CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND ITS HISTORICAL ORIGIN

A - THE PROBLEM.

1.      The "Linguistic Turn".

In the history of philosophy, language has been considered solely as a means or tool in philosophizing. However, in the first half of the present century some philosophers began to realize that there is more to language than being a tool. They believed that philosophy of language involves the whole of philosophy. This was considered as the linguistic turn: philosophers begin to realize that everything "there is" is in a sense through language. To investigate what "there is" is also to consider what our words mean. This linguistic turn, as Rorty puts it, is based on "the view that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use."(1) Most philosophers of language originated from the analytic tradition.

The analytic philosophers claim that to address the traditional philosophical problems is by way of the logical analysis of the language in which they are formulated. As Richard Rorty puts it, "the view that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use."

Therefore, the question is no longer "What is X?" But "What is the meaning of X?" The latter question can possibly be further transformed into "how do we use the sign X?" If ‘X’ has a meaning, then (1) and (2) express one and the same question. However, if ‘X’ has no meaning, then (1) and (2) are essentially different: (1) contains a meaningless word and is thus itself meaningless, whereas (2) is perfectly meaningful.

Quine considers this as simply a matter of "semantic ascent". There is now a shift from talk about objects to talk about words. Russell, Carnap and other proponents of the linguistic turn pointed out that the problem with language is that expressions which appear to stand for an object may well not do so. "The king of France", "God", "being" or "nothingness" are not names that refer to extralinguistic things. Therefore, they are meaningless. Their unverifiability renders these kinds of words meaningless.

This philosophical perspective is very recent in philosophical discourse of the twentieth-century philosophy. There have been diverse elaborations on this novel insight. Some would say that this is the ultimate word on philosophy, that is the end of philosophy in the traditional sense. Others would say that it is the beginning of the rise of a new science-based philosophy that is shaped by modernity. Now, formal logic is viewed as the means to unveil the "true structure" of language and consequently the "true structure " of the world. The structure of language is the structure of reality.

2.      The Two Basic Tendencies.(2)

There are two basic tendencies in our discourse on language. Among philosophers, there is a general agreement on the fact that man and language are fundamentally related to one another. However, there are diverse perspectives in looking at the nature of this relationship. This is the area where philosophers of language differ.

a.       Language seen primarily as a means by which man masters life, an instrument and expression of his effort to master the future in thought and plan.

o        The proponents are chiefly concerned with neo-positivism and linguistic analysis: the western scientific claim to explain and master the world rationally.

o        Language functions as an instrument for the rational knowledge and domination of the world - this instrument improved from vagueness by means of logical analysis.

a.       Language will be understood primarily as the mediator between human tradition of the past and a present (and future) which is to be read in the light of this tradition.

o        The upholders of this alternative are concerned with hermeneutics: with thought as it reaches back to the historicity of the language genesis.

o        With regards to the origin of language, it is interesting to note that man makes the distinction of expressions: e.g. existential, structural, metaphysical, philosophical, and theological.

B - A SHORT HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT:

PLATO:

The Cratilo dialogue of Plato, is the first philosophical work, which treats explicitly of language. The question which Plato raised to Socrates is the following: "Do words have their meaning through nature ("physei"), or through convention ("nomo")? To this question, the dialogue does not answer but ends as with other Socratic dialogues in an aporia. The dialogue is rich of irony, especially with respect to the many etymologies, which at that time were very much of the mode. The discussion does not immediately solve the problem, but it brings about the real problem: " what is the relation between speaking and the knowledge of the ideas?" Words express the meaning of things, but this presupposes the knowledge of the idea of things, which is in the mind. For example: "Book" = expresses the meaning book which presupposes the knowledge of the idea book. Thus, speculative knowledge is the beginning of language.

And take note, that proper already to the beginnings of philosophy, language is one of its themes. Hints to the philosophical problem of language can be found elsewhere in the works of Plato.

ARISTOTLE:

In his "Peri hermenias", Aristotle exposes a theory of signs and their meaning, and with that of their understanding and of their interpretation. The context of the work is that of rhetoric. The rest of the "Peri Hermenias" (De Interpretatione) and with the whole consideration of signs is part of the "organon", that is of Logic. Aristotle does not treat the problem of signs and of their meaning in "Peri psyches" (De Anima), that is not connected with psychology and the theory of knowledge.

AUGUSTINE:

Saint Augustine has not written a specific book on language, but very often he refers on the problem of language in his theological and philosophical works. This is shown to us in his "De Musica" and in his "De Catechizandis rudibus", or "On the way to teach catechism to children."

Ludwig Wittgenstein cites Saint Augustine in the beginning of Philosophical Investigation: " When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires."

Wittgenstein's citation and his critique on the thought of Augustine do not reflect the richness of the thought of this on language. However, what he pointed out is true, that the philosophical reflection on language is in Augustine. It augur the whole a long tradition as it was followed during the Medieval and in the Modern Period. This was connected with the problems of psychology, meaning to say with the internal mental life. Language in this context is somehow considered under the logical aspect.

