David Hume Essays Moral, Political, and Literary

Contents

Hume: ESY Contents mp. vii gp. vii 
Table of Contents: ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY
PAST MASTERS Preface
Editions Listed by Green and Grose

PART I
1. Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion
2. Of the Liberty of the Press
3. That Politics may be reduced to a Science
4. Of the First Principles of Government
5. Of the Origin of Government
6. Of the Independency of Parliament
7. Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy,
or to a Republic
8. Of Parties in General
9. Of the Parties of Great Britain
10. Of Superstition and Enthusiasm
11. Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature
12. Of Civil Liberty
13. Of Eloquence
14. Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences
15. The Epicurean
16. The Stoic
17. The Platonist
18. The Sceptic
19. Of Polygamy and Divorces
20. Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing
21. Of National Characters
22. Of Tragedy
23. Of the Standard of Taste

PART II
1. Of Commerce
2. Of Refinement in the Arts
3. Of Money
4. Of Interest
5. Of the Balance of Trade
6. Of the Jealousy of Trade
7. Of the Balance of Power
8. Of Taxes
9. Of Public Credit
10. Of some Remarkable Customs
11. Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations
12. Of the Original Contract
13. Of Passive Obedience
14. Of the Coalition of Parties
15. Of the Protestant Succession
16. Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth 
ESSAYS WITHDRAWN
1. Of Essay Writing
2. Of Moral Prejudices
3. Of the Middle Station of Life
4. Of Impudence and Modesty
5. Of Love and Marriage
6. Of the Study of History
7. Of Avarice
8. A Character of Sir Robert Walpole

UNPUBLISHED ESSAYS
1. Of the Immortality of the Soul
2. Of Suicide

Hume: ESY Green & Grose Editions gp. 85
Editions Listed by Green and Grose:
A Essays, Moral and Political. Edinburgh: R. Fleming and A. Alison, 1741.
B Essays, Moral and Political. The Second Edition, corrected, Edinburgh, 1742.
C Essays, Moral and Political. Vol. II. 1742.
D Essays, Moral and Political. The Third Edition, Corrected with Additions; 
London: A. Millar and Edinburgh: A. Kincaid, 1748.
E Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding. London: A. Millar, 1748.
F Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding. The Second Edition, with 
additions and corrections. London: A. Millar, 1751.
G An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. London: A. Millar, 1751. 
H Political Discourses. Edinburgh: R. Fleming, 1752. 
I Political Discourses. The Second Edition; Edition I. Edinburgh, 1752.
K Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Four Volumes. London: A. Millar and 
Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, 1753-54. 
L Four Dissertations. I. The Natural History of Religion. II. Of the Passions. 
III. Of Tragedy. IV. Of the Standard of Taste. London: A. Millar, 1757. And 
First Proof of the Above. No Title-Page: but in (?) Hume's handwriting--Five 
Dissertations, to wit, The Natural History of Religion: Of the Passions: Of 
Tragedy: Of Suicide: Of the Immortality of the Soul.
M Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. London: A. Millar and Edinburgh: A. 
Kincaid, 1758. One volume.
N Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Four Volumes. London: A. Millar and 
Edinburgh: A. Kincaid, 1760.
O Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Two Volumes. London: A. Millar and 
Edinburgh: A. Kincaid, 1764.
P Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Two Volumes. London: Printed for A. 
Millar, A. Kincaid, J. Bell, and A. Donaldson, in Edinburgh. 1764
Q Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Four Volumes. London: T. Cadell and 
Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, 1770. 
R Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Two Volumes. London: T. Cadell and 
Edinburgh: W. Donaldson and W. Creech, 1777. 
Two Essays. (On Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul.). 1767.
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. 1779.
Past Masters Preface
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The text of Essays Moral, Political, and Literary is a corrected version of the 
Miller edition (1987) with three exceptions: 1) The bibliographic information 
included in the footnotes is that of Green and Grose, although the text of the 
footnotes is that of Miller; Green and Grose altered (primarily added to) 
bibliographic information in Hume's footnotes; 2) the variant readings are those 
of Green and Grose, although we have introduced a few changes for reasons of 
consistency and presentation; and 3) The text of the essays "Of Suicide," and 
"Of the Immortality of the Soul," is drawn from Green and Grose. Miller and 
Green and Grose worked from different proof copies of these two essays.
Hume: ESY PAST MASTERS Preface Para. 2/4
Miller found 100 word and phrase discrepancies, and 175 punctuation 
discrepancies between Green and Grose and the 1777 Hume. Miller also used the 
1772 Hume to check typographical errors in the 1777 Hume. Hence our reliance 
upon Miller. We are indebted to Prof. Miller and the Liberty Fund for their 
kindly consenting to our use of their text. Prof. Miller's extensive editorial 
additions do not appear in this edition.
Hume: ESY PAST MASTERS Preface Para. 3/4
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Part I
Essay 1. OF THE DELICACY OF TASTE AND PASSION
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PART I
ESSAY I: OF THE DELICACY OF TASTE AND PASSION
Some People are subject to a certain delicacy of passion, which makes them 
extremely sensible to all the accidents of life, and gives them a lively joy 
upon every prosperous event, as well as a piercing grief, when they meet with 
misfortunes and adversity. Favours and good offices easily engage their 
friendship; while the smallest injury provokes their resentment. Any honour or 
mark of distinction elevates them above measure; but they are as sensibly 
touched with contempt. People of this character have, no doubt, more lively 
enjoyments, as well as more pungent sorrows, than men of cool and sedate 
tempers: But, I believe, when every thing is balanced, there is no one, who 
would not rather be of the latter character, were he entirely master of his own 
disposition. Good or ill fortune is very little at our disposal: And when a 
person, that has this sensibility of temper, meets with any misfortune, his 
sorrow or resentment takes entire possession of him, and deprives him of all 
relish in the common occurrences of life; the right enjoyment of which forms the 
chief part of our happiness. Great pleasures are much less frequent than great 
pains; so that a sensible temper must meet with fewer trials in the former way 
than in the latter. Not to mention, that men of such lively passions are apt to 
be transported beyond all bounds of prudence and discretion, and to take false 
steps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable.
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There is a delicacy of taste observable in some men, which very much resembles 
this delicacy of passion, and produces the same sensibility to beauty and 
deformity of every kind, as that does to prosperity and adversity, obligations 
and injuries. When you present a poem or a picture to a man possessed of this 
talent, the delicacy of his feeling makes him be sensibly touched with every 
part of it; nor are the masterly strokes perceived with more exquisite relish 
and satisfaction, than the negligences or absurdities with disgust and 
uneasiness. A polite and judicious conversation affords him the highest 
entertainment; rudeness or impertinence is as great a punishment to him. In 
short, delicacy of taste has the same effect as delicacy of passion: It enlarges 
the sphere both of our happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to pains as 
well as pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind.
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I believe, however, every one will agree with me, that, notwithstanding this 
resemblance, delicacy of taste is as much to be desired and cultivated as 
delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible. The good 
or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal; but we are pretty much 
masters what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake of, and what 
company we shall keep. Philosophers have endeavoured to render happiness 
entirely independent of every thing external. That degree of perfection is 
impossible to be attained: But every wise man will endeavour to place his 
happiness on such objects chiefly as depend upon himself: and that is not to be 
attained so much by any other means as by this delicacy of sentiment. When a man 
is possessed of that talent, he is more happy by what pleases his taste, than by 
what gratifies his appetites, and receives more enjoyment from a poem or a piece 
of reasoning than the most expensive luxury can afford.†a
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Whatever connexion there may be originally between these two species of 
delicacy, I am persuaded, that nothing is so proper to cure us of this delicacy 
of passion, as the cultivating of that higher and more refined taste, which 
enables us to judge of the characters of men, of compositions of genius, and of 
the productions of the nobler arts. A greater or less relish for those obvious 
beauties, which strike the senses, depends entirely upon the greater or less 
sensibility of the temper: But with regard to the sciences and liberal arts, a 
fine taste is, in some measure, the same with strong sense, or at least depends 
so much upon it, that they are inseparable. In order to judge aright of a 
composition of genius, there are so many views to be taken in, so many 
circumstances to be compared, and such a knowledge of human nature requisite, 
that no man, who is not possessed of the soundest judgment, will ever make a 
tolerable critic in such performances. And this is a new reason for cultivating 
a relish in the liberal arts. Our judgment will strengthen by this exercise: We 
shall form juster notions of life: Many things, which please or afflict others, 
will appear to us too frivolous to engage our attention: And we shall lose by 
degrees that sensibility and delicacy of passion, which is so incommodious.
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But perhaps I have gone too far in saying, that a cultivated taste for the 
polite arts extinguishes the passions, and renders us indifferent to those 
objects, which are so fondly pursued by the rest of mankind. On farther 
reflection, I find, that it rather improves our sensibility for all the tender 
and agreeable passions; at the same time that it renders the mind incapable of 
the rougher and more boisterous emotions.
Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.
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For this, I think there may be assigned two very natural reasons. In the first 
place, nothing is so improving to the temper as the study of the beauties, 
either of poetry, eloquence, music, or painting. They give a certain elegance of 
sentiment to which the rest of mankind are strangers. The emotions which they 
excite are soft and tender. They draw off the mind from the hurry of business 
and interest; cherish reflection; dispose to tranquillity; and produce an 
agreeable melancholy, which, of all dispositions of the mind, is the best suited 
to love and friendship.
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In the second place, a delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, 
by confining our choice to few people, and making us indifferent to the company 
and conversation of the greater part of men. You will seldom find, that mere men 
of the world, whatever strong sense they may be endowed with, are very nice in 
distinguishing characters, or in marking those insensible differences and 
gradations, which make one man preferable to another. Any one, that has 
competent sense, is sufficient for their entertainment: They talk to him, of 
their pleasure and affairs, with the same frankness that they would to another; 
and finding many, who are fit to supply his place, they never feel any vacancy 
or want in his absence. But to make use of the allusion of a celebrated French†1 
author, the judgment may be compared to a clock or watch, where the most 
ordinary machine is sufficient to tell the hours; but the most elaborate alone 
can point out the minutes and seconds, and distinguish the smallest differences 
of time. One that has well digested his knowledge both of books and men, has 
little enjoyment but in the company of a few select companions. He feels too 
sensibly, how much all the rest of mankind fall short of the notions which he 
has entertained. And, his affections being thus confined within a narrow circle, 
no wonder he carries them further, than if they were more general and 
undistinguished. The gaiety and frolic of a bottle companion improves with him 
into a solid friendship: And the ardours of a youthful appetite become an 
elegant passion.
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†1 Mons. FONTENELLE, Pluralite des Mondes. Soir. 6.
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†a How far delicacy of taste, and that of passion, are connected together in the 
original frame of the mind, it is hard to determine. To me there appears a very 
considerable connexion between them. For we may observe that women, who have 
more delicate passions than men, have also a more delicate taste of the 
ornaments of life, of dress, equipage, and the ordinary decencies of behavior. 
Any excellency in these hits their taste much sooner than ours; and when you 
please their taste, you soon engage their affections.--Editions A to Q; the 
latter omits the last sentence.

Essay 2. OF THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
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ESSAY II: OF THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
Nothing is more apt to surprize a foreigner, than the extreme liberty, which we 
enjoy in this country, of communicating whatever we please to the public, and of 
openly censuring every measure, entered into by the king or his ministers. If 
the administration resolve upon war, it is affirmed, that, either wilfully or 
ignorantly, they mistake the interests of the nation, and that peace, in the 
present situation of affairs, is infinitely preferable. If the passion of the 
ministers lie towards peace, our political writers breathe nothing but war and 
devastation, and represent the pacific conduct of the government as mean and 
pusillanimous. As this liberty is not indulged in any other government, either 
republican or monarchical; in HOLLAND and VENICE, more than in FRANCE or SPAIN; 
it may very naturally give occasion to a question, How it happens that GREAT 
BRITAIN alone enjoys this peculiar privilege?†a
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The reason, why the laws indulge us in such a liberty seems to be derived from 
our mixed form of government, which is neither wholly monarchical, nor wholly 
republican. It will be found, if I mistake not, a true observation in politics, 
that the two extremes in government, liberty and slavery, commonly approach 
nearest to each other; and that, as you depart from the extremes, and mix a 
little of monarchy with liberty, the government becomes always the more free; 
and on the other hand, when you mix a little of liberty with monarchy, the yoke 
becomes always the more grievous and intolerable.†b In a government, such as 
that of FRANCE, which is absolute, and where law, custom, and religion concur, 
all of them, to make the people fully satisfied with their condition, the 
monarch cannot entertain any jealousy against his subjects, and therefore is apt 
to indulge them in great liberties both of speech and action. In a government 
altogether republican, such as that of HOLLAND, where there is no magistrate so 
eminent as to give jealousy to the state, there is no danger in intrusting the 
magistrates with large discretionary powers; and though many advantages result 
from such powers, in preserving peace and order, yet they lay a considerable 
restraint on men's actions, and make every private citizen pay a great respect 
to the government. Thus it seems evident, that the two extremes of absolute 
monarchy and of a republic, approach near to each other in some material 
circumstances. In the first, the magistrate has no jealousy of the people: in 
the second, the people have none of the magistrate: Which want of jealousy 
begets a mutual confidence and trust in both cases, and produces a species of 
liberty in monarchies, and of arbitrary power in republics.
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To justify the other part of the foregoing observation, that, in every 
government, the means are most wide of each other, and that the mixtures of 
monarchy and liberty render the yoke either more easy or more grievous; I must 
take notice of a remark in TACITUS with regard to the ROMANS under the emperors, 
that they neither could bear total slavery nor total liberty, Nec totam 
servitutem, nec totam libertatem pati possunt. This remark a celebrated poet has 
translated and applied to the ENGLISH, in his lively description of queen 
ELIZABETH'S policy and government,
Et fit aimer son joug a l'Anglois indompte,
Qui ne peut ni servir, ni vivre en liberte, 
HENRIADE, liv. I.
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According to these remarks, we are to consider the ROMAN government under the 
emperors as a mixture of despotism and liberty, where the despotism prevailed; 
and the ENGLISH government as a mixture of the same kind, where the liberty 
predominates. The consequences are conformable to the foregoing observation; and 
such as may be expected from those mixed forms of government, which beget a 
mutual watchfulness and jealousy. The ROMAN emperors were, many of them, the 
most frightful tyrants that ever disgraced human nature; and it is evident, that 
their cruelty was chiefly excited by their jealousy, and by their observing that 
all the great men of ROME bore with impatience the dominion of a family, which, 
but a little before, was no wise superior to their own. On the other hand, as 
the republican part of the government prevails in ENGLAND, though with a great 
mixture of monarchy, it is obliged, for its own preservation, to maintain a 
watchful jealousy over the magistrates, to remove all discretionary powers, and 
to secure every one's life and fortune by general and inflexible laws. No action 
must be deemed a crime but what the law has plainly determined to be such: No 
crime must be imputed to a man but from a legal proof before his judges; and 
even these judges must be his fellow-subjects, who are obliged, by their own 
interest, to have a watchful eye over the encroachments and violence of the 
ministers. From these causes it proceeds, that there is as much liberty, and 
even, perhaps, licentiousness in GREAT BRITAIN, as there were formerly slavery 
and tyranny in ROME.
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These principles account for the great liberty of the press in these kingdoms, 
beyond what is indulged in any other government.†c It is apprehended, that 
arbitrary power would steal in upon us, were we not careful to prevent its 
progress, and were there not an easy method of conveying the alarm from one end 
of the kingdom to the other. The spirit of the people must frequently be rouzed, 
in order to curb the ambition of the court; and the dread of rouzing this spirit 
must be employed to prevent that ambition. Nothing so effectual to this purpose 
as the liberty of the press, by which all the learning, wit, and genius of the 
nation may be employed on the side of freedom, and every one be animated to its 
defence. As long, therefore, as the republican part of our government can 
maintain itself against the monarchical, it will naturally be careful to keep 
the press open, as of importance to its own preservation.
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†d It must however be allowed, that the unbounded liberty of the press, though 
it be difficult, perhaps impossible, to propose a suitable remedy for it, is one 
of the evils, attending those mixt forms of government.
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†a And whether the unlimited exercise of this liberty be advantageous or 
prejudicial to the public?--Editions A to P.
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†b I shall endeavor to explain myself.--Editions D to P.
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†c 'Tis sufficiently known.--Editions A to P.
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†d Edition Q omits the concluding sentence. Editions A to P have in place of it 
the following:--Since therefore that liberty is so essential to the support of 
our mixed government; this sufficiently decides the second question, Whether 
such a liberty be advantageous or prejudicial; there being nothing of greater 
importance in every state than the preservation of the ancient government, 
especially if it be a free one. But I would fain go a step farther, and assert, 
that this liberty is attended with so few inconveniencies, that it may be 
claimed as the common right of mankind, and ought to be indulged them almost in 
every government: except the ecclesiastical, to which indeed it would prove 
fatal. We need not dread from this liberty any such ill consequences as followed 
from the harangues of the popular demagogues of ATHENS and tribunes of ROME. A 
man reads a book or pamphlet alone and coolly. There is none present from whom 
he can catch the passion by contagion. He is not hurried away by the force and 
energy of action. And should he be wrought up to ever so seditious a humour, 
there is no violent resolution presented to him, by which he can immediately 
vent his passion. The liberty of the press, therefore, however abused, can 
scarce ever excite popular tumults or rebellion. And as to those murmurs or 
secret discontents it may occasion, 'tis better they should get vent in words, 
that they may come to the knowledge of the magistrate before it be too late, in 
order to his providing a remedy against them. Mankind, it is true, have always a 
greater propension to believe what is said to the disadvantage of their 
governors, than the contrary; but this inclination is inseparable from them, 
whether they have liberty or not. A whisper may fly as quick, and be as 
pernicious as a pamphlet. Nay, it will be more pernicious, where men are not 
accustomed to think freely, or distinguish between truth and falshood.
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It has also been found, as the experience of mankind increases, that the people 
are no such dangerous monster as they have been represented, and that it is in 
every respect better to guide them, like rational creatures, than to lead or 
drive them, like brute beasts. Before the United Provinces set the example, 
toleration was deemed incompatible with good government; and it was thought 
impossible, that a number of religious sects could live together in harmony and 
peace, and have all of them an equal affection to their common country, and to 
each other. ENGLAND has set a like example of civil liberty; and though this 
liberty seems to occasion some small ferment at present, it has not as yet 
produced any pernicious effects; and it is to be hoped, that men, being every 
day more accustomed to the free discussion of public affairs, will improve in 
the judgment of them, and be with greater difficulty seduced by every idle 
rumour and popular clamour.
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It is a very comfortable reflection to the lovers of liberty, that this peculiar 
privilege of BRITAIN is of a kind that cannot easily be wrested from us, but 
must last as long as our government remains, in any degree, free and 
independent. It is seldom, that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Slavery 
has so frightful an aspect to men accustomed to freedom, that it must steal upon 
them by degrees, and must disguise itself in a thousand shapes, in order to be 
received. But, if the liberty of the press ever be lost, it must be lost at 
once. The general laws against sedition and libelling are at present as strong 
as they possibly can be made. Nothing can impose a farther restraint, but either 
the clapping an IMPRIMATUR upon the press, or the giving to the court very large 
discretionary powers to punish whatever displeases them. But these concessions 
would be such a bare-faced violation of liberty, that they will probably be the 
last efforts of a despotic government. We may conclude, that the liberty of 
Britain is gone for ever when these attempts shall succeed.

