Biblical
Basis for God’s Foreknowledge
Exegetical
Reasons for Affirming God’s Foreknowledge
God’s
Foreknowledge of Choices
We
have wills and make choices
Things
are possible to us and within our ability
God
has ability to do otherwise than a prophesied event
God
Conveyed As Expressing Regret/Changing His mind
God
Conveyed as Surprised, Frustrated or Discovering what we choose
Causal
vs Logical Relationship
Arguments
for Theological Prognostic Determinism..
Two
Primary Deterministic Arguments
Argument
Based on Impossibility of a Contradiction
Argument
Based on Accidental Necessity
Preliminary
Responses to the Two Primary Arguments.
Impossibility
of a Contradiction
The
Compatibility of God’s Foreknowledge and our Freedom
Evaluation
of Alternative Explanations of God’s foreknowledge and freedom
Historic
(Accidental) Necessity
The
Basis of Truth in the Past
Analysis
of the Future as the Logical Basis for Statements about the Future
Logical
Relationships which are temporally inverted
Correspondence
theory of Truth
Appendix
A Freddosso’s Definitions
Metaphysically
De Re Necessity
De
Re Accidental Necessity (the Necessity of the Past)
De
Dicto Deterministic Natural Tendency/Aversion
De
Dicto natural Necessity/Impossibility.
De
Re Deterministic Natural Inclination/Repugnance
De
Re Natural Necessity/Impossibility/Contingency
The issue of God’s foreknowledge and freewill has been debated for centuries. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the compatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. The scriptures do not directly claim either that God has exhaustive infallible foreknowledge nor that man is free. Nevertheless, by putting the pieces together, such conclusions are inescapable.
I plan on first establishing God’s foreknowledge from scripture and then human ability from scripture. I will then construct and analyze three common but mistaken arguments for the incompatibility of foreknowledge and freewill. Then we will look at two much stronger arguments, one based on the necessity of the past and one based on our inability to bring about logical contradictions. I will review a proposed solution for each, a modified definition of the necessity of the past, and a modified definition of freewill. I will then propose my own analysis of the arguments and I intend to show an additional premise in both arguments. I will then discuss the definition of human ability, various models for understanding God’s foreknowledge and finally give my reasons for rejecting the additional premise.
Historically the vast majority of theologians have agreed that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. In recent times however, this belief has come into question. Specifically, Open Theists have denied that God knows future choices made by people. They agree that God knows what He will do, because no one would have the power to stop him. But they don’t think He knows the results of man’s freewill till they occur.
The primary reasons to affirm God’s foreknowledge are:
Isaiah goes to great lengths to declare that God knows the future. He uses “trial speeches” to show that other “gods” do not know the future, and in comparison God does. The key evidence in the trail is that other gods do not know the future, but God does. We find six trial speeches on the subject in Isaiah (Isaiah 41:2-5, 21-29; 42:18-25; 43:8-13; 44:6-20; 45:20-25). The primary passage is the prediction of Cyrus by name some three hundred years before his birth (Isa 44:28 and 45:1).
The first trial speech starts in Isa 41:21-29 with a challenge to the gods:
“Present your case,” says the LORD. “Set forth your arguments,” says Jacob’s King. “Bring in your idols to tell us what is going to happen. Tell us what the former things were, so that we may consider them and know their final outcome. Or declare to us the things to come, tell us what the future holds, so we may know that you are gods. Do something, whether good or bad, so that we will be dismayed and filled with fear.” (Isa 41:21-23).
The gods cannot do this, so God says: “But you are less than nothing and your works are utterly worthless; he who chooses you is detestable.” (Isa 41:24).
Then God shows that He does know the future, by predicting the coming deliverance of his people through Cyrus.
“I have stirred up one from the north, and he comes – one
from the rising sun who calls on my name. He treads on rulers as if there were
mortar, as if he were a potter treading the clay. Who told of this from the
beginning, so we could know, or beforehand, so we could say ‘He was right?’ No
one told of this, no one foretold it, no one heard any words from you. I was
the first to tell
Because the other gods cannot predict the future, God declares: “See, they are all false! Their deeds amount to nothing; their images are but wind and confusion” (Isa 41:29).
God alone can tell the future, even Cyrus’s actions and choices (v25).
The argument goes deeper. It is the glory of God that He knows the future. So he argues once again in Isa 42:8-9:
“I am the LORD; that is my name! I will not give my glory to another or my praise to idols. See the former things have taken place, and new things I declare; before they spring into being I announce them to you.”
Note that God links His glory with His ability to tell the future. Secondarily, note that God describes future events as ones that have not yet sprung into being. God knows about the events before they exist.
God continues with the same theme:
“Which of them foretold this and proclaimed to us the former things? Let them bring in their witnesses to prove they were right, so that other may hear and say, ‘It is true.’ You are my witnesses, declares the LORD, and my servant whom I have chosen, so that you may know and believe me and understand that I am he. Before me no god was formed, nor will there be one after me. I, even I, and the LORD, and apart from me there is no savior. I have revealed and saved and proclaimed – I, and not some foreign god among you. (Isa 43:9-12)
Who then is like me? Let him proclaim it. Let him declare and lay out before me what has happened since I established my ancient people, and what is yet to come – yes, let him foretell what will come. Do not tremble, do not be afraid. Did I not proclaim this and foretell it long ago? You are my witnesses. Is there any God besides me? No, there is no other Rock; I know not one. (Isa 44:7-8).”
Then comes a concrete example. God is able to predict Cyrus’s birth and
choices. In Isa 44:26-45:6, God says of Cyrus: “He is my shepherd and will
accomplish all that I please; he will say of
Isaiah’s key argument that God alone is worthy of worship and other gods do not exist is that God can tell the future and others cannot. That God can tell the future is repeated often and is given as the reason He is God.
Now some have countered that God did know what Cyrus would do and that God can sometimes remove freedom to know the future. But once this thread is pulled what unravels? If God knew Cyrus’s name, He knew what his parents would name Cyrus so that must not have been a choice either. Nor would any threat to Cyrus’s rule or life. Indeed much of what looks like choices must not in fact be choices after all.
Rather we should affirm that God passes the test He put to the other gods: “declare to us the things to come, tell us what the future holds, so we may know that you are gods”.
Isaiah argues that Jehovah is God because He can tell the future. Christ makes the same argument regarding Himself. He uses His prediction about the actions of Judas as proof of his own deity. In John 13:18-19, Jesus says:18 "I do not speak of all of you. I know the ones I have chosen; but it is that the Scripture may be fulfilled, 'HE WHO EATS MY BREAD HAS LIFTED UP HIS HEEL AGAINST ME.' 19 "From now on I am telling you before it comes to pass, so that when it does occur, you may believe that I am He. (NASB)
It’s true that the NASB adds “He” and it’s also true that not every occurrence of “ego eimi” is indicative of Jesus’ claim to deity. But in this case we do not have a predicate nominative. Christ is not saying “I am He”, but rather “I am”, which is a reference to the old testament passage where Moses finds out God’s name. This is a strong claim to diety by Christ, based on His ability to tell the future. Would Jesus have risked the proof of his own deity without being certain? No way!
Jesus makes a very specific prediction that Peter will betray him. This prediction is found in all four of the Gospels (Matt 26:34; Mark 14:30; Luke 22:34; John 13:38).
Jesus knew from early in His ministry that Judas was evil (John 6:70), and while eating the Last Supper, Jesus predicted Judas’ betrayal (Mat. 26:25), fulfilling a thousand-year-old prophecy found in Psalms 41:9: “Even my own familiar friend in whom I trusted, who ate my bread, has lifted up his heel against me”. Christ knew of Judas’s betrayal in detail, He knew: “all things that would come upon Him” (John 18:4). “Then was fulfilled what was spoken by Jeremiah the prophet, saying, ‘And they took the thirty pieces of silver… and gave them for the potter’s field, as the LORD directed me” (Mat. 27:9). “For it is written in the book of Psalms: ‘Let his dwelling place be desolate…’ and, ‘Let another take his office’” (Ps. 69:35; 109:8; Acts 1:20). Peter described the actions of Judas as a certain fulfillment of prophecy: “this Scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit spoke before by the mouth of David concerning Judas” (Acts 1:16).
