FOREWORD

The resolution of the Indian National Congress of 8th August 1942, which called upon the British to quit so that India could defend itself as a free nation and cooperate with the allies, looked ahead to the formation of a world federation. The resolution, which was drafted jointly by Gandhiji and Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

“While the All India Congress Committee must primarily be concerned with the independence and defence of India in this our danger, the committee is of opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another, the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples and the pooling of the world’s resources for the common good of all… An independent India would gladly join such a world federation and co-operate on an equal basis with other countries in the solution of international problems.”

I may mention that Gandhiji referred to the resolution while speaking about the San Francisco Conference of 1945 where the United Nations was founded. He said the resolution showed clearly what free India would stand for.

When India attained independence on 15th August 1947, it was characteristic of Jawaharlal Nehru to say: “It is fitting that at this moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India, and to the still larger cause of humanity.” This sentiment expressed the ethos of India’s freedom movement which saw the struggle for our independence as part of the quest for a democratic order. The objectives of India’s foreign policy, set out by Jawaharlal Nehru, were derived from a fundamental faith in political independence, peace and economic equality. This led to non-alignment with power blocs, the advocacy of cooperative co-existence of countries despite differences of ideology which was part of the Five Principles of peace which Nehru did so much to popularise, opposition to imperialism and colonialism in all their manifestations, and a struggle against racial discrimination so as to secure respect for the dignity and worth of the human person. Jawaharlal Nehru also saw an organic link between bringing about a good society at home and the realisation of a new international economic order based on justice, equality and reciprocity. He said: “Poverty anywhere is a danger to prosperity everywhere, just as some infectious disease somewhere might be a danger to healthy conditions elsewhere.”

It is also clear from what has been stated above that the U.N. was central to his vision of the New World Order and it was the appropriate forum to take up major issues of concern to the world community.
India’s interaction with the United Nations Organisation during the Nehru era is an extraordinarily significant period in our diplomatic history. A new country with novel ideas of global reorganisation entered the discussions of difficult chronic problems and, also, crisis situations with commitment and confidence. South Africa and Indonesia in the late forties, Korea and Indochina in the fifties were developments within the ambit of interest of the Indian national leadership with its specific preoccupation, within the Gandhian ethos, with peace, decolonisation, disarmament and development. There was one other issue which engaged the Indian delegation’s attention during those years, the admission of the People’s Republic of China as a permanent member of the Security Council under the Charter.

Jawaharlal Nehru was the creator and prime articulator of India’s policy on these and other issues. Krishna Menon was his able lieutenant and accomplished representative in the world forum. As a leader of the Indian delegation for several years from 1953 onwards he had occasion to spell out India’s deepest concerns on world issues. Krishna Menon became the nation’s spokesman on Kashmir during the later years in the Nehru era, after the passing away of N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar. They had to contend against the “active partisanship,” as Nehru put it, of the western powers in favour of Pakistan. There was also the notable individual contribution made by Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit not only on South Africa but on other major problems. It is in this continuous and effective record of active intervention in the U.N. debates that we have to place Krishna Menon’s remarkable speeches on Disarmament in their proper context.

Disarmament had been a passionate cause for Nehru from the very beginning of India’s emergence as a sovereign State. He wrote to the Chief Ministers:

“Disarmament should be the first and vital issue before everyone, not only disarmament in the physical sense of putting an end to the vast armed forces, but even more so in its effect on the mind. We have to disarm our minds of hatred and the spirit of violence. When that will be, I don’t know. But unless this comes about disaster on an inconceivable scale is inevitable.”

In this he was, of course, inspired by Gandhi but, over the years, he developed his agenda on the question. The atom bomb never ceased to fascinate and disturb him. Its more remote implications for the future of mankind obsessed his imagination at a time when it was fashionable to regard these problems as cold, strategic, statistical details. This was the reason why the nuclear problem bothered him at entirely two different levels at the same time. At one level, it was the issue of a global nuclear war leading to planetary devastation. This had to be prevented at all cost and a machinery devised within the parameters of existing global

1 Letters to Chief Ministers, Volume V, page 426
organisations to prevent the outbreak of such a conflict between the great powers. At another level, the continuing environmental hazards posed by the atmospheric tests bothered him and his scientific advisers. Year after year we can see in these speeches India’s concern with the environmental hazards posed by weapon testing in the atmosphere articulated with precision and passion by Krishna Menon. The running thread of environmental concern in these speeches is impressive because of its continuity. The tests had to be stopped because of the danger of war and the need for nuclear disarmament on the one hand and the prevention of environmental destruction on the other. And so, Krishna Menon continues to campaign within the United Nations in the First Committee on the need for suspension of tests.

During the period covered in these speeches, from 1954 to 1962, Menon was involved in the day-to-day diplomacy of nuclear and general disarmament in a most effective manner. These speeches reveal his remarkable power of persuasion. In 1958 and 1959 there was hope, almost euphoria, on the ability to reach an agreement on a suspension of atmospheric tests. These hopes, however, proved illusory. At the same time there was slow progress in devising a general machinery within the Security Council system and also facilitating an effective dialogue between Washington and Moscow. As a realist, Menon had never any doubts about the supreme importance of understanding between the two major powers on this crucial issue.

The early sixties were the most interesting period in the history of the disarmament campaign. This was the period when Menon carried out a continuous propaganda in favour of general and nuclear disarmament. This was also the time when Jawaharlal Nehru, along with other major statesmen of the world, attended the U.N. General Assembly to plead with the United Nations on these major, related, problems - disarmament, development and the completion of decolonisation process. There was an agenda in New Delhi in those years on these important matters and Nehru and Menon formed an effective team to carry out this agenda. The attitude of India as a single country and as a representative of the ‘uncommitted nations’ comes through clearly in Menon’s speeches. India is able to get some important resolutions passed unanimously for the purpose of speeding up the institution of a negotiating machinery. While this was true, there are many negative indications also and Menon was deeply concerned. He discusses in detail in these speeches partial solutions like the Nuclear Free Zones. He also discusses, more in sorrow than in anger, the French decision to conduct atomic tests in the Sahara not too far away from inhabited terrain. At no moment, however, does he cease to become the friendly advocate, the anxious persuader. The picture of an irascible, acerbic critic of other people, which the western press loved to project, is not borne out in these sincere efforts at converting the other side to one’s point of view.

I may mention here that I was a member of the Indian Delegation of which he was the leader in 1961. I recall his speech on the Test Ban, which was a tour de force.
It was, as always, forceful, logical and laced with wit and humour. He had mastery over relevant facts and figures in presenting his case and answering counter arguments. Menon’s diplomacy in the United Nations was however not limited to these speeches which were outstanding performances in their own right: he was extremely effective in his multilateral diplomacy when he succeeded, through patient negotiation, in bringing together divergent points of view, as, for instance, in the Suez crisis.

Krishna Menon was a great draw in the U.N. and the halls were always crowded whenever he was listed to speak. He was certainly an outstanding U.N. personality.

One major purpose of Menon’s arguments in these speeches was realised within a year of his demitting office and the end of his association with the Indian delegation to the United Nations. The Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 was a small but concrete step towards the reduction of environmental damage because of the new weapon systems. Before the Partial Test Ban Treaty, however, the world had come very near a nuclear war in Cuba and the immediate relevance of India’s concern in these matters was obvious to every one. There was a certain inevitable link between the tension over Cuba in 1962 and the final decision by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to go ahead with the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

There is another fact to remember when we read these speeches today. This was the great period of the disarmament campaigns by Bertrand Russell, Linus Pauling, Hewlett Johnson et al and the various peace organisations. Today the world is much more familiar with the risks of the nuclear winter and the possibility of planetary disaster. In 1986, Rajiv Gandhi and Gorbachev in the New Delhi Declaration made a fervent appeal for a non-nuclear and non-violent world order. This was followed up in Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan for complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament by 2010. In the years since then, there has been remarkable progress in the reduction of the actual number of weapons on both sides.

There are, however, many problems which are only beginning to be identified in this dangerous region of the human experience. Nuclear non-proliferation became a catch word by the end of the sixties and India has its own specific objections to the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of its discriminatory character. In some of the policies, which the country has adopted since his times, Menon would have seen a logical development of his own ideas and concerns.

These speeches on disarmament, therefore, contribute a great deal to our understanding of the general problem from a global point of view. India’s own interest in this period is primarily that of a concerned observer drawing attention to the central problem of human survival. On other problems of disarmament also Menon had his own views. Issues like the reallocation of defence expenditure to
developmental purposes attracted his interest. They were, however, early days for the full exploration of such ideas. It was in the seventies and the eighties that concepts like ‘the peace dividend’ and the inevitable effects of global arms expenditure in creating, not merely facilitating, conflicts would begin to be appreciated. In these speeches, however, we have the beginnings of these important preoccupations of a successor generation.

G. Parthasarathi

New Delhi
8 September 1994
INTRODUCTION

Disarmament was one of the main purposes of the United Nations as originally envisaged. Created as it was in the middle of the most destructive global conflict the world had ever known, it was only appropriate that one of the main purposes of the new organisation was to rid the world of “the scourge of war.” The framers of the Charter were quite conscious of the ultimate failure of the attempts in the League of Nations during the thirties to bring about general disarmament and believed that they had guarded against a repetition of that failure. Within a few months after the adoption of the Charter came the Hiroshima Bomb. Inevitably, the attention of the policy makers in the member countries was drawn to the new problems posed by nuclear weapons. From 1946 onwards, disarmament was discussed during almost every session of the U.N. General Assembly. However, because of the cold war, there was no progress at all in these debates. Even when there was some sign of moderate progress, it inevitably led to disappointment.

These were, however, not sterile years; it was the age of the Baruch Plan and tentative movements towards the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. By the end of the forties, the Soviet Union became a nuclear power and by the mid-fifties the Hydrogen Bomb was a reality. Britain had, by then, become a member of the Nuclear Club and all the discussions in the United Nations and its Special Committee on Disarmament centred on the twin questions of nuclear and general disarmament. India took an active part in these discussions. From the very beginning Jawaharlal Nehru had no doubts about the supreme importance of the nuclear problem. As early as January 22, 1947, before the transfer of power and adoption of the new Constitution, Nehru told the Constituent Assembly:

“We hear a lot about the atom bomb and the various kinds of energy that it represents and, in essence, there is a conflict in the world between two things, the atom bomb and what it represents and the spirit of humanity. I hope that while India will no doubt play a great part in all the material spheres, she will always lay stress on the spirit of humanity and I have no doubt in my mind that ultimately in this conflict that is confronting the world, the human spirit will prevail over the atom bomb.”

It was this approach which guided the activity of India in the United Nations on disarmament during the period of Nehru and Krishna Menon.

The first time India took an active part in the discussions on disarmament was in 1953 when, on the proposal of India, a subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission was set up so that the great powers could negotiate in private under U.N. auspices. This was a significant move. Throughout the speeches in this volume, Krishna Menon returns again and again to the need for a friendly dialogue between the major powers concerned, primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union. Other discussions in the General Assembly and the
Disarmament Commission were important but this was vital. Unfortunately, in spite of such moves, the fifties led to disappointment. The great powers were all the time, playing ‘gamesmanship.’ Discussions went on but, on the ground, armaments and nuclear weapons increased and a fourth member joined the Nuclear Club. France exploded her first bomb in the early sixties.

In 1954, when the Hydrogen Bomb became a reality, India took a major initiative. Prime Minister Nehru made his appeal to the Five Member Sub-Committee on Disarmament - consisting of Canada, France, USSR, United Kingdom and the United States - to consider ‘a standstill agreement’ to suspend test explosions of nuclear weapons. This was the beginning of a long and arduous struggle in the General Assembly for the suspension and, later, the cessation of nuclear tests. Year after year, India continued to campaign for this cause and mobilise world opinion. Most of Menon’s speeches - armed with facts - are concerned with this campaign. This effort achieved partial success and, today, the idea has found general acceptance. India, however, did not make many friends in this single-minded pursuit of what Nehru and Menon felt to be the supreme problem of contemporary civilisation. As a pioneer country, India was far ahead of the general climate of opinion on these matters and was regarded as a difficult critic and commentator on the activities of the great powers. There were several occasions during the late fifties and the early sixties when India actively intervened in the discussion. This volume is a chronicle of those interventions, Year after year the subject was discussed threadbare. There were moments of hope followed only by inevitable disappointment. One such moment of hope was in 1957 when Nehru made a dramatic gesture and ventured “to appeal to the great leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union.” This was on November 27, 1957. The appeal concluded:

“I appeal to them to stop all nuclear test explosions and, thus, to show to the world that they are determined to end this menace, and proceed also to bring about effective disarmament. The moment this is done, a great weight will be lifted from the mind of man. But it is not merely a physical change that is necessary but an attempt to remove fear and reverse the perilous trend which threatens the continued existence of the human race. It is only by direct approaches and agreements through peaceful methods that these problems can be solved.”

While India was a pioneer in the field, the other newly independent nations began to gravitate towards the same approach. Both at Bandung and, later, with much greater clarity, in Belgrade, the uncommitted nations actively campaigned for the suspension of the nuclear tests and the creation of an effective negotiating machinery to work out an agenda for disarmament. At Bandung, the Afro-Asian nations made a unanimous appeal to the powers concerned to reach agreements to suspend experiments with nuclear weapons as well as to realise disarmament. They decided to instruct their delegations in the United Nations to co-operate on this.
The speeches of Krishna Menon in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly over the years on disarmament have been collected in this volume. They demonstrate the single-minded pursuit of one aim - general and complete disarmament - by one country. It was, in its own fashion, a crusade but, not for a single moment did Krishna Menon or Nehru forget the parameters of a realistic diplomacy. No extravagant criticising can be found in these speeches. They are full of facts, quotations from eminent scientists on both sides of the Iron Curtain and the evidence provided by disinterested groups in all countries. The one subject which is repeated again and again is the danger to humanity of the radiation effects of the tests. This was the decade when, much more than the physical destruction brought about by the actual use of the nuclear weapon, experts were concerned over the insidious damage done to the environment by these tests. Many passages in these speeches are devoted to a detailed discussion of the dangers of increase of strontium in the atmosphere. The genetic consequences of these radiation effects are discussed in a cool scientific manner. On the whole, they represent intelligent advocacy of a good cause at its best. The ultimate failure of the campaign and the long sad story of the armaments race in the next three decades only vindicate the genuineness of the causes espoused by Krishna Menon in these remarkable efforts at persuasion.

