Essay 9. OF PUBLIC CREDIT
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ESSAY IX: OF PUBLIC CREDIT 
It appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make provision, 
during peace, for the necessities of war, and to hoard up treasures before-hand, 
as the instruments either of conquest or defence; without trusting to 
extraordinary impositions, much less to borrowing, in times of disorder and 
confusion. Besides the immense sums above mentioned,†1 which were amassed by 
ATHENS, and by the PTOLEMIES, and other successors of ALEXANDER; we learn from 
PLATO,†2 that the frugal LACEDEMONIANS had also collected a great treasure; and 
ARRIAN†3 and PLUTARCH†4 take notice of the riches which ALEXANDER got possession 
of on the conquest of SUSA and ECBATANA, and which were reserved, some of them, 
from the time of CYRUS. If I remember right, the scripture also mentions the 
treasure of HEZEKIAH and the JEWISH princes; as profane history does that of 
PHILIP and PERSEUS, kings of MACEDON. The ancient republics of GAUL had commonly 
large sums in reserve.†5 Every one knows the treasure seized in ROME by JULIUS 
CAESAR, during the civil wars: and we find afterwards, that the wiser emperors, 
AUGUSTUS, TIBERIUS, VESPASIAN, SEVERUS, &c. always discovered the prudent 
foresight, of saving great sums against any public exigency.
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On the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general, is to 
mortgage the public revenues, and to trust that posterity will pay off the 
incumbrances contracted by their ancestors: And they, having before their eyes, 
so good an example of their wise fathers, have the same prudent reliance on 
their posterity; who, at last, from necessity more than choice, are obliged to 
place the same confidence in a new posterity. But not to waste time in 
declaiming against a practice which appears ruinous,†a beyond all controversy; 
it seems pretty apparent, that the ancient maxims are, in this respect, more 
prudent than the modern; even though the latter had been confined within some 
reasonable bounds, and had ever, in any instance, been attended with such 
frugality, in time of peace, as to discharge the debts incurred by an expensive 
war. For why should the case be so different between the public and an 
individual, as to make us establish different maxims of conduct for each? If the 
funds of the former be greater, its necessary expences are proportionably 
larger; if its resources be more numerous, they are not infinite; and as its 
frame should be calculated for a much longer duration than the date of a single 
life, or even of a family, it should embrace maxims, large, durable, and 
generous, agreeably to the supposed extent of its existence. To trust to chances 
and temporary expedients, is, indeed, what the necessity of human affairs 
frequently renders unavoidable; but whoever voluntarily depend on such 
resources, have not necessity, but their own folly, to accuse for their 
misfortunes, when any such befal them.
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If the abuses of treasures be dangerous, either by engaging the state in rash 
enterprizes, or making it neglect military discipline, in confidence of its 
riches; the abuses of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, 
impotence, and subjection to foreign powers.
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According to modern policy war is attended with every destructive circumstance; 
loss of men, encrease of taxes, decay of commerce, dissipation of money, 
devastation by sea and land. According to ancient maxims, the opening of the 
public treasure, as it produced an uncommon affluence of gold and silver, served 
as a temporary encouragement to industry, and atoned, in some degree, for the 
inevitable calamities of war.
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†b It is very tempting to a minister to employ such an expedient, as enables him 
to make a great figure during his administration, without overburthening the 
people with taxes, or exciting any immediate clamours against himself. The 
practice, therefore, of contracting debt will almost infallibly be abused, in 
every government. It would scarcely be more imprudent to give a prodigal son a 
credit in every banker's shop in London, than to impower a statesman to draw 
bills, in this manner, upon posterity.
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What then shall we say to the new paradox, that public incumbrances, are, of 
themselves, advantageous, independent of the necessity of contracting them; and 
that any state, even though it were not pressed by a foreign enemy, could not 
possibly have embraced a wiser expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than 
to create funds, and debts, and taxes, without limitation? Reasonings, such as 
these, might naturally have passed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like 
the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on BUSIRIS and NERO, had we not seen such 
absurd maxims patronized by great ministers, and by a whole party among us.†c
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Let us examine the consequences of public debts, both in our domestic 
management, by their influence on commerce and industry; and in our foreign 
transactions, by their effect on wars and negociations.†d
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Public securities are with us become a kind of money, and pass as readily at the 
current price as gold or silver. Wherever any profitable undertaking offers 
itself, how expensive soever, there are never wanting hands enow to embrace it; 
nor need a trader, who has sums in the public stocks, fear to launch out into 
the most extensive trade; since he is possessed of funds, which will answer the 
most sudden demand that can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it necessary to 
keep by him any considerable cash. Bank-stock, or India-bonds, especially the 
latter, serve all the same purposes; because he can dispose of them, or pledge 
them to a banker, in a quarter of an hour; and at the same time they are not 
idle, even when in his scritoire, but bring him in a constant revenue. In short, 
our national debts furnish merchants with a species of money, that is 
continually multiplying in their hands, and produces sure gain, besides the 
profits of their commerce. This must enable them to trade upon less profit. The 
small profit of the merchant renders the commodity cheaper, causes a greater 
consumption, quickens the labour of the common people, and helps to spread arts 
and industry throughout the whole society.
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There are also, we may observe, in ENGLAND and in all states, which have both 
commerce and public debts, a set of men, who are half merchants, half 
stock-holders, and may be supposed willing to trade for small profits; because 
commerce is not their principal or sole support, and their revenues in the funds 
are a sure resource for themselves and their families. Were there no funds, 
great merchants would have no expedient for realizing or securing any part of 
their profit, but by making purchases of land; and land has many disadvantages 
in comparison of funds. Requiring more care and inspection, it divides the time 
and attention of the merchant; upon any tempting offer or extraordinary accident 
in trade, it is not so easily converted into money; and as it attracts too much, 
both by the many natural pleasures it affords, and the authority it gives, it 
soon converts the citizen into the country gentleman. More men, therefore, with 
large stocks and incomes, may naturally be supposed to continue in trade, where 
there are public debts; and this, it must be owned, is of some advantage to 
commerce, by diminishing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging 
industry.†e
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But, in opposition to these two favourable circumstances, perhaps of no very 
great importance, weigh the many disadvantages which attend our public debts, in 
the whole interior economy of the state: You will find no comparison between the 
ill and the good which result from them.
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First, It is certain, that national debts cause a mighty confluence of people 
and riches to the capital, by the great sums, levied in the provinces to pay the 
interest; and perhaps, too, by the advantages in trade above mentioned, which 
they give the merchants in the capital above the rest of the kingdom. The 
question is, whether, in our case, it be for the public interest, that so many 
privileges should be conferred on LONDON, which has already arrived at such an 
enormous size, and seems still encreasing? Some men are apprehensive of the 
consequences. For my own part, I cannot forbear thinking, that, though the head 
is undoubtedly too large for the body, yet that great city is so happily 
situated, that its excessive bulk causes less inconvenience than even a smaller 
capital to a greater kingdom. There is more difference between the prices of all 
provisions in PARIS and LANGUEDOC, than between those in LONDON and YORKSHIRE.†f 
The immense greatness, indeed, of LONDON, under a government which admits not of 
discretionary power, renders the people factious, mutinous, seditious, and even 
perhaps rebellious. But to this evil the national debts themselves tend to 
provide a remedy. The first visible eruption, or even immediate danger, of 
public disorders must alarm all the stockholders, whose property is the most 
precarious of any; and will make them fly to the support of government, whether 
menaced by Jacobitish violence or democratical frenzy.
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Secondly, Public stocks, being a kind of paper-credit, have all the 
disadvantages attending that species of money. They banish gold and silver from 
the most considerable commerce of the state, reduce them to common circulation, 
and by that means render all provisions and labour dearer than otherwise they 
would be.†g
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Thirdly, The taxes, which are levied to pay the interests of these debts,†h are 
apt either to heighten the price of labour, or be an oppression on the poorer 
sort.
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Fourthly, As foreigners possess a great share of our national funds, they render 
the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occasion the 
transport of our people and our industry.
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Fifthly, The greater part of the public stock being always in the hands of idle 
people, who live on their revenue, our funds, in that view, give great 
encouragement to an useless and unactive life.
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But though the injury, that arises to commerce and industry from our public 
funds, will appear, upon balancing the whole, not inconsiderable, it is trivial, 
in comparison of the prejudice that results to the state considered as a body 
politic, which must support itself in the society of nations, and have various 
transactions with other states in wars and negociations. The ill, there, is pure 
and unmixed, without any favourable circumstance to atone for it; and it is an 
ill too of a nature the highest and most important.
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We have, indeed, been told, that the public is no weaker upon account of its 
debts; since they are mostly due among ourselves, and bring as much property to 
one as they take from another. It is like transferring money from the right hand 
to the left; which leaves the person neither richer nor poorer than before. Such 
loose reasonings and specious comparisons will always pass, where we judge not 
upon principles. I ask, Is it possible, in the nature of things, to overburthen 
a nation with taxes, even where the sovereign resides among them? The very doubt 
seems extravagant; since it is requisite, in every community, that there be a 
certain proportion observed between the laborious and the idle part of it. But 
if all our present taxes be mortgaged, must we not invent new ones? And may not 
this matter be carried to a length that is ruinous and destructive?
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In every nation, there are always some methods of levying money more easy than 
others, agreeably to the way of living of the people, and the commodities they 
make use of. In GREAT BRITAIN, the excises upon malt and beer afford a large 
revenue; because the operations of malting and brewing are tedious, and are 
impossible to be concealed; and at the same time, these commodities are not so 
absolutely necessary to life, as that the raising of their price would very much 
affect the poorer sort. These taxes being all mortgaged, what difficulty to find 
new ones! what vexation and ruin of the poor!
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Duties upon consumptions are more equal and easy than those upon possessions. 
What a loss to the public, that the former are all exhausted, and that we must 
have recourse to the more grievous method of levying taxes!
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Were all the proprietors of land only stewards to the public, must not necessity 
force them to practise all the arts of oppression used by stewards; where the 
absence or negligence of the proprietor render them secure against enquiry?
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It will scarcely be asserted, that no bounds ought ever to be set to national 
debts; and that the public would be no weaker, were twelve or fifteen shillings 
in the pound, land-tax, mortgaged, with all the present customs and excises. 
There is something, therefore, in the case, beside the mere transferring of 
property from the one hand to another. In 500 years, the posterity of those now 
in the coaches, and of those upon the boxes, will probably have changed places, 
without affecting the public by these revolutions.
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†i Suppose the public once fairly brought to that condition, to which it is 
hastening with such amazing rapidity; suppose the land to be taxed eighteen or 
nineteen shillings in the pound; for it can never bear the whole twenty; suppose 
all the excises and customs to be screwed up to the utmost which the nation can 
bear, without entirely losing its commerce and industry; and suppose that all 
those funds are mortgaged to perpetuity, and that the invention and wit of all 
our projectors can find no new imposition, which may serve as the foundation of 
a new loan; and let us consider the necessary consequences of this situation. 
Though the imperfect state of our political knowledge, and the narrow capacities 
of men, make it difficult to fortel the effects which will result from any 
untried measure, the seeds of ruin are here scattered with such profusion as not 
to escape the eye of the most careless observer.
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In this unnatural state of society, the only persons, who possess any revenue 
beyond the immediate effects of their industry, are the stock-holders, who draw 
almost all the rent of the land and houses, besides the produce of all the 
customs and excises. These are men, who have no connexions with the state, who 
can enjoy their revenue in any part of the globe in which they chuse to reside, 
who will naturally bury themselves in the capital or in great cities, and who 
will sink into the lethargy of a stupid and pampered luxury, without spirit, 
ambition, or enjoyment. Adieu to all ideas of nobility, gentry, and family. The 
stocks can be transferred in an instant, and being in such a fluctuating state, 
will seldom be transmitted during three generations from father to son. Or were 
they to remain ever so long in one family, they convey no hereditary authority 
or credit to the possessor; and by this means, the several ranks of men, which 
form a kind of independent magistracy in a state, instituted by the hand of 
nature, are entirely lost; and every man in authority derives his influence from 
the commission alone of the sovereign. No expedient remains for preventing or 
suppressing insurrections, but mercenary armies: No expedient at all remains for 
resisting tyranny: Elections are swayed by bribery and corruption alone: And the 
middle power between king and people being totally removed, a grievous despotism 
must infallibly prevail. The landholders, despised for their poverty, and hated 
for their oppressions, will be utterly unable to make any opposition to it.
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Though a resolution should be formed by the legislature never to impose any tax 
which hurts commerce and discourages industry, it will be impossible for men, in 
subjects of such extreme delicacy, to reason so justly as never to be mistaken, 
or amidst difficulties so urgent, never to be seduced from their resolution. The 
continual fluctuations in commerce require continual alterations in the nature 
of the taxes; which exposes the legislature every moment to the danger both of 
wilful and involuntary error. And any great blow given to trade, whether by 
injudicious taxes or by other accidents, throws the whole system of government 
into confusion.
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But what expedient can the public now employ, even supposing trade to continue 
in the most flourishing condition, in order to support its foreign wars and 
enterprizes, and to defend its own honour and interests, or those of its allies? 
I do not ask how the public is to exert such a prodigious power as it has 
maintained during our late wars; where we have so much exceeded, not only our 
own natural strength, but even that of the greatest empires. This extravagance 
is the abuse complained of, as the source of all the dangers, to which we are at 
present exposed. But since we must still suppose great commerce and opulence to 
remain, even after every fund is mortgaged; these riches must be defended by 
proportional power; and whence is the public to derive the revenue which 
supports it? It must plainly be from a continual taxation of the annuitants, or, 
which is the same thing, from mortgaging anew, on every exigency, a certain part 
of their annuities; and thus making them contribute to their own defence, and to 
that of the nation. But the difficulties, attending this system of policy, will 
easily appear, whether we suppose the king to have become absolute master, or to 
be still controuled by national councils, in which the annuitants themselves 
must necessarily bear the principal sway.
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If the prince has become absolute, as may naturally be expected from this 
situation of affairs, it is so easy for him to encrease his exactions upon the 
annuitants, which amount only to the retaining money in his own hands, that this 
species of property would soon lose all its credit, and the whole income of 
every individual in the state must lie entirely at the mercy of the sovereign: A 
degree of despotism, which no oriental monarchy has ever yet attained. If, on 
the contrary, the consent of the annuitants be requisite for every taxation, 
they will never be persuaded to contribute sufficiently even to the support of 
government; as the diminution of their revenue must in that case be very 
sensible, would not be disguised under the appearance of a branch of excise or 
customs, and would not be shared by any other order of the state, who are 
already supposed to be taxed to the utmost. There are instances, in some 
republics, of a hundredth penny, and sometimes of the fiftieth, being given to 
the support of the state; but this is always an extraordinary exertion of power, 
and can never become the foundation of a constant national defence. We have 
always found, where a government has mortgaged all its revenues, that it 
necessarily sinks into a state of languor, inactivity, and impotence.
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Such are the inconveniencies, which may reasonably be foreseen, of this 
situation, to which GREAT BRITAIN is visibly tending. Not to mention, the 
numberless inconveniencies, which cannot be foreseen, and which must result from 
so monstrous a situation as that of making the public the chief or sole 
proprietor of land, besides investing it with every branch of customs and 
excise, which the fertile imagination of ministers and projectors have been able 
to invent.
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I must confess, that there is a strange supineness, from long custom, creeped 
into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines so 
vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, 
that the most sanguine imagination cannot hope, either that this or any future 
ministry will be possessed of such rigid and steady frugality, as to make a 
considerable progress in the payment of our debts; or that the situation of 
foreign affairs will, for any long time, allow them leisure and tranquillity for 
such an undertaking.†j What then is to become of us? Were we ever so good 
Christians, and ever so resigned to Providence; this, methinks, were a curious 
question, even considered as a speculative one, and what it might not be 
altogether impossible to form some conjectural solution of. The events here will 
depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negociations, intrigues, and 
factions. There seems to be a natural progress of things, which may guide our 
reasoning. As it would have required but a moderate share of prudence, when we 
first began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of 
men and of ministers, that things would necessarily be carried to the length we 
see; so now, that they have at last happily reached it, it may not be difficult 
to guess at the consequences. It must, indeed, be one of these two events; 
either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the 
nation. It is impossible that they can both subsist, after the manner they have 
been hitherto managed, in this, as well as in some other countries.
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There was, indeed, a scheme for the payment of our debts, which was proposed by 
an excellent citizen, Mr. HUTCHINSON, above thirty years ago, and which was much 
approved of by some men of sense, but never was likely to take effect. He 
asserted, that there was a fallacy in imagining that the public owed this debt; 
for that really every individual owed a proportional share of it, and paid, in 
his taxes, a proportional share of the interest, beside the expence of levying 
these taxes. Had we not better, then, says he, make a distribution of the debt 
among ourselves, and each of us contribute a sum suitable to his property, and 
by that means discharge at once all our funds and public mortgages? He seems not 
to have considered, that the laborious poor pay a considerable part of the taxes 
by their annual consumptions, though they could not advance, at once, a 
proportional part of the sum required. Not to mention, that property in money 
and stock in trade might easily be concealed or disguised; and that visible 
property in lands and houses would really at last answer for the whole: An 
inequality and oppression, which never would be submitted to. But though this 
project is not likely to take place; it is not altogether improbable, that, when 
the nation becomes heartily sick of their debts, and is cruelly oppressed by 
them, some daring projector may arise with visionary schemes for their 
discharge. And as public credit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, 
the least touch will destroy it, as happened in FRANCE during the regency; and 
in this manner it will die of the doctor.†k
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But it is more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the necessary 
effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of 
victories and conquests. I must confess, when I see princes and states fighting 
and quarrelling, amidst their debts, funds, and public mortgages, it always 
brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a China shop. How can it 
be expected, that sovereigns will spare a species of property, which is 
pernicious to themselves and to the public, when they have so little compassion 
on lives and properties, that are useful to both? Let the time come (and surely 
it will come) when the new funds, created for the exigencies of the year, are 
not subscribed to, and raise not the money projected. Suppose, either that the 
cash of the nation is exhausted; or that our faith, which has hitherto been so 
ample, begins to fail us. Suppose, that, in this distress, the nation is 
threatened with an invasion; a rebellion is suspected or broken out at home; a 
squadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a 
foreign subsidy cannot be advanced. What must a prince or minister do in such an 
emergence? The right of self-preservation is unalienable in every individual, 
much more in every community. And the folly of our statesmen must then be 
greater than the folly of those who first contracted debt, or, what is more, 
than that of those who trusted, or continue to trust this security, if these 
statesmen have the means of safety in their hands, and do not employ them. The 
funds, created and mortgaged, will, by that time, bring in a large yearly 
revenue, sufficient for the defence and security of the nation: Money is perhaps 
lying in the exchequer, ready for the discharge of the quarterly interest: 
Necessity calls, fear urges, reason exhorts, compassion alone exclaims: The 
money will immediately be seized for the current service, under the most solemn 
protestations, perhaps, of being immediately replaced. But no more is requisite. 
The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thousands 
in its ruins. And this, I think, may be called the natural death of public 
credit: For to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to its 
dissolution and destruction.
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†l So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, notwithstanding such a 
violent shock to public credit, as a voluntary bankruptcy in ENGLAND would 
occasion, it would not probably be long ere credit would again revive in as 
flourishing a condition as before. The present king of FRANCE, during the late 
war, borrowed money at lower interest than ever his grandfather did; and as low 
as the BRITISH parliament, comparing the natural rate of interest in both 
kingdoms. And though men are commonly more governed by what they have seen, than 
by what they foresee, with whatever certainty; yet promises, protestations, fair 
appearances, with the allurements of present interest, have such powerful 
influence as few are able to resist. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the 
same baits: The same tricks, played over and over again, still trepan them. The 
heights of popularity and patriotism are still the beaten road to power and 
tyranny; flattery to treachery; standing armies to arbitrary government; and the 
glory of God to the temporal interest of the clergy. The fear of an everlasting 
destruction of credit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needless bugbear. A 
prudent man, in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after we 
had taken a spunge to our debts, than at present; as much as an opulent knave, 
even though one could not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honest 
bankrupt: For the former, in order to carry on business, may find it his 
interest to discharge his debts, where they are not exorbitant: The latter has 
it not in his power. The reasoning of TACITUS,†6 as it is eternally true, is 
very applicable to our present case. Sed vulgus ad magnitudinem beneficiorum 
aderat: Stultissimus quisque pecuniis mercabatur: Apud sapientes cassa 
habebantur, quae neque dari neque accipi, salva republica, poterant. The public 
is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check which the creditors 
have upon her, is the interest of preserving credit; an interest, which may 
easily be overbalanced by a great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary 
emergence, even supposing that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention, that a 
present necessity often forces states into measures, which are, strictly 
speaking, against their interest.
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These two events, supposed above, are calamitous, but not the most calamitous. 
Thousands are thereby sacrificed to the safety of millions. But we are not 
without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be 
sacrificed for ever to the temporary safety of thousands.†7 Our popular 
government, perhaps, will render it difficult or dangerous for a minister to 
venture on so desperate an expedient, as that of a voluntary bankruptcy. And 
though the house of Lords be altogether composed of proprietors of land, and the 
house of Commons chiefly; and consequently neither of them can be supposed to 
have great property in the funds. Yet the connections of the members may be so 
great with the proprietors, as to render them more tenacious of public faith, 
than prudence, policy, or even justice, strictly speaking, requires. And perhaps 
too, our foreign enemies†m may be so politic as to discover, that our safety 
lies in despair, and may not, therefore, show the danger, open and barefaced, 
till it be inevitable. The balance of power in EUROPE, our grandfathers, our 
fathers, and we, have all deemed too unequal to be preserved without our 
attention and assistance. But our children, weary of the struggle, and fettered 
with incumbrances, may sit down secure, and see their neighbours oppressed and 
conquered; till, at last, they themselves and their creditors lie both at the 
mercy of the conqueror. And this may properly enough be denominated the violent 
death of our public credit.
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These seem to be the events, which are not very remote, and which reason 
foresees as clearly almost as she can do any thing that lies in the womb of 
time. And though the ancients maintained, that in order to reach the gift of 
prophecy, a certain divine fury or madness was requisite, one may safely affirm, 
that, in order to deliver such prophecies as these, no more is necessary, than 
merely to be in one's senses, free from the influence of popular madness and 
delusion.
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†1 Essay V.
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†2 ALCIB. I. p. 123.
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†3 Lib. iii. 16 and 19.
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†4 PLUT. in vita ALEX. 36, 37. He makes these treasures amount to 80,000 
talents, or about 15 millions sterl. QUINTUS CURTIUS (lib. v. cap. 2.) says, 
that ALEXANDER found in SUSA above 50,000 talents.
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†5 STRABO, lib. iv. p. 188.
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†6 Hist. lib. iii. 55.
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†7 I have heard it has been computed, that all the creditors of the public, 
natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000. These make a figure at present on 
their income; but in case of a public bankruptcy, would, in an instant, become 
the lowest, as well as the most wretched of the people. The dignity and 
authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted; and would 
render the contention very unequal, if ever we come to that extremity. One would 
incline to assign to this event a very near period, such as half a century, had 
not our fathers' prophecies of this kind been already found fallacious, by the 
duration of our public credit so much beyond all reasonable expectation. When 
the astrologers in FRANCE were every year foretelling the death of HENRY IV. 
These fellows, says he, must be right at last. We shall, therefore, be more 
cautious than to assign any precise date; and shall content ourselves with 
pointing out the event in general.
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†a Editions H to P add: Beyond the evidence of a hundred demonstrations.
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†b This paragraph was added in Ed. Q.
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†c Editions H to P add: And these puzzling arguments, (for they deserve not the 
name of specious) though they could not be the foundation of LORD ORFORD'S 
conduct, for he had more sense; served at least to keep his partizans in 
countenance, and perplex the understanding of the nation.
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†d Editions H to P add: There is a word, which is here in the mouth of every 
body, and which, I find, has also got abroad, and is much employed by foreign 
writers,†1 in imitation of the ENGLISH; and this is, CIRCULATION. This word 
serves as an account of every thing; and though I confess, that I have sought 
for its meaning in the present subject, ever since I was a school-boy, I have 
never yet been able to discover it. What possible advantage is there which the 
nation can reap by the easy transference of stock from hand to hand? Or is there 
any parallel to be drawn from the circulation of other commodities, to that of 
chequer-notes and INDIA bonds? Where a manufacturer has a quick sale of his 
goods to the merchant, the merchant to the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper to his 
customers; this enlivens industry, and gives new encouragement to the first 
dealer or the manufacturer and all his tradesmen, and makes them produce more 
and better commodities of the same species. A stagnation is here pernicious, 
wherever it happens; because it operates backwards, and stops or benumbs the 
industrious hand in its production of what is useful to human life. But what 
production we owe to CHANGE-ALLEY, or even what consumption, except that of 
coffee, and pen, ink, and paper, I have not yet learned; nor can one forsee the 
loss or decay of any one beneficial commerce or commodity, though that place and 
all its inhabitants were for ever buried in the ocean.
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But though this term has never been explained by those who insist so much on the 
advantages that result from a circulation, there seems, however, to be some 
benefit of a similar kind, arising from our incumbrances: As indeed, what human 
evil is there, which is not attended with some advantage? This we shall 
endeavour to explain, that we may estimate the weight which we ought to allow 
it.
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†1 MELON, DU TOT, LAW, in the pamphlets published in FRANCE.
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†e Editions H to O add as a note: On this head, I shall observe, without 
interrupting the thread of the argument, that the multiplicity of our public 
debts serves rather to sink the interest, and that the more the government 
borrows, the cheaper may they expect to borrow; contrary to first appearance, 
and contrary to common opinion. The profits of trade have an influence on 
interest. See Essay IV.
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†f The remainder of this paragraph was added in Ed. Q.
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†g Edition P adds: We may also remark, that this increase of prices, derived 
from paper-credit, has a more durable and a more dangerous influence than when 
it arises from a great increase of gold and silver: Where an accidental overflow 
of money raises the price of labor and commodities, the evil remedies itself in 
a little time: The money soon flows out into all the neighbouring nations: The 
prices fall to a level: And industry may be continued as before; a relief, which 
cannot be expected, where the circulating specie consists chiefly of paper, and 
has no intrinsic value.
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†h Editions H to N read: Are a check upon industry, heighten the price of 
labour, and are an oppr. &c.
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†i The six following paragraphs were added in Ed. O.
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†j Editions H to P add the note: In times of peace and security, when alone it 
is possible to pay debt, the monied interest are averse to receive partial 
payments, which they know not how to dispose of to advantage; and the landed 
interest are averse to continue the taxes requisite for that purpose. Why 
therefore should a minister persevere in a measure so disagreeable to all 
parties? For the sake, I suppose, of a posterity, which he will never see, or of 
a few reasonable reflecting people, whose united interest, perhaps, will not be 
able to secure him the smallest burrough in ENGLAND. 'Tis not likely we shall 
ever find any minister so bad a politician. With regard to these narrow 
destructive maxims of politics, all ministers are expert enough.
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†k Editions H to P add: Some neighbouring states practise an easy expedient, by 
which they lighten their public debts. The French have a custom (as the Romans 
formerly had) of augmenting their money; and this the nation has been so much 
familiarised to, that it hurts not public credit, though it be really cutting 
off at once, by an edict, so much of their debts. The Dutch diminish the 
interest without the consent of their creditors, or, which is the same thing, 
they arbitrarily tax the funds, as well as other property. Could we practise 
either of these methods, we need never be oppressed by the national debt; and it 
is not impossible but one of these, or some other method, may, at all 
adventures, be tried, on the augmentation of our incumbrances and difficulties. 
But people in this country are so good reasoners upon whatever regards their 
interests, that such a practice will deceive nobody; and public credit will 
probably tumble at once, by so dangerous a trial.
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†l This paragraph appears in Editions H to P as a footnote.
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†m Editions H to P: or rather enemy (for we have but one to dread.)

Essay 10. OF SOME REMARKABLE CUSTOMS
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ESSAY X: OF SOME REMARKABLE CUSTOMS I shall observe three remarkable customs in 
three celebrated governments; and shall conclude from the whole, that all 
general maxims in politics ought to be established with great caution; and that 
irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently discovered in the moral, 
as well as in the physical world. The former, perhaps, we can better account 
for, after they happen, from springs and principles, of which every one has, 
within himself, or from observation, the strongest assurance and conviction: But 
it is often fully as impossible for human prudence, before-hand, to foresee and 
foretel them.
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I. One would think it essential to every supreme council or assembly, which 
debates, that entire liberty of speech should be granted to every member, and 
that all motions or reasonings should be received, which can any wise tend to 
illustrate the point under deliberation. One would conclude, with still greater 
assurance, that, after a motion was made, which was voted and approved by that 
assembly in which the legislative power is lodged, the member who made the 
motion must for ever be exempted from future trial or enquiry. But no political 
maxim can, at first sight, appear more undisputable, than that he must, at 
least, be secured from all inferior jurisdiction; and that nothing less than the 
same supreme legislative assembly, in their subsequent meetings, could make him 
accountable for those motions and harangues, to which they had before given 
their approbation. But these axioms, however irrefragable they may appear, have 
all failed in the ATHENIAN government, from causes and principles too, which 
appear almost inevitable.
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By the {graphe paranomon}, or indictment of illegality, (though it has not been 
remarked by antiquaries or commentators) any man was tried and punished in a 
common court of judicature, for any law which had passed upon his motion, in the 
assembly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjust, or prejudicial 
to the public. Thus DEMOSTHENES, finding that ship-money was levied irregularly, 
and that the poor bore the same burden as the rich in equipping the gallies, 
corrected this inequality by a very useful law, which proportioned the expence 
to the revenue and income of each individual. He moved for this law in the 
assembly: he proved its advantages;†1 he convinced the people, the only 
legislature in ATHENS; the law passed, and was carried into execution: Yet was 
he tried in a criminal court for that law, upon the complaint of the rich, who 
resented the alteration that he had introduced into the finances.†2 He was 
indeed acquitted, upon proving anew the usefulness of his law.
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CTESIPHON moved in the assembly of the people, that particular honours should be 
conferred on DEMOSTHENES, as on a citizen affectionate and useful to the 
commonwealth: The people, convinced of this truth, voted those honours: Yet was 
CTESIPHON tried by the {graphe paranomon}. It was asserted, among other topics, 
that DEMOSTHENES was not a good citizen, nor affectionate to the commonwealth: 
And the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and consequently himself; 
which he executed by that sublime piece of eloquence, that has ever since been 
the admiration of mankind.
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After the battle of CHAERONEA, a law was passed upon the motion of HYPERIDES, 
giving liberty to slaves, and inrolling them in the troops.†3 On account of this 
law, the orator was afterwards tried by the indictment above-mentioned, and 
defended himself, among other topics, by that stroke celebrated by PLUTARCH and 
LONGINUS. It was not I, said he, that moved for this law: It was the necessities 
of war; it was the battle of CHAERONEA. The orations of DEMOSTHENES abound with 
many instances of trials of this nature, and prove clearly, that nothing was 
more commonly practised.
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The ATHENIAN Democracy was such a tumultuous government as we can scarcely form 
a notion of in the present age of the world. The whole collective body of the 
people voted in every law, without any limitation of property, without any 
distinction of rank, without controul from any magistracy or senate;†4 and 
consequently without regard to order, justice, or prudence. The ATHENIANS soon 
became sensible of the mischiefs attending this constitution: But being averse 
to checking themselves by any rule or restriction, they resolved, at least, to 
check their demagogues or counsellors, by the fear of future punishment and 
enquiry. They accordingly instituted this remarkable law; a law esteemed so 
essential to their form of government, that AESCHINES insists on it as a known 
truth, that, were it abolished or neglected, it were impossible for the 
Democracy to subsist.†5
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The people feared not any ill consequence to liberty from the authority of the 
criminal courts; because these were nothing but very numerous juries, chosen by 
lot from among the people. And they justly considered themselves as in a state 
of perpetual pupillage; where they had an authority, after they came to the use 
of reason, not only to retract and controul whatever had been determined, but to 
punish any guardian for measures which they had embraced by his persuasion. The 
same law had place in THEBES;†6 and for the same reason.
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It appears to have been a usual practice in ATHENS, on the establishment of any 
law esteemed very useful or popular, to prohibit for ever its abrogation and 
repeal. Thus the demagogue, who diverted all the public revenues to the support 
of shows and spectacles, made it criminal so much as to move for a repeal of 
this law.†7 Thus LEPTINES moved for a law, not only to recal all the immunities 
formerly granted, but to deprive the people for the future of the power of 
granting any more.†8 Thus all bills of attainder†9 were forbid, or laws that 
affected one ATHENIAN, without extending to the whole commonwealth. These absurd 
clauses, by which the legislature vainly attempted to bind itself for ever, 
proceeded from an universal sense in the people of their own levity and 
inconstancy.
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II. A wheel within a wheel, such as we observe in the GERMAN empire, is 
considered by Lord SHAFTESBURY†10 as an absurdity in politics: But what must we 
say to two equal wheels, which govern the same political machine, without any 
mutual check, controul, or subordination; and yet preserve the greatest harmony 
and concord? To establish two distinct legislatures, each of which possesses 
full and absolute authority within itself, and stands in no need of the other's 
assistance, in order to give validity to its acts; this may appear, before-hand, 
altogether impracticable, as long as men are actuated by the passions of 
ambition, emulation, and avarice, which have hitherto been their chief governing 
principles. And should I assert, that the state I have in my eye was divided 
into two distinct factions, each of which predominated in a distinct 
legislature, and yet produced no clashing in these independent powers; the 
supposition may appear incredible. And if, to augment the paradox, I should 
affirm, that this disjointed, irregular government, was the most active, 
triumphant, and illustrious commonwealth, that ever yet appeared; I should 
certainly be told, that such a political chimera was as absurd as any vision of 
priests or poets. But there is no need for searching long, in order to prove the 
reality of the foregoing suppositions: For this was actually the case with the 
ROMAN republic.
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The legislative power was there lodged in the comitia centuriata and comitia 
tributa. In the former, it is well known, the people voted according to their 
census; so that when the first class was unanimous, though it contained not, 
perhaps, the hundredth part of the commonwealth, it determined the whole; and, 
with the authority of the senate, established a law. In the latter, every vote 
was equal; and as the authority of the senate was not there requisite, the lower 
people entirely prevailed, and gave law to the whole state. In all 
party-divisions, at first between the PATRICIANS and PLEBEIANS, afterwards 
between the nobles and the people, the interest of the Aristocracy was 
predominant in the first legislature; that of the Democracy in the second: The 
one could always destroy what the other had established: Nay, the one, by a 
sudden and unforeseen motion, might take the start of the other, and totally 
annihilate its rival, by a vote, which, from the nature of the constitution, had 
the full authority of a law. But no such contest is observed in the history of 
ROME: No instance of a quarrel between these two legislatures; though many 
between the parties that governed in each. Whence arose this concord, which may 
seem so extraordinary?
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The legislature established in ROME, by the authority of SERVIUS TULLIUS, was 
the comitia centuriata, which, after the expulsion of the kings, rendered the 
government, for some time, very aristocratical. But the people, having numbers 
and force on their side, and being elated with frequent conquests and victories 
in their foreign wars, always prevailed when pushed to extremity, and first 
extorted from the senate the magistracy of the tribunes, and next the 
legislative power of the comitia tributa. It then behoved the nobles to be more 
careful than ever not to provoke the people. For beside the force which the 
latter were always possessed of, they had now got possession of legal authority, 
and could instantly break in pieces any order or institution which directly 
opposed them. By intrigue, by influence, by money, by combination, and by the 
respect paid to their character, the nobles might often prevail, and direct the 
whole machine of government: But had they openly set their comitia centuriata in 
opposition to the tributa, they had soon lost the advantage of that institution, 
together with their consuls, praetors, ediles, and all the magistrates elected 
by it. But the comitia tributa, not having the same reason for respecting the 
centuriata, frequently repealed laws favourable to the Aristocracy: They limited 
the authority of the nobles, protected the people from oppression, and 
controuled the actions of the senate and magistracy. The centuriata found it 
convenient always to submit; and though equal in authority, yet being inferior 
in power, durst never directly give any shock to the other legislature, either 
by repealing its laws, or establishing laws, which, it foresaw, would soon be 
repealed by it.
