Thirty years ago this year, a
popular movement began in Ethiopia whose process and outcome had no parallel
anywhere in Africa. It began peacefully, but the “bloodless revolution”—as it
was initially dubbed by its instigators—soon evoked overpowering passions and
frictions that degenerated into spiraling violence without precedent in the
country and with consequences that were unimagined by even those who initiated
it as a legitimate weapon of political struggle. In the maelstrom of the Red
Terror, as it was officially called, thousands of lives were lost and maimed.
Was this bloodshed inevitable or could it have been prevented? Who were the
real victims and the real perpetrators? What is its legacy? These queries
cannot be answered in the abstract but need to be situated in their historical
and social contexts readily available elsewhere[i]. This
paper reexamines the Red Terror in light of Arno Mayer’s recent and
controversial theoretical propositions. Such an approach will help us to see
the Ethiopian tragedy in a broader historical perspective.
Though it is difficult to imagine
exact historical parallels, only by comparing it with other cases of political
violence can it be established whether or not the Red Terror was a uniquely
Ethiopian phenomenon. In his monumental study of the French and Russian
revolutions, Arno Mayer makes several theoretical formulations regarding the
dialectical link between revolution and violence/terror. The Ethiopian
Revolution did share some basic similarities with its two European antecedents,
but it also markedly diverged from them in some respects. This is not to say
that the French and Russian historical experiences were contradicted by the
Ethiopian one, for each had its own national peculiarities. But it would seem
to suggest that either the French and Russian revolutions were more similar to
each other than they were to others, or the Ethiopian experience was manifestly
exceptional. The strong similarity between the European revolutions leads Mayer
to infer bold theories with universal implications. The Ethiopian Terror
significantly deviates from his theses, however, casting doubt on their
universal validity. The task now is, first, to identify the author’s
postulates, pointing out the extent to which they are supported or contradicted
by the Ethiopian revolution. Second, a compressed narrative of the main events
leading to the Red Terror and its features follows. It will be shown that the
key factor that made revolutionary violence possible was the lack of democratic
norms and skills, and that the Terror was an outcome of the interlacing of
three factors: contingent circumstances, ideological motivation, and political
ambition. Though galvanized by the same basic beliefs and visions, the radical
wing of the intelligentsia seeking to appropriate the revolution was driven by
violent feuds at a time when the government was buffeted by a tangled web of
domestic and external pressures. It was decimated following an opprobrious
defeat in a three-sided conflict at the hands of extraordinarily ambitious
soldiers who went on to erect a durable military dictatorship. But first
Mayer’s hypotheses and their relevance to the Ethiopian experience.
First postulate:” [T]here
is no revolution without violence and terror, without civil and foreign war,
without iconoclasm and religious conflict, and without collision between city
and country. The Furies of revolution are fueled principally by the inevitable
and unexpected resistance of the forces and ideas opposed to it, at home and
abroad.” [ii]This
premise is not fully sustained by the Ethiopian revolutionary experience. Like
the European revolutions, the Ethiopian Revolution was waged under the strains
of war, but it was unlike them in at least three important areas. First, there
was minimal class warfare; second, the rural-urban cleavage was much less
pronounced, and third, though there were counter-revolutionaries, what
“principally” incited and fed the Terror were not “forces and ideas” inevitably
opposed to the revolution but the violent vying for power among factions
supporting or leading the revolution. The Terror was neither inexorable nor
necessary.
Surely, the Ethiopian Revolution
was markedly violent, but there was little social strife in which gentry and
peasantry battled each other; nor was there any clash between secularists and
theocrats or between godless revolutionaries and ardent believers. The
Revolution began as a heterogeneous urban protest movement that posed only a
mild challenge to monarchical autocracy, also the principal target of Mayer’s
two European revolutions. But as the sectarian grievances coalesced and
leadership slowly fell into the hands of militant progressives, the popular
upsurge began to envision, much like the French and Russian social upheavals,
“a radical re-foundation of both polity and society.”[iii]
This meant transforming village Ethiopia where more than 90 percent of the
population lived and eked out a subsistence living under a social hierarchy not
unlike that of European feudalism. In its endeavor to establish a more
egalitarian and just social order, the new revolutionary leadership
disinherited the predatory landed classes with a single legal order, provoking
violent confrontation between uprooted feudal lords and empowered peasants. The
reaction of the dispossessed and waning classes was not unanticipated; the
unknown factor was whether it would be extensive, cohesive, and lasting. It
turned out to be none of these because the social block was internally
segmented along ethnic and regional lines. The resistance was localized,
uncoordinated, remarkably feeble and with no staying power, both in the
countryside and city. Similarly, although the Orthodox Church, pillar of the
fallen monarchy, was divested of its land holdings, the minimal financial
remuneration or compensation granted it (a privilege denied to the nobility) by
the new authorities was sufficient to keep it calm. There was no open clerical
resistance to the emerging order as in France and Russia, and the revolution
was devoid of any religious conflict. Attempts to mobilize the peasants of the
eastern periphery under the banner of Islam were fruitless.
Nor were there tangible collisions
between city and country. In fact, the revolution was made for, not by the
peasants, with the slogan ‘Land to the Tiller’. There were no jacqueries that
tried to starve the towns immediately before or after the spontaneous upheaval
of 1974. Both in its origin and genesis this most radical African revolution
that freed the peasantry from its feudal fetters was mainly an urban
phenomenon; and of the three million city dwellers in a country of about 32
million, scarcely 300,000 or 10 percent were directly and actively involved.[iv]
The peasants were drawn to mass politics subsequent to the land proclamation of
1975 when they created their own associations, under the auspices of the state,
to protect the gains of the revolution, as well as to manage their own affairs
with minimal intervention by the state. Even though some rural people were
drawn into the localized, and thus fragmented, risings led by former landlords
and aristocrats, by and large the peasants were for the revolution. Their
Associations helped seal the political fate of their class enemies. However,
when the regime in Addis Ababa began to institute policies that were
detrimental to the interests and welfare of the rural producers, they felt
alienated and many began to abandon it.
