Report of Capt

JOHN J. PERSHING AND THE LANAO DATUS, 1901-1903[1]

Federico V. Magdalena, Ph.D.
Mindanao State University
Marawi City

John J. Pershing (1860-1948) -
American Indian (Apache, Cheyenne and Sioux) fighter, Commander of Camp Vicars, Lake Lanao (1902-1903), Military Governor of Moro Province (1909-1913), first American officer to rise in rank from Captain to Brigadier General, Leader of the Punitive Expedition against "bandit" Pancho Villa across the Mexican border(1916) , Chief of American Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War I (1919), and the only US officer to be named "General of the Armies."

            These are vivid descriptions of the exploits of this man, John J. "Black Jack" Pershing, whose name left an indelible mark in Moroland at the turn of this century. In Mindanao, Pershing was the first white man ever to move around Lake Lanao, winning friends and foes alike among the recalcitrant Maranao datus. The last military governor of Moro Province, Pershing laid the claim for having pacified Moro resistance, disarming them and making them participate in crafting a government. That also signaled the integration of the remaining hostile district to the rest of the country, which Pershing himself recommended to authorities that his successor be a civilian. The Moro district would be integrated into the Philippine state which, in turn, became a member of the emerging world system. The rest of the episode is now history.

      How he came to Lanao and achieved international fame is a story perhaps worth recounting. With the help of his Nebraska friend, George D. Meiklejohn, Pershing was assigned to Zamboanga as Adjutant General for Mindanao in 1900. A year later, he was assigned to Iligan (November 1901) where he embarked on a brighter military career. There he stayed for over a year, participating in quelling the Filipino revolutionary troops in Misamis. After the infamous battle of Bayang of May 1902, he took command of Camp Vicars, in the heart of Lake Lanao district. His appointment as commander of a large US brigade in Vicars was unusual; it befitted a soldier of higher rank. For about a year, until June 1903, he held such post, routing the fierce resistance of some Maranao datus. Three years later, in December 1906, his military stint with the Moros earned him the rank of brigadier general, bypassing over 860 officers and causing furor in Washington. In November 1909, Pershing returned to Zamboanga to succeed Tasker Bliss as Governor of the Moro Province. This post was the longest he held while in the Philippines, before he vowed out to become America's most remarkable soldier and officer.

Pershing Enters Lanao

            A small garrison had been established in Iligan for a purpose. It was a strategic door for entering the unconquered Lanao, where lived the refractory Maranaos. There, John J. Pershing, took camp in November 1900. Right at the beginning, he had anticipated in this assignment "a rare opportunity for important service" (Unpublished Memoirs [henceforth Memoirs], Box 374, Pershing Papers). He organized troops to pursue the last Filipino revolutionary (insurrecto to the Spaniards and Americans), Nicolas Capistrano, and cleaned up a stronghold in Macajambos, Misamis (MacAdam, 1919). His efforts paid dividends. Successful in inducing the "rebel" to give up, the resistance in northern Mindanao finally ended. In February 1901, he was promoted to Captain.
            Himself a veteran of the American-Indian wars (he helped round up the Apaches, the Sioux and the Cheyenne warriors of the southwest frontier), Pershing had an appetite for challenge. Lanao offered him the opportunity for a bright military career. Cautious of his dealings with the Moros, whom he described as "savages" who respected "nothing but brute force," Pershing looked for a good start (Pershing to Judge Magoon, April 5, 1900, Box 317, Pershing Papers). He discovered that the weekly market in Iligan was "a most effective means of getting acquainted with the Malanao (Maranao) Moros" who would come down from the lakeshores to sell their wares, from chicken eggs to multi-colored clothings. He made it a practice to visit them and inquire about their crops, their government and their leading men. Encouraged, the Moros began to come in for conferences. "They liked to talk and wanted to talk with somebody in authority," confided Pershing in his memoirs (Box 374, Pershing Papers). Before long, an important datu from the north of the lake, Amai Manabilang of Madaya, was induced to pay him a visit after a few exchanges of letters (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers):

            ... he came in great taste, wearing his jacket of many colors and tight-fitting white trousers, his turban cocked jauntily on one side of his head and tied in rakish fashion. He rode a fine pony, a slave on either side, one bearing his gold-mounted kris and the other his brass box containing betel nut, buya (buyo) leaves, and a mixture of lime, all of which they combined for chewing. In the lead was a guard carrying a gun and another came behind. Then came minor chiefs, relatives and more slaves, all in their choicest finery.