Essay 3. THAT POLITICS MAY BE REDUCED TO A SCIENCE
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ESSAY III: THAT POLITICS MAY BE REDUCED TO A SCIENCE
It is a question with several, whether there be any essential difference between 
one form of government and another? and, whether every form may not become good 
or bad, according as it is well or ill administered?†1 Were it once admitted, 
that all governments are alike, and that the only difference consists in the 
character and conduct of the governors, most political disputes would be at an 
end, and all Zeal for one constitution above another, must be esteemed mere 
bigotry and folly. But, though a friend to moderation, I cannot forbear 
condemning this sentiment, and should be sorry to think, that human affairs 
admit of no greater stability, than what they receive from the casual humours 
and characters of particular men.
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It is true; those who maintain, that the goodness of all government consists in 
the goodness of the administration, may cite many particular instances in 
history, where the very same government, in different hands, has varied suddenly 
into the two opposite extremes of good and bad. Compare the FRENCH government 
under HENRY III. and under HENRY IV. Oppression, levity, artifice on the part of 
the rulers; faction, sedition, treachery, rebellion, disloyalty on the part of 
the subjects: These compose the character of the former miserable aera. But when 
the patriot and heroic prince, who succeeded, was once firmly seated on the 
throne, the government, the people, every thing seemed to be totally changed; 
and all from the difference of the temper and conduct of these two sovereigns.†a 
Instances of this kind may be multiplied, almost without number, from ancient as 
well as modern history, foreign as well as domestic.
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But here it may be proper to make a distinction. All absolute governments†b must 
very much depend on the administration; and this is one of the great 
inconveniences attending that form of government. But a republican and free 
government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and 
controuls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it 
not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good. Such is the 
intention of these forms of government, and such is their real effect, where 
they are wisely constituted: As on the other hand, they are the source of all 
disorder, and of the blackest crimes, where either skill or honesty has been 
wanting in their original frame and institution.
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So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so 
little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences 
almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which 
the mathematical sciences afford us.
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The constitution of the ROMAN republic gave the whole legislative power to the 
people, without allowing a negative voice either to the nobility or consuls. 
This unbounded power they possessed in a collective, not in a representative 
body. The consequences were: When the people, by success and conquest, had 
become very numerous, and had spread themselves to a great distance from the 
capital, the city-tribes, though the most contemptible, carried almost every 
vote: They were, therefore, most cajoled by every one that affected popularity: 
They were supported in idleness by the general distribution of corn, and by 
particular bribes, which they received from almost every candidate: By this 
means, they became every day more licentious, and the CAMPUS MARTIUS was a 
perpetual scene of tumult and sedition: Armed slaves were introduced among these 
rascally citizens; so that the whole government fell into anarchy, and the 
greatest happiness, which the ROMANS could look for, was the despotic power of 
the CAESARS. Such are the effects of democracy without a representative.
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A Nobility may possess the whole, or any part of the legislative power of a 
state, in two different ways. Either every nobleman shares the power as part of 
the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as composed of parts, which 
have each a distinct power and authority. The VENETIAN aristocracy is an 
instance of the first kind of government: The POLISH of the second. In the 
VENETIAN government the whole body of nobility possesses the whole power, and no 
nobleman has any authority which he receives not from the whole. In the POLISH 
government every nobleman, by means of his fiefs, has a distinct hereditary 
authority over his vassals, and the whole body has no authority but what it 
receives from the concurrence of its parts. The different operations and 
tendencies of these two species of government might be made apparent even a 
priori. A VENETIAN nobility is preferable to a POLISH, let the humours and 
education of men be ever so much varied. A nobility, who possess their power in 
common, will preserve peace and order, both among themselves, and their 
subjects; and no member can have authority enough to controul the laws for a 
moment. The nobles will preserve their authority over the people, but without 
any grievous tyranny, or any breach of private property; because such a 
tyrannical government promotes not the interests of the whole body, however it 
may that of some individuals. There will be a distinction of rank between the 
nobility and people, but this will be the only distinction in the state. The 
whole nobility will form one body, and the whole people another, without any of 
those private feuds and animosities, which spread ruin and desolation every 
where. It is easy to see the disadvantages of a POLISH nobility in every one of 
these particulars.
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It is possible so to constitute a free government, as that a single person, call 
him doge, prince, or king, shall possess a large share of power, and shall form 
a proper balance or counterpoise to the other parts of the legislature. This 
chief magistrate may be either elective or hereditary; and though the former 
institution may, to a superficial view, appear the most advantageous; yet a more 
accurate inspection will discover in it greater inconveniencies than in the 
latter, and such as are founded on causes and principles eternal and immutable. 
The filling of the throne, in such a government, is a point of too great and too 
general interest, not to divide the whole people into factions: Whence a civil 
war, the greatest of ills, may be apprehended, almost with certainty, upon every 
vacancy. The prince elected must be either a Foreigner or a Native: The former 
will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; suspicious of his new 
subjects, and suspected by them; giving his confidence entirely to strangers, 
who will have no other care but of enriching themselves in the quickest manner, 
while their master's favour and authority are able to support them. A native 
will carry into the throne all his private animosities and friendships, and will 
never be viewed in his elevation, without exciting the sentiment of envy in 
those, who formerly considered him as their equal. Not to mention that a crown 
is too high a reward ever to be given to merit alone, and will always induce the 
candidates to employ force, or money, or intrigue, to procure the votes of the 
electors: So that such an election will give no better chance for superior merit 
in the prince, than if the state had trusted to birth alone for determining 
their sovereign.
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It may therefore be pronounced as an universal axiom in politics, That an 
hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a people voting by their 
representatives, form the best MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY and DEMOCRACY. But in order 
to prove more fully, that politics admit of general truths, which are invariable 
by the humour or education either of subject or sovereign, it may not be amiss 
to observe some other principles of this science, which may seem to deserve that 
character.
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It may easily be observed, that, though free governments have been commonly the 
most happy for those who partake of their freedom; yet are they the most ruinous 
and oppressive to their provinces: And this observation may, I believe, be fixed 
as a maxim of the kind we are here speaking of. When a monarch extends his 
dominions by conquest, he soon learns to consider his old and his new subjects 
as on the same footing; because, in reality, all his subjects are to him the 
same, except the few friends and favourites, with whom he is personally 
acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any distinction between them in his 
general laws; and, at the same time, is careful to prevent all particular acts 
of oppression on the one as well as on the other. But a free state necessarily 
makes a great distinction, and must always do so, till men learn to love their 
neighbours as well as themselves. The conquerors, in such a government, are all 
legislators, and will be sure to contrive matters, by restrictions on trade, and 
by taxes, so as to draw some private, as well as public, advantage from their 
conquests. Provincial governors have also a better chance, in a republic, to 
escape with their plunder, by means of bribery or intrigue; and their 
fellow-citizens, who find their own state to be enriched by the spoils of the 
subject provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate such abuses. Not to 
mention, that it is a necessary precaution in a free state to change the 
governors frequently; which obliges these temporary tyrants to be more 
expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate sufficient wealth before 
they give place to their successors. What cruel tyrants were the ROMANS over the 
world during the time of their commonwealth! It is true, they had laws to 
prevent oppression in their provincial magistrates; but CICERO informs us, that 
the ROMANS could not better consult the interests of the provinces than by 
repealing these very laws. For, in that case, says he, our magistrates, having 
entire impunity, would plunder no more than would satisfy their own 
rapaciousness; whereas, at present, they must also satisfy that of their judges, 
and of all the great men in ROME, of whose protection they stand in need. Who 
can read of the cruelties and oppressions of VERRES without horror and 
astonishment? And who is not touched with indignation to hear, that, after 
CICERO had exhausted on that abandoned criminal all the thunders of his 
eloquence, and had prevailed so far as to get him condemned to the utmost extent 
of the laws; yet that cruel tyrant lived peaceably to old age, in opulence and 
ease, and, thirty years afterwards, was put into the proscription by MARK 
ANTHONY, on account of his exorbitant wealth, where he fell with CICERO himself, 
and all the most virtuous men of ROME? After the dissolution of the 
commonwealth, the ROMAN yoke became easier upon the provinces, as TACITUS 
informs us;†2 and it may be observed, that many of the worst emperors, 
DOMITIAN,†3 for instance, were careful to prevent all oppression on the 
provinces. In†4 TIBERIUS'S time, GAUL was esteemed richer than ITALY itself: 
Nor, do I find, during the whole time of the ROMAN monarchy, that the empire 
became less rich or populous in any of its provinces; though indeed its valour 
and military discipline were always upon the decline. The oppression and tyranny 
of the CARTHAGINIANS over their subject states in AFRICA went so far, as we 
learn from POLYBIUS,†5 that, not content with exacting the half of all the 
produce of the land, which of itself was a very high rent, they also loaded them 
with many other taxes.†d If we pass from ancient to modern times, we shall still 
find the observation to hold. The provinces of absolute monarchies are always 
better treated than those of free states. Compare the Pais conquis of FRANCE 
with IRELAND, and you will be convinced of this truth; though this latter 
kingdom, being, in a good measure, peopled from ENGLAND, possesses so many 
rights and privileges as should naturally make it challenge better treatment 
than that of a conquered province. CORSICA is also an obvious instance to the 
same purpose.
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There is an observation in MACHIAVEL, with regard to the conquests of ALEXANDER 
the Great, which I think, may be regarded as one of those eternal political 
truths, which no time nor accidents can vary. It may seem strange, says that 
politician, that such sudden conquests, as those of ALEXANDER, should be 
possessed so peaceably by his successors, and that the PERSIANS, during all the 
confusions and civil wars among the GREEKS, never made the smallest effort 
towards the recovery of their former independent government. To satisfy us 
concerning the cause of this remarkable event, we may consider, that a monarch 
may govern his subjects in two different ways. He may either follow the maxims 
of the eastern princes, and stretch his authority so far as to leave no 
distinction of rank among his subjects, but what proceeds immediately from 
himself; no advantages of birth; no hereditary honours and possessions; and, in 
a word, no credit among the people, except from his commission alone. Or a 
monarch may exert his power after a milder manner, like other EUROPEAN princes; 
and leave other sources of honour, beside his smile and favour: Birth, titles, 
possessions, valour, integrity, knowledge, or great and fortunate atchievements. 
In the former species of government, after a conquest, it is impossible ever to 
shake off the yoke; since no one possesses, among the people, so much personal 
credit and authority as to begin such an enterprize: Whereas, in the latter, the 
least misfortune, or discord among the victors, will encourage the vanquished to 
take arms, who have leaders ready to prompt and conduct them in every 
undertaking.†6
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Such is the reasoning of MACHIAVEL, which seems solid and conclusive; though I 
wish he had not mixed falsehood with truth, in asserting, that monarchies, 
governed according to eastern policy, though more easily kept when once subdued, 
yet are the most difficult to subdue; since they cannot contain any powerful 
subject, whose discontent and faction may facilitate the enterprizes of an 
enemy. For besides, that such a tyrannical government enervates the courage of 
men, and renders them indifferent towards the fortunes of their sovereign; 
besides this, I say, we find by experience, that even the temporary and 
delegated authority of the generals and magistrates; being always, in such 
governments, as absolute within its sphere, as that of the prince himself; is 
able, with barbarians, accustomed to a blind submission, to produce the most 
dangerous and fatal revolutions. So that, in every respect, a gentle government 
is preferable, and gives the greatest security to the sovereign as well as to 
the subject.
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Legislators, therefore, ought not to trust the future government of a state 
entirely to chance, but ought to provide a system of laws to regulate the 
administration of public affairs to the latest posterity. Effects will always 
correspond to causes; and wise regulations in any commonwealth are the most 
valuable legacy that can be left to future ages. In the smallest court or 
office, the stated forms and methods, by which business must be conducted, are 
found to be a considerable check on the natural depravity of mankind. Why should 
not the case be the same in public affairs? Can we ascribe the stability and 
wisdom of the VENETIAN government, through so many ages, to any thing but the 
form of government? And is it not easy to point out those defects in the 
original constitution, which produced the tumultuous governments of ATHENS and 
ROME, and ended at last in the ruin of these two famous republics? And so little 
dependance has this affair on the humours and education of particular men, that 
one part of the same republic may be wisely conducted, and another weakly, by 
the very same men, merely on account of the difference of the forms and 
institutions, by which these parts are regulated. Historians inform us that this 
was actually the case with GENOA. For while the state was always full of 
sedition, and tumult, and disorder, the bank of St. GEORGE, which had become a 
considerable part of the people, was conducted, for several ages, with the 
utmost integrity and wisdom.†7
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†f The ages of greatest public spirit are not always most eminent for private 
virtue. Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the 
manners and customs have instilled little humanity or justice into the tempers 
of men. The most illustrious period of the ROMAN history, considered in a 
political view, is that between the beginning of the first and end of the last 
PUNIC war; the due balance between the nobility and the people being then fixed 
by the contests of the tribunes, and not being yet lost by the extent of 
conquests. Yet at this very time, the horrid practice of poisoning was so 
common, that, during part of a season, a Praetor punished capitally for this 
crime above three thousand†8 persons in a part of ITALY; and found informations 
of this nature still multiplying upon him. There is a similar, or rather a worse 
instance,†9 in the more early times of the commonwealth. So depraved in private 
life were that people, whom in their histories we so much admire. I doubt not 
but they were really more virtuous during the time of the two Triumvirates; when 
they were tearing their common country to pieces, and spreading slaughter and 
desolation over the face of the earth, merely for the choice of tyrants.†10
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Here, then, is a sufficient inducement to maintain, with the utmost ZEAL, in 
every free state, those forms and institutions, by which liberty is secured, the 
public good consulted, and the avarice or ambition of particular men restrained 
and punished. Nothing does more honour to human nature, than to see it 
susceptible of so noble a passion; as nothing can be a greater indication of 
meanness of heart in any man, than to see him destitute of it. A man who loves 
only himself, without regard to friendship and desert, merits the severest 
blame; and a man, who is only susceptible of friendship, without public spirit, 
or a regard to the community, is deficient in the most material part of virtue.
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But this is a subject which needs not be longer insisted on at present. There 
are enow of zealots on both sides who kindle up the passions of their partizans, 
and under pretence of public good, pursue the interests and ends of their 
particular faction. For my part, I shall always be more fond of promoting 
moderation than zeal; though perhaps the surest way of producing moderation in 
every party is to increase our zeal for the public. Let us therefore try, if it 
be possible, from the foregoing doctrine, to draw a lesson of moderation with 
regard to the parties, into which our country is at present†g divided; at the 
same time, that we allow not this moderation to abate the industry and passion, 
with which every individual is bound to pursue the good of his country.
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Those who either attack or defend a minister in such a government as ours, where 
the utmost liberty is allowed, always carry matters to an extreme, and 
exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to the public. His enemies are sure 
to charge him with the greatest enormities, both in domestic and foreign 
management; and there is no meanness or crime, of which, in their account, he is 
not capable. Unnecessary wars, scandalous treaties, profusion of public 
treasure, oppressive taxes, every kind of mal-administration is ascribed to him. 
To aggravate the charge, his pernicious conduct, it is said, will extend its 
baleful influence even to posterity, by undermining the best constitution in the 
world, and disordering that wise system of laws, institutions, and customs, by 
which our ancestors, during so many centuries, have been so happily governed. He 
is not only a wicked minister in himself, but has removed every security 
provided against wicked ministers for the future.
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On the other hand, the partizans of the minister make his panegyric run as high 
as the accusation against him, and celebrate his wise, steady, and moderate 
conduct in every part of his administration. The honour and interest of the 
nation supported abroad, public credit maintained at home, persecution 
restrained, faction subdued; the merit of all these blessings is ascribed solely 
to the minister. At the same time, he crowns all his other merits by a religious 
care of the best constitution in the world, which he has preserved in all its 
parts, and has transmitted entire, to be the happiness and security of the 
latest posterity.
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When this accusation and panegyric are received by the partizans of each party, 
no wonder they beget an extraordinary ferment on both sides, and fill the nation 
with violent animosities. But I would fain persuade these party-zealots, that 
there is a flat contradiction both in the accusation and panegyric, and that it 
were impossible for either of them to run so high, were it not for this 
contradiction. If our constitution be really that noble fabric, the pride of 
BRITAIN, the envy of our neighbours, raised by the labour of so many centuries, 
repaired at the expence of so many millions, and cemented by such a profusion of 
blood;†11 I say, if our constitution does in any degree deserve these†h 
eulogies, it would never have suffered a wicked and weak minister to govern 
triumphantly for a course of twenty years, when opposed by the greatest geniuses 
in the nation, who exercised the utmost liberty of tongue and pen, in 
parliament, and in their frequent appeals to the people. But, if the minister be 
wicked and weak, to the degree so strenuously insisted on, the constitution must 
be faulty in its original principles, and he cannot consistently be charged with 
undermining the best form of government in the world. A constitution is only so 
far good, as it provides a remedy against mal-administration; and if the 
BRITISH, when in its greatest vigour, and repaired by two such remarkable 
events, as the Revolution and Accession, by which our ancient royal family was 
sacrificed to it; if our constitution, I say, with so great advantages, does 
not, in fact, provide any such remedy, we are rather beholden to any minister 
who undermines it, and affords us an opportunity of erecting a better in its 
place.
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I would employ the same topics to moderate the zeal of those who defend the 
minister. Is our constitution so excellent? Then a change of ministry can be no 
such dreadful event; since it is essential to such a constitution, in every 
ministry, both to preserve itself from violation, and to prevent all enormities 
in the administration. Is our constitution very bad? Then so extraordinary a 
jealousy and apprehension, on account of changes, is ill placed; and a man 
should no more be anxious in this case, than a husband, who had married a woman 
from the stews, should be watchful to prevent her infidelity. Public affairs, in 
such a government, must necessarily go to confusion, by whatever hands they are 
conducted; and the zeal of patriots is in that case much less requisite than the 
patience and submission of philosophers. The virtue and good intentions of CATO 
and BRUTUS are highly laudable; but, to what purpose did their zeal serve? Only 
to hasten the fatal period of the ROMAN government, and render its convulsions 
and dying agonies more violent and painful.
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I would not be understood to mean, that public affairs deserve no care and 
attention at all. Would men be moderate and consistent, their claims might be 
admitted; at least might be examined. The country-party might still assert, that 
our constitution, though excellent, will admit of mal-administration to a 
certain degree; and therefore, if the minister be bad, it is proper to oppose 
him with a suitable degree of zeal. And, on the other hand, the court-party may 
be allowed, upon the supposition that the minister were good, to defend, and 
with some zeal too, his administration. I would only persuade men not to 
contend, as if they were fighting pro aris & focis, and change a good 
constitution into a bad one, by the violence of their factions.†i
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I have not here considered any thing that is personal in the present 
controversy. In the best civil constitution, where every man is restrained by 
the most rigid laws, it is easy to discover either the good or bad intentions of 
a minister, and to judge, whether his personal character deserve love or hatred. 
But such questions are of little importance to the public, and lay those, who 
employ their pens upon them, under a just suspicion either of malevolence or of 
flattery.
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†1 For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administer'd is best. ESSAY on Man, Book 3.
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†2 Ann. lib. 1. cap. 2.
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†3 SUET. in vita DOMIT. c. 8.
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†4 Egregium resumendoe libertati tempus, si ipsi florentes, quam inops ITALIA 
quam imbellis urbana plebs, nihil validum in exercitibus, nisi quod externum 
cogitarent. TACIT. Ann. lib. 3. 40.†c
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†5 Lib. 1. cap. 72.
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†6 I have taken it for granted, according to the supposition of MACHIAVEL, that 
the ancient PERSIANS had no nobility; though there is reason to suspect, that 
the FLORENTINE secretary, who seems to have been better acquainted with the 
ROMAN than the GREEK authors, was mistaken in this particular. The more ancient 
PERSIANS, whose manners are described by XENOPHON, were a free people, and had 
nobility. Their {omotimoi} were preserved even after the extending of their 
conquests and the consequent change of their government. ARRIAN mentions them in 
DARIUS'S time, De exped. ALEX. lib. ii. 11. Historians also speak often of the 
persons in command as men of family. TYGRANES, who was general of the MEDES 
under XERXES, was of the race of ACHMAENES, HEROD. lib. vii. cap. 62. 
ARTACHAEAS, who directed the cutting of the canal about mount ATHOS, was of the 
same family. Id. cap. 117. MEGABYZUS was one of the seven eminent PERSIANS who 
conspired against the MAGI. His son, ZOPYRUS, was in the highest command under 
DARIUS, and delivered BABYLON to him. His grandson, MEGABYZUS, commanded the 
army, defeated at MARATHON. His great-grandson, ZOPYRUS, was also eminent, and 
was banished PERSIA. HEROD. lib. iii. 160, THUC. lib. i. 109. ROSACES, who 
commanded an army in EGYPT under ARTAXERXES, was also descended from one of the 
seven conspirators, DIOD. SIC. lib. xvi. 47. AGESILAUS, in XENOPHON, Hist. 
GRAEC. lib. iv. 1, being desirous of making a marriage betwixt king COTYS his 
ally, and the daughter of SPITHRIDATES, a PERSIAN of rank, who had deserted to 
him, first asks COTYS what family SPITHRIDATES is of. One of the most 
considerable in PERSIA, says COTYS. ARIAEUS, when offered the sovereignty by 
CLEARCHUS and the ten thousand GREEKS, refused it as of too low a rank, and 
said, that so many eminent PERSIANS would never endure his rule. Id. de exped. 
lib. ii. Some of the families descended from the seven PERSIANS abovementioned 
remained during all ALEXANDER'S successors; and MITHRIDATES, in ANTIOCHUS'S 
time, is said by POLYBIUS to be descended from one of them, lib. v. cap. 43. 
ARTABAZUS was esteemed, as ARRIAN says, {en tois protois Person}. lib. iii. 23. 
And when ALEXANDER married in one day 80 of his captains to PERSIAN women, his 
intention plainly was to ally the MACEDONIANS with the most eminent PERSIAN 
families. Id. lib. vii. 4. DIODORUS SICULUS says they were of the most noble 
birth in PERSIA, lib. xvii. 107. The government of PERSIA was despotic, and 
conducted in many respects, after the eastern manner, but was not carried so far 
as to extirpate all nobility, and confound all ranks and orders. It left men who 
were still great, by themselves and their family, independent of their office 
and commission. And the reason why the MACEDONIANS kept so easily dominion over 
them was owing to other causes easy to be found in the historians; though it 
must be owned that MACHIAVEL'S reasoning is, in itself, just, however doubtful 
its application to the present case.†e
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†7 Essempio veramente raro, & da Filosofi intante loro imaginate & vedute 
Republiche mai non trovato, vedere dentro ad un medesimo cerchio, fra medesimi 
cittadini, la liberta, & la tirannide, la vita civile & la corotta, la 
giustitia, & la licenza; perche quello ordine solo mantiere quella citta piena 
di costumi antichi & venerabili. E s'egli auvenisse (che col tempo in ogni modo 
auverra) que SAN GIORGIO tutta quel la citta occupasse, sarrebbe quella una 
Republica piu dalla VENETIANA memorabile. Della Hist. Florentine, lib. 8.
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†8 T. Livii, lib. 40. cap. 43.
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†9 Id. lib. 8. cap. 18.
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†10 L'Aigle contre L'Aigle, ROMAINS
contre ROMAINS,
Combatans seulement pour le choix de tyrans.
CORNEILLE.
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†11 Dissertation on parties, Letter 10.
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†a Editions A to P insert the following:--An equal difference of a contrary 
kind, may be found on comparing the reigns of ELIZABETH and JAMES, at least with 
regard to foreign affairs.
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They omit the words "foreign as well as domestic" in the next sentence.
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†b Editions A to Q insert: And such, in a great measure, was that of ENGLAND, 
till the middle of the last century, notwithstanding the numerous panegyrics on 
ancient ENGLISH liberty. Editions A and B stop at the word century.
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†c Ed. A reads Vespasian's, and gives no reference.
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†d This sentence and the notes 1 [2] and 2 [3] were added in Edition K.
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†e This note was added in Edition K.
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†f This paragraph was added in Edition D.
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†g Editions D to N give the date 1742.
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†h Elogiums: Editions A to D. The word is frequently so written in the Treatise.
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†i Editions D to P give in a note the well-known Character of Sir Robert 
Walpole. It will be found in the concluding section of Vol. IV.

