DebateConceptuality

ANIMAL VERSUS HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OBJECTIVIST VOLITION
_______________________________________________________________________________________
From: "Gayle Dean"
Subject: Animal conceptuality
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 20:33:37 -0500

There is accumulating scientific evidence for animal conceptuality, one such
study follows these links. Several sites that I have found to be excellent
sources of information are:

"Animals may possess much more complex concepts than previously thought, and
even a form of consciousness, two recent studies report. In a recent report,
Martin Giurfa and co-workers (Nature 410, 930-933) report that honeybees can
generalize correctly to previously unseen stimuli, even when in other
modalities, and so can be shown to learn and use the abstract concept of
'same' (and 'different'). For instance,
when first trained to choose the same color, the insect generalizes and
chooses the same shape, or the same smell.
___________________________________________

Nature 410 930-933, 2001

A preliminary account of part of this work was presented by S.W. Zhang and
M.V. Srinivasan as a poster and
unpublished abstract at the Gordon Research Conference on "Neuroethology:
Behaviour, Evolution and Neurobiology", Oxford, Aug 29- Sept 3, 1999

ABSTRACT:

"Insects process and learn information flexibly in order to adapt to their
environment. The honeybee Apis mellifera constitutes a traditional model for
the study of learning and memory at the behavioral, cellular, and molecular
levels1. Earlier studies have focused on elementary associative and
non-associative forms of learning as uncovered by olfactory conditioning of
the proboscis extension reflex1 and learning of visual stimuli2 in an
operant context. However, recent research has found that bees are capable of
cognitive performances that were previously thought to occur only in some
vertebrate species. For example, honeybees can interpolate visual
information3, exhibit associative recall4,5, categorize visual
information6-8 and learn contextual information9. Here we show that
honeybees can form "sameness" and "difference" concepts. They learn to solve
delayed-matching-to-sample and delayed-non-matching to sample
discriminations and transfer the learned rules to novel stimuli of the same
or a different sensory modality. Thus, bees can, not only learn specific
objects and their physical parameters, but also master abstract
interrelationships, such as "sameness" and "difference".

From: "Gayle Dean"
Subject: Re: Moore's conceptuality?
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 00:08:34 -0500

I said:
>Moore continues to evade science and the evidence that some animals
>do indeed conceptualize to some degree.

Morganis asked:
>By "conceptualize," you mean the same thing that Rand meant? Or, we're
>talking something else, like...?

Rand and Moore cannot not allow for ANY degree of conceptuality among the
lower animals for it would have troubling implications for their theory of
volition. Rand's view is that man's consciousness shares only the first two
stages of development with the lower animals--sensations and perceptions and
that ONLY man possesses the third stage as a conceptual being --and that is
what "makes him man." Rand drew a solid, almost mystical, dividing line
between man and the lower animals in this regard. But, we now happen to know
that the cognitive architecture of humans and other mammals is very similar
and that the ability to conceptualize lies along a continuum. There is no
magical, mystical, dividing line separating man from the lower animals.

And Rand held that the pre-conceptual level of consciousness ---i.e., the
level of ALL lower animals -- is NON-volitional. So, for Moore to admit that
conceptuality exists along an evolutionary continuum -- and that the lower
animals have ANY ability to conceptualize-- to any degree-- would be
problematic for her theory of volition.

For the latest "science" on animal cognition try Mark Hauser's "Wild Minds"
or "Species of Mind" by Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff for a philosophical
approach.
Gayle

From: Ross
Subject: Gayle Dean on Volition, Conception, and Animality
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 01:09:02 EST

Granting for the sake of argument that lower animals have lower levels of
conceptual abilities than man but that they exist in lower primates to some
degree, I fail to see how this is at all problematic for her theory of
volition. I think it would be much easier to interpret the data as saying
that Rand was simply wrong to determine that lower animals have no volition,
not as inferring from the data that even man doesn't have volition.
Ross L.