Radical agitators from the cities succeeded in stirring and mobilizing
them for what they called `national liberation’. In their ideological
posturing, these ethno-nationalists presented themselves as the authentic
socialists, at once opposed to `national chauvinists’, the Derg (Military
Council), whom they curiously dubbed `fascist’, and `Soviet social
imperialism’. Their movements, therefore, were unlike the reactionary peasant
uprisings in the French Vendee and Russia, especially in the Ukraine and the
Volga region, which pushed the Jacobins and Bolsheviks, respectively, to employ
techniques of terror in defense of their revolutions.[v] This
leads to Mayer’s second thesis, which, in a way, is a restatement of the first.
Second postulate: “There can be
no revolution without counterrevolution; both as phenomenon and process, they
are inseparable like truth and falsehood. The struggle between the ideas and
forces of revolution and counterrevolution was a prime mover of the spiraling
violence to the French and Russian revolutions”[vi]What
happened in Ethiopia was quite different. It is all too evident that every
revolution breeds a counterrevolution, the intensity and durability of which
varies from one situation to another; but in vivid contrast to France and
Russia, the terror in Ethiopia was never the result of a primary clash “between
the ideas and forces of revolution and counterrevolution.” The fratricidal
killings that marked the early years of the revolution actually took place
among the idealistic intellectuals and activists themselves. And there were no
irreconcilable ideological differences among the intellectual authors of the
Red Terror; they were divided only by the choice of tactics regarding the
conquest and reorganization of political power in order to make the social
revolution. Otherwise, they all resorted to Marxist canons and Leninist or
Maoist tactics to validate their behavior and actions.
Third postulate: “The
establishment and operation of the reign of terror was inseparable from the
tangled contingencies of civil war, foreign hostility, economic disorganization,
and social dislocation, which called for quick, centralizing, and coercive
action.”[vii]
The Ethiopian experience does validate this hypothesis. As in France and
Russia, the revolutionaries in Ethiopia were confronted with numerous
challenges from within and without that demanded concerted and speedy response.
In addition to the Eritrean insurgency, which began in 1961, and the Somali
aggression, which ignited a regional war in 1977, the revolution sparked
multiple ethnic and regional uprisings. Without question, these hostile forces
posed a grave danger not only to the survival of the revolutionary regime but
also to the national state, fully corroborating Mayer’s inference. The
stratagem or means adopted to deal with the entangled social conflicts and the
exigencies of war, and the manner those measures were interpreted and
implemented, were determined by a complex web of political, ideological,
psychological, and personal factors. What is clear is that the ascending
ethno-regional conflicts, the external enmity, as well as the socio-economic
disruptions caused by the political upheaval gave justification for both the
reassertion of a strong centralizing authority and the use of large-scale
coercion. In other words, the restoration of state authority and the protection
of public safety provided the rationale for coercive powers by the men at the
helm. Nevertheless, it would not be correct to correlate the sheer magnitude of
the indiscriminate violence inflicted upon the populace with the multiple pressures
and stresses bearing upon the fledgling government. A glimpse at the terror’s
history will make this contention abundantly clear.
In its beginnings the Ethiopian
Revolution was an inchoate urban uprising with no person or organization to
lead it and no ideology to guide it. It was unplanned, unforeseen, instantaneous, but widely popular and
generally bloodless. It was not long, however, before several potential
contenders for power emerged only to find themselves engulfed in a
three-dimensional bloody conflict that culminated in the Red Terror. The
opponents of the fallen regime were spurred by different sets of historical
circumstances, competing or conflicting interests, and disparate aspirations.
They had been temporarily and precariously united by their common opposition to
the existing social order, not by a shared vision of the future. Once autocracy
was removed, the emerging contenders for state power found themselves deeply
divided over tactics and strategy; each faction wanting to reconstruct state
and society according to its own vision and plan. As factional differences
sharpened, political allegiances that grew out of deeply held principles and
convictions of justice and injustice, right and wrong, democracy and
dictatorship, or from opportunistic and shifting stances in the
multidimensional rivalries, were scrutinized as never before. The struggles
were not always waged or fought for lofty philosophical and political ideas and
principles; they were exacerbated by competing ambitions and personality
clashes that turned extremely violent. Political rhetoric that extolled
violence, and the lack of a culture of democratic dialogue, compromise, and
tolerance, combined to make fratricidal conflict almost inevitable.
The first phase of the revolution,
running from June 1974 to February 1977, was mainly but not exclusively played
out in Addis Ababa, the nation’s capital, between three contending forces that
viewed each other with an ambiguous mixture of contempt and fear. On the one
hand was the Derg or composed of 120[viii]
men of different ranks, ranging from private to major, and hastily drawn from
the various branches of the armed forces, police and territorial army. At a
historical moment when the old ruling classes were in complete disarray and the
fragmented lower classes unable to fill in the vacuum, it seized power in June,
roughly six months after the first soldiers’ mutiny which had sparked the
popular upsurge. Two months later, it reconstituted itself as the Provisional
Military Administrative Council (PMAC) following its dethronement of the
autocratic emperor Haile Selassie I on September 12, 1974. It alluded to rights
of a common citizenship but fear of a mobilized citizenry drove it to exclusion
and repression. It immediately passed decrees that restricted democratic rights
of speech and assembly and, despite its name, the Council showed no sign of
sharing power with the civilian sector, let alone surrendering it, anytime
soon. Power, once forcibly acquired, is seldom freely relinquished.
