DebateReciprocity


	Is Reciprocity Required For Rights? From: Bill wrote Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 Subject: Re: Butchering animals Gayle Dean wrote, "Lions, gazelles, cows, monkeys, severely retarded people, babies, feebleminded people, and deranged people are not moral agents. They are moral "patients", i.e., beings who cannot understand right from wrong and therefore cannot do right, nor can they do wrong. However, they can be on the receiving end of wrongful acts performed by moral agents - say an adult parent brutally beating a baby for crying at night." True, very true. But we have to ask, why is it "wrong" for the parent to beat the baby for crying at night? Is it wrong, because the baby has natural rights? Or is it wrong for some other reason? I'd say it's wrong because it conflicts with the parent's purpose, which is to ~nurture~ the baby, not to harm it. It's wrong, because it's inconsistent with the goal of parenting. Rights, on the other hand, are a ~particular kind~ of moral principle, namely, the recognition of other people's autonomy. Why should we recognize the autonomy of others? Because we want our own to be recognized and respected. But observe that it is only other ~moral agents~ who are capable of recognizing our autonomy. Therefore, it is only to them that we owe such recognition. Bill __________________________________________________________________________________________ ---Bill wrote: > By "natural rights," I meant rights that one possesses by virtue of > one's ~nature~ as a rational animal. But prior to acquiring the > ability to reason, one is not ~yet~ a rational animal, because one > is not yet rational. Just as a sapling is not yet an oak tree, > although it will become one if allowed to grow and develop, so a > baby is not yet a rational animal, but will become one if allowed to > grow and develop. Rob Bass replied: Why is it being a rational animal (rather than something else) that is the 'nature' that is required for the animal to have rights? [....] > Of course. The argument is not that one's rights depend on knowing > that one has them, but that they depend on the ability to grasp and > apply moral principles. Since rights are a moral principle, they > apply only to moral agents - only to beings capable of regulating > their conduct on the basis of moral principles. The conclusion here, that rights "depend on the ability to grasp and apply moral principles" is not supported by the premise that "Since rights are a moral principle, they apply only to moral agents". To have a right, is (at least) for it to be the case that others ought to treat the right-possessor in a certain way. That means that to have a right, there must be _other_ beings who are moral agents with obligations toward the right-possessor. It doesn't mean that the right-possessor must herself be a moral agent. The sense in which it is true that "rights apply only to moral agents" is that only such agents will be able to recognize and respect rights. No argument has been given that only they can _have_ rights. Rob __________________________________________________________________________________________ From: Bill Date: Sun Oct 3, 2004 Subject: Re: Rights and the age of reason Rob Bass wrote, "The reciprocity requirement is certainly not something you have proved. (Nor have I ever seen a persuasive case for it.)" I replied, "I think I have proved it, because I've shown that because the principle of rights is reciprocal, it applies only to a community of moral agents. Insofar as babies are not (yet) members of that community, it follows that they do not possess natural rights." Gayle Dean responded, "Huh?! Rob said that you haven't proven the reciprocity requirement and you replied, 'I think I have proved it, because I've shown that because the principle of rights is reciprocal,'... "Uh, Bill. Reread what you said. Simply restating that the 'principle of rights is reciprocal' doesn't prove anything. True, it follows from 'if rights are reciprocal', then they can only apply to moral agents, but nowhere do you "show" that rights must be reciprocal." You're right, Gayle. That was an egregious bit of question-begging, if I ever saw one! :-P My bad! What I should have said is something like the following: A principle is one that applies to every case falling under it. So if I, as a moral agent, ought to sacrifice your interests whenever I can profit by doing so, then the same principle would apply to other moral agents as well. They ought to sacrifice mine whenever they can profit by doing so. What will be the consequence of our acting on such a principle? Obviously, it will be one of mutual sacrifice and mutual plunder. In order to avoid this consequence, it behooves us to adopt a principle that prevents it from occurring. What principle might that be? How about this: We refrain from sacrificing others to ourselves in order to avoid being sacrificed to others? Perhaps "reciprocity" is the wrong word to describe the willingness of everyone to follow