositions of mathematics and logic itself. In fact, Wittgenstein insists similarly on the difference between grammatical or logical action on the one part, and factual consideration on the other[13]. All these are true if referred to a theory of codes. In fact, mathematics and logic are fundamentally a formal theory of codes.

 

            Evidently, it is made problematic in such a way as the same notion of a priori. The apriori loses almost its absoluteness and ends to be a category of the philosophy of culture.

 

      But it is necessary to be attentive and not to mis-understand these observations and to make wrong conclusions.

First:  With all these, the grammatical truth does not become entirely banalized. Truth or falsity and definitions, etc. are often of extreme importance to human living. As a proof, it is enough to think of the political-ideological, philosophical and theological discussions and their historical importance - positive or negative.

 

Second:  Also many grammatical propositions are in some sense factually true or false, namely, depending on the linguistic and cultural facts; e.g. “ the English word for “casa” is house. With regards to this proposition the linguistic fact of which the existence is affirmed is an extralinguistic fact just like any other fact.

 

Third:  Language is not only a code, but it is used. However, some codes exist only for one possible use at least. Then, it follows that the logical grammatical questions cannot be separated from the factual ones. The lexical definitions which we find in the linguistic dictionaries are the most eloquent proofs of it. Many words exist and are used in a determined way because the facts are like that and not other. This, Wittgenstein recognizes explicitly[14]. The distinction between logical-grammatical propositions and factual propositions is not to be taken in the absolute sense.

 

Fourth:  To consider language as code under one point of view of signification is evidently an abstraction, which certainly is legitimate, but not a complete explanation of the phenomenon of speaking, more or less still, theory of truth.

 

            On the other hand, it is true that many discussions in politics, philosophy and theology, and even in science, were considered factual and instead were grammatical, at least in part if not prevalent. This does not mean that such discussions were not or will not be important, but only that they should not be considered in the same way and be treated according to the same method like some of the factual problems.

 

            There, where the “grammatical truth” is not attended and unexpectedly the breaking of the code happens, namely the identification and distinctions full unexpected, expressions which see to contradict the rules of lexicon and of grammar, a strange phenomenon is verified: one laughs or surprises himself. Both are reactions typically and exclusively human to a rupture of the social fabric of games and of danger.[15]

 

            It is important to observe how at least a part of the lyrical poem and various moments of the biblical prophecy, play  with the instrument of the breaking of codes, more or less strong.[16] The breaking of the code probably has general importance for the religious language, in as much as it understands always as the moment of its significance  “by way of negation”, which concretely plays with absurdity.

 

 

B.        THE USE OF LANGUAGE FOR SPEAKING OF “SOMETHING”: THE TRUE OR  FALSE PROPOSITIONS.  

 

            We have seen that the significativity of language and of its signs, in general, do not depend from an extra-linguistic reality of any type. But language and the signs sometimes refer to reality. This relationship does not appear when language is dealt with, in abstract way, and when signs are treated exclusively as codes. But language and the signs are also used. The codes have their concrete and lived reality in the use which men make of them.

 

            We are using language and signs not only to speak of facts or refer ourselves to them,[17] but we use it also to speak facts. We also make some propositions that are true or false in the factual sense, and are neither tautologies nor contradictions. It is only in this context of use, and of specific use of language, that is to say in propositional use, that problem of reference therefore is not a question of “meaning” of the words but of their use.[18] 

 

            If, and in the same way, the problem of reference to an extra-linguistic reality puts itself also for other uses of language, for example, for questions and for orders, it will have to be seen after having clarified through the propositions. But it seems clear, that in some way also, the other uses of language and of the signs have something to do with reality and with the facts.

 

The Passage To Logic:

 

            The origins of this problem are not so much ontological or epistemological order, but of logical order under two aspects. One aspect, the proposition is by definition that of logical reality, which is either true or false. It is therefore necessary to be able to indicate for it the values of truth. Under this aspect, the problem of reference is treated in the second part of the classical logic, namely in the chapter “De Propositionibus (On Propositions)”.[19]

 

            But on the other part, the problem of reference is connected with logical analysis of the proposition in the subject and predicate, that is the analysis of the act of predication.

 

            With this the problem of reference seems to return to the consideration of terms, which is made in the first part of the classical logic[20], that is the meaning of the words. but it is not so: the analysis of the proposition in subject and predicate regards the function of the terms in the proposition not in their meaning. In this sense, the problem of reference, is not only a problem of meaning but of use, but it is not a problem regarding words, but in their use as terms to the internal of the proposition. The problem of reference makes head more to the logic, which is to that of philosophy of language.

 

            In fact, the problem of reference is treated, in the Aristotelian antiquity, in contemporary philosophy by Frege, Russell, Strawson, Geach, Quine, Donnellan and by others[21] in the context of logic.  Treating it in the context of meaning shows a philosophical error of foundation, generally the ultra-realist type.