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No instance is found of any opposition or struggle between these comitia; except 
one slight attempt of this kind, mentioned by APPIAN in the third book of his 
civil wars. MARK ANTHONY, resolving to deprive DECIMUS BRUTUS of the government 
of CISALPINE GAUL, railed in the Forum, and called one of the comitia, in order 
to prevent the meeting of the other, which had been ordered by the senate. But 
affairs were then fallen into such confusion, and the ROMAN constitution was so 
near its final dissolution, that no inference can be drawn from such an 
expedient. This contest, besides, was founded more on form than party. It was 
the senate who ordered the comitia tributa, that they might obstruct the meeting 
of the centuriata, which, by the constitution, or at least forms of the 
government, could alone dispose of provinces.
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CICERO was recalled by the comitia centuriata, though banished by the tributa, 
that is, by a plebiscitum. But his banishment, we may observe, never was 
considered as a legal deed, arising from the free choice and inclination of the 
people. It was always ascribed to the violence alone of CLODIUS, and to the 
disorders introduced by him into the government.
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III. The third custom, which we purpose to remark, regards ENGLAND; and though 
it be not so important as those which we have pointed out in ATHENS and ROME, is 
no less singular and unexpected. It is a maxim in politics, which we readily 
admit as undisputed and universal, that a power, however great, when granted by 
law to an eminent magistrate, is not so dangerous to liberty, as an authority, 
however inconsiderable, which he acquires from violence and usurpation. For, 
besides that the law always limits every power which it bestows, the very 
receiving it as a concession establishes the authority whence it is derived, and 
preserves the harmony of the constitution. By the same right that one 
prerogative is assumed without law, another may also be claimed, and another, 
with still greater facility; while the first usurpations both serve as 
precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroism 
of HAMPDEN'S conduct, who sustained the whole violence of royal prosecution, 
rather than pay a tax of twenty shillings, not imposed by parliament; hence the 
care of all ENGLISH patriots to guard against the first encroachments of the 
crown; and hence alone the existence, at this day, of ENGLISH liberty.
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There is, however, one occasion, where the parliament has departed from this 
maxim; and that is, in the pressing of seamen. The exercise of an irregular 
power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and though it has frequently been 
under deliberation, how that power might be rendered legal, and granted, under 
proper restrictions, to the sovereign, no safe expedient could ever be proposed 
for that purpose; and the danger to liberty always appeared greater from law 
than from usurpation. While this power is exercised to no other end than to man 
the navy, men willingly submit to it, from a sense of its use and necessity; and 
the sailors, who are alone affected by it, find no body to support them, in 
claiming the rights and privileges, which the law grants, without distinction, 
to all ENGLISH subjects. But were this power, on any occasion, made an 
instrument of faction or ministerial tyranny, the opposite faction, and indeed 
all lovers of their country, would immediately take the alarm, and support the 
injured party; the liberty of ENGLISHMEN would be asserted; juries would be 
implacable; and the tools of tyranny, acting both against law and equity, would 
meet with the severest vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to 
grant such an authority, they would probably fall into one of these two 
inconveniencies: They would either bestow it under so many restrictions as would 
make it lose its effect, by cramping the authority of the crown; or they would 
render it so large and comprehensive, as might give occasion to great abuses, 
for which we could, in that case, have no remedy. The very irregularity of the 
practice, at present, prevents its abuses, by affording so easy a remedy against 
them.
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I pretend not, by this reasoning, to exclude all possibility of contriving a 
register for seamen, which might man the navy, without being dangerous to 
liberty. I only observe, that no satisfactory scheme of that nature has yet been 
proposed. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a 
practice seemingly the most absurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of 
full internal peace and concord, is armed against law. A continued violence is 
permitted in the crown, amidst the greatest jealousy and watchfulness in the 
people; nay proceeding from those very principles: Liberty, in a country of the 
highest liberty, is left entirely to its own defence, without any countenance or 
protection: The wild state of nature is renewed, in one of the most civilized 
societies of mankind: And great violence and disorder†a are committed with 
impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the supreme magistrate, the 
other the sanction of fundamental laws.
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†1 His harangue for it is still extant; {peri Symmorias}.
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†2 Pro CTESIPHONTE.
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†3 PLUTARCHUS in vita decem oratorum. DEMOSTHENES gives a different account of 
this law. Contra ARISTOGITON. orat. II. 803-4. He says, that its purport was, to 
render the {atimoi epitimoi}, or to restore the privilege of bearing offices to 
those who had been declared incapable. Perhaps these were both clauses of the 
same law.
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†4 The senate of the Bean was only a less numerous mob, chosen by lot from among 
the people; and their authority was not great.
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†5 In CTESIPHONTEM. It is remarkable, that the first step after the dissolution 
of the Democracy by CRITIAS and the Thirty, was to annul the {graphe paranomon}, 
as we learn from DEMOSTHENES {kata Timok}. The orator in this oration gives us 
the words of the law, establishing the {graphe paranomon}, pag. 297. ex edit. 
ALDI. And he accounts for it, from the same principles we here reason upon.
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†6 PLUT. in vita PELOP. c. 25.
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†7 DEMOST. Olynth. 1. 2.
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†8 DEMOST. contra LEPT. 457.
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†9 DEMOST. contra ARISTOCRATEM, 649.
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†10 Essay on the freedom of wit and humour, part 3. sec. 2.
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†a Editions H to P: Among the people, the most humane and the best natured.

Essay 11. OF THE POPULOUSNESS OF ANCIENT NATIONS
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ESSAY XI: OF THE POPULOUSNESS OF ANCIENT NATIONS
There is very little ground, either from reason or observation, to conclude the 
world eternal or incorruptible. The continual and rapid motion of matter, the 
violent revolutions with which every part is agitated, the changes remarked in 
the heavens, the plain traces as well as tradition of an universal deluge, or 
general convulsion of the elements; all these prove strongly the mortality of 
this fabric of the world, and its passage, by corruption or dissolution, from 
one state or order to another. It must therefore, as well as each individual 
form which it contains, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age; and it is 
probable, that, in all these variations, man, equally with every animal and 
vegetable, will partake. In the flourishing age of the world, it may be 
expected, that the human species should possess greater vigour both of mind and 
body, more prosperous health, higher spirits, longer life, and a stronger 
inclination and power of generation. But if the general system of things, and 
human society of course, have any such gradual revolutions, they are too slow to 
be discernible in that short period which is comprehended by history and 
tradition. Stature and force of body, length of life, even courage and extent of 
genius, seem hitherto to have been naturally, in all ages, pretty much the same. 
The arts and sciences, indeed, have flourished in one period, and have decayed 
in another: But we may observe, that, at the time when they rose to greatest 
perfection among one people, they were perhaps totally unknown to all the 
neighbouring nations; and though they universally decayed in one age, yet in a 
succeeding generation they again revived, and diffused themselves over the 
world. As far, therefore, as observation reaches, there is no universal 
difference discernible in the human species; and though it were allowed, that 
the universe, like an animal body, had a natural progress from infancy to old 
age; yet as it must still be uncertain, whether, at present, it be advancing to 
its point of perfection, or declining from it, we cannot thence presuppose any 
decay in human nature.†1 To prove, therefore, or account for that superior 
populousness of antiquity, which is commonly supposed, by the imaginary youth or 
vigour of the world, will scarcely be admitted by any just reasoner. These 
general physical causes ought entirely to be excluded from this question.
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There are indeed some more particular physical causes of importance. Diseases 
are mentioned in antiquity, which are almost unknown to modern medicine; and new 
diseases have arisen and propagated themselves, of which there are no traces in 
ancient history. In this particular we may observe, upon comparison, that the 
disadvantage is much on the side of the moderns. Not to mention some others of 
less moment; the small-pox commits such ravages, as would almost alone account 
for the great superiority ascribed to ancient times. The tenth or the twelfth 
part of mankind, destroyed every generation, should make a vast difference, it 
may be thought, in the numbers of the people; and when joined to venereal 
distempers, a new plague diffused every where, this disease is perhaps 
equivalent, by its constant operation, to the three great scourges of mankind, 
war, pestilence, and famine. Were it certain, therefore, that ancient times were 
more populous than the present, and could no moral causes be assigned for so 
great a change; these physical causes alone, in the opinion of many, would be 
sufficient to give us satisfaction on that head.
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But is it certain, that antiquity was so much more populous, as is pretended? 
The extravagancies of VOSSIUS, with regard to this subject, are well known. But 
an author of much greater genius and discernment has ventured to affirm, that, 
according to the best computations which these subjects will admit of, there are 
not now, on the face of the earth, the fiftieth part of mankind, which existed 
in the time of JULIUS CAESAR.†2 It may easily be observed, that the comparison, 
in this case, must be imperfect, even though we confine ourselves to the scene 
of ancient history; EUROPE, and the nations round the MEDITERRANEAN. We know not 
exactly the numbers of any EUROPEAN kingdom, or even city, at present: How can 
we pretend to calculate those of ancient cities and states, where historians 
have left us such imperfect traces? For my part, the matter appears to me so 
uncertain, that, as I intend to throw together some reflections on that head, I 
shall intermingle the enquiry concerning causes with that concerning facts; 
which ought never to be admitted, where the facts can be ascertained with any 
tolerable assurance. We shall, first, consider whether it be probable, from what 
we know of the situation of society in both periods, that antiquity must have 
been more populous; secondly, whether in reality it was so. If I can make it 
appear, that the conclusion is not so certain as is pretended, in favour of 
antiquity, it is all I aspire to.
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In general, we may observe, that the question, with regard to the comparative 
populousness of ages or kingdoms, implies important consequences, and commonly 
determines concerning the preference of their whole police, their manners, and 
the constitution of their government. For as there is in all men, both male and 
female, a desire and power of generation, more active than is ever universally 
exerted, the restraints, which they lie under, must proceed from some 
difficulties in their situation, which it belongs to a wise legislature 
carefully to observe and remove. Almost every man who thinks he can maintain a 
family will have one; and the human species, at this rate of propagation, would 
more than double every generation.†a How fast do mankind multiply in every 
colony or new settlement; where it is an easy matter to provide for a family; 
and where men are nowise straitened or confined, as in long established 
governments? History tells us frequently of plagues, which have swept away the 
third or fourth part of a people: Yet in a generation or two, the destruction 
was not perceived; and the society had again acquired their former number. The 
lands which were cultivated, the houses built, the commodities raised, the 
riches acquired, enabled the people, who escaped, immediately to marry, and to 
rear families, which supplied the place of those who had perished.†3 And for a 
like reason, every wise, just, and mild government, by rendering the condition 
of its subjects easy and secure, will always abound most in people, as well as 
in commodities and riches.†b A country, indeed, whose climate and soil are 
fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which produces corn 
only, and that more populous than one which is only fitted for pasturage. In 
general, warm climates, as the necessities of the inhabitants are there fewer, 
and vegetation more powerful, are likely to be most populous: But if every thing 
else be equal, it seems natural to expect, that, wherever there are most 
happiness and virtue, and the wisest institutions, there will also be most 
people.
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The question, therefore, concerning the populousness of ancient and modern 
times, being allowed of great importance, it will be requisite, if we would 
bring it to some determination, to compare both the domestic and political 
situation of these two periods, in order to judge of the facts by their moral 
causes; which is the first view in which we proposed to consider them.
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The chief difference between the domestic economy of the ancients and that of 
the moderns consists in the practice of slavery, which prevailed among the 
former, and which has been abolished for some centuries throughout the greater 
part of EUROPE. Some passionate admirers of the ancients, and zealous partizans 
of civil liberty, (for these sentiments, as they are, both of them, in the main, 
extremely just, are found to be almost inseparable) cannot forbear regretting 
the loss of this institution; and whilst they brand all submission to the 
government of a single person with the harsh denomination of slavery, they would 
gladly reduce the greater part of mankind to real slavery and subjection. But to 
one who considers coolly on the subject it will appear, that human nature, in 
general, really enjoys more liberty at present, in the most arbitrary government 
of EUROPE, than it ever did during the most flourishing period of ancient times. 
As much as submission to a petty prince, whose dominions extend not beyond a 
single city, is more grievous than obedience to a great monarch; so much is 
domestic slavery more cruel and oppressive than any civil subjection whatsoever. 
The more the master is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we 
enjoy; the less are our actions inspected and controled; and the fainter that 
cruel comparison becomes between our own subjection, and the freedom, and even 
dominion of another. The remains which are found of domestic slavery, in the 
AMERICAN colonies, and among some EUROPEAN nations, would never surely create a 
desire of rendering it more universal. The little humanity, commonly observed in 
persons, accustomed, from their infancy, to exercise so great authority over 
their fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were sufficient alone 
to disgust us with that unbounded dominion. Nor can a more probable reason be 
assigned for the severe, I might say, barbarous manners of ancient times, than 
the practice of domestic slavery; by which every man of rank was rendered a 
petty tyrant, and educated amidst the flattery, submission, and low debasement 
of his slaves.
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According to ancient practice, all checks were on the inferior, to restrain him 
to the duty of submission; none on the superior, to engage him to the reciprocal 
duties of gentleness and humanity. In modern times, a bad servant finds not 
easily a good master, nor a bad master a good servant; and the checks are 
mutual, suitably to the inviolable and eternal laws of reason and equity.
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The custom of exposing old, useless, or sick slaves in an island of the TYBER, 
there to starve, seems to have been pretty common in ROME; and whoever 
recovered, after having been so exposed, had his liberty given him, by an edict 
of the emperor CLAUDIUS; in which it was likewise forbidden to kill any slave 
merely for old age or sickness.†4 But supposing that this edict was strictly 
obeyed, would it better the domestic treatment of slaves, or render their lives 
much more comfortable? We may imagine what others would practise, when it was 
the professed maxim of the elder CATO, to sell his superannuated slaves for any 
price, rather than maintain what he esteemed a useless burden.†5
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The ergastula, or dungeons, where slaves in chains were forced to work, were 
very common all over ITALY. COLUMELLA†6 advises, that they be always built under 
ground; and recommends†7 it as the duty of a careful overseer, to call over 
every day the names of these slaves, like the mustering of a regiment or ship's 
company, in order to know presently when any of them had deserted. A proof of 
the frequency of these ergastula, and of the great number of slaves usually 
confined in them.†c
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A chained slave for a porter, was usual in ROME, as appears from OVID,†8 and 
other authors.†9 Had not these people shaken off all sense of compassion towards 
that unhappy part of their species, would they have presented their friends, at 
the first entrance, with such an image of the severity of the master, and misery 
of the slave?
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Nothing so common in all trials, even of civil causes, as to call for the 
evidence of slaves; which was always extorted by the most exquisite torments. 
DEMOSTHENES says,†10 that, where it was possible to produce, for the same fact, 
either freemen or slaves, as witnesses, the judges always preferred the 
torturing of slaves, as a more certain evidence.†11
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SENECA draws a picture of that disorderly luxury, which changes day into night, 
and night into day, and inverts every stated hour of every office in life. Among 
other circumstances, such as displacing the meals and times of bathing, he 
mentions, that, regularly about the third hour of the night, the neighbours of 
one, who indulges this false refinement, hear the noise of whips and lashes; 
and, upon enquiry, find that he is then taking an account of the conduct of his 
servants, and giving them due correction and discipline. This is not remarked as 
an instance of cruelty, but only of disorder, which, even in actions the most 
usual and methodical, changes the fixed hours that an established custom had 
assigned for them.†12
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But our present business is only to consider the influence of slavery on the 
populousness of a state. It is pretended, that, in this particular, the ancient 
practice had infinitely the advantage, and was the chief cause of that extreme 
populousness, which is supposed in those times. At present, all masters 
discourage the marrying of their male servants, and admit not by any means the 
marriage of the female, who are then supposed altogether incapacitated for their 
service. But where the property of the servants is lodged in the master, their 
marriage forms his riches, and brings him a succession of slaves that supply the 
place of those whom age and infirmity have disabled. He encourages, therefore, 
their propagation as much as that of his cattle; rears the young with the same 
care; and educates them to some art or calling, which may render them more 
useful or valuable to him. The opulent are, by this policy, interested in the 
being at least, though not in the well-being of the poor; and enrich themselves, 
by encreasing the number and industry of those who are subjected to them. Each 
man, being a sovereign in his own family, has the same interest with regard to 
it, as the prince with regard to the state; and has not, like the prince, any 
opposite motives of ambition or vain-glory, which may lead him to depopulate his 
little sovereignty. All of it is, at all times, under his eye; and he has 
leisure to inspect the most minute detail of the marriage and education of his 
subjects.†13
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Such are the consequences of domestic slavery, according to the first aspect and 
appearance of things: But if we enter more deeply into the subject, we shall 
perhaps find reason to retract our hasty determinations. The comparison is 
shocking between the management of human creatures and that of cattle; but being 
extremely just, when applied to the present subject, it may be proper to trace 
the consequences of it. At the capital, near all great cities, in all populous, 
rich, industrious provinces, few cattle are bred. Provisions, lodging, 
attendance, labour are there dear; and men find their account better in buying 
the cattle, after they come to a certain age, from the remoter and cheaper 
countries. These are consequently the only breeding countries for cattle; and by 
a parity of reason, for men too, when the latter are put on the same footing 
with the former. To rear a child in LONDON, till he could be serviceable, would 
cost much dearer, than to buy one of the same age from SCOTLAND or IRELAND; 
where he had been bred in a cottage, covered with rags, and fed on oatmeal or 
potatoes. Those who had slaves, therefore, in all the richer and more populous 
countries, would discourage the pregnancy of the females, and either prevent or 
destroy the birth. The human species would perish in those places where it ought 
to encrease the fastest; and a perpetual recruit be wanted from the poorer and 
more desert provinces. Such a continued drain would tend mightily to depopulate 
the state, and render great cities ten times more destructive than with us; 
where every man is master of himself, and provides for his children from the 
powerful instinct of nature, not the calculations of sordid interest. If LONDON, 
at present, without much encreasing, needs a yearly recruit from the country, of 
5000 people, as is usually computed, what must it require, if the greater part 
of the tradesmen and common people were slaves, and were hindered from breeding 
by their avaricious masters?
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All ancient authors tell us, that there was a perpetual flux of slaves to ITALY 
from the remoter provinces, particularly SYRIA, CILICIA,†14 CAPPADOCIA, and the 
Lesser ASIA, THRACE, and AEGYPT: Yet the number of people did not encrease in 
ITALY; and writers complain of the continual decay of industry and 
agriculture.†15 Where then is that extreme fertility of the ROMAN slaves, which 
is commonly supposed? So far from multiplying, they could not, it seems, so much 
as keep up the stock, without immense recruits. And though great numbers were 
continually manumitted and converted into ROMAN citizens, the numbers even of 
these did not encrease,†16 till the freedom of the city was communicated to 
foreign provinces.
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The term for a slave, born and bred in the family, was verna;†17 and these 
slaves seem to have been entitled by custom to privileges and indulgences beyond 
others; a sufficient reason why the masters would not be fond of rearing many of 
that kind.†18 Whoever is acquainted with the maxims of our planters, will 
acknowledge the justness of this observation.†19
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ATTICUS is much praised by his historian for the care, which he took in 
recruiting his family from the slaves born in it:†20 May we not thence infer, 
that this practice was not then very common?
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The names of slaves in the GREEK comedies, SYRUS, MYSUS, GETA, THRAX, DAVUS, 
LYDUS, PHRYX, &c. afford a presumption, that, at ATHENS at least, most of the 
slaves were imported from foreign countries. The ATHENIANS, says STRABO,†21 gave 
to their slaves, either the names of the nations whence they were bought, as 
LYDUS, SYRUS; or the names that were most common among those nations, as MANES 
or MIDAS to a PHRYGIAN, TIBIAS to a PAPHLAGONIAN.
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DEMOSTHENES, having mentioned a law which forbad any man to strike the slave of 
another, praises the humanity of this law; and adds, that, if the barbarians 
from whom the slaves were bought, had information, that their countrymen met 
with such gentle treatment, they would entertain a great esteem for the 
ATHENIANS.†22 ISOCRATES†23 too insinuates, that the slaves of the GREEKS were 
generally or very commonly barbarians.†e ARISTOTLE in his Politics†24 plainly 
supposes, that a slave is always a foreigner. The ancient comic writers 
represented the slaves as speaking a barbarous language.†25 This was an 
imitation of nature.
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It is well known that DEMOSTHENES, in his nonage, had been defrauded of a large 
fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he recovered, by a prosecution at 
law, the value of his patrimony. His orations, on that occasion, still remain, 
and contain an exact detail of the whole substance left by his father,†26 in 
money, merchandise, houses, and slaves, together with the value of each 
particular. Among the rest were 52 slaves, handicraftsmen, namely, 32 
sword-cutlers, and 20 cabinet-makers;†27 all males; not a word of any wives, 
children or family, which they certainly would have had, had it been a common 
practice at ATHENS to breed from the slaves: And the value of the whole must 
have much depended on that circumstance. No female slaves are even so much as 
mentioned, except some house-maids, who belonged to his mother. This argument 
has great force, if it be not altogether conclusive.
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Consider this passage of PLUTARCH,†28 speaking of the Elder CATO. "He had a 
great number of slaves, whom he took care to buy at the sales of prisoners of 
war; and he chose them young, that they might easily be accustomed to any diet 
or manner of life, and be instructed in any business or labour, as men teach any 
thing to young dogs or horses.-- And esteeming love the chief source of all 
disorders, he allowed the male slaves to have a commerce with the female in his 
family, upon paying a certain sum for this privilege: But he strictly prohibited 
all intrigues out of his family." Are there any symptoms in this narration of 
that care which is supposed in the ancients, of the marriage and propagation of 
their slaves? If that was a common practice, founded on general interest, it 
would surely have been embraced by CATO, who was a great economist, and lived in 
times when the ancient frugality and simplicity of manners were still in credit 
and reputation.
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It is expressly remarked by the writers of the ROMAN law, that scarcely any ever 
purchase slaves with a view of breeding from them.†29
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Our lackeys and house-maids, I own, do not serve much to multiply their species: 
But the ancients, besides those who attended on their person, had almost all 
their labour performed,†f and even manufactures executed, by slaves, who lived, 
many of them, in their family; and some great men possessed to the number of 
10,000. If there be any suspicion, therefore, that this institution was 
unfavourable to propagation, (and the same reason, at least in part, holds with 
regard to ancient slaves as modern servants) how destructive must slavery have 
proved?
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History mentions a ROMAN nobleman, who had 400 slaves under the same roof with 
him: And having been assassinated at home by the furious revenge of one of them, 
the law was executed with rigour, and all without exception were put to 
death.†30 Many other ROMAN noblemen had families equally, or more numerous; and 
I believe every one will allow, that this would scarcely be practicable, were we 
to suppose all the slaves married, and the females to be breeders.†31
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So early as the poet HESIOD,†32 married slaves, whether male or female, were 
esteemed inconvenient. How much more, where families had encreased to such an 
enormous size as in ROME, and where the ancient simplicity of manners was 
banished from all ranks of people?
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XENOPHON in his Economics, where he gives directions for the management of a 
farm, recommends a strict care and attention of laying the male and the female 
slaves at a distance from each other. He seems not to suppose that they are ever 
married. The only slaves among the GREEKS that appear to have continued their 
own race, were the HELOTES, who had houses apart, and were more the slaves of 
the public than of individuals.†33
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†g The same author†34 tells us, that NICIAS'S overseer, by agreement with his 
master, was obliged to pay him an obolus a day for each slave; besides 
maintaining them, and keeping up the number. Had the ancient slaves been all 
breeders, this last circumstance of the contract had been superfluous.
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The ancients talk so frequently of a fixed, stated portion of provisions 
assigned to each slave,†35 that we are naturally led to conclude, that slaves 
lived almost all single, and received that portion as a kind of board-wages.
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The practice, indeed, of marrying slaves seems not to have been very common, 
even among the country-labourers, where it is more naturally to be expected. 
CATO,†36 enumerating the slaves requisite to labour a vineyard of a hundred 
acres, makes them amount to 15; the overseer and his wife, villicus and villica, 
and 13 male slaves; for an olive plantation of 240 acres, the overseer and his 
wife, and 11 male slaves; and so in proportion to a greater or less plantation 
or vineyard.
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VARRO,†37 quoting this passage of CATO, allows his computation to be just in 
every respect, except the last. For as it is requisite, says he, to have an 
overseer and his wife, whether the vineyard or plantation be great or small, 
this must alter the exactness of the proportion. Had CATO'S computation been 
erroneous in any other respect, it had certainly been corrected by VARRO, who 
seems fond of discovering so trivial an error.
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The same author,†38 as well as COLUMELLA,†39 recommends it as requisite to give 
a wife to the overseer, in order to attach him the more strongly to his master's 
service. This was therefore a peculiar indulgence granted to a slave, in whom so 
great confidence was reposed.
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In the same place, VARRO mentions it as an useful precaution, not to buy too 
many slaves from the same nation, lest they beget factions and seditions in the 
family: A presumption, that in ITALY, the greater part, even of the country 
labouring slaves, (for he speaks of no other) were bought from the remoter 
provinces. All the world knows, that the family slaves in ROME, who were 
instruments of show and luxury, were commonly imported from the east. Hoc 
profecere, says PLINY, speaking of the jealous care of masters, mancipiorum 
legiones, et in domo turba externa, ac servorum quoque causa nomenclator 
adhibendus.†40
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It is indeed recommended by VARRO,†41 to propagate young shepherds in the family 
from the old ones. For as grasing farms were commonly in remote and cheap 
places, and each shepherd lived in a cottage apart, his marriage and encrease 
were not liable to the same inconveniencies as in dearer places, and where many 
servants lived in the family; which was universally the case in such of the 
ROMAN farms as produced wine or corn. If we consider this exception with regard 
to shepherds, and weigh the reasons of it, it will serve for a strong 
confirmation of all our foregoing suspicions.†42
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COLUMELLA,†43 I own, advises the master to give a reward, and even liberty to a 
female slave, that had reared him above three children: A proof, that sometimes 
the ancients propagated from their slaves; which, indeed, cannot be denied. Were 
it otherwise, the practice of slavery, being so common in antiquity, must have 
been destructive to a degree which no expedient could repair. All I pretend to 
infer from these reasonings is, that slavery is in general disadvantageous both 
to the happiness and populousness of mankind, and that its place is much better 
supplied by the practice of hired servants.
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The laws, or, as some writers call them, the seditions of the GRACCHI, were 
occasioned by their observing the encrease of slaves all over ITALY, and the 
diminution of free citizens. APPIAN†44 ascribes this encrease to the propagation 
of the slaves: PLUTARCH†45 to the purchasing of barbarians, who were chained and 
imprisoned, {barbarika desmoteria}.†46 It is to be presumed that both causes 
concurred.
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SICILY, says FLORUS†47 was full of ergastula, and was cultivated by labourers in 
chains. EUNUS and ATHENIO excited the servile war, by breaking up these 
monstrous prisons, and giving liberty to 60,000 slaves. The younger POMPEY 
augmented his army in SPAIN by the same expedient.†48 If the country labourers, 
throughout the ROMAN empire, were so generally in this situation, and if it was 
difficult or impossible to find separate lodgings for the families of the city 
servants, how unfavourable to propagation, as well as to humanity, must the 
institution of domestic slavery be esteemed?
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CONSTANTINOPLE, at present, requires the same recruits of slaves from all the 
provinces, that ROME did of old; and these provinces are of consequence far from 
being populous.
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EGYPT, according to Mons. MAILLET, sends continual colonies of black slaves to 
the other parts of the TURKISH empire; and receives annually an equal return of 
white: The one brought from the inland parts of AFRICA; the other from 
MINGRELIA, CIRCASSIA, and TARTARY.
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Our modern convents are, no doubt, bad institutions: But there is reason to 
suspect, that anciently every great family in ITALY, and probably in other parts 
of the world, was a species of convent. And though we have reason to condemn all 
those popish institutions, as nurseries†i of superstition, burthensome to the 
public, and oppressive to the poor prisoners, male as well as female; yet may it 
be questioned whether they be so destructive to the populousness of a state, as 
is commonly imagined. Were the land, which belongs to a convent, bestowed on a 
nobleman, he would spend its revenue on dogs, horses, grooms, footmen, cooks, 
and house-maids; and his family would not furnish many more citizens than the 
convent.
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The common reason, why any parent thrusts his daughters into nunneries, is, that 
he may not be overburthened with too numerous a family; but the ancients had a 
method almost as innocent, and more effectual to that purpose, to wit, exposing 
their children in early infancy. This practice was very common; and is not 
spoken of by any author of those times with the horror it deserves, or 
scarcely†49 even with disapprobation. PLUTARCH, the humane, good-natured 
PLUTARCH,†50 mentions it as a merit in ATTALUS, king of PERGAMUS, that he 
murdered, or, if you will, exposed all his own children, in order to leave his 
crown to the son of his brother, EUMENES; signalizing in this manner his 
gratitude and affection to EUMENES, who had left him his heir preferably to that 
son. It was SOLON, the most celebrated of the sages of GREECE, that gave parents 
permission by law to kill their children.†51
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Shall we then allow these two circumstances to compensate each other, to wit, 
monastic vows and the exposing of children, and to be unfavourable, in equal 
degrees, to the propagation of mankind? I doubt the advantage is here on the 
side of antiquity. Perhaps, by an odd connexion of causes, the barbarous 
practice of the ancients might rather render those times more populous. By 
removing the terrors of too numerous a family it would engage many people in 
marriage; and such is the force of natural affection, that very few, in 
comparison, would have resolution enough, when it came to the push, to carry 
into execution their former intentions.
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CHINA, the only country where this practice of exposing children prevails at 
present, is the most populous country we know of; and every man is married 
before he is twenty. Such early marriages could scarcely be general, had not men 
the prospect of so easy a method of getting rid of their children. I own, that 
PLUTARCH†52 speaks of it as a very general maxim of the poor to expose their 
children; and as the rich were then averse to marriage, on account of the 
courtship they met with from those who expected legacies from them, the public 
must have been in a bad situation between them.†53
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Of all sciences there is none, where first appearances are more deceitful than 
in politics. Hospitals for foundlings seem favourable to the encrease of 
numbers; and perhaps, may be so, when kept under proper restrictions. But when 
they open the door to every one, without distinction, they have probably a 
contrary effect, and are pernicious to the state. It is computed, that every 
ninth child born at PARIS, is sent to the hospital; though it seems certain, 
according to the common course of human affairs, that it is not a hundredth 
child whose parents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate him. The†j 
great difference, for health, industry, and morals, between an education in an 
hospital and that in a private family, should induce us not to make the entrance 
into the former too easy and engaging. To kill one's own child is shocking to 
nature, and must therefore be somewhat unusual; but to turn over the care of him 
upon others, is very tempting to the natural indolence of mankind.
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Having considered the domestic life and manners of the ancients, compared to 
those of the moderns; where, in the main, we seem rather superior, so far as the 
present question is concerned; we shall now examine the political customs and 
institutions of both ages, and weigh their influence in retarding or forwarding 
the propagation of mankind.
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Before the encrease of the ROMAN power, or rather till its full establishment, 
almost all the nations, which are the scene of ancient history, were divided 
into small territories or petty commonwealths, where of course a great equality 
of fortune prevailed, and the center of the government was always very near its 
frontiers.
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This was the situation of affairs not only in GREECE and ITALY, but also in 
SPAIN, GAUL, GERMANY, AFRIC, and a great part of the Lesser ASIA: And it must be 
owned, that no institution could be more favourable to the propagation of 
mankind. For, though a man of an overgrown fortune, not being able to consume 
more than another, must share it with those who serve and attend him; yet their 
possession being precarious, they have not the same encouragement to marry, as 
if each had a small fortune, secure and independent. Enormous cities are, 
besides, destructive to society, beget vice and disorder of all kinds, starve 
the remoter provinces, and even starve themselves, by the prices to which they 
raise all provisions. Where each man had his little house and field to himself, 
and each county had its capital, free and independent; what a happy situation of 
mankind! How favourable to industry and agriculture; to marriage and 
propagation! The prolific virtue of men, were it to act in its full extent, 
without that restraint which poverty and necessity imposes on it, would double 
the number every generation: And nothing surely can give it more liberty, than 
such small commonwealths, and such an equality of fortune among the citizens. 
All small states naturally produce equality of fortune, because they afford no 
opportunities of great encrease; but small commonwealths much more, by that 
division of power and authority which is essential to them.
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When XENOPHON†54 returned after the famous expedition with CYRUS, he hired 
himself and 6000 of the GREEKS into the service of SEUTHES, a prince of THRACE; 
and the articles of his agreement were, that each soldier should receive a daric 
a month, each captain two darics, and he himself, as general, four: A regulation 
of pay which would not a little surprise our modern officers.
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DEMOSTHENES and AESCHINES, with eight more, were sent ambassadors to PHILIP of 
MACEDON, and their appointments for above four months were a thousand drachmas, 
which is less than a drachma a day for each ambassador.†55 But a drachma a day, 
nay sometimes two,†56 was the pay of a common foot-soldier.
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A centurion among the ROMANS had only double pay to a private man, in POLYBIUS'S 
time,†57 and we accordingly find the gratuities after a triumph regulated by 
that proportion.†58 But MARK ANTHONY and the triumvirate gave the centurions 
five times the reward of the other.†59 So much had the encrease of the 
commonwealth encreased the inequality among the citizens.†60
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It must be owned, that the situation of affairs in modern times, with regard to 
civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near so favourable, either 
to the propagation or happiness of mankind. EUROPE is shared out mostly into 
great monarchies; and such parts of it as are divided into small territories, 
are commonly governed by absolute princes, who ruin their people by a mimicry of 
the greater monarchs, in the splendor of their court and number of their forces. 
SWISSERLAND alone and HOLLAND resemble the ancient republics; and though the 
former is far from possessing any advantage either of soil, climate, or 
commerce, yet the numbers of people, with which it abounds, notwithstanding 
their enlisting themselves into every service in EUROPE, prove sufficiently the 
advantages of their political institutions.
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The ancient republics derived their chief or only security from the numbers of 
their citizens. The TRACHINIANS having lost great numbers of their people, the 
remainder, instead of enriching themselves by the inheritance of their 
fellow-citizens, applied to SPARTA, their metropolis, for a new stock of 
inhabitants. The SPARTANS immediately collected ten thousand men; among whom the 
old citizens divided the lands of which the former proprietors had perished.†61
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After TIMOLEON had banished DIONYSIUS from SYRACUSE, and had settled the affairs 
of SICILY, finding the cities of SYRACUSE and SELLINUNTIUM extremely depopulated 
by tyranny, war, and faction, he invited over from GREECE some new inhabitants 
to repeople them.†62 Immediately forty thousand men (PLUTARCH†63 says sixty 
thousand) offered themselves; and he distributed so many lots of land among 
them, to the great satisfaction of the ancient inhabitants: A proof at once of 
the maxims of ancient policy, which affected populousness more than riches; and 
of the good effects of these maxims, in the extreme populousness of that small 
country, GREECE, which could at once supply so great a colony. The case was not 
much different with the ROMANS in early times. He is a pernicious citizen, said 
M. CURIUS, who cannot be content with seven acres.†64 Such ideas of equality 
could not fail of producing great numbers of people.
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We must now consider what disadvantages the ancients lay under with regard to 
populousness, and what checks they received from their political maxims and 
institutions. There are commonly compensations in every human condition: and 
though these compensations be not always perfectly equal, yet they serve, at 
least, to restrain the prevailing principle. To compare them and estimate their 
influence, is indeed difficult, even where they take place in the same age, and 
in neighbouring countries: But where several ages have intervened, and only 
scattered lights are afforded us by ancient authors; what can we do but amuse 
ourselves by talking pro and con, on an interesting subject, and thereby 
correcting all hasty and violent determinations?
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First, We may observe, that the ancient republics were almost in perpetual war, 
a natural effect of their martial spirit, their love of liberty, their mutual 
emulation, and that hatred which generally prevails among nations that live in 
close neighbourhood. Now, war in a small state is much more destructive than in 
a great one; both because all the inhabitants, in the former case, must serve in 
the armies; and because the whole state is frontier, and is all exposed to the 
inroads of the enemy.