The primary theme in all the speeches is the need for suspending nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Many of the details are concerned with the problems which will ensue after the tests are suspended. An agenda of disarmament had to be worked out. Inspection and control by an organisation of the United Nations had to be devised. This topic takes a great deal of space and time. The representatives of the great powers were soothing and reassuring in a rather smug fashion in their approach towards the environmental consequences. They were sceptical about the effectiveness of any inspection team. It is these criticisms which are dealt with again and again in these speeches year after year. Then there is the problem of a possible surprise attack. All these appear to be comparatively simple challenges to our generation familiar with the abstruse vocabulary of the SALT and START Treaties.

Apart from the atmospheric tests, underground tests are also discussed. The speeches go into interesting details about the problems faced by structural engineers in digging a hole deep enough to contain the explosion and to prevent radiation. The advantages of saline soil for this purpose are discussed. It is a serious effort at understanding difficult problems.

These are details but, throughout the speeches, Menon returns again and again to the annihilation theme. With remarkable persistence, the Indian delegate confronts his sceptical Big Power audience with the prognostications for human civilisation made by men like Einstein and Sakharov on either side of the ideological divide.
It will be recalled that this was the first heroic age of nuclear disarmament. Humanity had yet to learn to live with these terrible dangers. This was the time of the Aldermaston March and the great nuclear disarmament movement inspired by Bertrand Russell. Menon’s speeches reflect that spirit of protestantism going against the general philosophy of the cold war and the strategy of nuclear deterrence. In a very real sense, therefore, Krishna Menon was, in these speeches, voicing the private agonies of concerned people everywhere in all the countries at the Gadarene rush down the slope to destruction. It was no ironical coincidence that Krishna Menon was, during the later years of this period, the country’s Defence Minister. An inevitable connection can be seen between his preoccupations with defence and national security on the one hand and the need for a ‘world without war’ on the other.

Towards the end of the fifties, France decided to enter the nuclear arms field and had a programme of nuclear tests in the Sahara. This gave the discussion an extra dimension. The countries of the African continent were immediately involved as, in earlier years, Australia and New Zealand and the Pacific territories had been concerned about the Bikini tests. In discussing these problems Menon is interested in the Nuclear Free Zone proposals in Europe and in Africa. He does not, however, see in them an effective alternative to total disarmament.

The late fifties were a period of great hope as well as disappointment. In March 1958, the Soviet Union declared a moratorium on its own tests only to withdraw from it a few months later because the other side carried on with a conditional agenda. The atmosphere was not congenial in 1958 for a positive step forward. A Resolution moved by India with thirteen other countries calling for an immediate discontinuance of tests, pending an agreement on technical arrangements, was rejected in November 1958. In 1959, however, there was progress in relative terms. There was a voluntary suspension of testing by the three nuclear powers. Towards the end of the year, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution sponsored by every single member of the world body. It was couched in general enough terms but it accepted the need “to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution.” It also stated that the question of general and complete disarmament was “the most important one facing the world today.” Krishna Menon’s speech, delivered on November 2, 1959 on this Draft Resolution was, by any standard, a remarkable performance. Some sentences from the peroration would bear repetition today:

We believe that the proposals we have submitted are not unrealistic. We firmly believe that it is possible to disarm this world. We firmly believe that it is possible for man to throw away his arms. For thousands of years, men have talked about turning their weapons into plough-shares. But the time has now come when, if they do not turn them into instruments of peace, they will no longer be here to turn them into anything.

Rather uncharacteristically for him Menon ends the speech with a poetical
quotation from the *Rubaiyat*:

We must therefore recognise that, as the poet said:

   The moving Finger writes, and having writ  
   Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit  
   Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line  
   Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it.

Here, you get Krishna Menon’s eloquence at its effective best. It just escapes being hackneyed. There is a memory of the past achievement of human civilisation here and the dreadful possibility of its total destruction. Phrases which we have become familiar with during the last two decades - like ‘nuclear winter,’ the ‘need to be survived’ and the ‘Fate of the Earth’ - are all anticipated in this moment of faint hope.

India returned to the attack in the 1960 Session when, along with eleven other countries, she presented a Draft Resolution setting out the basis for an agreement, in general, and appealing for a resumption of the negotiations. The Draft Resolution was not voted upon. In 1961 came the irony of the appeal by the Non-aligned Conference on General Disarmament and the synchronised resumption of tests by the Soviet Union. Both Nehru and Krishna Menon were very much involved in the sad development. India acted in the General Assembly and succeeded in getting unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of a Resolution co-sponsored by India, Ghana, and the UAR. It was a detailed attempt to persuade the two great powers to reach agreement on a negotiating body. In 1962, one year later, some tangible benefits accrued from this Resolution. A new Committee on Disarmament consisting of eighteen States was formed, with India as one of the members. Krishna Menon’s last speech on disarmament in the U.N. was made in July 1962 about this new forum for negotiation. In this last speech, Krishna Menon talks about the non-dissemination of weapons as a high priority item. The phrase ‘non-proliferation’ had not come into use then. It was during this speech also that Menon stated that India did not have any programme of manufacturing nuclear weapons: “We do not claim national ego to possess atomic weapons.” In a moment of optimism reflecting the spirit of the age Menon concludes by hoping that the total period of disarmament

   “must be limited to a short period because it is the considered opinion of my government, repeatedly expressed by my Prime Minister in Parliament, that either we must disarm in a reasonably short time or the problem will become far worse than before.”

These speeches on Disarmament, therefore, constitute an exceptionally useful commentary on all developments in the field during that crucial early phase. In all the speeches, Menon is realistic and understanding of the problems of the others. All the nuclear powers are treated with understanding and courtesy. There are
references to the various aspects of the functioning of the world body which we
have come across in his general speeches as leader of the Indian delegation to the
General Assembly. As on other occasions, here also Menon is dismissive of facile
ideas of amending the Charter. “We cannot revise the Charter or change the
conditions under which the U.N. exists by the back door.” He sees in the principle
of unanimity of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, a certain
guarantee against confusion. More interestingly, while he articulates the need for
the United Nations to take effective measures in areas like disarmament, he is
wary about ambitious proposals floated by some countries about a U.N. Police
Force. In his comments upon the need for reconciling the national security needs
of a sovereign State and the demands of world peace, Menon speaks both as an
international negotiator and the Defence Minister of his own country. He sees
these ideas as worthy of being pursued but it should be done at a much later stage
when the world is ready for it. As an immediate programme of action, a world
police force under U.N. auspices would be, according to Menon, unrealistic to the
point of absurdity.

“I find it difficult to describe my consternation at this proposal that Mr.
Hammarskjold must have a large armoury where all these weapons, that
people have discarded not because they are useful, can be placed. Field
Marshal Hammarskjold will be in charge of this large quantity of arms to
convert him into a new Napoleon. This is not a laughing matter; it is a
very serious matter. This is going the wrong way. The orientation is
wrong. It is a way of trying to establish peace and abandon war by a
collection of arms.”

These comments have a certain uncomfortably contemporary resonance in the
years after the Gulf War. Also of contemporary relevance is Krishna Menon’s
conviction that fashionable ideas that military budgets will lead to the reallocation
of the funds saved to developmental purposes are unrealistic. With all the
technological information he has been able to gather, Menon feels that genuine
disarmament and the conversion of arms for peaceful purposes would itself be a
very expensive business. It would be an illusion to think that disarmament would
Immediately lead to developmental process. This is a rather personal and
controversial argument against the ‘peace dividend’ approach. Some of Menon’s
ideas have become outdated. But it is a refreshing example of non-conformity.
These were the years before world military expenditures listed carefully in SIPRI
Year Books made people conscious of the sheer magnitude of the world arms
expenditure. Menon is anxious to argue for disarmament on the basic fundamental
theme that the other alternative would be inevitable destruction. We should not
forget that this was the period when the term ‘the military industrial complex’ was
used by President Eisenhower. Succeeding generations would be involved with
prior allocation of finances for developmental purposes, not the more
questionable results of reconversion.

In their totality, these speeches sum up an ideological approach to disarmament
which retains all its relevance today. Discussing a global problem of the utmost seriousness and urgency, Menon’s style in these speeches is lucid and objective. There is the inevitable flash of humour once in a way. There are friendly references to valued colleagues on the disarmament circuits. There is also a proud reiteration of India’s own national belief in nuclear disarmament.

This volume forms the third in the series of the collections of Krishna Menon’s speeches. The first volume included all his speeches in the general debate in the General Assembly as leader of the Indian delegation. The second was devoted exclusively to the Kashmir speeches. Yet another volume dealing with South Africa is also under preparation. The final and concluding volume, it is hoped, would deal with other topics like decolonisation, development etc., and other specific issues of controversy or discussion which came up before the General Assembly.

The texts of these speeches have been based on the reprints in issues of the Indian Foreign Affairs Record published by the Government of India, and the official records of the United Nations.

The editors are grateful to Shri G. Parthasarathi for agreeing to their request to contribute a Foreword to this volume.

E.S. Reddy  
A.K. Damodaran

New Delhi  
3 May 1994
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STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, JULY 24, 1962
In 1954, the Disarmament Commission - following a suggestion originally made by India and endorsed by the General Assembly in 1953 - established a five-member Sub-Committee of Powers principally involved - Canada, France, USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America - to seek in private an acceptable solution to the problem of disarmament and report to Commission. Though serious differences remained among the great Powers, this procedure resulted in an Anglo-French proposal which was accepted by all the members of the Sub-Committee as a basis for discussion.

Another significant development in 1954 - the year when the United States monopoly of the hydrogen bomb ended - was an appeal by the Prime Minister of India to the Sub-Committee to consider a "standstill agreement" to suspend test explosions of nuclear weapons. This proposal, which stressed the harmful effects of these explosions on all humanity, was to receive increasing support from member States despite initial resistance by Western Powers.

The General Assembly, at its ninth session in 1954, unanimously adopted a draft resolution introduced by the five members of the Sub-Committee concerning future negotiations on disarmament.

India submitted a draft resolution to recommend that the Disarmament Commission take into consideration the study of ways and means of establishing an armaments truce, and other suggestions. On the proposal of the five Powers, the Assembly referred this draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission.

...At this stage in this debate it is unnecessary for me to recapitulate at length the points of agreement and disagreement that present themselves in regard to this problem at the present moment. Suffice it for me to say briefly that there is agreement among those principally concerned and therefore, no doubt, in the Assembly itself that there should be a disarmament convention or treaty. I am not sure what the difference is between a treaty and a convention, but to me it appears to be that while "treaty" usually refers to negotiated agreement - bilateral, trilateral or quadrilateral - a convention is a common agreement that is put forward by a body such as this, and others are invited to sign it. In the present context, of course, "convention" is the more appropriate term. But whatever it is,
the idea that there should be reduction of armaments and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction has been agreed to. There is agreement, also, among all parties concerned, that there must be machinery for control, whatever it is called, that that machinery must be international and that it must be effective. And, as I shall try to develop later on, it has become clear as the debate has developed that there is also agreement that all this must be done in harmony with the generally accepted conception of international law and the provisions of the Charter.

But having said all that, we still have to address ourselves to unresolved points. The two main aspects of those unresolved points appear to concern the limits within which reduction can take place and what has been roughly called the machinery of control. I shall address the latter half of my observations to these two aspects at some length.

To say that we have this remarkable degree of progress is not a kind of romantic optimism, and in this connection may I say that it appears to my delegation that this juxtaposition of the optimists and the pessimists has no relation to the objectives or to the realities of our work here. If there are nations, groups, Governments or representatives who feel less optimistic than others, then that is only an argument for greater endeavour. On the other hand, if there is reason for optimism, then it is an occasion for more enthusiastic endeavour in the near future.

Coupled with these advances that have been made in the work of the Disarmament Commission itself, reference has already been made, both in the Assembly and in Committee, to the comparatively more favourable conditions that exist in the world, and I think that the recapitulation and repetition of them should not tax our patience.

We have seen in the last two years the cessation of major hostilities in two great theatres of war, war that had raged for many years and that had taken toll of millions and millions of persons, and that is no mean achievement in the history of human effort. In other words, two wars which, in the old days, would have been considered as very considerable major wars, have come to an end. There has been the resolution of disputes in the Adriatic and the conclusion of the agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy with regard to Trieste. There has been, also, the resolving of the long-standing difficulties between the United Kingdom and Egypt in the Suez area, and in our part of the world, whatever may be the previous history of it, it is a matter of very great importance that these two countries have re-established their friendship. The same thing applies to the position of Iran, nearer to us, and to our own country.

It gives me pleasure to say this with the representative of France present; my own country, only two days ago, reached a friendly agreement with France after patient negotiation during which there had never been, at any time, any breaking points or any walking out over a period of many years, and the problems resolved,
although small in magnitude so far as concerns territory and population, involved deep questions of principle. We are glad to take this opportunity of saying that we have thus added one further item to the achievements of reconciliation.

But, as against that, we have taken into account the fact that during the period when the Disarmament Commission was considering the working papers and the machinery of control, working out common points about major reductions, working out phrases such as that nations shall regard themselves as committed to the prohibition of atomic weapons, working out positions whereby cuts could be made in what are called conventional armaments and armed forces, at the same time the great nations of the world found themselves engaged in the production of more arms, in what last year's resolution referred to as "competitive rearmament"... and what was finally referred to as "competition in the development of armaments and armed forces beyond what is necessary for the individual or collective security of member States" [resolution 715 (VIII)]. In other words, while there have been all these improvements, we have not come to the turning of the corner, to the point of putting a halt to the drift towards greater and greater armaments. That is the problem that confronts us. That is on the debit side.

But it is equally to be regretted, and this is one of the things that we have to make good hereafter, that neither in this Committee nor elsewhere have we yet reached the point at which this problem will become one of common exploration. The position taken by the United Kingdom and France in finding a common agreement and putting forward a common memorandum has as its basis an attitude of common exploration. And it is only when that attitude of common exploration prevails among the five great Powers that we shall be able to make greater advances. There is evidence of that in this Committee and I think we all have reason to congratulate ourselves when these vast and ominous problems are examined from another point of view than that of finding how many differences exist, than that of the cynical Greek philosopher who said that liberty consists in the emphasis of differences with my neighbour. Therefore we must recognise that what we require in the approach to this problem is this attitude of common exploration - which does not mean that one has to surrender a point of view until one is convinced that it has to be surrendered or amended.

We also have the situation that a solution of this problem of armaments, that is to say, to render war no longer a part of the conceptions or contingencies admitted by States, has been made even more necessary by the conditions of the world itself. And on this point we have a very respectable and weighty authority furnished as recently as last week. The President of the United States, speaking on October 20, said:

"Professional armies, professional navies have given way to the nation in

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3 Dwight D. Eisenhower
arms; and now we have had, in these modern days, science give to us weapons that mean not only is the whole nation in arms, but the whole nation is constantly exposed to the threat of destruction.

"We have arrived at that point, my friends, when war does not present the possibility of victory or defeat. War would present to us only the alternative in degrees of destruction. There could be no truly successful outcome."