 

The Analysis of the Proposition:

 

            To make a proposition (sentence) means, as we have seen, to use some terms, some words, in short: the language, in a well determined way, distinct from many others. To make a sentence, therefore, is always an act.[22]

 

            For this act of a sentence, it is better to use the term of predication not that of affirmation or judgment, because predication has two modes: 1) affirmation, and 2) negation. The term judgment instead refers rather to a psychological reality but not logical.[23]

 

            The analysis of predication carries two elements: the subject and the predicate, not three, that is to say not the composition of subject, predicate and “copula” (act of affirmation, act of predication). Only within the sentence a word, a term is a subject or a predicate. To be a predicate, then, is nothing else than to be predicated in the verbal sense. The predication, the making of a proposition, is already an action, an act; it does not need of an ulterior element to unite itself to the subject.

 

            The function of the subject in the proposition is that of indicating that which it is talking about, affirming or denying. The function of the predicate in the proposition instead is that to “predicare”, namely to say something about the subject, denying or affirming.

 

Towards the Border Between Logic and the Philosophy of Language.

 

            Between logic and philosophy of language, the question is placed whether there are some terms which can be used only within one sentence, and that within a sentence they can have only the function of subject, but no that of a predicate.

 

            In other words: the question is placed, whether there are some terms, some words, or some signs, which have as their semantic meaning the referential function, which permits that propositional predication, certainly not only this, but also orders, questions, etc., don’t these words have any other meaning?

 

            The diverse functions of determined terms in the predication was recognized already by Aristotle. He distinguishes four types of reality which are or are not “en hypokeimeno” and which are said or not said “kath hypokeimeno”[24]. The fourth type is: “Ta de oute en hypokeimeno tinos legeta”. (That which does not subsist in a substratum and which is not said in any subject). From the point of view of logic, with it, its deals with some terms, which can be used only in the function of the subject, but not in that of the predicate. For this type of term, Aristotle gives as example “tis anthropos” and “tis hippos”, i.e. a determined man and a determined horse - “this man” and “this horse”.[25]

 

            One first characteristic of this type of terms, is that they are expressions to only one reference. The classical example for this type of terms are the proper names: Socrates, Plato, Peter, Paul, etc. They are regularly used for the examples in logic by medieval logicians, but even by Canonists and  Moralists in the Casuistics of rights and morals: Tizio, Tizia, Semprona, etc. In common language which is often said: “certain”, “such”.

 

The Terms to Only One Reference:

 

The Proper Names.

 

            There are other types of terms to only one reference, but given that traditionally they are proposed as typical case of terms to a lone reference the proper names, it is convenient to stop for a while on their real use.

 

Proper Names: (e.g. Francesco Rossi)

 

They are used:

·        to address somebody

·        to talk to somebody

·        to identify someone: This is Miss Rose

·        to introduce one to another: I say his name to another, in a way that they may also call each other.

·        - and for other uses.

 

            Often the proper common names are not sufficient to fulfill this complex function. In such case or other individualizing notes are added, or they make use of code numbers, assigning to each one his ordinary number, taking recourse thus to the use of other terms of the lone reference, of which we will immediately be talking.

 

            The proper names have originally not only one function but also one meaning, which can be by origin, of place, of physical characteristic, of wish, etc. Their meaning can be discovered everytime through the etymology. In the geographical proper names this meaning is heard sometimes today: e.g. “Yellow River”. In the case of personal proper names this generally does not happen, exception made for the case of imposition, or the change of name, if it is wanted to give to this ritual act a meaning of historical return; e.g.  “Sr. Catherine of the Blessed Trinity” - “John Paul II”. But in the specific use of the proper names, (these) their meaning doesn’t enter for anything, but counts only their function, which is, although complex and in a certain sense, multiple.

 

            The function of a proper name, is to precisely serve all those mentioned uses, especially to talk to someone generally, but also especially in his absence. A proper name is not learned by using it, if it is not learned by using the same name  for the different ends mentioned above, in the same different situation, especially in the presence and in absence of the person, but also of the things named.

 

            The proper name in certain situation can serve also for communicating some informations. If, for example, I have given many informations about Francesco Marzanno (unknown), and later, in a given moment I accompany Francesco Marzanno and I say to those present: “I present to you Francesco Marzanno” or “This is Francesco Marzanno”. But also in such case, it cannot be said that the term “Francesco Marzanno”, namely a proper name, has been used as a real predicate in a proposition (sentence) and has an informative predicative[26] content. The function of the proper name is always non-predicative.

 

Other Expressions to a Unique Reference.

 

            Besides the proper names, there are many other terms to a single reference:

 

            The singular personal pronouns, I, You, He, She, - have single reference, if they are used in concrete, situations and their reference to a single determined person, is their specific and single function. They don’t have any other meaning.

