DebateRationality


	DEBATE FROM RATIONALITY IS RATIONALITY THE BASIS FOR RIGHTS? Date: Thu Sep 23, 2004 Subject: Are all rights human rights Ann wrote: >Humans have human rights because we're able to reason, right? Gayle replied: No. The obvious problem trying to use reason as a basis for rights is that some lower animals can, in fact, reason to some degree, while some humans (retarded people and babies) cannot. Therefore, by the rationality argument, either some lower animals have rights or some humans do not. The argument from marginal cases provides a strong argument that applies to almost any morally relevant difference between animals and humans. Gayle Dean __________________________________________________________________________________________ From: Bill Ann wrote: "Humans have human rights because we're able to reason, right? Gayle Dean replied: "No. The obvious problem trying to use reason as a basis for rights is that some lower animals can, in fact, reason to some degree, while some humans (retarded people and babies) cannot." Bill replied: By "reason," Objectivism means ~abstract~ reasoning - the ability to grasp and apply such concepts as "rights" and "responsibilities." If an animal cannot grasp and apply the concept of rights, then it is not in a position to apply the concept to the regulation of its own behavior. Most retarded people are in fact able to grasp the concept of rights on a basic level, just as are most children past the age of three. Children can understand the idea that these are my toys and those are your toys, and that stealing them is wrong. It is only the severely retarded who are not able to grasp such a concept as property rights. As for normal human babies, they will eventually become rational, so there is a problem in denying them rights, because the question is: when precisely do they acquire them? When do they reach the age of reason? There is no "bright line" that is obvious for every child - no clear-cut standard - for discriminating the rational from the pre- rational in the developmental process. Therefore, the best discernible principle is to respect a person's rights from the moment of birth onward. Bill __________________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Fri Sep 24, 2004 Subject Re: Are all rights human? Bill wrote: >Most retarded people are in fact able to grasp the concept of rights >on a basic level, just as are most children past the age of three. >Children can understand the idea that these are my toys and those >are your toys, and that stealing them is wrong. It is only the >severely retarded who are not able to grasp such a concept as >property rights. Yes, and Alzheimers patients and others. So, is it okay to torture or skin and eat those who cannot grasp it? The fact remains that some humans are not rational and some other animals are. So, rights cannot hinge on rationality. >As for normal human babies, they will eventually become rational, so >there is a problem in denying them rights, because the question is: >when precisely do they acquire them? When do they reach the age of >reason? There is no "bright line" that is obvious for every child - >no clear-cut standard - for discriminating the rational from the pre- >rational in the developmental process. The appeal to potential doesn't work either. The potential rationality argument has the same problem as the rationality argument, i.e., there are many humans who do not have the potential to develop rationality. But, there are bigger problems with it. Using Mark Rowlands example from "Animals Like Us", you have the potential to be the Prime Minister of Britain, but that does not mean that you have the rights or the entitlements of the Prime Minister. As best, you would only have the potential to have them. As the author points out, "a potential right is, for all intents and purposes, no right at all. Young children no more have additional rights because of their potential than you have additional rights because of your potential to be Prime Minister." [p. 48]. Gayle _________________________________________________________________________________ From: Ellen Date: Fri Sep 24, 2004 1:22 pm Subject: Re: Animal Rights Russ writes: > Bad behavior such as cruelty to animals is no different than any other bad behavior that > does not violate the rights of other people. There's a point of divergence (along with speaking of animals -- in relation to the animals -- as "property"). I think it IS different because animals are sentient. There's a victim in the case of cruelty to animals, which there isn't in the other examples you give of behavior which disgusts you. Ellen ________________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Fri Sep 24, 2004 Subject: re: Animal "Rights" Russ wrote: >Actually, it's volition/rational capacity as the basis for rights. And it _has_ been proven. You simply reject the >proof. There are no "glaring holes" in the argument. Actually, it has not been proven. If you think it has, then where? And yes, I do reject the rationality argument Objectivists use because it is flawed in the way I have been arguing. Additionally, saying that marginal cases do not apply here is an error. You cannot formulate a principle, but then argue that some beings on the margins have rights