Psalms 147:5 says: “Great is our Lord, and of great power: his understanding is infinite.”
Given the principle of bivalence, statements about the future are either true or false. Given God’s knowledge is infinite, He must know all truths.
This answers the possible counter argument that yes, God knew Peter and Judas’ choices, but not other choices. If He knows some, they are knowable. His knowledge being infinite, He knows them all.
Many passages speak of God’s foreknowing and predestining either people or events. Such passages don’t make sense without God knowing the future.
Acts 4:27-28 for truly in this city there were gathered together against your
holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along
with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever your hand and your
plan had predestined to take place.
Romans 8:28-30 And we know that for those who love God all things work together for good,[a] for those who are called according to his purpose. 29For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. 30And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified.
Ephesians 1:4-6 even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him. In love 5he predestined us[a] for adoption through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will, 6to the praise of his glorious grace, with which he has blessed us in the Beloved.
Scriptural evidence for freewill is taken from five types of passages. First there are passages which say we make choices and have abilities. Second, there are passages indicating God interacts with us. God is in control, but He is not a puppet-master. He enters relationships with His creatures. Passages in this second category are those in which God changes His mind, is conveyed as acting surprised, frustrated or discovering things we do, and passages in which God tests us. Third are passages in which God’s will is not done. Fourth are passages in which God’s grace is resisted. And fifth are passages that teach responsibility.
The scriptures declare in many places that we have wills and make choices. We are said to be under no constraint, but have authority over our own will (1 Corinthians 7:37), prophecy is contrasted with acts made by the human will (2 Peter 1:20-21), Paul contrasts willingness to compulsion when obtaining reward (1 Corinthians 9:14-18) and contrasts compulsion to freewill (Philemon 1:14). Offerings are distinguished between freewill and required (Ezra 7:16) and sins between willing and ignorant (Hebrews 10:26). God sets blessings and curses before us and commands us to choose life (Deuteronomy 30:19) and His servants demand that we make a choice as to who we will serve (Joshua 24:15).
Romans 12:18 says “If possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all.” And I Corinthians 10:13 says 13No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it.
Perhaps one of the strongest examples of how freedom is compatible with foreknowledge is God. If God knows He will do A, can He do B? The scriptural answer is a resounding, yes. Christ said:
Mat 26:53-54 Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels? But how then shall the scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?
Christ knew that He was going to die, yet he had the ability to avoid doing so. This freedom highlights His love for us, but also is a clear demonstration of the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge.
This does not demonstrate that we are free, only that God is. However, it does show that an event can be foreknown and happen freely.
The next set of passages teach that God interacts with and responses to men’s choices. God gives us a certain amount of “space” for freedom. He has a relationship with man, and it is not one sided. But He is in control.
Gen 6:5The LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intention of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. 6And the LORD was sorry that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart. 7So the LORD said, "I will blot out man whom I have created from the face of the land, man and animals and creeping things and birds of the heavens, for I am sorry that I have made them."
1 Sam 2:30Therefore the LORD the God of Israel declares: 'I promised that your house and the house of your father should go in and out before me forever,' but now the LORD declares: 'Far be it from me, for those who honor me I will honor, and those who despise me shall be lightly esteemed.
1 Sam15:10The word of the LORD came to Samuel: 11"I regret that I have made Saul king, for he has turned back from following me and has not performed my commandments." (crossreference 1 Sam 13:13)
Jeremiah 18:5Then the word of the LORD came to me: 6"O
house of
Jeremiah 26:7-11,13, 16-19
7The priests and the prophets and all the people heard
Jeremiah speaking these words in the house of the LORD. 8And when Jeremiah had
finished speaking all that the LORD had commanded him to speak to all the
people, then the priests and the prophets and all the people laid hold of him,
saying, "You shall die! 9Why
have you prophesied in the name of the LORD, saying, 'This house shall be like
10When the officials of
12Then Jeremiah spoke to all the officials and all the people, saying, "The LORD sent me to prophesy against this house and this city all the words you have heard. 13Now therefore mend your ways and your deeds, and obey the voice of the LORD your God, and the LORD will relent of the disaster that he has pronounced against you. 14But as for me, behold, I am in your hands. Do with me as seems good and right to you. 15Only know for certain that if you put me to death, you will bring innocent blood upon yourselves and upon this city and its inhabitants, for in truth the LORD sent me to you to speak all these words in your ears."
16Then the officials and all the people said to the priests
and the prophets, "This man does not deserve the sentence of death, for he
has spoken to us in the name of the LORD our God." 17And certain of the
elders of the land arose and spoke to all the assembled people, saying,
18"Micah of Moresheth prophesied in the days of Hezekiah king of Judah,
and said to all the people of Judah: 'Thus says the LORD of hosts,
"'Zion shall be plowed as a field;
Jerusalem shall become a heap of ruins,
and the mountain of the house a wooded height.'
19Did Hezekiah king of
Joel 2:12-13 “12"Yet even now," declares the LORD,
"return to me with all your heart,
with fasting, with weeping, and with mourning;
13and rend your hearts and not your garments."
Return to the LORD, your God,
for he is gracious and merciful,
slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love;
and he relents over disaster.”
Jon 3:9-10, 4:2 “9Who knows? God may turn and relent and turn from his fierce anger, so that we may not perish."
10When God saw what they did, how they turned from their evil way, God relented of the disaster that he had said he would do to them, and he did not do it.”
2And he prayed to the LORD and said, "O LORD, is not this what I said when I was yet in my country? That is why I made haste to flee to Tarshish; for I knew that you are a gracious God and merciful, slow to anger and abounding in steadfast love, and relenting from disaster.
1 Chronicles 21:15 “15And God sent the angel to
Ex 32:14 “12Why should the Egyptians say, 'With evil intent did he bring them out, to kill them in the mountains and to consume them from the face of the earth'? Turn from your burning anger and relent from this disaster against your people. 13Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, your servants, to whom you swore by your own self, and said to them, 'I will multiply your offspring as the stars of heaven, and all this land that I have promised I will give to your offspring, and they shall inherit it forever.'" 14And the LORD relented from the disaster that he had spoken of bringing on his people.”
Ps 106:23 “23Therefore he said he would destroy them--
had not Moses, his chosen one,
stood in the breach before him,
to turn away his wrath from destroying them.”
Now some object that divine repentance is an anthropomorphism. Just as the scriptures say that God has hands and council (Acts 4:28), yet God does not have hands or take council, so the scriptures say God repents, but He does not repent. Other passages teach us that God is a Spirit (John 4:24), so He must not have a body, and that God does not change His mind (Numbers 23:19), so He must not repent.
Now it seems true that divine repentance is an anthropomorphism. But just as God’s hand figuratively represents His power, and council represents His wisdom, so to divine repentance must represent something. What seems to be represented is that God’s decisions take into account human decisions. God interacts with and has relationships with us.
Following the thought process regarding anthropomorphisms above, we see some expressions in scripture which seem to go as far as to say that God does not know the future. God speaks in probabilistic language or thinks that such and such should happen but it doesn’t, or expresses frustration concerning what we do. These texts are not teaching that God is ignorant, but rather that He is interactive.
Ex 4:8"If they will not believe you," God said, "or listen to the first sign, they may believe the latter sign.
Jeremiah 3:6The LORD said to me in the days of King Josiah: "Have
you seen what she did, that faithless one,
Jeremiah 3:19"'I said
How I would set you among my sons,
and give you a pleasant land,
a heritage most beautiful of all nations.