 

            The indications of time and of place, “here”, “there”, “now”, etc. have their single reference also, even if they are of variable precision, if they are used in concrete situations.

 

            Outside their use in the concrete situation they don’t have any meaning.

 

            The cardinal number “one”.

            The ordinal numbers, first, second, third, etc.

            The abstract cardinal numbers, the “two”, “six”, etc.

 

            The demonstrative pronouns, “this”, “that”, etc. if used to determine a common name, confer to this a single reference; “this man” - in a concrete context the common name can not be said explicitly or remain very generic and undermined: “this explicitly or remain very generic and undetermined: “this (thing)”. If the demonstrative pronouns are used without determining any common name, they don’t refer to anything: in fact, they are not used.

 

            The possessive pronouns, “my”, ours, etc., in certain context they can be used in similar way to the demonstrative pronouns and to contribute to the common name, a single reference, for example: “our house”, “my father”.

 

            Names of Titles and Social functions, that in a determined atmosphere exist once, have proper for their fact a single reference: e.g. “padre”, “king”, “pastor”, etc. The single reference can be made more explicitly by the use of the possessive pronoun: “my father”, “our king”, “our rock”, “my refuge”.

 

            The so-called complete descriptions, describe, in a determined context, an object in such a way that this description of fact is verified in a single individual.

 

            The word “God”, just how it is used in the context of the monotheistic religion.

 

            The diverse modes of referring to a single object are traditionally treated in the classical logic under the title “on individual”, or under that of all improper “on singular concept” when a concept does not exist, namely a term of singular meaning. As we have said already in referring to an individual or to a singular object does not take part in the meaning of a term, but it is a function in a concrete and real use.

 

 

THE “INDEXICAL" ( DEICTIC):

 

1.   Definitions: deictic and indexical

 

Deixis (Greek) and Index (Latin) appear to be cognates. Deictic and indexical have similar core meanings in linguistics, involving pointing. Deictic reference, a.k.a. indexical reference, is reference to an aspect of the context of utterance or speech event (Levinson1983). Thus, deictic/indexical reference contrasts with anaphoric reference, which involves an entity evoked within the discourse.

 

            This brings us to consider the function of the “index”, namely that of “indicating”, either done with a finger or using the demonstrative pronoun. With the “index” the specific linguistic game of the ostensive definition is not understood: “This is a cat” or even “ This is called cat”. Here, we are talking about the indexical function within the predication: “This cat is fat.”

 

            The “index” (deictic), - indicating does not consist in the pure pointing or in the use of the demonstrative pronoun, the word “hoc” or “this” - by itself does not indicate anything and remains not understandable. It is necessary to say, of what “this” are we talking about.

 

            If I say “This is a dog” the question can still be raise: “What are you talking about?” If I say “Do this” - similarly it could be asked: “What should I do.” The same thing serves to point at something: Indicating, for example, a leaf of paper my indication can refer to the color, to the form, to the material, etc. If I do not say what I mean to indicate, the reference does not happen. Not even the “hic et nunc”. The “here and now” by itself is sufficient to comply the function of reference to the single object or the index. Here and now can be many things. It is necessary to specify to what thing one wants to refer.

 

            From all that, it follows the index is fulfilled only by saying “hoc aliquid” (this something), “this such”, respectively using an equivalent linguistic instrument.

 

            This use of language to refer to the single object the “hoc” not only belongs to the sensible world. Also the “such”, even if, in diverse mode belongs to the sensible world; but it is not pure sensible; it is a schema, a typical figure, called in a stable with this word. In Aristotelian terms, the reference is very similar to the intelligible in the sensible.

 

            The determinate article, “the” can be used for the same function. e.g. “the father”.

 

            Names of Titles and Social functions, that in a determined atmosphere exist once, have proper for their fact a single reference: single “padre”, “king”, “pastor”, etc. The single reference can be made more explicit by the use of the determinate article: “the king”, or better still for the use of the possessive pronoun: “my father”, “our king”, “our rock”, “my refuge”.

 

            The so-called complete descriptions, describe, in a determined context, an object in such a way that his description of fact is verified in a single individual.

 

            The word “God”, just how it is used in the context of the monotheistic religion.

 

            The diverse modes of referring to a single object are traditionally treated in the classical logic under the title “de individuo”, or under that of all improper “de conceptu singulari” when a concept does not exist, namely a term of singular meaning. As we have said already in referring to an individual or to a singular object does not take part in the meaning of a term, but it is a function in a concrete and real use.

 

2.   The Autonomy of Indexicals:

 

The terms 'refer' and its derivatives are multifaceted. Referring is also something we do intentionally, for example, when we direct someone's attention to a thing. But we cannot purposely direct attention upon what we ourselves do not attend to. Consequently, there must be a psychological process of identifying or "picking out" an item for the purposes of thinking or saying something about it. This, too, is a kind of reference--thinking reference, we may call it.