If that is the view of one of the most powerful States in the world, on whose decisions war and peace can depend to a considerable extent, then one must ask: what can be the purpose of pursuing any course except that of the outlawry of war? Whatever may be the ethical aspect of it, whatever may be the possibilities or the factors of strength or weakness of one side or the other, here we have a statement which I, for one, am prepared to accept, and I am sure that the greater part of the world would accept it: that "there could be no truly successful outcome". But if we know that there can be no such outcome, why should we pursue the course that has been pursued so far?

My delegation has always held the view that there can be no progress in disarmament unless the great Powers come to an agreement. Sometimes this has been called a great Power problem. It is a great Power problem in the sense that without the great Powers there could be no agreement. But it is equally true that, with them alone, agreement cannot be easily brought about. The public opinion of the world, the cooperation of other States - I shall not use the word "pressures" but the impact of their opinion the consultations and the cooperation that can come from them - the degree of security that small nations feel in the world, all these are contributory factors in bringing about agreement among the great Powers.

I hope that nothing I have said will lend itself to the interpretation by one or other of the components of this great Power group, as it is called, that the rest of the world thinks that they are a band of mischief-makers that are trying to make trouble while the rest of the world wants to live in peace. That would be a rather immature way of looking at the problem. It so happens that, if there is to be disarmament, those who have the more potent arms and whose arms are the conclusive factors in the world must come to an agreement with regard to the limitation or abandonment of those arms. That is all we mean by saying that it is a great Power problem. It is not as though the great Powers are thought of as the big bad wolves in this matter, while all the rest of us are very saintly. That is not the position. The position is that, in the context of the economic, military and political circumstances of the world, the capacity to say that this shall stop rests with the great Powers to a very considerable extent. But that does not mean that we can abdicate our responsibilities or that we do not have a very serious contribution to make, or that we ourselves may not be putting impediments in the way.
This is the attitude that my country takes to this problem of disarmament. We have always said that this matter cannot be decided on the basis of counting heads or on the basis of what are called the rights of sovereign States. By that, I mean that it cannot simply be said that all opinions are of equal value in this matter. They have to be given the weight they deserve in the context of the circumstances I have mentioned.

The present position, so far as the debate and the progress of disarmament are concerned, is that we now have a draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] before the Committee which is sponsored by the five members of the Sub-Committee.4 Irrespective of the content of that proposal, the joint sponsorship is in itself a great advance over anything that we have achieved so far. And what is the essence of that sponsorship? To me, the essence of that sponsorship is not any particular wording about cuts or major reductions - that is all very important - but that the five States concerned, which have worked on this problem, and whose contribution has military, political and other significance of a special character, have committed themselves to further exploration and have so proclaimed before this Committee. In other words, they have stated to us this position: that, irrespective of the different positions they hold, further attempts at adjustment, at exploration, at finding answers to difficulties, are not only necessary but possible.

It would be very wrong of us to think that this proposal is simply a tactical move for postponement or reference to a committee. That is not the way it has been put forward. It has been put forward as a statement that there are these major problems and that on these major problems a general degree of agreement is possible by the process not of saying "Take it or leave it" but by the process of patient negotiation. What has been achieved has been the result of patient negotiation, and what we have here is a proclamation of the success of the methods of conciliation and mature adjustment in the course of this debate.

Earlier in this debate, my delegation requested the United Kingdom representative to give some clarification on a number of points. As I said at the time, there were two reasons for the request. The first was the fact that Mr. Lloyd,5 one of the authors of the proposal, was leaving, and the other was that the debate here was being conducted on the basis of the Anglo-French memorandum. I had the good fortune to hear from Mr. Moch,6 the representative of France, that the answers which Mr. Lloyd gave were joint answers. In other words, today - and I want to emphasise this fact - we have not only the Anglo-French memorandum, but also

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4 This draft resolution, concerning the continuation of disarmament negotiations, originally proposed by Canada, was co-sponsored by France, USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It was adopted unanimously.
5 Selwyn Lloyd, representative of the United Kingdom
6 Jules Moch
an annotation, a clarification of it. We should read the answers given by Mr. Lloyd along with the memorandum. His answers would have been important even if they had represented only the view of the United Kingdom as he said at the time that they did - but they are still more important in the light of Mr. Moch's statement that he and the United Kingdom representative had discussed the matter and that the answers represented the joint views of the United Kingdom and France.

Hence, the clarifications which we have been given are now part of the text of the Anglo-French memorandum. That text is to be read with the clarifications. No one has offered any contradictions to those clarifications, and, what is more important, no one has challenged the thesis that has been put forward.

Thus there has been a great deal of give and take. In public speaking, there is sometimes a greater emphasis on the "take" than on the "give." That is why the General Assembly wisely decided at its last session that the Disarmament Sub-Committee should meet in private. Publicity has its great advantages, and we are all subscribers to the doctrine of open covenants, openly arrived at. I think, however, that the "arrived at" is more important. Sometimes an open covenant may be privately arrived at and openly proclaimed. However that may be, in the context of public debate differences may tend to appear to be greatly exaggerated.

There is no doubt, however, that there are differences and that those differences must be resolved. But am I not right in saying that it appears from the context of this debate that, while the differences are still fundamental and must be resolved before any convention can be signed, they have been reduced to dimensions in which they are capable of being resolved by adjustments or by finding a middle way? What is required, therefore, is a reinforcement of the attitude to which I have already referred. In the first place - and here I speak for my delegation - we not only must be thankful for the improvements that have taken place, but must also consciously accept them as assets to the possibility of a settlement. It seems to my delegation that it would be a political error and a poor tribute to the achievements of the past year simply to say: "It is not too bad; it could have been worse". We should regard those achievements as indications of a better state of affairs to come, as proof of the potency and efficacy of the methods which have been employed and, finally, as an answer to those who say that the points of view are irreconcilable. I do not want to introduce any words that are still the subject of controversy, but I would say that, living in this world as we do, we must learn to live with differences and not make those differences the points of isolation.

Thus, when we consider the origins and history of the Anglo-French memorandum, the success that that memorandum has achieved is being accepted as a basis of discussion, the fact that, thanks to the initiative of the Canadian delegation, a joint request has been put forward that certain propositions should be accepted as common ground and referred for consideration to the Disarmament Commission: when we consider all those things, we realise that very considerable
advances have been made.

I repeat that there are still unresolved differences. Again, it is not my purpose at this stage of the debate to go into these differences, *seriatim*, at any great length. I should like, however, to think that, broadly speaking, they fall into two groups.

The first concerns quantums and qualities - what may be called the limits of armaments and armed forces. In that respect, again, we have made some progress. Mr. Lloyd's reply - which I now qualify as an Anglo-French reply - has made the position very clear. To my delegation, the main factor is that it has been accepted that what we are aiming at is an equitable level, equitable reductions. Hence it is not a question of being addicted to any particular formula or even to particular figures. The governing condition is the word "equitable". We therefore must now proceed from this general notion of equitability which, of course, does no more than to show the way to a solution.

Now, if there is to be equitability, we must establish the factors which make for equitability. At a later stage in these observations, I shall refer to a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100] which has been circulated in behalf of my delegation. We think that it would amply repay us to go back over the laborious work done by the Disarmament Commission over the past years, when some of the points of view which are now rejected by one side were actually that side's own points of view, and *vice versa*. As I have said, the factors which enter into equitability must be established. I do not believe - and here I am speaking for myself - that it is impossible in international affairs to define a difficult problem or idea. It is always possible to list the attributes of such problems or ideas. For example, it may not be easy - and I hope that I am not now treading on the toes of any other committee - to define aggression; I myself find it very difficult to arrive at such a definition. It is however, possible to list the components of aggression.

My delegation's view in that respect is set out in its draft resolution. Of course, it is not our business to make recommendations or give orders or instructions to the Disarmament Commission. We are, however, entitled as one of the peoples concerned - in the sense that war is everyone's concern because its impact is so terrible, so evil - to suggest and hope that the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-committee will go into the ingredients, the elements, the factors that govern equitable reduction. The Disarmament Commission's second report [DC/20] sets out some of those factors, and they have been the subject of discussion in the General Assembly. Hence it should be possible to consider the factors governing equitable reduction, the quantums and the qualities - or, if one prefers, the levels. If those factors were considered, the institutional machinery that we have established would be able to make decisions, to have some guidance as to what those limits and levels were.

Quite naturally, decisions with regard to quantums and qualities have very largely
during the discussions of the past years been rule-of-thumb decisions. Even now, the Soviet Union puts forward the case of what is called a one-third reduction. I am sure that we were all happy to hear from Mr. Vyshinsky\(^7\) yesterday that the essence of the proposal for a one-third reduction was to place insistence on the fact that the reduction should be a major one. The figure of one-third was not a mathematical fraction of the whole integer. The intention was that the reduction should not be a small one, and a one-third reduction was regarded as a major reduction. Mr. Vyshinsky told us that that was therefore another way of saying "a major reduction"; it was a more specific way of stating it. If that is so, it certainly represents an advance.

At any rate, to determine these factors of equitable reduction, the limits, the quantums and the qualities of armaments and armed forces, would conform to the purposes of the Charter, to the international obligations of States and to the national necessities, political and otherwise, of States. That determination would not be one of the instruments that might, even without a definite political policy in that respect, be the causes of world war. Those factors are worthy of study. It is my delegation's view that they should be laid down in objective terms, without addiction to slogans of one kind or another or to rigid positions. If we reduce the factors to simple components, then words which have gained inhibitory or prohibitory significance will probably fall into their places. That would be a more scientific approach to this problem.

That was the approach adopted by the authors of the Franco-British proposals before they came to their conclusions. That is why, in the draft resolution that we have submitted, we have suggested that the Disarmament Commission - or the Sub-Committee, perhaps - should study the factors governing reduction. A new approach is required instead of the one where one side insists on a one-third reduction and the other insists on something else.

However, we would say at this stage, not in order to add to the difficulties but in order to have all the facts, at least so far as we can, before the minds and the eyes of the people who are to deal with them, that in taking into account these factors it would be necessary to take into account also all regional groupings. It is not sufficient to think in terms of a national entity. I do not want to labour this point at the moment, but I am satisfied with the explanation given - as I have said, it is now a Franco-British explanation - that these references to major reductions, to limitations, and so on, refer to the armies of the world as a whole, and therefore all these factors will be taken into consideration.

I am also happy to have been able to ascertain from the Franco-British side that it is their view that all proposals that are put forward must come within the terms of the Charter. Although it is not necessary to restate this, it is as well to put it on paper. Mr. Lloyd said that the answer to my question was definitely yes. In our

\(^7\) Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, representative of the USSR
view, the proposals that are put forward will have to come within the terms of the Charter. There are other aspects of this, to which I will have to turn later.

That brings us to the position that if these proposals are to be within the terms of the Charter, and if we accept the idea that the limitations and the other matters that go with them have to be considered in scientific, factual terms for the main purpose of bringing about a situation where the world is not armed at a level that is likely to lead to conflict, then the reductions themselves obviously must not be intended to establish a position of tug-of-war. In other words, we have to move towards the conception of the United Nations, not towards the conception of the nineteenth century with its doctrine of the balance of power. Balances of power are necessary when policies are based entirely upon power, but I hope the time will soon come when we will all recognise that the ingredients of power are not merely guns and bombs, but that the main ingredient of power is consent.

Authority, in the last analysis, must be based upon consent. That is so in the municipal community, and that is so everywhere. The most potent and easily seen sign of authority, it is said, is the policeman round the corner, but no policeman round the corner can function in a civilised society unless he has behind him the consent of the society he represents. That is true in international affairs, even more so in the context of sovereign States.

Therefore, while we consider that, in some respects, the two positions taken up are somewhat rigid, we do not ourselves accept either of these rigid positions and, in the context of the rapprochement that has taken place, we hope we can make further advances in this matter. Constructively, we have made the suggestions that are embodied in the draft resolution we have put forward. That I think, is sufficient for the present purpose in dealing with the questions of limits.

Then we come to the more difficult part of this problem, that of so-called control. May I say, with great respect, that it would be unfortunate if we thought of control merely in a negative or restrictive sense. Control is a constructive idea. Control is the institutional representation of the determination of nations for the securement of agreements that have been reached. In other words, we must think of control rather in terms of traffic policemen than in terms of punitive policemen. Control, fortunately for us, has now been reduced to institutional terms.

My delegation does not take the view that mere dedication on paper, mere proclamations of the desire to impose restrictions on oneself, would be adequate in the present circumstances of the world. It may well be that humanity and civilisation will advance to the stage when the word of a nation is its bond, and nothing more is required. It would be a good thing if there were acts of self-abnegation in this way, but, as things are, we have to provide that the agreements reached are maintained, and that is why control must be institutional.
On this matter, as I have said before, there is agreement that there must be control, that the control must be international and that the control must be effective. The difference appears to be in regard to the timing of the various controls or control positions and the procedures to be adopted. In this matter, may I say at the outset that my delegation has not been able to understand the insistence of the Soviet Union on two control bodies, one temporary and one permanent.

It may be that the background of our development and our history is rather different, but at any rate we believe that the very idea of having something temporary and of having something permanent is one of those things that, in the vicissitudes of international relations, is likely to reopen the whole of the problem at some other time, whereas, if this matter is decided now, it is decided once and for all. We, from the background of our constitutional development and our civilisation, believe that these institutions can be planned so as to be capable of automatic development. It is possible, within the statutes of the control authority, to have appointed dates for the emergence into action of the various institutions. We believe it would be definitely an impediment to agreement if there were undue insistence upon one set of controls following another. That is not to disregard the difficulties and doubts and suspicions that may exist, but we hope it will be possible in the early meetings of the Sub-Committee to hold this problem in abeyance and to get down to the functions the control body is to perform.

At this stage, I should like to say there is one aspect of this control body to which very little reference has been made during this debate. The only place where it to a certain extent appears is in the so-called Patterson document, that is, the United States working paper [DC/53, annex 4]. I will refer to that paper in a moment. That aspect to which I refer relates to the composition of the control body. Only a control body which enjoys the confidence of all the parties concerned can hope to function, and it is the composition of the control body more than anything else that appears to lie behind all the suspicions, all the prejudices and all the fears that have been engendered on the other side. With the assurance that the control body would function judicially, equitably, and impartially, and that it would have its eyes only on the objectives of the convention itself, a great deal of this trouble probably would disappear. Of course, that particular problem is as difficult of solution as anything else, and we would therefore like to address ourselves for a moment to this question of control machinery.