And I thought you would call me, My
Father,
and would not turn from following me.
20Surely, as a treacherous wife leaves her husband,
so have you been treacherous to me, O house of Israel,
declares the LORD.'"
Isaiah 5:1-4 “1Let me sing for my beloved
my love song concerning his vineyard:
My beloved had a vineyard
on a very fertile hill.
2He dug it and cleared it of stones,
and planted it with choice vines;
he built a watchtower in the midst of it,
and hewed out a wine vat in it;
and he looked for it to yield grapes,
but it yielded wild grapes.
3And now, O inhabitants of
and men of
judge between me and my vineyard.
4What more was there to do for my
vineyard,
that I have not done in it?
When I looked for it to yield grapes,
why did it yield wild grapes?”
Psalms 81:13 “Oh that My people would listen to Me, that
These passages perhaps support that God’s knowledge of what we would do under certain circumstances, in part depends on us. God uses this knowledge to decide and know what will happen. Regardless, even though God knows what we will do, He is still conveyed as surprised by what we do, demonstrating His interactive relationship with us.
Yet another example along a very similar path is God testing people. God foreknows what we will do, yet He still tests us. Why? Not to know what will happen, He already knows that. Rather, He wants to interact with us.
Genesis 22:12 “12He said, "Do not lay your hand on the boy or do anything to him, for now I know that you fear God, seeing you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me."”
2 Chronicles 32:31And so in the matter of the envoys of the princes of Babylon, who had been sent to him to inquire about the sign that had been done in the land, God left him to himself, in order to test him and to know all that was in his heart.
Deuteronomy 8:2And you shall remember the whole way that the LORD your God has led you these forty years in the wilderness, that he might humble you, testing you to know what was in your heart, whether you would keep his commandments or not.
Deuteronomy 13:1-3 1"If a prophet or a dreamer of dreams arises among you and gives you a sign or a wonder, 2and the sign or wonder that he tells you comes to pass, and if he says, 'Let us go after other gods,' which you have not known, 'and let us serve them,' 3you shall not listen to the words of that prophet or that dreamer of dreams. For the LORD your God is testing you, to know whether you love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul.
Judges 3:4 They were
for the testing of
The bible calls God’s commands His will. God want’s us to obey His commandments.
Ephesians 6:6 Obey them not only to win their favor when their eye is on you, but like slaves of Christ, doing the will of God from your heart.
John 7:17 If anyone's will is to do God's will, he will know whether the teaching is from God or whether I am speaking on my own authority.
Ezra 10:11Now then make confession to the LORD, the God of your fathers and do his will. Separate yourselves from the peoples of the land and from the foreign wives."
Luke 12:47 And that servant who knew his master's will but did not get ready or act according to his will, will receive a severe beating.
If we are not free and only do what God wants, how do we disobey His commands? Does God both want and not want us to sin? This seems to be a contradiction in God’s will.
Because of the devastating influence of sin in the world, God’s grace must bring us to Himself. Yet not all those who are being brought to God come. The gospel call is often broken down to the external preaching of the word, and the internal calling of the Holy Spirit within us. Yet scripture teaches some resist the Spirit and reject God’s purpose. This does not apply just to the external preaching. Those whom Christ would gather, those whom the Spirit is calling, those whom are partakes of the Sprit, resist to their own ruin.
Further, if the same call given to some who reject, would have been given to others, they would have repented. The call is the same, the response different. This is strong evidence of freedom.
Matthew 23:37"O
Acts 7:51"You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Spirit. As your fathers did, so do you.
Luke 7:30but the Pharisees and the lawyers rejected the purpose of God for themselves, not having been baptized by him.)
Hebrews 6:4For it is impossible to restore again to repentance those who have once been enlightened, who have tasted the heavenly gift, and have shared in the Holy Spirit, 5and have tasted the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come, 6if they then fall away, since they are crucifying once again the Son of God to their own harm and holding him up to contempt.
Mathew 11:21"Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you,
Those who resist, perish, contrary to God’s will. (Ezekiel 33:11, 1 Timothy 2:4, 2 Peter 3:9)
Perhaps the strongest evidence of freedom is in the area of responsibility. Arguments based on responsibility is two fold: we are responsible for our sin, and God is not responsible for our sin. God is holy and as such He cannot be the author of sin.
James 1:13 Let no one say when he is tempted, "I am being tempted by God," for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one.
Given freedom, this makes perfect sense. God is not responsible and we are, because we are freely sinning. Without freedom, responsibility becomes much harder to explain. Why blame us if we couldn’t do anything about it? Some say God sovereignly holds us accountable. But righteousness and justice are the foundation of God’s Sovereignty, not the other way around.
Psalms 97:2 Clouds and thick darkness are all around him;
righteousness and justice are the foundation of his throne.
Thus there must be a basis for just punishment beyond just God said so.
With God’s foreknowledge and freedom firmly in view, we will now proceed in the discussion of their compatibility.
Before we get into the arguments I think it will be worthwhile to define and distinguish the various types of necessity. They are logical necessity, causal necessity and the necessity of the past. These definitions are provided by Alfred Freddosso in his article the Necessity of Nature. What follows is a highly summarized and simplified version of his definitions, which are provided in detail in the appendix.
A proposition is logically necessary if and only if p is true at every moment in every possible world. An example of something that is logically necessary are the statements “God is good” or “A=A”. An event is causally necessary if and only if it has a natural sufficient cause, which is not impeded by an indeterministic cause. An example would be a fire that causally necessitates a kettle to water to boil, so long as no one chooses to remove the kettle. A proposition is historically necessary if and only if it’s true in every possible future that shares the same history with the possible world in which the proposition is made.
Beyond Freddosso’s definitions above, there are a few important distinctions to make, including the differences between changing and causing and a logical vs. a causal relationship. There seems to be an important distinction between causing and changing the past or future. The power to changing the past or future would seem to indicate that one has the power to bring about a different event than the one that will happen or one that did happen. Causing the past or future would seem to indicate that one has the power to causally contribute to the events that will and did happen.
Logical relationships are not causal relationships. Examples of logical relationships are that of premises to a conclusion or “4 is a prime number because it is divisible by 2”. Note the word “because”. This seems to indicate causation, but it does not. This distinction sometimes create semantic problems, so I will use the phrase "bring it about that" rather than "causes", to indicate logical rather than causal relationships.
The correspondence of truth with reality is a logical relationship. The tree in my back yard burned to the ground. This statement is true if my tree in fact burned. Now the burning of my tree didn’t cause the truth, but it brought about the logical relationship between reality and the truth of the statement. On the other hand, fire was the cause of the tree burning and the tree burning caused the bush to catch fire. These are causal relationships.
If God knows that I will put on a blue shirt tomorrow, can I choose to put on a red one? The theological prognostic determinist[1] says, no. God’s foreknowledge precludes such an ability, because it entails an error within God’s knowledge.
At first this augment seems obscure. How does God’s knowledge take away my ability? It doesn’t. Rather, the argument is that there isn’t any possibility of us to put on a red shirt for us to actualize. If I want to buy a cheeseburger I need both the money to do so, and someone to sell me a cheeseburger. Arguments from a causal necessity standpoint are like those saying I have no money. I don’t have the power needed to obtain alternative possibilities. Arguments from a prognostic determinism standpoint, however, are more like saying there are no cheeseburger’s to purchase. They don’t directly impact me. Rather, they remove the alternative possibilities that are supposedly in my power.
Let’s get into the arguments.
Here’s a matrix of 4 scenarios, given God’s foreknowledge and Bob’s choice of A or B:
|
|
God foreknows A |
God foreknows B |
|
Bob Choose A |
|
|
|
Bob Chooses B |
|
|
Next, we layer in the impact of God’s infallibility:
|
|
God foreknows A |
God foreknows B |
|
Bob Chooses A |
|
Impossible due to infallibility |
|
Bob Chooses B |
Impossible due to infallibility |
|
At this point, Bob still has two options, but the conjunct of Bob doing one thing and God foreknowing another is impossible. From this the determinists forms his first argument.