 

Indexicals offer a simple means of making, expressing, and communicating our references. A demonstrative like that or a demonstrative phrase, that thing over there represents the only way of picking out what suddenly looms into vision.

 

In such cases indexicals provide autonomous mechanisms of thinking reference that do not depend upon the user's possession of other ways of referring to the same items.

 

How is autonomous thinking reference by means of indexicals achieved? To resolve these questions is the object of what follows.

3.   A Challenge to Indexical Autonomy

Indexicals are distinguished by the fact that their reference systematically varies with the context of usage in accordance with definite rules. The rules specify the relations that hold between tokens of indexical types and their referents. For example, the relation of an "I" token to its referent is that of being the utterer of the token, while that of a time to a "now" token is being the time of the token's utterance.

 

Such rules display the characters of indexical types. And by their means one is able to interpret the corresponding tokens. Hearing you say, "I am now going to throw the ball over there," for example, my grasping the characters of "I," "now," and "there" and knowing that you uttered the sentence, when you uttered it, and what region you demonstrated, enable me to determine what your referents are. If this is how indexical referents are determined then Ruth Millikan is correct to repudiate the alleged autonomy of indexicals:

". . . to interpret an indexical one must . . . already know independently and ahead of time, what item bears the indexical's adapting relation to the indexical token. . . . One does not find this out by interpreting the indexical; one needs already to know it [the referent] in order to interpret the indexical. For example, a token of "I" does not not tell me who the originator of that token is, that it is, say, Alvin. Rather, if I am to understand a token of "I", I must already know who the speaker is." (Millikan 1993).

Similarly, if one interprets someone's saying "that way" in response to a request for direction, one must be able to independently determine what direction the person is indicating. One must discover what relations one bears to the indexical referents in order to locate and act upon them, but there is nothing indexical about these relations themselves (Millikan 1993). To interpret an indexical token, therefore, is to establish what other representational tokens it coincides with. By itself, it tells us neither about its contents--what it bears its adapting relation to--nor about its contexts; context determines the indexical's content, but context is not what content is about. No indexical reference occurs autonomously.

 

4.    Indexical Production is not Indexical Interpretation

 

To interpret an indexical token not only must one have an "independent route" to the referent. One must identify the token and relevant features of context, e.g., the speaker. But this is no objection to the autonomy thesis. The procedures a speaker uses to refer to items within his or her experience are distinct from those a hearer employs in identifying the referent of another's indexical. One who uses "I am hungry" to demand food does not first apprehend an "I" token and then determine its referent by recourse to context. If that were so we would be at a loss to explain how "I" references are initiated. Neither identifying nor interpreting a token can antedate the mechanisms whereby a speaker produces it. Autonomy is a matter of production, not interpretation.

 

Ruth Millikan, an authority in indexicals, is impressed by the image of consumption as the key to understanding the representative functions of language. Of course, we are born into linguistic communities and are constantly exposed to words with prepackaged meaning before we utter them. Our exposure to indexical types is no exception, and we could not begin to use them without grasping their meanings. Yet, consumption is only half the story.

 

We use indexical types creatively to articulate the structure of our immediate experience. The child who has progressed from babble to demonstratives like "dat" manifests a creative act of distinguishing something from among the many data impinging on its sense receptors. Its interlocutors might be unable to identify that referent, but it is there for the child. The child "consumes" in acquiring the capacity to use an indexical type meaningfully, yet "produces" the demonstrative tokens in order to express what it is unable to refer to by other means. A man who slips into a coma immediately after noticing a bright flash of light has "determined a referent" with his exclamation "What is that!" but without "determining what other thought tokens it coincides with in content or reference" or forging another route to the referent.

To "refer" is to distinguish something from all else that falls within one's immediate awareness. To arrive at such contrast one needs cognitive access to distinguishing features by whose means referents are singled out, features that themselves need not be referred to. Construed as modes of reference, they guide attention and are thus involved in the production of referential tokens. Saying that "The NDMU was marvellous," for example, I might have considered the NDMU qua the largest school in Marbel or qua that huge building over there across the DECS. A plurality of modes might be operative within a single act, as when one says; "Look at that one, the statue to the left, the only Michaelangelo in the room," and while some modes may be generic at least one must individuate. Modes are "ways of thinking" but at the same time some must reflect a genuine status of the referent, if only a relational property.

In the absence of a precise definition of "picks out . . . by means of," the satisfied mode might not be separately articulated. I might call your attention to a person with "the man drinking a Coca Cola in the corner" even when the referent is neither a man nor drinking a Coca Cola. Misidentification does not refute the satisfaction principle. I still rely upon some identifying feature even if more accurately conveyed by "the person in the corner." An overt mode can misidentify yet be cognitively operative by implying an operative mode that is satisfied.