by the principle -i.e., babies and retarded people -- but that other beings, the other animals with comparable capacities -- do not have rights. Either they all have rights or none of them do. >And you cannot "prove" animals have rights we need to respect >simply by declaring it to be so. No amount of arguing from borderline >cases (which you focus on a good deal re: this issue) will change that. I wasn't declaring that animals have rights or making an argument that they do, so I don't have to prove anything. But you do. My argument has been to demonstrate that the rationality argument is flawed: And it was conditional. _If_ all humans have rights, the property that gives rise to those rights must be something all humans share. That knocks out reason or reason-plus-volition. Also, it lets in the non-human animals that have whatever rights-conferring property all humans share. On the other hand, _if_ it really is reason or reason-plus-volition, then not all humans make the grade. This is simply a response to your position, not a free-standing argument for animal rights. That's why the person with something to prove is you. Gayle _________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Fri Sep 24, 2004 Subject: Are All Rights Human? >Russ wrote Plus, Gale's position really is self-contradictory. She does not believe in >volition/free will. And thus -- despite her protests -- has no basis for claiming that >morality is applicable to humans (let alone animals). And if personal morality does not >exist, then rights are also a meaningless concept (i.e., morality applied in a social context) >since the concept of rights is genetically dependent on the concept >of morality which is, in turn, genetically dependent on the concept >and reality of volition...which reality she rejects. That is all irrelevant. My argument would be the same even if I did believe in free will. It is no answer to that argument to complain that I believe something else that you disagree with. >So if humans do not have volition/morality/rights and do not use >reason to guide their volition, then what possible sense would it >make to claim that lower animals have "rights"? Objectivists claim that rationality is the basis for rights. I don't agree with that notion at all, in fact, I don't know where they get such an idea. They have never proven it, as far as I know. Second, I was simply showing that the Objectivist argument for rights based on rationality has glaring holes in it. You can qualify the principle 'til the cows come home, but you will not be able to reconcile the problem by simply declaring that all humans have rights, but no animals have them. Gayle _______________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 Subject: The Fallacy of Babies Rights Russ wrote: >Gayle persists in resting her entire "argument" on borderline cases. It has been pointed out to Russ several times that his argument about marginal cases does not apply in the way he is trying to apply it. It is an error in application on his part. Why doesn't he address this?? I also pointed out that I did not have any objection to Rand's principle against "marginal cases" per se, when it is correctly applied. My objection is that Russ does not seem to understand the distinction, which is crucial to understanding the arguments that are being made. I said in an earlier post when Russ quoted Rothbard: "Again, you (Russ) are misapplying Rothbard's principle [borderline cases]. I am not objecting to the principle, per se. I am objecting to the inconsistent way you are trying to apply it in the animal rights case." "If your ethical theory wishes to omit borderline or marginal cases, then they must be omitted in _all_ borderline cases. In other words, they must be omitted (or permitted) for both marginal babies as well as for marginal chimps who meet the rationality criterion. You cannot _equivocate_ on the principle to allow some marginal cases like babies in, but then disallow the marginal cases to exclude chimps, without offering some _other_ reason for excluding them. "By analogy, let's consider a different example. Suppose, there is a criterion that says that in order to qualify for law school, you must score at least a 90 on your final exam. But, very few people score that high this year, so in order to fill the classes, the university decides to examine the applications of the "marginal cases"...i.e., the people who scored 89. But then they proclaim that the only marginal cases that will qualify for the jobs are blue-eyed blondes who scored 89. They will not consider brown-eyed brunettes who also scored 89. This is how you are trying to apply the marginal cases principle to babies and animals. But, you cannot include one group who meets the marginal cases criterion (scoring 89) while excluding another group that also meets the same criterion, without offering some _other_ reason for excluding them." "It is the same in the lifeboat scenario. Neither Rothbard nor Rand would say that in marginal cases (emergency situations) it is moral for blondes to steal the lifeboat, but immoral for brunettes to steal it." This is a simple matter of logical consistency, but Russ does not seem to get this distinction. Nor does he get the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions and how to apply it. I don't see how anyone can make any sort of rational philosophical argument, when these basic distinctions are misunderstood. But, wait! Russ has not made any rational response to these points. Why is that? He picks out the conclusions he wants to reassert and ignores the important philosophic distinctions and counterarguments that are presented by his critics. When pressed to answer the problems with his view, he simply repeats his mantra and ultimately resorts to attacks accusing his interlocutors of engaging in emotional rationalistic endeavors. Russ wrote: >I think I will simply take Gayle at her word that she does not possess free-will and let her engage in her >rationalistic endeavors... This rationalism would do Peikoff and company proud. Yes, indeed. That is the best way to answer argument. Ad hominem attack and the fallacy of association, trying to associate me with the discredited "Peikoff and company". Fortunately, most listmembers can recognize this method of argument when they see it. I think it is interesting that Russ is so quick to charge animal rights advocates with emotionalism, when he is so unwilling to examine and address the actual arguments they make, and when he is the first to resort to name-calling. There is a phenomenon which psychologists call projection in which one person attributes precisely the flaw that they themselves are exhibiting. Russ would do well to examine his own emotionalism surrounding the issues that he is unable to respond to satisfactorily and try to confront the actual arguments that are made. Gayle Dean _________________________________________________________________ Russ asked me: >Then what do you believe? I believe that the Objectivist rights theory is flawed and that the anthropocentric claim that human rationality is the basis of rights, is wrong. >As for proof of what rights are and whether such apply to >humans, I guess you better specify what you would accept as >proof. Rand made the derivation. So have others. I see nothing >in error in such proofs. It's a major aspect of Objectivism. >But since you reject volition, any "argument" you might offer >to the contrary would be meaningless. Your position is akin >to those Aristotle addressed when he said that even >trying to refute the Law of Identity proves it. Whether I believe in volition is irrelevant. As I pointed out before, I'd make the same argument even if I did believe in volition. But, there's a bigger problem with your idea about that. My belief about volition doesn't matter because, according to you, I _do_ have volition. If you are right, then my mistaken belief that I don't have volition, doesn't in fact, keep me from having it. So, if I do in fact, have volition (as you believe) then you should view my argument as coming from someone who has volition -- and therefore it needs to be addressed. (When are you going to start?) If you can refute it, fine. If not, no amount of hysterics will turn your failure into a refutation. >Re: borderline cases, what I said was that you can't prove any >general principle by focusing on borderline cases. First, one >proves the general case. Then one can think about borderline >cases to see the limits of that general case. You are trying to >use borderline cases to disprove the fact that human beings >have rights. This is bass ackwards epistemology. As Rob has pointed out in great detail, you're confused about the term borderline cases and how it is applied. Please reread Rob's post. And no. I'm not trying to disprove human rights. You're the one who wants to say that rights are based on something that not all human beings have. If there's any enemy of human rights here, it's you. >Plus, you even have the conditional backwards. It's not "if all >humans have rights" where one begins. One begins with the >trait(s) that differentiate humans from other animals. Well, you have named rationality or rationality/volition as the basis for rights. But, again, it has been pointed out repeatedly that that property does _not_ "differentiate humans from other animals", so maybe you need to start with a different trait. >No wonder you have this all wrong. And -- I'll say this for the >_second_ time -- _if_ there are non-human creatures who possess >volitional consciousness and who require a moral code for guiding >their actions, then, yes, of course they would have rights. So what? >You once again try to make a point that I already readily accept. Great to hear it. But if you're as fair and even-handed as you are in dealing with the evidence of animal cognition, it's a safe bet that you'll also utilize your double-standard to find a way to deny rights to aliens as well, and we'll be char-broiling aliens if we can get away with it. >After all, even if no other earth animals qualify as rights-bearing >creatures than humans, we may one day meet aliens who are >non-human but still possess rights. No controversy there from >my position. But, the only reason other animals don't qualify is because of the double-standard Rob detailed. Here it is again: "any standard loose enough to conclude that a newborn baby is reasoning is going to say the same about many other animals; any standard strict enough to exclude most mammals will exclude a great many humans. When you want