By Aregawi Berhe
African Studies Centre, Leiden University
Present day Ethiopia constitutes a multi-ethnic society where ethnic politics and ethnic mobilization had been the path to power and the pillars to maintain it, perceptibly since the Era of Princes (1769-1855). During that period, Ethiopia was parcelled or ‘decentralized’ in disorderly fashion among local princes, who drew support from their ethnic or sub-ethnic base. To this day, ethnic grounds have been the power base of Ethiopian political elites under various banners and forms.
Ethiopia is now facing yet another
experimental policy under the autocratic regime of the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) whose core element is the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which set up an ethnic based federal
government structure with a constitutional “right” for nationalities to secede.
After a decade of trial, this experiment too does not at all appear to work and
has instead sown the seeds of recurring conflicts that deeply wreck the state.
Despite the unwarranted foreign policy
guidelines pursued by the successive regimes, Ethiopian rulers never find it
difficult to sustain the backing of one or the other foreign power – powers
unscrupulously bent on their national or global interests. This relationship
has left the Ethiopian state in perpetual crisis. Such relationship has even
lead states like that of Somalia to disintegrate.
True, the Ethiopian state is one of the
oldest states in the world (see Conti-Rossini, Carlo and Tamrat, Tadesse), yet
Ethiopia is a troubled state that finds itself at the bottom of the global
community of nations by all economic, social and political measures. The roots
of its problems lie primarily in its self appointed leaders who take charge of
governance at their will, never to deliver even a fraction of what they promise
as they ascend to power. Although foreign actors have their lot shaping and
sustaining the predicaments Ethiopia has to live with, the lion share of the
responsibility goes to the leadership that controls the internal process of
governance, which also facilitates the intrusion of the external factors.
To understand the enormous problems
compounding Ethiopia, one may go back in history to have an insight of the
evolution the Ethiopian State had to undergo and link it up with its present
socio-economic standing – an integral inference that should not be over looked
if a comprehensive understanding of the present impasse is the concern. It is
then exceedingly important to look in to the prevailing determinant factors
that are liable to its existing plight as the first step of resolving the
difficult impasse Ethiopia is encountering.
The major factors that have put the Ethiopian
State in deep rooted crisis bad governance being the main reflection, could be
classified into two: (1) the internal factors, (2) the external factors.
(1) The Internal Factors comprise:
(a) The leadership, which in most cases is
authoritarian, lacks accountability and transparency and entrenched in
corruption.
(b) An elite, which is fragmented on – ethnic
divides – religious affiliations – vested interests.
(c) Disempowered society, which finds it
difficult to defend its interest collectively or influence governance. A
combination of State repression, disorienting elite and an authoritarian
cultural legacy contribute to dispossess the society of acquiring empowerment.
(2) The External Factors, the major players
being:
(a) Powerful states who put their national
interest over and above the individual or collective interests of weak nations
or regions, giving no regard to empowerment.
(b) Donors and NGOs who seek local elite
alliance that have already been impediment to the growth of civil society which
strive to empower itself.
One should also denote that the culture of
resolving pertinent matters related to power and politics with the gun had
enabled unpopular forces and authoritarian governments to prevail over consent
and the rule of law. The need of addressing such a violent culture over the
prevalence of dialogue and reason as a concomitant factor should be well taken.
To demonstrate the interplay of the internal
and external factor on governance out lined above and the ill functioning of
the state, Ethiopia, which is also at the centre of the Horn of Africa
politics, is a best case in point. Most
African states, by and large, may not be too far from this scenario as well.
Given the
post-Cold War geopolitical scenario and the fall of the military dictatorship
under Colonel Mengistu, it was essential for the victorious TPLF-led EPRDF
forces to secure the backing of the USA and its European allies and Israel
(which were contented with the fall of the former pro-Soviet military regime)
in order to consolidate their position. The US spared no time supporting the
militarily stronger TPLF. It is ironic, though, to note that the so-called
Stalinist TPLF, seen at the height of the cold war as terrorist by the ‘free
democratic western alliance’, being supported by the US and Europeans as it
ascends to power.
The TPLF and its
affiliate organisations went on unilaterally creating a transitional government
in 1991 - installing a new constitution and implementing a highly controversial
policy of ethnic politics which grants the right of secession to the over
eighty ethnic groups in the country (1995 constitution, art.39, no.1). The
restructuring of the Ethiopian state proceeded in accordance with the dictates
of the EPRDF-led transitional government, with the leadership of the TPLF at
the helm of the new political set up. Although some US and European admirers
would like to call this “a democratisation process by a new breed of leaders”
with out seriously looking into the nature of this force and the circumstances
in which it seize power, critical observers however had warned of the dangers
this path entails. Terence Lyons correctly pointed out that: the EPRDF led
throughout this transition period and capitalized on its commanding position to
consolidate its power. The party dominated the political landscape by virtue of
its military power (Lyons 1996:121). “The electorate’s choice was basically
between the EPRDF and their allies or no vote”, declared the Norwegian Observer
Group (1992:12). Finally in August
1995, a new government was declared ‘elected’ with the same political grouping.
