A Nonviolent Solution to the Iraq War

in january 2007, i took a class titled 'philosophies of nonviolence.' one of the projects that we had to do for this class was to solve a problem nonviolently. being the over-achiever that i am, i decided to solve the iraq war nonviolently. you can read my solution in full below, download the word document here, or download the power point presentation here.

feedback, comments, and criticism welcomed. direct them to: email, aim, myspace, livejournal, or santa claus. go back to zoom!

Erika Boal
PHIL 367 � presentation paper

A Nonviolent Solution to the Iraq War that the U.S. Will Never Adopt

     I have chosen to tackle the war in Iraq as a problem to solve nonviolently. I feel that it is important before beginning this paper to mention that, as the situation stands currently, it is very difficult to get a clear understanding of the conflict because it is a current event. One must rely upon news articles to have an idea of who is fighting against whom, and even these cannot be relied upon entirely. A review of articles from national sources, on both political spectrums, as well as international sources (from Britain�s BBC to Al-Jazeera in the Middle East) reveals a complicated web of finger pointing, suspicion, accusations, and most of all, utter confusion. Therefore it must be understood that even if every attempt is made to see this conflict from an unbiased point of view, because the reality is so hard for anyone not present in Iraq currently to understand, this is all idealistic speculation.

     That being said, I have come up with a five step plan for ending the conflict in Iraq and restoring the country to economic and political stability. The first step is, not surprisingly, to withdraw all coalition troops from Iraq and to cease immediately the construction of permanent military bases in Iraq. The construction of such bases has been illegal since the beginning of fiscal year 2007 (Swanson). As long as such construction continues, not only is it a blatant snub to the wishes of Congress, but it also signals to the Iraqi people that the United States intends to stay in Iraq for a very long time. If construction must continue, it should be publicly turned over to Iraqi contractors and the Iraqi army. Withdrawing the troops will have several benefits, the most obvious being that it will remove over 100,000 men and women from a war zone and return them to their families and loved ones at home. Furthermore, the removal of this occupation force will remove the fuel that feeds the fire of the insurgency that has been waged against coalition troops (primarily against American troops) since 2003. The insurgent forces in Iraq are quite similar to the freedom fighters that brought America its independence. Once the occupying army had withdrawn, these �terrorists� resumed their lives as they had lived them before the rebellion. Additionally, if the occupying force announces a date and timetable for withdrawal, and is seen to be keeping to this timetable, ordinary Iraqi citizens who are not members of the insurgency, but who protect it nonetheless, will likely become less hospitable to the violence committed by the insurgents. With support for their cause dwindling and the occupying force leaving, it is likely that many of these insurgents will lay down their arms for the normal life they had enjoyed before the invasion. Finally, the removal of these troops, with the combination of step 2, will lessen the likelihood of Sunni, Shiite, or Kurdish groups being seen as allied with the United States by rival factions, and will therefore aid in decreasing the level of sectarian violence and support for radical foreign groups, such as Al-Qaeda, which never had an Iraqi following prior to the invasion and occupation.

     Step 2 embodies holding new elections at every level immediately following the withdrawal of coalition forces. This is an incredibly vital step for ensuring that all groups across Iraq see their government as legitimate. The elections of 2005 were largely boycotted by both Sunni voters and Sunni parties. The final election, held in December, elected a new parliament, and Sunni participation was only acquired after the U.S. ambassador to Iraq convinced the predominately Shiite Iraqi lawmakers to change a rule that would have made it more difficult for Sunnis (and other minority groups) to vote down a draft of the constitution before the October vote on the constitution. The rule also made it more difficult for minority groups to amend the constitution after its acceptance (Finer and Sarhan, Huffington). After December parliamentary election, leading Shiites then reneged on their promises to work with Sunnis on changing key parts of the constitution, such as the portions that guarantee that most oil wealth will go to Shiite and Kurdish areas, leaving Sunni dominated regions impoverished in the grand scheme of things (Huffington). Many Sunnis originally boycotted the elections on the pretense that many Sunni areas were still rife with violence, and needed more time to ensure that voting could be held without intimidation, something that was ignored by officials in both the Iraqi and American governments.

     The current government and constitution are therefore seen as illegitimate, or as products of American wishes, by about twenty percent of Iraq, and if they remain in place after a withdrawal, sectarian violence will certainly continue. Aside from electing new government officials and revisiting the constitution to ensure there is no bias against any group, the elections must include electing new heads of the police and army. Both of these institutions are currently dominated primarily by Shiites, with Kurds holding most of the remaining positions. After the Iraqi Army was disbanded by Paul Bremer in the process of �de-Baathification,� many Sunnis lost the ability to serve in these forces, as Saddam�s Baathist Party was composed primarily of Sunnis. Additionally, both of these groups have received much of their training from American forces, who, historically, have a habit of producing radical elements in national groups that seek to find political stability by torturing and executing minority or opposition groups. One need only look to events that unfolded in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s to see the results of such training and funding. In Iraq similar reports of death squads have surfaced, bearing many similarities to cases like El Salvador. As the sectarian killings continued to escalate, the outgoing UN Human Rights chief in Iraq, John Pace, reported that three quarters of the bodies in the mortuary bore signs of torture and execution, including injuries from drill bits and cigarette burns and gunshot wounds to the head. Pace linked the death squads to the Interior Ministry of the Iraqi government and the police squads under its command; both the head of the Interior Ministry and a majority of the police are linked to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq�s Badr Brigade, one of the main groups associated with sectarian violence (Buncombe and Cockburn). This was reported in February of 2006. By July of 2006, CNN reported that the U.S. Army was unable to find any �larger organization� behind the death squads, blaming it on �extremist elements from both sides� (Karadsheh).