But this was an amorphous and
unwieldy political body with no objective base in the economy, and one that was
both intellectually and technically ill-equipped to deal with the multiple
social and political contradictions that had given rise to it in the first
place. Half of its members were illiterate or semi-literate soldiers of petty
bourgeois orientation who nourished vague notions of liberty and equality; not
even their better-educated mutinous officers had a clue of how or by what means
to attain them.[ix]
Typically Bonapartist, they thought they could navigate the revolution above
social classes and without class struggles[x]. They
wanted to stabilize, not intensify the revolution. The men were patriotic
populists who genuinely but mistakenly believed that, following the removal of
the emperor and his henchmen, all the forces clamoring for a new order would
gratefully and gleefully rally behind them and that societal ills would be
resolved peacefully. It was a chimera, for they could not even settle their internal
disputes nonviolently. They breached their motto, `Ethiopia First, but without
bloodshed’ on the evening of November 23 when, first, they liquidated their
chairman and minister of defense, General Aman Mikael Andom, along with two
Council members, and then frantically killed 57 political prisoners, all former
high civil and military officials. The tragic episode, which dispelled the
illusion that a sweeping social revolution could be waged without violence, was
triggered by disagreements on how to handle the secessionist movement in
Eritrea, a political problem they inherited from the previous government. The
massacre foreshadowed the reign of terror.
Opposed to the PMAC, itself
undergoing a metamorphosis, were not only the languid remnants of the vanishing
order but also, and more importantly, the inspired rival claimants to
leadership of the new order. The aspirants were the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (better
known by its Amharic Acronym, Meison), byproducts of the international
Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s. Both surfaced in Addis Ababa soon
after the political upheaval and had, to varying degrees, become influential
enough to merit the concerned attention of the PMAC. In the transition, when
the old was dying and the new was not yet consolidated, to echo A. Gramsci,
there was a flowering of political ideas and activities. In the extraordinarily
permissive atmosphere, leftism thrived though only transiently. More successful
was the EPRP: Ingratiating itself to the domestic branch of the student
movement, it had significantly penetrated civil society by establishing cells
in the trade unions, the Teachers’ Association, the youth, and the middle
layers of the civilian bureaucracy, all opposed to military rule. Its Democracia
was the most coveted and widely read clandestine paper. Meison’s efforts at
recruitment were less efficacious and for the same reason, its Voice of the
Masses not as avidly read. The political tactics of the parties would
reflect their relative strengths and weaknesses. As the two distrustful rivals
feverishly strove to unseat the new power-wielders, they ruinously clashed
against each other. The animosity, the intrigue, the skullduggery, and the
inflexibility would eventually and tragically consume both of them.
The tangled events leading to the
Terror began to unfold in 1975, a year that saw the passage of landmark reforms
as well as the steady escalation of violence in which domestic conflict grimly
merged with external aggression. The PMAC was radicalized in the process, but
as it drifted leftward with the dominant political current, it would wipe out
the Left. Although unwilling to concede power, the PMAC did take some radical
measures in response to popular mood and in the hope of mollifying its leftist
critics. Already at the end of 1974 it had introduced as its convention
`Ethiopian Communalism’, a variant of the nebulous `African Socialism’. Prodded
by its civilian advisors and in an apparent response to its radical opponents,
the Council shaded its Bonapartist stance, moving beyond this ideological
dimness to strike a blow at the whole system of social domination and
exploitation in March 1975: It abolished feudalism by nationalizing all rural
land and undermined nascent capitalism by confiscating excess urban land and
houses, all major industrial enterprises and financial institutions. Its
dilemma at this stage was how to consolidate and institutionalize these
decisive and definitive achievements without a mobilized and organized popular
support. The PMAC found it expedient, therefore, to establish a modus
vivendi with the leftist organizations for at least three reasons: First,
to enlist their political and ideological support and even guidance in the
ongoing struggles to transform society; second, to use them as channels through
which it could expand its narrow social base, and third, short of co-opting
them, to appropriate their ideas, vocabulary, and organizational skills. It was
a shrewd and practical approach, but its relative success deepened the rift
between the EPRP and Meison.
The two self-styled Marxist
organizations got embroiled in a seemingly insoluble dispute regarding the
tasks and tactics of the revolution and the role of the military men in it. The
heated debates and acrimony swirled around three main issues two of which they
could not reconcile. These were the transition from feudalism to socialism, the
erection of popular sovereignty, and the question of nationalities in a
multi-ethnic empire-state. On the question of transition, they both subscribed
to the two-stage theory: Before a semi-feudal society like Ethiopia could move
to socialism it had to wage a national democratic revolution led by a vanguard
party and supported by an alliance of workers, peasants, and the progressive
elements of the petty bourgeoisie. Only the liquidation of feudalism and
concomitant defeat of imperialism would ensure the dawn of socialism. For
Meison, the soldiers had gone far enough in this respect to deserve `critical
support’ from Marxist revolutionaries. As for the masses they had to settle for
some kind of guided democracy alternately characterized as `national
dictatorship’ and `provisional revolutionary government’ until they could
represent themselves directly. Condemning this as an opportunistic ploy that
would tame the revolution by entrenching military rule, the EPRP rejected such
tactical partnership and called for an immediate and unconditional formation of
a `provisional people’s government’, in which all sectors of society, with the
exception of those opposed to the revolution, would be represented. Meison saw
the EPRP’s stance as infantile and contradictory, for a government, it argued,
cannot be popular and provisional at the same time. It was not even vaguely
clear to most observers why there could not be a provisional popular government. In fact, Meison had flirted with
the idea until it abandoned it altogether for seemingly tactical reasons.
With regard to the third issue,
both organizations recognized the Leninist principle of the right of
nationalities to self-determination, but with one important difference. The
EPRP argued for the right to include the option for secession whereas
Meison held that such a right ought to be exercised only within the “limits of
Ethiopia’s sovereignty”. Obviously, Meison’s position diverged from the
Leninist formula but was more palatable to the government; while its offer of
critical support recognized and bolstered the PMAC’s legitimacy, its option for
a vaguely conceptualized regional autonomy was not at all incompatible with the
government’s centralist policy. Actually, it afterwards granted limited
autonomy to some regions. The political differences, often couched in ambiguous
ways, were thus quite basic and each side firmly stood its ground. Further
hampered by personal antipathies and rivalries inherited from the external wing
of the student movement, the organizations could not find a middle ground for
accommodation. The stage was set for a violent confrontation that would impair
the antagonists and derail the social movement they aspired to lead.
