Inevitably, somehow, people think that IF one makes the marginal cases argument then this means that one is arguing from "IF babies have rights, then animals have rights." However, this is not the case. This basic misunderstanding of logic needs to addressed:
Posted by Gayle Dean
Ralph makes some erroneous assumptions and continues to repeat them in successive posts.
Ralph wrote (4/3):
> At the cost of repeating myself, I'd like to point out that it is not
> enough for beasts' rights advocates to say that "If humans have rights,
> then so must animals," for that condition would also be satisfied if
> _neither_ has rights. Why _do_ any (all) of us have rights? I'm
>still waiting for an answer to that.
First, no one that I am aware of has argued "If humans have rights, then so
must animals", or anything like that! I'm not going to accuse Ralph of intentionally
misrepresenting what is being said, although it is hard to imagine that he does
not understand the argument, since it has been stated clearly several times by
several people. But, I'll clarify one more time.
The purpose of the marginal cases arguments is NOT to say "babies have rights,
therefore animals have rights too". Instead it is an argument that _whatever_ the
criterion for rights, it has to be applied even-handedly. If the criterion is
something shared by both babies and animals, then:
A. "EITHER _BOTH_ babies and the animals have rights, or
B. NEITHER babies NOR the animals have rights."
If the criterion is blue eyes, then all beings with blue eyes have rights, etc.
Ralph continued (4/6):
> Perhaps there is something shaky about the argument from marginal cases,
> that bedrock foundation of the case for beasts' rights, eh?
The marginal cases argument is NOT the "bedrock foundation of the case"
FOR animal rights. It is simply an argument AGAINST theories that offer
criteria for rights, but then do not apply the criteria evenhandedly.
In fact, our view is that rationality is NOT the proper criterion for rights, but
some _other_ criterion like sentience or Tom Regan' s "being the subject of a life"
is. Therefore the question of whether babies and chimps have rationality is
irrelevant, except to demonstrate a major problem with the Objectivist theory.
Ralph wrote:
1) In order to conclude that all and only sentient species deserve a
full and equal moral status (and therefore that no non-sentient species
deserve a full and equal moral status), there must be some property
P that all and only sentient species have that can ground such a claim.
(2) Any P that only sentient species have is a property that (some)
members of sentient species lack (e.g., the marginal cases).
(3) Any P that all sentient species have is a property that (most)
non-sentient species have as well.
(4) Therefore, there is no way to defend the claim that all and only
sentient species deserve a full and equal moral status.
This is simply another confusion. The marginal cases argument does
not imply that there are NOT marginal cases to be found in all sorts of classes,
and no one is saying that all members of a class like "sentient species" possess
property P and therefore rights. All it says is that when you choose a criterion
for rights, that you'd better be comfortable with applying it evenhandedly.
If some beings in a class do not possess sentience (or whatever the criterion
is), then they don't have rights, in the same way that if babies don't possess
rationality (the Objectivist criterion), then babies don't have rights.
Gayle Dean
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Rob Bass
October 1, 2004.
I've been participating pretty heavily recently in the animal rights threads, and I've enjoyed it. I hope the discussion continues, and I expect to enjoy watching it. However, other demands on my time are becoming pressing, so I expect this to be my last post for awhile. I thought I'd say a bit in summary about how I see the animal-related issues at present.
What about animal rights?
If we're talking about the full-blooded sense of rights that licenses the legal system in protecting them, forcibly if necessary, then the marginal-cases argument is powerful. It is difficult to see how to set the standard low enough to include all post-natal and pre-comatose human beings without letting in many animals and equally difficult to see how to set the standard high enough to exclude all the other animals without also excluding many human beings.
It is surprising how rare it is for people to come to grips with that argument, and when they do, the responses are generally embarassingly bad. They are in fact so bad, the gyrations, lapses of consistency, and constant addition of epicycles to their theories so obvious, even when coming from otherwise reasonable and clear thinkers, that it is difficult to avoid the impression that their thinking on this subject is distorted by the gravitational pull of unadmitted prejudice. As inadequate response piles upon inadequate response, one begins to wonder how long people will keep trying to fix a broken theory rather than considering its replacement.
Nevertheless, I am not quite ready to accept the animal rights position. It is quite possible that I will come to accept it. It is even probable, if no better response to the marginal-cases argument can be found than I have seen here.
Serious Obligations to Animals
If I'm not ready to sign on to the strong animal rights position, does that mean that I think, after all, that we can do pretty much what we like to animals, or at least that any limits are derived from the stake human beings have -- as property owners, etc. -- in protecting animals? I don't think so.
About three years ago, I came across a simple argument that didn't assume that animals have rights or that animal interests should count just as much as the comparable human interests (Peter Singer's position). The argument came from an article by Mylan Engel, on "The Immorality of Eating Meat". Anyone who'd like to read the article can find it on the web at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~norcross/Engel_short.htm . The article made several things clear. The first was that terrible suffering was imposed on animals in the course of turning them into food. The second was that it was unnecessary -- we don't need the meat for our health, survival or flourishing. If anything, the reverse is true: Vegetarians are healthier and live longer.