to kick the other animals out, you raise the bar very high -- can they talk? do they have concepts of property or reciprocity? do they have the ability to guide their actions by a moral code? do they engage in long-term planning? do they create art or technology? When you want to let the babies in, on the other hand, you set the bar very low -- a bit of recognition and interest in the things and people around it is all you require. The babies would flunk the test you apply to animals, while lots of animals could pass the test you apply to babies. Only someone pushing a double-standard could be comfortable thinking that all humans use reason, but no other animals." Another problem. What does Russ say when ultra-rational aliens, who are much smarter than we are, land and publish their own rights theory? As it happens, we're not smart enough to understand their theory, but they assure us that we don't have rights (and the aliens do), and also assure us that the fact that we don't understand it doesn't make any difference. It's still true that we have no rights, and all the objections to this that might be proposed have been met by alien philosophers. Of course, we can't understand those responses, either, but that also doesn't matter. Human beings are property, and an alien owner of a human being may do whatever he wishes with his property. Stopping him would be a violation of his property rights. >Another of your errors is stating that "other animals with comparable >capacities" to babies and retarded people exist. That has not been >demonstrated let alone proven. So that point is meaningless, as well. That's nonsense! Clearly, you have read none of the modern literature on animal cognition by people like Mark Bekoff, Marc Hauser, Frans de Waal, Irene Pepperberg, and Jared Diamond, to name just a few. Even putting aside the fact that the Objectivist rights theory is wrong from the get-go, anyone seriously debating animal rights and animal cognition needs to keep up with the science. But alas, Objectivists seem to have an aversion to any science that does not support their own preconceived views. Gayle __________________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 Subject: Necessary/Sufficient Conditions Russ wrote: >Well... Usually in libertarian circles, "peaceful" in reference to >actions means that the person did not initiate violence against >other _people_. I regret if this shorthand was misinterpreted by Gayle. More question-begging. If it were _wrong_ to "initiate violence" against other _animals_, then "peaceful" would apply to other animals as well as to _people_, even in libertarian circles. Russ is just assuming from the get-go that animals other than _people_ cannot have rights, therefore the term "peaceful" only applies to people. >As I've said before, _prove_ that non-human animals have a >conceptual level consciousness and free-will thus necessitating >the formation of a freely chosen morality which then requires the >recognition of rights, so they can practice their morality in a >noncoercive manner in a social setting; do that and I will be >deliriously happy to acknowledge their rights. Repeated assertions that rationality-plus is a necessary criterion for rights. Why doesn't Russ respond to the objections to this notion?? And again, Rand (and Russ) assume from the start that a "social setting" includes ONLY rational humans. It does not include the broader range of beings that most people include in a society, i.e., babies, severely retarded people, Alzheimers patients, animals, and perhaps even, Dr. Spock. >But, of course, this is an impossible task for Gayle since she >rejects free-will and free choices, and thus the foundations >necessary for reason, morality, or rights. This is an error on several different levels. I have answered it before, but Russ chooses to ignore it and just keep repeating his flawed mantra about rationality being a necessary condition for rights. But, as I've said previously: 1. My beliefs about free-will are irrelevant! In fact, Russ insists that I _do_ have free-will, so my argument is coming from a person who in fact, HAS free-will (according to Russ). 2. Also, as I have said before, conceptual level consciousness and free-will are only relevant if one _assumes_ from the start (as Russ does) that rationality is a "necessary" condition for rights. The bottom line is that Russ seems to be unable to distinguish between _necessary_ and_sufficient_ conditions. While it is possible that rationality may be a _sufficient_ condition for rights, that does not mean that it is a _necessary_ condition. And if it is not a necessary condition, then babies and other animals may have rights. But, if it is a _necessary_ condition, (as Russ claims) then Russ has problems including babies and other sub-rational humans in his schema. But, he continues to ignore this problem! So, to simplify, for Russ. If humans have rights _because_ they are rational, it DOES NOT follow that other beings DON'T also have rights, but for other reasons. Fortunately, rationality is NOT a _necessary_ condition for rights, and therefore there are probably other criteria that also fit the bill...sentience, having blue hair (?), etc. Gayle __________________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 