In the course of the observations I have made before this Committee, I have already sought clarification from the Franco-British side with regard to the expression "control organ." It is generally agreed that it is not used in a technical sense, but that it refers to control machinery. Mr. Lloyd was also good enough to clarify the point that he, and later, also, the representative of France, had always thought of the disarmament convention and the control organ as being established in the framework of the United Nations, and that they were not at the present, regardless of the reference to a world disarmament conference as an essential necessity, thinking in terms of anything else. If that is so, then axiomatically,
something follows. It follows that any institution set up under the United Nations cannot go beyond the Charter; that is to say, it is impossible for a principal to create a subsidiary organ with an authority higher than itself. Therefore its outside limits are the limits set by the United Nations Charter.

May I at this stage, with great respect and without giving offence to anybody, say that a debate on disarmament does not appear to us to be the context or the occasion where questions of the revision of the Charter or of fundamental ills in the constitution of the United Nations can be usefully debated. We cannot revise the Charter or change the conditions under which the United Nations exists by, so to speak, the back door. If there is sufficient consent for it, sufficient public opinion for it, then it is a problem which must stand on its merits and by itself. We have to take ourselves as we are, a body of sovereign nations willing to delegate part of our sovereign functions, but not our sovereignties, in the context of an agreement. Indeed, my understanding of it is that this is an essential attribute of sovereignty - the right of a State to surrender any part of its functions provided it surrenders them of its own sovereign will. That is how treaties and agreements are made.

Since the institutions proposed are to be under the United Nations and must therefore be in conformity with the Charter and, presumably, with the precepts of international law, it follows that any organ that is set up - by organ I mean any machinery that is created - must act in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Charter, whether in relation to the Security Council or the Secretariat or the General Assembly or any other principal organ of the United Nations. I submit, therefore, that to regard the nations on either side as sovereign nations hermetically sealed off one from the other, whose sovereignty is not amenable to treaty obligations or to consent or to the procedures that have been commonly established and at the same time to speak of control machinery as though it were world government, is not the right approach to the matter. If we want a world government, with a world executive, a world judiciary and a world parliament - no doubt it would be a very desirable thing to have some time - we will not get it through armaments control.

It is not possible, then, for the United Nations to create something that is more powerful than itself, that is, which is not confined within its authority. At the same time, however, a control machinery that is not effective - and there is agreement on this now among the five sponsors of the draft resolution - is a snare and a delusion. It is likely to create a sense of false security; it leaves so many loopholes for evasions. Therefore it must be effective, and the wisdom of this Committee and of the Disarmament Commission has to be directed in the immediate present to finding ways and means whereby effectiveness can be obtained, at the same time retaining the basis and the purposes of our Organisation. That is our problem.

It therefore appears to me that at the next stage of this matter one would address
oneself to the statutes that are necessary for control. We cannot deal with this problem of control merely in terms of rigid positions and slogans. It has to be translated into terms of statutes of control law, and that law, in the context of our Organisation, would be something whose basic principles would be part of the conventions and treaties established. It would equally be part of the treaties and conventions established that each national State would immediately pass legislation to conform to those situations. In concrete terms, therefore, if by convention a particular type of armament was abolished, or a particular limit of arming was established, or a particular method of ingress or egress was provided, or if a particular manner of enforcement was agreed upon - I shall explain what I mean by enforcement - then it would immediately be the obligation of the national authority to pass a national law whereby this could be enforced. In other words, a breach of the convention would automatically become a breach of national law.

Much has been said here about enforcement and sanctions. To my understanding, which may be poor, it appears that there is here a play of words which only adds to our complications. Mr. Lloyd went so far as to make the difference between enforcement and sanctions. Sanctions, like sovereignty, is one of those words that have bedevilled international law ever since people began to think about it.

We are told, for example, that there must be sanction power in the control commission. We have moved away from that position, and now we are talking in terms of enforcement. I should like to know from those who say that there can be no interference with domestic jurisdiction - a phrase which we hear in many contexts, which has adherents and which cuts across all lines according to the context in which it is brought out - how there can be any control at all if it is not possible to secure any cooperation from the national authority. In that case, there would be unilateral action and not action taken by a concert of nations.

On the other hand, we are told that the inspector must have the right to invoke the national authority to get something done - a right one can understand - but perhaps Mr. Moch or someone else would tell us how it is possible in the present context of affairs to function except through that national authority. Can an international inspector physically obtain the enforcement of orders except through the national authority? Is it possible for an international inspector forcibly to do something to machinery, to shut down the doors, etc.?

It will therefore be necessary, in the statutes that are produced under the convention, to lay down what is required in great detail. There will be statutes, and rules made under the statutes and procedures established under the rules. When this develops, it will be a great field of international law just as it is in the case of belligerency, in the case of neutrality and in the case of other things that have so developed.

All these statutes and the rules made under the statutes will be part of the
commitments of the nations which sign the convention. The signatory States will immediately incorporate them in their national laws according to their national procedures, including the penalties which will be visited upon individuals, managers of factories or workmen or whoever commits a breach of law, because at once we have international authority and national sovereignty united in a common purpose, and any disobedience of the convention would become disobedience of national law. Enforcement would therefore mean that the international authority functioned not as a body which merely reported information it received, but as a body which served notice and which pointed out that there had been a breach of the agreement in terms that were not vague, terms not subject to interpretation.

There is no doubt that if that is so, then there is a commitment both for the individual and for the State; a breach of that commitment by the individual would be tantamount to disregard and disobedience of national law, while a breach by the State would be a breach of the international convention. To refuse to carry out the statutes which have been passed in the country in conformity with the international treaty becomes a major violation of international law. Whether there is a violation or not, I am afraid to confess, sometimes is a matter of interpretation, but is there anyone in this Committee who can tell us that treaties have not always presented problems of interpretation? There has been no time when agreements have not presented problems of interpretation.

That of course means that we have got to provide the machinery for it, the machinery of tribunals or courts, or whatever it may be that is connected with it, in the same way as it exists in national communities in regard to industrial disputes. This approach is one of the reasons why I tried to draw out my good friend, Mr. Lloyd, on the question of domestic legislation in his own country. It is not possible for a factory inspector to go and lock the doors and walk out any more than for a policeman to do so with a private house. However, a person who disobeys the law takes the consequences. That is the meaning of sanctions, and those consequences are very serious. That is not to reduce the position to the absurdity of the inspector saying, "Pull down gauge" (I hope at least he will say, "Please pull down that gauge"), or to the opposite absurdity of saying, "Oh no, take this matter to the Security Council" every time it is desired to work half an hour more than usual. These are extreme positions, and I believe myself, quite frankly, while honestly stated, they are debating positions at the moment. They are debating positions not in the sense of spinning out words, but in the sense that they are the two extreme views between which reconciliation must be found.

Therefore, to go back to what I was saying, it appears to me that the international convention would have to be centred on these words "effective" and "international." It would bear a considerable relation to the composition of the control commission itself, and that also should provide, by the detailed work it does, for the formulation of the statutes to the convention. Coupled with it is the provision that the signatories would incorporate the terms of the convention in
their legislations; that would be the national cooperation they would give. That cooperation does not consist merely in allowing inspectors to go around; it consists in adjusting the whole judicial and administrative machinery of the country to carry out an international obligation. So these statutes are made. When you come down to details, these statutes, as in the case of a factory, come down to the rules. If we were thinking of an industrial factory, there would be rules about boilers and engines and other relevant machinery. In these statutes there would be rules laid down to the last details, rules put into operation by national authorities who are participants in the international convention. They are the law-makers as much as anybody else, and therefore it becomes a matter of common consent.

This is the approach that appears to my delegation to be something that no doubt is in the minds of the wise people who are dealing with this. But we are asked here to say what we think about it. It is the approach on the lines of which some of these apparently irreconcilable positions may fall into their place. It is the more factual, the more practical and the more scientific approach to make in regard to these matters. Therefore one refers to the only document that we have before us; that is, the working paper submitted by the United States. It is a working paper which was not submitted to this Committee but to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission. It is part of the papers of the report of the Disarmament Commission, and therefore we are seized of it.

I should like at once to say that this is the first and only attempt at some detailed analysis of this position. There is a great deal in this which is worth very serious consideration. But it would be wrong to say either that it has been submitted as a final text or that it can be accepted as it stands. No one has asked that that should be done. It is what it calls itself. It is a working paper, and as a working paper, some of these facts are laid down with a more practical approach. It states, in paragraph 2 [DC/53, annex 4], that "the broad objectives in establishing control organs are: (i) to provide international control of atomic energy so as to enforce observance of prohibition and elimination of atomic and hydrogen weapons" - that is common ground - "and to ensure use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, (ii) to supervise programmes for limitation... and prohibition...; (iii) to supervise the various safeguards... including... verification," and it then goes on to the fourth point about "an open world." I shall speak about that separately. So in the main this paper itself speaks in terms of supervision.

Supervision does not mean simply observation and making a note. Supervision, as I said a while ago, is more like a traffic policeman. Supervision is the ensuring of enforcement in terms of international law which has become national law. In the last analysis, the only persons who can use physical force against the nationals of a country are the national authorities themselves, unless there is an army of occupation. No one suggests that an international inspecting team should have the physical power to come into conflict with the national authorities. That could
not be the suggestion that is put forward. I have been saying all this in order to point out that when it comes down to a practical working out of this proposition - I do not say there will be no difficulties; that would be a very sorry way of looking at things - it should be possible to resolve it in this way of defining the detailed functions of the control organ and the responsibility of the national authority for co-operating with it.

It may be convenient to bring to your attention sub-paragraph (iv) of the aforementioned paragraph 2, to which Mr. Lloyd has made very flattering references. I confess that I do not understand what it means. It reads:

"To help develop an open world by assuring each participating State that other States are observing the various agreements and by providing knowledge upon which States can take rapid action to provide for their security in the event of serious violations of the disarmament agreement."

The first part of it is a very welcome phrase, "to help develop an open world." An open world, of course, means not the tearing down of national identities but having egress and ingress and reducing obstructions, whether they be tariffs or prohibitions of various kinds. The part, however, about "assuring each participating State" frankly requires some explanation, though not necessarily here, because, as I said at the beginning, this is not the place to come to detailed agreement. Up to a point one can understand that part. But if it means that if there is a violation by one State we get back to the law of the jungle and each State then prepares for retaliatory action, I think it is a very serious matter. Therefore, with regard to sub-paragraph (iv) of paragraph 2, I make no criticisms. I simply express the feeling that, at the present moment, it is a very open statement and it can mean a lot of things.

Then we come in this working paper to the other factor that I have mentioned, which does not deal with what may be called complications but with the machinery. To a very large extent, it relies upon what is called a secretariat. Now what I say has no reference to the United Nations Secretariat at the moment. Reliance is placed entirely on the fact that the "secretariat should be staffed with international civil servants appointed by the Director-General" [paragraph 13]. Of course, ultimately that is the only way. But that is putting the cart before the horse. We do not have an international civil service or all the elements that make it at the moment. And when the time comes that there is such a person as an international civil servant who is trusted by the whole world, then no checks or balances will be necessary. This is the kind of thing one has to work towards.

I think we should congratulate ourselves that the United States Government, through its representative, has made available to others some points for consideration. That is what this paper calls itself: a working paper. But I must say in frankness that our consideration of the appositeness of this paper relates only to the first part. The second part, which deals with the civilian uses of
atomic energy, is an independent proposition. It would not be in accordance with realities to try to deal with both problems at once. Mr. Lloyd, in answer to the questions he was asked, and I believe in one of his statements said that these problems were related. He recognised the relation. That is as far as he went. That, I take it, is the Franco-British position: the problems are related. But we cannot include the whole question of atomic development as a sub-proposition under disarmament inspectors.

There is no harm in looking at the working paper. Its usefulness, however, in our view, is in the first part; in the second part, those elements are useful that relate to the conversion or to the prohibition of atomic weapons; because, in regard to disarmament, what we are trying to do is not to regulate atomic power for armed purposes but to prohibit it. It is undesirable, in our view, that this idea of regulation, which appertains to other armaments, should in effect - not deliberately - be applied to other fields. At the same time, however, there are aspects of the suggestions and proposals made here which are of some value and which must enable people to hope that when it comes down to the practical part, everybody becomes practical. For example, paragraph 37 (f) of the United States working paper states:

"In the event of a finding by the Authority of violations, obstructions, discrepancies, or pertinent omissions by a State, call upon such State to remedy forthwith the violation or other infraction; in the event of failure within a reasonable time" - there again is no question of shutting doors or anything of that kind - "of the offending State to comply fully, report the violation or other infraction to the Security Council, to the General Assembly, and to all States in order to permit appropriate action by the United Nations or by individual States in accordance with the treaty establishing the control organ."

I do not see why we should not pay attention to these well thought out things where some of the difficulties already stand resolved. It is general in terms, but there is no doubt that that sub-paragraph was written with an eye to the practical, with the recognition of facts as they are.

Paragraph 41 of the United States working paper goes on to say:

"The Authority should be empowered to take action as appropriate, short of the imposition of sanctions as provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to remedy any violations or infractions in connection with the enforcement of the provisions of the treaty establishing the system for the control of atomic energy."

While I still maintain the reservation with respect to the civilian uses - and the other proposition is coming in another item on the agenda to be subsequently discussed - I think these ideas which are put forward are constructive ones and
show the way to resolving some of the difficulties that have been put forward and to removing some of these suspicions. But ultimately, whatever machinery of control is established, it is not only reasonable but axiomatic that no control, no law, will work without public opinion. If that is true in a national community, it is even more true in an international community. The institutions must enable trust to be maintained, must reinforce that trust. But without international understanding, that is to say, if this control machinery is set up and the disarmament convention established in the context that everybody is trying to break it, then it will be broken.

There is no doubt that while small States may be more fearful, may be more subjected to the heavy hand of the bigger ones, if the giants that are involved in this are not brought into it on the basis of consent, then there is very little hope of the thing working at all. Therefore we must lay great stress on, and capitalise and consolidate, the gains that have been made. We must, if I may say so with respect, abandon this idea that the other fellow is not likely to honour an obligation. The main thing is to make the other side, whoever it is, accept the obligation to provide all reasonable machinery for its maintenance, so that the officials in a particular State do not go wrong, and the violation can be easily located as referring to particular national law covered by the international law.

There has been in the course of this discussion considerable, and if I may say so, unrelated discussion on the whole problem of the veto. The veto, incidentally, is a word which does not appear anywhere in the Charter. That is very important, because we have lost sight of the constructive aspect of this matter. The Charter refers to the need for "the concurring votes" of certain Powers in certain cases. If that should be abolished then, as I have said, it must come about in the normal way. It is not without significance that not one of the permanent members of the Security Council is willing to abandon the veto. The only objection is to the other fellow using the veto. It is just like saying, "I have no objection to a dictatorship so long as I am the dictator." We had the very honest, straight-forward and statesman-like utterance from Mr. Lodge, three or four days ago, that the United States would not give up the veto on any question where it was called upon to use its armed forces. It is an entirely right position.