P1: If God knows Bob will do A, Bob will do A
P2: God knows Bob will do A
C1: Bob cannot do nonA
Here it is in matrix format:
|
|
God foreknows A |
God foreknows B |
|
Bob Chooses A |
|
Impossible due to infallibility |
|
Bob Chooses B |
Impossible due to infallibility |
Impossible because Bob will choose A |
Notice the prognostic determinist’s strategy is not to show that A is necessary directly by demonstrating something about A. Rather, via process of elimination A is necessary. That is to say there are no possible alternatives.
The error is in substituting “will” for “can”. Can isn’t part of either of the premises, so it was erroneously imported into the conclusion. However, from this, the determinist might fine tune their argument a bit. The next two arguments will be considered together.
P1: If God knows Bob will do A, Bob will do A
P2: God knows Bob will do A
C1: Given A, Bob cannot do nonA
C2: Bob cannot do nonA
|
|
God foreknows A |
God foreknows B |
|
Bob Chooses A |
|
Impossible due to infallibility |
|
Bob Chooses B |
Impossible due to infallibility |
Impossible, since 1) A will happen and 2) A and nonA are impossible |
C1 is true, but should not be understood as an abridgement of Bob’s abilities. Bob can do B, such that, were he to do so, God would have foreknow Bob will do B.
P1 does not lead to that B cannot happen, only that it will not. P2 is a tautology, and not a restriction on Bob’s abilities, but it does lead to this clarification: Bob has the ability to choose B, such that, were he to choose B, God would have foreknown B.
Freewill isn’t the ability to do both alternatives (ie A & nonA) rather it’s the ability to do either. Hence Bob’s inability to do A & nonA doesn’t remove freewill. What matters is his ability to do nonA.
C2 however does not follow from the premises. To derive C2 is to commit a division fallacy. The conjunct of A and nonA is impossible. Dividedly, A is not necessary, nor nonA impossible.
The first three arguments were relatively easy to explain and relatively easy to disprove. However, each leaves us with the feeling that there is a bit more to understand, and each argument builds on the previous. The following two arguments are the culmination of the last three and are much tougher to resolve.
P1: "Bob will do A" and "Bob will do nonA" is a contradiction
P2: God knows "Bob will do A" is true
C1: Given "Bob will do A" is true, "Bob will do nonA" cannot be true
P3: Bob’s ability to become the basis of truth of "Bob will do nonA" entails the possibility of truth of "Bob will do nonA"
C2: Bob cannot become the basis of truth of "Bob will do A"
|
|
God foreknows A |
God foreknows B |
|
Bob Chooses A |
|
Impossible due to infallibility |
|
Bob Chooses B |
Impossible due to infallibility |
Impossible contradiction entailed |
God already knows what will happen. His foreknowledge is fixed and cannot change. If the foreknowledge of A is fixed, so is A. It’s unfair to talk about God’s foreknowledge as it could have been as a solution to the second argument above. God’s foreknowledge is, and more importantly, it was before A. Hence we arrive at:
P1: At T1, God knows "Bob will do A" is true
P2: The past is accidentally necessary
C1: Therefore, between T1 and T3, "Bob will do A" cannot change
P3: P2 entails that if T3 is present, "Bob is doing A" is true
C2: Therefore, no one, including Bob, has the power at or before T3, to become the basis of truth that if T3 is present, "Bob is doing A" isn't true.
|
|
God foreknows A |
God foreknows B |
|
Bob Chooses A |
|
Impossible due to infallibility |
|
Bob Chooses B |
Impossible due to infallibility |
Impossible since God foreknew A in the past, and the past cannot change |
This argument is based on the necessity of the past. To my knowledge it’s the strongest argument for determinism based on God’s foreknowledge. In some sense, it’s at the root of the above arguments, but it’s fashioned in a tighter structure.
The point is that in my response to argument three above, it’s unfair for me to speak of what God’s foreknowledge could have been. God’s actual foreknowledge precedes the event, so it’s part of the event’s history. Therefore, God’s foreknowledge is necessary. And since God’s foreknowledge has an unbreakable link with A, A also is necessary.
William Lain Craig and Alfred Freddoso have provided expert analysis on these two arguments. They have taught me more than any others on these issues. In what follows, we will examine their answers to these arguments. For them most part, I accept their answers and any modifications I make are more or less intended to be clarifications.
William Lane Craig has provided counter arguments our inability to bring about logically incompatible states of affairs. His primary maneuver is to define ability in such a way that this inability does not matter.
In Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism : Omniscience (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History) Craig defines “within one’s power” as:
I could do some action A, if I wanted to and were I to do A, then some consequence C would obtain.
Craig then defends this definition via a sequence of arguments.
1) distinguishing between will and could (claiming the logical consequence is that A will not obtain, not that it could not)
2) claiming that the truth value of propositions is a consequence, not a condition, of what I do and therefore isn’t logically available to restrict what I do
3) Agrees that we cannot change the future but makes a distinction between a divided and compound sense affirming we can change the future in a divided sense, but not in a compound sense
4) Similarly agrees we cannot change the past, but claims that we do have the ability to act in such a way that the past would have been different
Now these arguments seem valid. Particularly, 1, 2 and 4 are unassailable. 3 however may be something of a problem. It leaves questions as to how the prognostic determinism argument is resolved and what does Craig mean by a divided sense? Consider Craig’s argument:
“Utilizing the medieval distinction between the senses, however, consider the proposition
2. A future event can fail to occur.
In sensu diviso, (2) means
3. Possibly, an event, which is future, will fail to occur
and is true if the event is contingent. But taken in sensu composito, (2) means
4. Possibly, an event which is future will fail to occur,
which is necessarily false. Thus, what is at issue with regard to the misleading notion of "altering the future" is whether one has the power to prevent a future event in sensu diviso. One can prevent the event, but were one to do so, then the event would not be future. To say that one cannot prevent a future event in sensu composito is merely to assert that one cannot bring it about that the event both will and will not occur--hardly a restriction on human freedom!”
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/hasker.html
I will be the first to admit I am not entirely clear on what Craig means. He is either understanding “ability” in a divided sense or “the future” in a divided sense. To define ability in a divided sense is to define ability ignoring the implications of the future on that ability. To define the future in a divided sense is to make a distinction between a possible future and the actual future, and then divide out the actual future.
Craig continues:
“But is there not a similar fatal fallacy in theological fatalism? Consider
8. An event foreknown by God can fail to occur.
In sensu composito, this means
9. Possibly, an event which is foreknown by God will fail to occur,
which is self-contradictory. But in sensu diviso, (8) means
10. Possibly, an event, which is foreknown by God, will fail to occur,
which may be true.
Thus, my ability to prevent the event is not the ability the bring about the self-contradictory state of affairs that God foreknew the event and the event does not occur. It is the power to prevent the event, which is foreknown by God, and were I to do so, it would not have been foreknown by Him.”
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/hasker.html
Craig’s meaning is still not entirely clear to me, but he seems to be defining possibility in a divided sense, not considering the implications of God’s foreknowledge. The alternative is a divided sense of God’s foreknowledge, but it is tough to see what a divided sense to God’s foreknowledge would be, so likely “possibility” is probably being defined in a divided sense.
Craig continues:
“Hasker would reply that it is not within my power under the circumstances to act differently now. But the fallacy in in this reply may be seen by means of a second distinction, closely related to the first, which the medievals discerned, that between necessitas consequentiae and necessitas consequentis or the necessity of a hypothetical inference versus the necessity of the consequent of the hypothetical. Thus the proposition
11. If God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter cannot refrain from sinning,
properly understood, means
12. Necessarily, if God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter does not refrain from sinning.
Hasker is misled by (11) into asserting a necessitas consequentis which he interprets as a abridgement of Peter's personal power. But what is impossible is not Peter's refraining from sin, but the composite state of affairs of God's foreknowledge of Peter's sin and Peter's refraining. That is to say, the proposition
13. Peter can refrain
from the sin which God foreknew he would commit
is false in sensu
composito, but true in sensu diviso.