The post-Mengistu political processes, including the formation of the sovereign
Eritrean state in 1991 (see Hagos: 1995), as one could anticipate, have led to
serious confrontations between the new regime in Addis Ababa and a multitude of
oppositional groups of various political and ideological persuasions.
Whenever such
conflicting political, social, cultural and economic interests lack space for
compromise or broad-based consensus, and when local governance proceeds without
deliberation or consultation at the popular level, long-term peace drifts
beyond reach. If the absence of war does not necessarily mean peace, then
today’s Ethiopia (where the seeds to yet another cycle of conflict are being
sown), certainly illustrates this argument.
With the TPLF in
power, ethnic based national entities in Ethiopia have entered a new era, where
different political arrangements were anticipated. The TPLF (here after better
referred to by its official name, EPRDF), without the consensus of the
Ethiopian people or that of the numerous political organisations, hastily
imposed a highly ethnicised political experiment. According to this experiment,
every ethnic group is allowed to secede and form its independent state; thus
Ethiopia could find itself divided into not less than eighty ethnic-based
states. This policy, ostensibly meant to draw support and legitimacy from the
numerous ethnic groups for the TPLF, has only served to expedite the emergence
of another wave of ethnic conflicts, besides leaving the entire multiethnic,
multilingual, multi-religious population in a state of confusion.
As to the
realisation of the collective aspiration of the Tigrayans, who had paid dearly
during the struggle, no meaningful change has occurred, except that they served
as a steppingstone for the TPLF leaders to seize power over the whole of
Ethiopia, a power without a social base. To make matters worse, the Tigrayan
population, on the one hand, is seen by other Ethiopians as an accomplice of
the TPLF, while on the other hand is forced to support the TPLF leaders in
Addis Ababa, in their confrontation with the Ethiopian opposition. The reason
why no opposition party, other than the TPLF, is allowed to work in Tigray is
simply to claim undivided support for the ruling party, hence trampling over
the democratic rights of the Tigrayan people to organize an opposition.
True, it was the
combined effort of the Ethiopian peoples and various liberation movements,
albeit the significant military role played by the TPLF, which has brought the
seventeen years of the ‘Derg’s’ military dictatorship and reign of terror to an
end. Most Ethiopians welcomed the change, genuinely hoping that who-ever came
to power this time, may not be as horrendous as the military junta. In the
beginning, no one seemed to contest that this was a positive achievement,
although some people were casting their reservation because of the TPLF’s
wavering stand on Ethiopian unity[1]
and its ideology, which from the beginning was ultra-left but now appearing to
embrace the Western liberal democracy and ‘free’ market. Many foreign
governments - the US taking the lead - also offered instant recognition to the
new rulers assuming that they will easily join their club unlike the
‘pro-Soviet’ military dictators.
The concern of
the US-led Western powers was obvious. They wanted to arrest the expansion of
“Islamic Fundamentalism” which was seen to be posing a serious challenge to
their cultural values and a threat to their material interest in and around the
Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Sudan, where Islamist government is gaining
ground, and occupying a strategic position in The Horn has to be checked from
influencing the region. The US found the TPLF, a better-organised and
manageable military force in Ethiopia that could accomplish the strategic tasks
it wanted to pursue. Despite its leftist rhetoric, Meles Zenawi’s TPLF swiftly
came to terms with the US, and has come to be an ally in harnessing the
anticipated opposition from the other Ethiopian political forces and the people
at large. The US was more than willing, therefore, to facilitate the seizure and
consolidation of power in Ethiopia by the TPLF.
As the forces of
the TPLF and EPLF were closing in on Addis Ababa and Asmara respectively, in
London, on 27 May 1991, Herman Cohen, US assistant secretary of state for
Africa, met with leaders of the militarily stronger TPLF, OLF and EPLF and the
delegates of the collapsing ‘Derg’, ostensibly to negotiate a peaceful
transition of power. Other political
forces that could have affected Ethiopia’s future were ignored. A golden
opportunity for a political settlement was brushed aside in favour of military
solution. Before a negotiated settlement was reached, at the end of May 1991,
Meles Zenawi, after spending a night in the American Embassy in Khartoum,
suddenly showed up in Addis Ababa to head the forthcoming Ethiopian government.