From: "Gayle Dean" <gwdean at webworkz.com>
To: "Atlantis" <Atlantis at wetheliving.com>
Subject: ATL: Re:The good doctor on conceptuality
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 09:10:00 -0500
I didn't infer from "that data" that *man* doesn't have volition! Man's
volition (determinism/free-will) is a different issue altogether. The
problem I refer to is in the *other* direction. IF lower animals have any
degree of conceptuality, THEN that is problematic because it implies
"animal volition" and other unthinkable things
like animal rights??

Rand held that only man needed a code of morality because only man has
choices to make, which arise from his nature as a conceptual being. If
animals are conceptual then they too, have choices to make. Well, you can
take it from there:-)
Gayle
"Volition begins with the first syllogism..." Ayn Rand-

From: Jeff
Subject: ATL: Re: Gayle Dean on Volition, Conception, and Animality
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 10:28:38 -0800

Ross addressed Gayle's contention that animals having "any degree of
conceptuality...would have troubling implications for their
[non-determinists'] theory of volition":

"Granting for the sake of argument that lower animals have lower levels of
conceptual abilities than man but that they exist in lower primates to
some degree, I fail to see how this is at all problematic for her theory of
volition. I think it would be much easier to interpret the data as saying
that Rand was simply wrong to determine that lower animals have no volition,
not as inferring from the data that even man doesn't have volition."

Gayle then replied that "IF lower animals have any degree of
conceptuality, THEN that is problematic because it implies "animal volition"
and other unthinkable things like animal rights."

I think granting that animals possess volition to some degree � and by
extension that volition exists on a continuum rather than being an either
"on or off" phenomenon -- is also problematic because it strongly implies
both variability and limitations with respect to human will.

Among the "troubling implications," aside from animals possibly being
attributed rights (by those who attribute rights solely according to mental
characteristics), is that it now becomes an open question whether or not
human beings possess the required degree of volition to achieve genuine
knowledge (by the non-determinist account of genuine knowledge). Also, if
human beings vary in volitional capability, how may they be held equally
accountable for their actions? (For those who accord rights purely by
measurements of mental characteristics, isn't it possible that beings
further along the "volition/conceptual-continuum" might reasonably consider
us to possess insufficient volition/conceptuality for rights-consideration?)

Degrees of volition clearly imply *limits* of volitional capacity for any
given being (unless one wishes to argue that a given being resided at the
"far end" of the volition-conceptuality continuum, where Ross may very well
believe he resides:-). If such limits do apply, then it is true that there
are things that we *cannot* choose or will; and if this is true, then
doesn't it logically follow that there are things which we *must* will (for
once limits in our volitional powers are granted, how could we would lack
the power to choose certain actions
while not lacking the power to *not* choose certain actions?).

If individual human will varies, then doesn't it follow that different
individuals possess different degrees of will, and therefore different
degrees of responsibility for their actions? If some individuals do possess
more "willpower" than others -- if it is easier, for instance, for some
individuals to be moral than for others -- then how can their moral
culpability or praiseworthiness be considered equal?

Anyhow, I think the above suffices to show that there are some rather
troubling aspects to granting animals volition/conceptuality (both for
non-determinists, and for "X-characteristic = rights" advocates).
Jeff

From: Ellen
Subject: Question to Jeff Olson (was Gayle Dean on Volition,
Conception, and Animality)
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 14:13:41 -0500

Jeff-O,
I keep trying to get around to addressing the questions you raise, and I
keep having trouble "getting a handle" on your questions, because I think
that you're using the term "will" in a way which is "on a different page"
than the one I'm on.

For instance, you wrote:
>If individual human will varies, then doesn't it follow that different
>individuals possess different degrees of will, and therefore different
>degrees of responsibility for their actions? If some individuals do
>possess more "willpower" than others -- if it is easier, for instance, for
>some individuals to be moral than for others -- then how can their moral
>culpability or praiseworthiness be considered equal?