Of course, (13)'s truth in sensu diviso implies that a backtracking counterfactual is in order here, in that since the composite state of affairs is impossible, Peter's power to refrain implies that were he to refrain, the circumstances (God's foreknowledge) would have been different.”
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/hasker.html
Here it seems clearer that Peter’s ability (not God’s foreknowledge) is being defined in a divided sense.
Craig’s strategy is to use 2 above (claiming that the truth value of propositions is a consequence, not a condition, of what I do) to defend our ability in a divided sense and to minimize the damage of the compound sense to our inability to bring about either A or nonA but not both.
I agree with much of what Craig says. But there does seem to be a problem here. The divided sense seems to be dividing out the implications of the future and God’s foreknowledge from consideration in defining our ability. Of course without them we wouldn’t have to worry about prognostic determinism. I don’t see how this move avoids the problem. How does not considering God’s foreknowledge in defining freedom help reconcile God’s foreknowledge and freedom?
Calvinists affirm freedom in a divided sense, excluding the sufficient cause of our acts, such that were the causes different, our acts would be different. Albeit, what the Calvinists divides out is different (the Calvinist divides out a sufficient cause, Craig divides out God’s foreknowledge), the challenges with this approach are the same. We would like to understand the issue in a compound sense. So a divided sense in which God’s foreknowledge is divided out is unsatisfying in explaining how God’s foreknowledge is compatible with freedom.
Beyond the issues related to the divided sense, it seems the damage done in the compound sense is broader than our inability to bring about that an event will and will not occur. Rather, given that the event will occur, it is not in our power to bring about that the event will not occur, even as Craig defines “within our power”.
Now it seems Craig is using the divided sense to explain in what sense we have the ability to change the future. I somewhat agree with the approach. But I prefer to understand the future in a divided sense, as oppose to our ability in a divided sense. That is to say, considering a future event as any possible event that hasn’t happen yet and not one defined event. In this regard we can change future events. But if we consider the future as a defined set of events that will happen, we cannot change the future. That would violate the definition of the future. But I don’t think the ability to change future events need be one of the things that is within our power. There are many things which are not within our power, such as the ability to jump over the moon or create square circles. This does not mean we do not have abilities, rather that we only have limited abilities.
We have the ability to do otherwise that what we will do in a hypothetical future, not in the actual future. The divided sense is not related to the definition of ability, but rather in our understanding of future events. To reconcile God’s foreknowledge with freedom we must understand ability such that we can, but will not, do otherwise than what God foreknows. That is to say, considering God’s foreknowledge, we are still free.
Another problem here is that Craig’s definition of freewill includes the clause “if I wanted to”. This statement is fine as such. But compatiblists such as RC Sproul have argued that we are free to do what we want but not free to determine what we want. Our natures determine what we want, and in turn our natures are determined by genetics, circumstances, upbringing and ultimately creation. Phrased as Craig has, many compatiblists would agree that we are free in this sense.
However, Craig’s point number 2 above (claiming that the truth value of propositions is a consequence, not a condition, of what I do and therefore isn’t logically available to restrict what I do) is solid gold. The proposition “Bob will do A” is logically dependent upon Bob’s doing A in the future. Therefore, the truth of that proposition is unavailable to necessitate Bob’s doing A.
What is temporally precedent is logically subsequent. This leads to questions regarding the necessity of the past.
Alfred Freddoso has provided one of the best available counter arguments to determinism based on accidental necessity. He follows William Occham’s way out. Occham argued that if we were to do otherwise, the past would have been different. Further, some aspects of the past are not necessary.
Freddoso took these confusing statements and explained them. His primary contributions were:
1) a demonstration that if one follows Occham’s way out, they are asserting that we bring about the truth of past, future tense statements (ie yesterday, I correctly said I will wash my car tomorrow)
2) he defined accidental necessity, explaining which aspects of the past are necessary and which are not
Freddoso defined accidental necessity as:
(F) p is necessary per accidens at (w,t) iff (a) p is logically contingent and (b) p is true at t and at every moment after t in every world w* such that w* shares the same history with w at t (in the sense explicated by (E)).
With E being:
(E) w shares the same history with w* at t iff for any t* < t, both (a) (w,t*) ∈ R iff (w*,t*) ∈ R, and (b) for any submoment k, k obtains at (w,t*) iff k obtains at (w*,t*)
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/anld.htm
For example, the truth that “
Cleary, Fredosso’s definition of history is not the same one that a historian would use. Abstract things, like the truth of future tense propositions are not part of history. But also, God’s foreknowledge, God’s beliefs about the future, and even unconditional prophecies are not part of history, as Fredosso is defining history.
Here’s the theological determinism argument that Fredosso was working from:
(P1) The proposition that Katie will wash her car at T is true now, long before T. (assumption)
(P2) So the proposition that it was the case that Katie will wash her car at T will be necessary per accidens at every future moment, including every moment that precedes or is identical with T. (from (P1)and (C))
(P3) But the proposition that it was the case that Katie will wash her car at T entails the proposition that if T is present, then Katie is washing her car. (assumption) /262/
(P4) Therefore, no one (including Katie) will have the power at or before T to bring it about that it is or will be false that if T is present, then Katie is washing her car. That is, no one will have the power at or before T to bring it about that it is or will be true that Katie is not washing her car when T is present. (from (P2), (P3), and (B))
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/anld.htm
Freddoso’s solution to the argument was to deny P2. The proposition that Katie will wash her car at T, is not necessary per accident. He is arguing that given events prior to T, it could have been false that Katie will wash her car at T.
I very much like Freddoso’s solution. However, the counter argument is a good one. First, Freddoso’s definition of history is somewhat counter intuitive. The past is over and done with. So even though we may be able to understand that some elements of the past depend on the future, they seem fixed in some sense.
Second, and related to the first, even if the past could have been different (based on a possible future event), it cannot now be different (based on the actual future event).
Consequently, I prefer a slightly different approach, which I will explain below. It may well be a just a different way of explaining what Freddoso is saying, I don’t know.
I will however, do a little preliminary groundwork here for that upcoming explanation. Let’s look at the conclusion broken down between before and at T. At T:
(P4 at T) Therefore, no one (including Katie) will have the power at T to bring it about that it is false that if T is present, then Katie is washing her car. That is, no one will have the power at T to bring it about that it is true that Katie is not washing her car when T is present. (from (P2), (P3), and (B))
Now it seems P4 at T is true, but harmless. At T, Katie’s not washing the car is in fact impossible, because she is washing her car. The real question is before T.
Before T:
(P4 before T) Therefore, no one (including Katie) will have the power before T to bring it about that it will be false that if T is present, then Katie is washing her car. That is, no one will have the power before T to bring it about that it will be true that Katie is not washing her car when T is present. (from (P2), (P3), and (B))
On P4 before T we can observe that the conclusion seems based on our inability at T (ie if T is present Katie is washing her car). I don’t think that if the events at T were removed from the conclusion, the inability could be established, nor would the conclusion follow from the premises. But leaving the events at T in makes me think that the inability at T is based on the opposite event at T. So nothing before T is the basis or our inability before T.
The Compatibility of God’s Foreknowledge and our
Freedom
To reconcile foreknowledge and freedom, we first must understand a bit more about foreknowledge and then a bit more about freedom. To understand foreknowledge better, it may be helpful to contract various understandings of foreknowledge.