The US and its
allies spent no time granting the new regime diplomatic recognition as well as
financial aid. US military and technical experts, including constitutional
advisors began flowing to Zenawi’s administration within months of taking
office. A year later, in an interview with the Ethiopian Commentator (EC), Mr.
Marc Baas, US Ambassador to Ethiopia said, “The overall policy of the US
towards Ethiopia is to promote the process of democratisation in this country
and the opening up of the free market economy. We have done a great deal in the
last year [1992]. I have signed agreements for over 105 million dollars in
emergency food and humanitarian assistance, in addition to over 170 million
dollars of development assistance” (EC: May 1, 1993, p.31-32). The commitment
of the US to hook Ethiopia into its globalisation orbit lies in the fact that
geo-politically, Ethiopia is an important country in Africa - coping with peace
keeping, hosting mediatory talks between contesting African political actors,
tackling the Islamist state of Sudan and similar radicals in Somalia with the
co-operation of Uganda, Eritrea and Egypt for which the EPRDF regime is
remunerated $100 million worth military aid a year from the US.
Zenawi’s regime,
with its extremely narrow and uncertain social base, was confronted internally,
with the opposition of the Ethiopian people that denied it the mandate to rule
the country, and externally, with the pressure the US exerts to fight its proxy
war with Islamist Sudan. Zenawi’s choice appears to be repressing the
opposition of the people and conceding to US policy. In a poor country like
present day Ethiopia, that is confronted by a range of internal and external
problems, a stable government is less likely, if not impossible, to emerge
under such administration ridden with conflicting policies. People, who argue
that the current government is better than the former military regime of
Mengistu, should better know that the fall of one form of dictatorship does not
necessarily mean a transition to a democratic and peaceful system. The
difference was only that Mengistu was pro-Soviet and Zenawi became pro-West,
yet both doing the same thing to their people.
In fact, in
today’s Ethiopia, an unprecedented wave of resistance is in the making. The
EPRP in the west, the OLF in the south, the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF) in the south-east, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Front (ARDF) in the
east have stepped up their fight against the EPRDF. Many other political organisations,
including the Oromo National Congress (ONC), the Southern Ethiopian People’s
Democratic Union (SEPDU), the All Amhara People’s Organisation and the
Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) from within and the Tigrayan Alliance for
National Democracy (TAND), the Ethiopian Group for Social Democracy (EGSD), the
Ethiopian Medhine Democratic Party (MEDHIN) and many others from outside the
country are pressing hard to bring about a fundamental change in Ethiopia. Time
and again, all these organisations have been publicly calling for peace and
reconciliation. The EPRDF, however, has remained deaf to all popular calls for
peaceful change and has continued to push the country to a state of chaos and
civil war.
The unyielding
response of Zenawi’s regime to all the popular and legitimate calls of the
Ethiopian people and political organisations could also be scrutinised from
another dimension. In 1985 a party, officially known as the Marxist-Leninist
League of Tigray (MLLT) was established within the TPLF, Meles Zenawi as its
chief ideologue. In its constitution, this party declared that:
MLLT, as the core of the
future Ethiopian Marxist Leninist Party, is the only correct party free from
all sorts of revisionism (Trotskyism, Maoism...) that could constitute a proletarian-peasant
dictatorship to liberate the Ethiopian people (Constitution of MLLT 1985:1).
Any other
political organisation that does not ideologically correspond to that of MLLT’s
was labelled ‘reactionary’ and ‘anti-people’, and hence should be cleansed. In
an interview with The Independent, at the end of 1989, the present Prime
Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, asserted that “the Soviet Union and other
Eastern-bloc countries have never been truly socialist. The nearest any country
comes to being socialist as far as we are concerned is Albania” (The Independent, 28 Nov. 1989). To
him, as was clearly maintained in the same interview, only this party could
lead to a “fully democratic state” (Ibid). The officially published programme
and declarations of the MLLT and TPLF are no longer visible since Zenawi joined
the camp of the US; he prefers not even to mention that he was a leftist.
Eclectic as it appears, Zenawi’s policies have drawn the whole country into a
state of chaos and confusion, because of the incompatibility between what he
thinks and what he does. I will look now into some of the practical measures
and policies employed by the TPLF-led EPRDF, in Ethiopia’s complex power
politics.
III. Democracy at Bay
Mengistu’s
authoritarian regime and its reign of terror forced thousands of young
Ethiopians to take up arms and fight back organised under national and multi-national
fronts. All fought basically for a democratic and egalitarian system. Doing
best on the military front however, in May 1991 the TPLF managed to seize state
power forming the EPRDF, a so-called umbrella organisation.
After years of
struggle, the time for Zenawi’s “fully democratic State” and its
‘revolutionary’ slogans of democratic rights, national equality, freedom of expression
and organisation, rule of law and human rights came to be tested - rights for
which the people have struggled for decades and await in earnest for their
realisation.
