CHAPTER IV

SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS

(QUESTION OF SIGNIFICATIVITY)

I           -           SEMANTICS

Semantics is the study of meaning, truth, and reference. Note that the syntactic rules that we discussed last time operate on the basis of abstract structures. The question of meaning of particular words, in particular, did not enter into our discussion. Meaning is obviously important feature of language. Most of the time, we are more concerned with its meaning rather than the linguistic form of a statement Moreover, as we saw earlier in the course, in many cases the meaning of an utterance seems to be represented in the mind. We often remember the "gist" of what someone said without remembering the precise sequence of words that the person used to express that meaning. However, what is meaning? When you think about it, it is remarkable that a pattern of sounds can be about something else. How is that the case?

There is also the problem of the correspondence between language and the world. Does our language represent the world? Such articulations of the correspondence between language and the world, which are at the heart of the foundation of the Tarskian correspondence theory of truth, have initiated a broad and still continuing discussion.(1)

General Semantics:

There are different approaches to semantics, and one of the recent approache is general semantics. General semantics is not just semantics and it is not just a matter of words. It is an approach to living. The reflective consideration on general semantics emerged from the question of the reason why we humans have, in spite of advanced knowledge in science, mathematics and technology, we still demonstrate so much confusion, misunderstanding, and violence in our interactions with others and within ourselves. General semantics is an attempt to answer this question.

A Short Background of General-Semantics:

The expression General Semantics was used by Alfred Korzybski to describe his new system. Semantics is the study of meaning.(2) He called it General Semantics because he meant not only the linguistic definition or even our response, but our response to words and events in the fullest sense. According to Korzybski, human ills were caused by a persisting primitive type of thinking which his system aimed to overcome.

Alfred Korzybski examined the structures behind the methods of science and then applied these structures generally to all areas of human existence. This effort led him to investigate the new outlooks in physics, chemistry, etc., the foundations of mathematics, psychiatry, etc., and finally to formulate their most up-to-date principles into a practical, teachable system for living. He called this system General Semantics ("g-s"), elaborated in his book "Science and Sanity (1933) - an introduction to non-aristotelean systems and general semantics", which was his main work.

Korzybski was influenced by the work of Whorf (Whorf-Sapier Hypothesis) who maintained that the language of a culture determines how speakers of that language think and experience the world. The world is complex but our language leads us to 'split' with words what exists 'as-a-whole'. Benjamin Lee Whorf wrote, "We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages ... the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds -- and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances...." (3)

This influenced Korzybski who believed that if our language was improved then we would improve ourselves and our society. He believed that the language of science and mathematics was a model for us to emulate.

If we learn certain words and certain grammatical constructions then we would think in a different way and experience the world differently. Eskimos have several words for snow, and Arabs many words for camel. Clearly vocabulary does reflect the world in which we find ourselves. A doctor who knew many words for illnesses would be a different type of doctor from one who did not know the names of illnesses. In the minimum, the one who knew the names of many illnesses would be more able to communicate and collect new information from others who also knew the names of the illnesses.

Korzybski's general semantics principles are placed in contrast to the logic of Aristotle. According to Korzybski, Aristotle represents the black and white perspective of reality. The idea that things just ARE a certain way and you can describe them in some finite and satisfactory way. And the concept that ideas are either right or wrong.

The physics of Newton follows similar models. The world is considered a collection of finite, separate phenomena that can be studied in isolation from anything else. Therefore Newton also represents Aristotelian logic.

In the beginning of the 20th century the old science started to fall apart, thanks in part to relativity theory and quantum physics. You could no longer regard physical objects and phenomena as unchangeable, finite constructs that could be studied in isolation. Things were found to be much more interdependent and fluid than earlier assumption of Aristotelian logic.

General Semantics, as a Non-Aristotelian system, provides a system of logic and of studying man's relation to his world, to accompany the new, more wholistic and fluid, models of science.

If one has to draw out the single most important statement of General Semantics, it would invariably be: "The map is not the territory."

The world is what it is. We can make all kinds of maps and models of how the world works, and some of them can be very useful, and we can talk about them with great benefit. But the models and maps and any words one can put together can never do more than approximate the actual world or the actual phenomena being examined. The actual territory is beyond verbal description.

As humans we make abstractions all the time. An "abstraction", as used here, is one that simplifies, condenses, or symbolizes what is going on in order to better talk about it or think about it.

General-Semantics teaches that life issues become clearer and more manageable as we move toward a better understanding of the background assumptions we bring to a situation. We arrived at a better understanding if we have the willingness and the ability to make careful and clear observations, the willingness to continuously test, examine, evaluate, and change our assumptions and behavior based on our observations. General Semantics then provides information, methods, structures, and practical devices to assist us with the above goals.