Essay 4. OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT
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ESSAY IV: OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT
Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs with a 
philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the 
few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and 
passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is 
effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, 
the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on 
opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most 
despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most 
popular. The soldan of EGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive his harmless 
subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: But he 
must, at least, have led his mamalukes, or praetorian bands, like men, by their 
opinion.
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Opinion is of two kinds, to wit, opinion of INTEREST, and opinion of RIGHT. By 
opinion of interest, I chiefly understand the sense of the general advantage 
which is reaped from government; together with the persuasion, that the 
particular government, which is established, is equally advantageous with any 
other that could easily be settled. When this opinion prevails among the 
generality of a state, or among those who have the force in their hands, it 
gives great security to any government.
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Right is of two kinds, right to POWER and right to PROPERTY. What prevalence 
opinion of the first kind has over mankind, may easily be understood, by 
observing the attachment which all nations have to their ancient government, and 
even to those names, which have had the sanction of antiquity. Antiquity always 
begets the opinion of right; and whatever disadvantageous sentiments we may 
entertain of mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of blood and 
treasure in the maintenance of public justice.†a There is, indeed, no 
particular, in which, at first sight, there may appear a greater contradiction 
in the frame of the human mind than the present. When men act in a faction, they 
are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and 
morality, in order to serve their party; and yet, when a faction is formed upon 
a point of right or principle, there is no occasion, where men discover a 
greater obstinacy, and a more determined sense of justice and equity. The same 
social disposition of mankind is the cause of these contradictory appearances.
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It is sufficiently understood, that the opinion of right to property is of 
moment in all matters of government. A noted author has made property the 
foundation of all government; and most of our political writers seem inclined to 
follow him in that particular. This is carrying the matter too far; but still it 
must be owned, that the opinion of right to property has a great influence in 
this subject.
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Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of right to power, and 
of right to property, are all governments founded, and all authority of the few 
over the many. There are indeed other principles, which add force to these, and 
determine, limit, or alter their operation; such as self-interest, fear, and 
affection: But still we may assert, that these other principles can have no 
influence alone, but suppose the antecedent influence of those opinions 
above-mentioned. They are, therefore, to be esteemed the secondary, not the 
original principles of government.
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For, first, as to self-interest, by which I mean the expectation of particular 
rewards, distinct from the general protection which we receive from government, 
it is evident that the magistrate's authority must be antecedently established, 
at least be hoped for, in order to produce this expectation. The prospect of 
reward may augment his authority with regard to some particular persons; but can 
never give birth to it, with regard to the public. Men naturally look for the 
greatest favours from their friends and acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes 
of any considerable number of the state would never center in any particular set 
of men, if these men had no other title to magistracy, and had no separate 
influence over the opinions of mankind. The same observation may be extended to 
the other two principles of fear and affection. No man would have any reason to 
fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but from fear; since, 
as a single man, his bodily force can reach but a small way, and all the farther 
power he possesses must be founded either on our own opinion, or on the presumed 
opinion of others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in a sovereign 
extends very far, and has great influence; yet he must antecedently be supposed 
invested with a public character, otherwise the public esteem will serve him in 
no stead, nor will his virtue have any influence beyond a narrow sphere.
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A Government may endure for several ages, though the balance of power, and the 
balance of property do not coincide. This chiefly happens, where any rank or 
order of the state has acquired a large share in the property; but from the 
original constitution of the government, has no share in the power. Under what 
pretence would any individual of that order assume authority in public affairs? 
As men are commonly much attached to their ancient government, it is not to be 
expected, that the public would ever favour such usurpations. But where the 
original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an order of 
men, who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for them gradually to 
stretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to coincide with that of 
property. This has been the case with the house of commons in ENGLAND.
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Most writers, that have treated of the BRITISH government, have supposed, that, 
as the lower house represents all the commons of GREAT BRITAIN, its weight in 
the scale is proportioned to the property and power of all whom it represents. 
But this principle must not be received as absolutely true. For though the 
people are apt to attach themselves more to the house of commons, than to any 
other member of the constitution; that house being chosen by them as their 
representatives, and as the public guardians of their liberty; yet are there 
instances where the house, even when in opposition to the crown, has not been 
followed by the people; as we may particularly observe of the tory house of 
commons in the reign of king WILLIAM, Were the members obliged to receive 
instructions from their constituents, like the DUTCH deputies, this would 
entirely alter the case; and if such immense power and riches, as those of all 
the commons of GREAT BRITAIN, were brought into the scale, it is not easy to 
conceive, that the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or 
withstand that overbalance of property. It is true, the crown has great 
influence over the collective body in the elections of members; but were this 
influence, which at present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed 
in bringing over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted; and no 
skill, popularity, or revenue, could support it. I must, therefore, be of 
opinion, that an alteration in this particular would introduce a total 
alteration in our government, and would soon reduce it to a pure republic; and, 
perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form. For though the people, collected 
in a body like the ROMAN tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when 
dispersed in small bodies, they are more susceptible both of reason and order; 
the force of popular currents and tides is, in a great measure, broken; and the 
public interest may be pursued with some method and constancy. But it is 
needless to reason any farther concerning a form of government, which is never 
likely to have place in GREAT BRITAIN, and which seems not to be the aim of any 
party amongst us. Let us cherish and improve our ancient government as much as 
possible, without encouraging a passion for such dangerous novelties.†b
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†a Editions A to P insert as follows:--This passion we may denominate 
enthusiasm, or we may give it what appellation we please; but a politician, who 
should overlook its influence on human affairs, would prove himself but of a 
very limited understanding.
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Editions A and B omit the remainder of the paragraph.
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†b Editions A to N add the following paragraph:--I shall conclude this subject 
with observing, that the present political controversy, with regard to 
instructions, is a very frivolous one, and can never be brought to any decision, 
as it is managed by both parties. The country-party pretend not, that a member 
is absolutely bound to follow instructions, as an ambassador or general is 
confined by his orders, and that his vote is not to be received in the house, 
but so far as it is conformable to them. The court-party again, pretend not, 
that the sentiments of the people ought to have no weight with every member; 
much less that he ought to despise the sentiments of those he represents, and 
with whom he is more particularly connected. And if their sentiments be of 
weight, why ought they not to express these sentiments? The question, then, is 
only concerning the degrees of weight, which ought to be plac'd on instructions. 
But such is the nature of language, that it is impossible for it to express 
distinctly these different degrees; and if men will carry on a controversy on 
this head, it may well happen, that they differ in their language, and yet agree 
in their sentiments; or differ in their sentiments, and yet agree in their 
language. Besides, how is it possible to find these degrees, considering the 
variety of affairs which come before the house, and the variety of places which 
members represent? Ought the instructions of TOTNESS to have the same weight as 
those of LONDON? or instructions, with regard to the Convention, which respected 
foreign politics, to have the same weight as those with regard to the excise, 
which respected only our domestic affairs?