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The maxims of ancient war were much more destructive than those of modern; 
chiefly by that distribution of plunder, in which the soldiers were indulged. 
The private men in our armies are such a low set of people, that we find any 
abundance, beyond their simple pay, breeds confusion and disorder among them, 
and a total dissolution of discipline. The very wretchedness and meanness of 
those, who fill the modern armies, render them less destructive to the countries 
which they invade: One instance, among many of the deceitfulness of first 
appearances in all political reasonings.†65
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Ancient battles were much more bloody, by the very nature of the weapons 
employed in them. The ancients drew up their men 16 or 20, sometimes 50 men 
deep, which made a narrow front; and it was not difficult to find a field, in 
which both armies might be marshalled, and might engage with each other. Even 
where any body of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow 
ways, the battle was not so soon decided between the contending parties, but 
that the others had time to overcome the difficulties which opposed them, and 
take part in the engagement. And as the whole army was thus engaged, and each 
man closely buckled to his antagonist, the battles were commonly very bloody, 
and great slaughter was made on both sides, especially on the vanquished. The 
long thin lines, required by fire-arms, and the quick decision of the fray, 
render our modern engagements but partial rencounters, and enable the general, 
who is foiled in the beginning of the day, to draw off the greater part of his 
army, sound and entire.†k
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The battles of antiquity, both by their duration, and their resemblance to 
single combats, were wrought up to a degree of fury quite unknown to later ages. 
Nothing could then engage the combatants to give quarter, but the hopes of 
profit, by making slaves of their prisoners. In civil wars, as we learn from 
TACITUS,†66 the battles were the most bloody, because the prisoners were not 
slaves.
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What a stout resistance must be made, where the vanquished expected so hard a 
fate! How inveterate the rage, where the maxims of war were, in every respect, 
so bloody and severe!
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Instances are frequent, in ancient history, of cities besieged, whose 
inhabitants, rather than open their gates, murdered their wives and children, 
and rushed themselves on a voluntary death, sweetened perhaps by a little 
prospect of revenge upon the enemy. GREEKS,†67 as well as BARBARIANS, have often 
been wrought up to this degree of fury. And the same determined spirit and 
cruelty must, in other instances less remarkable, have been destructive to human 
society, in those petty commonwealths, which lived in close neighbourhood, and 
were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions.
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Sometimes the wars in GREECE, says PLUTARCH,†68 were carried on entirely by 
inroads, and robberies, and piracies. Such a method of war must be more 
destructive in small states, than the bloodiest battles and sieges.
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By the laws of the twelve tables, possession during two years formed a 
prescription for land; one year for moveables:†69 An indication, that there was 
not in ITALY, at that time, much more order, tranquillity, and settled police, 
than there is at present among the TARTARS.
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The only cartel I remember in ancient history, is that between DEMETRIUS 
POLIORCETES and the RHODIANS; when it was agreed, that a free citizen should be 
restored for 1000 drachmas, a slave bearing arms for 500.†70
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But, secondly, it appears that ancient manners were more unfavourable than the 
modern, not only in times of war, but also in those of peace; and that too in 
every respect, except the love of civil liberty and of equality, which is, I 
own, of considerable importance. To exclude faction from a free government, is 
very difficult, if not altogether impracticable; but such inveterate rage 
between the factions, and such bloody maxims, are found, in modern times amongst 
religious parties alone.†m In ancient history, we may always observe, where one 
party prevailed, whether the nobles or people (for I can observe no difference 
in this respect†71) that they immediately butchered all of the opposite party 
who fell into their hands, and banished such as had been so fortunate as to 
escape their fury. No form of process, no law, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a 
third, perhaps near half of the city was slaughtered, or expelled, every 
revolution; and the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the 
mischief possible to their fellow-citizens; till fortune put it in their power 
to take full revenge by a new revolution. And as these were frequent in such 
violent governments, the disorder, diffidence, jealousy, enmity, which must 
prevail, are not easy for us to imagine in this age of the world.
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There are only two revolutions I can recollect in ancient history, which passed 
without great severity, and great effusion of blood in massacres and 
assassinations, namely, the restoration of the ATHENIAN Democracy by 
THRASYBULUS, and the subduing of the ROMAN republic by CAESAR. We learn from 
ancient history, that THRASYBULUS passed a general amnesty for all past 
offences; and first introduced that word, as well as practice, into GREECE.†72 
It appears, however, from many orations of LYSIAS,†73 that the chief, and even 
some of the subaltern offenders, in the preceding tyranny, were tried, and 
capitally punished.†n And as to CAESAR'S clemency, though much celebrated, it 
would not gain great applause in the present age. He butchered, for instance, 
all CATO'S senate, when he became master of UTICA;†74 and these, we may readily 
believe, were not the most worthless of the party. All those who had borne arms 
against that usurper, were attainted; and, by HIRTIUS'S law, declared incapable 
of all public offices.
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These people were extremely fond of liberty; but seem not to have understood it 
very well. When the thirty tyrants first established their dominion at ATHENS, 
they began with seizing all the sycophants and informers, who had been so 
troublesome during the Democracy, and putting them to death by an arbitrary 
sentence and execution. Every man, says SALLUST†75 and LYSIAS,†76 was rejoiced 
at these punishments; not considering, that liberty was from that moment 
annihilated.
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The utmost energy of the nervous style of THUCYDIDES, and the copiousness and 
expression of the GREEK language, seem to sink under that historian, when he 
attempts to describe the disorders, which arose from faction throughout all the 
GRECIAN commonwealths. You would imagine, that he still labours with a thought 
greater than he can find words to communicate. And he concludes his pathetic 
description with an observation, which is at once refined and solid. "In these 
contests," says he, "those who were the dullest, and most stupid, and had the 
least foresight, commonly prevailed. For being conscious of this weakness, and 
dreading to be overreached by those of greater penetration, they went to work 
hastily, without premeditation, by the sword and poinard, and thereby got the 
start of their antagonists, who were forming fine schemes and projects for their 
destruction."†77
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Not to mention DIONYSIUS†78 the elder, who is computed to have butchered in cool 
blood above 10,000 of his fellow-citizens; or AGATHOCLES,†79 NABIS,†80 and 
others, still more bloody than he; the transactions, even in free governments, 
were extremely violent and destructive. At ATHENS, the thirty tyrants and the 
nobles, in a twelvemonth, murdered, without trial, about 1200 of the people, and 
banished above the half of the citizens that remained.†81 In ARGOS, near the 
same time, the people killed 1200 of the nobles; and afterwards their own 
demagogues, because they had refused to carry their prosecutions farther.†82 The 
people also in CORCYRA killed 1500 of the nobles, and banished a thousand.†83 
These numbers will appear the more surprising, if we consider the extreme 
smallness of these states. But all ancient history is full of such instances.†84
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When ALEXANDER ordered all the exiles to be restored throughout all the cities; 
it was found, that the whole amounted to 20,000 men;†85 the remains probably of 
still greater slaughters and massacres. What an astonishing multitude in so 
narrow a country as ancient GREECE! And what domestic confusion, jealousy, 
partiality, revenge, heart-burnings, must tear those cities, where factions were 
wrought up to such a degree of fury and despair.
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It would be easier, says ISOCRATES to PHILIP, to raise an army in GREECE at 
present from the vagabonds than from the cities.
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Even when affairs came not to such extremities (which they failed not to do 
almost in every city twice or thrice every century) property was rendered very 
precarious by the maxims of ancient government. XENOPHON, in the Banquet of 
SOCRATES, gives us a natural unaffected description of the tyranny of the 
ATHENIAN people. "In my poverty," says CHARMIDES, "I am much more happy than I 
ever was while possessed of riches: as much as it is happier to be in security 
than in terrors, free than a slave, to receive than to pay court, to be trusted 
than suspected. Formerly I was obliged to caress every informer; some imposition 
was continually laid upon me; and it was never allowed me to travel, or be 
absent from the city. At present, when I am poor I look big, and threaten 
others. The rich are afraid of me, and show me every kind of civility and 
respect; and I am become a kind of tyrant in the city."†86
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In one of the pleadings of LYSIAS,†87 the orator very coolly speaks of it, by 
the by, as a maxim of the ATHENIAN people, that, whenever they wanted money, 
they put to death some of the rich citizens as well as strangers, for the sake 
of the forfeiture. In mentioning this, he seems not to have any intention of 
blaming them; still less of provoking them, who were his audience and judges.
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Whether a man was a citizen or a stranger among that people, it seems indeed 
requisite, either that he should impoverish himself, or that the people would 
impoverish him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain. The orator last mentioned 
gives a pleasant account of an estate laid out in the public service;†88 that 
is, above the third of it in raree-shows and figured dances.
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I need not insist on the GREEK tyrannies, which were altogether horrible. Even 
the mixed monarchies, by which most of the ancient states of GREECE were 
governed, before the introduction of republics, were very unsettled. Scarcely 
any city, but ATHENS, says ISOCRATES, could show a succession of kings for four 
or five generations.†89
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Besides many other obvious reasons for the instability of ancient monarchies, 
the equal division of property among the brothers in private families, must, by 
a necessary consequence, contribute to unsettle and disturb the state. The 
universal preference given to the elder by modern laws, though it encreases the 
inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accustoms men to 
the same idea in public succession, and cuts off all claim and pretension of the 
younger.
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The new settled colony of HERACLEA, falling immediately into faction, applied to 
SPARTA, who sent HERIPIDAS with full authority to quiet their dissentions. This 
man, not provoked by any opposition, not inflamed by party rage, knew no better 
expedient than immediately putting to death about 500 of the citizens.†90 A 
strong proof how deeply rooted these violent maxims of government were 
throughout all GREECE.
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If such was the disposition of men's minds among that refined people, what may 
be expected in the commonwealths of ITALY, AFRIC, SPAIN, and GAUL, which were 
denominated barbarous? Why otherwise did the GREEKS so much value themselves on 
their humanity, gentleness, and moderation, above all other nations? This 
reasoning seems very natural. But unluckily the history of the ROMAN 
commonwealth, in its earlier times, if we give credit to the received accounts, 
presents an opposite conclusion. No blood was ever shed in any sedition at ROME, 
till the murder of the GRACCHI. DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSAEUS,†91 observing the 
singular humanity of the ROMAN people in this particular, makes use of it as an 
argument that they were originally of GRECIAN extraction: Whence we may 
conclude, that the factions and revolutions in the barbarous republics were 
usually more violent than even those of GREECE above-mentioned.
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If the ROMANS were so late in coming to blows, they made ample compensation, 
after they had once entered upon the bloody scene; and APPIAN'S history of their 
civil wars contains the most frightful picture of massacres, proscriptions, and 
forfeitures, that ever was presented to the world. What pleases most, in that 
historian, is, that he seems to feel a proper resentment of these barbarous 
proceedings; and talks not with that provoking coolness and indifference, which 
custom had produced in many of the GREEK historians.†92
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The maxims of ancient politics contain, in general, so little humanity and 
moderation, that it seems superfluous to give any particular reason for the acts 
of violence committed at any particular period. Yet I cannot forbear observing, 
that the laws, in the later period of the ROMAN commonwealth, were so absurdly 
contrived, that they obliged the heads of parties to have recourse to these 
extremities. All capital punishments were abolished: However criminal, or, what 
is more, however dangerous any citizen might be, he could not regularly be 
punished otherwise than by banishment: And it became necessary, in the 
revolutions of party, to draw the sword of private vengeance; nor was it easy, 
when laws were once violated, to set bounds to these sanguinary proceedings. Had 
BRUTUS himself prevailed over the triumvirate, could he, in common prudence, 
have allowed OCTAVIUS and ANTHONY, to live, and have contented himself with 
banishing them to RHODES or MARSEILLES, where they might still have plotted new 
commotions and rebellions? His executing C. ANTONIUS, brother to the triumvir, 
shows evidently his sense of the matter. Did not CICERO, with the approbation of 
all the wise and virtuous of ROME, arbitrarily put to death CATILINE'S 
accomplices, contrary to law, and without any trial or form of process? And if 
he moderated his executions, did it not proceed, either from the clemency of his 
temper, or the conjunctures of the times? A wretched security in a government 
which pretends to laws and liberty!
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Thus, one extreme produces another. In the same manner as excessive severity in 
the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their execution; so their excessive 
lenity naturally produces cruelty and barbarity. It is dangerous to force us, in 
any case, to pass their sacred boundaries.
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One general cause of the disorders, so frequent in all ancient governments, 
seems to have consisted in the great difficulty of establishing any Aristocracy 
in those ages, and the perpetual discontents and seditions of the people, 
whenever even the meanest and most beggarly were excluded from the legislature 
and from public offices. The very quality of freemen gave such a rank, being 
opposed to that of slave, that it seemed to entitle the possessor to every power 
and privilege of the commonwealth. SOLON'S†93 laws excluded no freeman from 
votes or elections, but confined some magistracies to a particular census; yet 
were the people never satisfied till those laws were repealed. By the treaty 
with ANTIPATER,†94 no ATHENIAN was allowed a vote whose census was less than 
2000 drachmas (about 60l. Sterling). And though such a government would to us 
appear sufficiently democratical, it was so disagreeable to that people, that 
above two-thirds of them immediately left their country.†95 CASSANDER reduced 
that census to the half;†96 yet still the government was considered as an 
oligarchical tyranny, and the effect of foreign violence.
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SERVIUS TULLIUS'S†97 laws seem equal and reasonable, by fixing the power in 
proportion to the property: Yet the ROMAN people could never be brought quietly 
to submit to them.
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In those days there was no medium between a severe, jealous Aristocracy, ruling 
over discontented subjects; and a turbulent, factious, tyrannical Democracy.†q 
At present, there is not one republic in EUROPE, from one extremity of it to the 
other, that is not remarkable for justice, lenity, and stability, equal to, or 
even beyond MARSEILLES, RHODES, or the most celebrated in antiquity. Almost all 
of them are well-tempered Aristocracies.
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But thirdly, there are many other circumstances, in which ancient nations seem 
inferior to the modern, both for the happiness and encrease of mankind. Trade, 
manufactures, industry, were no where, in former ages, so flourishing as they 
are at present in EUROPE. The only garb of the ancients, both for males and 
females, seems to have been a kind of flannel, which they wore commonly white or 
grey, and which they scoured as often as it became dirty. TYRE, which carried 
on, after CARTHAGE, the greatest commerce of any city in the MEDITERRANEAN, 
before it was destroyed by ALEXANDER, was no mighty city, if we credit ARRIAN'S 
account of its inhabitants.†98 ATHENS is commonly supposed to have been a 
trading city: But it was as populous before the MEDIAN war as at any time after 
it, according to HERODOTUS;†99 yet its commerce, at that time, was so 
inconsiderable, that, as the same historian observes,†100 even the neighbouring 
coasts of ASIA were as little frequented by the GREEKS as the pillars of 
HERCULES: For beyond these he conceived nothing.
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Great interest of money, and great profits of trade, are an infallible 
indication, that industry and commerce are but in their infancy. We read in 
LYSIAS†101 of 100 per cent. profit made on a cargo of two talents, sent to no 
greater distance than from ATHENS to the ADRIATIC: Nor is this mentioned as an 
instance of extraordinary profit. ANTIDORUS, says DEMOSTHENES,†102 paid three 
talents and a half for a house which he let at a talent a year: And the orator 
blames his own tutors for not employing his money to like advantage. My fortune, 
says he, in eleven years minority, ought to have been tripled. The value of 20 
of the slaves left by his father, he computes at 40 minas, and the yearly profit 
of their labour at 12.†103 The most moderate interest at ATHENS, (for there was 
higher†104 often paid) was 12 per cent.,†105 and that paid monthly. Not to 
insist upon the high interest, to which the vast sums distributed in elections 
had raised money†106 at ROME, we find, that VERRES, before that factious period, 
stated 24 per cent. for money which he left in the hands of the publicans: And 
though CICERO exclaims against this article, it is not on account of the 
extravagant usury; but because it had never been customary to state any interest 
on such occasions.†107 Interest, indeed, sunk at ROME, after the settlement of 
the empire: But it never remained any considerable time so low, as in the 
commercial states of modern times.†108
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Among the other inconveniencies, which the ATHENIANS felt from the fortifying of 
DECELIA by the LACEDEMONIANS, it is represented by THUCYDIDES,†109 as one of the 
most considerable, that they could not bring over their corn from EUBEA by land, 
passing by OROPUS; but were obliged to embark it, and to sail round the 
promontory of SUNIUM. A surprising instance of the imperfection of ancient 
navigation! For the water-carriage is not here above double the land.
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I do not remember a passage in any ancient author, where the growth of a city is 
ascribed to the establishment of a manufacture. The commerce, which is said to 
flourish, is chiefly the exchange of those commodities, for which different 
soils and climates were suited. The sale of wine and oil into AFRICA, according 
to DIODORUS SICULUS,†110 was the foundation of the riches of AGRIGENTUM. The 
situation of the city of SYBARIS, according to the same author†111 was the cause 
of its immense populousness; being built near the two rivers CRATHYS and 
SYBARIS. But these two rivers, we may observe, are not navigable; and could only 
produce some fertile vallies, for agriculture and tillage; an advantage so 
inconsiderable, that a modern writer would scarcely have taken notice of it.
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The barbarity of the ancient tyrants, together with the extreme love of liberty, 
which animated those ages, must have banished every merchant and manufacturer, 
and have quite depopulated the state, had it subsisted upon industry and 
commerce. While the cruel and suspicious DIONYSIUS was carrying on his 
butcheries, who, that was not detained by his landed property, and could have 
carried with him any art or skill to procure a subsistence in other countries, 
would have remained exposed to such implacable barbarity? The persecutions of 
PHILIP II. and LEWIS XIV. filled all EUROPE with the manufacturers of FLANDERS 
and of FRANCE.
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I grant, that agriculture is the species of industry chiefly requisite to the 
subsistence of multitudes; and it is possible, that this industry may flourish, 
even where manufactures and other arts are unknown and neglected. SWISSERLAND is 
at present a remarkable instance; where we find, at once, the most skilful 
husbandmen, and the most bungling tradesmen, that are to be met with in EUROPE. 
That agriculture flourished in GREECE and ITALY, at least in some parts of them, 
and at some periods, we have reason to presume; And whether the mechanical arts 
had reached the same degree of perfection, may not be esteemed so material; 
especially, if we consider the great equality of riches in the ancient 
republics, where each family was obliged to cultivate, with the greatest care 
and industry, its own little field, in order to its subsistence.
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But is it just reasoning, because agriculture may, in some instances, flourish 
without trade or manufactures, to conclude, that, in any great extent of 
country, and for any great tract of time, it would subsist alone? The most 
natural way, surely, of encouraging husbandry, is, first, to excite other kinds 
of industry, and thereby afford the labourer a ready market for his commodities, 
and a return of such goods as may contribute to his pleasure and enjoyment. This 
method is infallible and universal; and, as it prevails more in modern 
government than in the ancient, it affords a presumption of the superior 
populousness of the former.
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Every man, says XENOPHON,†112 may be a farmer: No art or skill is requisite: All 
consists in industry, and in attention to the execution. A strong proof, as 
COLUMELLA hints, that agriculture was but little known in the age of XENOPHON.
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All our later improvements and refinements, have they done nothing towards the 
easy subsistence of men, and consequently towards their propagation and 
encrease? Our superior skill in mechanics; the discovery of new worlds, by which 
commerce has been so much enlarged; the establishment of posts; and the use of 
bills of exchange: These seem all extremely useful to the encouragement of art, 
industry, and populousness. Were we to strike off these, what a check should we 
give to every kind of business and labour, and what multitudes of families would 
immediately perish from want and hunger? And it seems not probable, that we 
could supply the place of these new inventions by any other regulation or 
institution.
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Have we reason to think, that the police of ancient states was any wise 
comparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal security, either at 
home, or in their journies by land or water? I question not, but every impartial 
examiner would give us the preference in this particular.†113
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Thus, upon comparing the whole, it seems impossible to assign any just reason, 
why the world should have been more populous in ancient than in modern times. 
The equality of property among the ancients, liberty, and the small divisions of 
their states, were indeed circumstances favourable to the propagation of 
mankind: But their wars were more bloody and destructive, their governments more 
factious and unsettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languishing, 
and the general police more loose and irregular. These latter disadvantages seem 
to form a sufficient counterbalance to the former advantages; and rather favour 
the opposite opinion to that which commonly prevails with regard to this 
subject.
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But there is no reasoning, it may be said, against matter of fact. If it appear, 
that the world was then more populous than at present, we may be assured, that 
our conjectures are false, and that we have overlooked some material 
circumstance in the comparison. This I readily own: All our preceding 
reasonings, I acknowledge to be mere trifling, or, at least, small skirmishes 
and frivolous rencounters, which decide nothing. But unluckily the main combat, 
where we compare facts, cannot be rendered much more decisive. The facts, 
delivered by ancient authors, are either so uncertain or so imperfect as to 
afford us nothing positive in this matter. How indeed could it be otherwise? The 
very facts, which we must oppose to them, in computing the populousness of 
modern states, are far from being either certain or complete. Many grounds of 
calculation proceeded on by celebrated writers, are little better than those of 
the Emperor HELIOGABALUS, who formed an estimate of the immense greatness of 
ROME, from ten thousand pound weight of cobwebs which had been found in that 
city.†114
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It is to be remarked, that all kinds of numbers are uncertain in ancient 
manuscripts, and have been subject to much greater corruptions than any other 
part of the text; and that for an obvious reason. Any alteration, in other 
places, commonly affects the sense or grammar, and is more readily perceived by 
the reader and transcriber.
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Few enumerations of inhabitants have been made of any tract of country by any 
ancient author of good authority, so as to afford us a large enough view for 
comparison.
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It is probable, that there was formerly a good foundation for the number of 
citizens assigned to any free city; because they entered for a share in the 
government, and there were exact registers kept of them. But as the number of 
slaves is seldom mentioned, this leaves us in as great uncertainty as ever, with 
regard to the populousness even of single cities.
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The first page of THUCYDIDES is, in my opinion, the commencement of real 
history. All preceding narrations are so intermixed with fable, that 
philosophers ought to abandon them, in a great measure, to the embellishment of 
poets and orators.†115
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With regard to remote times, the numbers of people assigned are often 
ridiculous, and lose all credit and authority. The free citizens of SYBARIS, 
able to bear arms, and actually drawn out in battle, were 300,000. They 
encountered at SIAGRA with 100,000 citizens of CROTONA, another GREEK city 
contiguous to them; and were defeated. This is DIODORUS SICULUS'S†116 account; 
and is very seriously insisted on by that historian. STRABO†117 also mentions 
the same number of SYBARITES.
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DIODORUS SICULUS,†118 enumerating the inhabitants of AGRIGENTUM, when it was 
destroyed by the CARTHAGINIANS, says, that they amounted to 20,000 citizens, 
200,000 strangers, besides slaves, who, in so opulent a city as he represents 
it, would probably be, at least, as numerous. We must remark, that the women and 
the children are not included; and that, therefore, upon the whole, this city 
must have contained near two millions of inhabitants.†119 And what was the 
reason of so immense an encrease! They were industrious in cultivating the 
neighbouring fields, not exceeding a small ENGLISH county; and they traded with 
their wine and oil to AFRICA, which, at that time, produced none of these 
commodities.
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PTOLEMY, says THEOCRITUS,†120 commands 33,339 cities. I suppose the singularity 
of the number was the reason of assigning it. DIODORUS SICULUS†121 assigns three 
millions of inhabitants to AEGYPT, a small number: But then he makes the number 
of cities amount to 18,000: An evident contradiction.
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He says,†122 the people were formerly seven millions. Thus remote times are 
always most envied and admired.
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That XERXES'S army was extremely numerous, I can readily believe; both from the 
great extent of his empire, and from the practice among the eastern nations, of 
encumbering their camp with a superfluous multitude: But will any rational man 
cite HERODOTUS'S wonderful narrations as an authority? There is something very 
rational, I own, in LYSIAS'S†123 argument upon this subject. Had not XERXES'S 
army been incredibly numerous, says he, he had never made a bridge over the 
HELLESPONT: It had been much easier to have transported his men over so short a 
passage, with the numerous shipping of which he was master.
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POLYBIUS†124 says, that the ROMANS, between the first and second PUNIC wars, 
being threatened with an invasion from the GAULS, mustered all their own forces, 
and those of their allies, and found them amount to seven hundred thousand men 
able to bear arms: A great number surely, and which, when joined to the slaves, 
is probably†r not less, if not rather more, than that extent of country affords 
at present.†125 The enumeration too seems to have been made with some exactness; 
and POLYBIUS gives us the detail of the particulars. But might not the number be 
magnified, in order to encourage the people?
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DIODORUS SICULUS†126 makes the same enumeration amount to near a million. These 
variations are suspicious. He plainly too supposes, that ITALY in his time was 
not so populous: Another suspicious circumstance. For who can believe, that the 
inhabitants of that country diminished from the time of the first PUNIC war to 
that of the triumvirates?
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JULIUS CAESAR, according to APPIAN,†127 encountered four millions of GAULS, 
killed one million, and made another million prisoners.†128 Supposing the number 
of the enemy's army and that of the slain could be exactly assigned, which never 
is possible; how could it be known how often the same man returned into the 
armies, or how distinguish the new from the old levied soldiers? No attention 
ought ever to be given to such loose, exaggerated calculations; especially where 
the author does not tell us the mediums, upon which the calculations were 
founded.
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PATERCULUS†129 makes the number of GAULS killed by CAESAR amount only to 
400,000: A more probable account, and more easily reconciled to the history of 
these wars given by that conqueror himself in his Commentaries.†130†u The most 
bloody of his battles were fought against the HELVETII and the GERMANS.
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One would imagine, that every circumstance of the life and actions of DIONYSIUS 
the elder might be regarded as authentic, and free from all fabulous 
exaggeration; both because he lived at a time when letters flourished most in 
GREECE, and because his chief historian was PHILISTUS, a man allowed to be of 
great genius, and who was a courtier and minister of that prince. But can we 
admit, that he had a standing army of 100,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and a fleet of 
400 gallies?†131 These, we may observe, were mercenary forces, and subsisted 
upon pay, like our armies in EUROPE. For the citizens were all disarmed; and 
when DION afterwards invaded SICILY, and called on his countrymen to vindicate 
their liberty, he was obliged to bring arms along with him, which he distributed 
among those who joined him.†132 In a state where agriculture alone flourishes, 
there may be many inhabitants; and if these be all armed and disciplined, a 
great force may be called out upon occasion: But great bodies of mercenary 
troops can never be maintained, without either great trade and numerous 
manufactures, or extensive dominions. The United Provinces never were masters of 
such a force by sea and land, as that which is said to belong to DIONYSIUS; yet 
they possess as large a territory, perfectly well cultivated, and have much more 
resources from their commerce and industry. DIODORUS SICULUS allows, that, even 
in his time, the army of DIONYSIUS appeared incredible; that is, as I interpret 
it, was entirely a fiction, and the opinion arose from the exaggerated flattery 
of the courtiers, and perhaps from the vanity and policy of the tyrant 
himself.†v
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It is a usual fallacy, to consider all the ages of antiquity as one period, and 
to compute the numbers contained in the great cities mentioned by ancient 
authors, as if these cities had been all cotemporary. The GREEK colonies 
flourished extremely in SICILY during the age of ALEXANDER: But in AUGUSTUS'S 
time they were so decayed, that almost all the produce of that fertile island 
was consumed in ITALY.†133
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Let us now examine the numbers of inhabitants assigned to particular cities in 
antiquity; and omitting the numbers of NINEVEH, BABYLON, and the EGYPTIAN 
THEBES, let us confine ourselves to the sphere of real history, to the GRECIAN 
and ROMAN states. I must own, the more I consider this subject, the more am I 
inclined to scepticism, with regard to the great populousness ascribed to 
ancient times.
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ATHENS is said by PLATO†134 to be a very great city; and it was surely the 
greatest of all the GREEK†135 cities, except SYRACUSE, which was nearly about 
the same size in THUCYDIDES'S†136 time, and afterwards encreased beyond it. For 
CICERO†137 mentions it as the greatest of all the GREEK cities in his time; not 
comprehending, I suppose, either ANTIOCH or ALEXANDRIA under that denomination. 
ATHENAEUS†138 says, that, by the enumeration of DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, there were 
in ATHENS 21,000 citizens, 10,000 strangers, and 400,000 slaves. This number is 
much insisted on by those whose opinion I call in question, and is esteemed a 
fundamental fact to their purpose: But, in my opinion, there is no point of 
criticism more certain, than that ATHENAEUS and CTESICLES, whom he quotes, are 
here mistaken, and that the number of slaves is, at least, augmented by a whole 
cypher, and ought not to be regarded as more than 40,000.
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First, When the number of citizens is said to be 21,000 by ATHENAEUS,†139 men of 
full age are only understood. For, (1.) HERODOTUS says,†140 that ARISTAGORAS, 
ambassador from the IONIANS, found it harder to deceive one SPARTAN than 30,000 
ATHENIANS; meaning, in a loose way, the whole state, supposed to be met in one 
popular assembly, excluding the women and children. (2.) THUCYDIDES†141 says, 
that, making allowance for all the absentees in the fleet, army, garrisons, and 
for people employed in their private affairs, the ATHENIAN assembly never rose 
to five thousand. (3.) The forces, enumerated by the same historian,†142 being 
all citizens, and amounting to 13,000 heavy-armed infantry, prove the same 
method of calculation; as also the whole tenor of the GREEK historians, who 
always understand men of full age, when they assign the number of citizens in 
any republic. Now, these being but the fourth of the inhabitants, the free 
ATHENIANS were by this account 84,000; the strangers 40,000; and the slaves, 
calculating by the smaller number, and allowing that they married and propagated 
at the same rate with freemen, were 160,000; and the whole of the inhabitants 
284,000: A number surely large enough. The other number, 1,720,000, makes ATHENS 
larger than LONDON and PARIS united.
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Secondly, There were but 10,000 houses in ATHENS.†143
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Thirdly, Though the extent of the walls, as given us by THUCYDIDES,†144 be 
great, (to wit, eighteen miles, beside the sea-coast): Yet XENOPHON†145 says, 
there was much waste ground within the walls. They seem indeed to have joined 
four distinct and separate cities.†146
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Fourthly, No insurrection of the slaves, or suspicion of insurrection, is ever 
mentioned by historians; except one commotion of the miners.†147
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Fifthly, The treatment of slaves by the ATHENIANS is said by XENOPHON,†148 and 
DEMOSTHENES,†149 and PLAUTUS,†150 to have been extremely gentle and indulgent: 
Which could never have been the case, had the disproportion been twenty to one. 
The disproportion is not so great in any of our colonies; yet are we obliged to 
exercise a rigorous military government over the negroes.
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Sixthly, No man is ever esteemed rich for possessing what may be reckoned an 
equal distribution of property in any country, or even triple or quadruple that 
wealth. Thus every person in ENGLAND is computed by some to spend six-pence a 
day: Yet is he esteemed but poor who has five times that sum. Now TIMARCHUS is 
said by AESCHINES†151 to have been left in easy circumstances; but he was master 
only of ten slaves employed in manufactures. LYSIAS and his brother, two 
strangers, were proscribed by the thirty for their great riches; though they had 
but sixty a-piece.†152 DEMOSTHENES was left very rich by his father; yet he had 
no more than fifty-two slaves.†153 His workhouse, of twenty cabinet-makers, is 
said to be a very considerable manufactory.†154
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Seventhly, During the DECELIAN war, as the GREEK historians call it, 20,000 
slaves deserted, and brought the ATHENIANS to great distress, as we learn from 
THUCYDIDES.†155 This could not have happened, had they been only the twentieth 
part. The best slaves would not desert.
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Eighthly, XENOPHON†156 proposes a scheme for maintaining by the public 10,000 
slaves: And that so great a number may possibly be supported, any one will be 
convinced, says he, who considers the numbers we possessed before the DECELIAN 
war. A way of speaking altogether incompatible with the larger number of 
ATHENAEUS.
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Ninthly, The whole census of the state of ATHENS was less than 6000 talents. And 
though numbers in ancient manuscripts be often suspected by critics, yet this is 
unexceptionable; both because DEMOSTHENES,†157 who gives it, gives also the 
detail, which checks him; and because POLYBIUS†158 assigns the same number, and 
reasons upon it. Now, the most vulgar slave could yield by his labour an obolus 
a day, over and above his maintenance, as we learn from XENOPHON,†159 who says, 
that NICIAS'S overseer paid his master so much for slaves, whom he employed in†w 
mines. If you will take the pains to estimate an obolus a day, and the slaves at 
400,000, computing only at four years purchase, you will find the sum above 
12,000 talents; even though allowance be made for the great number of holidays 
in ATHENS. Besides, many of the slaves would have a much greater value from 
their art. The lowest that DEMOSTHENES estimates any of his†160 father's slaves 
is two minas a head. And upon this supposition, it is a little difficult, I 
confess, to reconcile even the number of 40,000 slaves with the census of 6000 
talents.
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Tenthly, CHIOS is said by THUCYDIDES,†161 to contain more slaves than any GREEK 
city, except SPARTA. SPARTA then had more than ATHENS, in proportion to the 
number of citizens. The SPARTANS were 9000 in the town, 30,000 in the 
country.†162 The male slaves, therefore, of full age, must have been more than 
780,000; the whole more than 3,120,000. A number impossible to be maintained in 
a narrow barren country, such as LACONIA, which had no trade. Had the HELOTES 
been so very numerous, the murder of 2000 mentioned by THUCYDIDES,†163 would 
have irritated them, without weakening them.
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Besides, we are to consider, that the number assigned by ATHENAEUS,†164 whatever 
it is, comprehends all the inhabitants of ATTICA, as well as those of ATHENS. 
The ATHENIANS affected much a country life, as we learn from THUCYDIDES;†165 and 
when they were all chased into town, by the invasion of their territory during 
the PELOPONNESIAN war, the city was not able to contain them; and they were 
obliged to lie in the porticoes, temples, and even streets, for want of 
lodging.†166
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The same remark is to be extended to all the other GREEK cities; and when the 
number of citizens is assigned, we must always understand it to comprehend the 
inhabitants of the neighbouring country, as well as of the city. Yet, even with 
this allowance, it must be confessed, that GREECE was a populous country, and 
exceeded what we could imagine concerning so narrow a territory, naturally not 
very fertile, and which drew no supplies of corn from other places. For, 
excepting ATHENS, which traded to PONTUS for that commodity, the other cities 
seem to have subsisted chiefly from their neighbouring territory.†167
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RHODES is well known to have been a city of extensive commerce, and of great 
fame and splendor; yet it contained only 6000 citizens able to bear arms, when 
it was besieged by DEMETRIUS.†168
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THEBES was always one of the capital cities of GREECE:†169 But the number of its 
citizens exceeded not those of RHODES.†170 PHLIASIA is said to be a small city 
by XENOPHON,†171 yet we find, that it contained 6000 citizens.†172 I pretend not 
to reconcile these two facts.†z Perhaps, XENOPHON calls PHLIASIA a small town, 
because it made but a small figure in GREECE, and maintained only a subordinate 
alliance with SPARTA; or perhaps the country, belonging to it, was extensive, 
and most of the citizens were employed in the cultivation of it, and dwelt in 
the neighbouring villages.
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MANTINEA was equal to any city in ARCADIA:†173 Consequently it was equal to 
MEGALOPOLIS, which was fifty stadia, or six miles and a quarter in 
circumference.†174 But MANTINEA had only 3000 citizens.†175 The GREEK cities, 
therefore, contained often fields and gardens, together with the houses; and we 
cannot judge of them by the extent of their walls. ATHENS contained no more than 
10,000 houses; yet its walls, with the sea-coast, were above twenty miles in 
extent. SYRACUSE was twenty-two miles in circumference; yet was scarcely ever 
spoken of by the ancients as more populous than ATHENS. BABYLON was a square of 
fifteen miles, or sixty miles in circuit; but it contained large cultivated 
fields and inclosures, as we learn from PLINY. Though AURELIAN'S wall was fifty 
miles in circumference;†176 the circuit of all the thirteen divisions of ROME, 
taken apart, according to PUBLIUS VICTOR, was only about forty-three miles. When 
an enemy invaded the country, all the inhabitants retired within the walls of 
the ancient cities, with their cattle and furniture, and instruments of 
husbandry: and the great height, to which the walls were raised, enabled a small 
number to defend them with facility.