General Semantics is a system which generalizes the principles and methods of modern science to all areas of human activity. Its principles and methods can be utilized to enhance our day to day activities and our relationships.

It is built on the assumption that we humans can be described as:

Time-Binders: Each generation, through symbols, especially language, gains from and builds upon the experience of past generations. We learn from each other, and pass on this knowledge. Korzybski called this process "time-binding", and considered it important enough to serve as a basis for defining humans.

Time binding is the uniquely human method of transmitting experience and knowledge over time. We are influenced by the past and the future at the present time because we are related to these through time binding. Our own personal history affects us now and in the future because of time binding.

Symbol Users Humans are symbol users and symbol manipulators. Language, including the special language called "mathematics", is our most important symbol system. How we use language determines the way we think, our relationship with ourselves, others, and our world. Many human problems can be traced to our ignorance of the ways we use language and the ways language uses us.

Problem Solvers Critical thinking and creative problem solving are basic human activities. Science and mathematics are examples of our most effective problem solving activities -- effective in terms of realizing goals. Effective problem solving requires an ability to first clarify the issues involved (therefore to think critically) and then apply creative processes to generate proposed solutions, which are then critically evaluated.

Different Descriptions of General Semantics:

There are diverse descriptions of General Semantics as this develops in the area of practice. According to the main proponent of this new approach, it is not a 'philosophy,' or 'psychology,' or 'logic,' as we ordinarily understand these disciplines. Rather, this is a new extensional discipline that gives as an explanation and training on how we can use our nervous systems in the most efficient manner.

For Erving Lee, this new approach refers to our articulation about ourselves and about the world so that all these talks fit the world. This similar to the logico-positivist tradition.

For Wendel Johnson, it is a general method of science that we apply not only to a particular area of our human experience but rather to our general daily life. Thus, it is a general way of solving problems. While J. Samuel Bois describes it simply as a program of guided awareness. It is a program that would educate our consciousness of the events in the world and also within ourselves.

General-semantics basically consists of two things. First is a comprehensive theory of how we conduct our lives. Second is a set of techniques that enables our functioning, thus reducing dis-functionalities. While language plays an important role in these formulations, it focuses also on our non-verbal experiences. We learn about how these relate to what is going on in and around us. This knowledge leads to a greater ability to deal with uncertainty, better decision-making and generally more successful living.

Since general semantics is all embracing in its approach, many practitioners of their diverse respective field find it very valuable in their work. They find this new comprehensive approach useful in improving their relationship with themselves and others in the context of family, co-workers, and the community. This is so because it brings into our awareness our limitations in terms of our experience, knowledge, and understanding. It makes us understand the nature of our conflicting relationships in our uncertain world.

 

General semantics gives us a description of the process of human consciousness. As we encounter things, persons and situations, we begin to form images and create symbols. These happen at the start totally within ourselves and our nervous systems. Our brains form these images and symbols by mapping the outside world and in the process filters out most information. Therefore, whatever information is abstracted represents not the thing itself but an abstract of the encounter.

Different people make different maps of a territory. Awareness of this abstracting process provides a key to developing our potential as humans. The symbols we form, the words we use are not pictures of things and situations in their totalities. The lack of understanding of this process can give rise to conflicts and misunderstandings. We have the tendency to absolutize the little or the narrow understanding of things and situations that we have. We mistake the map for the territory.

We have this tendency to confuse our words or symbols and maps with what they represent. We benefit by remembering that the map is not the territory, the word is not the thing. They are symbols we have created for convenience.

SEMANTIC REACTIONS

Semantic response to events can be very confusing. There is need to understand the meaning of this in general semantics. The word semantics in General Semantics refers to our total response to thing-events- not just word meaning. In fact, it is more of an evaluative response than a semantic one.

For Korzybski, a semantic response, or evaluative response he meant the total response - neurological, emotional, cognitive, semantic and behavioural - to the thing-event. Total response to the thing-event is our evaluative or semantic response. It is this sense that, in the field of 'gestalt', the work of Korzybski has been influential. Bernard Basescu of the New York Society for General Semantics presented on the use of general semantics in his gestalt therapy. (4) He makes the point that "those who associate general semantics with the study of language, and those for whom gestalt work means non-verbal expression (body feelings, tone of voice, posture, etc.) are missing much of the richness of each."

The human mind includes mechanisms that are part of the problem. Korzybsky talks about 'semantic reactions' which is when one reacts based on the consciously or sub-consciously perceived "meaning" of an event, rather than based on the event itself.

For example, Joe comes home from work and gives his wife flowers and she gets angry with him. She might assume that he gives her flowers because he has something to hide and it really means that he is having an affair, and she gets mad because of that. Maybe Joe just wanted to be nice, or there was a sale on flowers.

Semantic reactions sometimes make it difficult to have rational and constructive interactions between people.