I am not saying that the veto cannot be abused or has not been abused, or will not be abused. What I am saying is this: we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. This concurrence of the great Powers is something on which this Organisation has been built, and it is very bad practice, as any lawyer knows, to make bad law on account of hard cases. Therefore all this argument about the veto, and so on, no doubt has its relevance in a particular place, but it has no meaning so far as this particular question is concerned, because the Franco-British position is that the Charter must be respected. Mr. Lloyd, referring to my final

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8 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., representative of the United States of America
question whether all the proposals put forward would be clearly within the terms of the Charter, said the following:

"The answer to that question is ‘yes.’ In our view, the proposals which we put forward would have to be within the terms of the Charter. On the question of the veto and the position of the Charter in relation to the veto, we would say, I think, that it would be quite wrong for a treaty between States to provide that the veto should not operate in the Security Council on this or that matter; that it would be contrary to the Charter to insert such a provision in a multilateral treaty; but that it would be perfectly consistent with the Charter to say that certain enforcement measures should be decided upon in the control organisation by majority vote."

If I may say so with respect, that is a very correct and lucid statement of international law in relation to the Charter and the veto. What sort of obedience, what sort of respect for international law can it be when we violate that law by national agreements? Bi-national agreements have been suggested. If we stipulate that the veto shall not apply, without at the same time taking the provision concerning the veto away from the Charter, then of course what we are doing in that way can be done in some other way; that is, we come to a common agreement and then we make a separate common agreement - or some States make a separate common agreement - to alter that.

The question of the veto has been drawn like a red herring across the whole of this discussion. It is, of course, relevant to the working out of things; there will be plenty of arguments in the Security Council as to whether the veto applies in a particular matter or not, and there is no doubt that the veto will be used in inconvenient moments, and perhaps unreasonably. I do not deny all this. But I wonder whether the use of the veto, and all that has gone around it, is not a symptom rather than a malady itself; that is to say, the whole position arises from the power relationships which exist.

Again I would like to make the statement, which may only invite rebuke from either side, that neither the obduracy of a minority, its sulkiness or its obstinacy, or its use of shock power, on the one hand, nor the easily available power of a majority, can ever bring about international agreements. This is the view which is to be found in the Disarmament Commission's second report, and it was expressed by the representative of the United States at one of the meetings of the Disarmament Commission, where he said:

"There must be agreement on... international control, but it must not be subject to the veto nor branded as a plan controlled by a United States mechanical majority."

It works both ways. Therefore the position of the Security Council in respect to it, in the view of my delegation, is governed by the principles of the Charter and
by general considerations and we should not make bad law for a hard case.

Nothing that I have said takes away from our considered view that a control is no control at all unless it is effective, unless it provides in detail, and by scientific adjustment, all the things that are to be done, because in actual fact it is not a question of interpreting a clause of an agreement, but laying down whether something may or may not be done in a place of work. Of course, if we were to push the argument to its logical extreme of suggesting that an inspector must be stationed at every industrial establishment in the world, or something of that character, then we reduce the whole thing to an absurdity. You would have an army of inspectors larger than the armies in the world.

Therefore it comes to this common sense view that we cannot function, we cannot establish this treaty, we cannot establish the machinery of control or anything else, in a vacuum. Any idea that a control machinery can exist outside the national characteristics of people, outside the unhappy conflicts that may exist at the moment, outside national sovereignties, outside the machineries of adjustment that exist, outside national public opinion, would be an unreal view to take. This is probably the most powerful machinery that would exist, because it is the machinery which seeks to restrain arms, to restrain conflict and to restrain war, and it would be unthinkable, it would be unscientific, in my opinion, to think that such a machinery can exist in a world vacuum. It can only exist in the framework of national circumstances, in the atmosphere of good and evil as it exists, in the context of adjustment and consent. Fortunately for us we see a movement in that direction, because we have now come to the stage when the prohibition of arms and actual disarmament has become necessary on account of the conditions that exist in the world.

Before I go on to my next point, I want to deal with a particular aspect of what has been called the conditional use of the atomic weapon. On this point, my delegation has followed a position which it must continue to maintain, namely, that we do not consider that there are any circumstances in which the atomic weapon can be used. We entirely agree that it is impossible under present conditions to agree to unconditional prohibition, but we have always said that it is possible to arrive at a stage of non-use by agreement, in the same way as it has been stated in the Franco-British memorandum that nations will feel themselves committed, or words to that effect. However, to say that atomic weapons shall not be used except in the case of aggression is to permit their use and to make atomic weapons part of the armaments of the world. Indeed, it is far better to say nothing at all. Moreover, aggression remains undefined and the degree of aggression is not stated. Over and above all this, what are the scientific facts?

We have the statement of Professor Adrian to the effect that the human race could not survive if more than a few thousand large atomic bombs were exploded,
regardless of where they fell. That is to say, this conditional weapon, the weapon that can be used in case of aggression, would naturally provoke its own use more and more. That is the only thing of which we are sure: arms mean more arms and war means more war. The human race could not survive if more than a few thousand large atomic bombs were exploded. Professor Adrian goes on to add: "We must face the possibility that repeated atomic explosions will lead to a degree of general radioactivity which no one can tolerate or escape." This refers to a period when there is no war. That is to say, if the manufacture and development of atomic weapons continues to take place, these explosions will lead to a degree of general radioactivity which no one can tolerate.

Then there is the statement of another professor, Sir George Thomson of Oxford University, who said that the hydrogen bomb was "absolutely crazy as a weapon" and a possible form of suicide. I think that it is more than suicide: it is suicide for the States that use them, it is genocide for the rest of the world and infanticide for posterity.

We have even further evidence of this. Professor Otto R. Frisch, of Cambridge University, speaks about the cobalt bomb made by "seeding" hydrogen bombs with cobalt, and this, he states might result in radiation so deadly and widespread as to wipe out civilisation.

We have an American authority, Professor Leo Szilard, of the University of Chicago, who states that 400 one-ton deuterium-cobalt bombs would release enough radioactivity to extinguish all life on earth.

In these circumstances, if there was any argument for situations in which atomic power could be used for destruction, it has been entirely ruled out. It is the remedy that is worse than the disease. Therefore there can be no circumstance in which my delegation would ever subscribe to the use of atomic power for destructive purposes.

I should like at this stage to refer to the draft resolution which has been submitted to the Committee on behalf of my delegation. Before speaking on this draft resolution, however, I want to state that my delegation will support the joint draft resolution submitted by Canada and four other States [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]. We had hoped that in the course of negotiations on it, some alterations would be made. But in view of the fact that the five great Powers mainly concerned have agreed and that it is a draft which refers the question for further consideration, it would be wrong for anyone to interfere with it. We join with others in the hope that it will be adopted by acclamation and sent to the Assembly as a great step towards further endeavours for disarmament.

However, we still would like to invite the attention of the sponsors concerned, who have greater technical knowledge than we have, to the possibility of referring
to the dismantling of these weapons if they are not converted for use. We say that for this reason. We are told that it is not possible to destroy the atomic bomb because total destruction means explosion and the release of radioactivity in the way I have mentioned. We do not profess to know all about these things, but the fact remains that there are large quantities of these weapons in the world, so we are told, and the absorption of them in civilian use may take considerable time. If they are not absorbed, they remain as weapons; in this the whole idea of prohibition and the whole idea of non-use suffers some detraction.

Dr. Von Neumann, recently appointed by President Eisenhower to the United States Atomic Energy Commission, stated: "I am convinced that it would take a long time before it could be applied economically as atomic energy." It is quite reasonable to think that it would take considerable time before all this fissionable material that has been accumulated for war purposes can be absorbed. Therefore, if it is technically impossible, it is technically impossible. We suggested that the weapons should be destroyed, but we were told that destruction was not possible. Therefore we suggest dismantling, so that they cannot be used. We asked the sponsors of the joint draft resolution whether, if for nothing else than for the sake of world public opinion - which is probably the most important factor in the whole of this question - they would take that into account.

Having expressed our great appreciation and gladness that we now have before the Committee the main conclusion that we should reach in this question, my delegation has submitted a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. This draft resolution is in no way contradictory either to the wording or to the purposes of the five-Power draft resolution. It in no way detracts from the joint draft. We submit it because we think that for our own position, for the strengthening of the position of the members of the Sub-Committee, and for bringing confidence and good feeling in world public opinion, it is necessary for us to reaffirm some of the things which were stated at the last session of the General Assembly and which are not fully covered here in the preamble. Therefore in our preamble we reaffirm those positions. Also, there was nothing in the previous decisions of the Assembly with regard to the situation as it is at present. In the operative part of this draft - and we have no objection to altering the words in any way that suits anyone - we have requested that there should be effective cooperation with States that are not members of the Disarmament Commission.

Now in April 1954, the Government of India submitted to the Secretary-General a request that consideration should be given to obtaining a standstill of explosions. At that time, we did not have the learned authority of all the professors whose views I have read out, that is to say, that the explosions themselves create a degree of radioactivity which no one can tolerate or escape. We suggested, therefore, that in view of the disarmament discussions, and so on, we could at any rate put a stop to explosions. We requested the Secretary-General that it should be considered by the Disarmament Commission. We did not say that it should be adopted - we had no right to say that - but we felt that, as a member State of the
United Nations, we had the right to ask for it to be considered. The document was submitted to the Sub-Committee [DC/44 and Corr.1], but it was never considered. It has been distributed as a United Nations document, which happens to a lot of documents, including those from non-governmental organisations. We are not making a complaint about this we are only arguing the point that effective methods of cooperation with States which are not members of the Disarmament Commission should be established; that is to say, procedures for this must be found. This is not mandatory; it is a suggestion. After all, if disarmament is to come about, we must have the support of the large and the small. A small State can be a great nuisance and can prove to be a weak link in the chain. It is therefore necessary to secure the cooperation of States and to provide for the channelling of their views and for such participation as they may wish.

This idea was also in the minds of the authors of the Franco-British proposal. We therefore asked the Sub-Committee to take into consideration procedures for effective cooperation.

We have been told privately that our suggestion was not technically practicable. Of course, technicians and experts can disagree. We are told that it is possible to explode atomic bombs secretly. Well, we want, and the world wants, far more evidence than is supplied by one technician. We all know that expert witnesses are one of the problems of our courts - they appear on both sides.

Secondly, Sir Percy Spender, the representative of Australia, has submitted a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] asking that the points of agreement and difference should be tabulated by the Secretariat and made available to the Disarmament Commission so that its work may be simplified. This is an excellent suggestion, with which we are in agreement, but we think it should go a little further and not merely relate to putting down the points of agreement and difference but also the main suggestions and submissions made to this Committee by various delegations. That is one way of making the work of the Disarmament Commission more cosmopolitan, more representative, and, if I may say so, more fruitful. At any rate, it would enable the Sub-Committee to be armed with answers, if the suggestions made are impractical. We hope it will be possible for the representative of Australia to consider the suggestion and, if he agrees with it, to include it in his own draft resolution.

I have also referred in our draft resolution to one other point that had been made before, namely the consideration of the factors that decide the quantum and the quality of armaments, and so on.

We now come to paragraph 1 (a) of the Indian draft resolution. The Committee may remember that my delegation made this suggestion in submitting observations to the general debate in the General Assembly, that we would request the Disarmament Commission to study the possibilities of an armaments truce. That is to say, a disarmament convention is now common ground. The
establishment of institutions is common ground. But whether there is common ground or not, it is a fact established by scientists that in the conditions of atomic power at the present moment our civilisation stands under the threat of extinction. I wonder, in those circumstances, whether we could not apply to this proposition the analogous situation that arises in the conditions of non-cold war, that is, if there is a severe conflict, we try in this way to call a halt for the time being, not necessarily by the establishment of controls or by anticipating all that has to be done, but in the same way as the Franco-British proposal suggests - or Mr. Lloyd, I forget which - that nations must consider themselves committed. It is for the wisdom of these gentlemen to consider whether it is not possible, pending the conclusion of this truce, to establish some degree of cessation. This has been referred to in the memorandum as "freezing" and so on.

The United Kingdom has said that the Disarmament Sub-Committee should also consider whether the Disarmament Commission should limit in any way the expenditures of the participating Powers for military purposes. As the disarmament programme proceeds - this is exactly what we are saying - it may well be found that budgetary control provides one of the most effective safeguards. The Sub-Committee should also consider the suggestion that among the first steps towards world disarmament there will be a freeze, or standstill agreement, in regard to military expenditure, which would bind the signatories not to increase in any way their expenditure for military purposes.

We are not committing ourselves to one method or to another. All we are saying is, just as in the case of a war we try to achieve a cease-fire, or an armistice - after all, we are living in a world of armistices, we are able to maintain ourselves not so much by peace as by cessation of hostilities - in the same way, would it not be possible for the Committee to consider the establishment of an armaments truce? Here again, I would like to say that the draft resolution does not make it mandatory, but simply suggests a study of the ways and means of establishing an armaments truce. The rejection of the suggestion would mean that without study, or only with such studies as may be undertaken in private, the matter would not even be considered. That would be a poor consolation to the peoples of the world who look to the day when these ominous weapons no longer threaten to destroy civilisation altogether. So we think that nothing is lost. We are not making an inroad into the powers, the status or the functions of the Committee. There is no idea, other than is obvious in the thing itself, which makes it unacceptable to anybody to study ways and means of establishing an armaments truce pending the conclusion of the disarmament convention.

Further, the draft resolution also says that all these recommendations are covered by paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution. That is to say, they all come under the umbrella of other proposals. These other proposals include the United States paper, the letter we sent out earlier this year, other proposals that have come out from here and the various suggestions that have been made. There is a world problem, and a project which requires the willing cooperation and alignment of all
the forces in the world, great or small. As someone said yesterday, nations are referred to as great and small. These are conventional expressions used in certain contexts, but all nations are important in creating this great world settlement.

I hope, therefore, when the time comes it will be possible for the Assembly to adopt this draft resolution. My delegation will be entirely prepared to make any alterations in the wording in order to conform with the draft resolution that the Committee has previously passed, and it has been drafted on the assumption that the other draft resolution will be unanimously accepted, an anticipation which I think it is reasonable for us to make.