Here, I'm going to give a stripped-down and streamlined version of one of Engel's arguments (based on work by Nathan Nobis) that can readily be adapted to other issues where animal interests are at stake. Since this version is stripped-down, it does not include some qualifications and complications that are adequately addressed in the original article -- which I strongly encourage you to check out and read.
(The "P" lines below are premises, and the "C" lines, conclusions.)
P1. It is wrong to cause unnecessary pain, suffering and death.
P2. The process of turning animals into food causes unnecessary pain, suffering and death.
C1. Therefore, the process of turning animals into food is wrong.
C1. The process of turning animals into food is wrong.
P3. If it is wrong to turn animals into food, then it is wrong to support turning animals into food.
C2. It is wrong to support turning animals into food.
C2. It is wrong to support turning animals into food.
P4. If it is wrong to support turning animals into food, then you should
stop eating meat and other animal products, especially if it will benefit you to do so.
C3. You should stop eating meat and other animal products.
The arguments just given are plainly valid. If there is something wrong with any of the conclusions reached, it must be because one or more of the premises is false. The question to ask yourself is: What premise or premises do you think false? If, on reflection, you don't think any are false, what should you do?
When I faced questions of this sort three years ago, I concluded that I couldn't fault either the relevant premises or the reasoning, so I quit eating meat, and, as I realized over the next several months that the same kind of arguments applied to other animal products, I cut out consumption of eggs and dairy products as well.
I'm not yet prepared to say animals have rights, but it is plainly wrong for us to impose unnecessary suffering upon them. Short of the full-blooded animal rights position, we are stopping far too short unless we admit that we have serious obligations to animals.
Rob
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Michael asked:
>Certainly, if a human was killing another human in
>order to eat the other human, the right to life would
>allow a lethal force intervention.
>In other words, any attempt on the life of a human
>allows the legal right for lethal intervention. Is the
>same true in your theory of animal rights?
>Do you have the right to kill Farmer John for
>killing his cows for food?
Gayle replied:
I answered that in a previous post. I said:
"If an animal had rights, then the law would prevent
people from killing or abusing it in the same way
that they protect human life. If you saw someone
abusing a child to the point of killing it, would you
intervene to stop it? I assume the same sort of laws
would apply to animals. "
I sense that you find that idea incredible? But, why?
It seems more incredible to me that anyone would prefer
the other logical conclusion...i.e., that babies and non-rational
humans don't have rights, and therefore, anyone can kill them
with impunity.
Gayle
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From: "Gayle Dean"
Date: Thu Sep 30, 2004
Subject: Moral/Legal
Michael wrote:
>Given your logical, and perhaps admittedly absurd,
>conclusion of rights only applying to rational beings
>excludes infants, leads me to wonder where the
>contradiction in either your reason or mind lay.
Well, the contradiction is not with me. It is with the
Objectivist idea that rationality is the basis for rights.
in which case, EITHER some animals have rights or
some babies and other severely retarded people
do not. Take your pick!
Gayle
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From: "Gayle Dean"
Date: Thu Sep 30, 2004 8:18 am
Subject: Re: Differences
Michael wrote:
>Because the difference between animals (let's
>exclude borderline cases, like some higher primates
>for the sake of argument) and humans is a difference
>in kind (lack ability to think rationally) not degree
>(lower IQ score than the cutoff).
If you exclude the "marginal cases" that meet the
criterion of rationality (babies, apes, etc.) and utilize
a different standard, i.e., ("difference in kind"), then
you are making a different argument. It sounds like a
speciesism argument, i.e., that there isn't some _particluar_
trait like rationality that qualifies, but only membership in a
certain group, class, or kind. Speciesism is a predjudice
or bias in favor of members of one's own species and
against members of other species, but, it is the same
principle racists and sexists use to allow the interests
of their own special groups/kinds to override the
interests of members of other groups. Thus, as a
form of collectivism it is wrong even by Objectivist
premises.
Gayle
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From: "Gayle Dean"
Date: Fri Oct 1, 2004
Subject: Borderline cases and rights
Russ quoted Rothbard:
> In the first place, a lifeboat situation is hardly a valid test of a
> theory of rights, or of any moral theory whatsoever. Problems of a
> moral theory in such an extreme situation do not invalidate a theory
> for normal situations. In any sphere of moral theory, we are trying
> to frame an ethic for man, based on his nature and the nature of the
> world�and this precisely means for normal nature, for the way life
> usually is, and not for rare and abnormal situations. It is a wise
> maxim of the law, for precisely this reason, that "hard cases make
> bad law." We are trying to frame an ethic for the way men generally
>live in the world; we are not, after all, interested in framing an
>ethic that focuses on situations that are rare, extreme, and not
>generally encountered.Murray Rothbard
Again, you are misapplying Rothbard's principle. I am not objecting to the principle, per se.
I am objecting to the inconsistent way you are trying to apply it in the animal rights case.