Meison’s decision to collaborate
with the soldiers seems to have been predicated upon two tactical calculations.
First, it believed that access to state resources would enable it to fight its
unshakable rival more effectively. Second, by organizing a revolutionary
vanguard party under the aegis or in collaboration with the PMAC, it hoped to
supplant the latter from the apparatuses of state power eventually. It was evident
that Meison’s tactical alliance was at once indispensable and self-defeating;
indispensable because the organization was weaker than the EPRP, and
self-defeating because it grossly underestimated the soldiers’ own ambition to
cling to power and their capacity to acquire the rhetoric of radicalism and new
concepts and modes of political organization. Not surprisingly its maneuver
would misfire. For the time being, though, it had succeeded in outflanking its
rival.
The alliance immediately initiated
policies and created new organs that would advance the revolution while
safeguarding its gains. In December 1975 the government established the
Provisional Office of Mass Organizational Affairs (POMOA), consisting of five
unmatched political groups -- the PMAC, Meison, Wazleague (labor), the
Ethiopian Oppressed Masses Unity Struggle (Echat) and the Ethiopian
Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organization (Emalered) – and the Yekatit
(February) 66 Political School. Chaired by Meison’s ideologue, Haile Fida, POMOA
was to mobilize and organize mass support while the school recruited and
trained Marxist cadres, laying the groundwork for the formation of a workers’
party. Meison took advantage of its dominant position in the Provisional Office
to establish and extend parallel networks of its own party in the state
apparatuses and civic organizations throughout the country. In early 1976 POMOA
launched the Program for the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) that
envisioned a socialist people’s democratic republic led by the proletariat in
alliance with the peasants and the backing of the petty bourgeoisie. Existing
professional associations including the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions
(CELU) in which the EPRP had ensconced itself were dissolved; those that replaced
them were placed under Meison’s cadres or surrogates. POMOA also brought the
urban neighborhood (dwellers’) associations which would play a critical role in
the multifaceted conflict under its umbrella, facilitating Meison’s
infiltration. Further, the party swiftly planted itself in the state’s civilian
bureaucracy by placing its senior members in key positions. By mid-1976 Meison
had come close to achieving its first tactical objective. Its spectacular
ascendancy sent tremors in the EPRP’s camp, provoking it to embark on a
self-destructive adventure.
Realizing that it had been deftly
upstaged, the EPRP or, more correctly, its politburo, tried violently, but
futilely, to defeat its opponents. It did so without seriously considering the
sentiments, sensibilities and interests of the populace, nor the viability of
urban warfare. The party seems to have been deluded by the personal and
cliquish squabbles within the Derg which had already resulted in a major purge.
That its rural base in the far north was extremely precarious may have also
driven it to seize power through a short cut. This was a grievous
miscalculation. In September 1976 it began a campaign of terror in the capital
which it mistakenly saw as the Derg’s weakest spot, gunning down Meison’s cadres
and other visible “collaborators” whom it callously characterized as
mercenaries. Just as ominous was its abortive attempt to assassinate, on
September 23, the first vice chairman of the PMAC, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam.
What would have happened had it succeeded is only a subject for conjecture. The
bungled affair in any case would boomerang catastrophically. As the EPRP and
Meison slaughtered each other the vice chairman was enmeshed in the third and
final crisis within the Derg from which he emerged winner, intent to punish his
enemies.
The bloody discord that gave rise
to the man was set off by his establishment of the Abiotawi Seded
(Revolutionary Flame) sometime between September and October, a flame that
would lay waste a generation. In founding
the party, with the help of Derg members who had been sent to the Soviet Union
for political education, Mengistu appears to have had two goals: To counter the
growing threat of Meison in the short term, and to make Seded the core of the
proposed vanguard party in the long term. That would have deprived Meison of
its second and most ambitious objective—the seizure of power. His action
frightened some of the PMAC’s leading members who were excluded from the
party’s leadership. Seeing it as potentially eclipsing the PMAC, they conspired
to clip the Major’s powers before he could prune theirs. But Mengistu was a man
who thrived in crises. In a dazzling move that none had anticipated, he and his
cohorts slayed seven of them including the chairman, General Teferri Banti, on
3 February, 1977. This effectually abolished the PMAC as an unsteady collegiate
body. It marked the end of Bonapartism and the beginning of military
dictatorship. After three years of chaotic and sporadically violent struggles,
Mengistu rose as the undisputed strongman, combining the titles of chairman of
the PMAC, head of state, and commander of the armed forces.[xi]
His rise heralded a dark era in the country’s history. The path to his reign of
terror was paved with blood and tears. During the three tumultuous years,
Ethiopians had acquired what Crane Brinton called “the habit of violence,”[xii]
a state of mind perhaps more attuned to terror. But few of them could have ever
envisaged what lay ahead. Nothing in their recent experience could have prepared
them for it.
Only a day after his assumption of
absolute power, Mengistu declared, `We shall beat back White Terror with Red
Terror’, vowing to avenge the fallen comrades `double-and-triple fold’.
According to Mayer, “Vengeance is an integral part of both the Red and the
White Terror in revolution. There is, of course, vengeance without terror, just
as there is violence without terror. But for there to be terror there must be
vengeance and violence.”[xiii]
Mengistu inaugurated his rule with a pledge for vengeance, the main target of
his frightful pronouncement being the EPRP. At this stage the conflict was no
longer between two distrustful and stubborn rivals as it directly involved
state agencies of repression. Thus began the `Red Terror’ which lasted nearly
two years and exterminated a generation of Ethiopians without regard to class,
ethnic, religious and gender distinctions. In the process society endured so
much hardship and indignity that the ideas that nourished the revolution were
thoroughly degraded and the ideals for which it was fought completely
nullified.