     However, Newsweek reported in January of 2005 that the Pentagon was considering �the Salvador option� to contain the insurgency which had spiraled out of control. Defense chief Donald Rumsfeld denied that the Pentagon was going to use Special Forces to advise, support, and train Iraqi squads (likely Kurdish and Shiite militias) to target Sunni insurgents and their sympathizers. In response to a question about whether or not the option was being considered Rumsfeld said, "Why would I even talk about something like that?" (Hirsh and Barry). As early as December of 2003 high ranking members of the military and other advisors were advocating a more violent approach to quelling the insurgency. �With a heavy dose of fear and violence � I think we can convince these people that we are here to help them,� said Lt. Colonel Nathan Sassaman (Wilkins). An unnamed American advisor in Baghdad was quoted as saying �We�re going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrillas. Terrorism versus terrorism. We�ve got to scare the Iraqis into submission� (Hersh). The jury is still out on who is to blame for the death squads, but in many Sunni neighborhoods the sight of anyone in an official uniform breeds fear and mistrust, which casts a light of illegitimacy upon these institutions.
To ensure that these elections are legitimate, one condition that must be agreed upon before the withdrawal of coalition troops is to bring together the heads of the various political, religious, and ethnic sects in Iraq to form an independent body to monitor the elections. The first head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, General Jay Garner, attempted to do something very similar to this in the days after coalition forces had toppled Saddam�s regime. Garner intended to call a �big tent� meeting of Iraq�s tribal leaders in order to plan national elections to be held within 90 days of Saddam�s fall. However, Garner was replaced almost immediately after he arrived in Baghdad and was replaced by Paul Bremer, who will be the subject of step 3, and the meeting was cancelled. Bremer proceeded to appoint the interim government by himself. (Palast 66 � 69). I believe that the current Iraqi government should be allowed to participate in this body, and should be eligible to run for office again, but it should not be allowed to dictate any part of the monitoring or elections process. Along with an independent Iraqi election monitoring body, a UN elections monitoring and peacekeeping group should be stationed across Iraq during the withdrawal and elections. This force should not be made up of any member nations that participated in the original Iraq war; ideally it would be composed primarily of troops from nations who opposed it, like Canada, France, and Germany, to ensure that this force�s intentions are not questioned. The UN group should agree to leave after the elections have been held and the new government requests it.

     Step 3 involves nullifying the various orders issued by Bremer�s Coalition Provisional Authority, which have helped fuel economic insecurity and political instability.   Amongst other things, Bremer made Iraq into the world�s first large economy with no tariff protection whatsoever, allowing its markets to be flooded by cheap low quality imports that decimated local businesses. Bremer also eliminated taxes on foreign-grown food and tariffs that protected national growers, which ensured that many Iraqi farmers could no longer keep their farms active. Order 40, �the Bank Law,� saw Iraqi banks sold to three foreign groups, and eliminated prohibitions on high interest rates, an issue rife with religious sensitivity (Palast 71 � 73). Other orders included a 100 percent repatriation rate for foreign profits earned in Iraq, 100 percent foreign ownership of Iraqi businesses, 100 percent immunity for foreign contractors from Iraqi laws, and the privatization of all of Iraq�s state owned businesses by foreign owners (Jamail and Fadhily). As a result, national unemployment rates average about 60 to 70 percent, leaving most Iraqi families with little capital to purchase what little necessities are available, such as food and oil (Arnove). In the midst of this enormous economic depression, the World Bank and its cohorts at the International Monetary Fund continue to demand that if Iraq wants to receive $18 billion in aid, it must reform everything from food and fuel subsidies to payroll and pension policies. As Greg Palast explains it, ��Reform� is IMF-speak for �cut�. Cut food subsidies, cut fuel, cut pensions, cut payrolls� (130). Both Bremer�s CPA Orders and the advice of the World Bank must be done away with to bring more economic stability to the people of Iraq. Poverty is both a form of violence and a cause of violence; the old adage teaches us that desperate people will turn to desperate measures. In order for Iraq to return to a peaceful existence, the economic policies of its government must not be foreign-imposed; they must be just and allow Iraq to develop its own economy.
Bremer issued one final order before the CPA was disbanded, Order 100: �the interim government and all subsequent Iraqi governments inherit full responsibility for these laws, regulations, orders, memoranda, instructions, and directives� (qtd. in Palast 131). As a condition for withdrawal, the coalition forces must agree to nullify any tinkering done with Iraq�s legal code, including Bremer�s orders. Additionally, the United States, the country with the most influence at both the World Bank and the IMF (the United States controls both institutions and appoints their presidents), should pressure these groups to allow Iraq their aid money and loans without the stipulations placed upon their economic policies.