What it sounds to me like you're talking about is "will" defined as some
sort of ability just to *make* (viola!) actions happen -- indeed, your usage
of "will" sounds to me like the way I've often heard Christians use it
(excuse me, Debbie, people whom I'd think of as being "Christians," whether
you'd agree or not). And it sounds like the way Dennis May uses it, as some
sort of outside-the-scheme- of-the-natural-world "power." But this isn't
even "volition" as I mean "volition." (To repeat for the definition I use:
"the capacity for self-aware regulation, within limits, of one's mental
activities"; note: it might be better to say, "of what one's awareness is
doing.")

I'm not finding that I can get a grip on how the term "volition" as I use it
connects with the problems which you raise. So I wonder if you could give
me a definition for what you mean by "will."
Ellen S.

From: Jeff
Subject: Re: Question to Jeff (was Gayle Dean on
Volition,Conception, and Animality)
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 12:22:04 -0800

You're right, Ellen, I haven't been entirely clear in my use of the word
"will," especially about how it relates to "volition."

By "will," I think people customarily mean the strength and efficacy of
one's desire to act; "volition" generally refers to (conscious) regulation
of one's mind. The two are pretty much inextricably entwined, as I'm sure
you'd agree.

So when I speak of "will," I'm speaking of the sum of mental regulatory
processes leading up to a given action, beginning with the choice to focus
on something and ending with the choice to act. By "variable will," I mean
differences in the ability to initiate/control all the processes which lead
to an action, beginning with differences in the ability to initiate and
maintain focus (clearly that's a necessary first step in any action), and
ending with the final choice to effect a desire.
Jeff

From: Barbara B.
Subject: Re: ATL: Re: animal conceptuality?
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 14:54:48 EST

Moore asked:
<< Can any one of you animal volitionists provide us with a certain example
of an abstract animal concept?>>

I'm not an animal volitionist, not do I think that animals (except for my
cat) commonly think in abstractions, but I can give you one example that
always has fascinated me because it seems more than perceptual; it appears
to involve some level of abstraction. If, by accident, you step on you pet's
paw or otherwise hurt her, she does not run away as she would do if you had
deliberately hurt her as punishment for something.   Generally, she will
come to you to be comforted instead. I don't, of course, mean that the pet
thinks: On, that was an accident, she didn't mean to do it, so I don't need
to be afraid. But in some way, the rather complex difference between the
accidental and the intentional is "grasped."
Barbara

From: Santos
Subject: ATL: Re: animal conceptuality?
Date: Sun, 09 Dec 2001 15:42:16 �0800

But in punishing a pet, you use verbal and body language, which the pet
understands. In accidentally stepping on a paw or tail, it is not prefaced
by a firm voice and action towards the cat. (I'm willing to bet, Barbara,
That YOU take the initiative in the comforting.)
Patricia

From: BB
Subject: Re: animal conceptuality?
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2001 12:43:55 EST

Santos wrote:
<< But in punishing a pet, you use verbal and body language, which the pet
understands. In accidentally stepping on a paw or tail, it is not prefaced
by a firm voice and action towards the cat. (I'm willing to bet, Barbara,
that YOU take the initiative in the comforting. >>

This doesn't answer the question, it simply makes the pet's understanding
more complex. Because you have the pet "grasping" that punishment is
preceded by a certain kind of language, and accident is not.
Barbara

From: Michael
Subject: Re: animal conceptuality?
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 17:09:15 -0500 (EST)

I don't think this issue of animal conceptuality is as philosophically
important as some people seem to think. Ayn Rand made some assertions about
the differences between us and other animals, but her philosophical point
was about the differences between the ways we do or should function
mentally, on the one
hand, and the ways we would function if we had only lower, non-rational
mental abilities.