            After trading pleasantries and hospitality, the Sultan also invited Pershing to return the visit to his lakeside home. Pershing gladly accepted the invitation. In the company of an interpreter, three native scouts and the Sultan himself, they left unarmed on February 16, 1902 and stayed in Marahui (now Marawi) until the 18th. They were received in a friendly manner. At Madaya, "the whole subject of the relations between Americans and Moros was discussed from about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon until late at night." For his part, Pershing assured the Moros of the Davis's order, that the Americans "had no intention of interfering with their tribal relations, their customs, nor their religion, but that we wanted them to increase their efforts and by labor add to 1,200 men (MacAdam, 1919).

            He also befriended other Maranao datus and won support from many of them, including the stocky Datu Grande of Makadar (Datu Masla to the Maranao), Datu Pedro, Sultan of Ganassi, Amai Bancurung of Oato, and even some who were previously opposed to the Americans( e.g., the datus of Tubaran and Paigoay). They were drafted as "allies" or amigos.

            Then, shortly after the fall of Bayang on May 2, 1902, Pershing commanded Camp Vicars at the southeast side of the lake, relieving Frank Baldwin who was assigned to another post elsewhere. Pershing took command of two squadrons of the 15th Cavalry, a battalion of infantry, and a battery of mountain guns stationed in Camp Vicars, which was named after a fallen soldier, Lt. Vicars, during the Bayang affair. That force was larger than that usually commanded by an officer of his rank, but it was necessary for the ensuing campaigns designed to pacify the Moros.

Policy on the Lanao Moros

            No doubt that Pershing capitalized on the personal value of friendship among the Moros. His diplomacy centered on this element, and gave stern warning to those who continued their defiance against the United States. But if everything failed, he was also willing to use brute force under his disposal. This stand is made known in a letter he sent to all the datus of Lake Lanao prior to launching a bloody military operations in 1903. In sum, the letter gave notice that the Americans were in the Laguna "not to make war, nor to dispossess the Moros but to help them in every way." He promised "to buy their produce, give them jobs, provide them medicines," and more. However, he warned the unfriendly datus that "should they persist in obstructing the establishment of peace and continue their opposition, they must some day suffer the consequences of their stubborn ignorance" (Pershing Report, June 1902-May 1903)

            While busily befriending the Maranao chiefs, on another front the American troops under the command of Frank Baldwin were making war preparations that eventually led to the infamous 1902 Battle of Bayang. That battle cost hundreds of Moro lives in the rancheria of Bayang. The incident, Pershing admitted, proved to be "the most serious that had yet occurred and left the Lanao Moros, on the south side particularly, much in doubt as to our intentions" (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers). To allay their fears, he wrote to the datus en masse, alerting them of the government's noble purposes and inviting them to come to camp for talks. Many of the datus responded positively (letters in Box 319, Pershing Papers). It soon became clear to him that the Americans faced two groups of Moros, the "friends" (amigos) and "hostiles" (malos), which were often difficult to distinguish as "some while pretending to be friendly were actually hostile" (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers).

