Price of Inaction:� Turning the other cheek in the face of logic |
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By Greg McCulley |
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Drafted 14 May 1998 |
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����������� Saint Augustine of Hippo (AD 354-430) once said that since ?man is fallen, war is inevitable.?� If he is wrong in that statement, mankind has done little to prove his error. Augustine was a founding father of the Just War Tradition.� He, along with others, laid the foundation for a system of thinking that, if objectively applied, might guide man through the moral labyrinth of one of his most terrible inevitabilities: war.� This essay seeks to discuss one of Augustine?s teachings that references a fundamental concept about conflict.� In doing so, a modern comparison will be drawn with the situation in the former Yugoslavia.� |
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Jus ad bellum is a term used to describe the justification of a nation to make war with another nation or nations.�� It deals with whether a nation has the right to resort to force.� Several conditions describe the extent to which a nation satisfies the concept of jus ad bellum. In his teachings, St. Augustine advocated some of them in particular.� In one story, Augustine tells of a man on the street being robbed by a bandit.� If you, as a passer-by, see this attack, you have an obligation to intervene on behalf of the besieged person.� Further, in doing so, you must seek to use the minimum amount of force require to thwart the attacker and protect the victim (and yourself).� In other words, the attacker sets the level of violence.� This proportionality of violence is particularly important to our later discussion of Yugoslavia.� One final point Augustine made in this illustration was that when one does all these things, one does them with love for both the attacked and the attacker. |
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����������� With this concept in mind, let's look at the conflict that is going on in the former Yugoslavia.� This part of the world has been plagued with violence, stemming from religious and political differences of ethnic groups in that area.� The United Nations has a peacekeeping force in place to promote public safety and facilitate peace negotiations.� The United States has a large contingent in the area as well.� There has been political fallout in the United States for our commitment to the region, and many have expressed that we should not be there this far beyond a point at which earlier we stated we would be withdrawn.� The obvious sticking point to withdrawal is what happens to the ones left behind in the war?� If it was important enough for us to go in the first place, why is it now suddenly unimportant?�� Augustine would argue that we have an obligation to remain and do what we can to help. |
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Among the items of support he might use would be whether the factions involved enjoyed "just cause".� Does the side we support engage in the conflict for just reasons?� Just reasons could include situations of self-defense, imminent danger, threat to sovereignty, or threat to political or individual freedom.� If the oppressed side has the right to resort to armed conflict, rather than being a hostile invader out for immoral ends, then that side is involved in a just cause.� This does not address what activities are permissible, we are only talking about jus ad bellum here.� As long as the friendly side (or sides, for that matter) are within the bounds just cause, it is just that we support them in their cause if they request it.� Incidentally, this essay does not address the legality of any pre-existing treaties that might exist, I am looking at the situation from a strictly academic standpoint.� |
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Another element that must be met by the aggressors is right authority.� Are we dealing with terrorist groups here, or legitimate governments?� Or, has the governmental system broken down (as in the former Yugoslavia) and how do we recognize the remnants?� If we recognize new, independent states that have declared war (which certain factions would love), then right authority would exist.� If not, if we recognize merely a state of civil war, then we must be careful in taking sides.� This was a part of the dilemma that occupied minds during the Vietnam War.�� Would we have the right to intervene in such a situation?� Ethically speaking, that is the question of this essay, and I say the answer is yes.� I agree with Augustine in that we have an obligation to establish peace. |
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Also, the side we ally ourselves with must possess right intent.� The intentions of the nation (or faction) that we assist must be good; it must be in a just cause and seeking an end of peace.� If a score being settled is the true aim, and what really exists is an old feud, then we have no business getting involved.� Picking sides like that could be immoral and politically dangerous. |
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Proportionality must be considered in making the decision to support the effort as well.� This proportionality is in terms of the total good and/or evil anticipated.� If it is irrelevant who is the victor in the conflict, why fight it?� Even more, if it is a minor violation the factions are in conflict over, the level of force used must be proportional to the violation.� It would not be morally justifiable to intercede in the former Yugoslavia with devastating strategic bombing if the conflict was over a small strip of border shared.� Even a threat to free elections should not be decided by mass destruction.� What is the point of peace negotiations if the argument is going to be settled by eliminating the opposition?� That would be immoral, to kill all those who oppose the side you have chosen.� There are lesser levels of pressure available, such as diplomatic protest or economic sanctions, to name just a couple.� I believe that is why NATO has been cautious to implement the air strikes that are being discussed currently in Bosnia.� When we have used air strikes, they have been limited to police actions to remove artillery or troop placements where they threaten the peace.� The concept of proportionality holds true for retaliation as well. When attacked, one must use a proportional level of force to counterattack.� This goes back to Augustine?s notion of letting the attacker set the level of violence. |
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One last element that must be satisfied is whether the action is taken as a last resort.� This condition is, like the rest, quite open to individual interpretation.� After all, is there ever really a last resort?� There is almost always one last plea for peace, one last trip Richard Holbrooke could take, or one last invitation to Dayton for renewed peace accords.� But in the end, there really is a last practical resort.� If we have done all that we can do to promote peace, then it becomes obvious that we are justified in interceding with force.� In fact, if all the above conditions are met, we are obliged to intercede. |
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In the former Yugoslavia, hundreds of thousands of innocent lives are being caught up in the crossfire of a region that has long been plagued with conclift.� UN inspectors and US troops have found mass graves that opposition leaders have filled with the bodies of these innocents.� All the conditions for intercession have been met.� Augustine wrote that we have the obligation to our fellow man to intervene on the oppressed?s behalf.� He also said we should do so with love.� While love might be a little hard to realize in the situation, I do believe we are taking part in the situation with good intentions for both sides: to see peace settle in the area and, ergo lives saved.� It is not a tasteful operation, but if we turn the other cheek, and it results in the death of innocent lives and prolonging of war, we are doing an injustice to a just cause.� It is a matter if respecting the human rights of an embattled people.� |
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