      Barbara wrote:
>If, by accident, you step on you pet's paw or otherwise hurt her, she does
>not run away as she would do if you had deliberately hurt her

      Some people may recall Kurt expressed the view, and I agreed,
that animals not only are able to read expressions on people's faces, but by
doing so are *directly* aware of people's moods and states of mind. By
"directly" I mean it is not a *conscious* inference of the person's state of
mind from what is seen, but rather what is seen causes an awareness of the
state of mind by a non-conscious and (I suspect) hard-wired causal process.
I think that same process in humans makes possible the ability of
cartoonists to portray people's moods via an amazingly small number of
strokes of the pen.
Mike

From: Moore
Subject: Re: animal conceptuality
Date: Sun, 09 Dec 2001 16:52:18 -0600

Barbara,
I too have had the same experiences with my pet dogs and cats. They are
very sensitive to my body language, and especially so if it is expressed
audibly. Yes, they do come to me when they are hurt, and they come to me if
I express I'm hurt. They are upset and most attentive if I cry tears, or
cry out in pain, or vomit, or cough harshly. I think they learn all the
sounds we express and they response to all the nuances. They learn to
respond to the sound of words and the meaning of actions they have learned
to grasp. I doubt if it is abstractions like "intention and accident" that
they grasp -- what it is their responses to perception they've learned to
recognize from past experiences.

If we are vocally displeased, and show it, pets tend to go away to their
"safe" place. If Mel is annoyed with Teddy, our dog runs to hide under my
legs and peers out from under my safety.

When I accidentally step on a pet's foot, I recoil as quick as the animal
does, so I think they instantly read that body language, and by the time I
am saying 'Oh, sorry, I did not mean to hurt you' accompanied by loving
sounds and petting, they have already set aside the hurt. Even if they are
really ill, they tend to be silent and unresponsive. Animals are amazingly
sensitive, and their perception is truly remarkable.

Teddy appears to understand and respond to our conversation not only with
her, but between each other [if we are angry, she sulks or goes away], and
she looks and acts so intelligently, it's amazing sometimes. Because of my
interest in volition, I have watched carefully, and I have concluded that
animal knowledge and response is based on perception only. There has to be
a stimulus that the animal is aware of [even if we are not aware of it]
before they respond. My dog barks at things I cannot hear, and is aware of
everything because her perception is so keen.

Anyway, I see no evidence of animal ability to abstract or to form concepts.
They simply learn to respond to stimuli in their environment, and they
remember some things, but not others. e.g., Teddy does not recognize either
of us from a distance until she is close enough to see us or to hear our
voices. Also, she rushes to get between us when we hug - I'm not sure if
she just wants to be included, or if she is jealous. One thing I do know,
if she doesn't get what she makes clear she wants, we pay, because she
deliberately eats or shreds something she knows she should not. It sure
looks like deliberate vindictiveness to me. And then she shows all the signs
of guilt because she hides under my desk. It would seem that under my desk,
where we cannot get at her, is to her both a place of safety, a place of
avoiding punishment. Ah, the complexity of a cat's and dog's life.
Ellen M.

From: Michael Hardy hardy at math.mit.edu
To: gwdean at webworkz.com, atlantis at wetheliving.com
Subject: ATL: Re: Animal conceptuality
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 21:43:27 -0500 (EST)
      Those who think Ayn Rand relied essentially in philosophical arguments
on her assertion that animals lack conceptual faculties, are obtusely
missing the point.

      But the debate continues anyway. Gayle Dean quoted from a web site:

> "Animals may possess much more complex concepts than previously thought,
and even a form of consciousness, two recent studies report.

      This seems quite absurd: *Obviously* animals are conscious, and
obviously *concepts* are something that conscious organisms can either have
or lack. It's as if you said "Andrew Carnegie is fabulously wealthy, and
may even be able to afford to wear shoes." Unless they mean something
radically different by "concepts" from the way we in this forum understand
the term, as applied in epistemology in which case their statement is
irrelevant.