            On May 23, 1902 Pershing wrote a letter (Box 318, Pershing Papers) of friendship--and warning--to the defiant Sultans of Maciu and Bacolod, who had not presented themselves and whose followers continued in their conduct "unbecoming" to the Americans:

            In order that the Moros of Bacolod and Moros of Malanao may understand clearly the intention of the Americans toward them, I am writing you and other principal Moros in the hope that you may realize that we have your best interest at heart...We could become personally acquainted... The Americans desire to avoid further war and bloodshed of which there has already been too much, especially on the part of the Moros. We do not wish to kill your people nor destroy your houses and property but wish you all to know that we Americans are a peace loving people who want to be your friends. That the Moros are brave and courageous there is no doubt but it is foolish for a few of you or even all of you to try to fight against the Americans who are equally brave and courageous. You have only a few men and a few guns and a few horses, while we have millions of men and millions of guns and millions of horses. You ought to profit by the experience of the Moros of Binidayan and Bayan (Bayang) and by making friends with us avoid the possibility of a disaster.

Defiant Bacolod Datus

            Meanwhile the exchanges turned sour, punctuated as they were by unfriendly remarks, especially on the part of the Bacolod datus, and further inflamed by other irritating incidents: American horses ate the crops of neighboring Moros, telephone wires were cut, rifles stolen from unaware or isolated parties of soldiers, etc. Not too long after, Datu Panondiongan and the Sultan of Bacolod demanded that the Americans retire to Malabang and threatened to go on the warpath if they would not do so (Datu Panondiongan to Pershing, June 17, 1902, Box 319, Pershing Papers):

            We ask you to retire to Malabang because we do not want you to live in Lanao...You must follow our religion and our customs and in not doing so you will be to blame for all the datus of the Laguna will make war against you because we profess only one religion which is that of Stamboul (Istanbul). This letter goes burned in six places to indicate to you that it means war.

            Curiously, the Cali of Bacolod and the Sultan and other datus of that rancheria denied having sent such a letter and others in "bad form." They also belied the accusation that they were fortifying themselves and raising the defiant red flag, which they admitted they did in preparation not against the Americans but against the people of Nunungan who had made enemies of them. They implied that the charges were baseless, and that bad statements were falsely attributed to them by their enemies from neighboring rancherias (Cali of Bacolod and other datus to Pershing, June 18, 1902, Box 319, Pershing Papers). However, the Moro declaration of war was repeated in more pungent terms later during that year.

            For example, in a letter to Pershing on July 4, 1902 (Box 319, Pershing Papers), the Sultan of Bacolod and the Panondiongan demanded:

We ask you to return to the sea because you should not be here among circumcised Moros for you are not circumcised. If you should stay here we want to fight you this month and in no event do we wish to be your friends for you are marauders and do not wish to follow our religion and you eat pork.

And in another, on August 1, 1902 (Box 319, Pershing Papers), the sultan declared:

We want war and if you do not get out of here and go back to the sea neither the Sultan sa Bacolod nor the Panondiongan want (you)... If you do not want to go from here, come to this place that the Sultan and the Panondiongan will take care of you, for you are a lot of hogs that eat hog, and in presenting yourselves at Bacolod look out for we shall go to fight you.

            On August 11, 1902, a midnight attack at an outpost "by 10 to 15 Moros" killed a sergeant and a private, and wounded two other soldiers. One Moro died. The alleged attackers were a band of 15 Bacolod Moros (Report of Pershing, May 2-10, 1903). The night attacks became frequent until the soldiers turned weary of them. "We were rapidly losing prestige and further delay in punishing these Moros would only undo much of what had been accomplished." Furthermore, "our inactivity was misconstrued as cowardice, and even friendly Moros could not understand why we took no action," Pershing demurs (Diary, "Lake Lanao Expedition," August 12, 1902, Box 1, Pershing Papers). On September 17, 1902, the much-awaited order came. General Sumner summoned Pershing to launch a punitive expedition. Leading four companies of infantry, one troop of cavalry and a platoon of artillery, each man carrying 200 rounds of ammunition, he proceeded "to communicate with Butig and Maciu" on the southeast side, "authorized (by General Sumner), if necessary, to use force for this purpose." Along the way, all opposing fortifications were chastised without difficulty. As Pershing stated with pride, "The fighting, if such it could be called, had been very much one-sided...We suffered no casualties, while the Moros lost several killed and wounded." The harvest of the four-day expedition, which failed to reach Maciu, was these: 30 Moros killed and as many or more wounded, and eight cottas captured with their contents destroyed (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers).