Subject: The Fallacy of Babies Rights Russ wrote: >Gayle persists in resting her entire "argument" on borderline cases. It has been pointed out to Russ several times that his argument about marginal cases does not apply in the way he is trying to apply it. It is an error in application on his part. Why doesn't he address this?? I also pointed out that I did not have any objection to Rand's principle against "marginal cases" per se, when it is correctly applied. My objection is that Russ does not seem to understand the distinction, which is crucial to understanding the arguments that are being made. I said in an earlier post when Russ quoted Rothbard: "Again, you (Russ) are misapplying Rothbard's principle [borderline cases]. I am not objecting to the principle, per se. I am objecting to the inconsistent way you are trying to apply it in the animal rights case." "If your ethical theory wishes to omit borderline or marginal cases, then they must be omitted in _all_ borderline cases. In other words, they must be omitted (or permitted) for both marginal babies as well as for marginal chimps who meet the rationality criterion. You cannot _equivocate_ on the principle to allow some marginal cases like babies in, but then disallow the marginal cases to exclude chimps, without offering some _other_ reason for excluding them. "By analogy, let's consider a different example. Suppose, there is a criterion that says that in order to qualify for law school, you must score at least a 90 on your final exam. But, very few people score that high this year, so in order to fill the classes, the university decides to examine the applications of the "marginal cases"...i.e., the people who scored 89. But then they proclaim that the only marginal cases that will qualify for the jobs are blue-eyed blondes who scored 89. They will not consider brown-eyed brunettes who also scored 89. This is how you are trying to apply the marginal cases principle to babies and animals. But, you cannot include one group who meets the marginal cases criterion (scoring 89) while excluding another group that also meets the same criterion, without offering some _other_ reason for excluding them." "It is the same in the lifeboat scenario. Neither Rothbard nor Rand would say that in marginal cases (emergency situations) it is moral for blondes to steal the lifeboat, but immoral for brunettes to steal it." This is a simple matter of logical consistency, but Russ does not seem to get this distinction. Nor does he get the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions and how to apply it. I don't see how anyone can make any sort of rational philosophical argument, when these basic distinctions are misunderstood. But, wait! Russ has not made any rational response to these points. Why is that? He picks out the conclusions he wants to reassert and ignores the important philosophic distinctions and counterarguments that are presented by his critics. When pressed to answer the problems with his view, he simply repeats his mantra and ultimately resorts to attacks accusing his interlocutors of engaging in emotional rationalistic endeavors. Russ wrote: >I think I will simply take Gayle at her word that she does not >possess free-will and let her engage in her rationalistic endeavors... >This rationalism would do Peikoff and company proud. Yes, indeed. That is the best way to answer argument. Ad hominem attack and the fallacy of association, trying to associate me with the discredited "Peikoff and company". Fortunately, most listmembers can recognize this method of argument when they see it. I think it is interesting that Russ is so quick to charge animal rights advocates with emotionalism, when he is so unwilling to examine and address the actual arguments they make, and when he is the first to resort to name-calling. There is a phenomenon which psychologists call projection in which one person attributes precisely the flaw that they themselves are exhibiting. Russ would do well to examine his own emotionalism surrounding the issues that he is unable to respond to satisfactorily and try to confront the actual arguments that are made. Gayle Dean _________________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 Subject: Russ's tennis lob In view of the fact that Russ continues to avoid answering the arguments against his claim that "rationality is a _necessary_ condition for rights", by trying to shift the burden of proof to others, I want to reiterate --as I posted previously-- that I am not making an argument that animals have rights, regardless of how many times Russ tries to shift the argument in that direction. As I wrote previously, but he ignores: "I wasn't declaring that animals have rights or making an argument that they do, so I don't have to prove anything. But you do. My argument has been to demonstrate that the _rationality argument_ is flawed: And it was conditional. <snip> This is simply a response to your position, not a free-standing argument for animal rights. That's why the person with something to prove is you [Russ]." My claim is simply that Russ's argument is wrong and that rationality is not a _necessary_ condition for rights, which leaves the door open for other, less than optimally rational beings, to also possess rights. If Russ and