Training oneself to recognize and overcome semantic reactions in oneself and others, could form the basis of more sane interactions and activities between people.

Fuzzy Logic:

General semantics give rise to the important development of what we call Fuzzy Logic. This was introduced by Dr. Lotfi Zadeh (1960) as a means to model the uncertainty of natural language. Fuzzy logic is used for those gray areas between true and false, which the Aristotelian logic (formal logic) failed to account. Traditional computer logic operates with very precise equations and two answers: yes or no, one or zero.

So what happens if you need to write a computer application for a very ill-defined or vague system? You use fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic allows you to quantify those imprecise descriptions that we use in our language and gradual transitions in appliances such as going from dirty water to clean water in a washing machine.

If you need temperature control, fuzzy logic can vary the output depending on the current temperature deviation from the desired temperature. A single measure of heating or cooling could overshoot or undershoot the desired temperature, depending on how much it deviates from the desired temperature. In addition, fuzzy logic could be used to vary the rate of heating or cooling, depending on the deviation from the desired temperature.

Recognizing this in-between range is a central feature of general-semantics, or a non-Aristotelian orientation. We go beyond two-valued, either/or approaches to focus on both-and; in addition to black and white, we consider what can be found in the shades of gray as black shades into white, white into black. We give up false expectations for precision and certainty and gain greater relevance, accuracy and reliability. We recognize that we can have degrees of knowledge, of information, of success.

These standards allow for degrees, rather than either/or, "it is or it isn't" positions. Fuzzy process situations call for an ability to allow for fuzzy process answers rather than an insistence on a definitive "I have the truth" and that's that.

To quote Andrew Solomon:

It is tempting, in the end, to say there is no such thing as a disability. Equally, one might admit that almost everything is a disability. There are as many arguments for correcting everything as there are for correcting nothing. Perhaps it would be most accurate to say that "disability" and "culture" are really matters of degree. Being Deaf is a disability and a culture in modern America; so is being gay; so is being black; so is being female; so even, increasingly, is being a straight white male. So is being paraplegic, or having Down syndrome. What is at issue is which things are so "cultural" that you wouldn't think of curing them, and which things are so "disabling" that you must "cure" them -- and the reality is that for some people each of these experiences is primarily a disability experience while for others it is primarily a cultural one." (5)

II         -           PRAGMATICS

A. The Problem of Distinction between Semantics and Pragmatics.

The distinction between semantics and pragmatics is easier in the level of application than in level of explanation. This is due to many conflicting formulations. However, despite their conflicts, all diverse formulations shed light on the distinction as it is commonly applied, in both linguistics and philosophy. (6)

The semantics-pragmatics distinction has long been methodologically important in both linguistics and philosophy. This was implicit in philosophy in the discussions of pragmatic paradoxes and contextual implications as demonstrated by the "conversational implicature" of Grice. Such distinction was also invoked for corrective purposes. For instance, Strawson (1950) seemed to show this when he argued that Russell confused (linguistic) meaning and reference. Reference, Strawson contended, is something that speakers do, not words. Already, Strawson (1950) anticipated the distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker's meaning. Somehow this became the basis of the distinction between "what is said" and "what is implicated", which was elaborated by Grice (1989). This led to a new way of looking at presupposition.

To solve the problem of projection, presupposition is now considered as a pragmatic phenomenon, rather than just as semantic.

Austin, in his later works, acknowledged the semantic-pragmatic distinction by his contrast of the locutionary and illocutionary acts. Then, Kripke (1977), who decried the semantic ambiguity, illustrated how to avoid this by invoking the distinction between semantic reference and speaker's reference. This is to show that the difference between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is merely pragmatic.

The notion of context is usually invoked to explain how pragmatics complements semantics. The gap between linguistic meaning and what is said is filled by something called "context." There are many things that a speaker can mean, even when using his words in a thoroughly literal way. What one says in uttering the words can vary, so what fixes what one says cannot be facts about the words alone but must also include facts about the circumstances in which one is using them; those facts comprise the "context of utterance." Therefore, context plays an important role in both semantics and pragmatics.

While semantic information is grammatically associated with the linguistic material uttered, pragmatic information arises only in relation to the act of uttering that material. This makes silence communicative of pragmatic information, rather than semantic information. While semantic information is encoded in what is said, pragmatic information is generated by the act of uttering it. No sentence encodes the fact that it is being uttered. Contextual information is relevant to the hearer's inference only insofar as it can reasonably be taken as intended to be taken into account, and that requires the supposition that the speaker is producing the utterance with the intention that it be taken into account. In contrast, the encoded information provides the input to the hearer's inference in any context.

