Double Effect and the Search for Military Conquest
By Greg McCulley
Drafted 11 May 1999
����������� Karl von Clausewitz once stated that war is an extension of politics by other means.� To expand on this then, war erupts when there is a political objective that is so great, than it warrants the killing of men to achieve it.� This description holds whether the objective is a defensive or an offensive operation.� So, if men are willing to die in order to satisfy the overall objective, which is to compel the enemy to do our will, then is seems to hold that in such a just war, there is no substitute for victory.� I agree with this almost entirely.� However, to discuss this, we should not only define war, but victory.
����������� Webster's 9th New Collegiate Dictionary defines victory as the overcoming of an enemy or the successful conclusion of struggle.� Given this, compelling the enemy to surrender would be a victory, as would denying the enemy the means to resist.� The last sentence accurately describes the intent of most military field commanders, for it is at the heart of the military's mission.�
����������� Most military members who have been trained in the use of small arms are at some point given a lecture on the discrimination between combatants and noncombatants. �We are taught whom we can shoot, and whom we cannot. Sometimes we are taught even when we can shoot.� However, on some occasions, military leaders find themselves in a tight spot, wedged between the cardinal rule of never killing civilians, and accomplishing the mission.� However, the rule does not say to never kill civilians. �It says to never target civilians.� When can a commander (or any military member for that matter) kill a civilian and be still on moral terra firma?
����������� According to Michael Waltzer in his book Just and Unjust Wars (p 153), the principal of double effect outlines exactly when civilian casualties are permitted.� The principal calls for 4 conditions that must be met:� 1) the act to be done is good in itself or at least indifferent;� 2) the intended good is not obtained by means of the negative effect;� 3)the negative effect is not intended for itself but only permitted; and 4) there is a proportionately grave reason for the permission of the negative effect.� Let's look at each of these compared to an example case.
����������� As an example to use, let's imagine that a nation allied to our own (such as France) is unjustly invaded by an aggressor (such as Germany).� As a friendly nation, we assist the fallen country and try to expel the invaders.� If the nation has been taken over, and her own army displaced, the occupying army of the enemy will likely be situated among the civilian population.� Attacking the enemy means attacking at least some of the civilian populace.� Clearly, to attack the civilian infrastructure of France will result in two things:� The enemy will fall under our fire and the French civilians will be injured monetarily and perhaps bodily.� Is it worth it?� Ask the French, who live under the rule of the occupying army.� Of course it is worth it in this case.� It illustrates the first stipulation for double effect.� The shelling of German positions that have been taken up in French cottages would be done in the execution of a good.� The good would be the liberation and defense of a sovereign nation.� The act (shelling) may not be good, but it is indifferent to the civilians.� The point of the shelling would be the expulsion of the enemy.
����������� The second condition of double effect is that the negative effect (the destruction of the French homes and lives) is only an incidental by-product of the counter to the German presence.� Our scenario still holds here.� The point of shelling the lands of an ally is not to harm the ally;� that is unfortunate and painful to do, but it is nonetheless one of the safest and most practical method of dislocating an invading force.� Another method might be to bomb the enemy's supply lines, but even that would cause damage to some of the civilian infrastructure.� ��The bombing of these German positions is a necessary act, and it may incidentally harm the civilian population.
����������� When the US forces take aim at the German positions in our scenario, they must do so in the spirit and intent of liberating the civilians.� In the principle of double effect, there can be no hidden agenda in the damage done to the civilians.� No alternative itinerary may be satisfied if it is effected by the negative effect being done to the civilian population.� This is the third provision of the principle.�
����������� Perhaps the most significant stipulation is the fourth, �which states the reason for the negative effect.� We can assume the German presence has a direct impact on the quality of life for the French.� We also assume the majority of the country we seek to liberate does indeed desires to be free of the occupational forces.� Also, there is the possibility that the invading force might continue to invade other nations if not checked.� If the German ideology (or at least the ideology held by leadership at the time) is violent or evil in and of itself, then it must be stopped.� Victory must be achieved.
����������� I have outlined a strict scenario where the enemy is clearly unjust, and the defense of the invaded is called for without question.� That established, the question remains:� in war, is there a substitute for victory?� The answer is no.� One might be tempted to counter that the bloodless surrender of the enemy would be better, but that is still a victory.� I would put only one stipulation of my own into Mr. River's original quotation;� that would be that in a just war, there is no substitute for victory.� If the war is unjust, the victory would be unjust, and the following peace would be unjust.
����������� When politics are extended by means of war, an investment of blood is made.� In a just war, that investment is realized only through the achievement of victory;� we must compel the enemy to do our will, and in the end, for this there is no substitute.