The Red Terror occurred in two
overlapping phases. Its purpose was to eliminate political enemies, intimidate
potential opponents and, in its latter phase, to beat down society into total
submission. It was premeditated, planned, deliberate and pitiless. The Terror
began in a highly polarized environment, amidst an intense spasm of violence on
March 23, 1977 in Addis Ababa and quickly engulfed the whole country, its
incidence varying from province to province. There was no town or city that did
not see some measure of violence.
Those, like the EPRP and the
ethno-nationalists who condemned the Derg as fascist, may argue, along with
Mayer, that this was in fact a clash between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries;
that the military represented the right wing and that its violence against the
left was typical of revolutionary violence directed against an ideological
opponent. This is not entirely tenable because the soldiers were not opposed to
the political objectives of the revolution, going as far as forming alliances
with Marxist groups; they only wanted to direct it by sitting on the saddle of
power. The men have argued, with some justification, that what drove them to
take extreme measures was the extraordinary confluence of adverse circumstances
threatening central authority, and that those measures were initially endorsed
and supported by a segment of the radical intelligentsia.
Although the Terror was launched
under the overall supervision of Mengistu, its first phase was inspired and
coordinated by Meison with such slogans as `White Terror with Red Terror’,
`Intensify the Red Terror’, and `Democracy with the gun’. Though it knew too
well that the ghastly contest was between progressives, Meison nevertheless
inappropriately reinvented terms in order to cast the EPRP in the mold of the
Russian reactionary generals who prosecuted `White Terror’ against the
revolutionary Bolsheviks who responded with `Red Terror’. It was a
self-flattering but false analogy. It also mischievously attacked the leaders
of the EPRP as the disgruntled children of the dispossessed classes, calling
them anarchists and nihilists in order to stir up class animosity. It worked
direfully against the EPRP which had already alienated a cross-section of the
urban poor by its ill-considered attempt to kill Mengistu; the dispossessed and
underprivileged saw him as one of their
own, a plebeian, because of his humble social origins and the progressive image
he portrayed. The rhetoric or psychological warfare was as wicked as the
physical violence was appalling.
The contest quickly became a
mismatch, and the sheer scale of the brutality committed beggars the
imagination. Code-named Operation Mentir (pluck), the offensive to wipe out the
EPRP in the capital comprised the Union of Marxist Organizations ( Emaledh)[xiv],
the “revolution defense squads”, the 291 urban dwellers’ associations, and the
security and paramilitary forces that were the praetorian guards of the PMAC.
The operation was waged relentlessly for five months during which time two
major house-to house searches, lasting three to five days, were conducted to
flush out EPRP’s cadres, to seize its duplicating machines and publications,
and to disarm the populace. Society was trapped in an escalating and vicious
violence. The party immediately lost some of its leaders and began to fracture,
many of the hastily recruited cadres deserting or shifting sides to save their
own lives. Many more became informers on their former comrades. In the witch
hunt that followed, individuals were coerced to denounce and renounce their
membership in the party and to expose others. The Terror was not limited to
activists but reached anyone suspected of harboring anti-government sentiments.
And in the rapid flow of events, the turmoil and panic, things got out of
control and grievous mistakes were undoubtedly made. During the mayhem some
families lost up to four children, and thousands vanished never to be seen or
heard from again.[xv]
The defense squads, the vigilantes, mostly made up of resentful, vicious, and
vengeful lumpen, were turned into death squads empowered to harass, arrest,
detain, torture and kill almost at will. Most of them probably believed that
they were only defending a revolution that promised liberty and social equity.
But many individuals exploited the near-anarchic situation to settle accounts
or personal vendetta. And there were the psychopathic assassins like Girma
Kebede, Berhanu Kebede, and Ghesgis who summarily executed without the
slightest concern for judiciary procedures. Victims of the extra-judicial
killings were left by the roadside, often in prominent places with placards
that condemned them as anarchists, anti-people or counterrevolutionaries. Tens
of hundreds were thrown in unmarked mass graves. Rarely was a notice about
their death or disappearance delivered to their relatives. It was intended to
torment the living.
The EPRP had suffered a great
strategic defeat and was perilously close to extinction in the cities, but
Meison’s success was a fluke. It did not partake in the next phase of political
violence, for the party itself fell victim to the barbarity it had urged and
kindled. This campaign that finally decimated the Left began in August 1977 and
went on for about a year. Seded had not been happy with the power and
prominence Meison had attained. The dubious alliance fell apart rather
dramatically following the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977. Both Meison and
the EPRP had taken ambiguous and politically harmful positions on the event
which contributed to splits in the armed forces. While condemning the
aggression, both withheld full endorsement of the national resistance under the
PMAC’s leadership. Moreover, Meison overreached itself by wanting to take control
of the 100,000 militia that were drafted in response to the invasion. Mengistu
seems to have seen this as a plot or putsch. Seded wasted no time in pointing
the dagger at Meison while still killing suspected supporters of the EPRP. In a
state of panic, Meison’s entire leadership disappeared from the political scene
on August 21, abandoning their cadres and supporters to the wolves. Like the
EPRP, they had not prepared an exit strategy in the event their plans failed.
They were easily hunted down, executed or incarcerated. A few managed to flee
the country and some switched allegiance to Seded, serving the military
dictatorship until its fall in 1991. The brutal annihilation of Meison was soon
followed by that of Emalered and Wazleague. In a succession of blind furies the
Sededists had consolidated their hold on power by nearly eradicating the Left,
whose missteps and disgraceful feuds they exploited so cunningly.[xvi]
How many perished in the Terror?