Essay 5. OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT
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ESSAY V: OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT
Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, from necessity, from 
natural inclination, and from habit. The same creature, in his farther progress, 
is engaged to establish political society, in order to administer justice; 
without which there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual 
intercourse. We are, therefore, to look upon all the vast apparatus of our 
government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose but the distribution 
of justice, or, in other words, the support of the twelve judges. Kings and 
parliaments, fleets and armies, officers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, 
ministers, and privy-counsellors, are all subordinate in their end to this part 
of administration. Even the clergy, as their duty leads them to inculcate 
morality, may justly be thought, so far as regards this world, to have no other 
useful object of their institution.
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All men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain peace and order; 
and all men are sensible of the necessity of peace and order for the maintenance 
of society. Yet, notwithstanding this strong and obvious necessity, such is the 
frailty or perverseness of our nature! it is impossible to keep men, faithfully 
and unerringly, in the paths of justice. Some extraordinary circumstances may 
happen, in which a man finds his interests to be more promoted by fraud or 
rapine, than hurt by the breach which his injustice makes in the social union. 
But much more frequently, he is seduced from his great and important, but 
distant interests, by the allurement of present, though often very frivolous 
temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human nature.
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Men must, therefore, endeavour to palliate what they cannot cure. They must 
institute some persons, under the appellation of magistrates, whose peculiar 
office it is, to point out the decrees of equity, to punish transgressors, to 
correct fraud and violence, and to oblige men, however reluctant, to consult 
their own real and permanent interests. In a word, OBEDIENCE is a new duty which 
must be invented to support that of JUSTICE; and the tyes of equity must be 
corroborated by those of allegiance.
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But still, viewing matters in an abstract light, it may be thought, that nothing 
is gained by this alliance, and that the factitious duty of obedience, from its 
very nature, lays as feeble a hold of the human mind, as the primitive and 
natural duty of justice. Peculiar interests and present temptations may overcome 
the one as well as the other. They are equally exposed to the same 
inconvenience. And the man, who is inclined to be a bad neighbour, must be led 
by the same motives, well or ill understood, to be a bad citizen and subject. 
Not to mention, that the magistrate himself may often be negligent, or partial, 
or unjust in his administration.
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Experience, however, proves, that there is a great difference between the cases. 
Order in society, we find, is much better maintained by means of government; and 
our duty to the magistrate is more strictly guarded by the principles of human 
nature, than our duty to our fellow-citizens. The love of dominion is so strong 
in the breast of man, that many, not only submit to, but court all the dangers, 
and fatigues, and cares of government; and men, once raised to that station, 
though often led astray by private passions, find, in ordinary cases, a visible 
interest in the impartial administration of justice. The persons, who first 
attain this distinction by the consent, tacit or express, of the people, must be 
endowed with superior personal qualities of valour, force, integrity, or 
prudence, which command respect and confidence: and after government is 
established, a regard to birth, rank, and station has a mighty influence over 
men, and enforces the decrees of the magistrate. The prince or leader exclaims 
against every disorder, which disturbs his society. He summons all his partizans 
and all men of probity to aid him in correcting and redressing it: and he is 
readily followed by all indifferent persons in the execution of his office. He 
soon acquires the power of rewarding these services; and in the progress of 
society, he establishes subordinate ministers and often a military force, who 
find an immediate and a visible interest, in supporting his authority. Habit 
soon consolidates what other principles of human nature had imperfectly founded; 
and men, once accustomed to obedience, never think of departing from that path, 
in which they and their ancestors have constantly trod, and to which they are 
confined by so many urgent and visible motives.
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But though this progress of human affairs may appear certain and inevitable, and 
though the support which allegiance brings to justice, be founded on obvious 
principles of human nature, it cannot be expected that men should beforehand be 
able to discover them, or foresee their operation. Government commences more 
casually and more imperfectly. It is probable, that the first ascendant of one 
man over multitudes begun during a state of war; where the superiority of 
courage and of genius discovers itself most visibly, where unanimity and concert 
are most requisite, and where the pernicious effects of disorder are most 
sensibly felt. The long continuance of that state, an incident common among 
savage tribes, enured the people to submission; and if the chieftain possessed 
as much equity as prudence and valour, he became, even during peace, the arbiter 
of all differences, and could gradually, by a mixture of force and consent, 
establish his authority. The benefit sensibly felt from his influence, made it 
be cherished by the people, at least by the peaceable and well disposed among 
them; and if his son enjoyed the same good qualities, government advanced the 
sooner to maturity and perfection; but was still in a feeble state, till the 
farther progress of improvement procured the magistrate a revenue, and enabled 
him to bestow rewards on the several instruments of his administration, and to 
inflict punishments on the refractory and disobedient. Before that period, each 
exertion of his influence must have been particular, and founded on the peculiar 
circumstances of the case. After it, submission was no longer a matter of choice 
in the bulk of the community, but was rigorously exacted by the authority of the 
supreme magistrate.
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In all governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, 
between AUTHORITY and LIBERTY; and neither of them can ever absolutely prevail 
in the contest. A great sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be made in every 
government; yet even the authority, which confines liberty, can never, and 
perhaps ought never, in any constitution, to become quite entire and 
uncontroulable. The sultan is master of the life and fortune of any individual; 
but will not be permitted to impose new taxes on his subjects: a French monarch 
can impose taxes at pleasure; but would find it dangerous to attempt the lives 
and fortunes of individuals. Religion also, in most countries, is commonly found 
to be a very intractable principle; and other principles or prejudices 
frequently resist all the authority of the civil magistrate; whose power, being 
founded on opinion, can never subvert other opinions, equally rooted with that 
of his title to dominion. The government, which, in common appellation, receives 
the appellation of free, is that which admits of a partition of power among 
several members, whose united authority is no less, or is commonly greater than 
that of any monarch; but who, in the usual course of administration, must act by 
general and equal laws, that are previously known to all the members and to all 
their subjects. In this sense, it must be owned, that liberty is the perfection 
of civil society; but still authority must be acknowledged essential to its very 
existence: and in those contests, which so often take place between the one and 
the other, the latter may, on that account, challenge the preference. Unless 
perhaps one may say (and it may be said with some reason) that a circumstance, 
which is essential to the existence of civil society, must always support 
itself, and needs be guarded with less jealousy, than one that contributes only 
to its perfection, which the indolence of men is so apt to neglect, or their 
ignorance to overlook.

Essay 6. OF THE INDEPENDENCY OF PARLIAMENT
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ESSAY VI: OF THE INDEPENDENCY OF PARLIAMENT†a
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system 
of government, and fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, 
every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his 
actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by 
means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, 
co-operate to public good. Without this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the 
advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no 
security for our liberties or possessions, except the good-will of our rulers; 
that is, we shall have no security at all.
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It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a 
knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should 
be true in politics, which is false in fact. But to satisfy us on this head, we 
may consider, that men are generally more honest in their private than in their 
public capacity, and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their 
own private interest is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon mankind: 
But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great 
measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for 
what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of 
adversaries. To which we may add, that every court or senate is determined by 
the greater number of voices; so that, if self-interest influences only the 
majority, (as it will always do†b) the whole senate follows the allurements of 
this separate interest, and acts as if it contained not one member, who had any 
regard to public interest and liberty.
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When there offers, therefore, to our censure and examination, any plan of 
government, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among several 
courts, and several orders of men, we should always consider the separate 
interest of each court, and each order; and, if we find that, by the skilful 
division of power, this interest must necessarily, in its operation, concur with 
public, we may pronounce that government to be wise and happy. If, on the 
contrary, separate interest be not checked, and be not directed to the public, 
we ought to look for nothing but faction, disorder, and tyranny from such a 
government. In this opinion I am justified by experience, as well as by the 
authority of all philosophers and politicians, both antient and modern.
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How much, therefore, would it have surprised such a genius as CICERO, or 
TACITUS, to have been told, that, in a future age, there should arise a very 
regular system of mixed government, where the authority was so distributed, that 
one rank, whenever it pleased, might swallow up all the rest, and engross the 
whole power of the constitution. Such a government, they would say, will not be 
a mixed government. For so great is the natural ambition of men, that they are 
never satisfied with power; and if one order of men, by pursuing its own 
interest, can usurp upon every other order, it will certainly do so, and render 
itself, as far as possible, absolute and uncontroulable.
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But, in this opinion, experience shews they would have been mistaken. For this 
is actually the case with the BRITISH constitution. The share of power, allotted 
by our constitution to the house of commons, is so great, that it absolutely 
commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legislative power is 
plainly no proper check to it. For though the king has a negative in framing 
laws; yet this, in fact, is esteemed of so little moment, that whatever is voted 
by the two houses, is always sure to pass into a law, and the royal assent is 
little better than a form. The principal weight of the crown lies in the 
executive power. But besides that the executive power in every government is 
altogether subordinate to the legislative; besides this, I say, the exercise of 
this power requires an immense expence; and the commons have assumed to 
themselves the sole right of granting money. How easy, therefore, would it be 
for that house to wrest from the crown all these powers, one after another; by 
making every grant conditional, and choosing their time so well, that their 
refusal of supply should only distress the government, without giving foreign 
powers any advantage over us? Did the house of commons depend in the same manner 
on the king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would 
not he command all their resolutions, and be from that moment absolute? As to 
the house of lords, they are a very powerful support to the Crown, so long as 
they are, in their turn, supported by it; but both experience and reason shew, 
that they have no force or authority sufficient to maintain themselves alone, 
without such support.
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How, therefore, shall we solve this paradox? And by what means is this member of 
our constitution confined within the proper limits; since, from our very 
constitution, it must necessarily have as much power as it demands, and can only 
be confined by itself? How is this consistent with our experience of human 
nature? I answer, that the interest of the body is here restrained by that of 
the individuals, and that the house of commons stretches not its power, because 
such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its 
members. The crown has so many offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by 
the honest and disinterested part of the house, it will always command the 
resolutions of the whole so far, at least, as to preserve the antient 
constitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we 
please; we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and 
dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very 
nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed 
government.
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Instead then of asserting†1 absolutely, that the dependence of parliament, in 
every degree, is an infringement of BRITISH liberty, the country-party should 
have made some concessions to their adversaries, and have only examined what was 
the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to 
liberty. But such a moderation is not to be expected in party-men of any kind. 
After a concession of this nature, all declamation must be abandoned; and a calm 
enquiry into the proper degree of court-influence and parliamentary dependence 
would have been expected by the readers. And though the advantage, in such a 
controversy, might possibly remain to the country-party; yet the victory would 
not be so compleat as they wish for, nor would a true patriot have given an 
entire loose to his zeal, for fear of running matters into a contrary extreme, 
by diminishing too†2 far the influence of the crown. It was, therefore, thought 
best to deny, that this extreme could ever be dangerous to the constitution, or 
that the crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament.
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All questions concerning the proper medium between extremes are difficult to be 
decided; both because it is not easy to find words proper to fix this medium, 
and because the good and ill, in such cases, run so gradually into each other, 
as even to render our sentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar 
difficulty in the present case, which would embarrass the most knowing and most 
impartial examiner. The power of the crown is always lodged in a single person, 
either king or minister; and as this person may have either a greater or less 
degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity, or fortune, the power, which 
is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. In pure republics, 
where the authority is distributed among several assemblies or senates, the 
checks and controuls are more regular in their operation; because the members of 
such numerous assemblies may be presumed to be always nearly equal in capacity 
and virtue; and it is only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into 
consideration. But a limited monarchy admits not of any such stability; nor is 
it possible to assign to the crown such a determinate degree of power, as will, 
in every hand, form a proper counterbalance to the other parts of the 
constitution. This is an unavoidable disadvantage, among the many advantages, 
attending that species of government.
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†1 See Dissertation on Parties, throughout.
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†2 By that influence of the crown, which I would justify, I mean only that which 
arises from the offices and honours that are at the disposal of the crown. As to 
private bribery, it may be considered in the same light as the practice of 
employing spies, which is scarcely justifiable in a good minister, and is 
infamous in a bad one: But to be a spy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous 
under all ministers, and is to be regarded as a shameless prostitution. POLYBIUS 
justly esteems the pecuniary influence of the senate and censors to be one of 
the regular and constitutional weights, which preserved the balance of the ROMAN 
government. Lib. vi. cap. 15.†c
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†a In Editions A to N this Essay is introduced by the following examination of 
the spirit of parties. I have frequently observed, in comparing the conduct of 
the court and country parties, that the former are commonly less assuming and 
dogmatical in conversation, more apt to make concessions; and tho' not, perhaps, 
more susceptible of conviction, yet more able to bear contradiction than the 
latter; who are apt to fly out upon any opposition, and to regard one as a 
mercenary designing fellow, if he argues with any coolness and impartiality, or 
makes any concessions to their adversaries. This is a fact, which, I believe, 
every one may have observed, who has been much in companies where political 
questions have been discussed; tho', were one to ask the reason of this 
difference, every party would be apt to assign a different reason. Gentlemen in 
the Opposition will ascribe it to the very nature of their party, which, being 
founded on public spirit, and a zeal for the constitution, cannot easily endure 
such doctrines, as are of pernicious consequence to liberty. The courtiers, on 
the other hand, will be apt to put us in mind of the clown mentioned by lord 
SHAFTSBURY. "A clown," says that excellent author,†1 "once took a fancy to hear 
the Latin disputes of doctors at an university. He was asked what pleasure he 
could take in viewing such combatants, when he could never know so much, as 
which of the parties had the better. For that matter, replied the clown, I a'n't 
such a fool neither, but I can see who's the first that puts t'other into a 
passion. Nature herself dictated this lesson to the clown, that he who had the 
better of the argument would be easy and well-humoured: But he who was unable to 
support his cause by reason would naturally lose his temper and grow violent."
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To which of these reasons shall we adhere? To neither of them, in my opinion; 
unless we have a mind to enlist ourselves and become zealots in either party. I 
believe I can assign the reason of this different conduct of the two parties, 
without offending either. The country party are plainly most popular at present, 
and perhaps have been so in most administrations: So that, being accustomed to 
prevail in company, they cannot endure to hear their opinions controverted, but 
are as confident on the public favour, as if they were supported in all their 
sentiments by the most infallible demonstration. The courtiers, on the other 
hand, are commonly so run down by popular talkers, that if you speak to them 
with any moderation, or make them the smallest concessions, they think 
themselves extremely beholden to you, and are apt to return the favour by a like 
moderation and facility on their part. To be furious and passionate, they know, 
would only gain them the character of shameless mercenaries; not that of zealous 
patriots, which is the character that such a warm behaviour is apt to acquire to 
the other party.
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In all controversies, we find, without regarding the truth or falshood on either 
side, that those who defend the established and popular opinions, are always the 
most dogmatical and imperious in their stile: while their adversaries affect 
almost extraordinary gentleness and moderation, in order to soften, as much as 
possible, any prejudices that may lye against them. Consider the behavior of our 
free-thinkers of all denominations, whether they be such as decry all 
revelation, or only oppose the exorbitant power of the clergy; Collins, Tindal, 
Foster, Hoadley. Compare their moderation and good manners with the furious zeal 
and scurrility of their adversaries, and you will be convinced of the truth of 
my observation. A like difference may be observed in the conduct of those French 
writers, who maintained the controversy with regard to ancient and modern 
learning. Boileau, Monsieur and Madame Dacier, l'Abbe de Bos, who defended the 
party of the ancients, mixed their reasonings with satire and invective; while 
Fontenelle, la Motte, Charpentier, and even Perrault, never transgressed the 
bounds of moderation and good breeding; though provoked by the most injurious 
treatment of their adversaries.
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I must, however, observe, that this Remark with regard to the seeming Moderation 
of the Court Party, is entirely confin'd to Conversation, and to Gentlemen, who 
have been engag'd by Interest or Inclination in that Party. For as to the 
Court-Writers, being commonly hir'd Scriblers, they are altogether as scurrilous 
as the Mercenaries of the other Party; nor has the Gazeteer any Advantage, in 
this Respect, above Common Sense. A man of Education will, in any Party, 
discover himself to be such, by his Good-breeding and Decency; as a Scoundrel 
will always betray the opposite Qualities. The false Accusers accus'd, &c. is 
very scurrillous, tho' that Side of the Question, being least popular, shou'd be 
defended with most Moderation. When L--d B--e, L--d M--t, Mr. L--n take the Pen 
in Hand, tho' they write with Warmth, they presume not upon their Popularity so 
far as to transgress the Bounds of Decency. [This paragraph is only found in 
Editions A and B.]
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I am led into this train of reflection, by considering some papers wrote upon 
that grand topic of court influence and parliamentary dependence, where, in my 
humble opinion, the country party, besides vehemence and satyre, shew too rigid 
an inflexibility, and too great a jealousy of making concessions to their 
adversaries. Their reasonings lose their force by being carried too far; and the 
popularity of their opinions has seduced them to neglect in some measure their 
justness and solidity. The following reason will, I hope, serve to justify me in 
this opinion.
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†1 Miscellaneous Reflections, 107.
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†b In the present depraved state of mankind. Editions A to D.
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†c The reference to Polybius was added in Edition K.