>honeybees can generalize correctly to previously unseen stimuli, even when
>in other modalities, and so can be shown to learn and use the abstract
>concept of 'same' (and 'different'). For instance, when first trained to
>choose the same color, the insect generalizes and chooses the same shape,
>or the same smell.

      Gayle, this can only confuse the issue. Obviously, if bees have the
ability to behave as reported here, it does not follow that they have "the
abstract concept of 'same' (and 'different')" unless the authors are
defining "the abstract concept of...." to mean simply that bees are capable
of that behavior. And notice that it's very likely that epistemology is NOT
the topic in which the authors were interested, so it is very plausible that
they would use a definition so different from one that would naturally be of
interest to epistemologists.

      In ITOE, Rand mentioned a thought experiment involving a "rational
spider from Mars". If you start bringing up evidence that NASA's probes
have found that there are not really any rational spiders on Mars and never
have been, that would be equally relevant.       -- Mike Hardy

From: Dennis
Subject: Re: Animal conceptuality
Date: Sun, 09 Dec 2001 21:56:27 -0600

Gayle Dean mentioned a few sites where serious scientists are studying the
conceptual capabilities of insects working in unison as a single
consciousness. The selective advantage of working as a hive versus
individually is all too obvious in bees but is also present in many other
social insects and in more advanced creatures who work in herds or flocks.
Picture the hive brain as a physically separated brain in many parts but
communicating as a single larger brain. Neural network research often
implements a similar idea using separate interconnected computers.

A couple years ago my brother had a couple dozen ducks raised together since
hatching. As a group they act as intelligently as a cat or a dog. Once cut
off from the flock they are individually quite stupid and are readily killed
by predators.

Michael Hardy wrote:
>...And notice that it's very likely that epistemology is NOT the topic in
>which the authors were interested, so it is very plausible that they would
>use a definition so different from one that would naturally be of interest
>to epistemologists.

Unlike Michael I would be very interested in conceptual development as
defined by scientific criteria rather than that used by philosophers. The
scientific means has objective criteria and substantive data behind their
conclusions. Philosophers can however waive a hand and whole classes of
animals have no conceptual development regardless of the behavioral data and
physiological studies which say otherwise. The scientific method will
prevail in the study of consciousness and conceptual development.
Philosophers would do well to study the science before holding dear to their
view of what concepts and consciousness are.
Dennis May

From: Gayle Dean
Subject: Bees and concepts
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2001 09:25:54 -0500

Mike:
I wasn't able to locate the part of the article I was looking for about the
bees, but in addition to the one I posted -- what I was hoping to find was
the study below. I'm not sure about the details but the principle remains.
I queried Dennis and he says he remembers the study as well.

Researchers placed a honey tray on a post 200 yds. From the hive. The scout
bees found the tray right away and soon the entire hive was at the honey
tray. The next day they doubled the distance and moved the honey tray to
400 yds. away. The scout bees found it and notified the hive. The next day
the tray was moved to 800 yds. away and the same thing happened ... the
scouts signaled to the hive where to find the honey. But, the next
day--BEFORE the tray was ever moved �the researchers found the bees waiting
for the sugar tray to arrive at a point located 1600 yards away from the
hive.   Now, Did the bees DO MATH?? According to the researchers-- yes!
Gayle

From: Michael
Subject: Re: Bees and concepts
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2001 10:46:27 -0500 (EST)

*If* bees understand math, that does not detract from any of AR's
*philosophical* points in which she implied that nonhuman animals don't
understand, among other things, math. That is because she was saying: Here
is how we, who understand math and philosophy and the like, can and should
operate our minds and our lives differently from the way we would if we
lacked that ability. The details of which entities have, and which lack,
that ability, is a very minor point, and if she was mistaken about it,
that's a very minor error not altering the philosophical point.

      Does a stone dropped from a building *understand* that the distance it
has fallen is proportional to the square of the time it has fallen? Mike
Hardy

From: Moore
Subject: Re: animal conceptuality
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2001 15:48:03 -0600

Gayle Dean posted an "Abstract" by S.W. Zhang and M.V. Srinivasan.