            After a few days of respite, Pershing refitted his column for another expedition to Maciu on the 28th. Over 300 enlisted men and officers, with a pack train of 75 mules carrying four-days ration, and some Moro guides, would participate in this spirited campaign. The second day put them in a skirmish with the enemy and left a good impression on the morale of the troops. During the third and fourth days, some 150 warriors of Sultan Gunduali would confront the more numerous soldiers in a no-contest combat. McNair's four artilleries pounded the Moro cotta at a range of 300 yards and immediately silenced the slug-hurling lantakas and old muskets of the Moros. The Americans advanced their position to about 100 yards and pressed a heavier attack which was too much for the Moros. "The effective fire of the artillery at these close ranges had a demoralizing effect upon the Moros which they attempted to offset by yells of defiance, by beating tom-toms and by religious chants," Pershing said. In this terrible siege, the Sultan Cabugatan of Maciu was killed, together with some 50 of his faithful. Only two soldiers were wounded, but not seriously (Report of Pershing to Adjutant General, October 15, 1902, Box 316, Pershing Papers; "Pershing Returned," The Manila American, October 5,1902, Box 370, Pershing Papers). Pershing later recounted his observations (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers):

            The lesson administered to the recalcitrant and defiant Moros whom we had encountered on these two expeditions was a severe one. Every possible endeavor had been made to convince these people that we wanted to be real friends and that we had no intention of doing them the least harm. They were cautioned time and again that in the end they would be defeated and that they were no match for the Americans in battle. The effectiveness of our rifles was well known to them as they had a number of them in their possession, but they had little ammunition. It was really pathetic finally to see how futile was their resistance. But there was absolutely no way of convincing them except to defeat them completely and capture the cottas they thought impregnable.

Lake Lanao Operations and Siege of Bacolod

            As if fate conspired against the Moros, a series of calamities followed the campaigns. During the year locust and rinderpest destroyed the crops and killed many of the cattle and carabaos, causing damage of untold proportion to the Moros. In December 1902 the dreaded cholera plagued the lake residents, claiming probably 1,500 lives during the next two or three months (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers). Undeterred by these misfortunes, the Moros persisted in their assaults. It appeared, too, that the continuing attack on Americans was precipitated by the Moro beliefs that they were the "cholera men," who brought this terrible disease to their people (Bateman, "The Moros and their Myths," 1917; BIA 15216‑1).

            By then Pershing had recommended another expedition around the lake to complete his march and settle the Moro question once and for all. "The west shore trip would undoubtedly meet with opposition from the Bacolod Moros but I felt that the time had come when we must give up handling these people with gloves," he reminished later (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers).

            In April 1903 the authority came for Pershing's request (Order from General S. Sumner, April 2, 1903, Box 278, Pershing Papers). Letters were sent to the datus again as to the "friendly purpose of this expedition and all were cautioned that they must not molest us or oppose the march." The first sign of veritable resistance showed up on the 6^th of April when the expedition reached the vicinity of Bacolod. Artillery fire blasted every opposing cotta and other Moro strongholds until the column came close enough to Fort Bacolod where about 200 warriors expected an incoming enemy.

            The Bacolod cotta (fort) was heavily fortified and had the reputation, like that of Bayang's Fort Pandapatan, to be impregnable. Its dimensions are described thus (Report of Pershing, April 5-16, 1903: 343, also see Diagram next page):

…within its walls, it measured about 80 by 100 feet. The walls were 12 feet high, 15 feet thick at the base, and faced with stone on the outside. A berm 12 feet wide extended entirely around the fort, under which were constructed galleries, and both the fort and berm were covered with bamboo and earth. The fort proper and the galleries were used as a dwelling by the family of the Panondiongan and many of his people. The parapet was loopholed for rifle fire, and contained embrasures for cannon and lantacas, and a series of bamboo loopholes extended entirely around the edge of the berm for rifle fire from the galleries.