These, therefore, are the observations my delegation wishes to submit, and I would like to end with the thought that the progress that we have made may enable us to hope that the main element in disarmament, that is, the recognition of its inevitability, its absolute necessity, and the recognition that conditions in the world today are more propitious than they have been ever since the war, may be a great factor in bringing our work to greater success next year.
The Chairman will soon, I hope, begin asking the Committee to record its
decisions on the draft resolutions that have been submitted to it during the last two
days. I have in previous interventions today informed the Chairman that my
delegation proposes to speak on the draft resolution without in any way marring
the effect of the consensus of opinion that has been reached, not only on the
matter of these draft resolutions, but on the general approach towards the next
stage of the working out of the problem of disarmament. My delegation, and I
personally, are not given to exuberant sentiment. We have been too long
associated with the English. Therefore, we take things in a way that tends to
approach that masterpiece of Albionism understatement.

But I think it is right to say that the stage which we are about to enter is epochal.
We are too close to the events with which we are so intimately tied up, in which
we are participants - to a certain extent we are the architects - to be able to
appreciate either the distance which we have travelled or the speed at which we
are travelling. Those who participate in the making of history are not historians.
Historians are the people who write about them long afterwards, when they do not
have either a Secretariat memorandum or the verbatim records. Therefore we are
not likely to appreciate the importance of the turning point which we have
reached, and even at the risk of someone thinking privately that I am referring to
events outside this assembly, I think we are probably today marking a stage as
important as the one that was reached a few months ago when for the first time in
twenty-five years, the guns of war were silenced in the world; that is to say, in this
cold war we have now passed on to a period where, instead of conflict, parties
seem to embark upon cooperation.

The process of common exploration has begun and I refuse to believe that it is
going to be short-lived. I share the sentiments of the representative of France that
we have no right to speak about deadlocks, because deadlocks by definition are
things that are to be broken. There cannot be a permanent period of deadlock at
any time, because in the processes that go on within it, it resolves itself, if nothing
else. Therefore my delegation puts forward these thoughts because it regards it as
politically unwise, as paying little tribute to the common people of the world, that
we should minimise the real importance of this advance and talk in terms of
procedure and principle. Advance is substantial in itself.

But before I enter into more detailed aspects, I want to take this opportunity of

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9 Source: *Official Records of the General Assembly*, *Ninth Session, First
Committee*, pages 257-261
paying a very sincere tribute to the delegation of Canada and to its chairman,\textsuperscript{10} who was the initiator of the process which is about to take place. We are particularly happy that it comes from Canada, with which, during the last two years, we have been associated very closely in processes of conciliation and negotiation. Along with the Canadians today, in the war-torn part of Asia, my country is engaged in the tasks of metaphorically binding up the wounds of war in association with the French and their former opponents. We want, therefore, to place on record our tribute to the sister State in our Commonwealth, Canada, and the chairman of its delegation who has played such an important part in bringing this about. I have also the secret joy to feel that my friend, Mr. Martin, now thinks that it is possible to talk to those with whom he differs. We have also set in motion a process whereby we no longer think the emphasis of difference is the essence of independence. It is necessary to be able to talk to the people with whom we are wholly in disagreement, because there is no other way of resolving conflict. In this draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] we have made more than the advance of registering a decision; we have made a definite political advance which, we hope, will resolve, as time goes on and by, the continuance of these same processes, that aspect of international disease which has been called "the cold war." This principal draft resolution which is before us - the draft resolution moved originally by the delegation of Canada and afterwards cosponsored by the other four Powers - proclaims this development in international cooperation that has been reached, and therefore, as I said, it is more than just a decision upon one topic.

With regard to the substance of the draft resolution, I am free to confess that there are many of us, I imagine, ourselves not excluded - none of us really suffer from the lack of self-esteem or a sense of value of ourselves - who would think that we could probably draft it better. We certainly could draft it differently. But that is not the real point before us. More than any detailed improvements in the substance, the great achievement of the unanimity of the parties is what is important, and my delegation will do nothing to mar this sense of achievement, which is itself a great contribution to the work of the Disarmament Commission.

We hope that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution have taken note, in paragraph 3 of the operative part, of the whole content of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII), namely, that the Sub-Committee should meet, if necessary, in private and in any part of the world. It is very good sometimes to read either imaginative or lurid fiction in the newspapers connected with political events, but I think it is sometimes useful for those who make events to be able to talk to each other without the impediment of their thoughts being distorted. That takes me to a related aspect of this question, to which I made reference yesterday.

Therefore, before I pass to another question, may I say that my delegation will support the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] - I have to say five

\textsuperscript{10} Mr. Martin
"Power" although I do not like this word "Power," but that is how they say it - that has been put before this Committee, and we will do so enthusiastically.

Now we come to what has been called the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. I would not enter into the merits of it and I do not propose to debate it, because to debate it would, to a certain extent, detract from the procedures we have followed this morning. But it will be noted that the draft resolution moved by the five Powers [A/C.1/L.102] says that "the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this draft resolution was discussed" should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission. But that, of course, includes the observations made on them by everybody concerned. I propose to deal with them as gently and as moderately, and with as great restraint, as I can.

First of all, I want to say that the representative of France has outlined [700th meeting] what he means by the connotation which he attaches to the substance of the second draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102], that is, by referring the Indian draft resolution to the Sub-Committee. I read it this morning: "In doing so I would emphasise that this referral should not be confused with a rejection." Of course, I do not confuse it. It cannot be the same. Quite to the contrary - and that is what is more important - it would represent the taking into consideration of these proposals. My delegation, both by habit and by conviction, takes the statements of responsible persons entirely and fully at their face value and I have no doubt at all that these words mean exactly what they say, that is, that the draft resolution will go to the Sub-Committee and will obtain the degree of consideration, examination, criticism, and all the rest that is appropriate.

In normal times, or in circumstances when unanimity was not so important, it would have been possible to quarrel with the word "appropriate," which is introduced in this draft resolution. However, in the circumstances, I shall not do so.

There are certain aspects of the observations that were made in connection with this which, I would say, should be regarded only as a critique of the draft resolution and not as an analysis of it. I feel that if the representative of France had not spoken so soon after the draft resolution was presented and if it had been possible for an exchange of views to take place, the processes to which Mr. Vyshinsky referred a while ago might have come into play.

I am happy that the French delegation regards the earlier part of the preamble, at any rate, as not being inconsistent with the positions which we have taken up, but he quite naturally feels that it could have come somewhere else. I must, however, register our position with regard to the sixth paragraph of the preamble. This paragraph refers to the cessation of hostilities in various parts of the world, including Korea and Indo-China. The verbatim record shows Mr. Moch as having said [700th meeting]: "The sixth paragraph of the preamble refers to the Geneva agreements, that is to say, to measures which are, strictly speaking, alien to our
agenda." I think that this is a correct statement, providing the "strictly speaking" can be very strictly construed. But I would want it to be placed on record that my delegation does not regard the cessation of the eight-year war in India-China - to which the Government of France and its distinguished Prime Minister have made a contribution without which no such outcome would have been possible - as something that can just be regarded as an isolated event having no relation to these matters. I am certain that that is not the meaning of this phrase. I think that it only means that it would be better not to complicate our present problem by drawing in other matters.

I say this because I have a public and a Government to which I am responsible, and we could not put ourselves in the position of saying that this great achievement of the determination of a war, which has brought fighting in the world to an end, can just be regarded as something unconnected with the problem we have in mind.

I hope that the representative of France will take these observations in the spirit in which they are offered. It is not meant by any means as a kind of criticism or as an attempt merely to make points. It is intended only to place in record that we regard this as one of the great contributions to the change of atmosphere which has made the present developments possible.

When we submitted our draft resolution, it was not with any idea that it was incapable of improvement. In submitting it, I informed the Committee that we were prepared to amend it any way, as long as it was possible for us to agree that what emerged would be something useful. My Government and my delegation believe that our task here is to seek agreement and to seek to persuade. It is axiomatic that no one can persuade unless he himself is willing to be persuaded. I have been persuaded by the arguments, by the discussions and by the talks we have had, that our purposes are achieved by the particular modality that has been adopted in regard to the reference of this draft resolution.

However, in addition to that, there are paragraph in this draft resolution which would have aroused debate, and I have no hesitation in referring to the eighth paragraph of the preamble. If it had been debated, I do not think that this paragraph would have been adopted unanimously by this Committee, or even that it would have been adopted at all. In that circumstance, we would have been prepared either to modify it or to withdraw it. After all, it is only a statement of opinion, but it does not alter the main position. I want to reiterate this point, namely, that the delegation of India has asked for nothing more than the consideration of certain ideas. It has not said that an "armament truce" should be accomplished in a particular way, that it is entirely feasible or that there are no practical difficulties. All we have said is that it is one of the matters that should be considered, so that if it is not possible to achieve this, the world will at least know why it is not possible. This is not in the sense of imposing sanctions on those who made it impossible, but simply in order that the problem may be made
well known.

I say this not in order to justify our position as a debating matter, but simply so that the Sub-Committee may know that all that we sought to do from the very beginning was to place these ideas, through the medium of the General Assembly, before the Sub-Committee for its consideration. Also, this provides us with the opportunity of expressing our point of view.

As I informed the Committee yesterday, we have tried other methods in the past and, unfortunately, those methods ended in cold storage. But I think that the temperature of the Committee has now changed. It is no longer cold; I hope it is not too warm; it is temperately warm, and comfortably so. Therefore this reference is not a matter of cold storage.

Though I feel compelled by a sense of duty to go further into this analysis, I refrain from doing so because I do not want to open up these things in any way. I am sure that the draft resolution, when referred to the Commission, will receive such attention as it deserves, and it must stand on its own merits.

Now with regard to paragraph 2 of the operative part, it is obvious that that cannot be referred to the Commission. There is no meaning in that - it would make nonsense of the whole situation. Therefore, as I stated this morning, we have withdrawn that paragraph and have ourselves issued a revision [A/C.1/L.100/Rev.1]. I had requested the permission of the Committee, but I have been advised that it is not necessary for me to do so because we are entitled to revise the draft resolution.

However, there is one aspect of this matter which is more substantial. There is a reference here to cooperation, that is to say to ascertaining or receiving views and ideas of States not members of the Disarmament Commission.

I think that it is now common ground that the nations of the world, whether large or small, are all concerned in this matter. The governments of the world should not be placed in the position that the developments in the disarmament question reach them only as newspaper reports. I agree that newspapers are quicker than anything else. But it is quite likely that public opinion in their countries, policy statements by their ministers, and so on, may be conditioned by, and even in some cases may be based on, these reports, which may lead to further complications.

Therefore I submit - not in the form of a resolution - that in the process of the serious work which is being undertaken, subject to such considerations as agreements for temporary secrecy that may exist in the Sub-Committee, the component Governments of the General Assembly should be kept informed in the normal way of the progress that is being made, so that it would be possible for them to be adequately informed and equipped to deal with criticisms, with other developments or with such adjustments and adaptations of policy as each of us
Apart from anything else, it is not a very dignified position for a government to be in when decisions which concern it and which are being taken somewhere else, come to it only in the process of a debate in the General Assembly or in the report which the Commission makes several months later. I am not saying that it is always possible to avoid this. But my delegation simply submits that this process of consultation, the process of developing the feeling and the sense of active cooperation that should develop among all State members of the United Nations and all members of the Sub-Committee, must assume an organic character. It does not mean a reference to consultation, it does not mean seeking a mandate - it is simply an aspect team-work within all the limitations and with all the special characteristics that attend this matter. Therefore my delegation requests that this should be borne in mind in considering the particular clause in the draft resolution that refers to this question.

Reference has been made to the procedural character of the joint draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]. Now I do not know where procedure ends and principle begins, or vice versa. I do know that there are certain matters which can be more or less exclusively classified as procedure, and others as something else. But in this question of disarmament, the main thing that we are trying to do is to arrive at a procedure. A convention is a procedure, and nothing else. A convention is an instrument, and an instrument is a procedure. But it is a procedure which is vital - it is a procedure which stops the competition in arming and which stops the process that leads to war. Therefore this emphasis that this is purely a procedural victory is one that I do not understand.

I want to say, on behalf of my delegation, that we regard the agreements reached as being of major importance. We regard the agreements reached as being the proclamation by former opposite camps that they are prepared to go forward on the road to achieve this goal on a common basis. This does not mean that, as they go along, they will not look in this or in the other direction, or that they may not have arguments about some particular route to be taken in getting towards the goal.

Therefore the major importance of the draft resolution that is before us is this, that the parties which are usually called the East and the West have now come to an agreement on the bases of discussion, and that the bases of discussion are the Anglo-French proposals [DC/53, annex 9] submitted to us. That is the major agreement. After having spoken about that major agreement, there are all the other items, (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Canadian draft resolution, and all that follows, which are all matters of agreement and which are again sponsored by those five delegations. Not only has this present General Assembly developed this quality, but it has done something further. We should be deceiving ourselves if we did not admit that in there have been occasions in this Assembly when we have passed resolutions unanimously and that unanimity has not covered
agreement but has only been a reflection of our desire not to sharpen disagreements.

In this particular case, however, the parties concerned have stated their disagreements and said that they proposed to find a way out among themselves. I take the liberty of re-imposing in the statement I am making the principle of the five sponsors of the draft resolution. Mr. Lloyd, speaking on October 20, said [694th meeting]: "What is more, the Soviet Union has publicly declared that it accepts our proposal as a basis. I do not think that that is a misrepresentation of the present position as between us and the Soviet Union ..." And here is the important part: "... so I think it is wrong to say that there has been no progress." It is a very mild way of putting it, but then, you see, it comes from the representative of the United Kingdom.

Then we have Mr. Moch, who, in the Latin manner, is a little more expressive. He said [685th meeting]: "I ask these questions as one desirous of frank cooperation among us. For years, here and elsewhere, I have constantly striven for supervised disarmament." I expressed the sentiments of my delegation, by way of a tribute to Mr. Moch, yesterday. Mr. Moch went on to say: "I believe that notable progress has at last been made between June and October ..." Therefore, there cannot be any question of a procedural advance.

The representative of the Soviet Union said [686th meeting]: "It is easy to see that in this respect we agree on the main principle." Therefore, there again, from another side, comes the same view.

For the United States, Mr. Wadsworth said [687th meeting]: "We are still hopeful that these Soviet proposals represent an important step in the direction of an agreed disarmament programme." Not only agreement on just getting through the business of this Committee, but an important step in the direction of an agreed disarmament programme.

There are not many assemblies which, in the short space of time and in the context of the troubles of our world today, would regard that as a very small procedural advance. I will reserve until last the remarks of the initial author of the present settlement - and that is Mr. Martin - who said that he would agree with Mr. Vyshinsky when he said that there was no inseparable contradiction between the two positions. That, I think, is the classical definition overcoming the deadlock; when you say that there are no inseparable contradictions between the two positions, the separateness has disappeared.