If your ethical theory wishes to omit borderline or marginal cases, then they must be
omitted in _all_ borderline cases. In other words, they must be omitted (or permitted)
for both marginal babies as well as for marginal chimps who meet the rationality criterion.
You cannot equivocate on the principle to allow some marginal cases like babies in,
but then disallow the marginal cases to exclude chimps, without offering some
other reason for excluding them.
By analogy, let's consider a different example. Suppose,
there is a criterion that says that in order to qualify for law
school, you must score at least a 90 on your final exam.
But, very few people scored that high this year, so in
order to fill the classes, the university decides to examine
the applications of the marginal cases...i.e., all people who
scored 89. But then they proclaim that the only marginal
cases that they will accept are blue-eyed blondes who scored
89. They will not consider brown-eyed brunettes who also
scored 89. This is how you are trying to apply the marginal
cases principle to babies and animals. But, you cannot
include one group who meets the marginal cases criterion
(scoring 89) while excluding another group that also meets
the same criterion, without offering some _other_ reason
for excluding them.
It is the same in the lifeboat scenario. Neither Rothbard nor Rand
would say that in marginal cases (emergency situations) it is
moral for blondes to steal the lifeboat, but immoral for brunettes
to steal it.
This seems like a simple matter of logical consistency. If you still
don't get it then, so be it.
Gayle
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From: Russ
Date: Fri Oct 1, 2004 12:24 pm
Subject: re: Borderline cases...
Gayle Dean wrote:
> If your ethical theory wishes to omit borderline or marginal cases,
> then they must be omitted in _all_ borderline cases. In other
> words, they must be omitted (or permitted) for both marginal
> babies as well as for marginal chimps who meet the
> rationality criterion. You cannot equivocate on the principle
> to allow some marginal cases like babies in, but then
> disallow the marginal cases to exclude chimps, without
> offering some other reason for excluding them.
You are misapplying what I and Rothbard said. He specifically stated
-- as did I -- that you don't ignore borderline cases. He -- and I --
said you don't use borderline cases to _define_ and establish a
moral/rights theory. You seem to want to use some animals, human babies, and
people in comas to establish what rights are. Instead, I think we should
use moral/rights theory established for normal adults and then see _how_
they can best be applied -- or if they are applicable, at all -- to
marginal cases.
And again, you seem to take as a given that "marginal chimps" _have_
been proven to meet the "rationality criterion." But I disagree that
that proof has been made. As I said before, _if_ certain animals
_do_ have a conceptual consciousness, demonstrate volition, and use a
voluntarily chosen moral code to guide their decisions in life --
even if all these things are done poorly in comparison to normal people
then, of course, they have rights. I've already agreed to that, yet
here you bring it up again, accusing me of "equivocating" the principle
when I never, ever have.
I exclude great apes and cetaceans from rationality and thus rights
because I have yet to see _convincing_ proof that they meet the
criterion I have laid out. If such proof is ever established, then
we must recognize their rights. I don't think that will ever happen
sans evolutionary changes in those animals. But if it does, then I would
have no problem recognizing them as rights-bearing creatures.
I don't know how I can make my position any clearer.
But since you reject what I see as _essential_ criterion for rights,
i.e., volition, voluntarily chosen moral code, I see no possible
circumstance under which we could ever agree on this issue.
Russ
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Rush wrote:
> At risk of annoying some people, I don't think the case is relevantly
> different. While I wouldn't order the entree, I don't really care if Peter
> Singer's mother is on the menu at the French Laundry or Charlie Trotter's.
> If he doesn't care, and he doesn't protect her, why should I worry about
> whether she is served or not?
>
> The problem that I usually end up with here is that in general, the animal
> rights types don't WANT me to say that. Meaning that if I am consistent and
> we can eat Pete's mother - the animals do not end up with rights. This
> seems to bother them far more than my being consistent, hence the dilemma.
Rob Bass replied:
In one way, I think this is fine. If you say there's nothing wrong with eating Peter's mother, and likewise for the handicapped and children, your position is consistent. That's more than most people seem to manage on the issue.
On another level, I wonder how you got to that position. My guess is that, like most people, you once thought that all human beings, including babies and the handicapped had rights. Then, at some stage, you became convinced of something like a rationality criterion for rights. In order to preserve consistency, you then contracted the field of (acknowledged) possessors of rights to exclude the non-, sub-, pre-, and post-rational.
If that is approximately the way it went, it may be relevant -- unless you can provide the missing piece -- that, so far as I know, no one has ever shown that rationality is a necessary condition for having rights.
Quoting from another post (with slight alterations):
The best arguments I know that try to link reason or some related property to rights are what I call sufficiency arguments. They try to say that we can see or give reasons that a rational (or whatever) being has rights, or, in other words that being rational (etc.) is _sufficient_ for having rights. But no matter how successful that is, it doesn't begin to show that rationality is also necessary for having rights. So, even if rationality or some similar property is sufficient for having rights, that's no reason by itself to deny rights to beings that don't make the rationality grade."
That would mean that you gave up the common-sense conviction that even children and the handicapped have rights without a good enough reason. If so, it may be worth rethinking.
Rob
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