Open theist see God’s foreknowledge and freedom as incompatible. Since they affirm freedom, they do not believe God knows all aspects of the future. They hold that He knows some things, and He knows what He plans to do, but not the free choices of men. Hence, they do not reconcile foreknowledge and freedom.
There are two explanations of foreknowledge (and several subsets of variations under the two main groups), which rely on some stepping stone to explain how God knows the future.
1) the Eternal Now
a. A theory time and a special relationship between God and time
b. B theory time
2) God knows what He planned
a. God’s knowledge causes the future
b. God “calculates” the future based on cause and effect relationships
c. God references His plan
Under the eternal now theory, God is outside of time. He knows all times as now. Thus He does not foreknow the future, but rather He knows the present(s). The solution to the foreknowledge/freedom issues is that God doesn’t foreknow.
There are two main variations of this theory. In the first, time is defined normally (ie precedence and subsequence). This variation struggles to show how God’s being the eternal now avoids the difficulty of foreknowledge and freedom, since future events are certain. Also, it struggles with omniscience: if God is outside time, can He tell time?
The second variation of “the eternal now” adopts a special definition of time in which past, present and future exist simultaneously. Only our perception of events changes. Again, this view struggles to show how people’s actions could be free, because they already exist. Also, this theory of time is at best highly counter-intuitive.
Both of these views struggle with the question of why God didn’t create the world any sooner?
Nevertheless, the primary takeaway for our purposes is that God does not know the future directly, under the eternal now.
Under this view, which is adopted by both Calvinists and some Molinists, God plans the entire future, thus He knows what will happen. He need not see future events in themselves, all He has to do is reference His plan.
Variations of this view are extreme. Calvinists typically are compatiblists (holding human freedom is compatible with causal determinism) whereas Molinists are typically libertarian (holding human choices don’t have a sufficient cause). Hence Calvinists hold to a causal chain of events, whereby God may calculate the future. Molinists hold to “weak actualization” whereby God brings about the future without using sufficient causes for human choices, but rather knowledge of what people would freely do under a hypothetical circumstance and then choosing to actualize that circumstance. Some Calvinists hold God’s knowledge actually causes the future.
The issues here are immense. At this point, all I will say is that under this view God does know the future, but the explanation His foreknowledge is not based on direct knowledge of the events, but rather indirect means by which the future events are derived.
It seems to me that God knows the future, because it is future. Certainly it is true that God planned the future, and yes this would give Him indirect knowledge of it. However, I would not want to deny that God also directly knows the future.
Now I cannot explain how God knows the future. God’s relationship with the world is unique, having only limited analogy with our relationship with the world. We are different, in that His is infinite and we are finite. Hence our ability to comprehend Him is also limited.
Foreknowledge isn’t the only type of knowledge I cannot explain. I can’t explain how God knows possibilities, nor how He knows hypotheticals. Since His knowledge is infinite, He doesn’t learn.
One consequence of God’s knowing the future directly is that God’s foreknowledge is based on the future. Omniscience is knowledge of all truths and no falsehoods. Hence it presupposes and is based on truth. As Arminius put it:
5. The understanding of God is certain and infallible; so that he sees certainly and infallibly, even, things future and contingent, whether he sees them in their causes, or in themselves. But this infallibility depends on the infinity of the essence of God, and not on his unchangeable will.
6. The act of understanding of God is occasioned by no external cause, not even by its object; though if there be not afterwards an object, neither will there be any act of God’s understanding about it.
7. How certain soever the acts of God’s understanding may themselves be, this does not impose any necessity on things, but rather establishes contingency in them. For, as he knows the thing itself and its mode, if the mode of the thing be contingent, he must know it as such, and, therefore, it remains contingent with respect to the divine knowledge.
http://wesley.nnu.edu/arminianism/arminius/m.htm
Let’s continue the reconciliation of foreknowledge and freedom with a definition of ability or “within one’s power”. A simple and common definition given by libertarians is the ability to do otherwise.[2] Another common definition is power over alternative possibilities. But otherwise than what and alternative to what? The answer is what we will do. Hence, time is a key consideration with respect to ability. How does time impact our understanding of ability? Here’s a definition with reference to time:
(A) the ability to do nonA at T3 entails that nothing prior to T3 renders nonA impossible
Unfortunately, alternative definitions have been put foreword which confuse the whole discussion. For example:
(A*) the ability to do nonA at T3 entails the ability to become the basis of truth of nonA in the future[3]
Or
(A**) the ability to do nonA at T3 entails that the proposition “nonA will happen” can be true
A* and A** are in fact impossible, given God’s foreknowledge, but A is not.
Consider the following arguments against A* and A**.
Argument based on Impossibility of a Contradiction
P1: "Bob will do A" and "Bob will do nonA" is a contradiction
P2: God knows "Bob will do A" is true
C1: Given "Bob will do A" is true, "Bob will do nonA" cannot be true
P3: The ability to become the basis of truth of "Bob will do nonA" entails the possibility of truth of "Bob will do nonA"
C2: Bob cannot become the basis of truth of "Bob will do A"
A* is excluded by C1 and A** by C2, but A remains in tact.[4]
But doesn’t denying A* and A** mean nonA is impossible? Yes it does. But not before T3. Freewill isn’t the ability to do A and nonA, but rather the ability to do either. During and after the choice, it’s opposite is impossible. Before the choice, both alternatives are within the chooser’s power.
But the statement “nonA will happen” cannot be true, before T3. True, and this leads to a discussion of “the additional premise”.
It’s my argument that the whole discussion of theological and logical determinism requires one of two additional premises to invalidate A.
(AP) Logic renders not just propositions, but also events impossible
Or
(AP*) Logic implies a temporally prior "basis of truth" for events described by true propositions
Such premises allow for lucid transitions from the arguments based on non-contradiction and accidental necessity to a conclusion that contradicts A.
Consider again the argument on the basis of non-contradiction:
P1: "At T1, A will happen" and "At T1, nonA will happen" is a contradiction
P2: At T1, God knows "At T1, A will happen" is true
C1: Given "At T1, A will happen" is true at T1, "At T1, nonA will happen" cannot be true at T1
AP: Logic renders not just propositions, but also events impossible
C2: Logic renders nonA impossible, prior to T3
Or
AP*: Logic implies a temporally prior "basis of truth" for events described by true propositions
C2*: The implied "basis of truth" renders nonA impossible, prior to T3
AP and AP* are required to invalidate A, but neither are needed to invalidate A* and A**.
Now consider this argument based on accidental necessity:
P1: At T1, God knows "Bob will do A" is true
P2: The past is accidentally necessary
C1: Therefore, between T1 and T3, "Bob will do A" cannot change
P3: P2 entails that if T3 is present, "Bob is doing A" is true
C2: Therefore, no one, including Bob, has the power at or before T3, to become the basis of truth that if T3 is present, "Bob is doing A" isn't true.
AP: Logic renders not just propositions, but also events impossible
C3: Logic renders nonA impossible, prior to T3
Or
AP*: Logic implies a temporally prior "basis of truth" for events described by true propositions
C3*: The "basis of truth" renders nonA impossible, prior to T3
Again, AP and AP* are required to invalidate A, but neither are needed to invalidate A* and A**.
The Theological/Logical determinism debate involves the connections between propositions, truth of propositions and the basis of truth of propositions. The truth of a proposition does render its negation impossible. But the proposition does not render the basis of truth of its negation impossible. Rather, the basis of truth of the proposition renders the basis of truth of its negation impossible.
Hence, when discussing the basis of truth of statements about the future, we ask what is the basis of truth of future tense statements? Must it be something about the past? (ie a chain of causes originating in the past or perhaps God’s decree from eternity past or God’s act of creation). Or rather, might the basis of truth for statements about the future be the future itself. If it’s the future itself, then although the negation of a future tense statement is impossible, the future event itself doesn’t become impossible till that future moment in which the opposite basis of truth occurs.