One keen observer has written:
History offers few examples of
revolutions that have devoured their own children with such voraciousness and
so much cruelty. It can be estimated that, of ten civilians who had actively
worked for a radical transformation of Ethiopia, one escaped arrest,
imprisonment, torture, execution or assassination. The revolution swallowed the
whole of the young generation of Ethiopian intellectuals, that is literate.[xvii]
It is an acute but inaccurate
observation. The Terror destroyed the Left but did not exterminate the
intelligentsia. We will never have an exact reckoning of the death total.
Estimates vary from a couple of thousand to a quarter of a million.[xviii]
The number of deaths may have been in the neighborhood of 25,000. Behind the
grim statistics though lay the larger and gruesome picture of a revolution
eating its own children and of a society utterly crushed and traumatized.
Part of the trauma was caused by
torture, the other face of the Terror. State organized and civic associations
were turned into monsters of criminality. The neighborhood associations, the
police, the revolution defense squads, and the security services all had vast
powers to apprehend people and hold them in their respective detention,
interrogation and torture chambers, and other secret locations disguised as
sports or professional clubs. They held them indefinitely, sometimes without
revealing their identities and without giving them access except to government
officials. There is overwhelming evidence, most of it coming from the victims
themselves, that those who were kept for years in dingy and overcrowded cells
were subjected to all kinds of physical, psychological or mental torture. The
most common punishments included sleep deprivation; burning bodies with
cigarettes and electric current; hanging by the arms from bars or ceilings and
beating the soles of the feet with coiled wires; asphyxiating by ducking the
head in a plastic bucket of filthy water, or choking by stuffing dirty cloth
into the mouth; flogging or whipping; mock executions, denial of access to
toiletry and medical services. There are more lurid stories of rape or sexual
assaults and threats of rape to wives and daughters; of prisoners made to stand
for hours on end with their arms outstretched or forced to kneel on gravel
(pebbles) or rough cement; of finger nails ripped out, testicles crushed, and
electric shocks applied to the breast, rectum and genitalia. In some instances,
these unimaginably cruel techniques resulted in broken ribs, paralysis, loss of
hearing or eyesight, and potency. Torture was used to extract information or to
crush the willpower of individuals so that they abandoned their beliefs or
changed allegiances. Incredibly, not a few endured the pain to hold onto their
principles or beliefs,[xix]a
testimony to the unconquerable human spirit.
What was the justification for all
the ferocious repression? In other historical contexts, “revolutionary terror”
has been attributed either to ideological motivation, historical exigency, or
lust for power. These ingredients are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as
Mayer points out[xx]
and, to varying degrees, all three contributed to the genesis and
intensification of political violence that culminated in the Red Terror in
Ethiopia. The principled devotion to ones’ beliefs and the multifarious strains
on the central state authority were just as critical as the desire to grasp or
to cleave to power, perhaps the overriding reason for the furies.
Ideology was indeed intrinsic to
the Terror in Ethiopia. As a coherent system of beliefs, ideology was used “to
foster social and political solidarity, to legitimate and justify” ones’
actions and programs as well as to criticize, refute or discredit those of
adversaries.[xxi]
It defined political positions and determined choices. Those Marxist civilian
forces that instigated the terror were driven by powerful ideas or beliefs.
Convinced of the justness of their cause, they were determined to remake the
world. However, the violent urban struggles that reached their feverish pitch
by early 1977 were not between opposing forces guided by conflicting visions
and aspirations but between rival factions in the revolution. The ideas that
inspired their social vision and justified their political decisions and
actions were fundamentally the same. Although unified by a socialist imagination,
they splintered in their interpretation
of such central issues as self-determination and the reorganization of state
power. They all subscribed to the Leninist proposition that there is no social
revolution without the seizure of state power. The trouble was that each
faction saw itself as the custodian of the revolution and power as its
entitlement. Unbending in their formulations and interpretations of the tasks
and tactics of the revolution, the radical intellectuals disastrously resorted
to violence to settle their dispute. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion
that, if it were not for their rigidity and precipitous actions, there probably
would never have been an internecine conflict on such a scale in the cities. In
fact, and contrary to Mayer’s assertion, there could have been a revolution
without terror because the counter-revolutionary forces turned out to be rather
feeble.
Both the EPRP and Meison claimed that they resorted to violence
only in self-defense, each blaming the other for having provoked it and for the
fact that both were victims of the Terror. Meison has history on its side, for
it was the EPRP that ignited the urban civil war. But Meison aggravated it by
providing the Sededists ideas that justified and legitimized it. Evidently,
ideology was “the cause and engine of terror,”[xxii]
which was as much the outcome of political ambition as it was of circumstance.
Conforming to Mayer’s model, the general chaos and threats created a situation
that made internecine violence more possible.