 

Reference by means of indexicals is particularly relevant to this last point since the satisfied mode may well be indexical; it is that person in that corner. But what makes a referential mode or mechanism indexical? Roughly, it is one that embodies the thinker's experiential encounter with an item from a particular perspective.

 

My indexicals are autobiographical for me--biographical for my listeners--since they contain information about my relations to, or modes of encounter with, the referents from my particular spatio-temporal standpoint. The same is not true of the referring terms in.

 

Indexical reference is direct if made to what one is immediately aware of, as when I compare two colors and think that this one is darker than that one. Reference is vicarious when made to what is not immediately present, for example, when I look at a photograph of the Cathedral and think, That building is in Rome. I refer to the church, but my reference is parasitic upon what I am directly aware of, the photograph. The latter is not itself referred to though it may be an unarticulated constituent in the episode of thinking reference. Every indexical token is associated with some such item of direct awareness, its immediate content. Reference is direct when the immediate content is the referent. It is vicarious when referent and immediate content diverge.

A problem now arises. Only within a context--within an episode of thinking reference--do the characters of indexical types function as guides to reference. How does this happen? According to the satisfaction principle, one who refers with "you," say, does so in terms of some distinguishing features of the referent. You, as well as I, grasp the public meaning of "you," and you can employ that meaning in determining to whom I referred upon hearing me utter. You do so in terms of the individuating property, being the one addressed by the speaker of, but you do not thereby identify Henry as a you. Merely using the character of an indexical type i--even one associated with production--to determine a referent within a context is not to produce an i-reference, nor to reduplicate one already made. Furthermore, if this is how character-with-context works to produce an indexical reference then the thinker would have to independently identify elements of the context in order to refer indexically. But this effectively denies indexical autonomy.

Alternatively, we can acknowledge individuating indexical modes, each being a species of a public indexical type, unique to a particular act of thinking reference, and a relational property the referent has in virtue of being encountered from a given perspective. Nothing is intrinsically a this or a you; apart from immediate encounter nothing is a that, a then, or an I. Solutions of this sort are in the literature, but more detail is needed if we are to explain how each individuating mode is differentiated.

We think of objects, events, qualities in terms of this and that, of persons in terms of I, you, he, she, etc., of places as here, there, beyond, of times as now and then. A generic mode of encounter is a component of any individuating indexical mode. Each of the latter is also wedded to a perspective, the particular space-time region occupied by an event of thinking reference. Since distinct people occupy distinct perspectives, their individuating indexical modes will always differ even when their modes of encounter are the same. The twins Pedro and Pablo utilize different modes when each says "my brother was born before I was" because each has a unique perspective on its contents. A difference in times will account for a difference between a person's "this" at one time and another "this" at a later time. But suppose the same mode of encounter is operative within a single episode of thinking reference--You leave the room but you and you stay here!--or upon discovering that this is this? Is there a distinct mode for each token? Then there would be no trivial identities expressible through indexicals, yet many unsurprising cases of this is this seem to be just that.

Some have individuated modes by appeal to different "demonstrations" paired with distinct tokens, but Kaplan was correct to point out that the demonstrations are relevant only for communicating one's intentions to refer. Yet even the "directing intentions" must, qua intentions, be directed towards actions. One intends to do something or other, and if the intended doing concerns the referent that one "perceives" or "has in mind" then reference is presupposed. On the other hand, if reference is determined during the course of intending it must still be explained how the referent is singled out as a special object of intending. What makes an intention about X rather than Y? Recourse to distinguishing features is inescapable.

Individuating demonstrative modes are also locating devices; they secure a referent by virtue of a spatial and/or temporal orientation of the referent determined, in turn, by a relation of referent to the position of the immediate content within a particular perspective. No indexical reference is established ex nihilo; something must be there, positioned in the experiential field in a certain distance and direction from the thinker's standpoint. Even an effusive smell or sound occupies a locale, a vast region encompassing the perceiver's own position. When immediate content is the referent, the orientation-fixing relation is identity and orientation just is the position of the content. When reference is vicarious, the orientation is fixed by some other relation. For dynamic indexical thoughts like, This is moving very fast, where this retains its identity, orientation is determined by an ordering of the positions of immediate contents.

There is one final factor. Indexical modes are either simple or mixed depending upon the presence of additional sortal material. The pure indexical modes I and now as well as demonstrative modes this, you, he, there, beyond, etc. are simple because they individuate by indexical status alone. By contrast, that building, this pen, the day after tomorrow, and so on are mixed. In some cases the descriptive material plays an important individuating role, as when I declare that "that thief merits no respect but that person does" while pointing to one and the same person.