THE MEDIEVAL SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY:

Scholastic philosophy of the Medieval period proposes philosophy of language in two aspects. Both are closer to Logic. But, in difference to the Augustinian, one became the philosophical psychology, which is the comment of Saint Thomas on "Peri Psyches" of Aristotle. All these two points of the reflection on language find themselves in the first part of Logic. The first part treats language in terms of the distinction between "signum mentale" and "signum orale". The "signum orale" is a sign of the "signum mentale". But the scope remains a distinction of terms in the mind, oral and written, not a reflection on signs.

The second part treats language in terms of language itself, the problematic which currently is considered problem of philosophy of language. In the Chapter "De suppositione", where they treat themselves the diverse concrete uses of the same term, there is certain similarity in its consideration compared to that of Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigation.

CARTESIAN AND RATIONALISM.

Rationalism gives little importance to language. Its philosophical interest revolves around the whole of thought that is to the ideas and their clearness, which investigates exclusively by way of introspection. The Cartesian tradition, in fact, says nothing on language.

According to rationalism, the unique cognitive content is that of the idea, as content of knowledge. This necessarily gives birth to the problem of communication, even the danger of solipsism. How can I understand or have access to what is internal in the other person's mind?

In general, the problem of communication did not exist in the ancient and medieval philosophy, especially in the Aristotelian tradition. Our mental terms is achieved from the common functioning of the human intellect, which abstracts from the particular things of the world, i.e. the intelligible from the sensible = verbum mentis. This is common to all human beings, although virtually are diverse in linguistic expressions. This identity or universality of our mental terms is guaranteed by Metaphysics and by "Peri Psyches" of Aristotle.

According to Nominalism, our universal terms do not correspond to the objective reality, and, as a consequence, the reality of this world and our mental conceptions do not correspond anymore in the way mentioned above. This gap brings us to the problem of how we can know that what the person says corresponds to the same idea internal in his/her mind which finds itself in mine.

For the Cartesians and Rationalism, however, all human beings have the same ideas, clear and distinct, because they are innate. God has planted the ideas equally to all. So the possibility of communication is not anymore guaranteed by the same reality and human intellect (Realist), that is by Philosophy, but by God who cannot deceive and be deceived. With this position, there is a kind of Theology.

LOCKE:

Locke made the first systematic elaboration of a philosophy of language. He developed an awareness of the problem of communication and of language. Given that Locke is a kind of nominalist not in respect to real things, but in respect to the ideas in the mind, the universal finds itself exclusively in the words. Locke was known to be the first one to recognize the real general function of language. The primary function of language, for him, is to communicate with our fellow human beings. Signs are marks for ideas.

BERKELEY:

Finally, in Berkeley, the consequences of Cartesian imposition become evident. Communication, knowledge of reality, is realized only under the direct influence of God on every single human mind.

HERDER, HEGEL, HUMBOLDT:

With Herder, Hegel, and Humboldt, we already pass to the present problematic. The philosophical reflection on language is no longer put in terms of the rationalistic categories, but to the internal of romanticism and of post-romanticism. For Herder, in language expresses itself the "soul" of a people, its culture and its spirit. For Hegel then, in the context of the various forms in which the Spirit manifests itself, there is also language and occupies and important place.

So, we are in the threshold of various currents of contemporary philosophy of language.

C - THE CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS:

                                                                                                Hegel               ( Kant )

                                                                                                            Humboldt

                                    Pierce                                                   Husserl Cassirer

Russell                                                  Sausurre                                   Langer

            Wittgenstein                  Chomsky

                                    Morris              Structuralism                             Heidegger

                                                Prieto                           Gadamer

                                   

            Eco

D - REFLECTION ON THE HISTORY:

Philosophy of Language articulates itself in diverse directions towards diverse sciences and diverse parts of philosophy, to the second of the aspect of language, which takes prevalently into consideration:

The philosophical reflection can spell on language and concentrate itself on the external aspect of it, that is on sign; thus the development itself of: linguistics, psychology, physiology, phonetics.

But it can also take into consideration the internal aspect, that is the meaning; thus closer to Logic and developed the first part of it, that is the logic of the terms.

The philosophical reflection on language can also start from Logic itself. Logic can be seen in strict connection with ontology; therefore, it is considered without language and develops itself a philosophy of language distinct from logic.

But Logic can be elaborated without ontology; therefore it is generally seen in strict connection with language and develops itself a philosophy of language very much related to logic.

E - THE NAMES OF THIS PART OF PHILOSOPHY:

            Semiology ( Locke ): That part of philosophy which treats sign as such.

Semantics ( Linguistics ) (Breal): The study of the significative function of language; the study of meaning of words and of the variations of it. The treatment is either in the realm of language or the realm of the link between language and things in the world.

Semiotics ( Morris, Peirce ): closer to Linguistic Analysis.

Semantic: sign > things

pragmatic: sign > the subject of the use

syntactic: sign > sign.

"Semiotic" is also the term which is used by Umberto Eco.

Linguistic Analysis ( British ): logical analysis of language.

Hermeneutics: in Heideggerian context, especially in Gadamer and his disciples.

Philosophy of Language: a more general use.

N.B. The details on each would be discussed later in the course of our philosophical investigation.

 

NOTES:

1. Richard Rorty; The Linguistic Turn (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 3

2. Class Notes from Prof. Carlo Huber on Philosophy of Language, Gregorian University, Rome, 1991