The Derg pleaded that the Terror
was imposed on it by domestic opposition and international reaction which
combined to endanger both the revolution and the integrity of the state. That
is to say, the Terror was a defensive and legitimate response to the multiple
problems and pressures facing the new government. Indeed, the civil war at the
center intensified precisely at a time when the state was confronted with
insurrection and external aggression at the periphery. The Eritrean insurgents
were poised at the gates of Asmara, the provincial capital; the Ethiopian
Democratic Union (EDU), a counter-revolutionary organization supported by some
western governments and such reactionary regimes of the Sudan and Saudi Arabia,
had captured a couple of frontier towns and was advancing toward the interior;
government institutions and organizations were being harassed or assaulted by
ethno-nationalist movements that had sprung up in several provinces, for
communitarian self-affirmation, and in the midst of it all the Somalis attacked
from the east. Moreover, the government’s relationship with the United States,
the country’s traditional ally and arms supplier, had deteriorated to a
breaking point. The array of hostile forces was bewildering, the rapidity and intensity
of the flow of events mostly unanticipated and perplexing. The country seemed
to be staring into the abyss. Under these conditions, as in France and Russia,
the government “had no choice but to make grave and perilous decisions…for
which there was no rational criteria.”[xxiii]These
contingent circumstances provided the environment and rationalization for the
government’s call for the violent repression of the urban opposition. The
soldiers saw the termination of the
urban turmoil as the most urgent and essential prerequisite to the restoration
of state authority and public order at the center in order to deal with the
insurrection and war at the periphery. The force exerted to achieve that goal
was nonetheless disproportionate and indiscriminate, and in an unexpected way
wiped out the cream of the revolution. It was state terror ostensibly
perpetrated to safeguard the revolution and save the country, but it also
served as a mechanism with which to concentrate and solidify power in the hands
of one man and to stifle dissent everywhere
That the mounting social disorder
demanded resolute action is hardly disputable, but not on a scale of the Red
Terror to which men’s ambitions and vainglory contributed considerably. The
military men were driven by practical considerations of power than by either
ideology or contingency when they chose to erase the two radical parties. The
extermination of the Left had little rational justification other than the
monopolization of power. Sadly, though, it was the Left that initiated the
violence. An overestimation of their own relative strengths led, first, the
EPRP into a misadventure of defeating Meison and the Derg, and then Meison’s
failed attempt to control the militia aroused Mengistu’s wrath. The challenge
they posed to the regime as the countervailing forces of resistance or power at
a time when the country was teetering on the edge of dissolution gave added
justification to the counter-terror. The Terror gradually became the exclusive
instrument of Seded to liquidate the Left, silence society, and install a
regime on a totalitarian model.[xxiv]
The victory against Somalia in March 1978 enhanced Mengistu’s nationalist
image, making it easier to discredit and crush his leftist adversaries while
officially retaining the socialist rhetoric. Even though the EPRP was a spent
force in the urban areas by the end of 1977 and Meison had quietly abandoned
the terrain of struggle by the same time, the repression of their cadres and
sympathizers continued well into late 1978. Invoking contingency cannot absolve
Mengistu and his Sededist clan from their criminal responsibilities.
What about the Terror’s legacy?
What broader lessons can we draw from this sordid and sorrowful chapter in
contemporary Ethiopian history? In 1981 Rene Lefort intriguingly asked whether
Ethiopia’s was “an heretical revolution?” He should have added whether the Red
Terror, itself an aspect of the revolution, was also an historical aberration.
What marks off the Ethiopian revolution from the other two classic revolutions
that Mayer studied is not only the fact that it was spearheaded by ordinary
soldiers from the barracks, but also by the extreme fanaticism and
extraordinary recklessness that the radical intellectuals exhibited in their
pursuit of power and egalitarian goals, something that Lenin perhaps would have
chided as `infantile disorder’ or Trotsky as `a dull caricature of the tragic
intransigence of Jacobinism.’. The philosophical differences within the Jacobin
ranks that led to the execution of some of their towering leaders like Georges
J. Danton and the factional conflicts between the Bolsheviks and Social
revolutionaries (SR) that nearly claimed Lenin’s life, seem to pale in
comparison with the Ethiopian fratricidal horrors. To a considerable degree
this was the result of the lack of political maturity and of a deep
understanding of the society they sought to emancipate and transform.[xxv]
Clearly, there were areas of
political conflict as well as congruence between the goals and interests of the
soldiers and their radical opponents. Meison did grasp this and tried to seize
the moment by collaborating with the soldiers, but the EPRP remained
intransigent and plunged into a war it was fated to lose. It claimed that its
adoption of urban warfare, as an appropriate method of struggle, was based on a
concrete analysis of the existing situation.[xxvi]
However, other than the untenable assertion
that the Derg in 1976 was much weaker in the cities than the Chinese
Nationalists or Guomindang were in1927[xxvii],
there was no such objective knowledge. Where conditions were extremely fluid
and rapidly changing, and where alliances were constantly shifting, the EPRP’s
perspective could only be described as static and dogmatic. Halliday and
Molyneux’s observation that, “The real roots of its erroneous approach lay in
the kind of militaristic and highly dogmatic leftism its members had inherited
from their exile student days,”[xxviii]
is valid. Because it was deceived by the ebb and flow in the fortunes of the
Derg, the EPRP mistakenly, and fatally, underestimated the Derg’s capacity to
rebound and then unleash the repressive organs of the state. On the other hand,
though it initially demonstrated greater sobriety and flexibility, Meison
terribly misjudged the unbridled lust for power by Mengistu and his acolytes.
The violence it initiated to combat the EPRP ate it, too, leaving society
between empathy and aversion, awe and fear. The urban population was
immobilized, the revolution alienated from the social classes that it sought to
empower.
The first lesson of this tragedy
is that it is myopic not to make tactical changes when situations demand them.
The grand failure of the Ethiopian Left was its inability to harmonize theory
with reality. By utterly failing to re/adjust their political imaginations to
the hard realities that confronted them, the adversarial parties made their
sanguinary repression imminent. In hindsight, rather than fracturing the
progressive block, they should have harnessed the diversity of its energies to
establish a solid grass roots base. Only by negotiating the unity of all
civilian progressives could they have hoped to rally or outmaneuver the radical
soldiers. And unity was feasible, even
achievable, through a compromise on the question of provisional popular
government, perhaps the most divisive issue. Had the two parties been more open
to dialogue and coalition building, for their differences were not
unbridgeable, and had they focused on popular mobilization while tactically
refraining from challenging the grasping Mengistu so long as he was
demonstrably willing to embrace their socialist vision and programs, they would
have spared society the devastation inflicted on it and saved a generation at
the same time. There may not have been revolutions in France and Russia without
terror, as Mayer has asserted, but the terror and counter-terror in Ethiopia
were neither determined nor inescapable; the Red Terror was indeed an
aberration.
