| Downloaded on October 22, 2001, from http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/sep13/fp7.htm Deccan Herald (September, 13, 2001) � Copyright, 1999 The Printers (Mysore)Ltd. Nuclear Links Shyam Bhatia in London Siddiqui is the latest in the line of middle men, backed by Pakistan, who has been caught redhanded smuggling sensitive technology for Pakistan�s nuclear programme. A Pakistani accountant convicted of illegally exporting strategic components from London for Islamabad�s nuclear weapons programme has turned out to be a personal friend of Pakistan�s notorious nuclear weapons chief, Dr Abdul Qadir Khan. During his month long trial, which ended last week, Dhaka-born Abu Bakar Siddiqui, was described as a �procurement agent� and �conduit� for Khan�s nuclear research laboratories at Kahuta near Rawalpindi. In other words the 38-year-old accountant was a vital link in the supply chain to feed Islamabad�s nuclear needs. The trial has highlighted how Pakistan remains dependent on foreign imports for its nuclear weapons programme. It also demonstrates Pakistan�s determination to circumvent export controls of the Western powers by creating dummy companies and using middle men in third party countries to import whatever is needed. But Siddiqui�s trial has rung alarm bells in the West because of mounting evidence that Pakistani scientists are willing to breach the non proliferation barrier by exporting their know how to other aspiring nuclear powers. Siddiqui�s smuggling activities therefore have a much wider significance than simply assisting his friends in Kahuta. Last month the Wall Street Journal newspaper disclosed that United Nations inspectors were of the opinion that nuclear weapons design blueprints recovered from the now defunct Iraqi programme were of Pakistani and Chinese provenance. This confirms what has only been rumoured -- that Saddam Hussein asked for and received crucial data for making nuclear weapons from Khan. This is the same Bhopal-born Khan who until two years ago was in constant touch with Siddiqui urging him to provide Islamabad with all the equipment needed to keep the Pakistani nuclear programme running. Siddiqui was finally convicted last month at London�s Southwark Crown Court on three counts of exporting a 1500 degree celsius heat treatment furnace, high strength aluminum bars made up of an alloy called Aluminum 2041 and a high specification measuring machine. Some of the export orders were processed through Siddiqui�s company, AWD Europe. Siddiqui also operated a second company based in London called Euro Business. Pending his sentencing next October, the British authorities have taken possession of both his British and Pakistani passports. The value of the three illegally exported items alone, for which he has been convicted, has been estimated by British customs as worth several million pounds. Military and scientific experts, who have asked not to be named, say the heat treatment furnace would help to produce the extra strong maraging steel required for the uranium centrifuges that turn out Pakistan�s weapons grade uranium. The aluminum bars, according to the experts, were used by military industries to build air frames, missiles and satellites. The high specification measuring machine would be relevant for the development of inertial guidance for missiles. At his trial Siddiqui claimed the aluminum bars were meant for the production of Coca Cola cans and lorry hub caps in Pakistan. He also claimed to have only an impersonal and distant relationship with Khan. But evidence produced by British prosecution lawyer Mukul Chawla showed that Khan was a long standing family friend of the Siddiqui family. A photograph seized from Siddiqui�s home showed the accountant�s father, Khan and a third Pakistani together on holiday in Morocco. The papers and computer discs confiscated during the search provided the evidence that Siddqui had been receiving his instructions both from Khan and an associate engineer called Farooq based at the Khan Laboratories. Siddiqui started receiving his instructions from Khan in 1995, three years before the Pakistani nuclear tests. The demand for heat intensity furnaces was first made in December 1996 and the furnaces arrived in Karachi in February 1997. Another inquiry about furnaces was made in April 1997, but this time the end user was listed as a �Mr Tahir� of the A R Trading Company in Dubai. More orders were received in 1997 for liquid processors and welding materials, although in both cases the ultimate destination shown on the end user certificate was Bangladesh. When subsequently questioned by Customs, Siddiqui admitted the final destination was Pakistan. He claimed the items were to be used in cable and wire testing for the petro-chemical industry. In November 1997 Siddiqui was asked to facilitate the export of an �Accuracy Measurement Machine�, which Khan told him should be sent to the Peoples Steel Mill in Karachi. The revelations about Khan that have emerged from the Siddiqui trial are entirely consistent with the previously known activities of Pakistan�s nuclear supremo. A metallurgist by training, Khan worked in West Germany, Belgium and Holland for a consortium that developed a new method of producing highly enriched uranium. By the time he returned to Rawalpindi in 1975 Khan had acquired the expertise to set up Pakistan�s own uranium enrichment process that lies at the heart of Islamabad�s nuclear weapons programme. One of his first jobs after returning home was to set up the Special Works Organisation (SWO) that drew up a list of components that needed to be imported from abroad for the nuclear programme. Dummy companies set up by SWO in Holland, Switzerland, Canada, Britain, Dubai and other countries were used to such specialist items as valves, aluminum tubes, electric transformers and inverters. They were all sent to the Khan Laboratories in Kahuta. Over the years Khan also recruited a series of middle men to help facilitate the imports he needed. Siddiqui is the latest in this line of Pakistani-backed middle men who has been caught smuggling sensitive technology to Pakistan�s nuclear programme. Although he has yet to be sentenced, he is likely to receive a custodial sentence of at least two years. If he tries to skip bail by seeking refuge in Pakistan, he will not be allowed back into Britain. |