The important distinction between Semantics and Pragmatics are shown further by the following philosophers. (7)

Charles Morris (1938): Semantics deals with the relation of signs to … objects which they may or do denote. Pragmatics concerns the relation of signs to their interpreters. (1938/1971)

Stalnaker (1972): Syntax studies sentences, semantics studies propositions. Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed. There are two major types of problems to be solved within pragmatics: first, to define interesting types of speech acts and speech products; second, to characterize the features of the speech context which help determine which proposition is expressed by a given sentence. … It is a semantic problem to specify the rules for matching up sentences of a natural language with the propositions that they express. In most cases, however, the rules will not match sentences directly with propositions, but will match sentences with propositions relative to features of the context in which the sentence is used. These contextual features are part of the subject matter of pragmatics.

Katz (1977): [I] draw the theoretical line between semantic interpretation and pragmatic interpretation by taking the semantic component to properly represent only those aspects of the meaning of the sentence that an ideal speaker-hearer of the language would know in an anonymous letter situation, … [where there is] no clue whatever about the motive, circumstances of transmission, or any other factor relevant to understanding the sentence on the basis of its context of utterance.

Gazdar (1979): What we need in addition is some function that tells us about the meaning of utterances. … The domain of this pragmatic function is the set of utterances, which are pairs of sentences and contexts, so that for each utterance, our function will return as a value a new context-the context as changed by the sentence uttered … . And we can treat the meaning of the utterance as the difference between the original context and the context arrived at by utterance the sentence. [This applies to only] a restricted subset of pragmatic aspects of meaning.

Kempson (1988): Semantics provides a complete account of sentence meaning for the language, [by] recursively specifying the truth conditions of the sentences of the language. … Pragmatics provides an account of how sentences are used in utterances to convey information in context.

Pragmatics is the study of language which focuses attention on the users and the context of language use rather than on reference, truth, or grammar. Pragmatics studies the use of language in context, and the context-dependence of various aspects of linguistic interpretation. … [Its branches include the theory of how] one and the same sentence can express different meanings or propositions from context to context, owing to ambiguity or indexicality or both, … speech act theory, and the theory of conversational implicature.

The distinction between semantics and pragmatics is, roughly, the distinction between the significance conventionally or literally attached to words, and thence to whole sentences, and the further significance that can be worked out, by more general principles, using contextual information.

Universal Pragmatics of Habermas:

Universal Pragmatics or Formal Pragmatics is Jurgen Habermas' project of reconstructive understanding of the way in which language users employ sentences in order to relate three domains of reality.

The pragmatic function of representation enables the speaker to relate to an external state of affairs (external nature). The expressive function allows the speaker to focus on her "internal nature" and the "appellative" function allows her to establish interpersonal relations (society).

This analysis is reconstructive because it tries to reconstruct the rules that constitute the adult speaker's competence to use sentences in utterances. It examines the necessary presuppositions that enable successful speech, as opposed to an empirical study of concrete situations of language use, as in sociolinguistics.

Habermas's preoccupation with social theory and the analysis of communicative action provides the larger framework for his interest in pragmatics. Communication, for him, takes the type of action aimed at reaching an understanding to be fundamental. He treats insincere, persuasive or manipulative communication as derivative.

In the development of his thinking on universal pragmatics, he maintains a strict distinction between communicative action with the purpose of reaching understanding on the one hand, and what he calls "strategic" communication on the other.

This emphasis on the process of understanding leads to a rather strong idealization of the communicative situation: a basis of mutually recognized validity claims together with the vindication of these claims is presupposed.

These validity claims mirror the aforementioned functions of communicative actions: (a) external nature: the speaker must make a true statement, (b) internal nature: she must be truthful in expressing her beliefs, intentions, feelings, etc. and (c) society: she must perform a speech act that is "right" with respect to a given normative context.

Habermas defines "understanding a speech act" as knowing what makes it acceptable: besides the fact that a speech act obviously has to be comprehensible, the speaker and the hearer also assume that the speaker can provide grounds (truth claim) and justification (rightness) for her speech act, and that she can prove her trustworthiness (truthfulness). He believes that every speech act at the same time raises these three validity claims.

The first paper, "What is Universal Pragmatics" (1976), presents the views described above, but also provides the methodological justification for the proposed project.  It elaborates on the procedure of rational reconstruction, on the reasons why this programme should not be called "transcendental" and on a categorical distinction between linguistic expressions that appear in sentences with a representational function and those that appear in sentences with interpersonal or expressive functions.  It also explicitly positions Habermas' ideas with regard to Austin's and Searle's proposals regarding speech act theory.

In Habermas' pragmatics, the ethics of responsibility is very important as the result of interpersonal interactions. This also involves a fine-tuning of Habermas' distinction between action oriented toward success (consisting of instrumental and strategic action) and action oriented reaching understanding (communicative action).  A view of communication as fundamentally aimed toward reaching understanding can be extended so that it can also explain strategic uses ("perlocutionary effects").