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SPARTA, says XENOPHON,†177 is one of the cities of GREECE that has the fewest 
inhabitants. Yet POLYBIUS†178 says, that it was forty-eight stadia in 
circumference, and was round.
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All the AETOLIANS able to bear arms in ANTIPATER'S time,†aa deducting some few 
garrisons, were but ten thousand men.†179
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POLYBIUS†180 tells us, that the ACHAEAN league might, without any inconvenience, 
march 30 or 40,000 men: And this account seems probable: For that league 
comprehended the greater part of PELOPONNESUS. Yet PAUSANIAS,†181 speaking of 
the same period, says, that all the ACHAEANS able to bear arms, even when 
several manumitted slaves were joined to them, did not amount to fifteen 
thousand.
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The THESSALIANS, till their final conquest by the ROMANS, were, in all ages, 
turbulent, factious, seditious, disorderly.†182 It is not therefore natural to 
suppose, that this part of GREECE abounded much in people.
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†bb We are told by THUCYDIDES,†183 that the part of PELOPONNESUS, adjoining to 
PYLOS, was desart and uncultivated. HERODOTUS says,†184 that MACEDONIA was full 
of lions and wild bulls; animals which can only inhabit vast unpeopled forests. 
These were the two extremities of GREECE.
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All the inhabitants of EPIRUS, of all ages, sexes and conditions, who were sold 
by PAULUS AEMILIUS, amounted only to 150,000.†185 Yet EPIRUS might be double the 
extent of YORKSHIRE.†cc
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†dd JUSTIN†186 tells us, that, when PHILIP of MACEDON was declared head of the 
GREEK confederacy, he called a congress of all the states, except the 
LACEDEMONIANS, who refused to concur; and he found the force of the whole, upon 
computation, to amount to 200,000 infantry, and 15,000 cavalry. This must be 
understood to be all the citizens capable of bearing arms. For as the GREEK 
republics maintained no mercenary forces, and had no militia distinct from the 
whole body of the citizens, it is not conceivable what other medium there could 
be of computation. That such an army could ever, by GREECE, be brought into the 
field, and be maintained there, is contrary to all history. Upon this 
supposition, therefore, we may thus reason. The free GREEKS of all ages and 
sexes were 860,000. The slaves, estimating them by the number of ATHENIAN slaves 
as above, who seldom married or had families, were double the male citizens of 
full age, to wit, 430,000. And all the inhabitants of ancient GREECE, excepting 
LACONIA, were about one million two hundred and ninety thousand: No mighty 
number, nor exceeding what may be found at present in SCOTLAND, a country of not 
much greater extent, and very indifferently peopled.
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We may now consider the numbers of people in ROME and ITALY, and collect all the 
lights afforded us by scattered passages in ancient authors. We shall find, upon 
the whole, a great difficulty, in fixing any opinion on that head; and no reason 
to support those exaggerated calculations, so much insisted on by modern 
writers.
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DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSAEUS†187 says, that the ancient walls of ROME were nearly 
of the same compass with those of ATHENS, but that the suburbs ran out to a 
great extent; and it was difficult to tell, where the town ended or the country 
began. In some places of ROME, it appears, from the same author,†188 from 
JUVENAL,†189 and from other ancient writers,†190 that the houses were high, and 
families lived in separate storeys, one above another: But it is probable, that 
these were only the poorer citizens, and only in some few streets. If we may 
judge from the younger PLINY'S†191 account of his own house, and from BARTOLI'S 
plans of ancient buildings, the men of quality had very spacious palaces; and 
their buildings were like the CHINESE houses at this day, where each apartment 
is separated from the rest, and rises no higher than a single storey. To which 
if we add, that the ROMAN nobility much affected extensive porticoes, and even 
woods†192 in town; we may perhaps allow VOSSIUS (though there is no manner of 
reason for it) to read the famous passage of the elder PLINY†193 his own way, 
without admitting the extravagant consequences which he draws from it.
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The number of citizens who received corn by the public distribution in the time 
of AUGUSTUS, were two hundred thousand.†194 This one would esteem a pretty 
certain ground of calculation: Yet is it attended with such circumstances as 
throw us back into doubt and uncertainty.
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Did the poorer citizens only receive the distribution? It was calculated, to be 
sure, chiefly for their benefit. But it appears from a passage in CICERO†195 
that the rich might also take their portion, and that it was esteemed no 
reproach in them to apply for it.
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To whom was the corn given; whether only to heads of families, or to every man, 
woman, and child? The portion every month was five modii to each†196 (about 5/6 
of a bushel). This was too little for a family, and too much for an individual. 
A very accurate antiquary,†197 therefore, infers, that it was given to every man 
of full age: But he allows the matter to be uncertain.
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Was it strictly enquired, whether the claimant lived within the precincts of 
ROME; or was it sufficient, that he presented himself at the monthly 
distribution? This last seems more probable.†198
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Were there no false claimants? We are told,†199 that CAESAR struck off at once 
170,000, who had creeped in without a just title; and it is very little 
probable, that he remedied all abuses.
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But, lastly, what proportion of slaves must we assign to these citizens? This is 
the most material question; and the most uncertain. It is very doubtful, whether 
ATHENS can be established as a rule for ROME. Perhaps the ATHENIANS had more 
slaves, because they employed them in manufactures, for which a capital city, 
like ROME, seems not so proper. Perhaps, on the other hand, the ROMANS had more 
slaves, on account of their superior luxury and riches.
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There were exact bills of mortality kept at ROME; but no ancient author has 
given us the number of burials, except SUETONIUS,†200 who tells us, that in one 
season, there were 30,000 names carried to the temple of LIBITINA: But this was 
during a plague; which can afford no certain foundation for any inference.
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The public corn, though distributed only to 200,000 citizens, affected very 
considerably the whole agriculture of ITALY:†201 a fact no wise reconcileable to 
some modern exaggerations with regard to the inhabitants of that country.
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The best ground of conjecture I can find concerning the greatness of ancient 
ROME, is this: We are told by HERODIAN,†202 that ANTIOCH and ALEXANDRIA were 
very little inferior to ROME. It appears from DIODORUS SICULUS,†203 that one 
straight street of ALEXANDRIA reaching from gate to gate, was five miles long; 
and as ALEXANDRIA was much more extended in length than breadth, it seems to 
have been a city nearly of the bulk of PARIS;†204 and ROME might be about the 
size of LONDON.
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There lived in ALEXANDRIA, in DIODORUS SICULUS'S time,†205 300,000 free people, 
comprehending, I suppose, women and children.†206 But what number of slaves? Had 
we any just ground to fix these at an equal number with the free inhabitants, it 
would favour the foregoing computation.
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There is a passage in HERODIAN, which is a little surprising. He says 
positively, that the palace of the Emperor was as large as all the rest of the 
city.†207 This was NERO'S golden house, which is indeed represented by 
SUETONIUS†208 and PLINY as of an enormous extent;†209 but no power of 
imagination can make us conceive it to bear any proportion to such a city as 
LONDON.
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We may observe, had the historian been relating NERO'S extravagance, and had he 
made use of such an expression, it would have had much less weight; these 
rhetorical exaggerations being so apt to creep into an author's style, even when 
the most chaste and correct. But it is mentioned by HERODIAN only by the by, in 
relating the quarrels between GETA and CARACALLA.
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It appears from the same historian,†210 that there was then much land 
uncultivated, and put to no manner of use; and he ascribes it as a great praise 
to PERTINAX, that he allowed every one to take such land either in ITALY or 
elsewhere, and cultivate it as he pleased, without paying any taxes. Lands 
uncultivated, and put to no manner of use! This is not heard of in any part of 
CHRISTENDOM; except in some remote parts of HUNGARY; as I have been informed. 
And it surely corresponds very ill with that idea of the extreme populousness of 
antiquity, so much insisted on.
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We learn from VOPISCUS,†211 that there was even in ETRURIA much fertile land 
uncultivated, which the Emperor AURELIAN intended to convert into vineyards, in 
order to furnish the ROMAN people with a gratuitous distribution of wine; a very 
proper expedient for depopulating still farther that capital and all the 
neighbouring territories.
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It may not be amiss to take notice of the account which POLYBIUS†212 gives of 
the great herds of swine to be met with in TUSCANY and LOMBARDY, as well as in 
GREECE, and of the method of feeding them which was then practised. "There are 
great herds of swine," says he, "throughout all ITALY, particularly in former 
times, through ETRURIA and CISALPINE GAUL. And a herd frequently consists of a 
thousand or more swine. When one of these herds in feeding meets with another, 
they mix together; and the swine-herds have no other expedient for separating 
them than to go to different quarters, where they sound their horn; and these 
animals, being accustomed to that signal, run immediately each to the horn of 
his own keeper. Whereas in GREECE, if the herds of swine happen to mix in the 
forests, he who has the greater flock, takes cunningly the opportunity of 
driving all away. And thieves are very apt to purloin the straggling hogs, which 
have wandered to a great distance from their keeper in search of food."
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May we not infer from this account, that the north of ITALY, as well as GREECE, 
was then much less peopled, and worse cultivated, than at present? How could 
these vast herds be fed in a country so full of inclosures, so improved by 
agriculture, so divided by farms, so planted with vines and corn intermingled 
together? I must confess, that POLYBIUS'S relation has more the air of that 
economy which is to be met with in our AMERICAN colonies, than the management of 
a EUROPEAN country.
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We meet with a reflection in ARISTOTLE'S†213 Ethics, which seems unaccountable 
on any supposition, and by proving too much in favour of our present reasoning, 
may be thought really to prove nothing. That philosopher, treating of 
friendship, and observing, that this relation ought neither to be contracted to 
a very few, nor extended over a great multitude, illustrates his opinion by the 
following argument. "In like manner," says he, "as a city cannot subsist, if it 
either have so few inhabitants as ten, or so many as a hundred thousand; so is 
there a mediocrity required in the number of friends; and you destroy the 
essence of friendship by running into either extreme." What! impossible that a 
city can contain a hundred thousand inhabitants! Had ARISTOTLE never seen nor 
heard of a city so populous? This, I must own, passes my comprehension.
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PLINY†214 tells us that SELEUCIA, the seat of the GREEK empire in the East, was 
reported to contain 600,000 people. CARTHAGE is said by STRABO†215 to have 
contained 700,000. The inhabitants of PEKIN are not much more numerous. LONDON, 
PARIS, and CONSTANTINOPLE, may admit of nearly the same computation; at least, 
the two latter cities do not exceed it. ROME, ALEXANDRIA, ANTIOCH, we have 
already spoken of. From the experience of past and present ages, one might 
conjecture that there is a kind of impossibility, that any city could ever rise 
much beyond this proportion. Whether the grandeur of a city be founded on 
commerce or on empire, there seem to be invincible obstacles, which prevent its 
farther progress. The seats of vast monarchies, by introducing extravagant 
luxury, irregular expence, idleness, dependence, and false ideas of rank and 
superiority, are improper for commerce. Extensive commerce checks itself, by 
raising the price of all labour and commodities. When a great court engages the 
attendance of a numerous nobility, possessed of overgrown fortunes, the middling 
gentry remain in their provincial towns, where they can make a figure on a 
moderate income. And if the dominions of a state arrive at an enormous size, 
there necessarily arise many capitals, in the remoter provinces, whither all the 
inhabitants, except a few courtiers, repair for education, fortune, and 
amusement.†216 LONDON, by uniting extensive commerce and middling empire, has, 
perhaps, arrived at a greatness, which no city will ever be able to exceed.
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Chuse DOVER or CALAIS for a center: Draw a circle of two hundred miles radius: 
You comprehend LONDON, PARIS, the NETHERLANDS, the UNITED PROVINCES, and some of 
the best cultivated parts of FRANCE and ENGLAND. It may safely, I think, be 
affirmed, that no spot of ground can be found, in antiquity, of equal extent, 
which contained near so many great and populous cities, and was so stocked with 
riches and inhabitants. To balance, in both periods, the states, which possessed 
most art, knowledge, civility, and the best police, seems the truest method of 
comparison.
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It is an observation of L'ABBE DU BOS,†217 that ITALY is warmer at present than 
it was in ancient times. "The annals of ROME tell us," says he, "that in the 
year 480 ab U.C. the winter was so severe that it destroyed the trees. The TYBER 
froze in ROME, and the ground was covered with snow for forty days. When 
JUVENAL†218 describes a superstitious woman, he represents her as breaking the 
ice of the TYBER, that she might perform her ablutions:
Hybernum fracta glacie descendet in amnem,
Ter matutino Tyberi mergetur.
He speaks of that river's freezing as a common event. Many passages of HORACE 
suppose the streets of ROME full of snow and ice. We should have more certainty 
with regard to this point, had the ancients known the use of thermometers: But 
their writers, without intending it, give us information, sufficient to convince 
us, that the winters are now much more temperate at ROME than formerly. At 
present the TYBER no more freezes at ROME than the NILE at CAIRO. The ROMANS 
esteem the winters very rigorous, if the snow lie two days, and if one see for 
eight and forty hours a few icicles hang from a fountain that has a north 
exposure."
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The observation of this ingenious critic may be extended to other EUROPEAN 
climates. Who could discover the mild climate of FRANCE in DIODORUS 
SICULUS'S†219 description of that of GAUL? "As it is a northern climate," says 
he, "it is infested with cold to an extreme degree. In cloudy weather, instead 
of rain there fall great snows; and in clear weather it there freezes so 
excessive hard, that the rivers acquire bridges of their own substance, over 
which, not only single travellers may pass, but large armies, accompanied with 
all their baggage and loaded waggons. And there being many rivers in GAUL, the 
RHONE, the RHINE, &c. almost all of them are frozen over; and it is usual, in 
order to prevent falling, to cover the ice with chaff and straw at the places 
where the road passes."†ee Colder than a GALLIC Winter, is used by PETRONIUS as 
a proverbial expression. ARISTOTLE says, that GAUL is so cold a climate that an 
ass could not live in it.†220
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North of the CEVENNES, says STRABO,†221 GAUL produces not figs and olives: And 
the vines, which have been planted, bear not grapes, that will ripen.
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OVID positively maintains, with all the serious affirmation of prose, that the 
EUXINE sea was frozen over every winter in his time; and he appeals to ROMAN 
governours, whom he names, for the truth of his assertion.†222 This seldom or 
never happens at present in the latitude of TOMI, whither OVID was banished. All 
the complaints of the same poet seem to mark a rigour of the seasons, which is 
scarcely experienced at present in PETERSBURGH or STOCKHOLM.
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TOURNEFORT, a Provencal, who had travelled into the same country, observes, that 
there is not a finer climate in the world: And he asserts, that nothing but 
OVID'S melancholy could have given him such dismal ideas of it. But the facts 
mentioned by that poet, are too circumstantial to bear any such interpretation.
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POLYBIUS†223 says, that the climate in ARCADIA was very cold, and the air moist.
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"ITALY," says VARRO,†224 "is the most temperate climate in EUROPE. The inland 
parts" (GAUL, GERMANY, and PANNONIA, no doubt) "have almost perpetual winter."
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The northern parts of SPAIN, according to STRABO,†225 are but ill inhabited, 
because of the great cold.
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Allowing, therefore, this remark to be just, that EUROPE is become warmer than 
formerly; how can we account for it? Plainly, by no other method, than by 
supposing, that the land is at present much better cultivated, and that the 
woods are cleared, which formerly threw a shade upon the earth, and kept the 
rays of the sun from penetrating to it. Our northern colonies in AMERICA become 
more temperate, in proportion as the woods are felled;†226 but in general, every 
one may remark, that cold is still much more severely felt, both in North and 
South AMERICA, than in places under the same latitude in EUROPE.
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SASERNA, quoted by COLUMELLA,†227 affirmed, that the disposition of the heavens 
was altered before his time, and that the air had become much milder and warmer; 
as appears hence, says he, that many places now abound with vineyards and olive 
plantations, which formerly, by reason of the rigour of the climate, could raise 
none of these productions. Such a change, if real, will be allowed an evident 
sign of the better cultivation and peopling of countries before the age of 
SASERNA;†228 and if it be continued to the present times, is a proof, that these 
advantages have been continually encreasing throughout this part of the world.
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Let us now cast our eye over all the countries which are the scene of ancient 
and modern history, and compare their past and present situation: We shall not, 
perhaps, find such foundation for the complaint of the present emptiness and 
desolation of the world. AEGYPT is represented by MAILLET, to whom we owe the 
best account of it, as extremely populous; though he esteems the number of its 
inhabitants to be diminished. SYRIA, and the Lesser ASIA, as well as the coast 
of BARBARY, I can readily own, to be desart in comparison of their ancient 
condition. The depopulation of GREECE is also obvious. But whether the country 
now called TURKY in EUROPE may not, in general, contain more inhabitants than 
during the flourishing period of GREECE, may be a little doubtful. The THRACIANS 
seem then to have lived like the TARTARS at present, by pasturage and 
plunder:†229 The GETES were still more uncivilized:†230 And the ILLYRIANS were 
no better.†231 These occupy nine-tenths of that country: And though the 
government of the TURKS be not very favourable to industry and propagation; yet 
it preserves at least peace and order among the inhabitants; and is preferable 
to that barbarous, unsettled condition, in which they anciently lived.
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POLAND and MUSCOVY in EUROPE are not populous; but are certainly much more so 
than the ancient SARMATIA and SCYTHIA; where no husbandry or tillage was ever 
heard of, and pasturage was the sole art by which the people were maintained. 
The like observation may be extended to DENMARK and SWEDEN. No one ought to 
esteem the immense swarms of people, which formerly came from the North, and 
over-ran all EUROPE, to be any objection to this opinion. Where a whole nation, 
or even half of it remove their seat; it is easy to imagine, what a prodigious 
multitude they must form; with what desperate valour they must make their 
attacks; and how the terror they strike into the invaded nations will make these 
magnify, in their imagination, both the courage and multitude of the invaders. 
SCOTLAND is neither extensive nor populous; but were the half of its inhabitants 
to seek new seats, they would form a colony as numerous as the TEUTONS and 
CIMBRI; and would shake all EUROPE, supposing it in no better condition for 
defence than formerly.
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GERMANY has surely at present twenty times more inhabitants than in ancient 
times, when they cultivated no ground, and each tribe valued itself on the 
extensive desolation which it spread around; as we learn from CAESAR,†232 and 
TACITUS,†233 and STRABO.†234 A proof, that the division into small republics 
will not alone render a nation populous, unless attended with the spirit of 
peace, order, and industry.
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The barbarous condition of BRITAIN in former times is well known, and the 
thinness of its inhabitants may easily be conjectured, both from their 
barbarity, and from a circumstance mentioned by HERODIAN,†235 that all BRITAIN 
was marshy, even in SEVERUS'S time, after the ROMANS had been fully settled in 
it above a century.
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It is not easily imagined, that the GAULS were anciently much more advanced in 
the arts of life than their northern neighbours; since they travelled to this 
island for their education in the mysteries of the religion and philosophy of 
the DRUIDS.†236 I cannot, therefore, think, that GAUL was then near so populous 
as FRANCE is at present.
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Were we to believe, indeed, and join together the testimony of APPIAN, and that 
of DIODORUS SICULUS, we must admit of an incredible populousness in GAUL. The 
former historian†237 says, that there were 400 nations in that country; the 
latter†238 affirms, that the largest of the GALLIC nations consisted of 200,000 
men, besides women and children, and the least of 50,000. Calculating, 
therefore, at a medium, we must admit of near 200 millions of people, in a 
country, which we esteem populous at present, though supposed to contain little 
more than twenty.†239 Such calculations, therefore, by their extravagance, lose 
all manner of authority. We may observe, that the equality of property, to which 
the populousness of antiquity may be ascribed, had no place among the GAULS.†240 
Their intestine wars also, before CAESAR'S time, were almost perpetual.†241 And 
STRABO†242 observes, that, though all GAUL was cultivated, yet was it not 
cultivated with any skill or care; the genius of the inhabitants leading them 
less to arts than arms, till their slavery under ROME produced peace among 
themselves.
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CAESAR†243 enumerates very particularly the great forces which were levied in 
BELGIUM to oppose his conquests; and makes them amount to 208,000. These were 
not the whole people able to bear arms: For the same historian tells us, that 
the BELLOVACI could have brought a hundred thousand men into the field, though 
they engaged only for sixty. Taking the whole, therefore, in this proportion of 
ten to six,†ff the sum of fighting men in all the states of BELGIUM was about 
350,000; all the inhabitants a million and a half. And BELGIUM being about a 
fourth of GAUL, that country might contain six millions, which is not†gg near 
the third of its present inhabitants.†244†ii We are informed by CAESAR, that the 
GAULS had no fixed property in land; but that the chieftains, when any death 
happened in a family, made a new division of all the lands among the several 
members of the family. This is the custom of Tanistry, which so long prevailed 
in IRELAND, and which retained that country in a state of misery, barbarism, and 
desolation.
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The ancient HELVETIA was 250 miles in length, and 180 in breadth, according to 
the same author;†245 yet contained only 360,000 inhabitants. The canton of BERNE 
alone has, at present, as many people.
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After this computation of APPIAN and DIODORUS SICULUS, I know not, whether I 
dare affirm, that the modern DUTCH are more numerous than the ancient BATAVI.
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SPAIN is, perhaps, decayed from what it was three centuries ago; but if we step 
backward two thousand years, and consider the restless, turbulent, unsettled 
condition of its inhabitants, we may probably be inclined to think, that it is 
now much more populous. Many SPANIARDS killed themselves, when deprived of their 
arms by the ROMANS.†246 It appears from PLUTARCH,†247 that robbery and plunder 
were esteemed honourable among the SPANIARDS. HIRTIUS†248 represents in the same 
light the situation of that country in CAESAR'S time; and he says, that every 
man was obliged to live in castles and walled towns for his security. It was not 
till its final conquest under AUGUSTUS, that these disorders were repressed.†249 
The account which STRABO†250 and JUSTIN†251 give of SPAIN, corresponds exactly 
with those above mentioned. How much, therefore, must it diminish from our idea 
of the populousness of antiquity, when we find, that TULLY, comparing ITALY, 
AFRIC, GAUL, GREECE, and SPAIN, mentions the great number of inhabitants, as the 
peculiar circumstance, which rendered this latter country formidable?†252
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ITALY, however, it is probable, has decayed: But how many great cities does it 
still contain? VENICE, GENOA, PAVIA, TURIN, MILAN, NAPLES, FLORENCE, LEGHORN, 
which either subsisted not in ancient times, or were then very inconsiderable? 
If we reflect on this, we shall not be apt to carry matters to so great an 
extreme as is usual, with regard to this subject.
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When the ROMAN authors complain, that ITALY, which formerly exported corn, 
became dependent on all the provinces for its daily bread, they never ascribe 
this alteration to the encrease of its inhabitants, but to the neglect of 
tillage and agriculture.†253 A natural effect of that pernicious practice of 
importing corn, in order to distribute it gratis among the ROMAN citizens, and a 
very bad means of multiplying the inhabitants of any country.†254 The sportula, 
so much talked of by MARTIAL and JUVENAL, being presents regularly made by the 
great lords to their smaller clients, must have had a like tendency to produce 
idleness, debauchery, and a continual decay among the people. The parish-rates 
have at present the same bad consequences in ENGLAND.
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Were I to assign a period, when I imagine this part of the world might possibly 
contain more inhabitants than at present, I should pitch upon the age of TRAJAN 
and the ANTONINES; the great extent of the ROMAN empire being then civilized and 
cultivated, settled almost in a profound peace both foreign and domestic, and 
living under the same regular police and government.†255 But we are told, that 
all extensive governments, especially absolute monarchies, are pernicious to 
population, and contain a secret vice and poison, which destroy the effect of 
all these promising appearances.†256 To confirm this, there is a passage cited 
from PLUTARCH,†257 which being somewhat singular, we shall here examine it.
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That author, endeavouring to account for the silence of many of the oracles, 
says, that it may be ascribed to the present desolation of the world, proceeding 
from former wars and factions; which common calamity, he adds, has fallen 
heavier upon GREECE than on any other country; insomuch, that the whole could 
scarcely at present furnish three thousand warriors; a number which, in the time 
of the MEDIAN war, were supplied by the single city of MEGARA. The gods, 
therefore, who affect works of dignity and importance, have suppressed many of 
their oracles, and deign not to use so many interpreters of their will to so 
diminutive a people.
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I must confess, that this passage contains so many difficulties, that I know not 
what to make of it. You may observe, that PLUTARCH assigns, for a cause of the 
decay of mankind, not the extensive dominion of the ROMANS, but the former wars 
and factions of the several states; all which were quieted by the ROMAN arms. 
PLUTARCH'S reasoning, therefore, is directly contrary to the inference, which is 
drawn from the fact he advances.
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POLYBIUS supposes, that GREECE had become more prosperous and flourishing after 
the establishment of the ROMAN yoke;†258 and though that historian wrote before 
these conquerors had degenerated, from being the patrons, to be the plunderers 
of mankind; yet as we find from TACITUS,†259 that the severity of the emperors 
afterwards corrected the licence of the governors, we have no reason to think 
that extensive monarchy so destructive as it is often represented.
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We learn from STRABO,†260 that the ROMANS, from their regard to the GREEKS, 
maintained, to his time, most of the privileges and liberties of that celebrated 
nation; and NERO afterwards rather encreased them.†261 How therefore can we 
imagine, that the ROMAN yoke was so burdensome over that part of the world? The 
oppression of the proconsuls was checked; and the magistracies in GREECE being 
all bestowed, in the several cities, by the free votes of the people, there was 
no necessity for the competitors to attend the emperor's court. If great numbers 
went to seek their fortunes in ROME, and advance themselves by learning or 
eloquence, the commodities of their native country, many of them would return 
with the fortunes which they had acquired, and thereby enrich the GRECIAN 
commonwealths.
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But PLUTARCH says, that the general depopulation had been more sensibly felt in 
GREECE than in any other country. How is this reconcileable to its superior 
privileges and advantages?
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Besides, this passage, by proving too much, really proves nothing. Only three 
thousand men able to bear arms in all GREECE! Who can admit so strange a 
proposition, especially if we consider the great number of GREEK cities, whose 
names still remain in history, and which are mentioned by writers long after the 
age of PLUTARCH? There are there surely ten times more people at present, when 
there scarcely remains a city in all the bounds of ancient GREECE. That country 
is still tolerably cultivated, and furnishes a sure supply of corn, in case of 
any scarcity in SPAIN, ITALY, or the south of FRANCE.
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We may observe, that the ancient frugality of the GREEKS, and their equality of 
property, still subsisted during the age of PLUTARCH; as appears from 
LUCIAN.†262 Nor is there any ground to imagine, that that country was possessed 
by a few masters, and a great number of slaves.
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It is probable, indeed, that military discipline, being entirely useless, was 
extremely neglected in GREECE after the establishment of the ROMAN empire; and 
if these commonwealths, formerly so warlike and ambitious, maintained each of 
them a small city-guard, to prevent mobbish disorders, it is all they had 
occasion for: And these, perhaps, did not amount to 3000 men, throughout all 
GREECE. I own, that, if PLUTARCH had this fact in his eye, he is here guilty of 
a gross paralogism, and assigns causes no wise proportioned to the effects. But 
is it so great a prodigy, that an author should fall into a mistake of this 
nature?†263
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But whatever force may remain in this passage of PLUTARCH, we shall endeavour to 
counterbalance it by as remarkable a passage in DIODORUS SICULUS, where the 
historian, after mentioning NINUS'S army of 1,700,000 foot and 200,000 horse, 
endeavours to support the credibility of this account by some posterior facts; 
and adds, that we must not form a notion of the ancient populousness of mankind 
from the present emptiness and depopulation which is spread over the world.†264 
Thus an author, who lived at that very period of antiquity which is represented 
as most populous,†265 complains of the desolation which then prevailed, gives 
the preference to former times, and has recourse to ancient fables as a 
foundation for his opinion. The humour of blaming the present, and admiring the 
past, is strongly rooted in human nature, and has an influence even on persons 
endued with the profoundest judgment and most extensive learning.

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†1 COLUMELLA says, lib. iii. cap. 8. that in AEGYPT and AFRICA the bearing of 
twins was frequent, and even customary; gemini partus familiares, ac paene 
solennes sunt. If this was true, there is a physical difference both in 
countries and ages. For travellers make no such remarks on these countries at 
present. On the contrary, we are apt to suppose the northern nations more 
prolific. As those two countries were provinces of the ROMAN empire, it is 
difficult, though not altogether absurd, to suppose that such a man as COLUMELLA 
might be mistaken with regard to them.
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†2 Lettres PERSANES. See also L'Esprit de Loix, liv. xxiii. cap. 17, 18, 19.
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†3 This too is a good reason why the small-pox does not depopulate countries so 
much as may at first sight be imagined. Where there is room for more people, 
they will always arise, even without the assistance of naturalization bills. It 
is remarked by DON GERONIMO DE USTARIZ, that the provinces of SPAIN, which send 
most people to the INDIES, are most populous; which proceeds from their superior 
riches.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 4 mp. 384 gp. 386
†4 SUETONIUS in vita CLAUDII, 25.
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†5 PLUT. in vita CATONIS, 4.
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†6 Lib. i. cap. 6.
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†7 Id. lib. xi. cap. 1.
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†8 Amor. lib. i. eleg. 6.
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†9 SUETON. de claris rhetor, 3. So also the ancient poet, Janitoris tintinnire 
impedimenta audio.
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†10 In Onetor. orat. 1. 874.
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†11 The same practice was very common in ROME; but CICERO seems not to think 
this evidence so certain as the testimony of free-citizens. Pro Coelio, 28.
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†12 Epist. 122. The inhuman sports exhibited at ROME, may justly be considered 
too as an effect of the people's contempt for slaves, and was also a great cause 
of the general inhumanity of their princes and rulers. Who can read the accounts 
of the amphitheatrical entertainments without horror? Or who is surprised, that 
the emperors should treat that people in the same way the people treated their 
inferiors? One's humanity is apt to renew the barbarous wish of CALIGULA, that 
the people had but one neck. A man could almost be pleased, by a single blow, to 
put an end to such a race of monsters. You may thank God, says the author above 
cited, (epist. 7.) addressing himself to the ROMAN people, that you have a 
master (viz. the mild and merciful NERO) who is incapable of learning cruelty 
from your example. This was spoke in the beginning of his reign: But he fitted 
them very well afterwards; and, no doubt, was considerably improved by the sight 
of the barbarous objects, to which he had, from his infancy, been accustomed.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 13 mp. 387 gp. 388
†13 We may here observe, that if domestic slavery really encreased populousness, 
it would be an exception to the general rule, that the happiness of any society 
and its populousness are necessary attendants. A master, from humour or 
interest, may make his slaves very unhappy, yet be careful, from interest, to 
encrease their number. Their marriage is not a matter of choice with them, more 
than any other action of their life.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 14 mp. 388 gp. 389
†14 Ten thousand slaves in a day have often been sold for the use of the ROMANS, 
at DELUS in CILICIA. STRABO, lib. xiv., 668.
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†15 COLUMELLA, lib. i. proaem. et cap. 2, et 7. VARRO, lib. iii. cap. 1. HORAT, 
lib. ii. od. 15. TACIT. annal. lib. iii. cap. 54. SUETON. in vita AUG. cap. 
xlii. PLIN. lib. xviii, cap. 13.
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†16 Minore indies plebe ingenua, says TACITUS, ann. lib. iv. cap. 27.
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†17 As servus was the name of the genus, and verna of the species, without any 
correlative, this forms a strong presumption, that the latter were by far the 
least numerous. It is an universal observation which we may form upon language, 
that where two related parts of a whole bear any proportion to each other, in 
numbers, rank or consideration, there are always correlative terms invented, 
which answer to both the parts, and express their mutual relation. If they bear 
no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the less, and marks 
its distinction from the whole. Thus man and woman, master and servant, father 
and son, prince and subject, stranger and citizen, are correlative terms. But 
the words seaman, carpenter, smith, tailor, &c. have no correspondent terms, 
which express those who are no seamen no carpenters, &c. Languages differ very 
much with regard to the particular words where this distinction obtains; and may 
thence afford very strong inferences, concerning the manners and customs of 
different nations. The military government of the ROMAN emperors had exalted the 
soldiery so high, that they balanced all the other orders of the state: Hence 
miles and paganus became relative terms; a thing, till then, unknown to ancient, 
and still so to modern languages. Modern superstition exalted the clergy so 
high, that they overbalanced the whole state: Hence clergy and laity are terms 
opposed in all modern languages, and in these alone. And from the same 
principles I infer, that if the number of slaves bought by the ROMANS from 
foreign countries, had not extremely exceeded those which were bred at home, 
verna would have had a correlative, which would have expressed the former 
species of slaves. But these, it would seem, composed the main body of the 
ancient slaves, and the latter were but a few exceptions.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 18 mp. 389 gp. 390
†18 Verna is used by ROMAN writers as a word equivalent to scurra, on account of 
the petulance and impudence of those slaves. MART. lib. i. ep. 42. HORACE also 
mentions the vernae procaces; and PETRONIUS, cap. 24. vernula urbanitas. SENECA, 
de provid. cap. 1. vernularum licentia.
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†19 It is computed in the WEST INDIES, that a stock of slaves grow worse five 
per cent. every year, unless new slaves be bought to recruit them. They are not 
able to keep up their number, even in those warm countries, where cloaths and 
provisions are so easily got. How much more must this happen in EUROPEAN 
countries, and in or near great cities?†d I shall add, that, from the experience 
of our planters, slavery is as little advantageous to the master as to the 
slave, wherever hired servants can be procured. A man is obliged to cloath and 
feed his slave; and he does no more for his servant: The price of the first 
purchase is, therefore, so much loss to him: not to mention, that the fear of 
punishment will never draw so much labour from a slave, as the dread of being 
turned off and not getting another service, will from a freeman.
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†20 CORN. NEPOS in vita ATTICI. We may remark, that ATTICUS'S estate lay chiefly 
in EPIRUS, which, being a remote, desolate place, would render it profitable for 
him to rear slaves there.
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†21 Lib. vii., 304.
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†22 In MIDIAM, p. 221, ex. edit. ALDI.
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†23 Panegyr.
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†24 Lib. vii. cap. 10, sub fin.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 25 mp. 391 gp. 391
†25 ARISTOPH. Equites, 1. 17. The ancient scholiast remarks on this passage 
{barbarizei os doulos}.
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†26 In Amphobum orat. 1. 816.
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†27 {klinopoioi}, makers of those beds which the ancients lay upon at meals.
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†28 In vita CATONIS, 21.
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†29 "Non temere ancillae ejus rei causa comparantur ut pariant." Digest. lib. 5. 
tit. 3. de haered. petit. lex 27. The following texts are to the same purpose, 
"Spadonem morbosum non esse, neque vitiosum, verius mihi videtur; sed sanum 
esse, sicuti illum qui unum testiculum habet, qui etiam generare potest." 
Digest. lib. 2. tit. 1. de aedilitio edicto, lex 6. sec. 2. "Sin autem quis ita 
spado sit, ut tam necessaria pars corporis penitus absit, morbosus est." Id. lex 
7. His impotence, it seems, was only regarded so far as his health or life might 
be affected by it. In other respects, he was full as valuable. The same 
reasoning is employed with regard to female slaves. "Quaeritur de ea muliere 
quae semper mortuos parit, an morbosa sit? et ait Sabinus, si vulvae vitio hoc 
contingit, morbosam esse." Id. lex 14. It had even been doubted, whether a woman 
pregnant was morbid or vitiated; and it is determined, that she is sound, not on 
account of the value of her offspring, but because it is the natural part or 
office of women to bear children. "Si mulier praegnans venerit, inter omnes 
convenit sanam eam esse. Maximum enim ac praecipuum munus foeminarum accipere ac 
tueri conceptum. Puerperam quoque sanam esse; si modo nihil extrinsecus accedit, 
quod corpus ejus in aliquam valetudinem immitteret. De sterili Coelius 
distinguere Trebatium dicit, ut si natura sterilis sit, sana sit; si vitio 
corporis, contra." Id.