It concludes with this statement:
"Thus, bees can, not only learn specific objects and their physical
parameters, but also master abstract interrelationships, such as "'sameness'
and 'difference."

Of course, sameness and differences is implicitly given by automatic
physical perception. All animals cope by means of sensation and perception,
and with perceptual association. This does not mean they can acquire or
develop the ability of abstraction or conceptualization.

In another post, Gayle described the experiment where "honey trays" were
placed at intervals of further increasing distances from the bees' hives.
This does not prove that they can "abstract" or "DO MATH" or
conceptualize. They can learn by the state or degree of specific perceptual
memory association, as the researchers said, "at the behavioral, cellular,
and molecular level", and learn to associate similar events reoccurring in
the same way as before. Also, individual bees roam all over the place, so
any one of the scout bees could locate and alert the other bees to the honey
tray. Bees are physically "programmed" to act in specific ways to specific
stimuli present in a specific context, but there is no evidence here to show
that they form concepts or "Do MATH".

What causes this mistaken interpretation of these events. I think the
researchers and their followers/admirers do not understand the nature of
concept formation or conceptualization. The physical determinists really
should learn not to go beyond the automatic physical evidence into
volitional conceptual fields where their interpretations do not apply. The
level of sensory perception is ~only~ the base of human knowledge, but it
does not explain the nature of human volitional consciousness and the
conceptual level of human knowledge.
Ellen M.

From: Dennis May
Subject: Re: Animal conceptuality
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2001 15:48:13 -0600
Morganis wrote:

>...But we, here in ATL, have yet to hear from you what their *consensual*
>"definition" is re what the scientists are referring to when they EACH AND
>ALL *use* the term "concept"...which they are presumably studying ....
>which one of the *scientific* ones is it that you like? (I WILL be asking
>for the empirical sources that create the criteria for the definition, of
>course).

The scientific view of conceptual thinking is results oriented. If the
behavior of an animal is studied and shows signs of a wider understanding
being carried into new challenges outside of an original set of learned
tasks it can be said that conceptualization has taken place. Philosophers
claim as their own what does and does not qualify as conceptualization.
What exists now is an evolving scientific consensus not a well defined
consensus. Going from the hard science of neural networks to the softer
science of behavioral studies leaves a great deal of room for
interpretation. On the other end of the spectrum we have those in
philosophy who would reject conceptualization as even a possibility if
claimed in digital or silicon form, or among certain animals they are
familiar with. At this point I can only say to read what the researchers
are writing and see what criteria each researcher is using. The criteria
will vary somewhat as evolving sciences tend to do. I am only generally
familiar with animal behavioral studies. They tend to be intelligence tests
geared toward what animals are physically capable of doing.

My favorite examples of conceptual animals comes from animals teaching their
young food preparation, hygiene, and tool use. The snow monkeys of Japan
teach their young to transport dirty potatoes to be washed in salt water to
remove sand and give them a salt flavor. Chimps teach their young to use
pieces of grass and twigs to catch termites and what kinds of leaves to use
as toilet paper [what tissue to use varies from one group of Chimps to
another as it varies from one group of humans to another]. Asian monkeys
have learned to use plastic shopping bags to carry fresh vegetables stolen
from local gardens and markets. The use of plastic bags has spread like
wildfire among the young and old alike. In Missouri wind blown Wal-Mart
bags are referred to as Blue Tumbleweeds.

My post is most unsatisfactory in answering Morganis Chamlo's question. I
am not prepared to do the many hours of work needed to come up with a better
answer. There are many hundreds of good animal studies indicating
conceptualization and I've only read a few here and there. I'm sure there
are people better able to answer the questions of animal stats and criteria
used in conceptual studies.
Dennis May

From: Gayle Dean
Subject: ATL: Re:The good doctor on conceptuality
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 09:10:00 -

Ross wrote:
>Granting for the sake of argument that lower animals have lower levels of
>conceptual abilities than man but that they exist in lower primates to some
>degree, I fail to see how this is at all problematic for her theory of
>volition. I think it would be much easier to interpret the data as saying
>that Rand was simply wrong to determine that lower animals have no
>volition, not as inferring from the data that even man doesn't have
>volition.