such a principle. "Consistency" may be a better term. The point is simply that I cannot demand that others respect the principle, if I am unwilling to respect it. If I ought not to follow it, then neither should anyone else. By the same token, if anyone ought to follow it, then everyone ought to. There is no other way for it to work. � Bill ___________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Fri Sep 24, 2004 Subject: Re: Are all rights human? Bill wrote: >Most retarded people are in fact able to grasp the concept of rights >on a basic level, just as are most children past the age of three. >Children can understand the idea that these are my toys and those >are your toys, and that stealing them is wrong. It is only the >severely retarded who are not able to grasp such a concept as >property rights. Yes, and Alzheimers patients and others. So, is it okay to torture or skin and eat those who cannot grasp it? The fact remains that some humans are not rational and some other animals are. So, rights cannot hinge on rationality. >As for normal human babies, they will eventually become rational, so >there is a problem in denying them rights, because the question is: >when precisely do they acquire them? When do they reach the age of >reason? There is no "bright line" that is obvious for every child - >no clear-cut standard - for discriminating the rational from the pre- >rational in the developmental process. The appeal to potential doesn't work either. The potential rationality argument has the same problem as the rationality argument, i.e., there are many humans who do not have the potential to develop rationality. But, there are bigger problems with it. Using Mark Rowlands example from "Animals Like Us", you have the potential to be the Prime Minister of Britain, but that does not mean that you have the rights or the entitlements of the Prime Minister. As best, you would only have the potential to have them. As the author points out, "a potential right is, for all intents and purposes, no right at all. Young children no more have additional rights because of their potential than you have additional rights because of your potential to be Prime Minister." [p. 48]. Gayle ______________________________________________________________________________________ From: Bill Date: Sun Oct 3, 2004 12:23 am Subject: Re: Rights and the age of reason I wrote, "The implicit premise is that rights are reciprocal - that a community of moral agents should respect each other's rights, because they benefit by having their own rights respected, and because there is no principle by which others ought to respect my rights but I ought not to respect theirs." Rob Bass replied, "Let me make two quick points in reply. One is that you have somewhat stacked the deck by imagining an exception to your reciprocity premise as one where one party ought to respect the other's rights, but the other ought not to respect the rights of the first. That wasn't the sort of case we were discussing. We were discussing one where one party doesn't respect rights, not in the sense of dangerously attacking others or anything like that, but in the sense that it doesn't understand rights 'respecting rights'." The argument is that moral agents ought to respect each other's rights, because they benefit by having their own rights respected. But this argument does not and cannot apply to non-moral-agents, like the lower animals. I cannot argue that we - moral agents and non-moral agents alike - "ought" to respect each other's rights, because the lower animals are not moral agents capable of grasping and applying moral principles. So, I have nothing to lose by sacrificing their interests to mine. If they ~were~ moral agents who had that capability, then I ~would~ have something to lose, because I would be acting on a principle which if followed by other moral agents could be detrimental to my own interests. Rob continued, "Second, it is true that the additional premise that rights are reciprocal will make rationality (of the kind needed to respect rights) necessary to have rights. But that _is_ an additional premise and not at all obvious. Every person who believes that babies have rights is willing to countenance at least limited exceptions to your reciprocity requirement. The reciprocity requirement is certainly not something you have proved. (Nor have I ever seen a persuasive case for it.)" I think I have proved it, because I've shown that because the principle of rights is reciprocal, it applies only to a community of moral agents. Insofar as babies are not (yet) members of that community, it follows that they do not possess natural rights. Of course, as I have argued, we ought to grant them ~legal~ rights in order to avoid the problems inherent in setting the threshold of rationality at some arbitrary age beyond birth. The fact that, as you say, every person who believes that babies have (natural) rights is willing to countenance at least limited exceptions to the reciprocity requirement does not mean that their