            Additionally, the fort was surrounded by a ditch with a triangular cross section 30 feet wide at the top and at least 35 feet deep, protected by rifle pits, covering a distance of 800 yards. It stood proudly on a hill along the lake.

            The troops spent the night on a ridge overlooking the Bacolod cotta. By daybreak the morning of April 7^th,, the troops then positioned their mortars some 2000 yards away while a company was sent northeast into the hills to sanitize, and eventually dispatched, a party of Moros who fired into camp during the night. Firing began until 9 o'clock in the morning. the Sultan Panondiongan raised a white flag and requested terms of surrender. The parley he asked for did not convince Pershing who replied that "nothing but unconditional surrender would be accepted and that as prisoners their lives would be protected and that they would be well treated." The Sultan declined the terms and kept up the hopeless defense of his besieged fort. But the effectiveness of the mountain artillery already made its mark by destroying the embrasures and portholes of the fort. Pershing was still nonetheless desirous of avoiding loss of life, tried to delay the final assault until the following day hoping that the Moro fighters would give up. Early in the morning of April 8^th, the Panondiongan again asked for and was granted a conference with Pershing, but the talks failed as before. Nothing was left to do now but the final assault by the troops.

            On that same day (April 8^th), Pershing flashed the green light to lay siege on the Bacolod Moros.   Surrounded now, the otherwise impregnable cotta could not be defended against the mortar shells which began tearing it down. Escape was almost impossible. As the troops went close, hand-to-hand combat ensued with the Moros who, armed with their krises and kampilans, fought bravely and only stopped by death. When the battle smoke cleared, 60 Bacolod Moros were found dead, including the Sultan and several of his minor chiefs. Previous casualties in the vicinity added up to a total loss of 120 Moro killed and scores of wounded. The casualties on the American side were slight. Only eight soldiers were hurt, two whom had their arms severely cut by campilan and amputated, and another would die later of wounds while undergoing treatment. In all, the losses are one dead and 14 injured during the engagements from April 5 to 16, 1903 (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers; Pershing's Report to Adjutant General, May 15, 1903, Box 316, Pershing Papers).

            Before inspecting the battle site, however, the troops burned the fort as they could not enter it for fear of getting infected by cholera. Many rifle barrels and kris blades were found in the ashes, including 6 cannons and 7 lantacas.

Diagram Showing Bacolod Fort
(Source: Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, April 5-16, 1903, betw. pp. 343-344)

            The troops remained in Bacolod during the night of the 9^th. The next morning, they marched to a nearby stronghold at Calahui some three miles northeast, with combined forces of 250 men from Calahui and Taraca. War flags flying and Moro krises and kampilans flashing in the sunlight greeted Pershing's infantry. He then ordered some of his men to position their maxim guns at a point that could "rake the interior of the fort." By 4:00pm of April 10^th, the firing started. After a brief exchange of gunfire, it soon became evident that the cotta would fall. The next day (April 10^th), its warriors under Datu Ampuan surrendered themselves and were "required to take the oath of allegiance" according to Moro customs before being released. The battle left behind 23 Moro dead bodies and several wounded, and none whatsoever from the American side (Pershing's Report to Adjutant General, May 15, 1903, Box 316, Pershing Papers).

            The following day, the troops continued their march toward Marawi with their friendly Moro escorts (notably Amai Manabilang) and two Filipino interpreters, passing by Oato, Bucayauan and Marantao where they received friendship instead of resistance. After meeting with important Lanao datus in Marawi, Pershing marched his men back to Camp Vicars on the 14^th and reached Calahui the following day without incident. At Camp Vicars, Pershing now realized that Moros on the west side of the lake were friendly except those of Bacolod and Calahui.