Consider the following chart:
|
|
Time |
T1 |
T2 |
T3 |
T4 |
|
Possibilities |
A |
Possible |
Possible |
Actual |
Impossible |
|
|
B |
Possible |
Possible |
Impossible |
Impossible |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Propositions |
A will happen |
TRUE |
TRUE |
FALSE |
FALSE |
|
|
B will happen |
FALSE |
FALSE |
FALSE |
FALSE |
|
|
Moving reference |
A will happen |
A will happen |
A is happening |
A happened |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Events (basis of truth) |
|
God's plan begins execution |
Prophecy |
A happens |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ockham's way out |
"B is happening at T3" could have been true
based on prior events |
TRUE |
TRUE |
TRUE |
TRUE |
|
|
"B is happening at T3" could have been true
based on future events |
TRUE |
TRUE |
FALSE |
FALSE |
We will get into Ockham in a little bit. For now, consider that the logical determinist’s analysis of the T2 column would be, given “B will happen” is false at T2, I must look at events at or before T2 to find its basis of truth.[5] But those holding to freewill and that God directly knows the future might say, no we can look to T3 to find basis of truth of a statement at T2.
This leads to a discussion of the merits of AP*.
To counter AP*, we must examine the necessity of the past. We will look at the necessity of the past in three parts. First, the causal closeness of the past, second the unchangeableness of the past, and finally, the logical connections between the past and future.
We cannot cause the past as there is no retro causation. However, we can causally contribute to the future. Hence, the past is causally close, yet the future is not. This asymmetry of causal closeness of the past and causal openness of the future is a part of the necessity of the past.
No one is arguing that we can go back in time and cause what God knew, or retroactively cause His knowledge to change. Rather, we can act in such a way that the past would have been different. Further, the basis of truth (and therefore basis of necessity) is not in the past.
Causal closeness is the primary sense in which the past is necessary.
What should be clear at the outset is that this unchangeableness is not unique to the past. We cannot change the past, nor can we change the present or future. This implies the logical contradictions of: what was, was not and what will be, will not be. The opposite would violate the definition of the past and future.
Our inability to change the past or future is not a restriction on freewill. Freewill is the ability to do A or B. Given the unalterability of the past and future, what are we unable to do? Violate a definition. If we were to do nonA, the past would have been different. Hence the logical connection wouldn’t be broken. This is Occham’s point.
Arguments based on the unchangability of the past stop short of disproving A “the ability to do nonA at T3 entails that nothing prior to T3 renders nonA impossible.”. Rather they disprove A* and A**.
If we were to do nonA, the past would have been different. We can, but will not do nonA. That is to say, nothing prior to nonA renders nonA impossible, but the statement we will do nonA is both true and its negation impossible.
The unalterability of the past, is non-unique to the past, and therefore not an essential element to the necessity of the past.
I come now to the last and most controversial aspect of the necessity of the past.
The prognostic determinist is essentially asserting that:
(PBT) every truth in the past, had a basis of truth at or prior to that time.
Conversely, I deny this assertion. I assert:
(FBT) The basis of truth of statements about future choices are those choices in the future.
God’s foreknowledge and A are logically (not causally)
linked. The theological determinists
argues that all past tense statements are either true or false and nothing now
can impact their truth or falsehood. For
example, the statement “
However, what about the statement, last year, I was correct in my belief that I will buy a vehicle in 2007? Are past statements about the future also necessary and unalterable? Granted, no one can causally alter past future tense statements. But do the events in 2007 bring about the basis of the statement’s being true last year? I intend to argue that they do.
My strategy is two fold. First, we will look at logical relationships which are inverted temporally. Second, we will look at the importance of the present, based on temporal becoming, changing truth values, the correspondence of truth to reality, cause and effect, and finally lapsing possibilities.
Here’s my position on the temporal verses logical order:
|
Order |
Time |
Logical Basis |
|
First |
God
foreknows A |
A happens |
|
Second |
A happens |
God
foreknows A |
Is this unique to foreknowledge? There seems to be a strong correlation between this view and the Cavinistic supra-lapsarian schema of predestination. Consider:
|
Order |
Time |
Logical Basis (order of the decrees) |
|
First |
Creation |
Election
of individuals to Heaven/Hell |
|
Second |
Fall |
Decree of
Redemption |
|
Third |
Redemption |
Decree of
the Fall |
|
Fourth |
Heaven/Hell |
Decree of
Creation |
Now this is not an endorsement of supralapsarianism. There are many alternative views of the logical order of decrees such as:
|
Arminianism |
Amaranaltism |
Sub-lapsarian |
Supra-lapsarian |
|
To create man |
To create man |
To create man |
Unconditional election |
|
to permit the fall |
to permit the fall |
to permit the fall |
Christ appointed as head of
salvation |
|
Christ appointed as head of
salvation |
Christ appointed as head of
salvation |
Unconditional election |
fall ordained |
|
Faith as the condition of
salvation |
Unconditional election |
All means of salvation
provided |
To create man |
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means necessary to believe
given |
|
|
|
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Foreseen believers elected
to eternal life |
|
|
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Molinits and Thomists also argued the same issues and came up with these alternatives:
|
Thomas Aquinas |
Luis Molina |
Fransisco Suarez |
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God knows what can happen |
God knows what can happen |
God knows what can happen |
|
God elects some to salvation |
God provides grace to all
for salvation |
God elects some to salvation |
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God provides effectual grace
to the elect alone, which causally determines their conversion and
perseverance |
God know who would freely
respond to grace given any circumstance |
God know who would freely
respond to grace given any circumstance |
|
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God decrees to actualize one
circumstance |
God provides congruently
effectual grace to the elect alone |
|
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God knows what will happen |
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In any case, there are many alterative views of election and not all provide a logical order which corresponds to a temporal order. Hence FBT is not unique in it’s inverting the logical and temporal order.
The truth or falsehood change with time. The statement that I will buy a vehicle was true last year. I don’t know if it’s true now, but probably I will. But it’s not true after I purchase my last vehicle before my death. The same is true of past tense statements. The statement I did buy a vehicle is not true before I bought my first vehicle.
Additionally, the true or falsehood of past, present and future tense statements are all linked. The statement I will buy a car (stated before I buy a car), I am buying a car (stated while I buy a car), and I bought a car (stated after I bought a car) are all either true or false. It’s impossible that the past tense statement be true and present tense statement be false.
So from three distinct fixed points in time, the statements are interrelated. From moving points in time, their truth or falsehood change at the same moments. Hence they are linked.
But can this link work temporally backwards?
Under A theory of time, only events in the present exists. Past events have existed, and future events will exists. But they don’t now exist. This theory is highly intuitive and supported by scripture. Consider Romans 4:17: “God, who quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things which be not as though they were” and Isaiah 42:9: “new things I declare; before they spring into being I announce them to you.”
Under a correspondence theory of truth, the truth or falsehood corresponds to a statement’s reflection of reality. The statement I have a cup on my desk is true if and only if, there is a cup on my desk. Examining the issues above and this correspondence principle lead Aristotle to the deny that future tense statements are true or false. His basis was, because they don’t yet exist, there is nothing for the statement to correspond with. However, pace Aristotle, it would seem enough of a basis for truth for the statement Bob will do A, if Bob will do A. Bob will exist at some point in the future to cause A.
We see the parallel with past tense statements. The statement Bob did A is true, due to Bob’s doing A in the past. The past tense statement Bob did A, entails that the present tense statement (Bob is doing A) was true at some point in the past. Bob did exist in the past and caused A, and it’s this reality that the past tense statement corresponds with.
Hence we can see the importance of the present. In the present, cause and effect relationship completes. This impacts reality. The truth corresponds to reality. Past and future tense truths are related and interlocked with the present tense truth.
In this sense we have the power to bring about the past. We don’t cause the past, the past statements about the future are brought about by the events in the future.