Regrettably,
EPRDF leaders took no time to prove that in practice they are no different from
their predecessors, the military dictators. As they grabbed power, they began
systematically spreading their offensive campaign against legitimate democratic
organisations who like them had fought the Mengistu regime. To silence any
opposition elements within the country and deny freedom of expression that
could perhaps lead to mobilise people against their unpopular policies, EPRDF
leaders have launched a reign of terror starting by opening fire on peaceful
demonstrators of Addis Ababa University students only a few days after they
seized state power.
Encouraged by
opposition parties within and outside the country, many papers critical of the
government began to emerge. Yet, whenever critical remarks against the
government appear on the papers, the respective editors, journalists and
publishers were immediately dragged to prison accused of negative campaigning
against the government. For instance, according to Amnesty International:
“Since October
1992, over 100 journalists and publishers of private newspapers and magazines
in Addis Ababa have been arrested and a score or more others have been summoned
for interrogation. Two journalists have
“disappeared” (Amnesty International 1995:10).
Thousands of
members of political organisations, unions and associations who posed serious challenges and espouse different
programmes from that of the EPRDF are at present languishing in prisons and
detention centres. In the same report, Amnesty International reveals that over
20,000 officials and members of the OLF, AAPO, EPRP, ONLF and Southern
Ethiopian Political Parties are detained without due process of law and
subjected to harsh imprisonment and torture (Ibid:13-27). After giving details
of gross violations of human rights including names of people killed by EPRDF
forces, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) states that:
The rigid, self-righteous
and uncompromising position of those in power and their apparent determination
to hold the monopoly of power by any means is matched by the thwarted peace
efforts and frustrated ambitions of the opposition parties (EHRCO 7th Report, 26 Aug. 1994).
In the same vein,
in its resolution of 17-05-2001, the European Parliament “calls for the holding
of a general inter-Ethiopian dialogue, with all the opposition groups,
including armed movements and the representatives of civil society, on the
peace and national reconciliation provided for by the 1998 Paris Conference, in
order to achieve a peaceful resolution of the country’s political, economic and
social problems” (Resolution on Human Rights in Ethiopia, B5-0360, 0363, 0370,
0376, 0386 and B5-0396/2001).
From day one in power, the EPRDF apparently has been unpopular basically because it came to power by military force and remained in power using the same instruments of force that brought it to power. This partially explains why the EPRDF is engaged in gross violation of human and democratic rights. The democracy talked about by the EPRDF and its allies is nothing more than a fashionable paper formality that camouflages the true nature of the EPRDF leadership.
In brief, the nature of EPRDF’s eclectic ideology and the application of the policies that emanated there by had generated immeasurable uncertainty in the country’s bureaucratic apparatus deterring the functioning of the state. The so-called constitution, crafted by the EPRDF and its advisors was neither legitimate nor could regulate the role of the state as it was basically a programmatic constitution of the ruling party.
As events
revealed, the new constitution, no matter what was inscribed in it appearing to
defend the rights of citizens, nevertheless like Haile Sellassie’s and
Mengistu’s constitutions was no more than a piece of paper granted by
autocratic leaders that could only serve the interest of the ruling group.
IV. Ethnic Polarisation
The TPLF-led
EPRDF come to power promising, among other things, the right to
self-determination, including and up to secession for which it had fought rigorously
for sixteen years. So it is not surprising when article 39, No. 1 of the EPRDF
sponsored new constitution reads: Every nation, nationality and people in
Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right
to secession. This may lead to generate the feeling that an unlimited political
right is granted to all the nationalities in Ethiopia. In practice however the
EPRDF seems to show no concession to other forces with the same demand. To this
effect, it had declared war on the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF),
the intensity of the war and its heavy cost being reported even in the
government’s papers (see Ethiopian Herald, Jan - Feb. 1997).
One is then bound
to wonder what are the principles of the EPRDF regarding the right to
self-determination and inquire how the EPRDF reconciles its theory and practice
of self-determination, in particular article 39 of its new constitution. Of
course the EPRDF does not provide a clear explanation to this riddle, nor to a
number of pertinent political and economic questions that will be raised below.
It is fair to
admit that there is no easy answer to such complex issue of self-determination.
Genuine democratic endeavour could only pave the way to reach an acceptable
solution. The contradictory position of the EPRDF regarding self-determination
however, lacks both a genuine approach and democratic participation by the
people.