Essay 7. WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INCLINES MORE TO ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, OR 
TO A REPUBLIC
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ESSAY VII: WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INCLINES MORE TO ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, OR 
TO A REPUBLIC
It affords a violent prejudice against almost every science, that no prudent 
man, however sure of his principles, dares prophesy concerning any event, or 
foretel the remote consequences of things. A physician will not venture to 
pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after: 
And still less dares a politician foretel the situation of public affairs a few 
years hence. HARRINGTON thought himself so sure of his general principle, that 
the balance of power depends on that of property, that he ventured to pronounce 
it impossible ever to re-establish monarchy in ENGLAND: But his book was 
scarcely published when the king was restored; and we see, that monarchy has 
ever since subsisted upon the same footing as before. Notwithstanding this 
unlucky example, I will venture to examine an important question, to wit, 
Whether the BRITISH government inclines more to absolute monarchy, or to a 
republic; and in which of these two species of government it will most probably 
terminate? As there seems not to be any great danger of a sudden revolution 
either way, I shall at least escape the shame attending my temerity, if I should 
be found to have been mistaken.
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Those who assert, that the balance of our government inclines towards absolute 
monarchy, may support their opinion by the following reasons. That property has 
a great influence on power cannot possibly be denied; but yet the general maxim, 
that the balance of one depends on the balance of the other, must be received 
with several limitations. It is evident, that much less property in a single 
hand will be able to counterbalance a greater property in several; not only 
because it is difficult to make many persons combine in the same views and 
measures; but because property, when united, causes much greater dependence, 
than the same property, when dispersed. A hundred persons, of 1000l. a year 
a-piece, can consume all their income, and no body shall ever be the better for 
them, except their servants and tradesmen, who justly regard their profits as 
the product of their own labour. But a man possessed of 100,000l. a year, if he 
has either any generosity or any cunning, may create a great dependence by 
obligations, and still a greater by expectations. Hence we may observe, that, in 
all free governments, any subject exorbitantly rich has always created jealousy, 
even though his riches bore no proportion to those of the state. CRASSUS'S 
fortune, if I remember well, amounted†a only to†b about two millions and a half 
of our money; yet we find, that, though his genius was nothing extraordinary, he 
was able, by means of his riches alone, to counterbalance, during his lifetime, 
the power of POMPEY as well as that of CAESAR, who afterwards became master of 
the world. The wealth of the MEDICI made them masters of FLORENCE; though, it is 
probable, it was not considerable, compared to the united property of that 
opulent republic.
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These considerations are apt to make one entertain a magnificent idea of the 
BRITISH spirit and love of liberty; since we could maintain our free government, 
during so many centuries, against our sovereigns, who, besides the power and 
dignity and majesty of the crown, have always been possessed of much more 
property than any subject has ever enjoyed in any commonwealth. But it may be 
said, that this spirit, however great, will never be able to support itself 
against that immense property, which is now lodged in the king, and which is 
still encreasing. Upon a moderate computation, there are near three millions a 
year at the disposal of the crown. The civil list amounts to near a million; the 
collection of all taxes to another; and the employments in the army and navy, 
together with ecclesiastical preferments, to above a third million: An enormous 
sum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth part of the 
whole income and labour of the kingdom. When we add to this great property, the 
encreasing luxury of the nation, our proneness to corruption, together with the 
great power and prerogatives of the crown, and the command of military force, 
there is no one but must despair of being able, without extraordinary efforts, 
to support our free government much longer under these disadvantages.
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On the other hand, those who maintain, that the byass of the BRITISH government 
leans towards a republic, may support their opinion by specious arguments. It 
may be said, that, though this immense property in the crown, be joined to the 
dignity of first magistrate, and to many other legal powers and prerogatives, 
which should naturally give it greater influence; yet it really becomes less 
dangerous to liberty upon that very account. Were ENGLAND a republic, and were 
any private man possessed of a revenue, a third, or even a tenth part as large 
as that of the crown, he would very justly excite jealousy; because he would 
infallibly have great authority, in the government: And such an irregular 
authority, not avowed by the laws, is always more dangerous than a much greater 
authority, derived from them. A man, possessed of usurped power, can set no 
bounds to his pretensions:†c His partizans have liberty to hope for every thing 
in his favour: His enemies provoke his ambition, with his fears, by the violence 
of their opposition: And the government being thrown into a ferment, every 
corrupted humour in the state naturally gathers to him. On the contrary, a legal 
authority, though great, has always some bounds, which terminate both the hopes 
and pretensions of the person possessed of it: The laws must have provided a 
remedy against its excesses: Such an eminent magistrate has much to fear, and 
little to hope from his usurpations: And as his legal authority is quietly 
submitted to, he has small temptation and small opportunity of extending it 
farther. Besides, it happens, with regard to ambitious aims and projects, what 
may be observed with regard to sects of philosophy and religion. A new sect 
excites such a ferment, and is both opposed and defended with such vehemence, 
that it always spreads faster, and multiplies its partizans with greater 
rapidity, than any old established opinion, recommended by the sanction of the 
laws and of antiquity. Such is the nature of novelty, that, where any thing 
pleases, it becomes doubly agreeable, if new; but if it displeases, it is doubly 
displeasing, upon that very account. And, in most cases, the violence of enemies 
is favourable to ambitious projects, as well as the zeal of partizans.
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It may farther be said, that, though men be much governed by interest; yet even 
interest itself, and all human affairs, are entirely governed by opinion. Now, 
there has been a sudden and sensible change in the opinions of men within these 
last fifty years, by the progress of learning and of liberty. Most people, in 
this island, have divested themselves of all superstitious reverence to names 
and authority: The clergy have†d much lost their credit: Their pretensions and 
doctrines have been ridiculed; and even religion can scarcely support itself in 
the world. The mere name of king commands little respect; and to talk of a king 
as GOD's vicegerent on earth, or to give him any of those magnificent titles, 
which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in every one. Though 
the crown, by means of its large revenue, may maintain its authority in times of 
tranquillity, upon private interest and influence; yet, as the least shock or 
convulsion must break all these interests to pieces, the royal power, being no 
longer supported by the settled principles and opinions of men, will immediately 
dissolve. Had men been in the same disposition at the revolution, as they are at 
present, monarchy would have run a great risque of being entirely lost in this 
island.
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Durst I venture to deliver my own sentiments amidst these opposite arguments, I 
would assert, that, unless there happen some extraordinary convulsion, the power 
of the crown, by means of its large revenue, is rather upon the encrease; 
though, at the same time I own, that its progress seems very slow, and almost 
insensible. The tide has run long, and with some rapidity, to the side of 
popular government, and is just beginning to turn towards monarchy.
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It is well known, that every government must come to a period, and that death is 
unavoidable to the political as well as to the animal body. But, as one kind of 
death may be preferable to another, it may be enquired, whether it be more 
desirable for the BRITISH constitution to terminate in a popular government, or 
in absolute monarchy? Here I would frankly declare, that, though liberty be 
preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I should rather wish to see an 
absolute monarch than a republic in this island. For, let us consider, what kind 
of republic we have reason to expect. The question is not concerning any fine 
imaginary republic, of which a man may form a plan in his closet. There is no 
doubt, but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than absolute 
monarchy, or even than our present constitution. But what reason have we to 
expect that any such government will ever be established in GREAT BRITAIN, upon 
the dissolution of our monarchy? If any single person acquire power enough to 
take our constitution to pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an absolute 
monarch; and we have already had an instance of this kind, sufficient to 
convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or establish any 
free government. Matters, therefore, must be trusted to their natural progress 
and operation; and the house of commons, according to its present constitution, 
must be the only legislature in such a popular government. The inconveniencies 
attending such a situation of affairs, present themselves by thousands. If the 
house of commons, in such a case, ever dissolve itself, which is not to be 
expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it continue itself, we 
shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction, subdivided into new factions. And, as 
such a violent government cannot long subsist, we shall, at last, after many 
convulsions, and civil wars, find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would 
have been happier for us to have established peaceably from the beginning. 
Absolute monarchy, therefore, is the easiest death, the true Euthanasia of the 
BRITISH constitution.
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Thus, if we have reason to be more jealous of monarchy, because the danger is 
more imminent from that quarter; we have also reason to be more jealous of 
popular government, because that danger is more terrible. This may teach us a 
lesson of moderation in all our political controversies.
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†a Editions A and B: to Three Thousand Talents a Year, about 400,000l. 
Sterling.--Editions D to Q: only to about sixteen hundred thousand pounds in our 
money.
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†b Editions D to Q add: As interest in Rome was higher than with us, this might 
yield above 100,000l. a year.
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†c Editions A to N have the note: On ne monte jamais si haut que quand on ne 
scait pas ou on va, said Cromwell to the President de Bellievre.--De Retz's 
Memoirs.
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†d Editions A to D read: have entirely lost.

Essay 8. OF PARTIES IN GENERAL
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ESSAY VIII: OF PARTIES IN GENERAL
Of all men, that distinguish themselves by memorable atchievements, the first 
place of honour seems due to LEGISLATORS and founders of states, who transmit a 
system of laws and institutions to secure the peace, happiness, and liberty of 
future generations. The influence of useful inventions in the arts and sciences 
may, perhaps, extend farther than that of wise laws, whose effects are limited 
both in time and place; but the benefit arising from the former, is not so 
sensible as that which results from the latter. Speculative sciences do, indeed, 
improve the mind; but this advantage reaches only to a few persons, who have 
leisure to apply themselves to them. And as to practical arts, which encrease 
the commodities and enjoyments of life, it is well known, that men's happiness 
consists not so much in an abundance of these, as in the peace and security with 
which they possess them; and those blessings can only be derived from good 
government. Not to mention, that general virtue and good morals in a state, 
which are so requisite to happiness, can never arise from the most refined 
precepts of philosophy, or even the severest injunctions of religion; but must 
proceed entirely from the virtuous education of youth, the effect of wise laws 
and institutions. I must, therefore, presume to differ from Lord BACON in this 
particular, and must regard antiquity as somewhat unjust in its distribution of 
honours, when it made gods of all the inventors of useful arts, such as CERES, 
BACCHUS, AESCULAPIUS; and dignify legislators, such as ROMULUS and THESEUS, only 
with the appellation of demigods and heroes.
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As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and respected 
among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and 
hated; because the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of laws. 
Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest 
animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance 
and protection to each other. And what should render the founders of parties 
more odious is, the difficulty of extirpating these weeds, when once they have 
taken root in any state. They naturally propagate themselves for many centuries, 
and seldom end but by the total dissolution of that government, in which they 
are sown. They are, besides, plants which grow most plentifully in the richest 
soil; and though absolute governments be not wholly free from them, it must be 
confessed, that they rise more easily, and propagate themselves faster in free 
governments, where they always infect the legislature itself, which alone could 
be able, by the steady application of rewards and punishments, to eradicate 
them.
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Factions may be divided into PERSONAL and REAL; that is, into factions, founded 
on personal friendship or animosity among such as compose the contending 
parties, and into those founded on some real difference of sentiment or 
interest. The reason of this distinction is obvious; though I must acknowledge, 
that parties are seldom found pure and unmixed, either of the one kind or the 
other. It is not often seen, that a government divides into factions, where 
there is no difference in the views of the constituent members, either real or 
apparent, trivial or material: And in those factions, which are founded on the 
most real and most material difference, there is always observed a great deal of 
personal animosity or affection. But notwithstanding this mixture, a party may 
be denominated either personal or real, according to that principle which is 
predominant, and is found to have the greatest influence.
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Personal factions arise most easily in small republics. Every domestic quarrel, 
there, becomes an affair of state. Love, vanity, emulation, any passion, as well 
as ambition and resentment, begets public division. The NERI and BIANCHI of 
FLORENCE, the FREGOSI and ADORNI of GENOA, the COLONESI and ORSINI of modern 
ROME, were parties of this kind.
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Men have such a propensity to divide into personal factions, that the smallest 
appearance of real difference will produce them. What can be imagined more 
trivial than the difference between one colour of livery and another in horse 
races? Yet this difference begat two most inveterate factions in the GREEK 
empire, the PRASINI and VENETI, who never suspended their animosities, till they 
ruined that unhappy government.
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†a We find in the ROMAN history a remarkable dissension between two tribes, the 
POLLIA and PAPIRIA, which continued for the space of near three hundred years, 
and discovered itself in their suffrages at every election of magistrates.†1 
This faction was the more remarkable, as it could continue for so long a tract 
of time; even though it did not spread itself, nor draw any of the other tribes 
into a share of the quarrel. If mankind had not a strong propensity to such 
divisions, the indifference of the rest of the community must have suppressed 
this foolish animosity, that had not any aliment of new benefits and injuries, 
of general sympathy and antipathy, which never fail to take place, when the 
whole state is rent into two equal factions.
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Nothing is more usual than to see parties, which have begun upon a real 
difference, continue even after that difference is lost. When men are once 
inlisted on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom 
they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these passions 
they often transmit to their posterity. The real difference between GUELF and 
GHIBBELLINE was long lost in ITALY, before these factions were extinguished. The 
GUELFS adhered to the pope, the GHIBBELLINES to the emperor; yet the family of 
SFORZA, who were in alliance with the emperor, though they were GUELFS, being 
expelled MILAN by the king†2 of FRANCE, assisted by JACOMO TRIVULZIO and the 
GHIBBELLINES, the pope concurred with the latter, and they formed leagues with 
the pope against the emperor.
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The civil wars which arose some few years ago in MOROCCO, between the blacks and 
whites, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a pleasant 
difference. We laugh at them; but I believe, were things rightly examined, we 
afford much more occasion of ridicule to the MOORS. For, what are all the wars 
of religion, which have prevailed in this polite and knowing part of the world? 
They are certainly more absurd than the MOORISH civil wars. The difference of 
complexion is a sensible and a real difference: But the controversy about an 
article of faith, which is utterly absurd and unintelligible, is not a 
difference in sentiment, but in a few phrases and expressions, which one party 
accepts of, without understanding them; and the other refuses in the same 
manner.†c
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Real factions may be divided into those from interest, from principle, and from 
affection. Of all factions, the first are the most reasonable, and the most 
excusable. Where two orders of men, such as the nobles and people, have a 
distinct authority in a government, not very accurately balanced and modelled, 
they naturally follow a distinct interest; nor can we reasonably expect a 
different conduct, considering that degree of selfishness implanted in human 
nature. It requires great skill in a legislator to prevent such parties; and 
many philosophers are of opinion, that this secret, like the grand elixir, or 
perpetual motion, may amuse men in theory, but can never possibly be reduced to 
practice. In despotic governments, indeed, factions often do not appear; but 
they are not the less real; or rather, they are more real and more pernicious, 
upon that very account. The distinct orders of men, nobles and people, soldiers 
and merchants, have all a distinct interest; but the more powerful oppresses the 
weaker with impunity, and without resistance; which begets a seeming 
tranquillity in such governments.†d
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There has been an attempt in ENGLAND to divide the landed and trading part of 
the nation; but without success. The interests of these two bodies are not 
really distinct, and never will be so, till our public debts encrease to such a 
degree, as to become altogether oppressive and intolerable.
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Parties from principle, especially abstract speculative principle, are known 
only to modern times, and are, perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable 
phenomenon, that has yet appeared in human affairs. Where different principles 
beget a contrariety of conduct, which is the case with all different political 
principles, the matter may be more easily explained. A man, who esteems the true 
right of government to lie in one man, or one family, cannot easily agree with 
his fellow-citizen, who thinks that another man or family is possessed of this 
right. Each naturally wishes that right may take place, according to his own 
notions of it. But where the difference of principle is attended with no 
contrariety of action, but every one may follow his own way, without interfering 
with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, 
what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?
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Two men travelling on the highway, the one east, the other west, can easily pass 
each other, if the way be broad enough: But two men, reasoning upon opposite 
principles of religion, cannot so easily pass, without shocking; though one 
should think, that the way were also, in that case, sufficiently broad, and that 
each might proceed, without interruption, in his own course. But such is the 
nature of the human mind, that it always lays hold on every mind that approaches 
it; and as it is wonderfully fortified by an unanimity of sentiments, so is it 
shocked and disturbed by any contrariety. Hence the eagerness, which most people 
discover in a dispute; and hence their impatience of opposition, even in the 
most speculative and indifferent opinions.
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This principle, however frivolous it may appear, seems to have been the origin 
of all religious wars and divisions. But as this principle is universal in human 
nature, its effects would not have been confined to one age, and to one sect of 
religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental causes, which raise 
it to such a height, as to produce the greatest misery and devastation. Most 
religions of the ancient world arose in the unknown ages of government, when men 
were as yet barbarous and uninstructed, and the prince, as well as peasant, was 
disposed to receive, with implicit faith, every pious tale or fiction, which was 
offered him. The magistrate embraced the religion of the people, and entering 
cordially into the care of sacred matters, naturally acquired an authority in 
them, and united the ecclesiastical with the civil power. But the Christian 
religion arising, while principles directly opposite to it were firmly 
established in the polite part of the world, who despised the nation that first 
broached this novelty; no wonder, that, in such circumstances, it was but little 
countenanced by the civil magistrate, and that the priesthood was allowed to 
engross all the authority in the new sect. So bad a use did they make of this 
power, even in those early times, that the primitive persecutions may, perhaps, 
in part,†3 be ascribed to the violence instilled by them into their followers. 
And the same principles of priestly government continuing, after Christianity 
became the established religion, they have engendered a spirit of persecution, 
which has ever since been the poison of human society, and the source of the 
most inveterate factions in every government. Such divisions, therefore, on the 
part of the people, may justly be esteemed factions of principle; but, on the 
part of the priests, who are the prime movers, they are really factions of 
interest.
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There is another cause (beside the authority of the priests, and the separation 
of the ecclesiastical and civil powers) which has contributed to render 
CHRISTENDOM the scene of religious wars and divisions. Religions, that arise in 
ages totally ignorant and barbarous, consist mostly of traditional tales and 
fictions, which may be different in every sect, without being contrary to each 
other; and even when they are contrary, every one adheres to the tradition of 
his own sect, without much reasoning or disputation. But as philosophy was 
widely spread over the world, at the time when Christianity arose, the teachers 
of the new sect were obliged to form a system of speculative opinions; to 
divide, with some accuracy, their articles of faith; and to explain, comment, 
confute, and defend with all the subtilty of argument and science. Hence 
naturally arose keenness in dispute, when the Christian religion came to be 
split into new divisions and heresies: And this keenness assisted the priests in 
their policy, of begetting a mutual hatred and antipathy among their deluded 
followers. Sects of philosophy, in the ancient world, were more zealous than 
parties of religion; but in modern times, parties of religion are more furious 
and enraged than the most cruel factions that ever arose from interest and 
ambition.
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I have mentioned parties from affection as a kind of real parties, beside those 
from interest and principle. By parties from affection, I understand those which 
are founded on the different attachments of men towards particular families and 
persons, whom they desire to rule over them. These factions are often very 
violent; though, I must own, it may seem unaccountable, that men should attach 
themselves so strongly to persons, with whom they are no wise acquainted, whom 
perhaps they never saw, and from whom they never received, nor can ever hope for 
any favour. Yet this we often find to be the case, and even with men, who, on 
other occasions, discover no great generosity of spirit, nor are found to be 
easily transported by friendship beyond their own interest. We are apt to think 
the relation between us and our sovereign very close and intimate. The splendour 
of majesty and power bestows an importance on the fortunes even of a single 
person. And when a man's good-nature does not give him this imaginary interest, 
his ill-nature will, from spite and opposition to persons whose sentiments are 
different from his own.