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†30 TACIT. ann. lib. xiv. cap. 43.
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†31 The slaves in the great houses had little rooms assigned to them, called 
cellae. Whence the name of cell was transferred to the monk's room in a convent. 
See farther on this head, JUST. LIPSIUS, Saturn. i. cap. 14. These form strong 
presumptions against the marriage and propagation of the family slaves.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 32 mp. 393 gp. 392
†32 Opera et Dies, 405, also 602.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 33 mp. 394 gp. 393
†33 STRABO, lib. viii. 365.
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†34 De ratione redituum, 4, 14.
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†35 See CATO de re rustica, cap. 56. Donatus in Phormion, l. 1, 9. SENECAE 
epist. 80.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 36 mp. 394 gp. 393
†36 De re rust. cap. 10, 11.
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†37 Lib. i. cap. 18.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 38 mp. 395 gp. 393
†38 Lib. i. cap. 17.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 39 mp. 395 gp. 393
†39 Lib. i. cap. 18.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 40 mp. 395 gp. 394
†40 Lib. xxxiii. cap. 1. So likewise TACITUS, annal. lib. xiv. cap. 44.†h
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 41 mp. 396 gp. 394
†41 Lib. ii. cap. 10.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 42 mp. 396 gp. 394
†42 Pastoris duri est hic filius, ille bubulci. JUVEN, sat. 11, 151.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 43 mp. 396 gp. 394
†43 Lib. i. cap. 8.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 44 mp. 396 gp. 394
†44 De bel. civ. lib. i. 7.
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†45 In vita TIB. & C. GRACCHI.
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†46 To the same purpose is that passage of the elder SENECA, ex controversia 5. 
lib. v. "Arata quondam populis rura, singulorum ergastulorum sunt; latiusque 
nunc villici, quam olim reges, imperant. At nunc eadem," says PLINY, "vincti 
pedes, damnatae manus, inscripti vultus exercent." Lib. xviii. cap. 3. So also 
MARTIAL.
"Et sonet innumera compede Thuscus ager." Lib. ix. ep. 23.
And LUCAN.
"Tum longos jungere fines
Agrorum, et quondam duro sulcata Camilli,
Vomere et antiquas Curiorum passa ligones,
Longa sub ignotis extendere rura colonis." Lib. i. 167.
"Vincto fossore coluntur
Hesperiae segetes." Lib. vii. 402.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 47 mp. 397 gp. 395
†47 Lib. iii. cap. 19.
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†48 Id. lib. iv. cap. 8.
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†49 TACITUS blames it. De morib. Germ. 19.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 50 mp. 398 gp. 396
†50 De fraterno amore. SENECA also approves of the exposing of sickly infirm 
children. De ira, lib. i. cap. 15.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 51 mp. 399 gp. 396
†51 SEXT. EMP. lib. iii. cap. 24.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 52 mp. 399 gp. 396
†52 De amore prolis.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 53 Para. 1/2 mp. 400 gp. 397
†53 The practice of leaving great sums of money to friends, though one had near 
relations, was common in GREECE as well as ROME; as we may gather from LUCIAN. 
This practice prevails much less in modern times; and BEN. JOHNSON'S VOLPONE is 
therefore almost entirely extracted from ancient authors, and suits better the 
manners of those times.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 53 Para. 2/2 mp. 400 gp. 397
It may justly be thought, that the liberty of divorces in ROME was another 
discouragement to marriage. Such a practice prevents not quarrels from humour, 
but rather encreases them; and occasions also those from interest, which are 
much more dangerous and destructive. See farther on this head, Essays moral, 
political, and literary, Part I. Essay XIX. Perhaps too the unnatural lusts of 
the ancients ought to be taken into consideration, as of some moment.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 54 mp. 401 gp. 398
†54 De exp. CYR. lib. vii. 6.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 55 mp. 402 gp. 398
†55 DEMOST. de falsa leg. 390. He calls it a considerable sum.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 56 mp. 402 gp. 398
†56 THUCYD. lib. iii. 17.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 57 mp. 402 gp. 399
†57 Lib. vi. cap. 37.
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†58 TIT. LIV. lib. xli. cap. 7, 13 & alibi passim.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 59 mp. 402 gp. 399
†59 APPIAN. De bell. civ. lib. iv., 20.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 60 mp. 402 gp. 399
†60 CAESAR gave the centurions ten times the gratuity of the common soldiers, De 
bello Gallico, lib. viii. 4. In the RHODIAN cartel, mentioned afterwards, no 
distinction in the ransom was made on account of ranks in the army.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 61 mp. 403 gp. 399
†61 DIOD. SIC. lib. xii. 59. THUCYD. lib. iii. 92.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 62 mp. 403 gp. 399
†62 DIOD. SIC. lib. xvi. 82.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 63 mp. 403 gp. 399
†63 In vita TIMOL., 23.
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†64 PLIN. lib. 18. cap. 3. The same author, in cap. 6. says, Verumque fatentibus 
latifundia perdidere ITALIAM; jam vero et provincias. Sex domi semissem AFRICAE 
possidebant, cum interfecit eos NERO princeps. In this view, the barbarous 
butchery committed by the first ROMAN emperors, was not, perhaps, so destructive 
to the public as we may imagine. These never ceased till they had extinguished 
all the illustrious families, which had enjoyed the plunder of the world, during 
the latter ages of the republic. The new nobles who arose in their place, were 
less splendid, as we learn from TACIT. ann. lib. 3. cap. 55.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 65 mp. 405 gp. 401
†65 The ancient soldiers, being free citizens, above the lowest rank, were all 
married. Our modern soldiers are either forced to live unmarried, or their 
marriages turn to small account towards the encrease of mankind. A circumstance 
which ought, perhaps, to be taken into consideration, as of some consequence in 
favour of the ancients.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 66 mp. 405 gp. 401
†66 Hist. lib. ii. cap. 44.
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†67 As ABYDUS, mentioned by LIVY, lib. xxxi. cap. 17, 18, and POLYB. lib. xvi. 
34. As also the XANTHIANS, APPIAN. de bell. civil. lib. iv. 80.
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†68 In vita ARATI, 6.
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†69 INST. lib. ii. cap. 6.†l
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 70 mp. 406 gp. 402
†70 DIOD. SICUL. lib. xx. 84.
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†71 LYSIAS, who was himself of the popular faction, and very narrowly escaped 
from the thirty tyrants, says, that the Democracy was as violent a government as 
the Oligarchy. Orat. 25, de statu popul.
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†72 CICERO, PHILIP. 1, 1.
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†73 As orat. 12. contra ERATOST. orat. 13. contra AGORAT. orat. 16. pro MANTITH.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 74 mp. 408 gp. 403
†74 APPIAN, de bell. civ. lib. ii. 100.
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†75 See CAESAR's speech de bell. Catil. c. 51.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 76 mp. 408 gp. 404
†76 Orat. 25, 173. And in orat. 30, 184, he mentions the factious spirit of the 
popular assemblies as the only cause why these illegal punishments should 
displease.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 77 mp. 409 gp. 404
†77 Lib. iii.†o
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†78 PLUT. de virt. & fort. ALEX.
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†79 DIOD. SIC. lib. xviii, xix.
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†80 TIT. LIV. xxxi. xxxiii. xxxiv.
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†81 DIOD. SIC. Lib. xiv. 5. ISOCRATES says there were only 5000 banished. He 
makes the number of those killed amount to 1500. AREOP. 153. AESCHINES contra 
CTESIPH. 455 assigns precisely the same number. SENECA (de tranq. anim. cap. 5.) 
says 1300.
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†82 DIOD. SIC. lib. xv. c. 58.
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†83 DIOD SIC. lib. xiii. c. 48.
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†84 We shall mention from DIODORUS SICULUS alone a few massacres, which passed 
in the course of sixty years, during the most shining age of GREECE. There were 
banished from SYBARIS 500 of the nobles and their partizans; lib. xii. p. 77, ex 
edit. RHODOMANNI. Of CHIANS, 600 citizens banished; lib. xiii. p. 189. At 
EPHESUS, 340 killed, 1000 banished; lib. xiii. p. 223. Of CYRENIANS, 500 nobles 
killed, all the rest banished; lib. xiv. p. 263. The CORINTHIANS killed 120, 
banished 500; lib. xiv. p. 304. PHAEBIDAS the SPARTAN banished 300 BAEOTIANS; 
lib. xv. p. 342. Upon the fall of the LACEDAEMONIANS, Democracies were restored 
in many cities, and severe vengeance taken of the nobles, after the GREEK 
manner. But matters did not end there. For the banished nobles, returning in 
many places, butchered their adversaries at PHIALAE, in CORINTH, in MEGARA, in 
PHLIASIA. In this last place they killed 300 of the people; but these again 
revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and banished the rest; lib. xv. p. 
357. In ARCADIA 1400 banished, besides many killed. The banished retired to 
SPARTA and to PALLANTIUM: The latter were delivered up to their countrymen, and 
all killed; lib. xv. p. 373. Of the banished from ARGOS and THEBES, there were 
509 in the SPARTAN army; id. p. 374. Here is a detail of the most remarkable of 
AGATHOCLES'S cruelties from the same author. The people before his usurpation 
had banished 600 nobles; lib. xix. p. 655. Afterwards that tyrant, in 
concurrence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and banished 6000; id. p. 647. 
He killed 4000 people at GELA; id. p. 741. By AGATHOCLES'S brother 8000 banished 
from SYRACUSE; lib. xx. p. 757. The inhabitants of AEGESTA, to the number of 
40,000, were killed, man, woman, and child; and with tortures, for the sake of 
their money; id. p. 802. All the relations, to wit, father, brother, children, 
grandfather, of his LIBYAN arms, killed; id. p. 803. He killed 7000 exiles after 
capitulation; id. p. 816. It is to be remarked, that AGATHOCLES†p was a man of 
great sense and courage, and is not to be suspected of wanton cruelty, contrary 
to the maxims of his age.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 85 mp. 410 gp. 405
†85 DIOD. SIC. lib. xviii. c. 8.
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†86 Pag. 885. ex edit. LEUNCLAV.
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†87 Orat. 29. in NICOM. 185.
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†88 In order to recommend his client to the favour of the people, he enumerates 
all the sums he had expended. When {choregos}, 30 minas: Upon a chorus of men 20 
minas; {eis pyrrichistas}, 8 minas; {andrasi choregon}, 50 minas; {kykliko 
choro}, 3 minas; Seven times trierarch, where he spent 6 talents: Taxes, once 30 
minas, another time 40; {gymnasiarchon}, 12 minas; {choregos paidiko choro}, 15 
minas; {komodois choregon}, 18 minas; {pyrrichistais ageneiois}, 7 minas; 
{prierei amillomenos}, 15 minas; {architheoros}, 30 minas: In the whole ten 
talents 38 minas. An immense sum for an ATHENIAN fortune, and what alone would 
be esteemed great riches, Orat. 21, 161. It is true, he says, the law did not 
oblige him absolutely to be at so much expence, not above a fourth. But without 
the favour of the people, no body was so much as safe; and this was the only way 
to gain it. See farther, orat. 25. de pop. statu. In another place, he 
introduces a speaker, who says that he had spent his whole fortune, and an 
immense one, eighty talents, for the people. Orat. 26. de prob. EVANDRI. The 
{metoikoi}, or strangers, find, says he, if they do not contribute largely 
enough to the people's fancy, that they have reason to repent it. Orat. 31. 
contra PHIL. You may see with what care DEMOSTHENES displays his expences of 
this nature, when he pleads for himself de corona; and how he exaggerates 
MIDIAS'S stinginess in this particular, in his accusation of that criminal. All 
this, by the by, is a mark of a very iniquitous judicature: And yet the 
ATHENIANS valued themselves on having the most legal and regular administration 
of any people in GREECE.
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†89 Panath. 258.
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†90 DIOD. SIC. lib. xiv. 38.
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†91 Lib. i. 89.
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†92 The authorities cited above, are all historians, orators, and philosophers, 
whose testimony is unquestioned. It is dangerous to rely upon writers who deal 
in ridicule and satyr. What will posterity, for instance, infer from this 
passage of Dr. SWIFT: "I told him, that in the kingdom of TRIBNIA (BRITAIN) by 
the natives called LANGDON (LONDON) where I had sojourned some time in my 
travels, the bulk of the people consist, in a manner, wholly of discoverers, 
witnesses, informers, accusers, prosecutors, evidences, swearers, together with 
their several subservient and subaltern instruments, all under the colours, the 
conduct, and pay of ministers of state and their deputies. The plots in that 
kingdom are usually the workmanship of those persons," &c. GULLIVER'S travels. 
Such a representation might suit the government of ATHENS; not that of ENGLAND, 
which is remarkable even in modern times, for humanity, justice, and liberty. 
Yet the Doctor's satyr, though carried to extremes, as is usual with him, even 
beyond other satyrical writers, did not altogether want an object. The Bishop of 
ROCHESTER, who was his friend, and of the same party, had been banished a little 
before by bill of attainder, with great justice, but without such a proof as was 
legal, or according to the strict forms of common law.
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†93 PLUTARCHUS in vita SOLON, 18.
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†94 DIOD. SIC. lib. xviii. 18.
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†95 Id. ibid.
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†96 Id. ibid. 74.
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†97 TIT. LIV. lib. i. cap. 43.
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†98 Lib. ii. 24. There were 8000 killed during the siege; and the captives 
amounted to 30,000. DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. xvii. 46, says only 13,000: But he 
accounts for this small number, by saying that the TYRIANS had sent away 
before-hand part of their wives and children to CARTHAGE.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 99 mp. 417 gp. 410
†99 Lib. v. 97, he makes the number of the citizens amount to 30,000.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 100 mp. 417 gp. 410
†100 Ib. viii. 132.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 101 mp. 417 gp. 410
†101 Orat. 32. 908 advers. DIOGIT.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 102 mp. 417 gp. 410
†102 Contra APHOB. p. 25. ex edit. ALDI.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 103 mp. 417 gp. 410
†103 Id. p. 19.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 104 mp. 417 gp. 411
†104 Id. ibid.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 105 mp. 417 gp. 411
†105 Id. ibid. and AESCHINES contra CTESIPH. 104.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 106 mp. 418 gp. 411
†106 Epist. ad ATTIC. lib. iv. epist. 15.
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†107 Contra VERR. orat. 3, 71.
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†108 See Essay IV.
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†109 Lib. vii. 28.
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†110 Lib. xiii. 81.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 111 mp. 418 gp. 411
†111 Lib. xii. 9.
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†112 Econ. 15, 10.
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†113 See Part I. Essay XI.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 114 mp. 421 gp. 414
†114 AELII LAMPRID. in vita HELIOGAB. cap. 26.
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†115 In general, there is more candour and sincerity in ancient historians, but 
less exactness and care, than in the moderns. Our speculative factions, 
especially those of religion, throw such an illusion over our minds, that men 
seem to regard impartiality to their adversaries and to heretics, as a vice or 
weakness: But the commonness of books, by means of printing, has obliged modern 
historians to be more careful in avoiding contradictions and incongruities. 
DIODORUS SICULUS is a good writer, but it is with pain I see his narration 
contradict, in so many particulars, the two most authentic pieces of all GREEK 
history, to wit, XENOPHON'S expedition, and DEMOSTHENES'S orations. PLUTARCH and 
APPIAN seem scarce ever to have read CICERO'S epistles.
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†116 Lib. xii. 9.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 117 mp. 422 gp. 415
†117 Lib. vi. 26.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 118 mp. 423 gp. 415
†118 Lib. xiii. 90.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 119 mp. 423 gp. 415
†119 DIOGENES LAERTIUS (in vita EMPEDOCLIS) says, that AGRIGENTUM contained only 
800,000 inhabitants.
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†120 Idyll. 17.
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†121 Lib. i. 18.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 122 mp. 423 gp. 415
†122 Id. Ibid.
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†123 Orat. funebris, 193.
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†124 Lib. ii. 24.
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†125 The country that supplied this number, was not above a third of ITALY, viz. 
the Pope's dominions, TUSCANY, and a part of the kingdom of NAPLES: But perhaps 
in those early times there were very few slaves, except in ROME, or the great 
cities.†s
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†126 Lib. ii. 5.
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†127 CELTICA, c. 2.
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†128 PLUTARCH (in vita CAES. 15) makes the number that CAESAR fought with amount 
to three millions; JULIAN (in CAESARIBUS) to two.
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†129 Lib. ii. cap. 47.
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†130 PLINY, lib. vii. cap. 25, says, that CAESAR used to boast, that there had 
fallen in battle against him one million one hundred and ninety-two thousand 
men, besides those who perished in the civil wars. It is not probable, that that 
conqueror could ever pretend to be so exact in his computation. But allowing the 
fact, it is likely, that the HELVETII, GERMANS, and BRITONS, whom he 
slaughtered, would amount to near a half of the number.†t
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 131 mp. 425 gp. 417
†131 DIOD. SIC. lib. ii. 5.
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†132 PLUTARCH in vita DIONYS, 25.
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†133 STRABO, lib vi. 273.
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†134 Apolog. SOCR. 29 D.
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†135 ARGOS seems also to have been a great city; for LYSIAS contents himself 
with saying that it did not exceed ATHENS. Orat. 34, 922.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 136 mp. 427 gp. 418
†136 Lib. vi. See also PLUTARCH in vita NICIAE, 17.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 137 mp. 427 gp. 418
†137 Orat. contra VERREM, lib. iv. cap. 52. STRABO, lib. vi. 270, says, it was 
twenty-two miles in compass. But then we are to consider, that it contained two 
harbours within it; one of which was a very large one, and might be regarded as 
a kind of bay.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 138 mp. 427 gp. 418
†138 Lib. vi. cap. 20.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 139 mp. 427 gp. 419
†139 DEMOSTHENES assigns 20,000; contra ARISTOG, 785.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 140 mp. 427 gp. 419
†140 Lib. v. 99.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 141 mp. 428 gp. 419
†141 Lib. viii. 72.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 142 mp. 428 gp. 419
†142 Lib. ii. 13. DIODORUS SICULUS'S account perfectly agrees, lib. xii. 40.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 143 mp. 428 gp. 419
†143 XENOPHON. Mem. lib. iii. 6, 14.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 144 mp. 428 gp. 419
†144 Lib. ii. 13.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 145 mp. 428 gp. 419
†145 De ratione red. 2, 6.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 146 mp. 428 gp. 419
†146 We are to observe, that when DIONYSIUS HALYCARNASSAEUS says, that if we 
regard the ancient walls of ROME, the extent of that city will not appear 
greater than that of ATHENS; he must mean the ACROPOLIS and high town only. No 
ancient author ever speaks of the PYRAEUM, PHALERUS, and MUNYCHIA, as the same 
with ATHENS. Much less can it be supposed, that DIONYSIUS would consider the 
matter in that light, after the walls of CIMON and PERICLES were destroyed, and 
ATHENS was entirely separated from these other towns. This observation destroys 
all VOSSIUS'S reasonings, and introduces common sense into these calculations.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 147 mp. 429 gp. 420
†147 ATHEN. lib. vi. 104.
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†148 De rep. ATHEN, 1.
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†149 PHILIP. 3, 31.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 150 mp. 429 gp. 420
†150 STICHO. 3. 1, 39.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 151 mp. 429 gp. 420
†151 Contra TIMARCH. 42.
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†152 Orat. xii.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 153 mp. 429 gp. 420
†153 Contra APHOB. 816.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 154 mp. 429 gp. 420
†154 Ibid.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 155 mp. 430 gp. 420
†155 Lib. vii. 27.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 156 mp. 430 gp. 420
†156 De rat. red. 4, 25.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 157 mp. 430 gp. 421
†157 De classibus, 183.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 158 mp. 430 gp. 421
†158 Lib. ii. cap. 62.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 159 mp. 430 gp. 421
†159 De rat. red. 4, 14.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 160 mp. 430 gp. 421
†160 Contra APHOBUM, 816.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 161 mp. 431 gp. 421
†161 Lib. viii. 40.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 162 mp. 431 gp. 421
†162 PLUTARCH, in vita LYCURG, 8.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 163 mp. 431 gp. 421
†163 Lib. iv. 80.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 164 mp. 431 gp. 421
†164 The same author affirms, that CORINTH had once 460,000 slaves, AEGINA 
470,000. But the foregoing arguments hold stronger against these facts, which 
are indeed entirely absurd and impossible. It is however remarkable, that 
ATHENAEUS cites so great an authority as ARISTOTLE for this last fact: And the 
scholiast on PINDAR mentions the same number of slaves in AEGINA.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 165 mp. 431 gp. 422
†165 Lib. ii. 14.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 166 mp. 432 gp. 422
†166 Id. lib. ii. 17.
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†167 DEMOST. contra LEPT. 466. The ATHENIANS brought yearly from PONTUS 400,000 
medimni or bushels of corn, as appeared from the custom-house books. And this 
was the greater part of their importation of corn. This by the by is a strong 
proof that there is some great mistake in the foregoing passage of ATHENAEUS. 
For ATTICA itself was so barren of corn, that it produced not enough even to 
maintain the peasants. Tit. Liv. lib. xliii. cap. 6.†x And 400,000 medimni would 
scarcely feed 100,000 men during a twelvemonth. LUCIAN, in his navigum sive 
vota, says, that a ship, which, by the dimensions he gives, seems to have been 
about the size of our third rates, carried as much corn as would maintain all 
ATTICA for a twelvemonth. But perhaps ATHENS was decayed at that time; and 
besides, it is not safe to trust to such loose rhetorical calculations.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 168 mp. 432 gp. 422
†168 DIOD. SIC. lib. xx. 84.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 169 mp. 432 gp. 422
†169 ISOCR. paneg.
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†170 DIOD. SIC. lib. xvii. 14.†y When ALEXANDER attacked THEBES, we may safely 
conclude, that almost all the inhabitants were present. Whoever is acquainted 
with the spirit of the GREEKS, especially of the THEBANS, will never suspect, 
that any of them would desert their country, when it was reduced to such extreme 
peril and distress. As ALEXANDER took the town by storm, all those who bore arms 
were put to the sword without mercy; and they amounted only to 6000 men. Among 
these were some strangers and manumitted slaves. The captives, consisting of old 
men, women, children, and slaves, were sold, and they amounted to 30,000. We may 
therefore conclude that the free citizens in THEBES, of both sexes and all ages, 
were near 24,000; the strangers and slaves about 12,000. These last, we may 
observe, were somewhat fewer in proportion than at ATHENS; as is reasonable to 
imagine from this circumstance, that ATHENS was a town of more trade to support 
slaves, and of more entertainment to allure strangers. It is also to be 
remarked, that thirty-six thousand was the whole number of people, both in the 
city of THEBES, and the neighbouring territory: A very moderate number, it must 
be confessed; and this computation, being founded on facts which appear 
indisputable, must have great weight in the present controversy. The 
above-mentioned number of RHODIANS too were all the inhabitants of the island, 
who were free, and able to bear arms.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 171 mp. 433 gp. 423
†171 Hist. GRAEC. lib. vii. 2, 1.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 172 mp. 433 gp. 423
†172 Id. lib. vii.
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†173 POLYB. lib. ii. 56.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 174 mp. 433 gp. 423
†174 POLYB. lib. ix. cap. 20.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 175 mp. 434 gp. 423
†175 LYSIAS, orat. 34, 92.
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†176 VOPISCUS in vita AUREL, 222 B.
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†177 De rep. LACED. 1, 1. This passage is not easily reconciled with that of 
PLUTARCH above, who says, that SPARTA had 9000 citizens.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 178 mp. 435 gp. 424
†178 POLYB. lib. ix. cap. 20.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 179 mp. 435 gp. 424
†179 DIOD. SIC. lib. xviii. 24.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 180 mp. 435 gp. 424
†180 LEGAT.
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†181 In ACHAICIS, 7. 15, 7.
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†182 TIT. LIV. lib. xxxiv. cap. 51. PLATO in CRITONE, 53 D.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 183 mp. 436 gp. 424
†183 Lib. iv. 3.
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†184 Lib. vii. 126.
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†185 TIT. LIV. lib. xlv. cap. 34.
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†186 Lib. ix. cap. 5.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 187 mp. 437 gp. 425
†187 Lib. iv. 13.
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†188 Lib. x. 32.
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†189 Satyr. iii. 1. 269, 270.
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†190 STRABO, liv. v. says, that the emperor AUGUSTUS prohibited the raising 
houses higher than seventy feet. In another passage, lib. xvi. he speaks of the 
houses of ROME as remarkably high. See also to the same purpose VITRUVIUS, lib. 
ii. cap. 8. ARISTIDES the sophist, in his oration {eis Romen}, says, that ROME 
consisted of cities on the top of cities; and that if one were to spread it out, 
and unfold it, it would cover the whole surface of ITALY. Where an author 
indulges himself in such extravagant declamations, and gives so much into the 
hyperbolical style, one knows not how far he must be reduced. But this reasoning 
seems natural: If ROME was built in so scattered a manner as DIONYSIUS says, and 
ran so much into the country, there must have been very few streets where the 
houses were raised so high. It is only for want of room, that any body builds in 
that inconvenient manner.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 191 mp. 438 gp. 426
†191 LIB. ii. epist. 16. lib. v. epist. 6. It is true, PLINY there describes a 
country-house: But since that was the idea which the ancients formed of a 
magnificent and convenient building, the great men would certainly build the 
same way in town. "In laxitatem ruris excurrunt," says SENECA of the rich and 
voluptuous, epist. 114. VALERIUS MAXIMUS, lib. iv. cap. 4. speaking of 
CINCINNATUS'S field of four acres, says, "Auguste se habitare nunc putat, cujus 
domus tantum patet quantum CINCINNATI rura patuerant." To the same purpose see 
lib. xxxvi. cap. 15. also lib. xviii. cap. 2.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 192 mp. 438 gp. 426
†192 VITRUV. lib. v. cap. 11. TACIT. annal. lib. xi. cap. 3. SUETON. in vita 
OCTAV. cap. 72, &c.
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†193 "MOENIA ejus (ROMAE) collegere ambitu imperatoribus, censoribusque 
VESPASIANIS, A.U.C. 828. pass. xiii. MCC. complexa montes septem, ipsa dividitur 
in regiones quatuordecim, compita earum 265. Ejusdem spatii mensura, currente a 
milliario in capite ROM. Fori statuto, ad singulas portas, quae sunt hodie 
numero 37, ita ut duodecim portae semel numerentur, praetereanturque ex 
veteribus septem, quae esse desierunt, efficit passuum per directum 30,775. Ad 
extrema vero tectorum cum castris praetoriis ab eodem Milliario, per vicos 
omnium viarum, mensura collegit paulo amplius septuaginta millia passuum. Quo si 
quis altitudinem tectorum addat, dignam profecto, aestimationem concipiat, 
fateaturque nullius urbis magnitudinem in toto orbe potuisse ei comparari." 
PLIN. lib. iii. cap. 5.
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All the best manuscripts of PLINY read the passage as here cited, and fix the 
compass of the walls of ROME to be thirteen miles. The question is, What PLINY 
means by 30,775 paces, and how that number was formed? The manner in which I 
conceive it, is this. ROME was a semicircular area of thirteen miles 
circumference. The Forum, and consequently the Milliarium, we know, was situated 
on the banks of the TYBER, and near the center of the circle, or upon the 
diameter of the semicircular area. Though there were thirty-seven gates to ROME, 
yet only twelve of them had straight streets, leading from them to the 
Milliarium. PLINY, therefore, having assigned the circumference of ROME, and 
knowing that that alone was not sufficient to give us a just notion of its 
surface, uses this farther method. He supposes all the streets, leading from the 
Milliarium to the twelve gates, to be laid together into one straight line, and 
supposes we run along that line, so as to count each gate once: In which case, 
he says, that the whole line is 30,775 paces: Or, in other words, that each 
street or radius of the semicircular area is upon an average two miles and a 
half; and the whole length of ROME is five miles, and its breadth about half as 
much, besides the scattered suburbs.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 193 Para. 3/5 mp. 439 gp. 426
PERE HARDOUIN understands this passage in the same manner; with regard to the 
laying together the several streets of ROME into one line, in order to compose 
30,775 paces: But then he supposes, that streets led from the Milliarium to 
every gate, and that no street exceeded 800 paces in length. But (1.) a 
semicircular area, whose radius was only 800 paces, could never have a 
circumference near thirteen miles, the compass of ROME as assigned by PLINY. A 
radius of two miles and a half forms very nearly that circumference. (2.) There 
is an absurdity in supposing a city so built as to have streets running to its 
center from every gate in its circumference. These streets must interfere as 
they approach. (3.) This diminishes too much from the greatness of ancient ROME, 
and reduces that city below even BRISTOL or ROTTERDAM.
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The sense which VOSSIUS in his Observationes variae, puts on this passage of 
PLINY, errs widely in the other extreme. One manuscript of no authority, instead 
of thirteen miles, has assigned thirty miles for the compass of the walls of 
ROME. And VOSSIUS understands this only of the curvilinear part of the 
circumference; supposing, that as the TYBER formed the diameter, there were no 
walls built on that side. But (1.) this reading is allowed to be contrary to 
almost all the manuscripts. (2.) Why should PLINY, a concise writer, repeat the 
compass of the walls of ROME in two successive sentences? (3.) Why repeat it 
with so sensible a variation? (4.) What is the meaning of PLINY'S mentioning 
twice the MILLIARIUM, if a line was measured that had no dependence on the 
MILLIARIUM? (5.) AURELIAN'S wall is said by VOPISCUS to have been drawn laxiore 
ambitu, and to have comprehended all the buildings and suburbs on the north side 
of the TYBER; yet its compass was only fifty miles; and even here critics 
suspect some mistake or corruption in the text; since the walls, which remain, 
and which are supposed to be the same with AURELIAN'S, exceed not twelve miles. 
It is not probable, that ROME would diminish from AUGUSTUS to AURELIAN. It 
remained still the capital of the same empire; and none of the civil wars in 
that long period, except the tumults on the death of MAXIMUS and BALBINUS, ever 
affected the city. CARACALLA is said by AURELIUS VICTOR to have encreased ROME. 
(6.) There are no remains of ancient buildings, which mark any such greatness of 
ROME. VOSSIUS'S reply to this objection seems absurd, that the rubbish would 
sink sixty or seventy feet under ground. It appears from SPARTIAN (in vita 
Severi) that the five-mile stone in via Lavicana was out of the city. (7.) 
OLYMPIODORUS and PUBLIUS VICTOR fix the number of houses in ROME to be betwixt 
forty and fifty thousand. (8.) The very extravagance of the consequences drawn 
by this critic, as well as LIPSIUS, if they be necessary, destroys the 
foundation on which they are grounded: That ROME contained fourteen millions of 
inhabitants; while the whole kingdom of FRANCE contains only five, according to 
his computation, &c.
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The only objection to the sense which we have affixed above to the passage of 
PLINY, seems to lie in this, That PLINY, after mentioning the thirty-seven gates 
of ROME, assigns only a reason for suppressing the seven old ones, and says 
nothing of the eighteen gates, the streets leading from which terminated, 
according to my opinion, before they reached the Forum. But as PLINY was writing 
to the ROMANS, who perfectly knew the disposition of the streets, it is not 
strange he should take a circumstance for granted, which was so familiar to 
every body. Perhaps too, many of these gates led to wharfs upon the river.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 194 mp. 441 gp. 427
†194 Ex monument. Ancyr.
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†195 Tusc. Quaest. lib. iii. cap. 48.
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†196 Licinius apud Sallust. hist. frag. lib. iii.
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†197 Nicolaus Hortensius de re frumentaria Roman.
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†198 Not to take the people too much from their business, AUGUSTUS ordained the 
distribution of corn to be made only thrice a-year: But the people finding the 
monthly distributions more convenient, (as preserving, I suppose, a more regular 
economy in their family) desired to have them restored. SUETON. AUGUST. cap. 40. 
Had not some of the people come from some distance for their corn, AUGUSTUS'S 
precaution seems superfluous.
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†199 Sueton. in Jul. cap. 41.
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†200 In vita Neronis. 39.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 11 Foot. 201 mp. 443 gp. 429
†201 Sueton. Aug. cap. 42.
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†202 Lib. iv. cap. 5.
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†203 Lib. xvii. 52.
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†204 Quintus Curtius says, its walls were ten miles in circumference, when 
founded by Alexander; lib. iv. cap. 8. Strabo, who had travelled to Alexandria, 
as well as Diodorus Siculus, says it was scarce four miles long, and in most 
places about a mile broad; lib. xvii. Pliny says it resembled a Macedonian 
cassock, stretching out in the corners; lib. v. cap. 10. Notwithstanding this 
bulk of Alexandria, which seems but moderate, Diodorus Siculus, speaking of its 
circuit as drawn by Alexander (which it never exceeded, as we learn from 
Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xxii. cap. 16.) says it was {megethei diapheronta}, 
extremely great, ibid. The reason which he assigns for its surpassing all cities 
in the world (for he excepts not Rome) is, that it contained 300,000 free 
inhabitants. He also mentions the revenues of the kings, to wit, 6000 talents, 
as another circumstance to the same purpose: No such mighty sum in our eyes, 
even though we make allowance for the different value of money. What Strabo says 
of the neighbouring country, means only that it was well peopled, {oikoumena 
kalos}. Might not one affirm, without any great hyperbole, that the whole banks 
of the river from Gravesend to Windsor are one city? This is even more than 
Strabo says of the banks of the lake Mareotis, and of the canal to Canopus. It 
is a vulgar saying in Italy, that the king of Sardinia has but one town in 
Piedmont; for it is all a town. Agrippa, in Josephus de bello Judaic. lib. ii. 
cap. 16. to make his audience comprehend the excessive greatness of Alexandria, 
which he endeavours to magnify, describes only the compass of the city as drawn 
by Alexander: A clear proof that the bulk of the inhabitants were lodged there, 
and that the neighbouring country was no more than what might be expected about 
all great towns, very well cultivated, and well peopled.
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†205 Lib. xvii. 52.
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†206 He says {eleutheroi}, not {politai}, which last expression must have been 
understood of citizens alone, and grown men.
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†207 Lib. iv. cap. 1. {pases poleos}. POLITIAN interprets it "aedibus majoribus 
etiam reliqua urbe."
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†208 He says (in NERONE, cap. 30.) that a portico or piazza of it was 3000 feet 
long; "tanta laxitas ut porticus triplices milliarias haberet." He cannot mean 
three miles. For the whole extent of the house from the PALATINE to the 
ESQUILINE was not near so great. So when VOPISC. in AURELIANO mentions a portico 
in SALLUST'S gardens, which he calls porticus milliarensis, it must be 
understood of a thousand feet. So also HORACE:
"Nulla decempedis
Metata privatis opacam
Porticus excipiebat Arcton."
Lib. ii. ode 15.
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So also in lib. i. satyr. 8.
"Mille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum
Hic dabat."
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†209 PLINIUS, lib. xxxvi. cap. 15. "Bis vidimus urbem totam cingi domibus 
principum, CAII ac NERONIS."
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†210 Lib. ii. cap. 15.
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†211 In AURELIAN. cap. 48.
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†212 Lib. xii. cap. 2.
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†213 Lib. ix. cap. 10. His expression is {anthropos}, not {polites}; inhabitant, 
not citizen.
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†214 Lib. vi. cap. 28.
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†215 Lib. xvii. 833.
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†216 Such were ALEXANDRIA, ANTIOCH, CARTHAGE, EPHESUS, LYONS, &c. in the ROMAN 
empire. Such are even BOURDEAUX, THOLOUSE, DIJON, RENNES, ROUEN AIX, &c. in 
FRANCE; DUBLIN, EDINBURGH, YORK, in the BRITISH dominions.
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†217 Vol. 2. Sect. 16.
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†218 Sat. 6. 522.
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†219 Lib. iv. 25.
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†220 De generat. anim. lib. ii. 8, 14.
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†221 Lib. iv. 178.
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†222 Trist. lib. iii. eleg. 10. De Ponto, lib. iv. eleg. 7, 9, 10.
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†223 Lib. iv. cap. 21.
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†224 Lib. i. cap. 2.
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†225 Lib. iii. 137.