In the third article Habermas counters Charles Taylor's criticism on the project of formal pragmatics, by pointing out Taylor's preoccupation with self-consciousness.  This bias leads to a view of the self as one among many and as one against all, and this leaves no room for linguistically structured society.  Taylor's claim that on the basis of the project of formal 

pragmatics only some kind of procedural ethics is possible, is taken to be basically correct, but one cannot attempt a universal morality on the basis of an analysis of the universal potential of speech along Humboldtian lines.  Also the world-disclosing function of language should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that this language-disclosing function has to prove its worth within the world.  The universal, the particular and the individual are released from their relation to a totality and are conceived as reference points that are equally primordial.

Habermas clarifies the Husserlian concept of "lifeworld".  It starts off with yet another comparison between action ("running") and speech ("statement"), stressing the latter's reflexive characteristic self-interpretation (it makes itself known as the action that is planned to be).  Further differences lie in the goal's independence/dependence of the means of intervention, the causal/cooperative way in which the action is brought about and the objective/interpersonal world in which the results of the action/speech are to be located.  The lifeworld, then, is that conception of society that explores the terrain of the preflectively familiar and the unquestionably certain and allows a vision of the sociocultural context of life from within.  It consists of a linguistically mediated intermeshing of culture (knowledge), society (legitimate orders) and personality structures (identity).

III        -           LANGUAGE, CONTEXT, AND LANGUAGE-GAMES.

1.      LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION is meaningful only within a context, and in as much as it belongs to a "lingua" and is used in a determined language-game; isolated it has no sense.

a.       NO LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION HAS A DETERMINED MEANING IF NOT IN A CONCRETE CONTEXT.

The same phrase in different concrete situations, the same word in different phrases have different meanings - at least in part. The phrase and the word taken singularly and isolatedly, have an indeterminate meaning. They can have potential meaning, which is actualized fully and is determined in their insertion in a context. The lexicographic meaning of a word is not that which generalizes the various possible (forms) uses of that word in the sentence. The meaning is actualized through the phrases in different concrete discourses of a certain language. It is in that way that the meaning of the word is defined depending on the use which it makes of itself in a certain language. Thus, pragmatic approach to meanings.

The meaning of a word in a phrase and a phrase in a discourse is determined by the relationships which that phrase, that word, etc... have in structural unity, i.e. together with the other elements, be it linguistic or extra-linguistic.

            b)         THE DETERMINATION OF THE POTENTIAL MEANING OF A WORD.

The potential meaning of a word, that is the possibility that a word can be used in different phrases, is determined either by a relation of opposition, or of possible substitution, or of similarity and dissimilarity, etc..., of this word with other words within the totality of a language. The meaning of the word is changed, and even the meaning of many other words, at least, those of the words of the same linguistic camp.

            c)         THE BELONGING OF THE WORDS TO SAME "LANGUAGE GAME."

The meaning of a word is later more precise when it belongs to a determined "linguistic game". Here, its meaning is further determined by other elements, and thus also by the rules of the language game itself. The same word can be used in different language games, but with a meaning, at least, partially different. Think, for example, of a scientific description, of a story, or a prayer. The meaning, for example, of the word "energy" in the technical language or the common language is very different. There are those words that belong to only one language game, others instead take part in many language games, and certain words can be frequently used in all.

The diverse linguistic languages have some rules not only diverse, but also of many types and of diverse rigors. Think, for example, of the jokes, of the dialogue, insults or the prayers. The rule in joking is different from the rule in praying, etc.

After all, the meaning of a word is definitely determined by the concrete use in the concrete context. That which is said by the words, serves in analogous mode even for the phrase or for discourse. Also they have only an indeterminate meaning, if they are considered isolatedly.

            d)         THE ISOLATED LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS DO NOT HAVE MEANING.

If a linguistic expression is isolated completely from all the others and an abstraction is made in its possible relations, then that expression will no longer have any meaning: it will only be pure sound.

In fact, it cannot be understood and can never be understood, a word absolutely singular and isolated: neither on the part of the one (speaker) using it nor on the one (hearer) listening. If I understand a word, I should know beforehand, in what way I ought to use it in different phrase. If I understand the phrase, I am already able to form it in diverse forms. Thus, I can never learn only one isolated word. However, I can add one single word to a language already known. But then that new word is learned in relation to the totality of the already known language, and is immediately integrated to it. This is true even for some single words of a foreign language. They are initially learnt in relation to the totality of the mother tongue. In fact, we don’t start to learn our mother tongue with the acquisition of some single words. That which we learn, in every case, is already the language: even if it is initially of a language of very little elements. We learn the mother tongue when we start to participate, over the foundation of prelinguistic behavior already existent: concretely in the family where one is born.

1.      A LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION IS MEANINGFUL ONLY WHEN IT BELONG TO A LANGUAGE AND TO A DETERMINED LANGUAGE GAME.

