| Downloaded from http://www.indianembassy.org/new/NewDelhiPressFile/china_factor.htm on Nov 8, 2001. The China Factor K. Subrahmanyam Appeared in the Economic Times on January 22, 1999 The Chinese are carrying on a sustained campaign against India for its allegedly violating the non-proliferation norms and are putting pressure on the US and other nations to punish India and to compel it to roll back. Many in this country will be too willing to jump to the conclusion that all this happened mainly because India cited China as the reason for its nuclear tests. While there may be some truth in it and the Indian nuclear tests could have been justified on situation specific terms instead of country specific ones it is becoming increasing clear that China's conduct arises from factors larger than annoyance with India's citing China as justification for its tests. While the US apologists for China argue that the ring magnets supply by China to Pakistan in breach of Article III(2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an aberration that occurred without the knowledge of higher Chinese authorities, reports from US now speak of Pakistani nuclear test in May, 1998 at Chagai having released radioactivity into the air which indicated the presence of weapons-grade plutonium. Pakistan has no known indigenous source of plutonium of weapon grade and therefore in all probability the fissile material came from China. If that were so, China continues to breach the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which it is a party and the ring magnets transfer could not have been an aberration. Since China's assistance to Pakistan on nuclear weapon technology before 1992 when it joined the NPT is an established fact and the missile and ring magnets transfers after 1992 have also been proved the burden of proving that the weapon grade plutonium did not emerge from China is on China and its apologist, the United States. China has constructed the 40-mw Khushab reactor in Pakistan and it can produce weapon grade plutonium for two bombs a year The reactor is not under international safeguards and that is a breach of NPT by China. Heavy water for the reactor was supplied by China without safeguards, which is yet another breach of NPT. Already the US Administration appears to have launched an obfuscation exercise to shield China by suggesting the sample tested had been inadvertently contaminated. Some Americans also argue that Pakistan's nuclear programme was more advanced than Indians think and therefore they urge India should enter into an agreement of mutual restraint. In fact, Pakistani nuclear programme for all practical purposes is an extension of the Chinese programme and there is no point in India dealing with Pakistan without China being brought into it. The Chinese campaign against India and their pressuring the western countries to punish India and to roll back its programme may have an underlying deeper motivation. China knows that rolling back of India's programme cannot be done. By making this demand China may be building up a case to justify its own future proliferation policies. The US has been permissive of Chinese proliferation to Pakistan. Now China is charging the US and the west of being soft on India. It will not be surprising if in future China proliferates further to Pakistan and Iran and argues it was doing so because the US and the west did not punish India to its satisfaction. In other words, since the US started sliding down the slippery slope of conniving at Chinese proliferation that country rides a high horse vis-a-vis the US. There is no need for India to be unduly alarmed because of the Chinese behaviour. India should stick to its no first use and minimum deterrent programme. India should ask the US to explain the source of Pakistani plutonium and why it is continuing to connive at ongoing Chinese proliferation. The US permissiveness exposes total helplessness of US Administration to enforce non-proliferation norms to be observed by nuclear weapon powers. India should take up the issue of continuing collapse of the non-proliferation regime with other nuclear weapon powers. |