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†226 The warm southern colonies also become more healthful: And it is 
remarkable, that in the SPANISH histories of the first discovery and conquest of 
these countries, they appear to have been very healthful; being then well 
peopled and cultivated. No account of the sickness or decay of CORTES'S or 
PIZARRO'S small armies.
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†227 Lib. i. cap. 1.
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†228 He seems to have lived about the time of the younger AFRICANUS; lib. i. 
cap. 1.
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†229 Xenoph. Exp. lib. vii. Polyb. lib. iv. cap. 45.
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†230 Ovid. passim, &c. Strabo, lib. vii.
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†231 Polyb. lib. ii. cap. 12.
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†232 De Bello Gallico, lib. vi. 23.
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†233 De Moribus Germ.
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†234 Lib. vii.
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†235 Lib. iii. cap. 47.
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†236 CAESAR de Bello Gallico, lib. vi. 13. STRABO, lib. vii. 290 says, the GAULS 
were not much more improved than the GERMANS.
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†237 Celt. pars 1. lib. iv. 2.
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†238 Lib. v. 25.
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†239 Ancient Gaul was more extensive than modern FRANCE.
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†240 CAESAR de Bello Gallico, lib. vi. 13.
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†241 Id. ibid. 15.
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†242 Lib. iv. 178.
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†243 De Bello Gallico, lib. ii. 4.
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†244 It appears from CAESAR'S account, that the GAULS had no domestic slaves,†hh 
who formed a different order from the Plebes. The whole common people were 
indeed a kind of slaves to the nobility, as the people of POLAND are at this 
day: And a nobleman of GAUL had sometimes ten thousand dependents of this kind. 
Nor can we doubt, that the armies were composed of the people as well as of the 
nobility. The fighting men amongst the HELVETII were the fourth part of the 
inhabitants; a clear proof that all the males of military age bore arms. See 
CAESAR de bello Gall. lib. 1.
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We may remark, that the numbers in CAESAR'S commentaries can be more depended on 
than those of any other ancient author, because of the GREEK translation, which 
still remains, and which checks the LATIN original.
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†245 De Bello Gallico, lib. i. 2.
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†246 Titi Livii, lib. xxxiv. cap. 17.
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†247 In vita Marii. 6.
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†248 De Bello Hisp. 8.
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†249 Vell. Paterc. lib. ii. sec. 90.
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†250 Lib. iii.
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†251 Lib. xliv.
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†252 "Nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Poenos, nec 
artibus Graecos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis, ac terrae domestico 
nativoque sensu, Italos ipsos ac Latinos--superavimus." De harusp. resp. cap. 9. 
The disorders of SPAIN seem to have been almost proverbial: "Nec impacatos a 
tergo horrebis Iberos." Virg. Georg. lib. iii. 408. The IBERI are here plainly 
taken, by a poetical figure, for robbers in general.
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†253 VARRO de re rustica, lib. ii. praef. COLUMELLA praef. SUETON. AUGUST. cap. 
42.
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†254 Though the observations of L'Abbe du Bos should be admitted, that ITALY is 
now warmer than in former times, the consequence may not be necessary, that it 
is more populous or better cultivated. If the other countries of EUROPE were 
more savage and woody, the cold winds that blew from them, might affect the 
climate of ITALY.
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†255 The inhabitants of MARSEILLES lost not their superiority over the GAULS in 
commerce and the mechanic arts, till the ROMAN dominion turned the latter from 
arms to agriculture and civil life. See STRABO, lib. iv. That author, in several 
places, repeats the observation concerning the improvement arising from the 
ROMAN arts and civility: And he lived at the time when the change was new, and 
would be more sensible. So also PLINY: "Quis enim non, communicato orbe 
terrarum, majestate ROMANI imperii, profecisse vitam putet, commercio rerum ac 
societate festae pacis, omniaque etiam, quae occulta antea fuerant, in promiscuo 
usu facta." Lib. xiv. proem. "Numine deum electa (speaking of ITALY) quae coelum 
ipsum clarius faceret, sparsa congregaret imperia, ritusque molliret, & tot 
populorum discordes, ferasque linguas sermonis commercio contraheret ad 
colloquia, & humanitatem homini daret; breviterque, una cunctarum gentium in 
toto orbe patria fieret;" lib. ii. cap. 5. Nothing can be stronger to this 
purpose than the following passage from TERTULLIAN, who lived about the age of 
SEVERUS. "Certe quidem ipse orbis in promptu est, cultior de die & instructior 
pristino. Omnia jam pervia, omnia nota, omnia negotiosa. Solitudines famosas 
retro fundi amoenissimi obliteraverunt, silvas arva domuerunt, feras pecora 
fugaverunt; arenae seruntur, saxa panguntur, paludes eliquantur, tantae urbes, 
quantae non casae quondam. Jam nec insulae horrent, nec scopuli terrent; ubique 
domus, ubique populus, ubique respublica, ubique vita. Summum testimonium 
frequentiae humanae, onerosi sumus mundo, vix nobis elementa sufficiunt; & 
necessitates arctiores, et querelae apud omnes, dum jam nos natura non 
sustinet." De anima, cap. 30. The air of rhetoric and declamation which appears 
in this passage, diminishes somewhat from its authority, but does not entirely 
destroy it.†jj The same remark may be extended to the following passage of 
ARISTIDES the sophist, who lived in the age of ADRIAN. "The whole world," says 
he, addressing himself to the ROMANS, "seems to keep one holiday; and mankind, 
laying aside the sword which they formerly wore, now betake themselves to 
feasting and to joy. The cities, forgetting their ancient animosities, preserve 
only one emulation, which shall embellish itself most by every art and ornament; 
Theatres every where arise, amphitheatres, porticoes, aqueducts, temples, 
schools, academies; and one may safely pronounce, that the sinking world has 
been again raised by your auspicious empire. Nor have cities alone received an 
encrease of ornament and beauty; but the whole earth, like a garden or paradise, 
is cultivated and adorned: Insomuch, that such of mankind as are placed out of 
the limits of your empire (who are but few) seem to merit our sympathy and 
compassion."
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It is remarkable, that though DIODORUS SICULUS makes the inhabitants of AEGYPT, 
when conquered by the ROMANS, amount only to three millions; yet JOSEPH. de 
bello Jud. lib. ii. cap. 16. says, that its inhabitants, excluding those of 
ALEXANDRIA, were seven millions and a half, in the reign of NERO: And he 
expressly says, that he drew this account from the books of the ROMAN publicans, 
who levied the poll-tax. STRABO, lib. xvii. 797, praises the superior police of 
the ROMANS with regard to the finances of AEGYPT, above that of its former 
monarchs: And no part of administration is more essential to the happiness of a 
people. Yet we read in ATHENAEUS, (lib. i. cap. 25.) who flourished during the 
reign of the ANTONINES, that the town MAREIA, near ALEXANDRIA, which was 
formerly a large city, had dwindled into a village. This is not, properly 
speaking, a contradiction. SUIDAS (AUGUST.) says, that the Emperor AUGUSTUS, 
having numbered the whole ROMAN empire, found it contained only 4,101,017 men 
({andres}). There is here surely some great mistake, either in the author or 
transcriber. But this authority, feeble as it is, may be sufficient to 
counterbalance the exaggerated accounts of HERODOTUS and DIODORUS SICULUS with 
regard to more early times.
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†256 L'Esprit de Loix, liv. xxiii. chap. 19.
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†257 De Orac. Defectu.
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†258 Lib. ii. cap. 62. It may perhaps be imagined, that POLYBIUS, being 
dependent on ROME, would naturally extol the ROMAN dominion. But, in the first 
place, POLYBIUS, though one sees sometimes instances of his caution, discovers 
no symptoms of flattery. Secondly, This opinion is only delivered in a single 
stroke, by the by, while he is intent upon another subject; and it is allowed, 
if there be any suspicion of an author's insincerity, that these oblique 
propositions discover his real opinion better than his more formal and direct 
assertions.
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†259 Annal. lib. i. cap. 2.
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†260 Lib. viii. and ix.
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†261 PLUTARCH. De his qui sero a Numine puniuntur.
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†262 De mercede conductis.
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†263 I must confess that that discourse of PLUTARCH, concerning the silence of 
the oracles, is in general of so odd a texture, and so unlike his other 
productions, that one is at a loss what judgment to form of it. It is written in 
dialogue, which is a method of composition that PLUTARCH commonly but little 
affects. The personages he introduces advance very wild, absurd, and 
contradictory opinions, more like the visionary systems or ravings of PLATO than 
the plain sense of PLUTARCH. There runs also through the whole an air of 
superstition and credulity, which resembles very little the spirit that appears 
in other philosophical compositions of that author. For it is remarkable, that, 
though PLUTARCH be an historian as superstitious as HERODOTUS or LIVY, yet there 
is scarcely, in all antiquity, a philosopher less superstitious, excepting 
CICERO and LUCIAN. I must therefore confess, that a passage of PLUTARCH, cited 
from this discourse, has much less authority with me, than if it had been found 
in most of his other compositions.
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There is only one other discourse of PLUTARCH liable to like objections, viz., 
that concerning those whose punishment is delayed by the Deity. It is also writ 
in dialogue, contains like superstitious, wild visions, and seems to have been 
chiefly composed in rivalship to PLATO, particularly his last book de republica.
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And here I cannot but observe, that Mons. FONTENELLE, a writer eminent for 
candor, seems to have departed a little from his usual character, when he 
endeavours to throw a ridicule upon PLUTARCH on account of passages to be met 
with in this dialogue concerning oracles. The absurdities here put into the 
mouths of the several personages are not to be ascribed to PLUTARCH. He makes 
them refute each other; and, in general, he seems to intend the ridiculing of 
those very opinions, which FONTENELLE would ridicule him for maintaining. See 
Histoire des oracles.
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†264 Lib. ii. 5.
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†265 He was cotemporary with CAESAR and AUGUSTUS.
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†a Editions H to W add: Were every one coupled as soon as he comes to the age of 
puberty.
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†b A country . . . to . . . pasturage, was added in Edition H, and In general . 
. . to . . . populous, in Edition Q.
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†c Editions H and I added the misquotation: Partem Italiae ergastula a 
solitudine vindicant.
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†d The remainder of this note was added in Ed. R.
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†e The remainder of this paragraph was added in Edition M.
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†f And even manufactures executed; added in Edition Q.
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†g This paragraph was added in Edition K.
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†h This reference to TACITUS was added in Edition K.
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†i Of the most abject superstition: Editions H to P.
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†j Infinite: Editions H to P.
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†k Editions H to P add: Could FOLARD'S project of the column take place (which 
seems impracticable†1) it would render modern battles as destructive as the 
antient.
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†1 What is the advantage of the column after it has broke the enemy's line? 
only, that it then takes them in flank, and dissipates whatever stands near it 
by a fire from all sides. But till it has broke them, does it not present a 
flank to the enemy, and that exposed to their musquetry, and, what is much 
worse, to their cannon?
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†l Editions H to P add: 'Tis true the same law seems to have continued till the 
time of JUSTINIAN. But abuses introduced by barbarism are not always corrected 
by civility.
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†m Editions H to P add: Where bigotted priests are the accusers, judges, and 
executioners.
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†n Editions H to Q add: This is a difficulty not cleared up, and even not 
observed by antiquarians and historians.
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†o The country in EUROPE in which I have observed the factions to be most 
violent, and party-hatred the strongest, is IRELAND. This goes so far as to cut 
off even the most common intercourse of civilities between the Protestants and 
Catholics. Their cruel insurrections and the severe revenges which they have 
taken of each other, are the causes of this mutual ill will, which is the chief 
source of the disorder, poverty, and depopulation of that country. The GREEK 
factions I imagine to have been inflamed still to a higher degree of rage; the 
revolutions being commonly more frequent, and the maxims of assassination much 
more avowed and acknowledged. Editions H to P.
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†p The remainder is not in Editions H to O. P has instead of it: His violent 
tyranny, therefore, is a stronger proof of the measures of the age.
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†q The remainder of this paragraph was added in Edition R.
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†r Not less, if not rather--added in Edition M.
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†s The last clause was added in Edition K.
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†t This note was added in Edition R.
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†u This sentence was added in Edition R.
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†v Editions H to M proceed as follows: The critical art may very justly be 
suspected of temerity, when it pretends to correct or dispute the plain 
testimony of ancient historians by any probable or analogical reasonings: Yet 
the licence of authors upon all subjects, particularly with regard to numbers, 
is so great, that we ought still to retain a kind of doubt or reserve, whenever 
the facts advanced depart in the least from the common bounds of nature and 
experience. I shall give an instance with regard to modern history. Sir William 
Temple tells us, in his memoirs, that having a free conversation with Charles 
the II., he took the opportunity of representing to that monarch the 
impossibility of introducing into this island the religion and government of 
France, chiefly on account of the great force requisite to subdue the spirit and 
liberty of so brave a people. "The Romans," says he, "were forced to keep up 
twelve legions for that purpose" (a great absurdity),†1 "and Cromwell left an 
army of near eighty thousand men." Must not this last be regarded as 
unquestioned by future critics, when they find it asserted by a wise and learned 
minister of state cotemporary to the fact, and who addressed his discourse, upon 
an ungrateful subject, to a great monarch who was also cotemporary, and who 
himself broke those very forces about fourteen years before? Yet, by the most 
undoubted authority, we may insist, that Cromwell's army, when he died, did not 
amount to half the number here mentioned.†2
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†1 Strabo, lib. iv. 200, says, that one legion would be sufficient, with a few 
cavalry; but the Romans commonly kept up somewhat a greater force in this 
island, which they never took the pains entirely to subdue.
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†2 It appears that Cromwell's parliament, in 1656, settled but 1,300,000 pounds 
a year on him for the constant charges of government in all the three kingdoms. 
See Scobel, chap. 31. This was to supply the fleet, army, and civil list. It 
appears from Whitelocke, that in the year 1649, the sum of 80,000 pounds a month 
was the estimate for 40,000 men. We must conclude, therefore, that Cromwell had 
much less than that number upon pay in 1656. In the very instrument of 
government, 20,000 foot and 10,000 horse are fixed by Cromwell himself, and 
afterwards confirmed by the parliament, as the regular standing army of the 
commonwealth. That number, indeed, seems not to have been much exceeded during 
the whole time of the protectorship. See farther Thurlo, Vol. 11. pp. 413, 499, 
568. We may there see, that though the Protector had more considerable armies in 
Ireland and Scotland, he had not sometimes more than 4,000 or 5,000 men in 
England.
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†w In digging of mines, and also kept up the number of slaves: Editions H and I. 
In digging of mines: K to Q.
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†x This sentence was added in Edition Q.
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†y DIOD. SIC. lib. 15 and 17: Editions H and I, and omit the rest of this note.
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†z The remainder of the paragraph was added in Edition K.
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†aa Deducting some few garrisons: not in F and G.
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†bb This paragraph was added in Edition K.
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†cc Editions H and I add the following note, in place of the following 
paragraph: A late French writer, in his observations on the Greeks, has 
remark'd, that Philip of Macedon, being declar'd captain-general of the GREEKS, 
wou'd have been back'd by the force of 230,000 of that nation in his intended 
expedition against Persia. This number comprehends, I suppose, all the free 
citizens, throughout all the cities; but the authority, on which that 
compilation is founded, has, I own, escap'd either my memory or reading; and 
that writer, tho' otherwise very ingenious, has given into a bad practice, of 
delivering a great deal of erudition, without one citation. But supposing, that 
that enumeration cou'd be justify'd by good authority from antiquity, we may 
establish the following computation. The free Greeks of all ages and sexes were 
920,000. The slaves, computing them by the number of Athenian slaves as above, 
who seldom marry'd or had families, were double the male citizens of full age, 
viz. 460,000. And the whole inhabitants of antient Greece about one million, 
three hundred and eighty thousand. No mighty number nor much exceeding what may 
be found at present in Scotland, a country of nearly the same extent, and which 
is very indifferently peopl'd.
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†dd This paragraph was added in Edition K.
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†ee The next two sentences are not in Editions H to K: and the latter was added 
in Edition R.
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†ff Editions H and I read as follows: The sum of fighting men in all the States 
of BELGIUM was above half a million; the whole inhabitants two millions. And 
BELGIUM being about the fourth of GAUL, that country might contain eight 
millions, which is scarce above the third of its present inhabitants.
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†gg "Near" was added in Edition R.
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†hh "who . . . Plebes" not in Editions H and I.
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†ii The remainder of the paragraph was added in Edition N.
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†jj Editions H and I add: A man of violent imagination, such as TERTULLIAN, 
augments everything equally; and for that reason his comparative judgments are 
the most to be depended on.

Essay 12. OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT
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ESSAY XII: OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT
As no party, in the present age, can well support itself, without a 
philosophical or speculative system of principles, annexed to its political or 
practical one; we accordingly find, that each of the factions, into which this 
nation is divided, has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to 
protect and cover that scheme of actions, which it pursues. The people being 
commonly very rude builders, especially in this speculative way, and more 
especially still, when actuated by party-zeal; it is natural to imagine, that 
their workmanship must be a little unshapely, and discover evident marks of that 
violence and hurry, in which it was raised. The one party, by tracing up 
government to the DEITY, endeavour to render it so sacred and inviolate, that it 
must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch 
or invade it, in the smallest article. The other party, by founding government 
altogether on the consent of the PEOPLE, suppose that there is a kind of 
original contract, by which the subjects have tacitly reserved the power of 
resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that 
authority, with which they have, for certain purposes, voluntarily entrusted 
him. These are the speculative principles of the two parties; and these too are 
the practical consequences deduced from them.
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I shall venture to affirm, That both these systems of speculative principles are 
just; though not in the sense, intended by the parties: And, That both the 
schemes of practical consequences are prudent; though not in the extremes, to 
which each party, in opposition to the other, has commonly endeavoured to carry 
them.
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That the DEITY is the ultimate author of all government, will never be denied by 
any, who admit a general providence, and allow, that all events in the universe 
are conducted by an uniform plan, and directed to wise purposes. As it is 
impossible for the human race to subsist, at least in any comfortable or secure 
state, without the protection of government; this institution must certainly 
have been intended by that beneficent Being, who means the good of all his 
creatures: And as it has universally, in fact, taken place, in all countries, 
and all ages; we may conclude, with still greater certainty, that it was 
intended by that omniscient Being, who can never be deceived by any event or 
operation. But since he gave rise to it, not by any particular or miraculous 
interposition, but by his concealed and universal efficacy; a sovereign cannot, 
properly speaking, be called his vice-gerent, in any other sense than every 
power or force, being derived from him, may be said to act by his commission. 
Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of 
providence; nor has the greatest and most lawful prince any more reason, upon 
that account, to plead a peculiar sacredness or inviolable authority, than an 
inferior magistrate, or even an usurper, or even a robber and a pyrate. The same 
divine superintendant, who, for wise purposes, invested†a a TITUS or a TRAJAN 
with authority, did also, for purposes, no doubt, equally wise, though unknown, 
bestow power on a BORGIA or an ANGRIA. The same causes, which gave rise to the 
sovereign power in every state, established likewise every petty jurisdiction in 
it, and every limited authority. A constable, therefore, no less than a king, 
acts by a divine commission, and possesses an indefeasible right.
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When we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in 
their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education; we must 
necessarily allow, that nothing but their own consent could, at first, associate 
them together, and subject them to any authority. The people, if we trace 
government to its first origin in the woods and desarts, are the source of all 
power and jurisdiction, and voluntarily, for the sake of peace and order, 
abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and 
companion. The conditions, upon which they were willing to submit, were either 
expressed, or were so clear and obvious, that it might well be esteemed 
superfluous to express them. If this, then, be meant by the original contract, 
it cannot be denied, that all government is, at first, founded on a contract, 
and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by 
that principle. In vain, are we asked in what records this charter of our 
liberties is registered. It was not written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or 
barks of trees. It preceded the use of writing and all the other civilized arts 
of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality,†b or 
something approaching equality, which we find in all the individuals of that 
species. The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and 
armies, is plainly political, and derived from authority, the effect of 
established government. A man's natural force consists only in the vigour of his 
limbs, and the firmness of his courage; which could never subject multitudes to 
the command of one. Nothing but their own consent, and their sense of the 
advantages resulting from peace and order, could have had that influence.
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†c Yet even this consent was long very imperfect, and could not be the basis of 
a regular administration. The chieftain, who had probably acquired his influence 
during the continuance of war, ruled more by persuasion than command; and till 
he could employ force to reduce the refractory and disobedient, the society 
could scarcely be said to have attained a state of civil government. No compact 
or agreement, it is evident, was expressly formed for general submission; an 
idea far beyond the comprehension of savages: Each exertion of authority in the 
chieftain must have been particular, and called forth by the present exigencies 
of the case: The sensible utility, resulting from his interposition, made these 
exertions become daily more frequent; and their frequency gradually produced an 
habitual, and, if you please to call it so, a voluntary, and therefore 
precarious, acquiescence in the people.
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But philosophers, who have embraced a party (if that be not a contradiction in 
terms) are not contented with these concessions. They assert, not only that 
government in its earliest infancy arose from consent or rather the voluntary 
acquiescence of the people; but also, that, even at present, when it has 
attained full maturity, it rests on no other foundation. They affirm, that all 
men are still born equal, and owe allegiance to no prince or government, unless 
bound by the obligation and sanction of a promise. And as no man, without some 
equivalent, would forego the advantages of his native liberty, and subject 
himself to the will of another; this promise is always understood to be 
conditional, and imposes on him no obligation, unless he meet with justice and 
protection from his sovereign. These advantages the sovereign promises him in 
return; and if he fail in the execution, he has broken, on his part, the 
articles of engagement, and has thereby freed his subject from all obligations 
to allegiance. Such, according to these philosophers, is the foundation of 
authority in every government; and such the right of resistance, possessed by 
every subject.
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But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with 
nothing that, in the least, corresponds to their ideas, or can warrant so 
refined and philosophical a system. On the contrary, we find, every where, 
princes, who claim their subjects as their property, and assert their 
independent right of sovereignty, from conquest or succession. We find also, 
every where, subjects, who acknowledge this right in their prince, and suppose 
themselves born under obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign, as much 
as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain parents. These connexions are 
always conceived to be equally independent of our consent, in PERSIA and CHINA; 
in FRANCE and SPAIN; and even in HOLLAND and ENGLAND, wherever the doctrines 
above-mentioned have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or subjection 
becomes so familiar, that most men never make any enquiry about its origin or 
cause, more than about the principle of gravity, resistance, or the most 
universal laws of nature. Or if curiosity ever move them; as soon as they learn, 
that they themselves and their ancestors have, for several ages, or from time 
immemorial, been subject to such a form of government or such a family; they 
immediately acquiesce, and acknowledge their obligation to allegiance. Were you 
to preach, in most parts of the world, that political connexions are founded 
altogether on voluntary consent or a mutual promise, the magistrate would soon 
imprison you, as seditious, for loosening the ties of obedience; if your friends 
did not before shut you up as delirious, for advancing such absurdities. It is 
strange, that an act of the mind, which every individual is supposed to have 
formed, and after he came to the use of reason too, otherwise it could have no 
authority; that this act, I say, should be so much unknown to all of them, that, 
over the face of the whole earth, there scarcely remain any traces or memory of 
it.
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But the contract, on which government is founded, is said to be the original 
contract; and consequently may be supposed too old to fall under the knowledge 
of the present generation. If the agreement, by which savage men first 
associated and conjoined their force, be here meant, this is acknowledged to be 
real; but being so ancient, and being obliterated by a thousand changes of 
government and princes, it cannot now be supposed to retain any authority. If we 
would say any thing to the purpose, we must assert, that every particular 
government, which is lawful, and which imposes any duty of allegiance on the 
subject, was, at first, founded on consent and a voluntary compact. But besides 
that this supposes the consent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the 
most remote generations, (which republican writers will never allow) besides 
this, I say, it is not justified by history or experience, in any age or country 
of the world.
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Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains 
any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or 
conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary 
subjection of the people. When an artful and bold man is placed at the head of 
an army or faction, it is often easy for him, by employing, sometimes violence, 
sometimes false pretences, to establish his dominion over a people a hundred 
times more numerous than his partizans. He allows no such open communication, 
that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or force. He gives them 
no leisure to assemble together in a body to oppose him. Even all those, who are 
the instruments of his usurpation, may wish his fall; but their ignorance of 
each other's intention keeps them in awe, and is the sole cause of his security. 
By such arts as these, many governments have been established; and this is all 
the original contract, which they have to boast of.
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The face of the earth is continually changing, by the encrease of small kingdoms 
into great empires, by the dissolution of great empires into smaller kingdoms, 
by the planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there any thing 
discoverable in all these events, but force and violence? Where is the mutual 
agreement or voluntary association so much talked of?
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Even the smoothest way, by which a nation may receive a foreign master, by 
marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; but supposes 
them to be disposed of, like a dowry or a legacy, according to the pleasure or 
interest of their rulers.
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But where no force interposes, and election takes place; what is this election 
so highly vaunted? It is either the combination of a few great men, who decide 
for the whole, and will allow of no opposition: Or it is the fury of a 
multitude, that follow a seditious ringleader, who is not known, perhaps, to a 
dozen among them, and who owes his advancement merely to his own impudence, or 
to the momentary caprice of his fellows.
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Are these disorderly elections, which are rare too, of such mighty authority, as 
to be the only lawful foundation of all government and allegiance?
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In reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total dissolution of 
government, which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes the determination or 
choice of a new establishment depend upon a number, which nearly approaches to 
that of the body of the people: For it never comes entirely to the whole body of 
them. Every wise man, then, wishes to see, at the head of a powerful and 
obedient army, a general, who may speedily seize the prize, and give to the 
people a master, which they are so unfit to chuse for themselves. So little 
correspondent is fact and reality to those philosophical notions.
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Let not the establishment at the Revolution deceive us, or make us so much in 
love with a philosophical origin to government, as to imagine all others 
monstrous and irregular. Even that event was far from corresponding to these 
refined ideas. It was only the succession, and that only in the regal part of 
the government, which was then changed: And it was only the majority of seven 
hundred, who determined that change for near ten millions. I doubt not, indeed, 
but the bulk of those ten millions acquiesced willingly in the determination: 
But was the matter left, in the least, to their choice? Was it not justly 
supposed to be, from that moment, decided, and every man punished, who refused 
to submit to the new sovereign? How otherwise could the matter have ever been 
brought to any issue or conclusion?
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The republic of ATHENS was, I believe, the most extensive democracy, that we 
read of in history: Yet if we make the requisite allowances for the women, the 
slaves, and the strangers, we shall find, that that establishment was not, at 
first, made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of those who were bound to 
pay obedience to it: Not to mention the islands and foreign dominions, which the 
ATHENIANS claimed as theirs by right of conquest. And as it is well known, that 
popular assemblies in that city were always full of licence and disorder, 
notwithstanding the institutions and laws by which they were checked: How much 
more disorderly must they prove, where they form not the established 
constitution, but meet tumultuously on the dissolution of the ancient 
government, in order to give rise to a new one? How chimerical must it be to 
talk of a choice in such circumstances?
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†d The ACHAEANS enjoyed the freest and most perfect democracy of all antiquity; 
yet they employed force to oblige some cities to enter into their league, as we 
learn from POLYBIUS.†1
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HARRY the IVth and HARRY the VIIth of ENGLAND, had really no title to the throne 
but a parliamentary election; yet they never would acknowledge it, lest they 
should thereby weaken their authority. Strange, if the only real foundation of 
all authority be consent and promise!
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It is in vain to say, that all governments are or should be, at first, founded 
on popular consent, as much as the necessity of human affairs will admit. This 
favours entirely my pretension. I maintain, that human affairs will never admit 
of this consent; seldom of the appearance of it. But that conquest or 
usurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by dissolving the ancient 
governments, is the origin of almost all the new ones, which were ever 
established in the world. And that in the few cases, where consent may seem to 
have taken place, it was commonly so irregular, so confined, or so much 
intermixed either with fraud or violence, that it cannot have any great 
authority.
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†e My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one 
just foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most 
sacred of any. I only pretend, that it has very seldom had place in any degree, 
and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other foundation of 
government must also be admitted.
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Were all men possessed of so inflexible a regard to justice, that, of 
themselves, they would totally abstain from the properties of others; they had 
for ever remained in a state of absolute liberty, without subjection to any 
magistrate or political society: But this is a state of perfection, of which 
human nature is justly deemed incapable. Again; were all men possessed of so 
perfect an understanding, as always to know their own interests, no form of 
government had ever been submitted to, but what was established on consent, and 
was fully canvassed by every member of the society: But this state of perfection 
is likewise much superior to human nature. Reason, history, and experience shew 
us, that all political societies have had an origin much less accurate and 
regular; and were one to choose a period of time, when the people's consent was 
the least regarded in public transactions, it would be precisely on the 
establishment of a new government. In a settled constitution, their inclinations 
are often consulted; but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and public 
convulsions, military force or political craft usually decides the controversy.
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When a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are commonly 
dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from 
any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The prince is watchful and 
jealous, and must carefully guard against every beginning or appearance of 
insurrection. Time, by degrees, removes all these difficulties, and accustoms 
the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family, which, at 
first, they considered as usurpers or foreign conquerors. In order to found this 
opinion, they have no recourse to any notion of voluntary consent or promise, 
which, they know, never was, in this case, either expected or demanded. The 
original establishment was formed by violence, and submitted to from necessity. 
The subsequent administration is also supported by power, and acquiesced in by 
the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation. They imagine not, that 
their consent gives their prince a title: But they willingly consent, because 
they think, that, from long possession, he has acquired a title, independent of 
their choice or inclination.
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Should it be said, that, by living under the dominion of a prince, which one 
might leave, every individual has given a tacit consent to his authority, and 
promised him obedience; it may be answered, that such an implied consent can 
only have place, where a man imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. 
But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under established 
governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain 
form of government; it would be absurd to infer a consent or choice, which he 
expressly, in this case, renounces and disclaims.
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Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave 
his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to 
day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by 
remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he 
was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the 
moment he leaves her.
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What if the prince forbid his subjects to quit his dominions; as in TIBERIUS'S 
time, it was regarded as a crime in a ROMAN knight that he had attempted to fly 
to the PARTHIANS, in order to escape the tyranny of that emperor?†2 Or as the 
ancient MUSCOVITES prohibited all travelling under pain of death? And did a 
prince observe, that many of his subjects were seized with the frenzy of 
migrating to foreign countries, he would doubtless, with great reason and 
justice, restrain them, in order to prevent the depopulation of his own kingdom. 
Would he forfeit the allegiance of all his subjects, by so wise and reasonable a 
law? Yet the freedom of their choice is surely, in that case, ravished from 
them.
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A company of men, who should leave their native country, in order to people some 
uninhabited region, might dream of recovering their native freedom; but they 
would soon find, that their prince still laid claim to them, and called them his 
subjects, even in their new settlement. And in this he would but act conformably 
to the common ideas of mankind.
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The truest tacit consent of this kind, that is ever observed, is when a 
foreigner settles in any country, and is beforehand acquainted with the prince, 
and government, and laws, to which he must submit: Yet is his allegiance, though 
more voluntary, much less expected or depended on, than that of a natural born 
subject. On the contrary, his native prince still asserts a claim to him. And if 
he punish not the renegade, when he seizes him in war with his new prince's 
commission; this clemency is not founded on the municipal law, which in all 
countries condemns the prisoner; but on the consent of princes, who have agreed 
to this indulgence, in order to prevent reprisals.
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†f Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another succeed, as 
is the case with silk-worms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense 
enough to choose their government, which surely is never the case with men, 
might voluntarily, and by general consent, establish their own form of civil 
polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents, which prevailed among 
their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour 
going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to 
preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves 
to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, 
treading in the footsteps of theirs, had marked out to them. Some innovations 
must necessarily have place in every human institution, and it is happy where 
the enlightened genius of the age give these a direction to the side of reason, 
liberty, and justice: but violent innovations no individual is entitled to make: 
they are even dangerous to be attempted by the legislature: more ill than good 
is ever to be expected from them: and if history affords examples to the 
contrary, they are not to be drawn into precedent, and are only to be regarded 
as proofs, that the science of politics affords few rules, which will not admit 
of some exception, and which may not sometimes be controuled by fortune and 
accident. The violent innovations in the reign of HENRY VIII. proceeded from an 
imperious monarch, seconded by the appearance of legislative authority: Those in 
the reign of CHARLES I. were derived from faction and fanaticism; and both of 
them have proved happy in the issue: But even the former were long the source of 
many disorders, and still more dangers; and if the measures of allegiance were 
to be taken from the latter, a total anarchy must have place in human society, 
and a final period at once be put to every government.
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Suppose, that an usurper, after having banished his lawful prince and royal 
family, should establish his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any country, 
and should preserve so exact a discipline in his troops, and so regular a 
disposition in his garrisons, that no insurrection had ever been raised, or even 
murmur heard, against his administration: Can it be asserted, that the people, 
who in their hearts abhor his treason, have tacitly consented to his authority, 
and promised him allegiance, merely because, from necessity, they live under his 
dominion? Suppose again their native prince restored, by means of an army, which 
he levies in foreign countries: They receive him with joy and exultation, and 
shew plainly with what reluctance they had submitted to any other yoke. I may 
now ask, upon what foundation the prince's title stands? Not on popular consent 
surely: For though the people willingly acquiesce in his authority, they never 
imagine, that their consent made him sovereign. They consent; because they 
apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful sovereign. And as to that 
tacit consent, which may now be inferred from their living under his dominion, 
this is no more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and usurper.
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When we assert, that all lawful government arises from the consent of the 
people, we certainly do them a great deal more honour than they deserve, or even 
expect and desire from us. After the ROMAN dominions became too unwieldly for 
the republic to govern them, the people, over the whole known world, were 
extremely grateful to AUGUSTUS for that authority, which, by violence, he had 
established over them; and they shewed an equal disposition to submit to the 
successor, whom he left them, by his last will and testament. It was afterwards 
their misfortune, that there never was, in one family, any long regular 
succession; but that their line of princes was continually broken, either by 
private assassinations or public rebellions. The praetorian bands, on the 
failure of every family, set up one emperor; the legions in the East a second; 
those in GERMANY, perhaps, a third: And the sword alone could decide the 
controversy. The condition of the people, in that mighty monarchy, was to be 
lamented, not because the choice of the emperor was never left to them; for that 
was impracticable: But because they never fell under any succession of masters, 
who might regularly follow each other. As to the violence and wars and 
bloodshed, occasioned by every new settlement; these were not blameable, because 
they were inevitable.
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The house of LANCASTER ruled in this island about sixty years;†g yet the 
partizans of the white rose seemed daily to multiply in ENGLAND. The present 
establishment has taken place during a still longer period. Have all views of 
right in another family been utterly extinguished; even though scarce any man 
now alive had arrived at years of discretion, when it was expelled, or could 
have consented to its dominion, or have promised it allegiance? A sufficient 
indication surely of the general sentiment of mankind on this head. For we blame 
not the partizans of the abdicated family, merely on account of the long time, 
during which they have preserved their imaginary loyalty. We blame them for 
adhering to a family, which, we affirm, has been justly expelled, and which, 
from the moment the new settlement took place, had forfeited all title to 
authority.
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But would we have a more regular, at least a more philosophical, refutation of 
this principle of an original contract or popular consent; perhaps, the 
following observations may suffice.
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All moral duties may be divided into two kinds. The first are those, to which 
men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates 
on them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to 
public or private utility. Of this nature are, love of children, gratitude to 
benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on the advantage, which 
results to society from such humane instincts, we pay them the just tribute of 
moral approbation and esteem: But the person, actuated by them, feels their 
power and influence, antecedent to any such reflection.
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The second kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any original 
instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when 
we consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of 
supporting it, if these duties were neglected. It is thus justice or a regard to 
the property of others, fidelity or the observance of promises, become 
obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For as it is evident, that 
every man loves himself better than any other person, he is naturally impelled 
to extend his acquisitions as much as possible; and nothing can restrain him in 
this propensity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the 
pernicious effects of that licence, and the total dissolution of society which 
must ensue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or instinct, is here 
checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or observation.