Until now we have described the prevailing concrete structural units of speaking, these are: the phrase, the discourse, and the language as concrete unity. Now let us take into test, in its formal aspect - language, communication, the various languages, the different uses of language, and the diverse mode of talking.

            a)         The words and the phrases are meaningful, when they belong to a determined language.

The meaning of words and of phrases is determined in relation with the other elements and the other possible compositions of the same language.

The linguistic expressions should be used according to the rules of their respective language.

In order that words or phrases may mean something, this is achieved by using them. I may understand something, and the other may understand it, I must use it according to the rules and laws of correlation within a context - linguistical and extra-linguistical. In such a way these rules are not only rules of a language, but also rules of social behavior in a determined culture.

There are some rule of communication or speaking in general, somehow implied within and by these rules or laws: "rules" - very general - of acting in a human way.

Such rules, partly, are conventional, but rarely purely conventional; partly they are given with the same nature of language and thus with same human nature; either physical, or even metaphysical.

In order to use the linguistic expression according to the rules of the respective language I should already know the language as a whole.

In order, therefore, that one can work with words, form some phrases, and use them in a meaningful and intelligible way it is necessary that the whole language be already known with its rules. And also, it should already be known what thing to speak or communicate with others. I cannot learn words or phrases isolated; I should learn a language, which at the start can evidently be sufficiently simple and composed of only small elements. If I want to use a word, I ought to know how to form a phrase. If I am able to use a word in a sentence, I am already able to use it also in another sentence. If I can form a sentence, I can form also another. If with a word I can indicate an object, I can indicate it also in other. If I can say something in a given situation, I can, within certain limits, say similar or different things in other situations, similar or different.

All these, then, I can and I should do according to those rules which already determine the single actual use. If not I say one thing, later I should say about it again in this or that mode. Also, consequently, if or any special reason I intend to talk incoherently, that same incoherence acquired meaning through some rules, for example, by contrast, by attracting the attention, etc.

If we notice well, the rules of which we are speaking often vary elastically. Only in the context of certain use of language that they become more and more rigorous, for example, in the case of scientific terminology or in mathematics. They can even invent new rules and introduce them in the linguistic business, but this cannot be the work of only one person: in as much as every language, together with the rules, is a public and social reality. New uses of speaking of special language of a group, slang and so on are developed continually, but also continually they go out of use.

a.       The Words and Phrases are Meaningful, When They Excel in Different Language Game" That is in Different Mode of Talking.

Every act of talking and of communicating, the words and the sentences which we concretely use, do not belong only to the field of human behavior and to that of communication and of talking in general, nor only to a certain language: they belong even to a determined and different modes of talking: to which Wittgenstein in "Philosophical Investigation" calls "language game".

WHAT IS A LANGUAGE GAME?

The term "language game" is central to philosophy after Wittgenstein. But it does not take part in a theory. It is not an explanation of language, but an analogy, namely a comparison of many uses of language with all that which we call "game", especially with chess game. The term language game refers to the totality of the language, to some singular game, namely some typical uses of language.

Just as in the game of Chess, things are defined, be it the King or the Tower through the convention that regulate the way of moving them in which men serve themselves of them, namely through the rule according to which it is used in certain typical situations, and therefore, in the different "language game".

Since men make many games very different from among each other, which, despite of having all some "family resemblance", they do not have a common essence; that way we are also using the language in various manner, without these various uses of having common essence: for example, describing, or even "painting" some facts.

The Analogy Between Diverse Modes of Speaking and the Multiplicity of "Games" Conveys the Following:

1.      Speaking is an activity, as it is of playing.

1.      Speaking is a complex activity, which unites the diverse elements: elements properly linguistic (words, etc.) and non-linguistic elements ( other activities, situations, etc.).

2.      Speaking, that is using the language is a multiform activity as the multiplicity of that which is called "games"; it is not reducible to the unity of a common "essence".

3.      The meaning of the singular linguistic expression depends on its relation to the other elements of the language game itself and, definitive from Logic, which is from the specific "depth grammar" of the language game in question.

4.      Various "language games" lead to a "form of life."

5.      Speaking, which is using language becomes part of the "natural history" of man.

6.      Speaking, namely using the language is an activity according to public rules, which are more or less guided according to the type of linguistic game in question.

"Following a rule" is something public and institutional, and does not consist in "feeling guided by a rule."

 

EXAMPLES OF VARIOUS LANGUAGE GAMES:

            As example of the multitude of language games, we can indicate the following:

o        to command and act according to the command

o        to describe the appearance of an object

o        to indicate the dimension of an object in centimeters

o        to construct an object according to its description

o        reporting an event

o        to elaborate a scientific hypothesis and verify it

o        propose the results of an experiment

o        personify a personality in a theater

o        invent a story and narrate it

o        translating one language to another

o        solve a mathematical problem

o        thank, to curse

o        to greet, pray insult, count

o        invent and impose some names

o        to define, to philosophize, etc. etc.