 

CONCLUSIONS:

           

1.      Not all the words can be used to refer to a single object.

 

2.      A single type of word does not exist, for example the proper names or some “indicator” words, in order to make the reference to a single object. Instead, various types of words or the combination of words can be assumed to this use.  This confirms that in the case of reference, it treats about the use or rather of the function of a term, not of its meaning.

 

3.      A certain number of typical uses of words exist to refer to a single object. In the real linguistic praxis their number is not much, but on the other hand it does not seem to be neither fixed, nor rigorously delimited.

 

4.      The words that are used in order to refer to the single object can generally be used in order to refer to the single object can generally be used also in other way, and not only the referential use.

 

5.      The various typical ways of using words to refer to a single object have a multiple function, which is similar, if not properly identical to that of the proper names.

 

6.      In the multiplicity of the referential function, there are well distinct aspects, for example, talking to someone, talking of something, identifying something or somebody, etc. But these various uses are associated, and among them there are no rigorously defined limits, but rather continuos flow.

 

7.      Among the various model of using words to refer to a single object, the proper names do not carry out an exemplaricity or a spatial logical statute. What is rather very important is the combination among the demonstrative pronouns and a universal term, namely the “this such”, the “hoc aliquid”.

 

This importance is not seen only in the concrete common linguistic use - but it was also already asserted by the testimony of Aristotle. The reason for which in the late - medieval logic this type of reference appears less central and the importance given to the proper names starts to prevail, it is probably to be sought in the nominalist orientation of the late-medieval logicians.

The very important fact, is that all the other modes of referring to a single object by itself are insufficient and presuppose other referential linguistic elements.

 

C.        THE REALITY WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE REFERENCE: THE SUBSTANCE.

 

            In all the modes of using language, in which we talk about something, that of which we talked about, to which it refers, must possess certain characteristics:

 

1.         That which Corresponds to the Term of Reference is Real:

 

            Evidently, this does not mean that the fact of talking about something, or making sentences, guarantees or presupposes the real existence of this thing. But if I speak of something, I presuppose, perhaps erroneously, that that which I speak about exists. If that which I talk about does not exist, my referential use of language is abortive, it does not happen. My talking of something is not so; that which I say, will neither be true nor false, that is to say, it will not be a proposition. In such a case, I make another referential use of the language. Even if I am lying, or even just playing, I insinuate the existence of that which I talk to others. Later, they will discover, that in fact, I am not speaking of anything, because my attempted reference, simply does not occur.

 

            But if an attention is made: In the case of a mistaken reference, unsuccessful, or even falsified, it does not deal with a simple error or deception. The reference, at least, that of the index (deixis), is present and sensible: “This such” in all these cases, the sentence is not denied or is refuted. For example, to obey, but the presuppose is denied. To the saying: “This door is close.” Or “Close this door” in the case of unsuccessful reference, it is answered: “ What door? - or “This is not a door”, or “Here there is no door”, or even “Here there is nothing”.

 

 

 

2.         That which Corresponds to the Term of  Reference is a ParticularReality.

 

            That which can be indicated and which corresponds in reality to the referential use of language, is necessarily singular and can never be a universal. A general term does not serve to indicate and to identify that which is talked about. Only this is a reality which can be named.

 

NOTA BENE:

 

This also serves for the term “God”, if it is used in referential way, that is, either speaking about God, or praying etc. In such case, God is singular reality, distinct from other particular realities. This fact , in the mode of speaking, in the context of praxis of a religion is evident. Even the affirmation of the transcendence of God, it elaborates the referentiality of the term God. God is distinct from every other thing, even from all the universe. But the meaning of the term “God”, proper within the monotheistic code, in which “God” is a term of singular reference, is such by excluding that it is either a particular reality like other particular realities and accounted to him. A purely referential use of the term “God”, carries, in fact, the danger of a polytheistic paganism which divinizes some finite and particular realities.

 

However, when the omnipresence, infinity, and other attributes of God, in philosophical context, are insisted, the referential aspect of the term “God” progressively is lessened, towards the point of danger - of the pantheistic impossibility of identifying God and of distinguishing Him from whatever other thing.

 

3.         That which Corresponds to the Term of Reference Possesses an

            Existence not Purely Momentarily, but of a Certain Permanence

            and Continuity.

 

            When I talked about something, I must identify it. And I can identify it again. For this reason, that of which I speak, that which I indicate, should not only exist, but also continue to exist for a certain period of time, even how short it may be. In other words, it should exist temporarily.

 

            This means not only, when it says of something, that it is changed. In such case, I say that a determined reality, inspite of being changed, remains, under other aspect, (itself) the same, namely identical. To say this, it presupposes that the reality which is talked about exists not momentarily, but that it possesses a continuos existence. Indeed, in every referential use of language, there should be something that I can identify which remains itself, namely “identical”. According to Aristotle, no possibility of predication would exist, if all reality would exist only in momentary form. In terms of Philosophy of Language, the same thing could be said in the following mode. The referential use of language is realized only if a “this” is indicated as a “this such”: that is, as belonging to a class of objects this determination linguistically can happen only through common terms, which have a determined meaning within a code. The meanings within a code necessarily should have a certain stability not only in order to be used later, but simply to construct a code.