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The case is precisely the same with the political or civil duty of allegiance, 
as with the natural duties of justice and fidelity. Our primary instincts lead 
us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited freedom, or to seek dominion over 
others: And it is reflection only, which engages us to sacrifice such strong 
passions to the interests of peace and public order. A small degree of 
experience and observation suffices to teach us, that society cannot possibly be 
maintained without the authority of magistrates, and that this authority must 
soon fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not payed to it. The 
observation of these general and obvious interests is the source of all 
allegiance, and of that moral obligation, which we attribute to it.
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What necessity, therefore, is there to found the duty of allegiance or obedience 
to magistrates on that of fidelity or a regard to promises, and to suppose, that 
it is the consent of each individual, which subjects him to government; when it 
appears, that both allegiance and fidelity stand precisely on the same 
foundation, and are both submitted to by mankind, on account of the apparent 
interests and necessities of human society? We are bound to obey our sovereign, 
it is said; because we have given a tacit promise to that purpose. But why are 
we bound to observe our promise? It must here be asserted, that the commerce and 
intercourse of mankind, which are of such mighty advantage, can have no security 
where men pay no regard to their engagements. In like manner, may it be said, 
that men could not live at all in society, at least in a civilized society, 
without laws and magistrates and judges, to prevent the encroachments of the 
strong upon the weak, of the violent upon the just and equitable. The obligation 
to allegiance being of like force and authority with the obligation to fidelity, 
we gain nothing by resolving the one into the other. The general interests or 
necessities of society are sufficient to establish both.
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If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to 
government, I readily answer, because society could not otherwise subsist: And 
this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your answer is, because we 
should keep our word. But besides, that no body, till trained in a philosophical 
system, can either comprehend or relish this answer: Besides this, I say, you 
find yourself embarrassed, when it is asked, why we are bound to keep our word? 
Nor can you give any answer, but what would, immediately, without any circuit, 
have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.
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But to whom is allegiance due? And who is our lawful sovereign? This question is 
often the most difficult of any, and liable to infinite discussions. When people 
are so happy, that they can answer, Our present sovereign, who inherits, in a 
direct line, from ancestors, that have governed us for many ages; this answer 
admits of no reply; even though historians, in tracing up to the remotest 
antiquity, the origin of that royal family, may find, as commonly happens, that 
its first authority was derived from usurpation and violence. It is confessed, 
that private justice, or the abstinence from the properties of others, is a most 
cardinal virtue: Yet reason tells us, that there is no property in durable 
objects, such as lands or houses, when carefully examined in passing from hand 
to hand, but must, in some period, have been founded on fraud and injustice. The 
necessities of human society, neither in private nor public life, will allow of 
such an accurate enquiry: And there is no virtue or moral duty, but what may, 
with facility, be refined away, if we indulge a false philosophy, in sifting and 
scrutinizing it, by every captious rule of logic, in every light or position, in 
which it may be placed.
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The questions with regard to private property have filled infinite volumes of 
law and philosophy, if in both we add the commentators to the original text; and 
in the end, we may safely pronounce, that many of the rules, there established, 
are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary. The like opinion may be formed with 
regard to the succession and rights of princes and forms of government.†h 
Several cases, no doubt, occur, especially in the infancy of any constitution, 
which admit of no determination from the laws of justice and equity: And our 
historian RAPIN†i pretends, that the controversy between EDWARD the Third and 
PHILIP DE VALOIS was of this nature, and could be decided only by an appeal to 
heaven, that is, by war and violence.
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Who shall tell me, whether GERMANICUS or DRUSUS ought to have succeeded to 
TIBERIUS, had he died, while they were both alive, without naming any of them 
for his successor? Ought the right of adoption to be received as equivalent to 
that of blood, in a nation, where it had the same effect in private families, 
and had already, in two instances, taken place in the public? Ought GERMANICUS 
to be esteemed the elder son because he was born before DRUSUS; or the younger, 
because he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the 
elder to be regarded in a nation, where he had no advantage in the succession of 
private families? Ought the ROMAN empire at that time to be deemed hereditary, 
because of two examples; or ought it, even so early, to be regarded as belonging 
to the stronger or to the present possessor, as being founded on so recent an 
usurpation?
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COMMODUS mounted the throne after a pretty long succession of excellent 
emperors, who had acquired their title, not by birth, or public election, but by 
the fictitious rite of adoption. That bloody debauchee being murdered by a 
conspiracy suddenly formed between his wench and her gallant, who happened at 
that time to be Praetorian Praefect; these immediately deliberated about 
choosing a master to human kind, to speak in the style of those ages; and they 
cast their eyes on PERTINAX. Before the tyrant's death was known, the Praefect 
went secretly to that senator, who, on the appearance of the soldiers, imagined 
that his execution had been ordered by COMMODUS. He was immediately saluted 
emperor by the officer and his attendants; chearfully proclaimed by the 
populace; unwillingly submitted to by the guards; formally recognized by the 
senate; and passively received by the provinces and armies of the empire.
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The discontent of the Praetorian bands broke out in a sudden sedition, which 
occasioned the murder of that excellent prince: And the world being now without 
a master and without government, the guards thought proper to set the empire 
formally to sale. JULIAN, the purchaser, was proclaimed by the soldiers, 
recognized by the senate, and submitted to by the people; and must also have 
been submitted to by the provinces, had not the envy of the legions begotten 
opposition and resistance. PESCENNIUS NIGER in SYRIA elected himself emperor, 
gained the tumultuary consent of his army, and was attended with the secret 
good-will of the senate and people of ROME. ALBINUS in BRITAIN found an equal 
right to set up his claim; but SEVERUS, who governed PANNONIA, prevailed in the 
end above both of them. That able politician and warrior, finding his own birth 
and dignity too much inferior to the imperial crown, professed, at first, an 
intention only of revenging the death of PERTINAX. He marched as general into 
ITALY; defeated JULIAN; and without our being able to fix any precise 
commencement even of the soldiers' consent, he was from necessity acknowledged 
emperor by the senate and people; and fully established in his violent authority 
by subduing NIGER and ALBINUS.†3
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Inter haec Gordianus CAESAR (says CAPITOLINUS, speaking of another period) 
sublatus a militibus. Imperator est appellatus, quia non erat alius in 
proesenti, It is to be remarked, that GORDIAN was a boy of fourteen years of 
age.
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Frequent instances of a like nature occur in the history of the emperors; in 
that of ALEXANDER'S successors; and of many other countries: Nor can any thing 
be more unhappy than a despotic government of this kind; where the succession is 
disjointed and irregular, and must be determined, on every vacancy, by force or 
election. In a free government, the matter is often unavoidable, and is also 
much less dangerous. The interests of liberty may there frequently lead the 
people, in their own defence, to alter the succession of the crown. And the 
constitution, being compounded of parts, may still maintain a sufficient 
stability, by resting on the aristocratical or democratical members, though the 
monarchical be altered, from time to time, in order to accommodate it to the 
former.
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In an absolute government, when there is no legal prince, who has a title to the 
throne, it may safely be determined to belong to the first occupant. Instances 
of this kind are but too frequent, especially in the eastern monarchies.†j When 
any race of princes expires, the will or destination of the last sovereign will 
be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of LEWIS the XIVth, who called the 
bastard princes to the succession in case of the failure of all the legitimate 
princes, would, in such an event, have some authority.†4†k Thus the will of 
CHARLES the Second disposed of the whole SPANISH monarchy. The cession of the 
ancient proprietor, especially when joined to conquest, is likewise deemed a 
good title. The general obligation, which binds us to government, is the 
interest and necessities of society; and this obligation is very strong. The 
determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government is 
frequently more uncertain and dubious. Present possession has considerable 
authority in these cases, and greater than in private property; because of the 
disorders which attend all revolutions and changes of government.†l
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We shall only observe, before we conclude, that, though an appeal to general 
opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural 
philosophy, or astronomy, be deemed unfair and inconclusive, yet in all 
questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no other 
standard, by which any controversy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer 
proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to 
paradoxes, repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind, and to the practice 
and opinion of all nations and all ages. The doctrine, which founds all lawful 
government on an original contract, or consent of the people, is plainly of this 
kind; nor has the most noted of its partizans, in prosecution of it, scrupled to 
affirm, that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be 
no form of civil government at all;†5 and that the supreme power in a state 
cannot take from any man, by taxes and impositions, any part of his property, 
without his own consent or that of his representatives.†6 What authority any 
moral reasoning can have, which leads into opinions so wide of the general 
practice of mankind, in every place but this single kingdom, it is easy to 
determine.†m
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The only passage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to 
government is ascribed to a promise, is in PLATO'S Crito: where SOCRATES refuses 
to escape from prison, because he had tacitly promised to obey the laws. Thus he 
builds a tory consequence of passive obedience, on a whig foundation of the 
original contract.
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New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If scarce any man, till 
very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on compact, it is 
certain, that it cannot, in general, have any such foundation.
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The crime of rebellion among the ancients was commonly expressed by the terms 
{neoterizein}, novas res moliri.
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†1 Lib. ii. cap. 38.
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†2 TACIT. Ann. vi. cap. 14.
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†3 HERODIAN, lib. ii.
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†4 It is remarkable, that, in the remonstrance of the duke of BOURBON and the 
legitimate princes, against this destination of LOUIS the XIVth, the doctrine of 
the original contract is insisted on, even in that absolute government. The 
FRENCH nation, say they, chusing HUGH CAPET and his posterity to rule over them 
and their posterity, where the former line fails, there is a tacit right 
reserved to choose a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the 
bastard princes to the throne, without the consent of the nation. But the Comte 
de BOULAINVILLIERS, who wrote in defence of the bastard princes, ridicules this 
notion of an original contract, especially when applied to HUGH CAPET; who 
mounted the throne, says he, by the same arts, which have ever been employed by 
all conquerors and usurpers. He got his title, indeed, recognized by the states 
after he had put himself in possession: But is this a choice or contract? The 
Comte de BOULAINVILLIERS, we may observe, was a noted republican; but being a 
man of learning, and very conversant in history, he knew that the people were 
never almost consulted in these revolutions and new establishments, and that 
time alone bestowed right and authority on what was commonly at first founded on 
force and violence. See Etat de la France, Vol. III.
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†5 See LOCKE on Government, ‡‡chap. vii. sec. 90.
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†6 Id. chap. xi. sec. 138, 139, 140.
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†a An Elizabeth or a Henry the 4th of France: Edition D to P.
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†b Or . . . equality: added in Edition Q.
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†c This paragraph was added in Edition R.
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†d The two following paragraphs were added in Edition K.
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†e This paragraph and the next were added in Edition K.
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†f This paragraph was added in Edition R.
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†g The latter half of this sentence was added in Edition K.
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†h Edition D omits from this sentence down to "monarchies" on page 459: and 
substitutes as follows--The Discussion of these Matters would lead us entirely 
beyond the Compass of these Essays. 'Tis sufficient for our present Purpose, if 
we have been able to determine, in general, the Foundation of that Allegiance, 
which is due to the established Government, in every Kingdom and Commonwealth. 
When there is no legal Prince, who has a Title to a Throne, I believe it may 
safely be determined to belong to the first Occupier. This was frequently the 
Case with the ROMAN Empire.
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†i Allows: Editions K to P.
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†j In Edition D the remainder of this paragraph is given in continuation of note 
17.
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†k This sentence was added in Edition M.
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†l Here Editions K to P subjoin in a note what is now the concluding paragraph 
of the Essay.
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†m At this point Editions D to P stop. Editions K to P give the two next 
paragraphs as a note; they have already given the concluding one as a note.

Essay 13. OF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE
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ESSAY XIII: OF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE
In the former essay, we endeavoured to refute the speculative systems of 
politics advanced in this nation; as well the religious system of the one party, 
as the philosophical of the other. We come now to examine the practical 
consequences, deduced by each party, with regard to the measures of submission 
due to sovereigns.
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As the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, 
which require mutual abstinence from property, in order to preserve peace among 
mankind; it is evident, that, when the execution of justice would be attended 
with very pernicious consequences, that virtue must be suspended, and give place 
to public utility, in such extraordinary and such pressing emergencies. The 
maxim, fiat Justitia et ruat Coelum, let justice be performed, though the 
universe be destroyed, is apparently false, and by sacrificing the end to the 
means, shews a preposterous idea of the subordination of duties. What governor 
of a town makes any scruple of burning the suburbs, when they facilitate the 
approaches of the enemy? Or what general abstains from plundering a neutral 
country, when the necessities of war require it, and he cannot otherwise subsist 
his army? The case is the same with the duty of allegiance; and common sense 
teaches us, that, as government binds us to obedience only on account of its 
tendency to public utility, that duty must always, in extraordinary cases, when 
public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original 
obligation. Salus populi suprema Lex, the safety of the people is the supreme 
law. This maxim is agreeable to the sentiments of mankind in all ages: Nor is 
any one, when he reads of the insurrections against NERO†a or PHILIP the Second, 
so infatuated with party-systems, as not to wish success to the enterprize, and 
praise the undertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in spite of their 
sublime theory, are forced, in such cases, to judge, and feel, and approve, in 
conformity to the rest of mankind.
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Resistance, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the question 
can only be among good reasoners, with regard to the degree of necessity, which 
can justify resistance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I must 
confess, that I shall always incline to their side, who draw the bond of 
allegiance very close, and consider an infringement of it, as the last refuge in 
desperate cases, when the public is in the highest danger, from violence and 
tyranny. For besides the mischiefs of a civil war, which commonly attends 
insurrection; it is certain, that, where a disposition to rebellion appears 
among any people, it is one chief cause of tyranny in the rulers, and forces 
them into many violent measures which they never would have embraced, had every 
one been inclined to submission and obedience. Thus the tyrannicide or 
assassination, approved of by ancient maxims, instead of keeping tyrants and 
usurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now 
justly, upon that account, abolished by the laws of nations, and universally 
condemned as a base and treacherous method of bringing to justice these 
disturbers of society.
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Besides we must consider, that, as obedience is our duty in the common course of 
things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can any thing be more 
preposterous than an anxious care and solicitude in stating all the cases, in 
which resistance may be allowed. In like manner, though a philosopher reasonably 
acknowledges, in the course of an argument, that the rules of justice may be 
dispensed with in cases of urgent necessity; what should we think of a preacher 
or casuist, who should make it his chief study to find out such cases, and 
enforce them with all the vehemence of argument and eloquence? Would he not be 
better employed in inculcating the general doctrine, than in displaying the 
particular exceptions, which we are, perhaps, but too much inclined, of 
ourselves, to embrace and to extend?
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There are, however, two reasons, which may be pleaded in defence of that party 
among us, who have, with so much industry, propagated the maxims of resistance; 
maxims, which, it must be confessed, are, in general, so pernicious, and so 
destructive of civil society. The first is, that their antagonists carrying the 
doctrine of obedience to such an extravagant height, as not only never to 
mention the exceptions in extraordinary cases (which might, perhaps, be 
excusable) but even positively to exclude them; it became necessary to insist on 
these exceptions, and defend the rights of injured truth and liberty. The 
second, and, perhaps, better reason, is founded on the nature of the BRITISH 
constitution and form of government.
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It is almost peculiar to our constitution to establish a first magistrate with 
such high pre-eminence and dignity, that, though limited by the laws, he is, in 
a manner, so far as regards his own person, above the laws, and can neither be 
questioned nor punished for any injury or wrong, which may be committed by him. 
His ministers alone, or those who act by his commission, are obnoxious to 
justice; and while the prince is thus allured, by the prospect of personal 
safety, to give the laws their free course, an equal security is, in effect, 
obtained by the punishment of lesser offenders, and at the same time a civil war 
is avoided, which would be the infallible consequence, were an attack, at every 
turn, made directly upon the sovereign. But though the constitution pays this 
salutary compliment to the prince, it can never reasonably be understood, by 
that maxim, to have determined its own destruction, or to have established a 
tame submission, where he protects his ministers, perseveres in injustice, and 
usurps the whole power of the commonwealth. This case, indeed, is never 
expressly put by the laws; because it is impossible for them, in their ordinary 
course, to provide a remedy for it, or establish any magistrate, with superior 
authority, to chastise the exorbitancies of the prince. But as a right without a 
remedy would be an absurdity; the remedy in this case, is the extraordinary one 
of resistance, when affairs come to that extremity, that the constitution can be 
defended by it alone. Resistance therefore must, of course, become more frequent 
in the BRITISH government, than in others, which are simpler, and consist of 
fewer parts and movements. Where the king is an absolute sovereign, he has 
little temptation to commit such enormous tyranny as may justly provoke 
rebellion: But where he is limited, his imprudent ambition, without any great 
vices, may run him into that perilous situation. This is frequently supposed to 
have been the case with CHARLES the First; and if we may now speak truth, after 
animosities are ceased, this was also the case with JAMES the Second. These were 
harmless, if not, in their private character, good men; but mistaking the nature 
of our constitution, and engrossing the whole legislative power, it became 
necessary to oppose them with some vehemence; and even to deprive the latter 
formally of that authority, which he had used with such imprudence and 
indiscretion.
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†a Or a Caracalla: Edition D; or a Philip: Editions K to P.

Essay 14. OF THE COALITION OF PARTIES
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ESSAY XIV: OF THE COALITION OF PARTIES†a
To abolish all distinctions of party may not be practicable, perhaps not 
desirable, in a free government. The only dangerous parties are such as 
entertain opposite views with regard to the essentials of government, the 
succession of the crown, or the more considerable privileges belonging to the 
several members of the constitution; where there is no room for any compromise 
or accommodation, and where the controversy may appear so momentous as to 
justify even an opposition by arms to the pretensions of antagonists. Of this 
nature was the animosity, continued for above a century past, between the 
parties in ENGLAND; an animosity which broke out sometimes into civil war, which 
occasioned violent revolutions, and which continually endangered the peace and 
tranquillity of the nation. But as there have appeared of late the strongest 
symptoms of an universal desire to abolish these party distinctions; this 
tendency to a coalition affords the most agreeable prospect of future happiness, 
and ought to be carefully cherished and promoted by every lover of his country.
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There is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end, than to 
prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party over the other, to 
encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all disputes, to 
persuade each that its antagonist may possibly be sometimes in the right, and to 
keep a balance in the praise and blame, which we bestow on either side. The two 
former Essays, concerning the original contract and passive obedience, are 
calculated for this purpose with regard to the philosophical†b and practical 
controversies between the parties, and tend to show that neither side are in 
these respects so fully supported by reason as they endeavour to flatter 
themselves. We shall proceed to exercise the same moderation with regard to the 
historical disputes between the parties, by proving that each of them was 
justified by plausible topics; that there were on both sides wise men, who meant 
well to their country; and that the past animosity between the factions had no 
better foundation than narrow prejudice or interested passion.
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The popular party, who afterwards acquired the name of whigs, might justify, by 
very specious arguments, that opposition to the crown, from which our present 
free constitution is derived. Though obliged to acknowledge, that precedents in 
favour of prerogative had uniformly taken place during many reigns before 
CHARLES the First, they thought, that there was no reason for submitting any 
longer to so dangerous an authority. Such might have been their reasoning: As 
the rights of mankind are for ever to be deemed sacred, no prescription of 
tyranny or arbitrary power can have authority sufficient to abolish them. 
Liberty is a blessing so inestimable, that, wherever there appears any 
probability of recovering it, a nation may willingly run many hazards, and ought 
not even to repine at the greatest effusion of blood or dissipation of treasure. 
All human institutions, and none more than government, are in continual 
fluctuation. Kings are sure to embrace every opportunity of extending their 
prerogatives: And if favourable incidents be not also laid hold of for extending 
and securing the privileges of the people, an universal despotism must for ever 
prevail amongst mankind. The example of all the neighbouring nations proves, 
that it is no longer safe to entrust with the crown the same high prerogatives, 
which had formerly been exercised during rude and simple ages. And though the 
example of many late reigns may be pleaded in favour of a power in the prince 
somewhat arbitrary, more remote reigns afford instances of stricter limitations 
imposed on the crown; and those pretensions of the parliament, now branded with 
the title of innovations, are only a recovery of the just rights of the people.
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These views, far from being odious, are surely large, and generous, and noble: 
To their prevalence and success the kingdom owes its liberty; perhaps its 
learning, its industry, commerce, and naval power: By them chiefly the ENGLISH 
name is distinguished among the society of nations, and aspires to a rivalship 
with that of the freest and most illustrious commonwealths of antiquity. But as 
all these mighty consequences could not reasonably be foreseen at the time when 
the contest began, the royalists of that age wanted not specious arguments on 
their side, by which they could justify their defence of the then established 
prerogatives of the prince. We shall state the question, as it might have 
appeared to them at the assembling of that parliament, which, by its violent 
encroachments on the crown, began the civil wars.
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The only rule of government, they might have said, known and acknowledged among 
men, is use and practice: Reason is so uncertain a guide that it will always be 
exposed to doubt and controversy: Could it ever render itself prevalent over the 
people, men had always retained it as their sole rule of conduct: They had still 
continued in the primitive, unconnected, state of nature, without submitting to 
political government, whose sole basis is, not pure reason, but authority and 
precedent. Dissolve these ties, you break all the bonds of civil society, and 
leave every man at liberty to consult his private interest, by those expedients, 
which his appetite, disguised under the appearance of reason, shall dictate to 
him. The spirit of innovation is in itself pernicious, however favourable its 
particular object may sometimes appear: A truth so obvious, that the popular 
party themselves are sensible of it; and therefore cover their encroachments on 
the crown by the plausible pretence of their recovering the ancient liberties of 
the people.
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But the present prerogatives of the crown, allowing all the suppositions of that 
party, have been incontestably established ever since the accession of the House 
of TUDOR; a period, which, as it now comprehends a hundred and sixty years, may 
be allowed sufficient to give stability to any constitution. Would it not have 
appeared ridiculous, in the reign of the Emperor ADRIAN, to have talked of the 
republican constitution as the rule of government; or to have supposed, that the 
former rights of the senate, and consuls, and tribunes were still subsisting?
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But the present claims of the ENGLISH monarchs are much more favourable than 
those of the ROMAN emperors during that age. The authority of AUGUSTUS was a 
plain usurpation, grounded only on military violence, and forms such an epoch in 
the ROMAN history, as is obvious to every reader. But if HENRY VII. really, as 
some pretend, enlarged the power of the crown, it was only by insensible 
acquisitions, which escaped the apprehension of the people, and have scarcely 
been remarked even by historians and politicians. The new government, if it 
deserve the epithet, is an imperceptible transition from the former; is entirely 
engrafted on it; derives its title fully from that root; and is to be considered 
only as one of those gradual revolutions, to which human affairs, in every 
nation, will be for ever subject.
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The House of TUDOR, and after them that of STUART, exercised no prerogatives, 
but what had been claimed and exercised by the PLANTAGENETS. Not a single branch 
of their authority can be said to be an innovation. The only difference is, 
that, perhaps, former kings exerted these powers only by intervals, and were not 
able, by reason of the opposition of their barons, to render them so steady a 
rule of administration.†c But the sole inference from this fact is, that those 
ancient times were more turbulent and seditious; and that royal authority, the 
constitution, and the laws have happily of late gained the ascendant.
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Under what pretence can the popular party now speak of recovering the ancient 
constitution? The former controul over the kings was not placed in the commons, 
but in the barons: The people had no authority, and even little or no liberty; 
till the crown, by suppressing these factious tyrants, enforced the execution of 
the laws, and obliged all the subjects equally to respect each others rights, 
privileges, and properties. If we must return to the ancient barbarous and†d 
feudal constitution; let those gentlemen, who now behave themselves with so much 
insolence to their sovereign, set the first example. Let them make court to be 
admitted as retainers to a neighbouring baron; and by submitting to slavery 
under him, acquire some protection to themselves; together with the power of 
exercising rapine and oppression over their inferior slaves and villains. This 
was the condition of the commons among their remote ancestors.
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But how far back must we go, in having recourse to ancient constitutions and 
governments? There was a constitution still more ancient than that to which 
these innovators affect so much to appeal. During that period there was no magna 
charta: The barons themselves possessed few regular, stated privileges: And the 
house of commons probably had not an existence.
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It is ridiculous to hear the commons, while they are assuming, by usurpation, 
the whole power of government, talk of reviving ancient institutions. Is it not 
known, that, though representatives received wages from their constituents; to 
be a member of the lower house was always considered as a burden, and an 
exemption from it as a privilege? Will they persuade us, that power, which, of 
all human acquisitions, is the most coveted, and in comparison of which even 
reputation and pleasure and riches are slighted, could ever be regarded as a 
burden by any man?
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The property, acquired of late by the commons, it is said, entitles them to more 
power than their ancestors enjoyed. But to what is this encrease of their 
property owing, but to an encrease of their liberty and their security? Let them 
therefore acknowledge, that their ancestors, while the crown was restrained by 
the seditious barons, really enjoyed less liberty than they themselves have 
attained, after the sovereign acquired the ascendant: And let them enjoy that 
liberty with moderation; and not forfeit it by new exorbitant claims, and by 
rendering it a pretence for endless innovations.
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The true rule of government is the present established practice of the age. That 
has most authority, because it is recent: It is also best known, for the same 
reason. Who has assured those tribunes, that the PLANTAGENETS did not exercise 
as high acts of authority as the TUDORS? Historians, they say, do not mention 
them. But historians are also silent with regard to the chief exertions of 
prerogative by the TUDORS. Where any power or prerogative is fully and 
undoubtedly established, the exercise of it passes for a thing of course, and 
readily escapes the notice of history and annals. Had we no other monuments of 
ELIZABETH'S reign, than what are preserved even by CAMDEN, the most copious, 
judicious, and exact of our historians, we should be entirely ignorant of the 
most important maxims of her government.
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Was not the present monarchical government, in its full extent, authorized by 
lawyers, recommended by divines, acknowledged by politicians, acquiesced in, nay 
passionately cherished, by the people in general; and all this during a period 
of at least a hundred and sixty years, and till of late, without the smallest 
murmur or controversy? This general consent surely, during so long a time, must 
be sufficient to render a constitution legal and valid. If the origin of all 
power be derived, as is pretended, from the people; here is their consent in the 
fullest and most ample terms that can be desired or imagined.
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But the people must not pretend, because they can, by their consent, lay the 
foundations of government, that therefore they are to be permitted, at their 
pleasure, to overthrow and subvert them. There is no end of these seditious and 
arrogant claims. The power of the crown is now openly struck at: The nobility 
are also in visible peril: The gentry will soon follow: The popular leaders, who 
will then assume the name of gentry, will next be exposed to danger: And the 
people themselves, having become incapable of civil government, and lying under 
the restraint of no authority, must, for the sake of peace, admit, instead of 
their legal and mild monarchs, a succession of military and despotic tyrants.
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These consequences are the more to be dreaded, as the present fury of the 
people, though glossed over by pretensions to civil liberty, is in reality 
incited by the fanaticism of religion; a principle the most blind, headstrong, 
and ungovernable, by which human nature can possibly be actuated. Popular rage 
is dreadful, from whatever motive derived: But must be attended with the most 
pernicious consequences, when it arises from a principle, which disclaims all 
controul by human law, reason, or authority.
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These are the arguments, which each party may make use of to justify the conduct 
of their predecessors, during that great crisis. The event, if that can be 
admitted as a reason, has shown, that the arguments of the popular party were 
better founded; but perhaps, according to the established maxims of lawyers and 
politicians, the views of the royalists ought, before-hand, to have appeared 
more solid, more safe, and more legal. But this is certain, that the greater 
moderation we now employ in representing past events; the nearer shall we be to 
produce a full coalition of the parties, and an entire acquiescence in our 
present establishment. Moderation is of advantage to every establishment: 
Nothing but zeal can overturn a settled power: And an over-active zeal in 
friends is apt to beget a like spirit in antagonists. The transition from a 
moderate opposition against an establishment, to an entire acquiescence in it, 
is easy and insensible.
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There are many invincible arguments, which should induce the malcontent party to 
acquiesce entirely in the present settlement of the constitution. They now find, 
that the spirit of civil liberty, though at first connected with religious 
fanaticism, could purge itself from that pollution, and appear under a more 
genuine and engaging aspect; a friend to toleration, and an encourager of all 
the enlarged and generous sentiments that do honour to human nature. They may 
observe, that the popular claims could stop at a proper period; and after 
retrenching the high claims of prerogative, could still maintain a due respect 
to monarchy, to nobility, and to all ancient institutions. Above all, they must 
be sensible, that the very principle, which made the strength of their party, 
and from which it derived its chief authority, has now deserted them, and gone 
over to their antagonists. The plan of liberty is settled; its happy effects are 
proved by experience; a long tract of time has given it stability; and whoever 
would attempt to overturn it, and to recall the past government or abdicated 
family, would, besides other more criminal imputations, be exposed, in their 
turn, to the reproach of faction and innovation. While they peruse the history 
of past events, they ought to reflect, both that those rights of the crown are 
long since annihilated, and that the tyranny, and violence, and oppression, to 
which they often gave rise, are ills, from which the established liberty of the 
constitution has now at last happily protected the people. These reflections 
will prove a better security to our freedom and privileges, than to deny, 
contrary to the clearest evidence of facts, that such regal powers ever had an 
existence. There is not a more effectual method of betraying a cause, than to 
lay the stress of the argument on a wrong place, and by disputing an untenable 
post, enure the adversaries to success and victory.
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†a This Essay first appeared in Edition M.
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†b And practical: added in Edition R.
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†c Editions M to Q append the note: The author believes that he was the first 
writer who advanced that the family of TUDOR possessed in general more authority 
than their immediate predecessors: An opinion, which, he hopes, will be 
supported by history, but which he proposes with some diffidence. There are 
strong symptoms of arbitrary power in some former reigns, even after signing of 
the charters. The power of the crown in that age depended less on the 
constitution than on the capacity and vigour of the prince who wore it.
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†d GOTHIC: Editions M to Q.

Essay 15. OF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION
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ESSAY XV: OF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION
I suppose, that a member of parliament, in the reign of King WILLIAM or Queen 
ANNE, while the establishment of the Protestant Succession was yet uncertain, 
were deliberating concerning the party he would chuse in that important 
question, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and disadvantages on 
each side. I believe the following particulars would have entered into his 
consideration.
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He would easily perceive the great advantage resulting from the restoration of 
the STUART family; by which we should preserve the succession clear and 
undisputed, free from a pretender, with such a specious title as that of blood, 
which, with the multitude, is always the claim, the strongest and most easily 
comprehended. It is in vain to say, as many have done, that the question with 
regard to governors, independent of government, is frivolous, and little worth 
disputing, much less fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter 
into these sentiments; and it is much happier, I believe, for society, that they 
do not, but rather continue in their natural prepossessions. How could stability 
be preserved in any monarchical government, (which, though, perhaps, not the 
best, is, and always has been, the most common of any) unless men had so 
passionate a regard for the true heir of their royal family; and even though he 
be weak in understanding, or infirm in years, gave him so sensible a preference 
above persons the most accomplished in shining talents, or celebrated for great 
atchievements? Would not every popular leader put in his claim at every vacancy, 
or even without any vacancy; and the kingdom become the theatre of perpetual 
wars and convulsions? The condition of the ROMAN empire, surely, was not, in 
this respect, much to be envied; nor is that of the Eastern nations, who pay 
little regard to the titles of their sovereign, but sacrifice them, every day, 
to the caprice or momentary humour of the populace or soldiery. It is but a 
foolish wisdom, which is so carefully displayed, in undervaluing princes, and 
placing them on a level with the meanest of mankind. To be sure, an anatomist 
finds no more in the greatest monarch than in the lowest peasant or 
day-labourer; and a moralist may, perhaps, frequently find less. But what do all 
these reflections tend to? We, all of us, still retain these prejudices in 
favour of birth and family; and neither in our serious occupations, nor most 
careless amusements, can we ever get entirely rid of them. A tragedy, that 
should represent the adventures of sailors, or porters, or even of private 
gentlemen, would presently disgust us; but one that introduces kings and 
princes, acquires in our eyes an air of importance and dignity. Or should a man 
be able, by his superior wisdom, to get entirely above such prepossessions, he 
would soon, by means of the same wisdom, again bring himself down to them, for 
the sake of society, whose welfare he would perceive to be intimately connected 
with them. Far from endeavouring to undeceive the people in this particular, he 
would cherish such sentiments of reverence to their princes; as requisite to 
preserve a due subordination in society. And though the lives of twenty thousand 
men be often sacrificed to maintain a king in possession of his throne, or 
preserve the right of succession undisturbed, he entertains no indignation at 
the loss, on pretence that every individual of these was, perhaps, in himself, 
as valuable as the prince he served. He considers the consequences of violating 
the hereditary right of kings: Consequences, which may be felt for many 
centuries; while the loss of several thousand men brings so little prejudice to 
a large kingdom, that it may not be perceived a few years after.
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The advantages of the HANOVER succession are of an opposite nature, and arise 
from this very circumstance, that it violates hereditary right; and places on 
the throne a prince, to whom birth gave no title to that dignity. It is evident, 
from the history of this island, that the privileges of the people have, during 
near two centuries, been continually upon the encrease, by the division of the 
church-lands, by the alienations of the barons' estates, by the progress of 
trade, and above all, by the happiness of our situation, which, for a long time, 
gave us sufficient security, without any standing army or military 
establishment. On the contrary, public liberty has, almost in every other nation 
of EUROPE, been, during the same period, extremely upon the decline; while the 
people were disgusted at the hardships of the old†a feudal militia, and rather 
chose to entrust their prince with mercenary armies, which he easily turned 
against themselves. It was nothing extraordinary, therefore, that some of our 
BRITISH sovereigns mistook the nature of the constitution, at least, the genius 
of the people; and as they embraced all the favourable precedents left them by 
their ancestors, they overlooked all those which were contrary, and which 
supposed a limitation in our government. They were encouraged in this mistake, 
by the example of all the neighbouring princes, who bearing the same title or 
appellation, and being adorned with the same ensigns of authority, naturally led 
them to claim the same powers and prerogatives.†b It appears from the speeches, 
and proclamations of JAMES I. and the whole train of that prince's actions, as 
well as his son's, that he regarded the ENGLISH government as a simple monarchy, 
and never imagined that any considerable part of his subjects entertained a 
contrary idea. This opinion made those monarchs discover their pretensions, 
without preparing any force to support them; and even without reserve or 
disguise, which are always employed by those, who enter upon any new project, or 
endeavour to innovate in any government. The flattery of courtiers farther†c 
confirmed their prejudices; and above all, that of the clergy, who from several 
passages of scripture, and these wrested too, had erected a regular and avowed 
system of arbitrary power. The only method of destroying, at once, all these 
high claims and pretensions, was to depart from the true hereditary line, and 
choose a prince, who, being plainly a creature of the public, and receiving the 
crown on conditions, expressed and avowed, found his authority established on 
the same bottom with the privileges of the people. By electing him in the royal 
line, we cut off all hopes of ambitious subjects, who might, in future 
emergencies, disturb the government by their cabals and pretensions: By 
rendering the crown hereditary in his family, we avoided all the inconveniencies 
of elective monarchy: And by excluding the lineal heir, we secured all our 
constitutional limitations, and rendered our government uniform and of a piece. 
The people cherish monarchy, because protected by it: The monarch favours 
liberty, because created by it. And thus every advantage is obtained by the new 
establishment, as far as human skill and wisdom can extend itself.
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These are the separate advantages of fixing the succession, either in the house 
of STUART, or in that of HANOVER. There are also disadvantages in each 
establishment, which an impartial patriot would ponder and examine, in order to 
form a just judgment upon the whole.
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The disadvantages of the protestant succession consist in the foreign dominions, 
which are possessed by the princes of the HANOVER line, and which, it might be 
supposed, would engage us in the intrigues and wars of the continent, and lose 
us, in some measure, the inestimable advantage we possess, of being surrounded 
and guarded by the sea, which we command. The disadvantages of recalling the 
abdicated family consist chiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to 
society than that established amongst us, is contrary to it, and affords no 
toleration, or peace, or security to any other communion.
