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Philippines: Rebel Presence in Military Endangers U.S. Troops
16 January 2002
Summary
Fighting has broken out on the southern Philippine island of Jolo between military forces and supporters of jailed Muslim rebel leader Nur Misuari, some of whom are members of the police force. The clashes signal the inability of the Philippine military and police to control former militants within their ranks. As a result, U.S. troops who are being deployed in the country as part of the post-Sept. 11 anti-terror campaign could find themselves in the precarious position of training and working alongside Muslim militant elements.
Analysis
Philippine police officers loyal to jailed Muslim rebel leader Nur Misuari have clashed with the country's military forces on the southern island of Jolo, with more then 30 people killed in two days of fighting. The most recent attack occurred when former members of Misuari's Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) who are now part of the police force fired on an army Jeep Jan. 16.
The fighting comes on the heels of an announcement that more than 650 U.S. troops will be deployed to the volatile southern Philippines region -- where Muslim rebels are highly active -- to participate in anti-terrorism exercises with Filipino troops. But the Jolo incident has revealed the military's inability to control former rebel elements within the country's security forces. This could prove dangerous for U.S. forces, whose efforts to help Philippine troops fight terror groups may put them in close contact with Muslim extremist elements.
The United States and the Philippines have mostly kept close relations for the past 50 years, although Washington has paid even more attention to the country since Sept. 11 due to the ties between its Muslim militant groups and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network.
Of the 650 troops that the United States is sending to the Philippines, 500 will be support and maintenance personnel, and 150 will comprise Special Operations forces. They will join about 1,200 Philippine troops for the joint exercises, known as Balikantan 02-01. The live-ammunition training will take place in the rebel-infested areas of Basilan island and Zamboanga. The exercises, initially scheduled for six months, could be extended until the end of 2002.
Washington and the Philippines have never held joint military exercises in these war-torn areas before. But the locations will allow U.S. military personnel to both observe Philippine forces in serious combat situations and train them on how to handle future operations against domestic terrorist elements.
Besides receiving training, the Philippine military will be able to carry out dramatic offensives with its ally the United States watching its back. U.S. troops also tend to leave behind military equipment following joint exercises, Asia Times reported.
One of the major goals of the U.S.-Philippine military cooperation will be the dismantling of groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim rebel organization with strong links to al Qaeda. More than 5,000 Filipino troops have been deployed to free two Americans who were kidnapped by the group but so far have not succeeded.
Philippine President Gloria Arroyo told local radio Jan. 16 that the U.S. soldiers will only be acting as advisers, although Filipino military officials have said that the U.S. trainers would be given live ammunition and are allowed to fire in self defense, Agence France-Presse reported.
The mere presence of U.S. forces has already angered many in the country, and an attack by hostile separatist groups is a very real possibility. However, another increasing danger is the threat posed by former rebel elements within the military.
The government integrated rebel members into its military and police forces following the 1996 Peace Accord established between Manila and the MNLF. Over the years both the military and the police have experienced defections as the rebels returned to their former comrades, taking their assigned arms with them.
The recent fighting in Jolo shows that many rebels who have not defected -- such as former MNLF members -- may not have cut their old ties and may still harbor strong loyalties to factions other than the Philippine government. This has been seen in the past, as former rebels within the security forces have allowed active militant members to pass through security lines or have refused to fight against certain groups.
This may become an even bigger problem for U.S. forces, as the already strong anti-U.S. sentiment in the Philippines could be inflamed by the government's plan to try Misuari for inciting an uprising last year. Such a catalyst may cause further rebel elements in the military and police to switch allegiances, and their proximity to U.S. personnel can allow them to complicate U.S. efforts in the region or threaten troops themselves.
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