As we have noted
earlier, the TPLF, before and after establishing the EPRDF in 1991, obviously
understood that as an ethnic-based national movement for sixteen years, its
social base was restricted to Tigray, with a population of about four million
in a vast country of fifty five million people. When it became apparent that
Mengistu’s regime was collapsing and a power vacuum was imminent, and as a
better organised military force than the other opposition movements, the TPLF
made a swift advance to the capital, in the name of the EPRDF, which was
created late in the day to extend the image of a multi-national force. The
strength and participation of the EPDM (composed of about two hundred members)
and OPDO (just formed of few POWs from the military regime) - organisations
that helped the TPLF form the EPRDF - was only nominal. Suddenly the TPLF found
itself in a sea of people, it has never been fit to mobilise or organise during
its struggle and whose allegiance has been to other political organisations
most of which have been antagonistic to the TPLF/EPRDF. The highly motivated
TPLF army which expected to get a warm hero’s welcome for its sacrifice of
getting rid of the military dictators had to suffer verbal, and at times
physical, attack from the non-Tigrayan majority of Ethiopians.
Without having
thought through of its application and having failed to anticipate the
consequences of its actions, hastily, the TPLF declared the right to self-determination
including secession and invited all ethnic groups in the country to organise on
an ethnic basis and join the EPRDF. The EPRDF leaders naively hoped the newly
formed ethnic organisations, which understandably lack the necessary
organisational experience and strength to run their own affairs by themselves
would rush to join the EPRDF in the citadel of power, thereby hoping to draw
support and develop legitimacy to rule the country.
Contrary to the
expectation of the EPRDF leaders, many ethnic organisations have began to
demand their version of self-determination, including secession without even
considering their politico-economic viability as independent nation-states. The
Ogadeni, the Oromo, the Afar and the EPRP are at present engaged in armed
struggle against the TPLF-EPRDF regime. Many others are waging propaganda war
from within and outside the country, some of which are contemplating armed
confrontation, openly stating that ‘those who come with a gun can only go with
a gun.’
The EPRDF’s
ethnicised political device to generate legitimacy and consolidate hold of
power proved to be not only a failure, but also ‘a thorn in the flesh’ for the
regime. The no less than eighty ethnic groups in Ethiopia, which thought to
exercise the unlimited political, economic and social rights that go as far as
secession to form a nation state, as inscribed in the new constitution, have
become unmanageable, largely because of the ill-conceived experiment of ethnic
politics of the EPRDF. This is why we find these days a new wave of
ethnic-based national challenges of many nationalities: Afars, Ogadenis,
Oromos, Sidamas, Beni Shangulis, to mention but a few.
Ethnic-based
nationalism, generally speaking, being a reaction to national domination or
oppression, within it bears - what EPRDF is fostering - an exclusionist motive
reflected in many ways by all nationalist actors and expressed as ‘we’
vis-à-vis ‘them’. “At the heart of nationalism”, argues John Keane, “is its
simultaneous treatment of the Other as every thing and nothing. The Other is
seen as a knife in the throat of the nation” (Keane 1995:193). And as Peter
Alter further argues, “Nationalism, to all intents and purposes, means
undisguised political egoism. As an ideology it preaches solidarity with and
willingness to make sacrifice to one particular social group” (Alter 1994:118).
Carried away by its military success, the TPLF conveniently opened a Pandora’s
box that could not be closed so easily, except, perhaps, by sheer force which
obviously creates a countervailing force that could bring the demise of the
former.
To fight
domination or oppression and opt for an egalitarian state of relationships is a
desirable thing, but to go for secession, brushing aside centuries old social,
economic and political interdependence is problematic. Failing to learn from
the humiliating defeat of the former dictators or even from the predicament of
neighbouring Somalia, the EPRDF leaders are keen on promoting the ethnic factor
by pushing it to its extreme limit. At least two instances of this
short-sighted ethnic policy could be referred to:
a) Instructing and
pressing the South Ethiopia People’s Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) composed of
thirteen ethnic organisations to be represented in the national assembly on a
single ethnic basis rather than as a coalition,
b) Forcing the multi-national Ethiopian People’s
Democratic Movement (EPDM) which was initially TPLF’s junior partner in forming
the EPRDF, to represent only the Amhara ethnic group and change its name to
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). Such undertakings clearly reflect
how far Zenawi’s government is bent on promoting ethnicity, which leads to
exclusionary politics which in turn had negative impact on the socio-economic
integration of the country.
Another
significant political force marginalized by EPRDF’s ethnic politics is the
whole spectrum of multi-national political organisations. This Ethiopian
political segment puts emphasis on the unity of the people and the integrity of
the country as one ‘national’ entity. Some of these organisations - like the
EPRP and MEISON - have a long history of struggle no less than that of the
TPLF. These multi-national forces have been at loggerheads with the TPLF ever
since its inception and their relationship worsened when it seized power.