Therefore I would like, in commenting on this draft resolution to the Committee - or, rather, in expressing our appreciation to the Committee - to refer to two words which have been used in this Committee so often. One is the word "unanimously," when we say that we hope the draft resolution will be unanimously carried. The other is the word "acclamation," when we say that we
hope it will be carried by acclamation. I propose to refer to this towards the end of my observations.

There is one problem, one matter of business, to which I must refer and that is what I stated yesterday [700th meeting] with regard to the working paper [DC/53, annex 4] that has been submitted. We put our position in this matter quite frankly to the Committee, that we appreciated the work that had gone into it and that, for the first time, an effort of this kind had been made, but, equally, we stated that it was a working paper. That is to say, it was a basis from which the greatest problems of control and supervision and so on would be worked out. What is more, there are contradictions in that working paper itself. We are, according to that paper, to state our position with regard to the control and use of atomic energy for industrial purposes. It is a matter which is arguable whether it even comes as fully within the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission as set out in that document. This is not in any way to discount its value. We regard it as a notable contribution, a contribution that would assist in the detailed tasks that are before us, but the very way to kill that paper, the very way to make it a centre of controversy, is to elevate it to the position of a statute. That is not what it is. It is provided as an analysis, both as a compendium of problems and as a prescription of remedies. That is how it should be.

There is an amendment before us from the representative of El Salvador [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1]. We are in a difficult position with regard to this. A separate draft resolution has just come out and I would like to say that we are entirely in agreement that all the proceedings of this Committee should be communicated to the Disarmament Commission. We are, however, in the same position as Mr. Moch, in not wanting to break from the general consensus of opinion. It was partly the same reasons which persuaded us to take up our position with regard to our own draft resolution. We believe that atmosphere has a great deal to do with the finding of solutions. After all, human beings have to bring about these situations and their approach and reconcilability to each other, and the context of the reconciliation, is very important. I would, however, say that if we are adopting a resolution, if I may put it this way, we feel equally - in view of our recent experience of difficulty in amending a cosponsored draft resolution - that once you start amending it, many other amendments will come about. Therefore we are quite prepared to take it as it is. As a consolation, may I take the liberty of pointing out to the representative of El Salvador that paragraph 1 (c) of the operative part of the Indian draft resolution says: "The discussions and suggestions on disarmament in the General Assembly."

That is to say, the whole of the proceedings in this matter will be part of the communication to the Disarmament Commission. That is how we satisfied ourselves, but I do not want the impression to be conveyed that we are only concerned with the particular draft resolution that we put forward. We feel sure that the draft resolution will be generously and honestly interpreted in a kind of "packed-in" way. The draft resolution has been referred to the Committee, and it
says that all the suggestions and everything else must be referred to the Disarmament Commission. Speaking for ourselves, we would be quite satisfied with that. If it had been possible for us, without major deviation from our purposes, namely, to proclaim to ourselves, to our own hearts and minds, above all, the dignity and the unanimity we have reached, we would have been willing to support the draft resolution that is now put forward.

In the circumstances of the explanations, it may perhaps be possible for the representative of El Salvador - in the light of these explanations and of this request - to place his opinions on record, and it may be possible for us to conclude this particular part of the Committee's proceedings with unanimous decisions on the two five-Power draft resolutions.

That is all I wish to say with regard to the draft resolutions. We hope that these two words, "unanimity" and "acclamation," really mean what they convey; not unanimity in the sense of all sixty hands going up but unanimity on the goal that has to be reached, the appreciation that various principles have been agreed upon and, what matters more than anything else, unanimity and even enthusiasm for unanimity. That enthusiasm for unanimity has been expressed by certain delegations in saying that draft resolutions will be adopted by acclamation. There is no need for us to get excited, but, at the same time, it would be a sad state of affairs if we were to become prisoners of all the gloom we have created ourselves. That is to say, if we are afraid of achievement; the fear of achievement is the fear that we may be disappointed, and therefore we may not rejoice. In that case, we may never have the opportunity to rejoice now, or to rejoice when the achievement comes, so why should we not be thankful for the advance we have made and proclaim to ourselves and to the world that we have now, in this particular problem, reached a situation where, at any rate, it is one of the turning points? It is a major development that makes negotiation, conciliation and, what is more, the establishment of the common goal, the settlement of the achievement of disarmament, a practical problem. Therefore we do not apologise for regarding this as a major advance and not merely a procedural victory. There are not rules of procedure for the victory; and if the five States have been able to agree on all that was set out in a Canadian draft resolution and, what is more, if they have been able to agree even to take into consideration such a humble effort as our own, on each occasion saying: "We do not want to break up this unanimity" that is one of the by-products of our discussion this afternoon, that each one of them says: "We do not want to do anything that impairs this agreement" - is that not a reiteration of the desire for a common exploration, for common achievements? Therefore let us now pass on to the situation where the index of power is proclaimed not merely by guns or by bombs, but by the common consent of governments.
STATEMENT IN THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION,
JULY 12, 1956

[India was invited, at its request, to make a statement before the Disarmament Commission. The Commission had been established by the General Assembly in 1952, and was composed of members of the Security Council and Canada.

Mr. Menon’s statement was devoted mainly to India’s appeal for the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions.]

The Government of India is deeply appreciative of the decision of the Commission to invite its representative to come before it and present its views in accordance with the letter to which the Chairman has just referred.

I address myself to the main concern which the Government of India has in mind, and I use these words deliberately, namely, "the suspension of nuclear explosions." Perhaps one should modify them these days by saying "suspension of explosions relating to weapons of mass destruction," because while we draft resolutions, time passes on, and while disarmament makes - I would not say no progress - a little progress or less progress than we would all like, the inventiveness of men and the projectile and destructive powers of armaments increase. Therefore, it is perhaps better to use the expression that covers the intent of the idea, namely, "weapons of mass destruction."

There are three main aspects in this regard to which I wish to refer. The first is the effects of these explosions. While it is true that you are a Commission of experts who have had this problem before you for two or three years and who have looked, one hopes, at every aspect of it, while your advisers are great experts on this subject, my Government cannot forget the fact that the peoples of the world, and certainly the people of our country where the effect of radio-active dust reaches the streets of Calcutta, cannot but be very concerned about and have at the top of their minds the effects of radiation from the fall-out of these explosions. At this particular moment, I am not referring to the nuclear war; I am only referring to experimental tests, going on now in the way of explosions. Again, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, every observation I make has reference to the explosions for which one country or another is responsible. There are no political or other alignments or considerations governing them. These are physical facts which are to be looked at objectively in the interest of mankind as a whole.

After I came to New York I read and I heard from my colleagues in private talks

11 From: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, July 1956, pages 98-110
and otherwise about various reports recently submitted by scientists working under governmental auspices.

There is an excellent report on this by a British medical authority produced by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, which will give us all a great deal of food for thought and greater room for concern. While there is nothing alarmist in this report, it points out the worst of all the really alarmist factors - that this is an unknown field. No one can calculate the consequences for future generations of the results of the fall-out from explosions. If that is so, then those who are responsible for the conduct of affairs have to think very far and very deep before they commit themselves to consequences unknown and ungovernable.

Recently, before the House Government Operations Sub-Committee of the United States Congress, a leading American scientist, Dr. Lapp, gave evidence. He gave the Committee a table of estimated radio-activity lingering after the burst of a weapon equivalent to 20 million tons of TNT. He said that the radio-active fall-out from such a bomb could cover 10,000 square miles. That is a moderate estimate. He said on June 20, 1956, that a progressive increase in such tests will release enough dangerous radiation by 1962 to give everyone in the world the "maximum possible amount." Dr. Lapp goes on to say that the technical effects would not be felt until late 1970; radio-active particles will hang in the upper air until then.

Now, I come to the British authority, the British Research Council. Its report says:

"There is little direct knowledge of the genetic effects of ionising radiations on man, but with certain reservations it is justifiable to draw upon our knowledge of the effects of radiation on other organisms. Damage to genetic materials is cumulative and irreparable."

"Cumulative" really means that once the harm is done, one has put in there a chain reaction which works on a particular individual, and also on succeeding generations. None of us have the moral right to inject harm which is beyond one’s own control. Long continued exposure to radiation of low intensity - that is what happens after a fall-out - induces as much gene mutations as a single exposure to equal dosage of radiation of higher intensity.

Therefore, the fact which is often quoted that this is only very little and after all we have so much radiation that it does not matter, is a rather misreading of statistics because, if the effects of radiation last long enough, as they must, because it takes nearly five years for this to fall from the stratosphere, they are very considerable. The report goes on to say:

"It must be realised that genetic studies inevitably tend to be slow and that sufficient knowledge on which to base these firm conclusions will be
accumulated only after many years of intensified research."

Now I turn to another American authority on this subject, which is the National Academy of Sciences of the United States. On 12 June of this year the National Academy of Sciences said:

"Thirteen months after the first hydrogen bomb test in Bikini in 1954, the contaminated water mass of the Pacific Ocean, at the scene of the explosion, had spread over one million square miles."

We have been told in another committee that 30,000 square miles have been fenced off. It is quite true that that is something, but here we are being told that the water remains contaminated thirteen months afterwards, for one million square miles. This is not anybody’s particular pond; it is not an inland sea; it is a world ocean. The report goes on to say:

"Two days after the 1954 tests, the radio-activity of the surface waters near Bikini was observed to be a million times greater than the naturally occurring radio-activity. This material was transported and diluted by ocean currents, and four months later concentrations three times the natural radiation were found 1,500 miles from the test area; thirteen months later the contaminated water mass had spread over a million square miles, artificial activity had been reduced to about one-fifth the natural activity, but could be detected 3,500 miles from the sources."

It is quite clear that the result of the fall-out from explosions would last a very long time and, as time goes on, it does not die out but spreads more and more. There is no extinguishment.

Now I shall go on to two places nearer home. One is Japan and the other is my own country. The Japanese Welfare Ministry reported that the fruit and vegetables in the central district of Japan were radio-active and warned people against eating them. The warning said that the amount of radio-activity found in fruit and vegetables in the area exposed to recent heavy rainfalls was calculated to be five times greater than the amount considered safe for human consumption.

In my own country, there having been some effects with regard to the consumption of eatables, investigations were made by the University of Calcutta, which were now under consideration by the Government of India. The report says:

"Many common vegetables as well as the milk, ghee and rice which are consumed by people every day, have been found to be radio-active by a team of scientists at the Calcutta University College of Science."
Then I come to two other aspects of this matter. I have already referred to the question of posterity, and that is one of those things to which we ought to pay much greater attention, weighing the pros and cons of this matter, assuming that it has the expected results in stopping aggression or in saving civilisation, if we are to consider whether civilisation is to be saved. Here again I go back to the American authority. The National Academy of Sciences said the other day:

"The basic fact is - and no competent persons doubt this - that radiations produce mutations and that mutations are in general harmful. It is difficult, at the present state of knowledge of genetics, to estimate just how much of what kind of harm will appear in each future generation after mutant genes are induced by radiations. Different geneticists prefer different ways of describing this situation; but they all come out with the unanimous conclusion that the potential danger is great."

I would like to say here that I read somewhere the other day that even under natural radiation, as it is at present, two per cent of the children born in the world are affected by radiation and there are genetic effects upon them already. That to a certain extent explains the kind of malformations and defects that exist in the human race. If that is so in the normal state of radiation, just add a little more to it and then what happens?

Before I go to my final piece on this, which is on strontium 90, I want to refer to something for which the United Nations has some responsibilities, and here again, it so happens that the instance is connected with the United States explosions. But radiation, radio-activity, and its consequences are as harmful if it comes from any other country, and the Japanese have been subjected to a great deal of this by the explosions that are reported to have taken place in the Soviet Union. The Visiting Mission to the Pacific Trust Territories - the head of which was a distinguished British civil servant with the representative Guatemala, Belgium and my own country in it - produced a report. I want to say here and now that none of them are scientists nor doctors. So they have not produced any kind of pseudo-medical opinion. All they have done is to transmit to us the information given to them by the medical authorities in these islands.

The report states that a group of medical officers attached to the United States Atomic Energy Commission informed the Mission that

"the people concerned had been irradiated from the fall-out in three ways: penetrating gamma radiation from the ground, trees and houses resulted in whole body irradiation; skin contamination from fall-out resulted in spotty localised irradiation of the skin and scalp; and internal contamination occurred from ingesting of contaminated food and breathing in fall-out material."

The paragraph continues: "The island groups and extent of involvement are
shown in the following table..." I shall not read out the whole table, but it shows
that in one island 64 Marshallese received an estimated penetrating dose of 175
roentgens. And we are told that 10 to 15 roentgens, if it penetrates somebody, is
fatal. Now this is the amount that is in the atmosphere. In another group, the
table states 18 Marshallese had 69 roentgens; in another group 28 Americans had
78 roentgens; and in another group 157 Marshallese had 14 roentgens, although
the result on them was very slight.

Here we are not arguing at present the question whether the explosion should
have taken place there or not, but this happens to be a scene where experimental
results are available.

I want to come now to a particular matter to which our scientists, our advisers and
our Government have paid special attention. It concerns the fall-out of strontium-
90. The worst of this is that it can remain in the stratosphere and in the high air
for a considerable period, and may fall to the earth in five years. And again I
quote the American authority, Dr. Lapp:

"The unique nature of the hazard is indicated by the fact that one ounce of
radio-strontium, or about a teaspoonful, contains the equivalent of the
maximum permissible amount for every person on this earth. The number
of atoms in an ounce of material is so astronomical, even when divided by
the population of the earth, that it amounts to 70 trillion per person. Many
pounds of radio-strontium are produced in a super-bomb explosion."

Dr. Lapp goes on to say that a number of the products that are produced in high-
yielding fission have a very long life. Of these, strontium-90, with its twenty-
eight and half-year life, seems to be the most important, and Dr. Lapp concludes
that a serious strontium hazard exists in the area of the local fall-out.

I quoted to the General Assembly last year another American, Colonel Victor
Burns, who addressed the sixty-second annual convention of the Association of
Military Surgeons in the United States, and this is what he said:

"An atom bomb explosion produces coagulation of the tissues and the
mechanical destruction of the choroid in the retina by converting the tissue
fluids into steam and thereby exploding the retina."

A member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, I believe, in his
evidence before the United States Congress, said:

"Let me be more specific. One of the nuclear products released by any
nuclear explosion is a substance that is called radio-active strontium.
Unlike ordinary strontium this strontium gives off beta radiation, which is
one of the three kinds of radiation emitted by radium. Prior to the atomic
age, there was no radio-active strontium in the atmosphere of the earth."

Now that increases the responsibility of those who have today the power to stop these explosions. There was no such material before the explosions. The gentleman in question continued:

"Of the radio-active strontium released in an explosion of a large thermonuclear weapon, some falls to earth rather quickly over thousands of square miles and some is shot up into the stratosphere. From thence, it settles down, diffusing throughout the whole envelope of atmosphere that surrounds the earth. Rainfall speeds its descent, but it comes down slowly; only a fraction of it is deposited on the earth during the course of a year.

