1952 on reviewing 'Gus' Breen's paper
The shooting of one of the 1 Battalion RAR standing patrol members forced me to send the Company Medical Corporal and stretcher bearers to evacuate the wounded soldier. I was conscious that it would deplete these resources but it was a deliberate decision.
Speed of Movement
Comments have been made that the outward journey was too slow. I can assure you that the terrain, to say the least, was difficult. Iced pools of water in the paddy fields would break through as you trod on them and even a soft curse would travel some distance. Generally, the ground was iced-over and slippery and if a soldier fell and dropped his weapon it could ice-up. I had reports from previous patrols on this matter. As a matter of interest, after the operation some members of the Company suggested that one of the missing in action (MIA) had an 'iced-up' rifle and couldn't fire.
Navigation
It was difficult to find the correct re-entrant into which we turned right to reach the objective. I must say 'thank-you' to 'Gus' for his good navigation. Too deep or even too shallow could have been catastrophic.
Contact
The attack on Company Headquarters blasted me upwards and I landed on 'Tommy' Williams, my batman. Later, I said to Tommy 'Well, I landed on you and I probably saved your life'. His reply, 'You bloody near broke my back'. When my head cleared, I realised that there was no change of getting a prisoner and to stay would invite more casualties. We had destroyed what we could, so it was 'Boomerang' back home. John Salmon should have been a stretcher case, but as he could stand and walk I sent him out with my Batman with the comment 'make the minefield gap'.
I was at the foot of the feature instructing all troops to spread out, 10 yards between men, because of the artillery and mortar attacks. I found Sergeant McNulty trying to get Sergeant Kavanagh, who was wounded, to move. He wanted to wait for Corporal Crotty. I then tried to contact Crotty with no response. The wireless had been blown up a couple of times with me, so I gave it an old-fashioned thump. It worked and contact was made. He 'Wilco'd' (message received and will be complied with) and without releasing the handset said 'thank Christ the big bastard's OK'. The ext day I asked him what right he had to call me a 'big bastard' (Joe' was 6'3" and weighed around 16 stone).
The withdrawal was not a 'bug-out'. The gaps between the men, no bunching, and the faster speed of the return run ensured that there were no casualties during that phase. I then called company second in command (2IC), Captain Cyril Morahan and 5 Platoon to move after Crotty's section was clear. As I neared the top of the minefield gap I saw John Salmon. Putting him across my shoulder, I took him to the R.A.P. where the doctor, Basil Ireland was waiting. John couldn't make the last few yards; his backside was one hell of a mess.
In the strict sense we had not achieved our aim, to capture a prisoner, but I can say with confidence that B Company will be remembered with pride in 1 Battalion's regimental history.
Footnote
1. Two daylight and one night rehearsal were held.
2. See para 5 1RAR Intelligence Report No. 39 for period 100700 hours to 110700 hours December 1952. Also note para 4 Hostile Shelling from this Intrep which was above normal and added to casualties that night in 1RAR area.
Para 3 shows ranges at which vehicles were sighted during night 10/112 December 1952 gives an indication of the importance of 355. From its top, all 10 battalions of 1 COMWEL Division were visible and many from 1ROK Division.
3. The Austin papers at War Memorial include a contemporary report on 'Fauna' which recommended spare radio sets being carried. This applied to the earlier July raid on 227. Today's sets are more reliable but there is probably a lesson here nevertheless. Battalion 'Rover Group' including CO Fd Bty Comd 10 Sig Officer were on top of 355 to gain maximum wireless reception. Normal Comd Post 1.0 was manned by battle 21/C and Adjt.
Most histories incorrectly list all 22 casualties with the raiding company. The Regimental History, 'Duty First' lists, 1 ROK on our left instead of right. The anticipated Chinese attack on1 ROK on this night was of significance. We only had one ROK Liaison Officer and there was some debate as to whether he went to Battalion Tactical Headquarters or stayed at the Command Post (which he did).
I believe that we achieved complete surprise and I did not appreciate the Signal Officer's "Bruce' Roger's request for a situation report (sitrep) just seconds before we made contact. I believe I was rather rude to him.
The Chinese opened fire and many of their bullets were over our heads. This confirmed reports from patrols which drew fire, that generally the fire was high. From later work with the Australian Army training team Vietnam, I would say that soldiers fire higher and more so at night. Our answer was to concentrate on firing low. One over your head is disturbing but a close ricochet is terrifying.
When 4 Platoon fired, and it was on target, there was no return of fire for some seconds and then it was really on.