From: Ross
Sent: Saturday, October 02, 2004
Subject: Moral/Legal...A Question to Bass/Dean
I must admit to an absence of several days, and only skimming the large number of interesting posts on the subject of rights and the justifications thereof.
Gayle and Rob have done an interesting job in explaining why there is a tension between claiming that rationality, or rationality-plus, is a necessary criterion for rights and also claiming that only humans have rights: either babies and some other humans will not qualify as rights-holders, or some advanced non-human mammals will.
I haven't seen (and apologize if I've simply missed this part of the discussion) the following move made. It answers Rob and Gayle's consistancy concerns, quite raising (naturally) some issues of its own.
Perhaps the nature of rights is such that it is species-specific. That is, if some humans have rights then (rights being the kind of things they are) all humans have rights.
Surely Rob and Gayle aren't suggesting that, on the assumption some advanced apes have evidence of rationality it follows we would need to test all apes individually to determine whether or not specific apes have rights? One explanation of why that seems counterintuitive is that rights are species-specific. If Kong got rights, all G-d's apes got rights.
The other aspect of species-specificity deals with who has to adhere to the morality of respecting rights. Smith (GHS, not Adam) has argued that if the world were also inhabited by rational vampires, they might well recognize rights among themselves, but it wouldn't follow that because they see themselves as having rights other vampires should respect, and recognize humans as creatures other humans see as having rights, that vampires need respect human rights. It might not lead to the flourishing of members of that species to recognize other species' rights as affecting their behavior.
Note this is different than saying no other species has rights. Both the rational vampires and humans together agree that lower life forms don't have rights that even lower life forms recognize and respect.
Why would rights be the sort of thing that is species specific? And how does rationality or rationality plus volition come into play?
Maybe rights recognition is the sort of thing one wants for societies to function efficiently, and one typically forms societies with members of one's own species. And maybe rationality is required to see the benefits, and thus make the effort to recognize, rights. So we don't see life forms that are not rational as engaging in behaviors that require "they recognize the rights of others" to explain.
These are thoughts I have not fully reflected upon; but this approach seems to handle many of the concerns Bass and Dean raise while explaining clearly why so many people intuitively feel the need to draw the rights line at the species level.
Dr. Ross
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Posted by: Gayle Dean
Sat. April 2, 2005 Saturday
Here is an answer to Ross's question.
Often, in response the the "marginal cases argument", people offer the "species
normality" argument. To be clear, ordinary speciesism is the idea that
being a member of a certain species is the criterion for rights -- regardless of
any morally relevant traits that are possessed by members of the species.
Just being a member of the preferred group, i.e., being human, or white, or
male is enough, because these groups are viewed as superior in some overall
way to the others. But, speciesism, like racism and sexism and cannot be
justified, in itself.
However, the argument for "species normality" [which Dr. Vetter's offered above]
is a bit more sophisticated, in that it at least requires a being-- whatever his species --
to possess a specific trait (rationality, blue hair, or whatever) that is "normally possessed"
by the species as a whole. If for example, one believes that rationality is the
morally relevant criterion for rights, then the argument from species normality
says that any beings who are members of a species, which "normally possesses"
the trait of rationality, has rights. Individual humans don't have rights by virtue
of their individual rationality, but only because they belong to a species that
"normally" has rationality. The species normality argument is supposed to get
around the marginal cases argument because it allows babies, retarded people,
and rational aliens like Spock, to possess rights _because_ they are members
of a species whose members _normally possess_ rationality, even if they do
not themselves, possess the trait. And it excludes other animals (like chimps
or parrots) because their species "normally" does NOT possess this trait
(although I think I'd disagree with that also).
In any case, I think it is a bizarre position to hold, not only because it is unjust, but
because it seems to be antithetical to the Objectivist/libertarian ideal of individualism.
However, it is a view held by several highly repectable people on this list, so I like
to present the argument against it. Here are the two most succinct arguments I am
aware of: 1. From Alistair Norcross, professor at Rice University and 2. From
Libertarian David Graham:
Alistair Norcross Argument:
There is something deeply troublesome about the line of argument that runs
through...responses to the argument from marginal cases. A particular feature,
or set of features is claimed to have so much moral significance that its presence
or lack can make the difference to whether a piece of behavior is morally justified or
morally outrageous. But then it is claimed that the presence or lack of the feature in any
particular case is not important. The relevant question is whether the presence or lack of
the feature is normal. Such an argument would seem perfectly preposterous in most other
cases. Suppose, for example, that ten famous people are on trial in the afterlife for crimes
against humanity. On the basis of conclusive evidence, five are found guilty and five are
found not guilty. Four of the guilty are sentenced to an eternity of torment, and one is
granted an eternity of bliss. Four of the innocent are granted an eternity of bliss, and one
is sentenced to an eternity of torment. The one innocent who is sentenced to torment asks
why he, and not the fifth guilty person, must go to hell. Saint Peter replies, "Isn't it
obvious Mr. Ghandi? You are male. The other four men-Adolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin,
George W. Bush, and Milton Friedman-are all guilty. Therefore the normal condition
for a male defendant in this trial is guilt. The fact that you happen to be innocent is
irrelevant. Likewise, of the five female defendants in this trial, only one was guilty.