Despite the hostility reflected on both sides, these organisations together
with other ethnic forces, have taken the initiative to peacefully negotiate
with the TPLF. The Paris Peace and Reconciliation Conference of March 1993 and
the Carter Peace Centre Conference of February 1994 could be referred to as
some of the constructive endeavours on the part of the multi-national
opposition parties. None of these peaceful challenges seem to convince the
EPRDF leaders, while anger and frustration was mounting in the quarters of the
opposition as well as with the peace mediators. In a letter written to the opposition organisations in 18 March
1994, former US President Jimmy Carter stated his frustration as follows: “the negotiation with the government could
not proceed further because of President Meles’s unwillingness to proceed on
the proposed terms of negotiation.”
When the doors to
negotiated settlement of existing conflicts are closed and state repression
becomes the response to peaceful initiatives, what could the next plausible
step of these multi-ethnic and the numerous ethnic organisations be? How do we
influence the current leaders to get into a democratic track and avoid violence
as a means to achieve ends? Such are the questions revolving these days in the
minds of many concerned Ethiopians. Naturally, a lot of proposals are being put
forward to these ends. Some propose a “comprehensive national civil
disobedience organised at the grass roots level” (Araya 1996:32), as the only
hope for Ethiopia’s predicaments. There are many others who argue that power
holders, as a rule, listen only to countervailing power, and therefore the only
remaining option to set Ethiopia free from the shackles of ‘the dictators’ who
remain deaf to the repeated calls for peace - is to use force. Whichever
direction the struggle may take, Ethiopia seems to face yet another
catastrophe, perhaps worse than the present chaotic situation.
V. Can’t We Break the Cycles of Conflict?
No matter how
complex this question appears to be and the solution not within easy reach, the
need to confront it, however, is indisputable.
The present
political crisis in Ethiopia basically emanates from the unbridled desire of
the TPLF leaders to monopolise power in all its aspects as was evident with
their predecessors. This impasse has two major effects: on the conflict of the
EPRDF with the opposition forces on one hand and on the mounting tension among
ethnic groups on the other.
The US and its
allies’ one-sided intervention, which had ignored the will of the people and
the role of the opposition forces, also aggravated this crisis. Intellectuals
who for various reasons support the EPRDF are worsening the crisis by blindly
defending the very wrong policies that are recreating conflicts. Perhaps
Ethiopia’s leaders love to adulate and be swayed by uncritical remarks like
that of Stephen Ellis who with carefully selected words declares that “Ethiopia
is experimenting with an ethnically based constitution which to an outsider,
looks hazardous. But perhaps it looks different to those who live in Ethiopia”
(Ellis 1996:271). Ironically, while Ellis writes about “the atrocities
committed in the name of Islam in Algeria and Egypt” (Ibid: 272), he does not
refer to what accompanied the experiment - i.e. a catalogue of war atrocities
perpetrated on the Oromos, Ogadenis and Afars in the South and East and a
plethora of human rights violations, ‘disappearances’, large-scale imprisonment
and torture - in short, organised state terror throughout the country,
including Tigray, the ethnic base area of the TPLF. Adhana Haile Adhana goes
even further to tell us that, “In politics, the Ethiopian peoples have already
stepped in the ‘Garden of Eden’ (Adhana, 1995:93); an opportunist position
without content, which even Zenawi himself would not dare repeat.
The opposition
forces are regrouping and reorganising themselves to wage a struggle for
political space. Some of them have already formed an alliance, like the
Coalition of the Ethiopian Opposition Political Organizations (CEOPO), and have
undertaken a political offensive, with civil disobedience as one of their
tactics. Others like the OLF, ARDU and ONLF are already engaged in armed
struggle in the southern and eastern parts of the country.
Worst of all, the
ethnic tension apparently is mounting sharply every day. The ethnic policy of
the EPRDF which was meant to draw support from the no less than 80 ethnic
groups in the country - a fatally simplistic approach - has only created an
unmanageable crisis never experienced in the history of Ethiopia. To assert
their ‘independent’ identity and justify their claim to statehood of their own
(no matter regarding the viability of the imagined state), almost all the
ethnic groups have come forward with their exclusive agendas. The present
chaotic predicament reminds many Ethiopians of their mid 17th to mid 19th
history, the ‘Era of Princes’, when, as Markakis puts it “provincial rules
waged a protracted struggle for supremacy...central power was entirely eclipsed
and the throne itself remained vacant” (Markakis 1990:15). These ethnic agendas
pretend they have nothing socially, politically, economically or historically
in common with the other ethnic compatriots in the country.