I could go on making some other examples. Wittgenstein himself closes: "But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question and command? - There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences".

And here, we have to take important note particularly on the distinction between the descriptive use of an expression and the factive use: "I name you president", "I baptize you", "I love you", etc.

Language games, of which Wittgenstein speaks, are either natural and existent or simplified or even invented. Certain language games, which Wittgenstein proposes, are impossible and absurd, at least for human beings as we know them.

THE LIMITS AMONG THE VARIOUS LANGUAGE GAMES:

The distinction between two language games is not absolute. Various linguistic games can be considered as one or more. However, some linguistic expressions (words, combinations of words, phrases, specially composed formulas of some sentences) can be used only in one or in few language games. This pertains above all of technical terms. Anything similar serves for many expressions of language of small groups.

Even expressions of religious language, of poetic language, and of political language have their meaning within their specific meaning within their respective language game. If such expressions were used outside the sphere of their respective language game, generally they would lack meaning. That withstanding these expressions, they can be used, intentionally, in determined situations in order to obtained the particular effect, but now they are used in a modified sense and, that means: analogous and improper.

Many linguistic expressions (above all words, but even combination of words, phrases, and even combination of phrases) are reconstructed in various language games. In this case their meaning will be at least partially different. If you think especially of some expressions which indicate a nexus: "true", "good", "exact", "simple", "distinct", etc..

THE RULES OF THE GAMES AND THE FREEDOM FROM THE RULES.

As every game, for example, that of chess, of football, etc. - have rules, so also every language game is made of, and ought to be made according to the rules, which determine the use of the linguistic expressions and of the extra-linguistic elements, which contribute to the determination of their meaning. Diversely it would be impossible to have so many players in the same game, but also not making sense when I just play alone.

Generally, these rules enjoy certain degree of elasticity, which is greater or smaller depending on the type and of the scope of the respective language game. In sciences, which are considered exact, the rules are rigid enough. In mathematical sciences, their elasticity is reduced to nothing. On the other part, in daily conversation the ambit of freedom of expressions is so great, but not indeterminate. But such innovations do not depend totally from one individual, but always from a linguistic community.

If it is necessary, for example in the case of a new fundamental experience, of the birth of a new science, of the development of a new cultural structure, economic structure, political structure, etc.., new language games can also be invented; although it may not really be completely new. In fact, even the new language games, they have some historical connections of continuity with those that preceded them. They always have a certain relation with what is already existent. Besides, even, the new language games will always be a human use of language.

The rules which determine the use of the linguistic expressions, of the extralinguistic elements of a given language game, they constitute the special logic of this game. That logic is always at least partially different from the diverse language games. Thus, for example, the expressions "factive" are neither true nor false; instead they can be effective or not effective, sincere or not sincere, e.g. "I love you." etc. Also they have a certain relation with reality, but this is different from that of "descriptive" expressions. Also their dependence from the circumstance is different.

Another example can be that of the difference between scientific expressions and religious expressions: the two types of propositions are not truly of the same mode. Their relation to the reality is very diverse. And even their way of justifying their truth-claims is very different.

To sum up everything that can be said, that the linguistic expressions are not significative only in one unique sense, but in many ways according to the diverse language games in which they are adopted.

1.      LANGUAGE AND THE RESPECTIVE LANGUAGE GAME DETERMINE A PRIORI THE MEANING OF THE LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS.

            a)         Language is a Structure which Precedes the Linguistic Expressions and It Determines Them.

As it was exposed in the preceding point, language with its rules is a whole, an order, a structure, which precedes the single word and the single phrases, and such also the actual use of the language itself, and the act of speaking and of communicating. Language is the "a priori" of speaking.

Language, in as much as its rules constitute an order, is a priori with respect to the single acts of speaking: If I want to talk and communicate, necessarily I have to talk in a certain way.

Understanding something by way of linguistic expressions and comprehending such expressions, is possible only in this order, and such order determines "a priori" the possibility of the expressions and their meaning. Language with their diverse rules is the condition "a priori" of the possibility of speaking.

The Fulfillment of the Meaning in the Expressive and Communicative Act of Speaking:

Thus, it can be said: In every act of speaking, in every single significative use of a linguistic expression, in as much as this single expression refers itself to the possible totality of the respective language, it is actuated by the aprioristic order of the language, that is to say, it opens itself to the horizon of the totality of that language. With that it also opens itself indirectly the total horizon of human speaking. Concretely this means no other than the application of the rules of the respective language.

The structure of such horizon is "aprioristic" in various ways, such as the rules of the language and of speaking have various nature and necessity.