Therefore the normal condition for female defendants in this trial is innocence. That is
why Margaret Thatcher gets to go to heaven instead of you."
As I said, such an argument is preposterous. Is the reply to the argument from
marginal cases any better? Perhaps it will be claimed that a biological category such as a
species is more 'natural', whatever that means, than a category like 'all the male (or
female) defendants in this trial'. Even setting aside the not inconsiderable worries about
the conventionality of biological categories, it is not at all clear why this distinction
should be morally relevant. What if it turned out that there were statistically relevant
differences in the mental abilities of men and women? Suppose that men were, on
average, more skilled at manipulating numbers than women, and that women were, on
average, more empathetic than men. Would such differences in what was 'normal' for
men and women justify us in preferring an innumerate man to a female math genius for a
job as an accountant, or an insensitive woman to an ultra-sympathetic man for a job as a
counselor? I take it that the biological distinction between male and female is just as real
as that between human and chimpanzee.
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Graham Argument
Why the Argument from Species Normality Fails
Does the Argument from Species Normality hold water? Does it destroy the Argument from
Marginal Cases? The philosopher James Rachels addressed this argument in his essay
" Darwin , Species, and Morality":
"This idea-that how individuals should be treated is determined by what is normal for
their species-has a certain appeal, because it does seem to express our moral intuition
about defective humans. "We should not treat a person worse merely because he has
been so unfortunate," we might say about someone who has suffered brain damage.
But the idea will not bear close inspection. Suppose (what is probably impossible)
that a chimpanzee learned to read and speak English. And suppose he eventually
was able to converse about science, literature, and morals. Finally he wants to
attend university classes. Now there might be various arguments about whether
to permit this, but suppose someone argued as follows: Only humans should
be allowed to attend these classes. Humans can read, talk, and understand
science. Chimps cannot." But this chimp can do those things. "Yes, but normal
chimps cannot, and that is what matters." Is this a good argument? Regardless
of what other arguments might be persuasive, this one is weak. It assumes that
we should determine how an individual is to be treated, not on the basis of its
qualities, but on the basis of other individuals' qualities. This chimp is not
permitted to do something that requires reading, despite the fact that he can read,
because other chimps cannot. That seems not only unfair, but irrational. (p. 100, Animal
Rights and Human Obligations, Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds.).
"Rachels's choice of a positive right-the "right" to attend a university-is unfortunate,
but his point applies to any kind of right. He gives us a straight reductio ad absurdum.
The denial of rights for our super-smart chimp follows logically from Machan's implied
premise that we should treat individuals according to what is normal for their species.
If you think the outcome of Rachels's thought experiment is unacceptable or irrational,
then you must also reject the claim that led you to it-that the moral status of a marginal
human depends on what is normal for her species. Logically, you have no choice.
"And why stop at rights? If an individual's moral status depends on what is normal
for her species, why not impose the same moral duties on marginal cases? As Machan
points out, an essential part of being a moral agent is that other people may hold you
responsible for your actions. On the other hand, we do not hold those who lack moral
agency responsible for their actions, for they do not know what they are doing. They are
unable to have evil intent, or what lawyers call mens rea. But normal humans know what
they are doing. Therefore, according to the Argument from Species Normality, we
should punish even marginal humans for their bad actions. If, for example, a man
suffering from the advanced stages of Alzheimer's escapes from a nursing home,
steals a car, and runs over a child, we should convict him of manslaughter and
throw him in the clink.
"Are you willing to bite the bullet and accept these implications? Most people would
say, "Of course you shouldn't punish an insane man for his actions. You have to
take into account his individual shortcomings. You can't treat him like a normal
human." Exactly. And that is why the Argument from Species Normality fails.
"If you think about it, the Argument from Species Normality is very un-libertarian.
It demands that we judge a being not as an individual, but as a member of a group,
in this case her species. This is no different from the "identity politics" we hear from
the left. If it's senseless to decide a person's value or moral status solely on the
basis of his race, it's equally senseless to decide a person's value or moral status
solely on the basis of his species. Species, by itself, is simply not morally relevant.
What matters is the nature of the individual, viewed under the light of objective moral principles."
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