The necessity of the past only applies to the past being causally closed. Only events that are in the past, and statements regarding those events, are necessary. Statements in the past, which are about the future, are not necessary.
As time moves possibilities laps. That is to say, before T3, nonA is possible, but at and after T3, nonA is impossible. If a basis of truth of future tense statements must exist in the past, we have the odd consequence that the future isn’t possible.
Perhaps my arguments that the events in the future are the basis of truth for statements about the future were not entirely convincing. In that case we would have reason to doubt FBT. But likewise, without evidence proving PBT, it is reasonable to doubt PBT. Both seem possible, and each rules the other out. So hopefully, I have at a minimum, provided reason to doubt that prognostic determinism is true.
These definitions are provided by Alfred Freddosso in his article The Necessity of Nature.
Proposition p is metaphysically necessary if and only if p is true at every moment in every possible world.
Proposition p is metaphysically impossible if and only if p is false at every moment in every possible world.
Proposition p is metaphysically contingent if and only if p is neither metaphysically necessary nor metaphysically impossible.
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/necnat.htm
An example of something that is logically necessary are the statements “A=A” or “God is good”.
It is metaphysically necessary for entity x to have property P at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) x exists at t in w, and
(b) for any moment t* and any possible world w* such that x exists at t* in w*, x has P at t* in w*.
It is metaphysically impossible for entity x to have property P at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) x exists at t in w, and
(b) for any moment t* and any possible world w* such that x exists at t* in w*, x lacks P at t* in w*.
It is metaphysically contingent for entity x to have property P at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) x exists at t in w, and
(b) it is neither metaphysically necessary for x to have P at t in w nor metaphysically impossible for x to have P at t in w.
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/necnat.htm
An example of something that is metaphysically de re necessary is “sin is evil”.
The difference between metaphysical de re necessity and logical necessity is only the existence of thing in question. Sin may or may not exist, but if it does it is evil. God however must exist.
It is metaphysically necessary for entity x to have property P at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) x exists at t in w, and
(b) for any moment t* and any possible world w* such that x exists at t* in w*, x has P at t* in w*.
It is metaphysically impossible for entity x to have property P at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) x exists at t in w, and
(b) for any moment t* and any possible world w* such that x exists at t* in w*, x lacks P at t* in w*.
It is metaphysically contingent for entity x to have property P at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) x exists at t in w, and
(b) it is neither metaphysically necessary for x to have P at t in w nor metaphysically impossible for x to have P at t in w.
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/necnat.htm
Proposition p is accidentally necessary at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) p is not metaphysically necessary, and
(b) p is true at t and at every moment after t in every possible world w * such that w * shares the same history with w at t.
Proposition p is accidentally impossible at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) p is not metaphysically impossible, and
(b) p is false at t and at every moment after t in every possible world w * such that w * shares the same history with w at t.
Proposition p is accidentally contingent at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) p is metaphysically contingent, and
(b) p is neither accidentally necessary at t in w nor accidentally impossible at t in w.
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/necnat.htm
At moment t, possible world w has a deterministic natural tendency toward proposition p at moment t* (where t* is at or after t) if and only if
(a) p is not metaphysically necessary, and
(b) p is not accidentally necessary at t* in w, and
(c) p is true at t* in every possible world w* such that (i) w* shares the same history with w at t and (ii) no freely acting agent brings it about at or after t in w* that p is false at t*, and
(d) in at least one possible world w* such that (i) w* shares the same history with w at t and (ii) p is true at t* in w*, p's being true at t* is not brought about at or after t in w* either by a freely acting nonomnipotent agent or by an omnipotent agent acting freely and alone.
At time t, possible world w has a deterministic natural aversion to proposition p at time t* if and only if at t, w has a deterministic natural tendency toward not-p at t*.
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/necnat.htm
Proposition p is naturally necessary (or: true by a necessity of nature ) at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) p is true at t in w, and
(b) there is a moment t* such that (i) at every moment from t* to t, w has a deterministic natural tendency toward p at t, and (ii) p's truth at t is not brought about at or after t* in w either by a freely acting nonomnipotent agent or by an omnipotent agent acting freely and alone.
De dicto natural impossibility can be explicated as follows:
Proposition p is naturally impossible (or: false by a necessity of nature ) at moment t in possible world w if and only if
(a) p is false at t in w, and
(b) there is a moment t* such that (i) at every moment from t* to t, w has a deterministic natural aversion to p at t and (ii) p's falsity at t is not brought about at or after t* in w either by a freely acting nonomnipotent agent or by an omnipotent agent acting freely and alone.
At moment t in possible world w, proposition p is contingent with respect to the causes operative at moment t* (where t* is at or before t) if and only if
(a) p is metaphysically contingent, and
(b) p is accidentally contingent at t in w, and
(c) p is true at t in w, and
(d) it is not the case that at t*, w has a deterministic natural tendency toward p at t.
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/necnat.htm
At moment t in possible world w, entity x has a deterministic natural inclination toward property P at moment t* (where t* is at or after t) if and only if
(a) x exists at t in w, and
(b) it is not metaphysically necessary for x to have P at t* in w, and
(c) it is not accidentally necessary for x to have P at t* in w, and
(d) x has P at t* in every possible world w* such that (i) w* shares the same history with w at t, and (ii) no freely acting agent brings it about at or after t in w* that x does not have P at t*, and
(e) in at least one possible world w* such that (i) w* shares the same history with w at t and (ii) x has P at t* in w*, x's having P at t* is not brought about at or after t in w* either by a freely acting nonomnipotent agent or by an omnipotent agent acting freely and alone.
At moment t in possible world w, entity x has a deterministic natural repugnance to property P at moment t* (where t* is at or after t) if and only if at t in w, x has a deterministic natural inclination toward the complement of P at t*.
http://www.nd.edu/%7Eafreddos/papers/necnat.htm
It is naturally necessary for entity x to have property P at moment t in possible world w (or: x has P by a necessity of nature at t in w) if and only if
(a) x has P at T in w, and
(b) there is a moment t* such that (i) at every moment from t* to t in w, x has a deterministic natural inclination toward P at t and (ii) x's having P at t is not brought about at or after t* in w either by a freely acting nonomnipotent agent or by an omnipotent agent acting freely and alone.
It is naturally impossible for entity x to have property P at moment t in possible world w (or: x lacks P by a necessity of nature at t in w) if and only if
(a) x lacks P at t in w, and
(b) there is a moment t* such that (i) at every moment from t* to t in w, x has a deterministic natural repugnance to P at t and (ii) x's lacking P at t is not brought about at or after t* in w either by a freely acting nonomnipotent agent or by an omnipotent agent acting freely and alone.
At moment t in possible world w, it is contingent for entity x to have property P relative to the causes operative at moment t* (where t* is at or before t) if and only if
(a) it is metaphysically contingent for x to have P at t in w, and
(b) it is accidentally contingent for x to have P at t in w, and
(c) x has P at t in w, and
(d) it is not the case that at t* in w, x has a deterministic natural inclination toward P at t.
[1] Many authors call this view Theological Fatalism. However, some protest against this title. So I will use the term “prognostic determinism” and add that term to the list of things I am grateful to Turretinfan for.
[2] Compatibility on the other hand define our ability to do otherwise in a divided sense, excluding the sufficient cause of our actions or as a passive ability waiting for something else to actualize through us or as the ability to do what we want (but not control what we want).
[3] Defined as the ability to do nonA at T3 entails the ability to become the basis of truth of nonA in a possible future, we could defend A*. With the understanding of possibility along the lines of A.
[4] It is perhaps possible to rescue A* by denying P3. Such a position requires careful analysis, so for the sake of argument and not to pretend I understand more than I do, I will move on under the assumption that P3 is true. A** however, is clearly wrong.
[5] William Craig has argued that unless some cause is supposed, the argument is incoherent, supposing an unintelligible constraint. (The Only Wise God, p 67-68)