I didn't infer from "that data" that *man* doesn't have volition! Man's
volition (determinism/free-will) is a different issue altogether. The
problem I refer to is in the *other* direction. IF lower animals have any
degree of conceptuality, THEN that is problematic because it implies
"animal volition" and other unthinkable things
like animal rights??

Rand held that only man needed a code of morality because only man has
choices to make, which arise from his nature as a conceptual being. If
animals are conceptual then they too, have choices to make. Well, you can
take it from there:-)
Gayle
"Volition begins with the first syllogism..." Ayn Rand-

From: Ellen
Subject: Re: Animal volition-- we close the circle
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2001 23:41:00 -0500

I've been reading Mike's posts on the other-animals/humans division, and I
agree with him. It doesn't affect the validity of anything Rand said about
the significance of the human conceptual ability for human life if she was
wrong in thinking that no lower animals have any conceptual abilities (I
think she was wrong about that).
Ellen S.

From: "George
Subject: Re: Eternal life -- Objectivist style
Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2002 14:00:23 -0600
I wrote:
"A duck who 'mistakes' a decoy for a fellow duck is simply acting on the
perceptual similarities between the two objects. He has not committed an
"error," because he is unable to introspect and think to himself, 'I thought
the damn thing was a real duck, but I was *wrong.*'"

Bill Dwyer replied:
"As I say, I don't think that an animal needs to ~recognize~ abstractly that
it has made an error in order to ~make~ one. The process of making an error
is independent of its abstract recognition."

And Gayle Dean remarked:
"Right! Both George (above) and Ellen Moore (in her previous posts) are
making essentially the same claim, which is based in a primacy of
consciousness view. Ellen Moore argued both, that one *cannot make an
error unless one is aware that one has made it* and that *the universe does
not exist if humans are not alive to perceive it.* "

This is a ludicrous charge. This has nothing to do with the "primacy of
consciousness." It has to do with the presuppositions of a concept ("error,"
in this case), that are essential to the meaning of that concept.

As for Bill's remark, to say that a we can make an "error" without an
abstract judgment is absurd. An "error" *is* an abstract judgment. There are
no error-entities floating around out there with metaphysical properties.
Actions do not present themselves with the name tag "error" already affixed.
An "error" is not an *action*; it is an abstract *judgment* about an action.

Gayle wrote:
"Clearly (as Bill points out) errors can be made without anyone being aware
of making them. In fact, people are never aware that they are making
ERRORS, before the fact-- or else they wouldn't make them."

This is totally beside the point. We are not discussing whether something
needs to be aware of a concept while taking a particular action, but whether
it possesses the requisite characteristics that are essential to the
*meaning* of that concept. Only if we *first* agree that the concept "error"
has meaning in relationship to human beings can we then go on to observe the
particular circumstances in which a person may be said to have committed an
error. The same applies to ducks.
.
Gayle wrote:
"That is the definition of an error...a mistake made *unknowingly.*"

This is *precisely* my point. An error is a mistake make *unknowingly,* and
the concept "unknowingly* (in this context) makes sense only in *contrast*
to the concept "knowingly." So does a duck sometimes do
things "knowingly" -- i.e., with *knowledge* -- only to commit errors from
time to time by doing something "unknowingly"? We don't say that a rock
behaves "unknowingly" in the same sense as human beings, because we don't
presume that a rock is capable of behaving "knowingly" at all. The contrast
between "knowing" and "unknowing" behavior, which is essential to the
concept of error, does not apply to a rock at all. It is therefore absurd to
say that a rock can commit an "error." All of it behavior is "unknowing," so
there is nothing to *contrast* this with.