Failing to realise
the extent to which ethnic claims could be stretched, EPRDF leaders are
frantically trying to reverse the proliferation of ethnic movements by launching
state terrorism instead of committing themselves to democratic dialogue. These
leaders should have better grasped how far ethnic sentiments could be
destructive, looking at realities in Rwanda, Somalia or the former Yugoslavia.
As Eugeen Roosens critically observes, “the study of ethnic phenomena reveals
how far ethnic ideology and historical reality can diverge from each other; how
much people feel things that are not there and conveniently forget realities
that have existed” (Roosens 1989:161). Present day Ethiopian political
realities by and large, reflect this critical assertion. It is only through
engagement in a democratic and rational dialogue that one can make people feel
the positive side of their history and appreciate harmonious relationship and
unity.
Contrary to the
preposterous position of Adhana and his likes, the gross violation of human and
democratic rights - essentially state terrorist acts - perpetrated by Zenawi’s
regime have been repeatedly reported by many concerned organisations including
Amnesty International, the European Parliament, the Ethiopian Human Rights
Council (EHRCO), the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Africa
Watch, to mention but a few. In its ‘A World-wide Survey’ annual report for the
year 1993, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) writes, “For the second
year running, Ethiopia held more journalists in prison than any other country
in Africa” and gave the list of journalists in prison as of March 1994, that
ranked Ethiopia second in the world (CPJ 1994:6-7). Prisons are over-crowded
and there is no fair trial. According to EHRCO (1996: 13), only five court
benches are handling over 35,000 cases. Of the several thousand detainees who
have been accused of committing human rights violations and war crimes during
the ‘Derg’ regime, a considerable number have not yet been formally charged
even six years after the fall of the ‘Derg’. No plausible reason is given for
the delay, except that the present leaders do not want to set the precedence
that will try them tomorrow.
In countries with
very low economic development, like Ethiopia, contention over the scarce
economic resource, mainly land but other advantages too, also consolidates
ethnic alliances. “The longing for material goods does not by itself produce
ethnic identity or ethnicity ...Ethnicity, however, is directly concerned with
group formation, and thus with power relation” (Roosens 1989:158). The
political élite, in this case the opposition forces, for its own purpose fills
the gap of political leadership in the ethnic uprising. Then the battle over
state power intensifies devastating the country’s human and material resources
including the state itself as observed in Somalia.
On the part of
most of the opposition forces there seems a growing realisation of the ensuing
danger of large-scale violent conflict if the current situation is allowed to
continue. The biggest danger is the emergence of an organised force of ethnic
based extremists, some of them taking the form of racism or religious
fundamentalism and who negate basic principles of democracy. The other danger
comes from the anti-ethnic extremists who could not comprehend unity with
diversity. This cluster of self declared politicians who venture for ethnic
cleansing are also equally racist and dangerous for the unity of the country.
In a democratic system,
self-determination and national unity are two concomitant categories and not
mutually exclusive notions, as the extremists want us to believe. Yet, under
dictatorial system of the EPRDF, self-determination like all democratic rights
will always suffer repression, hence inducing a series of confrontations
leading to fragmentation and recurring conflicts that knocks down the structure
on which the state has to rest.
Today, as we
speak, the EPRDF government which has failed to establish a popular base and
mandate because of its undemocratic evolution to power and bad administrative
practices have lost the political clout and the moral ground to govern. The
country is in turmoil. The EPRDF leadership is splintered into two
irreconcilable clusters of leaders. The army and police are on the streets to
quell the uprising, sadly killing and wounding students demonstrating for
change.
Given the deep
rooted and complex predicaments Ethiopia is entangled with, heavy
responsibility rests on the democratic opposition forces to avert the looming
catastrophe. It is this democratic force, if organised in a common democratic
front that could prevent the extremist forces who found fertile ground to grow
in the ominous ethnic policy of the EPRDF, from dictating their short sighted
and destructive terms of struggle. It is only the democratic forces who can
forge a political mechanism that could empower the people to exercise their
political rights in creating a dynamic constitution that could permanently
enable them to influence the conduct and modality of a government they set up.
Again, it is the democratic forces that could envisage a positive policy of
self-determination, a notion which has galvanised almost the entire country and
help create unity with all the cultural, linguistic, religious and historical
diversity respected. If individuals, groups or organizations could truly uphold
these principles, there is no reason why they could not forge a broader front
or a stronger party, that could force the EPRDF out of office and lead the
country in peace to progress.
Bringing the case
of Ethiopia into picture, I have tried to establish the link between the
authoritarian leadership, the fragmented elite and the strangled civil society
on one hand and the global powers and the NGOs who could not terrace pass the
powers realm of interest on the other – a link apparently one side could not
afford to avoid and with no concern to the emergence and empowerment of civil
society.