 

            For this reason, the metaphysical systems, which reduce the reality to the existence of pure events, happenings, changes, facts, etc., are insufficient from the point of view wither from logic, or from philosophy of language.

 

4.         That Which Corresponds to the Term of Reference is an Individual

                        Which Belongs to a Class.

 

            The reference to a particular reality happens only if this is indicated as a  “hoc aliquid”, a “this such” - or in an equivalent way, namely as an individual that belongs to a determined class of objects. This class is denominated with a meaningful word which belongs to the code. It does not constitute necessarily an “essentia”  reale. The general term which dominates this class of objects possesses its meaning in as much as it belongs in a systematic way, but as always conventionally to the code.

 

5.         That Which Corresponds to the Term of Reference is not Purely Sensible, But Intelligible.

 

            That which corresponds to the term of reference is not a pure “this” which indicates sensibly as present here and now in space and time in material form. It is a “this such”, belonging to a class of objects, that as such is denominated by a significant word which in a systematic way takes part in a code. The “sign functions” of a code, therefore, are not something concrete and sensible. They are something abstract and general. In a certain sense they have the quality of being “thought”, even if not in psychical and individual way, but in institutional way. But, given that which corresponds to the term of reference, it is also purely always a “this”, namely a determined sensible particular, we can say in terms of  scholastic philosophy, that it is an intelligible in the sensible.

 

            But this description, is still insufficient: that which corresponds to the term of reference is not only potentially intelligible. The codes with their system of “sign functions” already existing and equipped of a certain stability, precede necessarily the usage that is done to fulfill the reference. They constitute in the real sense an “a priori” of the use of language in order to speak of something.

 

6          -           That Which Corresponds to the Term of Reference is a Cultural Unity.

 

            In as much as that which is talked about, is “this such”, and “an intelligible act in the sensible”, it is always a cultural reality, and not only natural. It is that which is, actually it exist as that to which the term of reference is referring only as a counterpart of the reference, which is a cultural human reality.

 

            The “this such” is already a result of a preceding cultural process.

 

7          -           That Which Corresponds to the Term of Reference is a Determinable

                        Reality.

 

            The referential use of language happens only within the predication or in another similar linguistic use. Thus, a term is used in referential way. Only it is served as subject of the predication, or it may have an analogous function in a linguistic determinate use. A term, therefore, can serve as a subject, only if from it a predicate is predicated, that is, if within the sentence it is logically determined.

 

            This entails that the real object, which corresponds to the term of reference is necessarily not a simple reality, close in itself, but determinable, rather always determined already in one or in other way. The determination of the realities which corresponds to the term of reference always covers in fact the sphere of a logical opposition. This man can be tall or short, fat or thin, so on and so forth.

 

8          -           That which Corresponds to the Term of Reference Aristotle Calls

                        “Prote Ousia”, that is “Substantia Prima”.

 

            All those that we have found until now as the characteristics of that which corresponds to the term of reference. Aristotle finds them realized only in the “prima substantia”. For this, Aristotle insists in polemics with Plato, that there are the first substances, that which is in full and proper sense. If some first substance do not exist, no predication could be done, and nothing would exist.

 

D.        THE REALITY AS TRANSCENDENTAL CONDITION OF SPEAKING

 

            If the referential function of certain words were to be eliminated, so also the significativity of all language would be lost. If language cannot be used for speaking, in various ways, of something (referent), language can neither be used for whatever uses. However, language that cannot be used does not possess the capacity of signification of a code.

 

            We can say the same thing in another and in a complete way, extending the discussion to all the conditions of possibility of the language.

 

            Language is not only a code or a structure of “sign functions” - but it has to be used: the existence of “I”, that is of a real subject that speaks, is a condition of possibility for the existence of language, as code and structure of “sign functions”. This means also that philosophy of language should not be too or outrightly exclusively structuralism.

 

            Language is not only an expressive activity of the subject, but it needs a person who listens and understands it: the existence of “You”, that is of another real subject, is also a condition of possibility of the existence of language, either as a structure, or as an expression. This means also, that philosophy of language should not exaggerate the expressive function of language just like what the romantic language has done, or outrightly to reduce (it) all the reality of language.

 

            Language is not only communicative, but it has the need of a linguistic community, which speaks a determined language; the existence of a language and of a society, that in a determined historical culture uses it, either also as communication, or as expression. This means also that the philosophy of language would not exaggerate the communicative function of language, just like what the philosophy of personalistic and existentialistic language does especially Gabriel Marcel.