reasoning is correct. Most people accept the fact that babies have natural rights, because they do not base their belief in human rights on rationality. They accept these rights as self-evident, irreducible primaries that apply to all (innocent) human beings and require no rational justification. Bill ________________________________________________________________________________________ From: Bill Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 10:33 am Subject: Re: Butchering animals Gayle Dean wrote, "Lions, gazelles, cows, monkeys, severely retarded people, babies, feebleminded people, and deranged people are not moral agents. They are moral "patients", i.e., beings who cannot understand right from wrong and therefore cannot do right, nor can they do wrong. However, they can be on the receiving end of wrongful acts performed by moral agents - say an adult parent brutally beating a baby for crying at night." True, very true. But we have to ask, why is it "wrong" for the parent to beat the baby for crying at night? Is it wrong, because the baby has natural rights? Or is it wrong for some other reason? I'd say it's wrong because it conflicts with the parent's purpose, which is to ~nurture~ the baby, not to harm it. It's wrong, because it's inconsistent with the goal of parenting. Rights, on the other hand, are a ~particular kind~ of moral principle, namely, the recognition of other people's autonomy. Why should we recognize the autonomy of others? Because we want our own to be recognized and respected. But observe that it is only other ~moral agents~ who are capable of recognizing our autonomy. Therefore, it is only to them that we owe such recognition. Bill ___________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 9:56 am Subject: Means and Ends I wrote: "And so (according to Bill) beating the baby would not be wrong if the goal of the parents is to NOT nurture the baby. I'm sure others have pointed this out before, but I'll try again. This formulation is circular and subjective. What it amounts to is that _whatever_ a person desires, is right, and that we only should be concerned with whether or not his means are consistent with the goals he seeks." Bill replied: >I wouldn't say that it's circular. A person should do whatever is >necessary to achieve his goals. How is that circular? It is circular because the beginning and end are the same. You say that if a person's goal is to beat the baby, then he is moral for beating the baby. But, if a person's goal is to nurture the baby, then he is moral for nurturing the baby. There is no right or wrong in either action...no right or wrong _ends_. According to Bill the only immoral act is to choose the _wrong means_ to his ends. But this is confused. According to Objectivism, one must choose the ends that are in one's "self-interest." And this doesn't mean that just _ANY subjective ends_ will do. Just because you successfully accomplish your ends, by using the best means to beat the baby, does not make beating the baby moral. >Nor would I say that whatever a person ultimately desires >is "right." The concept "right" pertains only to the means to an >end. It does not and cannot apply to the end itself. An end is >neither right nor wrong. It simply is. Something is right or wrong >only insofar as it serves or frustrates the end. An "end is neither right nor wrong, it just is"??? What?? So, according to Bill, the concept right or wrong does not apply to a robber who wants to rob a bank. As long as the robber uses the best means to execute his goal of robbing the bank-- say, by buying a fast getaway car and a high powered gun--then he is acting morally. And the concept right or wrong does NOT apply to Hitler's killing millions of people. It only applies to whether or not Hitler used the best "means" to his end-- say by building large gas chambers? Haven't we had this bizarre argument before? :-) >Does that mean that beating the baby would be right if it made you >happy? Yes, but that's a very big "if." I would argue that >ultimately, it would not make you happy - that harming your baby in >this way would take its toll on you psychologically, and would >therefore be against your interest. But according to you, the goal is morally unimportant....it is only the means that matter. You said just above: "The concept "right" pertains only to the means to an end. It does not and cannot apply to the end itself. An end is neither right nor wrong. It simply is. Something is right or wrong only insofar as it serves or frustrates the end." So which is it, Bill? Is it wrong i.e., _not in your interests_ to beat the baby? Is it wrong i.e., _not in your interests_ to rob the bank? Is it wrong i.e., _not in your interests_ to kill millions of people. If you say it is wrong (not in your interests) then you are contradicting yourself, because you are, in fact, concerning yourself with the moral status of those pesky little ends- concerning yourself with whether they are right or wrong, apart from the means to accomplish them. Aaaaagh :-) Gayle