In what sense does a duck possess "knowledge," and in what sense can a duck
form conscious purposes? To commit an "error," in the realm of action, is
unknowingly to act contrary to one's *intention.* Does a duck
form intentions? A intention is a consciously formulated purpose, so does a
duck think to himself, "I want to do X,," only to think later, "I wanted to
do X, but I unknowingly did Y instead, contrary to my intentions"?

I doubt if ducks do *any* of these things, because these mental actions
require a sophisticated level of conceptual and introspective ability. To
say that something was an "error" is to render a *judgment,* a
judgment that contrasts what one wanted to do with what one actually did. Do
ducks utter false propositions? No, because they cannot form propositions at
all. Do ducks make errors in judgment? No because a "judgment" requires the
*same* kind of conceptual ability. An error does not refer to an action per
se; rather, it pertains to *judgments* that we make about our actions. An
"error" presupposes the ability to formulate judgments that can be rendered
in the form of propositions.

In other words, to say that an action was an "error" is to *identify* the
nature of an action, and to *judge* that it was not what one *intended* to
do. A species that is incapable of identification, judgment, and intentions
cannot commit errors.

Can ducks formulate intentions (conscious purposes) and render judgments
about them? I seriously doubt it. It is we human being who make these
judgments and *apply* them to ducks. To confuse concepts that apply only to
conceptual beings and apply them to non-conceptual beings is to engage in
shameless anthropomorphizing.

Gayle wrote:
"And it is not necessary to know that they have made errors after-the-fact
either. People make errors all the time and never become aware of them and
thus, have no idea why their lives are so screwed up. And as I pointed out
earlier-- a person who drives into the path of an oncoming car on the
freeway--and is killed instantly --will never know that he has made an
error, but he surely did make one."

Again, this is equivocation of the worst sort. To say that people commit
errors "unintentionally" or "unknowingly" makes sense because we know that
humans are capable of forming intentions and acting with knowledge. These
are term of *contrast.* When we say that a person behaves "unknowingly," we
don't mean the same thing as when we say that a rock behaves "unknowingly."
A rock doesn't possess knowledge at all, so in this sense *all* of its
behavior is "unknowing" -- but this is *not* what we mean when we apply the
same term to the actions of human beings. Likewise, when we say that a rock
behaves "unintentionally," we don't mean the same thing as when we say that
a person behaves unintentionally. (It would be more accurate to say that a
rock behaves "nonknowingly" and "nonintentionally.")

Suppose lightening were to strike one yard away from me, and I said: "Boy,
was I lucky. That lightening intended to strike me, but it made an error."
Now suppose that Gayle were to object that this way of speaking is absurd,
because lightening isn't "aware" of anything. And suppose I replied, "Well,
Gayle, we humans aren't aware of when we commit errors either, so your
objection obviously doesn't apply. Indeed, we sometimes *never* become aware
of our errors, just as lightening is never aware of its errors. Q.E.D."

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to spot the sophistical equivocation in
this kind of reasoning. In one instance, we are speaking of "awareness" of a
particular thing; in another instance we are speaking of the faculty of
awareness in general. Likewise, "unknowingly" can refer either to lack of
knowledge in a particular case, or to the inability to form conceptual
knowledge in general. It is this latter meaning that I apply to ducks.

"Error" is simply an abbreviated form of "error in judgment." With no
judgments, there can be no "errors in judgment." This debate therefore
hinges on whether ducks can formulate judgments, which in turn presupposes
the ability to form and manipulate abstract concepts. If Bill and Gayle wish
to argue that ducks possess this kind of conceptual ability and therefore
can sometimes commit errors in judgment, then that is one thing. But if they
wish to argue that "errors" can occur where no judgments are possible, then
that is quite another thing. In this latter case, they will need to explain
what "error" can possibly mean, if not an error in judgment.
Ghs