If there is another lesson to be
drawn from the harrowing Ethiopian experience it is that the revolutionary
conquest of power is impossible unless the social, political, cultural, and
psychological conditions are propitious, or as Marx put it more aptly, history
is not made wistfully. It was not socialist revolutionary commitment the
Ethiopian militants lacked, although that transcendent commitment often derived
from a fleeting knowledge of Marxism, but an adequate knowledge and
appreciation of their own society, and the temperament for sober democratic
dialogue and compromise. They proved unable to break out from the
pre-revolutionary political culture that tended to cultivate secrecy,
mendacity, suspicion , and intrigue while devaluing openness, trust, and
candor-- really survival devices in a society marked by extreme inequities and
scarcity in a world of gross and abominable inequalities. Is it any wonder
that, while stubbornly trying to snatch power from the soldiers, all the
militants sunk in the mud? For lack of flexibility, they destroyed and devoured
their own ideals. The train of tactical errors they committed made it possible
for the Sededists to win and erect a brutal military dictatorship that
tyrannized society for fifteen long years with an admixture of vacuous
revolutionary rhetoric, fatuous state patriotism, and brute force.
Ideas inspire and drive people to
action. They simultaneously unite and divide political actors. Yet of the three
interweaving factors that historically produced political violence elsewhere,
ideology was the least significant in the Ethiopian case. Ethiopian Marxist
revolutionaries were unified in their commitment to egalitarian goals and to
the reshaping of their world, but hopelessly and tragically splintered in their
elusive pursuit of power. Unable to compromise on secondary differences, they
all perished in the “mutual carnage” they themselves initiated. They fell
victim to a regime that used contingency as a rational or pretext to wipe them
out. What Mayer wrote about France and Russia holds true for Ethiopia: “The
virtual breakdown of authority in an environment of swelling social disorder
aggravated by foreign and civil war demands resolute action in which innovation
is dictated as much by critical circumstances as by the rage to remake the
world.”[xxix]
Overwhelmed by a bewildering array of forces and events, the radical soldiers
sought to restore centralized authority and sovereignty by reclaiming the
monopolistic control of legitimate coercion.
But to say no more would be to
absolve the Derg which, in the process, liquidated its civilian rivals in the
revolutionary camp, terrorized society, and installed a regime far more
tyrannical or brutal than the one it replaced so that a criminal gang of its
members would quench its lust for power. What thus began as a violent campaign
to eliminate the EPRP developed into a totalizing system of repression the
hallmark of which were death, immiseration and stagnation. Sedad used the
Terror to tighten its grip on political life by eradicating the civic
organizations that stood between society and itself in the cities. Dissent was
completely muted there, civil society held captive.
Arno
Mayer’s rational model for explaining why people torture and murder on a grand
scale is highly illuminating, but falls short of elucidating the Ethiopian
conundrum. That the Terror happened despite the meekness of
counter-revolutionaries supports his contention that there is no revolution
without terror. However, contrary to his postulate that terror is the
inevitable outcome of a clash between forces of the old order and those of the
new, the Red Terror was exclusively an affair of the revolutionaries. It was comrades against comrades. In this sense, it was an aberration which
Mayer’s explanatory tools do not help to decipher.
NOTES
[i] Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: power and protest, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univerisity Press, 1988); Marina and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1978); Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London: Verso, 1981), and Rene Lefort, Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution? (London: Zed Press, 1983).
[ii] Arno Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions ( Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 4, 23.
[iii] Ibid., 4.
[iv] Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55-56.
[v] See, for example, John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[vi] Mayer, The Furies, 45.
[vii] Ibid., 119-120.
[viii] The size of the Derg has been a source of debate. Mengistu has finally confirmed that there were 120 members. Genet Ayele Anbese, Reminiscences of Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam –Amharic (Addis Ababa: Mega Printers, 2001), 125.
[ix] See Genet, 1-13, 122-5.
[x] Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: from autocracy to revolution, Occasional Publication No 1, Review of African Political Economy, London: Merlin Press, 1975, 113-4.
[xi] For a fuller picture, see Ottoways, Ethiopia and Lefort, Ethiopia.
[xii] Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, revised and expanded (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 198-9.
[xiii] Mayer, The Furies, 126.
[xiv] This was a union of the five political organizations that made up POMOA. It was formed in July 1976.
[xv] Donatella Lorch, “Where Tyrants Ruled, Thousands Cry for Justice”, The New York Times, November 11, 1994. The author reported that at the time 1,300 had been arrested and 3,500 others implicated in the Terror.
[xvi] For details of the Terror see Andargachew Assegid, A Long Journey Cut Short: Meison in the Struggle of the Ethiopian Peoples -Amharic- (Addis Ababa: The Central Printing Press, 2000), 409-27; Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation: The History of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party –Amharic- (Silver Spring, MD. : Independent Printers, 1998), vol. II, 306-26; Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation –Amharic- (Addis Ababa: Image Printing Press, 2000), vol. III, 127-54; Tefaye Makonnen, To the Protagonist –Amharic- (Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1992) 188-247; and Babile Tola, To Kill A Generation: The Red Terror in Ethiopia (Washington, D.C.: Free Ethiopia Press, 1989), 72-164.
[xvii] Lefort, Ethiopia, 257.
[xviii] Mengistu does not believe the total exceeded 2,000. Genet, 198. Tola in To Kill gives a figure of 250,000.
[xix] Tola, To Kill, 165-200; Kiflu, The Generation, II, 147-50.
[xx] Mayer, 96-8.
[xxi] Mayer, 9.
[xxii] Ibid.
[xxiii] Mayer, 9. See also Genet,
[xxiv] Mengistu has tried to wash his hands off by assigning full responsibility to the rival civilian political parties and the urban associations. He categorically, but unbelievably, denied that both Seded and the security forces were involved in the Terror. Genet, Reminiscences, 198-9.
[xxv] Halliday and Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, 141.
[xxvi] Democracia, 4, II, nd.
[xxvii] Kiflu, The Generation, II, 286.
[xxviii] Halliday and Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, 127.