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It appears to me, that these advantages and disadvantages are allowed on both 
sides; at least, by every one who is at all susceptible of argument or 
reasoning. No subject, however loyal, pretends to deny, that the disputed title 
and foreign dominions of the present royal family are a loss. Nor is there any 
partizan of the STUARTS, but will confess, that the claim of hereditary, 
indefeasible right, and the Roman Catholic religion, are also disadvantages in 
that family. It belongs, therefore, to a philosopher alone, who is of neither 
party, to put all the circumstances in the scale, and assign to each of them its 
proper poise and influence. Such a one will readily, at first, acknowledge that 
all political questions are infinitely complicated, and that there scarcely ever 
occurs, in any deliberation, a choice, which is either purely good, or purely 
ill. Consequences, mixed and varied, may be foreseen to flow from every measure: 
And many consequences, unforeseen, do always, in fact, result from every one. 
Hesitation, and reserve, and suspence, are, therefore, the only sentiments he 
brings to this essay or trial. Or if he indulges any passion, it is that of 
derision against the ignorant multitude, who are always clamorous and 
dogmatical, even in the nicest questions, of which, from want of temper, perhaps 
still more than of understanding, they are altogether unfit judges.
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But to say something more determinate on this head, the following reflections 
will, I hope, show the temper, if not the understanding of a philosopher.
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Were we to judge merely by first appearances, and by past experience, we must 
allow that the advantages of a parliamentary title in the house of HANOVER are 
greater than those of an undisputed hereditary title in the house of STUART; and 
that our fathers acted wisely in preferring the former to the latter. So long as 
the house of STUART ruled in GREAT BRITAIN, which, with some interruption, was 
above eighty years, the government was kept in a continual fever, by the 
contention between the privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the 
crown. If arms were dropped, the noise of disputes continued: Or if these were 
silenced, jealousy still corroded the heart, and threw the nation into an 
unnatural ferment and disorder. And while we were thus occupied in domestic 
disputes, a foreign power, dangerous to public liberty, erected itself in 
EUROPE, without any opposition from us, and even sometimes with our assistance.
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But during these last sixty years, when a parliamentary establishment has taken 
place; whatever factions may have prevailed either among the people or in public 
assemblies, the whole force of our constitution has always fallen to one side, 
and an uninterrupted harmony has been preserved between our princes and our 
parliaments. Public liberty, with internal peace and order, has flourished 
almost without interruption: Trade and manufactures, and agriculture, have 
encreased: The arts, and sciences, and philosophy, have been cultivated. Even 
religious parties have been necessitated to lay aside their mutual rancour: And 
the glory of the nation has spread itself all over EUROPE;†d derived equally 
from our progress in the arts of peace, and from valour and success in war. So 
long and so glorious a period no nation almost can boast of: Nor is there 
another instance in the whole history of mankind, that so many millions of 
people have, during such a space of time, been held together, in a manner so 
free, so rational, and so suitable to the dignity of human nature.
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But though this recent experience seems clearly to decide in favour of the 
present establishment, there are some circumstances to be thrown into the other 
scale; and it is dangerous to regulate our judgment by one event or example.
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We have had two rebellions during the flourishing period above mentioned, 
besides plots and conspiracies without number. And if none of these have 
produced any very fatal event, we may ascribe our escape chiefly to the narrow 
genius of those princes who disputed our establishment; and we may esteem 
ourselves so far fortunate. But the claims of the banished family, I fear, are 
not yet antiquated; and who can foretel, that their future attempts will produce 
no greater disorder?
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The disputes between privilege and prerogative may easily be composed by laws, 
and votes, and conferences, and concessions; where there is tolerable temper or 
prudence on both sides, or on either side. Among contending titles, the question 
can only be determined by the sword, and by devastation, and by civil war.
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A prince, who fills the throne with a disputed title, dares not arm his 
subjects; the only method of securing a people fully, both against domestic 
oppression and foreign conquest.
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Notwithstanding our riches and renown, what a critical escape did we make, by 
the late peace, from dangers, which were owing not so much to bad conduct and 
ill success in war, as to the pernicious practice of mortgaging our finances, 
and the still more pernicious maxim of never paying off our incumbrances? Such 
fatal measures would not probably have been embraced, had it not been to secure 
a precarious establishment.†e
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But to convince us, that an hereditary title is to be embraced rather than a 
parliamentary one, which is not supported by any other views or motives; a man 
needs only transport himself back to the aera of the restoration, and suppose, 
that he had had a seat in that parliament which recalled the royal family, and 
put a period to the greatest disorders that ever arose from the opposite 
pretensions of prince and people. What would have been thought of one, that had 
proposed, at that time, to set aside CHARLES II. and settle the crown on the 
Duke of YORK, or GLOUCESTER, merely in order to exclude all high claims, like 
those of their father and grandfather? Would not such a one have been regarded 
as an extravagant projector, who loved dangerous remedies, and could tamper and 
play with a government and national constitution, like a quack with a sickly 
patient?†f
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In reality, the reason assigned by the nation for excluding the race of STUART, 
and so many other branches of the royal family, is not on account of their 
hereditary title (a reason, which would, to vulgar apprehensions, have appeared 
altogether absurd), but on account of their religion. Which leads us to compare 
the disadvantages above mentioned in each establishment.
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I confess, that, considering the matter in general, it were much to be wished, 
that our prince had no foreign dominions, and could confine all his attention to 
the government of this island. For not to mention some real inconveniencies that 
may result from territories on the continent, they afford such a handle for 
calumny and defamation, as is greedily seized by the people, always disposed to 
think ill of their superiors. It must, however, be acknowledged, that HANOVER, 
is, perhaps, the spot of ground in EUROPE the least inconvenient for a King of 
ENGLAND. It lies in the heart of GERMANY, at a distance from the great powers, 
which are our natural rivals: It is protected by the laws of the empire, as well 
as by the arms of its own sovereign: And it serves only to connect us more 
closely with the house of AUSTRIA, our natural ally.†g
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The religious persuasion of the house of STUART is an inconvenience of a much 
deeper dye, and would threaten us with much more dismal consequences. The Roman 
Catholic religion, with its train of priests and friers, is more expensive than 
ours: Even though unaccompanied with its natural attendants of inquisitors, and 
stakes, and gibbets, it is less tolerating: And not content with dividing the 
sacerdotal from the regal office (which must be prejudicial to any state), it 
bestows the former on a foreigner, who has always a separate interest from that 
of the public, and may often have an opposite one.
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But were this religion ever so advantageous to society, it is contrary to that 
which is established among us, and which is likely to keep possession, for a 
long time, of the minds of the people. And though it is much to be hoped, that 
the progress of reason will, by degrees, abate the†h acrimony of opposite 
religions all over EUROPE; yet the spirit of moderation has, as yet, made too 
slow advances to be entirely trusted.†i
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Thus, upon the whole, the advantages of the settlement in the family of STUART, 
which frees us from a disputed title, seem to bear some proportion with those of 
the settlement in the family of HANOVER, which frees us from the claims of 
prerogative: But at the same time, its disadvantages, by placing on the throne a 
Roman Catholic, are greater than those of the other establishment, in settling 
the crown on a foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot, in the reign of 
K. WILLIAM or Q. ANNE, would have chosen amidst these opposite views, may, 
perhaps, to some appear hard to determine.†j
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But the settlement in the house of HANOVER has actually taken place. The princes 
of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without solicitation on their 
part, have been called to mount our throne, by the united voice of the whole 
legislative body. They have, since their accession, displayed, in all their 
actions, the utmost mildness, equity, and regard to the laws and constitution. 
Our own ministers, our own parliaments, ourselves have governed us; and if aught 
ill has befallen us, we can only blame fortune or ourselves. What a reproach 
must we become among nations, if, disgusted with a settlement so deliberately 
made, and whose conditions have been so religiously observed, we should throw 
every thing again into confusion; and by our levity and rebellious disposition, 
prove ourselves totally unfit for any state but that of absolute slavery and 
subjection?
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The greatest inconvenience, attending a disputed title, is, that it brings us in 
danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wise man, to avoid this inconvenience, 
would run directly into a civil war and rebellion? Not to mention, that so long 
possession, secured by so many laws, must, ere this time, in the apprehension of 
a great part of the nation, have begotten a title in the house of HANOVER, 
independent of their present possession: So that now we should not, even by a 
revolution, obtain the end of avoiding a disputed title.
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No revolution made by national forces, will ever be able, without some other 
great necessity, to abolish our debts and incumbrances, in which the interest of 
so many persons is concerned. And a revolution made by foreign forces, is a 
conquest: A calamity, with which the precarious balance of power threatens us, 
and which our civil dissentions are likely, above all other circumstances, to 
bring upon us.
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†a GOTHIC: Editions H to N.
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†b For this sentence and the next, Editions H to P read as follows; K to P, in a 
note: It appears from the speeches, and proclamations, and whole train of King 
JAMES I.'s actions, as well as his son's, that they considered the ENGLISH 
government as a simple monarchy, and never imagined that any considerable part 
of their subjects entertained a contrary idea. This made them discover their 
pretensions, without preparing any force to support them; and even without 
reserve or disguise, which are always employed by those, who enter upon any new 
project, or endeavour to innovate in any government. King JAMES told his 
parliament plainly, when they meddled in state affairs, Ne sutor ultra crepidam. 
He used also, at his table, in promiscuous companies, to advance his notions, in 
a manner still more undisguised: As we may learn from a story told in the life 
of Mr. WALLER, and which that poet used frequently to repeat. When Mr. WALLER 
was young, he had the curiosity to go to court; and he stood in the circle, and 
saw King JAMES dine, where, amongst other company, there sat at table two 
bishops. The King, openly and aloud, proposed this question, Whether he might 
not take his subjects money, when he had occasion for it, without all this 
formality of parliament? The one bishop readily replied, God forbid you should 
not: For you are the breath of our nostrils. The other bishop declined 
answering, and said he was not skilled in parliamentary cases. But upon the 
King's urging him, and saying he would admit of no evasion, his lordship replied 
very pleasantly, Why, then, I think your majesty may lawfully take my brother's 
money: For he offers it. In Sir WALTER RALEIGH'S preface to the History of the 
World, there is this remarkable passage. PHILIP II. by strong hand and main 
force, attempted to make himself not only an absolute monarch over the 
Netherlands, like unto the kings and sovereigns of England and France; but 
Turk-like, to tread under his feet all their natural and fundamental laws, 
privileges, and antient rights. SPENSER, speaking of some grants of the ENGLISH 
kings to the IRISH corporations, says, "All which, tho', at the time of their 
first grant, they were tolerable, and perhaps reasonable, yet now are most 
unreasonable and inconvenient. But all these will easily be cut off with the 
superior power of her majesty's prerogative, against which her own grants are 
not to be pleaded or inforced." State of IRELAND, p. 1537. Edit. 1706.
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As these were very common, if not, perhaps, the universal notions of the times, 
the two first princes of the house of STUART were the more excusable for their 
mistake. And RAPIN, [Editions H and I read: The most judicious of historians.] 
suitable to his usual malignity and partiality, seems to treat them with too 
much severity, upon account of it.
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†c Blinded them: Editions H to N.
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†d For the remainder of this sentence, Editions H to P substitute: While we 
stand the bulwark against oppression, and the great antagonist of that power 
which threatens every people with conquest and subjection.
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†e Editions H to P add the note: Those who consider how universal this 
pernicious practice of lending has become all over EUROPE, may perhaps dispute 
this last opinion. But we lay under less necessity than other states.
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†f Editions H to P add the following paragraph: The advantages which result from 
a parliamentary title, preferably to an hereditary one, tho' they are great, are 
too refined ever to enter into the conception of the vulgar. The bulk of mankind 
would never allow them to be sufficient for committing what would be regarded as 
an injustice to the prince. They must be supported by some gross, popular, and 
familiar topics; and wise men, though convinced of their force, would reject 
them, in compliance with the weakness and prejudices of the people. An 
incroaching tyrant or deluded bigot alone, by his misconduct, is able to enrage 
the nation, and render practicable what was always perhaps desirable.
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†g Editions H to P insert the following paragraph: In the last war, it has been 
of service to us, by furnishing us with a considerable body of auxiliary troops, 
the bravest and most faithful in the world. The Elector of HANOVER is the only 
considerable prince in the empire, who has pursued no separate end, and has 
raised up no stale pretensions, during the late commotions of EUROPE; but has 
acted, all along, with the dignity of a King of BRITAIN. And ever since the 
accession of that family, it would be difficult to show any harm we have ever 
received from the electoral dominions, except that short disgust in 1718, with 
CHARLES XII., who, regulating himself by maxims very different from those of 
other princes; made a personal quarrel of every public injury. [Editions O and P 
append the note: This was published in 1752.]
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†h The virulent acrimony: Editions H to N.
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†i Editions H to P add: The conduct of the SAXON family, where the same person 
can be a Catholic King and Protestant Elector, is, perhaps, the first instance, 
in modern times, of so reasonable and prudent a behaviour. And the gradual 
progress of the Catholic superstition does, even there, prognosticate a speedy 
alteration: After which, 'tis justly to be apprehended, that persecutions will 
put a speedy period to the Protestant religion in the place of its nativity.
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†j Editions H to P add: For my part, I esteem liberty so invaluable a blessing 
in society, that whatever favours its progress and security, can scarce be too 
fondly cherished by every one who is a lover of human kind.

Essay 16. IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH
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ESSAY XVI: IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH
†a It is not with forms of government, as with other artificial contrivances; 
where an old engine may be rejected, if we can discover another more accurate 
and commodious, or where trials may safely be made, even though the success be 
doubtful. An established government has an infinite advantage, by that very 
circumstance of its being established; the bulk of mankind being governed by 
authority, not reason, and never attributing authority to any thing that has not 
the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try 
experiments merely upon the credit of supposed argument and philosophy, can 
never be the part of a wise magistrate, who will bear a reverence to what 
carries the marks of age; and though he may attempt some improvements for the 
public good, yet will he adjust his innovations, as much as possible, to the 
ancient fabric, and preserve entire the chief pillars and supports of the 
constitution.
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The mathematicians in EUROPE have been much divided concerning that figure of a 
ship, which is the most commodious for sailing; and HUYGENS, who at last 
determined the controversy, is justly thought to have obliged the learned, as 
well as commercial world; though COLUMBUS had sailed to AMERICA, and Sir FRANCIS 
DRAKE made the tour of the world, without any such discovery. As one form of 
government must be allowed more perfect than another, independent of the manners 
and humours of particular men; why may we not enquire what is the most perfect 
of all, though the common botched and inaccurate governments seem to serve the 
purposes of society, and though it be not so easy to establish a new system of 
government, as to build a vessel upon a new construction? The subject is surely 
the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who 
knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and 
learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing 
the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by 
the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world? In 
all cases, it must be advantageous to know what is most perfect in the kind, 
that we may be able to bring any real constitution or form of government as near 
it as possible, by such gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too 
great disturbance to society.
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All I pretend to in the present essay is to revive this subject of speculation; 
and therefore I shall deliver my sentiments in as few words as possible. A long 
dissertation on that head would not, I apprehend, be very acceptable to the 
public, who will be apt to regard such disquisitions both as useless and 
chimerical.
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All plans of government, which suppose great reformation in the manners of 
mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the Republic of PLATO, and 
the Utopia of Sir THOMAS MORE. The OCEANA is the only valuable model of a 
commonwealth, that has yet been offered to the public.
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The chief defects of the OCEANA seem to be these. First, Its rotation is 
inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever abilities, by intervals, out of 
public employments. Secondly, Its Agrarian is impracticable. Men will soon learn 
the art, which was practised in ancient ROME, of concealing their possessions 
under other people's name; till at last, the abuse will become so common, that 
they will throw off even the appearance of restraint. Thirdly, The OCEANA 
provides not a sufficient security for liberty, or the redress of grievances. 
The senate must propose, and the people consent; by which means, the senate have 
not only a negative upon the people, but, what is of much greater consequence, 
their negative goes before the votes of the people. Were the King's negative of 
the same nature in the ENGLISH constitution, and could he prevent any bill from 
coming into parliament, he would be an absolute monarch. As his negative follows 
the votes of the houses, it is of little consequence: Such a difference is there 
in the manner of placing the same thing. When a popular bill has been debated in 
parliament, is brought to maturity, all its conveniencies and inconveniencies, 
weighed and balanced; if afterwards it be presented for the royal assent, few 
princes will venture to reject the unanimous desire of the people. But could the 
King crush a disagreeable bill in embryo (as was the case, for some time, in the 
SCOTTISH parliament, by means of the lords of the articles), the BRITISH 
government would have no balance, nor would grievances ever be redressed: And it 
is certain, that exorbitant power proceeds not, in any government, from new 
laws, so much as from neglecting to remedy the abuses, which frequently rise 
from the old ones. A government, says MACHIAVEL, must often be brought back to 
its original principles. It appears then, that, in the OCEANA, the whole 
legislature may be said to rest in the senate; which HARRINGTON would own to be 
an inconvenient form of government, especially after the Agrarian is abolished.
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Here is a form of government, to which I cannot, in theory, discover any 
considerable objection.
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Let GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 
100 counties, and each county into 100 parishes, making in all 10,000. If the 
country, proposed to be erected into a commonwealth be of more narrow extent, we 
may diminish the number of counties; but never bring them below thirty. If it be 
of greater extent, it were better to enlarge the parishes, or throw more 
parishes into a county, than encrease the number of counties.
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†b Let all the freeholders of twenty pounds a-year in the county, and all the 
householders worth 500 pounds in the town parishes, meet annually in the parish 
church, and chuse, by ballot, some freeholder of the county for their member, 
whom we shall call the county representative.
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Let the 100 county representatives, two days after their election, meet in the 
county town, and chuse by ballot, from their own body, ten county magistrates, 
and one senator. There are, therefore, in the whole commonwealth, 100 senators, 
1100 county magistrates, and 10,000 county representatives. For we shall bestow 
on all senators the authority of county magistrates, and on all county 
magistrates the authority of county representatives.
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Let the senators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole executive 
power of the commonwealth; the power of peace and war, of giving orders to 
generals, admirals, and ambassadors, and, in short, all the prerogatives of a 
BRITISH King, except his negative.
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Let the county representatives meet in their particular counties, and possess 
the whole legislative power of the commonwealth; the greater number of counties 
deciding the question; and where these are equal, let the senate have the 
casting vote.
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Every new law must first be debated in the senate; and though rejected by it, if 
ten senators insist and protest, it must be sent down to the counties. The 
senate, if they please, may join to the copy of the law their reasons for 
receiving or rejecting it.
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Because it would be troublesome to assemble all the county representatives for 
every trivial law, that may be requisite, the senate have their choice of 
sending down the law either to the county magistrates or county representatives.
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The magistrates, though the law be referred to them, may, if they please, call 
the representatives, and submit the affair to their determination.
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Whether the law be referred by the senate to the county magistrates or 
representatives, a copy of it, and of the senate's reasons, must be sent to 
every representative eight days before the day appointed for the assembling, in 
order to deliberate concerning it. And though the determination be, by the 
senate, referred to the magistrates, if five representatives of the county order 
the magistrates to assemble the whole court of representatives, and submit the 
affair to their determination, they must obey.
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Either the county magistrates or representatives may give, to the senator of the 
county, the copy of a law to be proposed to the senate; and if five counties 
concur in the same order, the law, though refused by the senate, must come 
either to the county magistrates or representatives, as is contained in the 
order of the five counties.
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Any twenty counties, by a vote either of their magistrates or representatives, 
may throw any man out of all public offices for a year. Thirty counties for 
three years.
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The senate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its 
own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The senate cannot throw out twice 
in a year the senator of the same county.
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The power of the old senate continues for three weeks after the annual election 
of the county representatives. Then all the new senators are shut up in a 
conclave, like the cardinals; and by an intricate ballot, such as that of VENICE 
or MALTA, they chuse the following magistrates; a protector, who represents the 
dignity of the commonwealth, and presides in the senate; two secretaries of 
state; these six councils, a council of state, a council of religion and 
learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of 
the admiralty, each council consisting of five persons; together with six 
commissioners of the treasury and a first commissioner. All these must be 
senators. The senate also names all the ambassadors to foreign courts, who may 
either be senators or not.
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The senate may continue any or all of these, but must re-elect them every year.
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The protector and two secretaries have session and suffrage in the council of 
state. The business of that council is all foreign politics. The council of 
state has session and suffrage in all the other councils.
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The council of religion and learning inspects the universities and clergy. That 
of trade inspects every thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inspects 
all the abuses of law by the inferior magistrates, and examines what 
improvements may be made of the municipal law. That of war inspects the militia 
and its discipline, magazines, stores, &c. and when the republic is in war, 
examines into the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the 
same power with regard to the navy, together with the nomination of the captains 
and all inferior officers.
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None of these councils can give orders themselves, except where they receive 
such powers from the senate. In other cases, they must communicate every thing 
to the senate.
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When the senate is under adjournment, any of the councils may assemble it before 
the day appointed for its meeting.
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Besides these councils or courts, there is another called the court of 
competitors; which is thus constituted. If any candidates for the office of 
senator have more votes than a third of the representatives, that candidate, who 
has most votes, next to the senator elected, becomes incapable for one year of 
all public offices, even of being a magistrate or representative: But he takes 
his seat in the court of competitors. Here then is a court which may sometimes 
consist of a hundred members, sometimes have no members at all; and by that 
means, be for a year abolished.
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The court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has only the 
inspection of public accounts, and the accusing of any man before the senate. If 
the senate acquit him, the court of competitors may, if they please, appeal to 
the people, either magistrates or representatives. Upon that appeal, the 
magistrates or representatives meet on the day appointed by the court of 
competitors, and chuse in each county three persons; from which number every 
senator is excluded. These, to the number of 300, meet in the capital, and bring 
the person accused to a new trial.
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The court of competitors may propose any law to the senate; and if refused, may 
appeal to the people, that is, to the magistrates or representatives, who 
examine it in their counties. Every senator, who is thrown out of the senate by 
a vote of the court, takes his seat in the court of competitors.
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The senate possesses all the judicative authority of the house of Lords, that 
is, all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewise appoints the Lord 
Chancellor, and all the officers of the law.
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Every county is a kind of republic within itself, and the representatives may 
make bye-laws; which have no authority 'till three months after they are voted. 
A copy of the law is sent to the senate, and to every other county. The senate, 
or any single county, may, at any time, annul any bye-law of another county.
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The representatives have all the authority of the BRITISH justices of peace in 
trials, commitments, &c.
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The magistrates have the appointment of all the officers of the revenue in each 
county. All causes with regard to the revenue are carried ultimately by appeal 
before the magistrates. They pass the accompts of all the officers; but must 
have their own accompts examined and passed at the end of the year by the 
representatives.
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The magistrates name rectors or ministers to all the parishes.
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The Presbyterian government is established; and the highest ecclesiastical court 
is an assembly or synod of all the presbyters of the county. The magistrates may 
take any cause from this court, and determine it themselves.
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The magistrates may try, and depose or suspend any presbyter.
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The militia is established in imitation of that of SWISSERLAND, which being well 
known, we shall not insist upon it. It will only be proper to make this 
addition, that an army of 20,000 men be annually drawn out by rotation, paid and 
encamped during six weeks in summer; that the duty of a camp may not be 
altogether unknown.
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The magistrates appoint all the colonels and downwards. The senate all upwards. 
During war, the general appoints the colonel and downwards, and his commission 
is good for a twelvemonth. But after that, it must be confirmed by the 
magistrates of the county, to which the regiment belongs. The magistrates may 
break any officer in the county regiment. And the senate may do the same to any 
officer in the service. If the magistrates do not think proper to confirm the 
general's choice, they may appoint another officer in the place of him they 
reject.
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All crimes are tried within the county by the magistrates and a jury. But the 
senate can stop any trial, and bring it before themselves.
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Any county may indict any man before the senate for any crime.
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The protector, the two secretaries, the council of state, with any five or more 
that the senate appoints, are possessed, on extraordinary emergencies, of 
dictatorial power for six months.
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The protector may pardon any person condemned by the inferior courts.
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In time of war, no officer of the army that is in the field can have any civil 
office in the commonwealth.
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The capital, which we shall call LONDON, may be allowed four members in the 
senate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The representatives of 
each of these chuse one senator, and ten magistrates. There are therefore in the 
city four senators, forty-four magistrates, and four hundred representatives. 
The magistrates have the same authority as in the counties. The representatives 
also have the same authority; but they never meet in one general court: They 
give their votes in their particular county, or division of hundreds.
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When they enact any bye-law, the greater number of counties or divisions 
determines the matter. And where these are equal, the magistrates have the 
casting vote.
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The magistrates chuse the mayor, sheriff, recorder, and other officers of the 
city.
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In the commonwealth, no representative, magistrate, or senator, as such, has any 
salary. The protector, secretaries, councils, and ambassadors, have salaries.
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The first year in every century is set apart for correcting all inequalities, 
which time may have produced in the representative. This must be done by the 
legislature.
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The following political aphorisms may explain the reason of these orders.
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The lower sort of people and small proprietors are good judges enough of one not 
very distant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their parochial 
meetings, will probably chuse the best, or nearly the best representative: But 
they are wholly unfit for county-meetings, and for electing into the higher 
offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of 
deceiving them.
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Ten thousand, even though they were not annually elected, are a basis large 
enough for any free government. It is true, the nobles in POLAND are more than 
10,000, and yet these oppress the people. But as power always continues there in 
the same persons and families, this makes them, in a manner, a different nation 
from the people. Besides the nobles are there united under a few heads of 
families.
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All free governments must consist of two councils, a lesser and greater; or, in 
other words, of a senate and people. The people, as HARRINGTON observes, would 
want wisdom, without the senate: The senate, without the people, would want 
honesty.
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A large assembly of 1000, for instance, to represent the people, if allowed to 
debate, would fall into disorder. If not allowed to debate, the senate has a 
negative upon them, and the worst kind of negative, that before resolution.
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Here therefore is an inconvenience, which no government has yet fully remedied, 
but which is the easiest to be remedied in the world. If the people debate, all 
is confusion: If they do not debate, they can only resolve; and then the senate 
carves for them. Divide the people into many separate bodies; and then they may 
debate with safety, and every inconvenience seems to be prevented.
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Cardinal de RETZ says, that all numerous assemblies, however composed, are mere 
mob, and swayed in their debates by the least motive. This we find confirmed by 
daily experience. When an absurdity strikes a member, he conveys it to his 
neighbour, and so on, till the whole be infected. Separate this great body; and 
though every member be only of middling sense, it is not probable, that any 
thing but reason can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being 
removed, good sense will always get the better of bad among a number of 
people.†c
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There are two things to be guarded against in every senate: Its combination, and 
its division. Its combination is most dangerous. And against this inconvenience 
we have provided the following remedies. 1. The great dependence of the senators 
on the people by annual elections; and that not by an undistinguishing rabble, 
like the ENGLISH electors, but by men of fortune and education. 2. The small 
power they are allowed. They have few offices to dispose of. Almost all are 
given by the magistrates in the counties. 3. The court of competitors, which 
being composed of men that are their rivals, next to them in interest, and 
uneasy in their present situation, will be sure to take all advantages against 
them.
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The division of the senate is prevented, 1. By the smallness of their number. 2. 
As faction supposes a combination in a separate interest, it is prevented by 
their dependence on the people. 3. They have a power of expelling any factious 
member. It is true, when another member of the same spirit comes from the 
county, they have no power of expelling him: Nor is it fit they should; for that 
shows the humour to be in the people, and may possibly arise from some ill 
conduct in public affairs. 4. Almost any man, in a senate so regularly chosen by 
the people, may be supposed fit for any civil office. It would be proper, 
therefore, for the senate to form some general resolutions with regard to the 
disposing of offices among the members: Which resolutions would not confine them 
in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one hand, or extraordinary 
stupidity on the other, appears in any senator; but they would be sufficient to 
prevent†d intrigue and faction, by making the disposal of the offices a thing of 
course. For instance, let it be a resolution, That no man shall enjoy any 
office, till he has sat four years in the senate: That, except ambassadors, no 
man shall be in office two years following: That no man shall attain the higher 
offices but through the lower: That no man shall be protector twice, &c. The 
senate of VENICE govern themselves by such resolutions.
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In foreign politics the interest of the senate can scarcely ever be divided from 
that of the people; and therefore it is fit to make the senate absolute with 
regard to them; otherwise there could be no secrecy or refined policy. Besides, 
without money no alliance can be executed; and the senate is still sufficiently 
dependant. Not to mention, that the legislative power being always superior to 
the executive, the magistrates or representatives may interpose whenever they 
think proper.
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The chief support of the BRITISH government is the opposition of interests; but 
that, though in the main serviceable, breeds endless factions. In the foregoing 
plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The competitors have no 
power of controlling the senate: They have only the power of accusing, and 
appealing to the people.
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It is necessary, likewise, to prevent both combination and division in the 
thousand magistrates. This is done sufficiently by the separation of places and 
interests.
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But lest that should not be sufficient, their dependence on the 10,000 for their 
elections, serves to the same purpose.
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Nor is that all: For the 10,000 may resume the power whenever they please; and 
not only when they all please, but when any five of a hundred please, which will 
happen upon the very first suspicion of a separate interest.
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The 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except when they meet 
in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention 
their annual election,†e by the whole body of the people, that are of any 
consideration.
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A small commonwealth is the happiest government in the world within itself, 
because every thing lies under the eye of the rulers: But it may be subdued by 
great force from without. This scheme seems to have all the advantages both of a 
great and a little commonwealth.
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Every county-law may be annulled either by the senate or another county; because 
that shows an opposition of interest: In which case no part ought to decide for 
itself. The matter must be referred to the whole, which will best determine what 
agrees with general interest.
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As to the clergy and militia, the reasons of these orders are obvious. Without 
the dependence of the clergy on the civil magistrates, and without a militia, it 
is in vain to think that any free government will ever have security or 
stability.
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In many governments, the inferior magistrates have no rewards but what arise 
from their ambition, vanity, or public spirit. The salaries of the FRENCH judges 
amount not to the interest of the sums they pay for their offices. The DUTCH 
burgo-masters have little more immediate profit than the ENGLISH justices of 
peace, or the members of the house of commons formerly. But lest any should 
suspect, that this would beget negligence in the administration (which is little 
to be feared, considering the natural ambition of mankind), let the magistrates 
have competent salaries. The senators have access to so many honourable and 
lucrative offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little 
attendance required of the representatives.
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That the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who 
considers the resemblance that it bears to the commonwealth of the United 
Provinces,†f a wise and renowned government. The alterations in the present 
scheme seem all evidently for the better. 1. The representation is more equal. 
2. The unlimited power of the burgo-masters in the towns, which forms a perfect 
aristocracy in the DUTCH commonwealth, is corrected by a well-tempered 
democracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county 
representatives. 3. The negative, which every province and town has upon the 
whole body of the DUTCH republic, with regard to alliances, peace and war, and 
the imposition of taxes, is here removed. 4. The counties, in the present plan, 
are not so independent of each other, nor do they form separate bodies so much 
as the seven provinces; where the jealousy and envy of the smaller provinces and 
towns against the greater, particularly HOLLAND and AMSTERDAM, have frequently 
disturbed the government. 5. Larger powers, though of the safest kind, are 
intrusted to the senate than the States-General possess; by which means, the 
former may become more expeditious, and secret in their resolutions, than it is 
possible for the latter.
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The chief alterations that could be made on the BRITISH government, in order to 
bring it to the most perfect model of limited monarchy, seem to be the 
following. First, The plan of†g CROMWELL'S parliament ought to be restored, by 
making the representation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county 
elections who possess not†h a property of 200 pounds value. Secondly, As such a 
house of Commons would be too weighty for a frail house of Lords, like the 
present, the Bishops and SCOTCH Peers ought to be removed:†i The number of the 
upper house ought to be raised to three or four hundred: Their seats not 
hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own 
members; and no commoner should be allowed to refuse a seat that was offered 
him. By this means the house of Lords would consist entirely of the men of chief 
credit, abilities, and interest in the nation; and every turbulent leader in the 
house of Commons might be taken off, and connected by interest with the house of 
Peers. Such an aristocracy would be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy 
and against it. At present, the balance of our government depends in some 
measure on the abilities and behaviour of the sovereign; which are variable and 
uncertain circumstances.
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This plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, seems still liable to three 
great inconveniencies. First, It removes not entirely, though it may soften, the 
parties of court and country. Secondly, The king's personal character must still 
have great influence on the government. Thirdly, The sword is in the hands of a 
single person, who will always neglect to discipline the militia, in order to 
have a pretence for keeping up a standing army.†j
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We shall conclude this subject, with observing the falsehood of the common 
opinion, that no large state, such as FRANCE or GREAT BRITAIN, could ever be 
modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form of government can only take 
place in a city or small territory. The contrary seems probable. Though it is 
more difficult to form a republican government in an extensive country than in a 
city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady 
and uniform, without tumult and faction. It is not easy, for the distant parts 
of a large state to combine in any plan of free government; but they easily 
conspire in the esteem and reverence for a single person, who, by means of this 
popular favour, may seize the power, and forcing the more obstinate to submit, 
may establish a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily 
concurs in the same notions of government, the natural equality of property 
favours liberty, and the nearness of habitation enables the citizens mutually to 
assist each other. Even under absolute princes, the subordinate government of 
cities is commonly republican; while that of counties and provinces is 
monarchical. But these same circumstances, which facilitate the erection of 
commonwealths in cities, render their constitution more frail and uncertain. 
Democracies are turbulent. For however the people may be separated or divided 
into small parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in 
a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very sensible. 
Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were most 
admired by ancient writers; but they are jealous and oppressive. In a large 
government, which is modelled with masterly skill, there is compass and room 
enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into 
the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher 
magistrates, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so 
distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or 
passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.
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It is needless to enquire, whether such a government would be immortal. I allow 
the justness of the poet's exclamation on the endless projects of human race, 
Man and for ever! The world itself probably is not immortal. Such consuming 
plagues may arise as would leave even a perfect government a weak prey to its 
neighbours. We know not to what length enthusiasm, or other extraordinary 
movements of the human mind, may transport men, to the neglect of all order and 
public good. Where difference of interest is removed, whimsical and 
unaccountable factions often arise, from personal favour or enmity. Perhaps, 
rust may grow to the springs of the most accurate political machine, and 
disorder its motions. Lastly, extensive conquests, when pursued, must be the 
ruin of every free government; and of the more perfect governments sooner than 
of the imperfect; because of the very advantages which the former possess above 
the latter. And though such a state ought to establish a fundamental law against 
conquests; yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and present 
interest makes men forgetful of their posterity. It is a sufficient incitement 
to human endeavours, that such a government would flourish for many ages; 
without pretending to bestow, on any work of man, that immortality, which the 
Almighty seems to have refused to his own productions.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 16 Var. a mp. 647 gp. 480
†a Editions H to P begin as follows: Of all mankind there are none so pernicious 
as political projectors, if they have power; nor so ridiculous, if they want it: 
As on the other hand, a wise politician is the most beneficial character in 
nature, if accompanied with authority; and the most innocent, and not altogether 
useless, even if deprived of it.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 16 Var. b mp. 647 gp. 482
†b Editions H and I read: Let all the freeholders in the country parishes, and 
those who pay scot and lot in the town parishes, &c. K to P, read: Let all the 
freeholders of ten pounds a year in the country, and all the householders worth 
200 pounds in the town-parishes, &c.
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†c Editions H to P add: Good sense is one thing: But follies are numberless; and 
every man has a different one. The only way of making a people wise, is to keep 
them from uniting into large assemblies.
Hume: ESY Pt. 2 E. 16 Var. d mp. 647 gp. 489
†d Brigue: Editions H to P.
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†e By almost the whole body of the people: so Editions H to M end the paragraph.
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†f Formerly one of the wisest and most renowned governments in the world: 
Editions H to P.
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†g Of the republican parliament: Editions H to P.
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†h A hundred a year: Editions H and I.
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†i Whose behaviour, in former parliaments, destroyed entirely the authority of 
that house: Editions H to P.
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†j Editions H to P add: It is evident, that this is a mortal distemper in the 
BRITISH government, of which it must at last inevitably perish. I must, however, 
confess, that SWEDEN seems, in some measure, to have remedied this 
inconvenience, and to have a militia, with its limited monarchy, as well as a 
standing army, which is less dangerous than the BRITISH.