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†1 As this fact has not been much observed by antiquaries or politicians, I 
shall deliver it in the words of the ROMAN historian. Populus TUSCULANUS cum 
conjugibus ac liberis ROMAM venit: Ea multitudo, veste mutata, & specie reorum 
tribus circuit, genibus se omnium advolvens. Plus itaque misericordia ad paenoe 
veniam impetrandam, quam causa ad crimen purgandum valuit. Tribus omnes praeter 
POLLIAM, antiquarunt legem. POLLIAE sententia fuit, puberes verberatos necari, 
liberos conjugesque sub corona lege belli venire: Memoriamque ejus irae 
TUSCULANIS in paenoe tam atrocis auctores mansisse ad patris aetatem constat; 
nec quemquam fere ex POLLIA tribu candidatum PAPIRAM ferre solitam, T. LIVII, 
lib. 8. 37. The CASTELANI and NICOLLOTI are two mobbish factions in VENICE, who 
frequently box together, and then lay aside their quarrels presently.†b
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†2 LEWIS XII.
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†3 I say, in part; For it is a vulgar error to imagine, that the ancients were 
as great friends to toleration as the ENGLISH or DUTCH are at present. The laws 
against external superstition, amongst the ROMANS, were as ancient as the time 
of the twelve tables;†e and the JEWS as well as CHRISTIANS were sometimes 
punished by them; though, in general, these laws were not rigorously executed. 
Immediately after the conquest of Gaul, they forbad all but the natives to be 
initiated into the religion of the DRUIDS; and this was a kind of persecution. 
In about a century after this conquest,†f the emperor, CLAUDIUS, quite abolished 
that superstition by penal laws; which would have been a very grievous 
persecution, if the imitation of the ROMAN manners had not, before-hand, weaned 
the GAULS from their ancient prejudices. SUETONIUS in vita CLAUDII. PLINY 
ascribes the abolition of the Druidical superstitions to TIBERIUS, probably 
because that emperor had taken some steps towards restraining them (lib. xxx. 
cap. i.).†g This is an instance of the usual caution and moderation of the 
ROMANS in such cases; and very different from their violent and sanguinary 
method of treating the Christians. Hence we may entertain a suspicion, that 
those furious persecutions of Christianity were in some measure owing to the 
imprudent zeal and bigotry of the first propagators of that sect; and 
Ecclesiastical history affords us many reasons to confirm this suspicion.†h
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†a This paragraph was added in Edition B.
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†b The last sentence was added in Edition D.
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†c Editions A to P add the following: Besides, I do not find that the whites in 
MOROCCO ever imposed on the blacks any necessity of altering their complexion, 
or threatened them with inquisitions and penal laws in case of obstinacy: nor 
have the blacks been more unreasonable in this particular. But is a man's 
opinion, where he is able to form a real opinion, more at his disposal than his 
complexion? And can one be induced by force or fear to do more than paint and 
disguise in the one case as well as in the other?
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†d See Considerations sur le Grandeur et sur la Decadence de Romains. Edition K.
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†e Editions B and D read: "were very ancient" for "were as . . . tables."
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†f Editions B and D read: "they quite" for "the Emperor . . . quite"
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†g Editions B and D omit the reference to Pliny.
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†h This note is not in A.

Essay 9. OF THE PARTIES OF GREAT BRITAIN
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ESSAY IX: OF THE PARTIES OF GREAT BRITAIN
Were the BRITISH government proposed as a subject of speculation, one would 
immediately perceive in it a source of division and party, which it would be 
almost impossible for it, under any administration, to avoid. The just balance 
between the republican and monarchical part of our constitution is really, in 
itself, so extremely delicate and uncertain, that, when joined to men's passions 
and prejudices, it is impossible but different opinions must arise concerning 
it, even among persons of the best understanding. Those of mild tempers, who 
love peace and order, and detest sedition and civil wars, will always entertain 
more favourable sentiments of monarchy, than men of bold and generous spirits, 
who are passionate lovers of liberty, and think no evil comparable to subjection 
and slavery. And though all reasonable men agree in general to preserve our 
mixed government; yet, when they come to particulars, some will incline to trust 
greater powers to the crown, to bestow on it more influence, and to guard 
against its encroachments with less caution, than others who are terrified at 
the most distant approaches of tyranny and despotic power. Thus are there 
parties of PRINCIPLE involved in the very nature of our constitution, which may 
properly enough be denominated those of COURT and COUNTRY.†a The strength and 
violence of each of these parties will much depend upon the particular 
administration. An administration may be so bad, as to throw a great majority 
into the opposition; as a good administration will reconcile to the court many 
of the most passionate lovers of liberty. But however the nation may fluctuate 
between them, the parties themselves will always subsist, so long as we are 
governed by a limited monarchy.
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But, besides this difference of Principle, those parties are very much fomented 
by a difference of INTEREST, without which they could scarcely ever be dangerous 
or violent. The crown will naturally bestow all trust and power upon those, 
whose principles, real or pretended, are most favourable to monarchical 
government; and this temptation will naturally engage them to go greater lengths 
than their principles would otherwise carry them. Their antagonists, who are 
disappointed in their ambitious aims, throw themselves into the party whose 
sentiments incline them to be most jealous of royal power, and naturally carry 
those sentiments to a greater height than sound politics will justify. Thus 
Court and Country, which are the genuine offspring of the BRITISH government, 
are a kind of mixed parties, and are influenced both by principle and by 
interest. The heads of the factions are commonly most governed by the latter 
motive; the inferior members of them by the former.†b
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As to ecclesiastical parties; we may observe, that, in all ages of the world, 
priests have been enemies to liberty;†c and it is certain, that this steady 
conduct of theirs must have been founded on fixed reasons of interest and 
ambition. Liberty of thinking, and of expressing our thoughts, is always fatal 
to priestly power, and to those pious frauds, on which it is commonly founded; 
and, by an infallible connexion, which prevails among all kinds of liberty, this 
privilege can never be enjoyed, at least has never yet been enjoyed, but in a 
free government. Hence it must happen, in such a constitution as that of GREAT 
BRITAIN, that the established clergy, while things are in their natural 
situation, will always be of the Court-party; as, on the contrary, dissenters of 
all kinds will be of the Country-party; since they can never hope for that 
toleration, which they stand in need of, but by means of our free government. 
All princes, that have aimed at despotic power, have known of what importance it 
was to gain the established clergy: As the clergy, on their part, have shewn a 
great facility in entering into the views of such princes.†1 GUSTAVUS VAZA was, 
perhaps, the only ambitious monarch, that ever depressed the church, at the same 
time that he discouraged liberty. But the exorbitant power of the bishops in 
SWEDEN, who, at that time, overtopped the crown itself, together with their 
attachment to a foreign family, was the reason of his embracing such an unusual 
system of politics.
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This observation, concerning the propensity of priests to the government of a 
single person, is not true with regard to one sect only. The Presbyterian and 
Calvinistic clergy in HOLLAND were professed friends to the family of ORANGE; as 
the Arminians, who were esteemed heretics, were of the LOUVESTEIN faction, and 
zealous for liberty. But if a prince have the choice of both, it is easy to see, 
that he will prefer the episcopal to the presbyterian form of government, both 
because of the greater affinity between monarchy and episcopacy, and because of 
the facility, which he will find, in such a government, of ruling the clergy, by 
means of their ecclesiastical superiors.†2
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If we consider the first rise of parties in ENGLAND, during the great rebellion, 
we shall observe, that it was conformable to this general theory, and that the 
species of government gave birth to them, by a regular and infallible operation. 
The ENGLISH constitution, before that period, had lain in a kind of confusion; 
yet so, as that the subjects possessed many noble privileges, which, though not 
exactly bounded and secured by law, were universally deemed, from long 
possession, to belong to them as their birth-right. An ambitious, or rather a 
misguided, prince arose, who deemed all these privileges to be concessions of 
his predecessors, revokeable at pleasure; and, in prosecution of this principle, 
he openly acted in violation of liberty, during the course of several years. 
Necessity, at last, constrained him to call a parliament: The spirit of liberty 
arose and spread itself: The prince, being without any support, was obliged to 
grant every thing required of him: And his enemies, jealous and implacable, set 
no bounds to their pretensions. Here then began those contests, in which it was 
no wonder, that men of that age were divided into different parties; since, even 
at this day, the impartial are at a loss to decide concerning the justice of the 
quarrel. The pretensions of the parliament, if yielded to, broke the balance of 
the constitution, by rendering the government almost entirely republican. If not 
yielded to, the nation was, perhaps, still in danger of absolute power, from the 
settled principles and inveterate habits of the king, which had plainly appeared 
in every concession that he had been constrained to make to his people. In this 
question, so delicate and uncertain, men naturally fell to the side which was 
most conformable to their usual principles; and the more passionate favourers of 
monarchy declared for the king, as the zealous friends of liberty sided with the 
parliament. The hopes of success being nearly equal on both sides, interest had 
no general influence in this contest: So that ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER were 
merely parties of principle; neither of which disowned either monarchy or 
liberty; but the former party inclined most to the republican part of our 
government, the latter to the monarchical. In this respect, they may be 
considered as court and country-party, enflamed into a civil war, by an unhappy 
concurrence of circumstances, and by the turbulent spirit of the age. The 
commonwealth's men, and the partizans of absolute power, lay concealed in both 
parties, and formed but an inconsiderable part of them.
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The clergy had concurred with the king's arbitrary designs; and, in return, were 
allowed to persecute their adversaries, whom they called heretics and 
schismatics. The established clergy were episcopal; the non-conformists 
presbyterian: So that all things concurred to throw the former, without reserve, 
into the king's party; and the latter into that of the parliament.†f
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Every one knows the event of this quarrel; fatal to the king first, to the 
parliament afterwards. After many confusions and revolutions, the royal family 
was at last restored, and the ancient government re-established. CHARLES II. was 
not made wiser by the example of his father; but prosecuted the same measures, 
though at first, with more secrecy and caution. New parties arose, under the 
appellation of Whig and Tory, which have continued ever since to confound and 
distract our government. To determine the nature of these parties is, perhaps, 
one of the most difficult problems, that can be met with, and is a proof that 
history may contain questions, as uncertain as any to be found in the most 
abstract sciences. We have seen the conduct of the two parties, during the 
course of seventy years, in a vast variety of circumstances, possessed of power, 
and deprived of it, during peace, and during war: Persons, who profess 
themselves of one side or other, we meet with every hour, in company, in our 
pleasures, in our serious occupations: We ourselves are constrained, in a 
manner, to take party; and living in a country of the highest liberty, every one 
may openly declare all his sentiments and opinions: Yet are we at a loss to tell 
the nature, pretensions, and principles of the different factions.†g
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When we compare the parties of WHIG and TORY with those of ROUND-HEAD and 
CAVALIER, the most obvious difference, that appears between them, consists in 
the principles of passive obedience, and indefeasible right, which were but 
little heard of among the CAVALIERS, but became the universal doctrine, and were 
esteemed the true characteristic of a TORY. Were these principles pushed into 
their most obvious consequences, they imply a formal renunciation of all our 
liberties, and an avowal of absolute monarchy; since nothing can be a greater 
absurdity than a limited power, which must not be resisted, even when it exceeds 
its limitations. But as the most rational principles are often but a weak 
counterpoise to passion; it is no wonder that these absurd principles†h were 
found too weak for that effect. The TORIES, as men, were enemies to oppression; 
and also as ENGLISHMEN, they were enemies to arbitrary power. Their zeal for 
liberty, was, perhaps, less fervent than that of their antagonists; but was 
sufficient to make them forget all their general principles, when they saw 
themselves openly threatened with a subversion of the ancient government. From 
these sentiments arose the revolution; an event of mighty consequence, and the 
firmest foundation of BRITISH liberty. The conduct of the TORIES during that 
event, and after it, will afford us a true insight into the nature of that 
party.
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In the first place, they appear to have had the genuine sentiments of BRITONS in 
their affection for liberty, and in their determined resolution not to sacrifice 
it to any abstract principle whatsoever, or to any imaginary rights of princes. 
This part of their character might justly have been doubted of before the 
revolution, from the obvious tendency of their avowed principles, and from 
their†i compliances with a court, which seemed to make little secret of its 
arbitrary designs. The revolution shewed them to have been, in this respect, 
nothing, but a genuine court-party, such as might be expected in a BRITISH 
government: That is, Lovers of liberty, but greater lovers of monarchy. It must, 
however, be confessed, that they carried their monarchical principles farther, 
even in practice, but more so in theory, than was, in any degree, consistent 
with a limited government.
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Secondly, Neither their principles nor affections concurred, entirely or 
heartily, with the settlement made at the revolution, or with that which has 
since taken place. This part of their character may seem opposite to the former; 
since any other settlement, in those circumstances of the nation, must probably 
have been dangerous, if not fatal to liberty. But the heart of man is made to 
reconcile contradictions; and this contradiction is not greater than that 
between passive obedience, and the resistance employed at the revolution. A 
TORY, therefore, since the revolution, may be defined in a few words, to be a 
lover of monarchy, though without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the 
family of STUART. As a WHIG may be defined to be a lover of liberty though 
without renouncing monarchy; and a friend to the settlement in the PROTESTANT 
line.†j
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These different views, with regard to the settlement of the crown, were 
accidental, but natural additions to the principles of the court and country 
parties, which are the genuine divisions in the BRITISH government. A passionate 
lover of monarchy is apt to be displeased at any change of the succession; as 
savouring too much of a commonwealth: A passionate lover of liberty is apt to 
think that every part of the government ought to be subordinate to the interests 
of liberty.
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Some, who will not venture to assert, that the real difference between WHIG and 
TORY was lost at the revolution, seem inclined to think, that the difference is 
now abolished, and that affairs are so far returned to their natural state, that 
there are at present no other parties among us but court and country; that is, 
men, who, by interest or principle, are attached either to monarchy or liberty. 
The TORIES have been so long obliged to talk in the republican stile, that they 
seem to have made converts of themselves by their hypocrisy, and to have 
embraced the sentiments, as well as language of their adversaries. There are, 
however, very considerable remains of that party in ENGLAND, with all their old 
prejudices; and a proof that court and country are not our only parties, is, 
that almost all the dissenters side with the court, and the lower clergy, at 
least, of the church of ENGLAND, with the opposition. This may convince us, that 
some biass still hangs upon our constitution, some extrinsic weight, which turns 
it from its natural course, and causes a confusion in our parties.†3†k
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†1 Judaei sibi ipsi reges imposuere; qui mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumpta per 
arma dominatione; fugas civium, urbium eversiones, fratrum, conjugam, parentum 
neces, aliaque solita regibus ausi, superstitionem fovebant; quia honor 
sacerdotii firmamentum potentiae assumebatur. TACIT. hist. lib. v. 8.†d
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†2 Populi imperium juxta libertatem: paucorum dominatio regiae libidini proprior 
est. TACIT. Ann. lib. vi. 41.†e
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†3 Some of the opinions delivered in these Essays, with regard to the public 
transactions in the last century, the Author, on more accurate examination, 
found reason to retract in his History of GREAT BRITAIN. And as he would not 
enslave himself to the systems of either party, neither would he fetter his 
judgment by his own preconceived opinions and principles; nor is he ashamed to 
acknowledge his mistakes. These mistakes were indeed, at that time, almost 
universal in this kingdom.
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†a Editions A to P add the following note: These words have become of general 
use, and therefore I shall employ them, without intending to express by them an 
universal blame of the one party, or approbation of the other. The court-party 
may, no doubt, on some occasions consult best the interest of the country, and 
the country-party oppose it. In like manner, the ROMAN parties were denominated 
Optimates and Populares; and CICERO, like a true party man, defines the 
Optimates to be such as, in all public conduct, regulated themselves by the 
sentiments of the best and worthiest of the ROMANS: Pro Sextio, cap. 45. The 
term of Country-party may afford a favourable definition or etymology of the 
same kind: But it would be folly to draw any argument from that head, and I have 
regard to it in employing these terms.
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†b Editions A to P add the following: I must be understood to mean this of 
persons who have motives for taking party on any side. For, to tell the truth, 
the greatest part are commonly men who associate themselves they know not why; 
from example, from passion, from idleness. But still it is requisite, that there 
be some source of division, either in principle or interest; otherwise such 
persons would not find parties, to which they could associate themselves.
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†c Editions B to P add the note: This proposition is true, notwithstanding, that 
in the early times of the ENGLISH government, the clergy were the great and 
principal opposers of the crown: But, at that time, their possessions were so 
immensely great, that they composed a considerable part of the proprietors of 
ENGLAND, and in many contests were direct rivals of the crown.
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†d This note was added in Edition K.
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†e This note was added in Edition K.
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†f For this paragraph Editions A to P substitute the following: The clergy had 
concurred [in a shameless manner: A to K] with the king's arbitrary designs, 
according to their usual maxims in such cases: And, in return, were allowed to 
persecute their adversaries, whom they called heretics and schismatics. The 
established clergy were episcopal; the non-conformists presbyterian: So that all 
things concurred to throw the former, without reserve, into the king's party; 
and the latter into that of the parliament. The Cavaliers being the court-party, 
and the Round-heads the country-party, the union was infallible between the 
former and the established prelacy, and between the latter and presbyterian 
non-conformists. This union is so natural, according to the general principles 
of politics, that it requires some very extraordinary situation of affairs to 
break it.
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†g Editions A to P add: The question is, perhaps, in itself, somewhat difficult; 
but has been rendered more so, by the prejudice and violence of party.
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†h Editions A to P add: sufficient, according to a celebrated author, 
(Dissertation on Parties, Letter 2d.) to shock the common sense of a HOTTENTOT 
or SAMOIEDE.
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†i Editions A to K read: almost unbounded compliances. M to Q: great 
compliances.
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†j Editions A to P add the following note: The author [Celebrated writer: A, B, 
and D.] above cited has asserted, that the REAL distinction betwixt WHIG and 
TORY was lost at the revolution, and that ever since they have continued to be 
mere personal parties, like the GUELFS and GIBBELINES, after the emperors had 
lost all authority in ITALY. Such an opinion, were it received, would turn our 
whole history into an aenigma; [and is, indeed, so contrary to the strongest 
Evidence, that a Man must have great Opinion of his own Eloquence to attempt the 
proving of it.--A and B.]
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I shall first mention, as a proof of a real distinction between these parties, 
what every one may have observed or heard concerning the conduct and 
conversation of all his friends and acquaintance on both sides. Have not the 
TORIES always borne an avowed affection to the family of STUART, and have not 
their adversaries always opposed with vigour the succession of that family?
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The TORY principles are confessedly the most favourable to monarchy. Yet the 
Tories have almost always opposed the court these fifty years; nor were they 
cordial friends to King WILLIAM, even when employed by him. Their quarrel, 
therefore, cannot be supposed to have lain with the throne, but with the person 
who sat on it.
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They concurred heartily with the court during the four last years of Queen ANNE. 
But is any one at a loss to find the reason?
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[This paragraph is not in A and B.] The succession of the crown in the BRITISH 
government is a point of too great consequence to be absolutely indifferent to 
persons who concern themselves, in any degree, about the fortune of the public; 
much less can it be supposed that the TORY party, who never valued themselves 
upon moderation, could maintain a stoical indifference in a point of such 
importance. Were they, therefore, zealous for the house of HANOVER? Or was there 
any thing that kept an opposite zeal from openly appearing, if it did not openly 
appear, but prudence, and a sense of decency?
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'Tis monstrous to see an established episcopal clergy in declared opposition to 
the court, and a non-conformist presbyterian clergy in conjunction with it. What 
could have produced such an unnatural conduct in both? Nothing, but that the 
former espoused monarchical principles too high for the present settlement, 
which is founded on principles of liberty: And the latter, being afraid of the 
prevalence of those high principles, adhered to that party from whom they had 
reason to expect liberty and toleration.
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The different conduct of the two parties, with regard to foreign politics, is 
also a proof to the same purpose. HOLLAND has always been most favoured by one, 
and FRANCE by the other. In short, the proofs of this kind seem so palpable and 
evident, that 'tis almost needless to collect them.
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†k So the Essay concludes in Editions Q and R. In place of the last paragraph, 
the preceding Editions read as follows:
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'Tis however remarkable, that tho' the principles of WHIG and TORY were both of 
them of a compound nature; yet the ingredients, which predominated in both, were 
not correspondent to each other. A TORY loved monarchy, and bore an affection to 
the family of STUART; but the latter affection was the predominant inclination 
of the party. A WHIG loved liberty, and was a friend to the settlement in the 
PROTESTANT line; but the love of liberty was professedly his predominant 
inclination. The TORIES have frequently acted as republicans, where either 
policy or revenge has engaged them to that conduct; and there was no one of that 
party, who, upon the supposition, that he was to be disappointed in his views 
with regard to the succession, would not have desired to impose the strictest 
limitations on the crown, and to bring our form of government as near republican 
as possible, in order to depress the family, which, according to his 
apprehension, succeeded without any just title. The WHIGS, 'tis true, have also 
taken steps dangerous to liberty, under colour of securing the succession and 
settlement of the crown, according to their views: But as the body of the party 
had no passion for that succession, otherwise than as the means of securing 
liberty, they have been betrayed into these steps by ignorance, or frailty, or 
the interests of their leaders. The succession of the crown was, therefore, the 
chief point with the TORIES; the security of our liberties with the WHIGS. [The 
remainder of this paragraph is not in A and B.] Nor is this seeming irregularity 
at all difficult to be accounted for, by our present theory. Court and country 
parties are the true parents of TORY and WHIG. But 'tis almost impossible, that 
the attachment of the court party to monarchy should not degenerate into an 
attachment to the monarch; there being so close a connexion between them, and 
the latter being so much the more natural object. How easily does the worship of 
the divinity degenerate into a worship of the idol? The connexion is not so 
great between liberty, the divinity of the old country party or WHIGS, and any 
monarch or royal family; nor is it so reasonable to suppose, that in that party, 
the worship can be so easily transferred from the one to the other. Tho' even 
that would be no great miracle.
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'Tis difficult to penetrate into the thoughts and sentiments of any particular 
man; but 'tis almost impossible to distinguish those of a whole party, where it 
often happens, that no two persons agree precisely in the same maxims of 
conduct. Yet I will venture to affirm, that it was not so much PRINCIPLE, or an 
opinion of indefeasible right, which attached the TORIES to the ancient royal 
family, as AFFECTION, or a certain love and esteem for their persons. The same 
cause divided ENGLAND formerly between the houses of YORK and LANCASTER, and 
SCOTLAND between the families of BRUCE and BALIOL; in an age, when political 
disputes were but little in fashion, and when political principles must of 
course have had but little influence on mankind. The doctrine of passive 
obedience is so absurd in itself, and so opposite to our liberties, that it 
seems to have been chiefly left to pulpit-declaimers, and to their deluded 
followers among the vulgar. Men of better sense were guided by affection; and as 
to the leaders of this party, 'tis probable, that interest was their chief 
motive, and that they acted more contrary to their private sentiments, than the 
leaders of the opposite party. [The remainder of this paragraph is not in A and 
B.] Tho' 'tis almost impossible to maintain with zeal the right of any person or 
family, without acquiring a good-will to them, and changing the principle into 
affection; yet this is less natural to people of an elevated station and liberal 
education, who have had full opportunity of observing the weakness, folly, and 
arrogance of monarchs, and have found them to be nothing superior, if not rather 
inferior to the rest of mankind. The interest, therefore, of being heads of a 
party does often, with such people, supply the place both of principle and 
affection.
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Some, who will not venture to assert, that the real difference between WHIG and 
TORY was lost at the revolution, seem inclined to think, that the difference is 
now abolished, and that affairs are so far returned to their natural state, that 
there are at present no other parties amongst us but court and country; that is, 
men, who by interest or principle, are attached either to monarchy or to 
liberty. It must, indeed, be confest, that the TORY party seem, of late, to have 
decayed much in their numbers; still more in their zeal; and I may venture to 
say, still more in their credit and authority. There are few men of knowledge or 
learning, at least, few philosophers, since Mr. LOCKE has wrote, who would not 
be ashamed to be thought of that party; and in almost all companies the name of 
OLD WHIG is mentioned as an uncontestable appellation of honour and dignity. 
Accordingly, the enemies of the ministry, as a reproach, call the courtiers the 
true TORIES; and as an honour, denominate the gentlemen in the opposition the 
true WHIGS. [The last two sentences were omitted in P. A and B read no man, 
omitting "at least . . . wrote."] The TORIES have been so long obliged to talk 
in the republican stile, that they seem to have made converts of themselves by 
their hypocrisy, and to have embraced the sentiments, as well as language of 
their adversaries. There are, however, very considerable remains of that party 
in ENGLAND, with all their old prejudices; and a proof that court and country 
are not our only parties, is, that almost all the dissenters side with the 
court, and the lower clergy, at least, of the church of ENGLAND, with the 
opposition. This may convince us, that some biass still hangs upon our 
constitution, some intrinsic weight, which turns it from its natural course, and 
causes a confusion in our parties. [This sentence does not occur in A.]
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I shall conclude this subject with observing that we never had any TORIES in 
SCOTLAND, according to the proper signification of the word, and that the 
division of parties in this country was really into WHIGS and JACOBITES. A 
JACOBITE seems to be a TORY, who has no regard to the constitution, but is 
either a zealous partizan of absolute monarchy, or at least willing to sacrifice 
our liberties to the obtaining the succession in that family to which he is 
attached. The reason of the difference between ENGLAND and SCOTLAND, I take to 
be this: Political and religious divisions in the latter country, have been, 
since the revolution, regularly correspondent to each other. The PRESBYTERIANS 
were all WHIGS without exception: Those who favoured episcopacy, of the opposite 
party. And as the clergy of the latter sect were turned out of the churches at 
the revolution, they had no motive for making any compliances with the 
government in their oaths, or their forms of prayers, but openly avowed the 
highest principles of their party; which is the cause why their followers have 
been more violent than their brethren of the TORY party in ENGLAND.†1
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[A and B add the following paragraph to the text.] As violent Things have not 
commonly so long a Duration as moderate, we actually find, that the Jacobite 
Party is almost entirely vanish'd from among us, and that the Distinction of 
Court and Country, which is but creeping in at LONDON, is the only one that is 
ever mention'd in this kingdom. Beside the Violence and Openness of the JACOBITE 
party, another Reason has, perhaps, contributed to produce so sudden and so 
visible an Alteration in this part of BRITAIN. There are only two Ranks of Men 
among us; Gentlemen, who have some Fortune and Education, and the meanest 
slaving Poor; without any considerable Number of that middling Rank of Men, 
which abounds more in ENGLAND, both in Cities and in the Country, than in any 
other Part of the World. The slaving Poor are incapable of any Principles: 
Gentlemen may be converted to true Principles, by Time and Experience. The 
middling Rank of Men have Curiosity and Knowledge enough to form Principles, but 
not enough to form true ones, or correct any Prejudices that they may have 
imbib'd: And 'tis among the middling Rank, that TORY Principles do at present 
prevail most in ENGLAND.
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†1 Some of the opinions, delivered in these Essays, with regard to the public 
transactions in the last century, the Author, on more accurate examination, 
found reason to retract in his History of GREAT BRITAIN. And as he would not 
enslave himself to the systems of either party, neither would he fetter his 
judgment by his own preconceived opinions and principles; nor is he ashamed to 
acknowledge his mistakes. [This note does not occur in any edition prior to M.]