            On May 4, 1903, the last of the Lanao battles was fought on the eastern part of the basak (paddies) at Taraca. After two days of stepped-up attack, desultory firing at night and several hand-to-hand encounters, the cotta of Taraca and allied fortresses fell with over 200 Moros killed (90 of them died at the Taraca fort proper). Among the leaders who died were the Sultan Cabugatan of Pitacus, the Sangcopan of Lumasa and the Cabugatan of Maciu. Those who surrendered unconditionally were Ampuana Gaus, the leading datu of the basak (ricefields) region who would continue on his defiant stance for the next ten years. In this fight, the Americans incurred losses of two killed and five wounded (Memoirs, Box 374, Pershing Papers).

Implications

            Pershing's successful pacification campaign around the lake established authority for the United States Army and also gave him much military capital in Washington. His exploits in the Laguna exemplified the first and victorious march around the lake by a white man who, cotta after cotta, flew the Stars and Stripes as symbol of unquestionable American sovereignty over the Moros. For his part, Pershing would soon be promoted to Brigadier General above the heads of more than 800 other officers and, later, would rule the Moro Province as the last Military Governor (1909-1913).

            Curiously, Pershing dealt with two kinds of Moro datus, friends (amigos) and foes (malos), which required prudence and diplomacy while at the same time demonstrating unyielding authority. The amigos no doubt played a key role in the entire pacification effort and at a later period helped cushion the transition of Maranao society from tradition to modernity.

            Perhaps, the more important lesson gained is that Lanao and the rest of the Moro Province would soon become part of the Philippine state and the emergent world system in which societies and states of varying persuasions are integrated into a modern capitalist network. By then, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to opt out of such a system unless that system is destroyed or replaced by another.

Bibliography

Bateman, Cephas. "The Moros and their Myths," 1917: Ch. IV & V, BIA 15216‑1. Record Group 350, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

MacAdam, George. "The Life of General Pershing," The World's Work 38 (May 1919): 86-103.

Magdalena, Federico V. "Lake Lanao Operations, Moro Province, the Philippines," in Benjamin R. Beede (ed.), The War of 1898 and US Interventions, 1898-1934. New York: Garland Pub., 1994, pp. 248-251.

Mahon, John K. "Pershing, John Joseph (1860-1948)," in Benjamin R. Beede (ed.), The War of 1898 and US Interventions, 1898-1934. New York: Garland Pub., 1994, pp. 407-412.

Pershing, John J. Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Important papers consulted are Pershing memoirs, a diary, correspondences and transcripts of conversations during meetings with Lanao datus during 1901-1903.

Pershing's Report On Moro Affairs. From "Report of Brig. General George W. Davis," pp. 556-559 in Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902, pp. Vol. IX. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1902.

Samuel S. Sumner, "Occupation of the Lake Lanao Region" (Appendix IV), Annual Reports of the War Department for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1903. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903. In this volume are found the following:
· "Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, 15th Cavalry, of an Expedition to the Southeast of Lake Lanao, September 18-22, 1902" (Appendix IV), pp. 332-335.
· "Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, 15th Cavalry, of an Expedition against Hostile Moros of Maciu, September 28-October 3, 1902" (Appendix IV), pp. 338-341.
· "Report of Pershing on Lake Lanao Operations, June 1902 to May 1903" (Appendix IV), pp. 319-342.
· " Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, of an Exploring Expedition from Camp Vicars to Marahui, along the West Shore of Lake Lanao, April 5 to 16, 1903" (Appendix IV), pp. 342-347.

· "Report of Capt. John J. Pershing, Fifteenth Cavalry, of an Exploring Expedition around Lake Lanao, May 2 to 10, 1903" (Appendix IV), pp. 348-353;

The author may be contacted at [email protected]

File ref: PERSHING AND LANAO DATUS, 1901-1903

[1]Revised version of the paper presented at the Conference on the Centenaries of Mindanao Battles, under the auspices of the National Historical Institute, MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology, Iligan City, April 9-10, 2003.