Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations has represented for many a continuing monument to the folly of idealism: specifically, the sort of "never again" idealism which predominated at the close of World War II. These critics are generally political realists who argue that world politics will always be dominated by a ruthless logic of power, and that humanity's claim to have turned over a new leaf is about as credible as the alcoholic's promise never to touch another drop. Now, as the echoes of the last global conflict grow fainter, these voices grow louder, calling for UN downsizing, or even for a wholesale scrapping of the institution. For many more, however, the UN still represents not only the world's best hope to avert another world war, but its only hope to prevent smaller conflicts or to resolve them with impartiality. Their faith is not founded purely upon idealism, but upon a recognition of the fact that there is an essential need for a universal, transparent forum of interaction which can function as a coordinating mechanism and an instrument of justice in this increasingly interdependent world. If humanity is to have any hope of managing its affairs in the global era, these latter are the people upon whose ideas the UN's future should be based.

Much criticism of the United Nations finds its empirical basis in the failure of the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations. The League was, like the UN, inspired by a wave of postwar idealism which sought to avert future wars. Its membership, however, lacked universality. Germany was only admitted in 1926, the Soviet Union in 1934, and the United States never joined at all. Furthermore, its aspirations were not universal. Instead, it was designed primarily to manage a multipolar balance of power, much like that of the Concert of Europe in the previous century. ¹ In practice, it attempted to play a realist, power-diplomacy game, but with empty threats that lacked the force to back them up, its ineffectiveness was a foregone conclusion.

The basic goal of the UN was similar to that of the League: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". ² The organizational structure is also similar. There are, however, important differences. Unlike the League, the UN's creators deliberately avoided policies that might suggest it was an imposed regime. ³ Universal membership was sought from the outset and, within a short time, largely achieved. The participation of the U.S. was felt to be particularly significant, since many had blamed the absence of this great power for the League's failure. ⁴ Furthermore, the UN was a much larger project than the League, with economic and social offices not relegated to backstage, but given equal prominence alongside the primary mission of security. All of this was premised on the hope that the UN would be able to exercise collective security, not solely on the basis of military force, but also on the basis of universal consensus and the legitimacy which it generates.

The most visible element of the UN's security role is its peacekeeping missions, and the UN's efficacy is therefore often judged on the basis of their success or failure. This has been particularly true in the aftermath of the Cold War, which freed the UN from the Security Council paralysis imposed by superpower rivalry. Thus, while only 13 missions were undertaken in the first 40 years of the UN, 36 new operations have been established since 1988.⁵ Although this increased activity has generally produced positive results, there have been some notable failures which have provided ammunition for critics of the UN. The missions to Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda all fell far short of their objectives, if achieving anything at all. These setbacks merit investigation.

All of the failures took place amid conflicts which were intrastate rather than interstate. There is a growing trend towards intrastate conflict in recent years; in fact, in the postwar period, intrastate conflict has been the rule rather than the exception. ⁶ Of the conflicts in which UN missions were undertaken prior to 1988, close to half (7 out of 13) could properly be considered interstate. After 1988, however, the overwhelming majority have been intrastate. This has complicated the task of the United Nations considerably. With its strong emphasis on the Westphalian principle of state sovereignty, the UN is organically more suited to resolving interstate disputes, but it is discovering that the tools of interstate diplomacy are less effective when used in an intrastate setting. ⁷ The increased number of failures in recent years reflects this fact. Another factor in all of these failures is a lack of resources, especially military resources. In Bosnia, insufficiently armed peacekeepers were ignored or taken hostage; in Somalia, the mission was doomed after US forces pulled out; and in Rwanda, not a single country answered the first call for contributions.⁸ This lack of resources has been compounded in recent years by a UN financial crisis. As of May 1999, member states owed the UN over $2.6 billion US, of which $1.6 billion was owed by the United States.⁹

The UN's peacekeeping missions will continue to experience setbacks, as evidenced more recently in East Timor and Sierra Leone, unless some fundamental changes are made in the UN's vision and mandate. The state-centered paradigm continues to limit the effectiveness of the UN. The UN must therefore break out of these narrow confines on the strength of its greatest asset: universality. Towards this end, former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made a series of proposals in An Agenda for Peace (1992), calling for a standing army, the introduction of certain global taxes, and a generally more empowered UN. In addition, he proposed a broader approach to security, focusing not only on preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, but also on human security issues beyond those of a military nature.¹⁰

Some find these proposals threatening. Jesse Helms has been very vocal in his repudiation of the UN, claiming that it "is being transformed from an institution of sovereign nations into a quasi-sovereign entity in itself." This, he feels, "represents an obvious threat to U.S. national interests." ¹¹ Others, such as realist Charles Krauthammer, merely scoff at the idea: "The great powers are simply not going to stand for another independent actor pushing them around in the world." ¹² However, as W. Andy Knight points out, "transnational and global economic forces as well as advances in technology are constantly overriding national sovereignty and pose a far greater danger to sovereignty than the UN system."¹³

The UN must proceed with determination on the path towards empowerment because, like it or not, this increasingly interconnected world needs a meta-sovereign structure to maintain global order. If the UN does not fill this role, it will be quickly occupied by regional organizations. Momentum in this direction is already ominously strong, as seen in NATO's unilateral decision to bomb Serbia, and in the expanded security provisions planned for the OAS which will be unveiled by Lloyd Axworthy in Windsor, Ontario on June 5, 2000. ¹⁴ These actions seek to transfer the right to legitimize interventions into sovereign territory from the UN, where such powers properly belong, to regional powers which are more easily controlled by powerful states. Left unchecked, these trends will soon fragment the world order into distinct zones of influence, thereby setting the stage for a dangerous multi-polar system.

The bottom line is that the world is no longer made up of isolated states containing isolated societies. As Boutros-Ghali put it, " The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty... has passed."¹⁵ Both individuals and states from all corners of the globe have become irreversibly interdependent in both material and cultural terms. Increasingly, there is a recognition that sovereign rights should be subordinated to universal human rights, and measures for universal human security must exist to enforce that this happens. Only the UN possesses the credentials of universality required to fulfill these functions with integrity. This, then, is the role the UN should seek to fill in the future.

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