Essay 10. OF SUPERSTITION AND ENTHUSIASM
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ESSAY X: OF SUPERSTITION AND ENTHUSIASM
That the corruption of the best things produces the worst, is grown into a 
maxim, and is commonly proved, among other instances, by the pernicious effects 
of superstition and enthusiasm, the corruptions of true religion.
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These two species of false religion, though both pernicious, are yet of a very 
different, and even of a contrary nature. The mind of man is subject to certain 
unaccountable terrors and apprehensions, proceeding either from the unhappy 
situation of private or public affairs, from ill health, from a gloomy and 
melancholy disposition, or from the concurrence of all these circumstances. In 
such a state of mind, infinite unknown evils are dreaded from unknown agents; 
and where real objects of terror are wanting, the soul, active to its own 
prejudice, and fostering its predominant inclination, finds imaginary ones, to 
whose power and malevolence it sets no limits. As these enemies are entirely 
invisible and unknown, the methods taken to appease them are equally 
unaccountable, and consist in ceremonies, observances, mortifications, 
sacrifices, presents, or in any practice, however absurd or frivolous, which 
either folly or knavery recommends to a blind and terrified credulity. Weakness, 
fear, melancholy, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of 
SUPERSTITION.
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But the mind of man is also subject to an unaccountable elevation and 
presumption, arising from prosperous success, from luxuriant health, from strong 
spirits, or from a bold and confident disposition. In such a state of mind, the 
imagination swells with great, but confused conceptions, to which no sublunary 
beauties or enjoyments can correspond. Every thing mortal and perishable 
vanishes as unworthy of attention. And a full range is given to the fancy in the 
invisible regions or world of spirits, where the soul is at liberty to indulge 
itself in every imagination, which may best suit its present taste and 
disposition. Hence arise raptures, transports, and surprising flights of fancy; 
and confidence and presumption still encreasing, these raptures, being 
altogether unaccountable, and seeming quite beyond the reach of our ordinary 
faculties, are attributed to the immediate inspiration of that Divine Being, who 
is the object of devotion. In a little time, the inspired person comes to regard 
himself as a distinguished favourite of the Divinity; and when this frenzy once 
takes place, which is the summit of enthusiasm, every whimsy is consecrated: 
Human reason, and even morality are rejected as fallacious guides: And the 
fanatic madman delivers himself over, blindly, and without reserve, to the 
supposed illapses of the spirit, and to inspiration from above. Hope, pride, 
presumption, a warm imagination, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the 
true sources of ENTHUSIASM.
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These two species of false religion might afford occasion to many speculations; 
but I shall confine myself, at present, to a few reflections concerning their 
different influence on government and society.
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†a My first reflection is, That superstition is favourable to priestly power, 
and enthusiasm not less or rather more contrary to it, than sound reason and 
philosophy. As superstition is founded on fear, sorrow, and a depression of 
spirits, it represents the man to himself in such despicable colours, that he 
appears unworthy, in his own eyes, of approaching the divine presence, and 
naturally has recourse to any other person, whose sanctity of life, or, perhaps, 
impudence and cunning, have made him be supposed more favoured by the Divinity. 
To him the superstitious entrust their devotions: To his care they recommend 
their prayers, petitions, and sacrifices: And by his means, they hope to render 
their addresses acceptable to their incensed Deity. Hence the origin of 
PRIESTS,†b who may justly be regarded†c as an invention of a timorous and abject 
superstition, which, ever diffident of itself, dares not offer up its own 
devotions, but ignorantly thinks to recommend itself to the Divinity, by the 
mediation of his supposed friends and servants. As superstition is a 
considerable ingredient in almost all religions, even the most fanatical; there 
being nothing but philosophy able entirely to conquer these unaccountable 
terrors; hence it proceeds, that in almost every sect of religion there are 
priests to be found: But the stronger mixture there is of superstition, the 
higher is the authority of the priesthood.†d
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On the other hand, it may be observed, that all enthusiasts have been free from 
the yoke of ecclesiastics, and have expressed great independence in their 
devotion; with a contempt of forms, ceremonies, and traditions. The quakers are 
the most egregious, though, at the same time, the most innocent enthusiasts that 
have yet been known; and are, perhaps, the only sect, that have never admitted 
priests amongst them. The independents, of all the ENGLISH sectaries, approach 
nearest to the quakers in fanaticism, and in their freedom from priestly 
bondage. The presbyterians follow after, at an equal distance in both 
particulars. In short this observation is founded in experience; and will also 
appear to be founded in reason, if we consider, that, as enthusiasm arises from 
a presumptuous pride and confidence, it thinks itself sufficiently qualified to 
approach the Divinity, without any human mediator. Its rapturous devotions are 
so fervent, that it even imagines itself actually to approach him by the way of 
contemplation and inward converse; which makes it neglect all those outward 
ceremonies and observances, to which the assistance of the priests appears so 
requisite in the eyes of their superstitious votaries. The fanatic consecrates 
himself, and bestows on his own person a sacred character, much superior to what 
forms and ceremonious institutions can confer on any other.
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My second reflection with regard to these species of false religion is, that 
religions, which partake of enthusiasm are, on their first rise, more furious 
and violent than those which partake of superstition; but in a little time 
become more gentle and moderate. The violence of this species of religion, when 
excited by novelty, and animated by opposition, appears from numberless 
instances; of the anabaptists in GERMANY, the camisars in FRANCE, the levellers 
and other fanatics in ENGLAND, and the covenanters in SCOTLAND. Enthusiasm being 
founded on strong spirits, and a presumptuous boldness of character, it 
naturally begets the most extreme resolutions; especially after it rises to that 
height as to inspire the deluded fanatic with the opinion of divine 
illuminations, and with a contempt for the common rules of reason, morality, and 
prudence.
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It is thus enthusiasm produces the most cruel disorders in human society; but 
its fury is like that of thunder and tempest, which exhaust themselves in a 
little time, and leave the air more calm and serene than before. When the first 
fire of enthusiasm is spent, men naturally, in all fanatical sects, sink into 
the greatest remissness and coolness in sacred matters; there being no body of 
men among them, endowed with sufficient authority, whose interest is concerned 
to support the religious spirit: No rites, no ceremonies, no holy observances, 
which may enter into the common train of life, and preserve the sacred 
principles from oblivion. Superstition, on the contrary, steals in gradually and 
insensibly; renders men tame and submissive; is acceptable to the magistrate, 
and seems inoffensive to the people: Till at last the priest, having firmly 
established his authority, becomes the tyrant and disturber of human society, by 
his endless contentions, persecutions, and religious wars. How smoothly did the 
ROMISH church advance in her acquisition of power? But into what dismal 
convulsions did she throw all EUROPE, in order to maintain it? On the other 
hand, our sectaries who were formerly such dangerous bigots, are now become very 
free reasoners; and the quakers seem to approach nearly the only regular body of 
deists in the universe, the literati, or the disciples of CONFUCIUS in CHINA.†1
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My third observation on this head is, that superstition is an enemy to civil 
liberty, and enthusiasm a friend to it. As superstition groans under the 
dominion of priests, and enthusiasm is destructive of all ecclesiastical power, 
this sufficiently accounts for the present observation. Not to mention, that 
enthusiasm, being the infirmity of bold and ambitious tempers, is naturally 
accompanied with a spirit of liberty; as superstition, on the contrary, renders 
men tame and abject, and fits them for slavery. We learn from ENGLISH history, 
that, during the civil wars, the independents and deists, though the most 
opposite in their religious principles; yet were united in their political ones, 
and were alike passionate for a commonwealth. And since the origin of whig and 
tory, the leaders of the whigs have either been deists or profest 
latitudinarians in their principles; that is, friends to toleration, and 
indifferent to any particular sect of christians: While the sectaries, who have 
all a strong tincture of enthusiasm, have always, without exception, concurred 
with that party, in defence of civil liberty. The resemblance in their 
superstitions long united the high-church tories, and the Roman catholics, in 
support of prerogative and kingly power; though experience of the tolerating 
spirit of the whigs seems of late to have reconciled the catholics to that 
party.
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The molinists and jansenists in FRANCE have a thousand unintelligible disputes, 
which are not worthy the reflection of a man of sense: But what principally 
distinguishes these two sects, and alone merits attention, is the different 
spirit of their religion. The molinists conducted by the jesuits, are great 
friends to superstition, rigid observers of external forms and ceremonies, and 
devoted to the authority of the priests, and to tradition. The jansenists are 
enthusiasts, and zealous promoters of the passionate devotion, and of the inward 
life; little influenced by authority; and, in a word, but half catholics. The 
consequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing reasoning. The jesuits are 
the tyrants of the people, and the slaves of the court: And the jansenists 
preserve alive the small sparks of the love of liberty, which are to be found in 
the FRENCH nation.
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†1 The CHINESE Literati have no priests or ecclesiastical establishment.†e
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†a In Editions A and B, this and the three next paragraphs were written as 
follows: My first Reflection is, that Religions, which partake of Enthusiasm 
are, on their first Rise, much more furious and violent than those which partake 
of Superstition; but in a little Time become much more gentle and moderate. The 
Violence of this Species of Religion, when excited by Novelty, and animated by 
Opposition, appears from numberless Instances; of the Anabaptists in Germany, 
the Camisars in France, the Levellers and other Fanaticks in England, and the 
Covenanters in Scotland. As Enthusiasm is founded on strong Spirits and a 
presumptuous Boldness of Character, it naturally begets the most extreme 
Resolutions; especially after it rises to that Height as to inspire the deluded 
Fanaticks with the Opinion of Divine Illuminations, and with a Contempt of the 
common Rules of Reason, Morality and Prudence.
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'Tis thus Enthusiasm produces the most cruel Desolation in human Society: But 
its Fury is like that of Thunder and Tempest, which exhaust themselves in a 
little Time, and leave the Air more calm and serene than before. The Reason of 
this will appear evidently, by comparing Enthusiasm to Superstition, the other 
Species of false Religion; and tracing the natural Consequences of each. As 
Superstition is founded on Fear, Sorrow, and a Depression of Spirits, it 
represents the Person to himself in such despicable Colours, that he appears 
unworthy, in his own Eyes, of approaching the Divine Presence, and naturally has 
Recourse to any other Person, whose Sanctity of Life, or, perhaps, Impudence and 
Cunning, have made him be supposed to be more favoured by the Divinity. To him 
they entrust their Devotions: To his Care they recommend their Prayers, 
Petitions, and Sacrifices: And, by his Means, hope to render their Addresses 
acceptable to their incensed Deity. Hence the Origin of PRIESTS,†1 who may 
justly be regarded as one of the grossest Inventions of a timorous and abject 
Superstition, which, ever diffident of itself, dares not offer up its own 
Devotions, but ignorantly thinks to recommend itself to the Divinity, by the 
Mediation of his supposed Friends and Servants. As Superstition is a 
considerable Ingredient of almost all Religions, even the most fanatical; there 
being nothing but Philosophy able to conquer entirely these unaccountable 
Terrors; hence it proceeds, that in almost every Sect of Religion there are 
Priests to be found: But the stronger Mixture there is of Superstition, the 
higher is the Authority of the Priesthood. Modern Judaism and Popery, especially 
the latter, being the most barbarous and absurd Superstitions that have yet been 
known in the World, are the most enslav'd by their Priests. As the Church of 
ENGLAND may justly be said to retain a strong Mixture of Popish Superstition, it 
partakes also, in its original Constitution, of a Propensity to Priestly Power 
and Dominion; particularly in the Respect it exacts to the Priest. And though, 
according to the Sentiments of that Church, the Prayers of the Priest must be 
accompanied with those of the Laity; yet is he the mouth of the Congregation, 
his Person is sacred, and without his Presence few would think their public 
Devotions, or the Sacraments, and other Rites, acceptable to the Divinity.
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On the other Hand, it may be observed, That all Enthusiasts have been free from 
the Yoke of Ecclesiastics, and have exprest a great Independence in their 
Devotion; with a contempt of Forms, Tradition and Authorities. The Quakers are 
the most egregious, tho', at the same Time, the most innocent, Enthusiasts that 
have been yet known; and are, perhaps, the only Sect, that have never admitted 
Priests among them. The Independents, of all the ENGLISH Sectaries, approach 
nearest to the QUAKERS in Fanaticism, and in their Freedom from Priestly 
Bondage. The Presbyterians follow after, at an equal Distance in both these 
Particulars. In short, this Observation is founded on the most certain 
Experience; and will also appear to be founded on Reason, if we consider, that 
as Enthusiasm arises from a presumptuous Pride and Confidence, it thinks itself 
sufficiently qualified to approach the Divinity without any human Mediator. Its 
rapturous Devotions are so fervent, that it even imagines itself actually to 
approach him by the Way of Contemplation and inward Converse; which, makes it 
neglect all those outward Ceremonies and Observances, to which the Assistance of 
the Priests appears so requisite in the Eyes of their superstitious Votaries. 
The Fanatick consecrates himself, and bestows on his own Person a sacred 
Character, much superior to what Forms and ceremonious Institutions can confer 
on any other.
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'Tis therefore an infallible Rule, That Superstition is favourable to Priestly 
Power, and Enthusiasm as much, or rather more, contrary to it than sound Reason 
and Philosophy. The Consequences are evident. When the first Fire of Enthusiasm 
is spent, Men naturally, in such fanatical Sects, sink into the greatest 
Remissness and Coolness in Sacred Matters; there being no Body of Men amongst 
them, endow'd with sufficient Authority, whose Interest is concerned, to support 
the religious Spirit. Superstition, on the contrary, steals in gradually and 
insensibly; renders Men tame and submissive; is acceptable to the Magistrate, 
and seems inoffensive to the People: Till at last the Priest, having firmly 
establish'd his Authority, becomes the Tyrant and Disturber of human Society, by 
his endless Contentions, Persecutions, and religious Wars. How smoothly did the 
Romish Church advance in their Acquisition of Power? But into what dismal 
Convulsions did they throw all EUROPE, in order to maintain it? On the other 
Hand, our Sectaries, who were formerly such dangerous Bigots, are now become our 
greatest Free-thinkers; and the Quakers are, perhaps, the only regular Body of 
Deists in the Universe, except the Literati or Disciples of Confucius in China.
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†1 By Priests I understand only the Pretenders to Power and Dominion, and to a 
superior Sanctity of Character, distinct from Virtue and good Morals. These are 
very different from Clergymen, who are set apart (by the Laws) [Parenthetical 
note added in Edition B] to the care of sacred Matters, and the conducting our 
public Devotions with greater Decency and Order. There is no Rank of Men more to 
be respected than the latter.
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†b The following note is appended in Editions D to N: By Priests, I here mean 
only the pretenders to power and dominion, and to a superior sanctity of 
character, distinct from virtue and good morals. These are very different from 
clergymen, who are set apart by the laws, to the care of sacred matters, and to 
the conducting our public devotions with greater decency and order. There is no 
rank of men more to be respected than the latter.
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†c As one of the grossest inventions. D to N.
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†d Here D to P add: Modern Judaism and popery, (especially the latter) being the 
most unphilosophical and absurd superstitions which have yet been known in the 
world, are the most enslaved by their priests. As the church of ENGLAND may 
justly be said to retain some mixture of Popish superstition, it partakes also, 
in its original constitution, of a propensity to priestly power and dominion; 
particularly in the respect it exacts to the sacerdotal character. And though, 
according to the sentiments of that Church, the prayers of the priest must be 
accompanied with those of the laity; yet is he the mouth of the congregation, 
his person is sacred, and without his presence few would think their public 
devotions, or the sacraments, and other rites, acceptable to the divinity.
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†e This note is not in D and K, which read in the text: and the quakers seem to 
approach nearly the only regular body of deists in the universe, the literati, 
or the disciples of Confucius in China.