     Step 4 deals with the issue of Iraq�s reconstruction. While the United States government has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into Iraq, the only money earmarked for reconstruction was given at the beginning of the invasion, and has been used up completely already. But a majority of Iraq�s infrastructure has not been repaired, and most Iraqis still do not have access to electricity, hot water, or health care services. Therefore, while the United States should pull out its troops, it should not simply abandon Iraq. Money should be moved from the war effort into the reconstruction effort, and should not be used to hire American companies, as it is now. Instead, the money should be used to hire Iraqi businesses and laborers, a move that will have two benefits. First, this will be a direct infusion of money into Iraq�s economy, which will benefit more than just the immediate recipients. Money that is used to rebuild factories and begin production again, and in combination with the reintroduced taxes on imported goods, the revenue from products sold will create more money, which can be used to hire more workers. Secondly, the lower the amount of unemployed men and women, the fewer recruits for extremist groups. A former officer in the Iraqi army explains this in the documentary Occupation: Dreamland: �If they want to succeed in Falluja they should provide work for all these people. They are all unemployed. What do they have? These people, I would put them to work. They come back from work tired and they�ll go to sleep. They won�t think about politics, or anything else. They�ll go to sleep right away.� As money begins to flow back into Iraq�s economy, the benefits will be felt by all: as employment rises, families will be able to provide for themselves basic necessities, which will become increasingly available at lower prices. Extremist groups who promise their followers basic protections, such as shelter and a job, will lose their appeal, which will further eliminate sectarian violence.

     Finally, step 5 deals with the large numbers of young men and the smaller number of women who were taken into captivity by coalition and Iraqi forces during the occupation. The holding of these people, the vast majority of whom are suspected of being innocent, causes tension and anger amongst the family and friends of the prisoners. With no other hope for legal redress, many of these families turn to extremist groups to exact revenge, especially after revelations that torture and executions are rampant in many American and Iraqi prisons. After the election of a new government, coalition forces should agree to release those prisoners they have no evidence against, and turn the remainder over to the Iraqi government. Prisoners who are being held based solely upon hearsay or confessions extracted from torture should be turned over to the Iraqi government, who in turn must decide to pardon or continue to prosecute these people in a fair manner. Any prisoners who happen to have hard evidence against them should be given speedy trials in front of a jury of their peers � not members of the United States military.

     Of course, there is no guarantee that these measures will completely eliminate the radical elements that are now present in Iraq. Historically there has been no conflict between the various religious factions in Iraq, and the terrorist group Al-Qaeda was never present there, but now, after 4 years of war and occupation by a foreign power seen as advancing an agenda of economic imperialism, it is hard to say whether or not the people of Iraq will be able to let go of the injustices done to them. While the above steps can be mandated by international governments, one step cannot be signed into law: a strong leader must step into the spotlight in Iraq and urge the Iraqi people to come together in unity and forgive the citizens of the world for their governments� actions.

Works Cited
Arnove, Anthony. �Iraq: More Hellish Now Than Under Saddam.� AlterNet. 20 Dec. 2006. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/45699/>.

Buncombe, Andrew and Patrick Cockburn. �Iraq�s death squads: On the brink of civil war.� The Independent. 26 Feb. 2006. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article347806.ece>.

Hersh, Seymour M. �Moving Targets.� The New Yorker. 8 Dec. 2003. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/031215fa_fact?031215fa_fact>.

Hirsh, Michael and John Barry. ��The Salvador Option�.� Newsweek. 8 Jan. 2005. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6802629/site/newsweek>.

Huffington, Arianna. �Civil War Looms; Media Yawns.� AlterNet. 13 Jan. 2006. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/30811/>.

Jamail, Dahr and Ali Al-Fadhily. �Business Is the Next Big Casualty in Iraq.� AlterNet. 4 Dec. 2006. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/45068/>.

Karadsheh, Jomana. �U.S. cracks down on Iraq death squads.� CNN.com International. 25 July 2006. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/24/iraq.main/>.

Occupation: Dreamland. Dir. Garrett Scott and Ian Olds. Perf. Matt Bacik, John Byler, Chris Corcionne, Eric Forbes, Patrick Napoli, Luis Pacheco, Thomas Tuner, and Joseph Wood. DVD. Rumur Releasing LLC, 2005.

Palast, Greg. Armed Madhouse. New York: Penguin Group Inc., 2006.

Swanson, David. �We Must Prevent Permanent Bases in Iraq.� AlterNet. 8 Dec. 2006. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/45223/>.

Wilkins, Dexter. �Tough New Tactics by U.S. Tighten Grip on Iraq Towns.� CommonDreams.org News Center. 7 Dec. 2003. 29 Jan. 2007 <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1207-06.htm>.