A Task of the Philosophy of Language:

It is one of the specific task of the philosophy of language to elaborate the "aprioristic" structure of language and of speaking. Such philosophy has been elaborated in the British Analytical tradition ( Moore, Russell and especially Wittgenstein, and also Austin and Ryle), than in the Phenomenological tradition ( Husserl, Heidegger, Meleau-Ponty, Riccoeur, Gadamer ).

b)         "Language Games" and the "Form of Life" as Horizons of Meaning.

As the language, so also the single language games, are of fields, of structured and organized totality, which precede the actual use of a linguistic expression in its respective game. In fact the rules and the logic of the language games determine "apriori" the way according to which we ought to be using the linguistic expressions, if we want them to be significative.

If I want to insult a guy, I should know already how to insult him some other million times. If I say a prayer, then I could say it many times. It is not that I know already the prayers that I will say, but I know already the rules to form it, i.e. their forms and structure and their style. Otherwise, neither can I say at least the first. I know and I should know how I can continue, if I want that I myself and the others may understand that which we are saying.

In that way, every particular language game is in some way also a "space", a "horizon" of speaking. Because I cannot speak without using the language in a determined way in any language game. In every act of speaking, they act together, not only the aprioristic field of language, but also the "horizon" of a determined language game. In praying, for example, I refer myself to the total sphere of possible praying. In making a scientific affirmation, I refer myself to all the language of the respective sciences. The scientific language is a condition of possibility of every single scientific affirmation. Religious language is the condition of possibility of the single act of faith. Also the various literary forms can be considered as various language games. Hence, from the philosophical point of view the interpretation and the literary critic, the problem of the interpretation and the biblical exegesis are to be treated in this context.

4.         THE HORIZON OF HUMAN SPEAKING IS NOT LIMITED BUT OPENED.

            a)         Human Language is an Opened Horizon.

Some language game depends one from the other. Some has structural similarities among themselves. Some unite themselves in a more comprehensive language game. For example, the various forms of praying in the language game of prayer: prayer and other language games in the religious language etc. In the long run all language games become part of speaking and of the human behavior.

We can learn new language games, just as we can learn new language. We learn them starting with the participation in the game. This is possible, because all the games belong to the human use of the language and to the human behavior. By itself, it is possible to learn. speaking and communicating all that are communicable. In that way comes to light the ultimate horizon of speaking, of behaving as a human being, of communicating with others about the world and about the reality in general. This horizon embraces in itself all the possible ways of speaking. Diversely no man could learn them. This horizon is by itself infinite: it is co-extensive with the horizon of human knowledge. In it reside the form and the structure under which man knows everything and talks about. Since the mode of speaking and language are various forms of human life, therefore speaking in general is the form of life as such. In this appears and is determined that which man is: the animal who speaks: "zoon logisticon".

            b)         Language as Behavior in the World.

Human language is not primarily a means of expression or of communication, but the existential human way of being or of living in a world. It is man’s way of knowing the world, ordering it and transcending it. Language does not only express our relationship to the world. It is our relationship to the world.

For this, linguistic analysis analyzes the structure and the logic of various language games comparing them and establishing some "family resemblance", thus elaborating a detailed logic. It is rather the task of Philosophy of Language to elaborate the ultimate dimension of speaking and its opening.

NOTA BENE:

Everything this chapter had elaborated the structurality of language parts exclusively from the natural human language. For other types of languages the same considerations are valid, but applying it only in the analogous mode.

 

NOTES:

1.      Cf. Donald Davidson: "The Structure and Content of Truth", Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 279-328

2.      Korzybski, Alfred. Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General
Semantics, 4th Edition, International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Co., Lakeville, Conn., 1958

3.      Whorf, B.L. Language, Thought and Reality. Edited by John E. Carroll, M.I.T. Press, 1971.

4.      Basescu, Bernard. "On the Use of General Semantics Formulations in the Practice of Gestalt Therapy."
General Semantics Bulletin, No. 46, Institute of General Semantics, Lakeville, Conn., 1979, pp. 57-66.

5.      Solomon, Andrew, "Defiantly Deaf" The New York Times Magazine, 28 August 1994: 38-68. The Sun (Baltimore), 8 July 1994: A-14.

6.      Bach, Kent, The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters, San Francisco: San Francisco University

7.      Ibid.

8.      L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, g. 664: "In the use of words one might distinguish ‘surface grammar ‘ from ‘depth grammar’. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use - one might say - that can be taken in by the ear. And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word ‘to mean’, with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about."

9.      ibid. gg. 19,23,241.

10.  ibid g. 25: It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: "they do not think, and that is why they do not talk." But - they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language - if we except the most primitive forms of language. - Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.

11.  L. Wittgenstein, P.I., g. 23

12.  L. Wittgenstein, P.I., gg. 1, 157, 160, 207, 273, 331, 556.