Essay 11. OF THE DIGNITY OR MEANNESS OF HUMAN NATURE
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ESSAY XI: OF THE DIGNITY OR MEANNESS OF HUMAN NATURE†a
There are certain sects, which secretly form themselves in the learned world, as 
well as factions in the political; and though sometimes they come not to an open 
rupture, they give a different turn to the ways of thinking of those who have 
taken part on either side. The most remarkable of this kind are the sects, 
founded on the different sentiments with regard to the dignity of human nature; 
which is a point that seems to have divided philosophers and poets, as well as 
divines, from the beginning of the world to this day. Some exalt our species to 
the skies, and represent man as a kind of human demigod, who derives his origin 
from heaven, and retains evident marks of his lineage and descent. Others insist 
upon the blind sides of human nature, and can discover nothing, except vanity, 
in which man surpasses the other animals, whom he affects so much to despise. If 
an author possess the talent of rhetoric and declamation, he commonly takes part 
with the former: If his turn lie towards irony and ridicule, he naturally throws 
himself into the other extreme.
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I am far from thinking, that all those, who have depreciated our species, have 
been enemies to virtue, and have exposed the frailties of their fellow creatures 
with any bad intention. On the contrary, I am sensible that a delicate sense of 
morals, especially when attended with a splenetic temper,†b is apt to give a man 
a disgust of the world, and to make him consider the common course of human 
affairs with too much indignation. I must, however, be of opinion, that the 
sentiments of those, who are inclined to think favourably of mankind, are more 
advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles, which give us a mean 
opinion of our nature. When a man is prepossessed with a high notion of his rank 
and character in the creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and 
will scorn to do a base or vicious action, which might sink him below that 
figure which he makes in his own imagination. Accordingly we find, that all our 
polite and fashionable moralists insist upon this topic, and endeavour to 
represent vice as unworthy of man, as well as odious in itself.†c
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We find few disputes, that are not founded on some ambiguity in the expression; 
and I am persuaded, that the present dispute, concerning the dignity or meanness 
of human nature, is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, 
be worth while to consider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this 
controversy.
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That there is a natural difference between merit and demerit, virtue and vice, 
wisdom and folly, no reasonable man will deny: Yet is it evident, that in 
affixing the term, which denotes either our approbation or blame, we are 
commonly more influenced by comparison than by any fixed unalterable standard in 
the nature of things. In like manner, quantity, and extension, and bulk, are by 
every one acknowledged to be real things: But when we call any animal great or 
little, we always form a secret comparison between that animal and others of the 
same species; and it is that comparison which regulates our judgment concerning 
its greatness. A dog and a horse may be of the very same size, while the one is 
admired for the greatness of its bulk, and the other for the smallness. When I 
am present, therefore, at any dispute, I always consider with myself, whether it 
be a question of comparison or not that is the subject of the controversy; and 
if it be, whether the disputants compare the same objects together, or talk of 
things that are widely different.†d
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In forming our notions of human nature, we are apt to make a comparison between 
men and animals, the only creatures endowed with thought that fall under our 
senses. Certainly this comparison is favourable to mankind. On the one hand, we 
see a creature, whose thoughts are not limited by any narrow bounds, either of 
place or time; who carries his researches into the most distant regions of this 
globe, and beyond this globe, to the planets and heavenly bodies; looks backward 
to consider the first origin, at least, the history of human race; casts his eye 
forward to see the influence of his actions upon posterity, and the judgments 
which will be formed of his character a thousand years hence; a creature, who 
traces causes and effects to a great length and intricacy; extracts general 
principles from particular appearances; improves upon his discoveries; corrects 
his mistakes; and makes his very errors profitable. On the other hand, we are 
presented with a creature the very reverse of this; limited in its observations 
and reasonings to a few sensible objects which surround it; without curiosity, 
without foresight; blindly conducted by instinct, and attaining, in a short 
time, its utmost perfection, beyond which it is never able to advance a single 
step. What a wide difference is there between these creatures! And how exalted a 
notion must we entertain of the former, in comparison of the latter!
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There are two means commonly employed to destroy this conclusion: First, By 
making an unfair representation of the case, and insisting only upon the 
weaknesses of human nature. And secondly, By forming a new and secret comparison 
between man and beings of the most perfect wisdom. Among the other excellencies 
of man, this is one, that he can form an idea of perfections much beyond what he 
has experience of in himself; and is not limited in his conception of wisdom and 
virtue. He can easily exalt his notions and conceive a degree of knowledge, 
which, when compared to his own, will make the latter appear very contemptible, 
and will cause the difference between that and the sagacity of animals, in a 
manner, to disappear and vanish. Now this being a point, in which all the world 
is agreed, that human understanding falls infinitely short of perfect wisdom; it 
is proper we should know when this comparison takes place, that we may not 
dispute where there is no real difference in our sentiments. Man falls much more 
short of perfect wisdom, and even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than 
animals do of man; yet the latter difference is so considerable, that nothing 
but a comparison with the former can make it appear of little moment.
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It is also usual to compare one man with another; and finding very few whom we 
can call wise or virtuous, we are apt to entertain a contemptible notion of our 
species in general. That we may be sensible of the fallacy of this way of 
reasoning, we may observe, that the honourable appellations of wise and 
virtuous, are not annexed to any particular degree of those qualities of wisdom 
and virtue; but arise altogether from the comparison we make between one man and 
another. When we find a man, who arrives at such a pitch of wisdom as is very 
uncommon, we pronounce him a wise man: So that to say, there are few wise men in 
the world, is really to say nothing; since it is only by their scarcity, that 
they merit that appellation. Were the lowest of our species as wise as TULLY, or 
lord BACON, we should still have reason to say, that there are few wise men. For 
in that case we should exalt our notions of wisdom, and should not pay a 
singular honour to any one, who was not singularly distinguished by his talents. 
In like manner, I have heard it observed by thoughtless people, that there are 
few women possessed of beauty, in comparison of those who want it; not 
considering, that we bestow the epithet of beautiful only on such as possess a 
degree of beauty, that is common to them with a few. The same degree of beauty 
in a woman is called deformity, which is treated as real beauty in one of our 
sex.
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As it is usual, in forming a notion of our species, to compare it with the other 
species above or below it, or to compare the individuals of the species among 
themselves; so we often compare together the different motives or actuating 
principles of human nature, in order to regulate our judgment concerning it. 
And, indeed, this is the only kind of comparison, which is worth our attention, 
or decides any thing in the present question. Were our selfish and vicious 
principles so much predominant above our social and virtuous, as is asserted by 
some philosophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible notion of 
human nature.
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†e There is much of a dispute of words in all this controversy. When a man 
denies the sincerity of all public spirit or affection to a country and 
community, I am at a loss what to think of him. Perhaps he never felt this 
passion in so clear and distinct a manner as to remove all his doubts concerning 
its force and reality. But when he proceeds afterwards to reject all private 
friendship, if no interest or self-love intermix itself; I am then confident 
that he abuses terms, and confounds the ideas of things; since it is impossible 
for any one to be so selfish, or rather so stupid, as to make no difference 
between one man and another, and give no preference to qualities, which engage 
his approbation and esteem. Is he also, say I, as insensible to anger as he 
pretends to be to friendship? And does injury and wrong no more affect him than 
kindness or benefits? Impossible: He does not know himself: He has forgotten the 
movements of his heart; or rather he makes use of a different language from the 
rest of his countrymen, and calls not things by their proper names. What say you 
of natural affection? (I subjoin) Is that also a species of self-love? Yes: All 
is self-love. Your children are loved only because they are yours: Your friend 
for a like reason: And your country engages you only so far as it has a 
connexion with yourself: Were the idea of self removed, nothing would affect 
you: You would be altogether unactive and insensible: Or, if you ever gave 
yourself any movement, it would only be from vanity, and a desire of fame and 
reputation to this same self. I am willing, reply I, to receive your 
interpretation of human actions, provided you admit the facts. That species of 
self-love, which displays itself in kindness to others, you must allow to have 
great influence over human actions, and even greater, on many occasions, than 
that which remains in its original shape and form. For how few are there, who, 
having a family, children, and relations, do not spend more on the maintenance 
and education of these than on their own pleasures? This, indeed, you justly 
observe, may proceed from their self-love, since the prosperity of their family 
and friends is one, or the chief of their pleasures, as well as their chief 
honour. Be you also one of these selfish men, and you are sure of every one's 
good opinion and good will; or not to shock your ears with these expressions, 
the self-love of every one, and mine among the rest, will then incline us to 
serve you, and speak well of you.
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In my opinion, there are two things which have led astray those philosophers, 
that have insisted so much on the selfishness of man. In the first place, they 
found, that every act of virtue or friendship was attended with a secret 
pleasure; whence they concluded, that friendship and virtue could not be 
disinterested. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous sentiment or 
passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel a pleasure in 
doing good to my friend, because I love him; but do not love him for the sake of 
that pleasure.
Hume: ESY Pt. 1 E. 11 Para. 11/11 mp. 86 gp. 155
In the second place, it has always been found, that the virtuous are far from 
being indifferent to praise; and therefore they have been represented as a set 
of vain-glorious men, who had nothing in view but the applauses of others. But 
this also is a fallacy. It is very unjust in the world, when they find any 
tincture of vanity in a laudable action, to depreciate it upon that account, or 
ascribe it entirely to that motive. The case is not the same with vanity, as 
with other passions. Where avarice or revenge enters into any seemingly virtuous 
action, it is difficult for us to determine how far it enters, and it is natural 
to suppose it the sole actuating principle. But vanity is so closely allied to 
virtue, and to love the fame of laudable actions approaches so near the love of 
laudable actions for their own sake, that these passions are more capable of 
mixture, than any other kinds of affection; and it is almost impossible to have 
the latter without some degree of the former. Accordingly, we find, that this 
passion for glory is always warped and varied according to the particular taste 
or disposition of the mind on which it falls. NERO had the same vanity in 
driving a chariot, that TRAJAN had in governing the empire with justice and 
ability. To love the glory of virtuous deeds is a sure proof of the love of 
virtue.
Hume: ESY Pt. 1 E. 11 Var. a mp. 619 gp. 150
†a All the Editions from A to P are headed: Of the Dignity of Human Nature.
Hume: ESY Pt. 1 E. 11 Var. b mp. 619 gp. 151
†b Editions A to P read: especially when attended with somewhat of the 
Misanthrope.
Hume: ESY Pt. 1 E. 11 Var. c mp. 619 gp. 151
†c Editions A to P add the following: Women are generally much more flattered in 
their youth than men; which may proceed from this reason, among others, that 
their chief point of honour is considered as much more difficult than ours, and 
requires to be supported by all that decent pride, which can be instilled into 
them.
Hume: ESY Pt. 1 E. 11 Var. d mp. 619 gp. 152
†d Editions A to P add: As the latter is commonly the case, I have long since 
learnt to neglect such disputes as manifest abuses of leisure, the most valuable 
present that could be made to mortals.
Hume: ESY Pt. 1 E. 11 Var. e mp. 620 gp. 154
†e This paragraph does not occur in Editions A to D, which read instead of it: I 
may, perhaps, treat more fully of this Subject in some future Essay. In the mean 
Time, I shall observe, what has been prov'd beyond Question by several great 
Moralists of the present Age, that the social Passions are by far the most 
powerful of any, and that even all the other Passions receive from them their 
chief Force and Influence. Whoever desires to see this Question treated at 
large, with the greatest Force of Argument and Eloquence, may consult my Lord 
SHAFTSBURY'S Enquiry concerning Virtue.