Abraham Lincoln,
in his 19 May 1856 speech said “ The ballot is stronger than the bullet” and
later in 10 Nov. 1864 added “We cannot have free government with out election;
and if the rebellion could force us to forego or postpone a national election,
it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us.” I think close
observation of the present Ethiopian power politics can reveal what President
Lincoln warned, that is the Ethiopian civil society is almost conquered and
about to be ruined. That seems the pattern in most of African States, except
for South Africa and some very few states that managed to run a fair election
and peaceful transfer of power.
Contemporary US
administrations and European powers however seem to brush aside what Abraham
Lincoln set straight some 145 years ago. Had the US and British administrations
who in 1991 facilitated the transfer of power from the military dictators to
the EPRDF included opposition parties and members of the civil society in the
process of the transition, both the EPRDF on one hand and the outlawed
opposition and the strangled civil society on the other wouldn’t have reach the
present confrontational posture which might lead to total anarchy.
Primarily though,
it is the responsibility of the EPRDF leader who were driven by greed of power
to exclude the opposition groups and members of the civil society who could and
must have their share in peace and nation building. With out an inclusive
politics no governance can function in the true sense of its meaning. Even if
it seems to function in the beginning, definitely as the case in Ethiopia has
demonstrated it is temporary and more devastating.
The requisite for
peace and durable governance is then empowerment of the civil society
accompanied by institutional structure that has an effective influence over
governing bodies and an inclusive politics based on popular constitution that
accommodates any opposition which other wise could be the seed of conflict.
Secondly, a
mechanism has to be devised to depart from the syndicated relationship of the
African elite and the NGOs whose expertise and resources should be based on
realities at the grassroots level and controlled by an organised civil society.
The culture of settling differences through violent means could not be left to Africans alone. The Western World too is engaged in selected violent confrontations with the unbridled production of instruments of violence, thereby posing a potential threat that could be unleashed any time the possessor deems it necessary. When people have to live under such state of affair, they get used to and also accept it as means of resolving differences or conflicts. Societies, whichever side they belong to benefit nothing from war. In fact they have rather much more fundamental interests that bring them together. Peace, free movement, exchange of ideas and resources, healthy environment etc. are some of common ideals they share and nurture. A consorted effort expounding the culture of peace in general and resolving conflicting interests peacefully in particular, concomitantly addressing the injustice that induces people to react, is absolutely indispensable.
An old Ethiopian
saying goes: “If we don’t change our direction, we might end up where we are
heading.”
Although there
seems to be a positive intention of the international community to empower
civil society, the practical application of the intent has always been frustrating,
especially when it comes to Africa and Ethiopia in particular. Whatever
contribution the international community may set for Africa, it has to be:
(A) Empowerment oriented;
(B) Must directly
reach the peoples concerned/affected; and
(C)There has to
be concerted pressure nationally, regionally and internationally on governments
that resist this direct approach to better government in 21st century
Africa.
The numerous
Ethiopian intellectuals, if organized under a broad national visionary program
of empowering the Ethiopian society and lead them to be masters of their
destiny, an accountable and a transparent government could be set up and
foreign actors would be forced to accept a fair relationship. Such a
relationship could be the ground for stable and sustainable popular government
with accountability and transparency as obvious norms of a functioning state.
This is a
challenging direction, but a direction where we should head to if the deep rooted
problems of Africa in general and that of Ethiopia in particular are to terminate.
ACRONYMS
AAPO All Amhara People’s Organisation
ALF Afar Liberation Front
ANDM Amhara National
Democratic Movement
ARDU Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union
CAFPD Coalition of
Alternative Forces for Peace and Development
COEDF Coalition of
Ethiopian Democratic Forces
EDU Ethiopian Democratic Union
EHRCO Ethiopian Human
Rights Council
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front
EPDM Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement
EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EPRDF Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
MEDHINE Ethiopian Medhine Democratic Front
MEISON All
Ethiopian Socialist Movement
MLLT Marxist Leninist League of Tigray
MNCPE Multi-National
Congress Party of Ethiopia
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
ONC Oromo National Congress
ONLF Ogadeni National Liberation Front
OPDO Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation
SEPDU Southern Ethiopia
People’s Democratic Coalition
TAND Tigris Alliance for National Democracy
TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TLF Tigray Liberation Front
TNO Tigrayan National Organisation
TPDM Tigray People’s Democratic Movement
TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front
TTE Tigray Tigrigni Ethiopia
Select
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[1] See Manifesto of the TPLF, Vol. I, pg. 24,
published Feb. 1976, which declared that the first task of the TPLF would be “
the establishment of an independent democratic republic of Tigray”. This was
the stand of the present EPRDF leaders and was a point of difference with the
author who consistently fought for a democratic unity of Ethiopia.