 

            Language is not only a socio-cultural phenomenon, but it needs a reality, of which to talk about: the existence of the world is itself a condition of possibility of the existence of language, either as a structure, or as expression, or as a communication, or even as socio-cultural phenomenon. This means also, that philosophy of language should not exaggerate the social function of language, just like what the socio-linguistic does often, or outrightly reducing everything of the reality of language to the social function.

 

E.         SIGNIFYING ACTION AND THE SUBJECT OF SIGNIFICATION: THE PROBLEM OF "I" WHO SPEAKS.  ( PRAGMATICS )

 

a)         SIGNIFYING ACTION:

 

            The signifying action consists in the use of codes. Using codes is always, either changing or maintaining established codes. Using codes, in the broadest sense, is always a socio-cultural activity, even a political activity.

 

            Given that it treats itself always of using codes, they prevail either the use or the codes. At this point they constitute the levels of linguistic activity, and with this the levels of behaviour and human consciousness, according to the prevalence of the structural aspect, that is that of use.

 

            These bring us to mind the three levels of Kierkegaard: the aesthetic level, the ethico-moral level, and the religious level. The aesthetic level is that of Hegelian philosophy, that is that of the prevalence of the codes, a treatment from semantics. The ethico-moral level is that of the existential of choices, that is of the prevalence of the use, a treatment from pragmatics. The ethical responsibility of the subject through its semiotic activity is certainly of critical importance for the comprehension of the relation between codes and the use of them, between semantics and pragmatics.

 

b)   THE SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE:

 

1.     The Problem:

 

            In the subject of language, on the one part they are evidently the concrete human beings who speak and who are responsible for what they say. On the other part, the subject of language ought to be collective, even universal. It ought to be the subject of the total structure of signification. As such the subject itself takes part of the linguistic universe, and ought to be studied as such.

 

2.     The Position of Umberto Eco:

 

            “The subject of an act of expression… ought to be considered first of all as one among the possible referents of the message or the text. It constitutes one of the objects of possible reference from the part of the message, and as such it would be studied by the disciplines which occupy the various physical and psychical objects of which the languages speak.”

 

            “ since the subject of the enunciation, with all its property and attitudes, is presupposed by the enunciated, it ought to be “read” or interpreted as one of the elements of the vehicled content.”

 

            “… the subject of every semiotic activity is no other than the result of the historical and social  segmentation of the universe, the investigation on the nature of the Global Semantic Space has rest evident. This subject present itself in the theory of codes as a mode of seeing the world.”

 

            “… the subject of semiosis manifest itself as a continuum and continually incomplete system of systems of signification which reflect one to the other.”

 

Then, Eco cites Pierce, who is a Hegelian:

 

“Since the fact that every thought would be a sign, in connection with the fact that life is a chain of thoughts, it proves that man is a  sign; and that every thought would be an external sign, it proves that man is an external sign. It is equivalent to say that man and external signs are identical, in the sense in which they are identical the word “Homo” and man. Then my language is the total sum of myself: because man is thought.”

 

            For Eco, all this is not idealism, because it does not express a metaphysical position, but only a methodical choice.

 

            The final word of Eco on this context is however astonishing: “… he recognises as a unique subject verifiable of the proper discourse the social existence of the universe of signification … which are, and occurring clinching … material expressions.”

 

            Therefore, Eco reduces the subject of speaking methodically to the internal of the universe of codes, that is of the signifying  functions. This, from the methodic semiotic - “scientific” point of view, it seems to be justified; from the philosophical point, it remains unsatisfactory, at least, there where speaking falls under the moral responsibility of the subject.

 

3.     A Line for a Solution:

 

            Also the subject is not part of the semantic, and it does not function without subject, as it does not function without reality. But as the reality, also the real existence of the subject who speaks, that is of the I, is a transcendental condition of speaking.

 

            But the problem remains that language has a need of an intersubjective subject, in a certain sense institutional. The function of the subject in language is proper of guaranteeing the intersubjective coherence. It, as subject, ought to make itself, that the language would be intersubjective, objective and indefinitely opened. In saying it in the classical way: language has a need of a transcendental subject.

 

            What is the relation of the single concrete subject to this transcendental subject? The problem is similar in Aristotle: nous poietico: comune-singolo? Psyche - uomo? Descartes: cogito - res cogitans = anima? Kant: transcendental subject - empirical subject? Theory of knowledge plus logic - anthropology/psychology- metaphysics.

 

            All these solutions, also that of Eco, carry elements in the right direction, but none is truly satisfying. The concrete subject, ought to be itself transcendental. But this metaphysical subject, ought to be not only the concrete subject, but also it ought to be a duality and a plurality of subjects: I and You and We. And finally it ought to be an unlimited subject: a soul, or rather an immortal human person.