other Objectivists can ever get beyond their dogmatic denials of the flaws surrounding their argument, then perhaps we can have a serious discussion about what other criteria might exist for rights --criteria that might include babies, mentally handicapped people, and other animals. If Russ wants to continue to try and shift the burden of proof to others it will become even more obvious that he is unable to support his position. And that is fine with me, because my intent all along was simply to demonstrate the problems with the argument that rationality is a _necessary condition_ for rights. If I can accomplish that goal then I will be satisfied. Russ can continue to delude himself if he wishes, but his credibility with intelligent people will suffer, with every denial. Gayle _____________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean" Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 Subject: Who is really doing the lunatic raving! Russ raved: >The animal "rights" nuts seek to use the concept of "rights" ripped... Calling people "nuts" is an emotional response, not a rational one:-) >As for Rob Bass's amusing header, well, I spent considerable time >arguing with him on another Objectivist list back in the 90's. I saw >the...quality...of his thinking then and won't waste any more of my >time on his nonsense. It's obvious whose thinking is of questionable quality. >I avoid him for the same reason I would avoid stepping >in a pile of dog shit I saw on the sidewalk before me. Any >rational human being would do the same. This kind of name calling is an emotional response, not a rational one. And this kind of crude emotional response is particularly offensive. But, this is a perfect demonstration of what I said in my earlier post about projection. And I laughed aloud when I visited Russ's website and read his description of animal rights advocates as emotionally, driven people. He says at his website: "Of course, I understand that many people get upset envisioning a person being cruel to or torturing their pets or animals. But an emotional response is not a proper means of establishing a principle." No kidding! Maybe you should take your own advice. >You might, however, want to wear a bib so all that spittle from your >lunatic raving about "rights" for rats doesn't soil your shirts. Clearly, Russ is the only one doing the "lunatic raving"! But, somehow I suspect that we won't see anything written at his website about the emotional arguments put forth by the ANTI-animal rights advocates like himself. You can bet on it. Ha! Gayle ___________________________________________________________________________________________ From: Ellen Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 10:27 am Subject: Re: [atlantis_II] Russ's tennis lob... ...and several other posts in which Gayle -- and Rob -- have said that Russ is not addressing their arguments, and is substituting dogmatic replies and name-calling for coming to grips with the issues: I agree with this evaluation. (So that's thrice, lately, E and Gayle have agreed. Possibly a record-setting stretch. ;-)) Ellen ________________________________________________________________________________________ From: "Gayle Dean Date: Thu Oct 28, 2004 Subject: Logic/Animal Rights Russ wrote: >So Gayle tells us that she is only concerned with "if" cases and is >_not_ saying that she thinks non-human animals have rights; >that she is _not_ arguing in favor of non-human animal rights. Correct. I have never made a positive argument for animal rights. My project was simply to discredit Russ's claim that "rationality is a _necessary condition_ for rights". As Mike Hardy correctly observed - Russ seems to be confused about the logic involved here...and I think, at several different levels. Both, in understanding what does or does not follow from eliminating rationality as a _necessary_ condition, and what does or does not follow from _my_ arguing against rationality as a necessary condition. What I _have_ argued and what correctly follows (IF rationality is NOT a _necessary_ condition) is that it leaves the door open for there to be other _criteria_ for rights (in addition to rationality), criteria, which other beings may possess. In fact, I said this, in a previous post: "So, to simplify, for Russ. If humans have rights _because_ they are rational, it DOES NOT follow that other beings DON'T also have rights, but for other reasons." But that is just a logical statement. It is not an argument that animals do, in fact, have rights. It is simply an open door. Of course, the next step would be to find those "other" criteria that may qualify. It simply does not follow --as Russ seems to believe-- that "IF rationality is NOT _necessary_,THEN animals have rights". And I never made that claim. On the other hand, Russ seems to think that, because I am NOT offering an argument _for_ animal rights, this somehow means that they don't have them, or that I think they don't have them. But, none of that follows either. Mike's prime number example was right on target. >Well. Nice to know that Gayle really agrees with me that animals do >_not_ have rights and that she is _not_ arguing -- in any fashion >that such lower animals _do_ have rights. I don't agree with Russ at all. And I think he must be having a seizure or something. None of what he has been saying follows from anything that I have said or implied. Here is a really nice, free, interactive, online, logic course that might be helpful. http://www2.sjsu.edu/depts/itl/ Or maybe emotionalism is affecting Russ's ability to read and understand what is being said? I have noticed that many ANTI-animal rights advocates tend to let their emotions cloud their reasoning. Or perhaps, it is simply that Russ has _chosen_ to become overly "focused" on the brown stuff on his shoe, to the exclusion of all else. I know that when Objectivists fail to _choose to focus_ correctly, it can create all sorts of problems:-) Gayle "If it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic."--Lewis Carroll ___________________________________________________________________________________________ From: gayledean Date: Thu Oct 28, 2004 Subject: Bass-ackwards Russ asserted his argument again: Let's examine it again. >What I [Russ] have said is that animals do not have rights because >they do [not] possess the traits necessary for possessing rights. And again, neither do babies! >Therefore, since they are non-rights-bearing creatures, they can be owned. Thus, babies can be owned? >And If someone owns something, they can do whatever they want with that property. Thus one can do whatever one wants to do with babies? Now, Russ will reply by changing his original argument to something else. Potentialities, speciesism, etc. But those additional arguments have also been answered. Sigh! Gayle ________________________________________________________________________________________ From: Rob Bass Date: Fri Oct 29, 2004 6:35 pm Subject: Follow-up Though apparently Russ is not reading my posts, I note that, in a reply to someone else, he has recently answered two of the four questions I posed for him. I had asked, 1. Do babies have rights? 2. Do babies have a rational capacity? 3. If the answer to #2 is Yes, what test for the presence of rationality is there that all babies pass, but that no other animal does? 4. If the answer to #2 is No (along with a Yes answer to #1), then, since it follows from those that rationality is not necessary for having rights, is Russ going to quit asserting the contrary? Now, he has said "that babies, retarded people, people with dementia _do_ have rights _because_ they have a rational capacity." That amounts to answering the first two questions with a Yes, and making the fourth (for the time being) beside the point, since it was premised upon a negative answer to #2.) So, of the four, only #3 remains: What test for the presence of rationality is there that all babies pass, but that no other animal does? As I said before, I can't think of any plausible test. Anything you could name, that looks like a test for the presence of rational capacity, is going to be either something that not all human beings have or that some other animals have as well. The only thing I can see that would make someone think otherwise is applying a double-standard -- one test for babies, a different and far more demanding test for other animals. I made this point in a post over a month ago: "If you look at the evidence without a double-standard, you're going to conclude either that there is good evidence for the non-human use of reason or that some humans fall short of being able to reason. Any standard loose enough to conclude that a newborn baby is reasoning is going to say the same about many other animals; any standard strict enough to exclude most mammals will exclude a great many humans. When you want to kick the other animals out, you raise the bar very high -- can they talk? do they have concepts of property or reciprocity? do they have the ability to guide their actions by a moral code? do they engage in long-term planning? do they create art or technology? When you want to let the babies in, on the other hand, you set the bar very low -- a bit of recognition and interest in the things and people around it is all you require. The babies would flunk the test you apply to animals, while lots of animals could pass the test you apply to babies. Only someone pushing a double-standard could be comfortable thinking that all humans use reason, but no other animals." Russ hasn't answered this yet, and I can't say that I expect him to. But the point is straightforward. If we say rationality is necessary for having rights, and if we expect to say that some beings lack rationality and therefore lack rights, then we'd better be able to say how we sort beings so as to determine which are which. Otherwise, (a) we may end up not recognizing the rationality of some who have it, and (b) we may attribute rationality where it is not to be found. Further, if we can't spell out some single standard that we can apply to the different cases, it looks as if our decisions are being governed by prejudice rather than good reasons. Russ may never answer this question, but the question itself is important. I commend it to the attention of anyone tempted by something akin to Russ's position, who does not share Russ's debilitating distraction, apparently caused by obsessive concern with excrement and bodily fluids. Rob ___________________________________________________________________________________________