"From the earth’s soil, radio-active strontium passes into food and then into the human body, where it is absorbed into the bone structure."

And this is what it does:

"Here its beta rays, if intense enough, can cause bone tumours. We know that there is a limit to the amount of this strontium that the human body can absorb without harmful effects. Beyond that limit, danger lies, and even death."

The problem, of course, is to fix the limit. I have read out the quantity of radio-strontium that falls out from one explosion. The statement goes on:

"In any event there is a limit to the tolerable amount of radio-strontium that can be deposited in the soil. Consequently, there is a limit to the number of large thermonuclear explosions that the human race can withstand.

"The sheer fact of this effect is certain. The new power we have in hand can affect the lives of generations still unborn."

The next point to which I want to refer is that, when discussion takes place, the effects of this radiation are always assessed on the basis of what exists on that particular day. But at the next meeting of the General Assembly or of the Disarmament Commission a change has probably taken place. That is to say, there is a continuing and increasing evil, unless we realise that even as it is it is bad, but that an increase would be worse.

We have also taken into account the fact that whether the explosions be on land or under the sea, the winds are uncontrollable, so that, there is no predicting in what direction it may go - whether it will go right up and come down. But the effects are lasting and, what is more, they remain in the soil and the sea. They are transmitted through cattle, through our agricultural products, and not to one
generation alone because the agricultural produce transmits them to its descendants and they go on for ever.

That is the first aspect of this question to which I want to draw attention. The second aspect is the relation of the proposals made by the Government of India for several years, and quoted throughout the world and many times in the United Nations, with regard to this suspension - that is, the relation of a suspension of explosions to nuclear disarmament. Now if the effects stood alone - if it was merely the question of effect - in my opinion that is big enough. That is to say, we have no right to go on laying down the foundations of destruction which is beyond our control, lasting through generations and probably leaving results which in themselves have a chain reaction, creating worse results. I want, however, to go on to the second aspect of this, which is the relation of the suspension of explosions to nuclear disarmament itself.

It is well known that the position of the Government of India is that it stands without any reservation for the banning, the total non-use and the destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. We recognise that machinery has to be agreed and established, that there are difficulties, that there are points of view to be met, and so on, but in this particular case the stopping of the explosions would be a first step towards disarmament as well, because without experiments it is not possible to develop these weapons...

I submit with great deference that if we take a step to suspend the testing of these nuclear weapons, we shall be taking a first step towards nuclear disarmament. For by taking that step we shall be reversing the process of competitive armaments.

So far as we know, there is no rational ground for continuing these experiments. An experiment is made in order to prove something. In the case of nuclear test explosions, the purpose is destruction, or, in some cases, TO ascertain how these products can be used for other aims. I submit that all the explosions which have already taken place, all the weapons which have already been manufactured by the respective parties are adequate to blow this planet to smithereens. Hence, there is no need for further experiments. The experiments are futile; they constitute a futile adventure; they have no raison d’être. One experiment can only lead to another. The purpose cannot be the pursuit of pure knowledge in this case, because the pursuit of pure knowledge should not have such disastrous consequences.

There is another aspect. If the Disarmament Commission were to recommend to the General Assembly steps for negotiation between the two - I am told the figure is now three - parties mainly concerned, for the suspension of these experiments, I think the Commission would have taken a measure having a far greater psychological and political importance than any architectural plan of control, supervision, inspection, and so forth. It would echo throughout the world that a
great step had been taken to reverse the engines of destruction, to reverse these policies of mass destruction which, we are told, are conceived to save aspects of civilisation or for self-preservation. If a step were to be taken to suspend these tests, that would represent the single and major measure that the United Nations could take to create confidence among the people; it would ring throughout the world.

We have heard a great deal about tensions, suspicions and deadlocks. This big change that I am suggesting would have an effect on those tensions, suspicions and deadlocks. The step that we should be taking would have a far greater importance than might appear on the surface.

It is now my duty to deal with the objections that have been raised to the suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons.

In the first instance, there have been silent indications that it is not possible to control these explosions; that it is possible for the bad man to get through and the good man alone will abide by the agreement. On behalf of the Government of India, I wish to say that we are entirely unmoved by this opinion, and we do not think that the suggestions have any valid foundation. It is not possible to produce atomic explosions in one's pocket. No more unacceptable opinion has ever been voiced than the one to which I have just referred.

An objection has also been raised that it would not be possible to suspend these tests until some system of control had been introduced. Even as regards this simple proposition, this proposition having such vast consequences and importance, we come up against the vicious circle of control first, or disarmament first. In our opinion, the objection is not valid, and we are not convinced by it.

We have taken scientific advice - in our own and other countries - and we find that there is no valid evidence anywhere to support the contention that large-scale explosions, explosions that could do the kind of damage which I have described, could take place in a concealed way. Suspending these tests would be one of the steps which could be taken without introducing the problem of control.

This is perhaps the time to refer to the idea introduced by the United Kingdom representative. I refer to the "limitation" of explosions. The limitation of any evil is in itself good. In this particular case, however, limitation is something that completely destroys the agreement for a remedy. In the first place, limitation at once introduces question of control. If it is decided that an explosion of a certain size is permissible, there will always be discussions about whether or not the size is right, about where the test should be carried out, and so forth. Furthermore, any measurable limitation would be of such character as to increase the amount of radio-activity in the world. So far as my Government is concerned, to permit limited explosions would be to go against the basic concept that it is both morally
and politically wrong to permit atomic war and the use of atomic weapons. We are therefore totally against this idea of limitation - not because we are purists and say "either the whole or nothing," but because we think it represents a step backwards.

I would add that, since Mr. Nutting addressed this Commission, I have had an opportunity to read extracts from a speech made by his Prime Minister in the United Kingdom Parliament in which the latter pointed out that this limitation is included in the terms of the Anglo-French proposals - that may have changed, but I think that it is still the position. In the Anglo-French proposals, the entire question of stopping nuclear explosions enters in what is called in those proposals the second stage. In view of the fact that it has taken the Disarmament Commission ten years to arrive at this stage of comparative agreement on a number of points - and I might say that, in my Government’s opinion, there has been agreement on points - it would take a very long time indeed to come to the second stage of the plan provided for in the Anglo-French proposals.

I should now like to read out some excerpts from an article dealing with this problem and appearing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a review published in the United States:

"It is by now generally known that testing of thermonuclear weapons cannot be concealed from the world; its cessation therefore will not need verification by international inspection, which has been the bone of contention between West and East ever since United Nations negotiations concerning the control of atomic energy began in 1945. The testing of inter-continental missiles is not equally easily detected from outside the testing country - if the latter has at its disposal the land masses of Siberia, or the wide reaches of the Pacific. However, a relatively small number of extra-territorial internationally manned radar stations within each large country would probably suffice to make the concealment of such tests impossible. It can be suggested, therefore, that foolproof control of the perfection of IBMs, as such, as well as that of nuclear warheads, is technically feasible without excessive interference with national sovereignties. The possibility of freezing the arms race, in the way suggested... thus depends only on whether the United States and the Soviet Union want this to happen, and not on technical difficulties which stand in the way of an agreed and controlled elimination of existing weapons... Furthermore, they argue, only such a freeze can prevent nations not now in the van of the arms race from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The acquisition of atomic weapons by smaller Powers is bound to create a multilateral danger, less predictable and less controllable than the present danger of the outbreak of atomic war by one of the two armed camps..."

12 The representative of the United Kingdom
"...He believes that the suggested attempts to stop the race will have to be made within the next few months - otherwise, it will be too late, technological progress having put the mastery of the ultimate terror weapons irrevocably in the hands of man.

"[This] is not a proposal to shift the blame for the arms race to the other side. It is deeply serious. Their belief that we are now offered literally the last opportunity to avoid an irrevocable deadlock of mutual terror is a sober estimate of reality, and not an exaggeration to whip up support for a pet disarmament plan. It is, in fact, now or never."\(^\text{13}\)

I also want to quote from the statement of another scientist in the same publication, as follows:

"A world-wide nuclear test ban agreement is the simplest possible step of guaranteed arms limitation and would prevent the rise of other nuclear Powers, or at least minimise their potential effectiveness. It is the simplest step because it requires only a minimum deviation from conventional diplomatic and military attitudes, upon which our present partial security is based. It leaves us with our present nuclear weapons and the freedom to build more of them to keep the stalemate effective. It merely interferes with the rate of development of new weapons, treating the great powers equally so that neither can gain a decisive advantage. The step is simple also because it does not require the admission of inspectors with free access throughout the various countries.

"The step is guaranteed against significant evasion because nuclear tests can be detected from afar. It is necessary to consider, at greater length than we shall here, the possibilities of special evasions, the limits of small air bursts that might not be detected by monitoring atmospheric radio-activity, the dependability of seismological detection of deep underground tests, and so forth. It seems very likely that a complete study would show that technically possible evasion would be of a minor nature and would not upset the stalemate. If it should, nevertheless, be deemed necessary, special provisions could be made to cover this difficulty which would only slightly complicate the otherwise simple scheme, such admission of inspectors to seismic observatories at a few agreed spots in large countries."\(^\text{14}\)

I would submit here that in our respective countries, we do not give up the idea of passing legislation because there are bound to be a few law-breakers; we do not give up the idea of the police because there are still a few burglaries. The whole point here is this: no concealment of any effective character is possible in regard to explosions.

\(^{13}\) *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. XII, No. 6, June 1956, pages 186-87
\(^{14}\) *Ibid.*, page 197
I want to set out categorically the reasons why the tests should be suspended.

The first reason is the one I have set out at great length: the effects of radiation, of strontium-90 and all the other consequences that flow from these experiments.

The second reason is that if the experiments go on, then the atomic race goes on. If we are not able to take this initial step, where will we stop it? Without experiments, it is not possible to produce better bombs - although it is true that it is still possible to produce bombs on the old model. But it is of some use, politically, psychologically and physically, if there is some arresting of the process.

The third reason is what some people used to call the third-country problem. Now it is the fourth-country problem. Next time we meet, it may be the fifth-country problem.

I want to point out with great respect that this whole atomic and thermonuclear development has taken place in the United States and the Soviet Union on a large scale. These are two powerful countries, with unfathomable resources of wealth and manpower and great intellectual and scientific ability. When rich people do something, they do it in a big way, and it therefore costs a lot of money. What America does with one dollar, I suppose that our country will try to do with ten cents. Therefore, when these things are attempted in other countries, where the resources are smaller and the standard of living and everything that goes with it is on a lower level, the production of these weapons will become less expensive than it is now. There are many countries in the world today which are highly advanced in this technique. And it should not be forgotten that the technicians and scientists in the United States and the Soviet Union have not all have their origin in those countries. Talent has come from other countries. Talent is not divided by geographical limitation.

The fourth reason is that, as I said before, the suspension of these experiments would be an epochal step. It would create a different psychology in the world.

Fifthly, it would be a first step in nuclear disarmament. While arguments go on as to whether it is possible to detect stock-piles, whether there should be controls and how these controls can operate, and so on, we would have taken one forward step - and one step always carries within it the embryo, the possibility, of another step. Therefore, this first step in nuclear disarmament would link up the two aspects of disarmament which have always tended to fall apart.

Sixthly, I want to refer to the large volume of world public opinion. This is reflected in the actions taken by parliaments in different parts of the world. The other day, both Houses of the Japanese Parliament passed unanimous resolutions
requesting the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries concerned to ban these tests because their populations are suffering. Recently, the Indonesian Parliament heard that the British were likely to explode a bomb in a place called Christmas Island. A nice place name for an atomic bomb! There are two Christmas Islands. One Christmas Island is in the Indian Ocean and it could have been that. Apparently, however, it is the Christmas Island in the Pacific. Whatever it was, the Indonesians protested. I am not saying that the supposed location of the test was the only reason that moved the Indonesians; we have had to answer questions in our own Parliament too about this.

But there is no law that prevents the wind from blowing from the Christmas Island in the Pacific to the islands of Indonesia, also in the Pacific. Therefore, the Indonesian Parliament which passed a resolution to this effect did so appropriately.

In Burma, there are nation-wide protests about this. The opinion in our own country is well known. I also want to refer to the Conference at Bandung last year, at which twenty-nine Governments were represented, the overwhelming majority of them members of the United Nations. At that conference, there were people who belonged to the Western bloc and people who belonged to the Eastern bloc - and there were people like us, who belonged to no bloc. Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the Powers concerned to reach an agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons. Now, can the United Nations and the Commission, particularly composed of non-Asian countries, afford to ignore the opinion of Asia and Africa?

The latest adherence to this protest does not come from Asia, nor does it come from Africa; it comes from one of the countries which is affiliated with the Western alliance, and that is New Zealand, represented by Western Samoa. No New Zealander would either think or dare to say that Samoan opinion is not reflective of New Zealand. The members of the Council of State, the Legislative Assembly and the "fono of paipule" of Western Samoa, I think largely concerned with the possible explosions on the Christmas Island, have also appealed to those concerned to suspend the explosions.

The final reason is that there are already so many of these weapons that further experiments are quite unnecessary. Why do something that is filled with so much danger and untold damage for future generations when it is no longer necessary?

Let us assume that their purpose in the world is something that cannot be overlooked. We are told that the destructive power now contained in the bombs that have been stockpiled by the Soviet Union and the United States, is sufficient to destroy this planet. I am sure that it is not part of the plans of the nations today to destroy other planets! Therefore, I believe that there are no rational grounds for proceeding with these experiments.
As I was arriving, I read another article concerning yet another aspect of radiation, an aspect that can be given as a further reason. These matters are creating in the world, particularly in the Western Powers, which seem more susceptible to this, a neurosis. Every time someone gets a headache, he thinks that he has an atomic headache. Every time it does not rain, he believes that the atomic explosions are stopping the rain. This is creating a general psychology of distress and discontent. The Japanese have investigated this phenomenon, and they have coined a term for it, "hoshano noirozeh", which means radiation neurosis, a state of extreme nervousness. This must be taken very seriously, because there is nothing like jittery nations that can make for war.

I have set out seven or eight reasons why the suspension of these tests should take place now. I believe that the most telling of all reasons, from a purely practical point of view, is that the tests are futile. They are purposeless. The difference between civilised humanity and uncivilised humanity is that civilisation always leads the human being to act for a purpose.

Before leaving this particular aspect of the subject, I should like to say that as a practical consideration, it may be that having regard to certain circumstances a proximate date could be fixed so as to enable certain arrangements that have already been made to be completed. It is possible to find some method whereby arrangements which have been made and which have gone ahead too far can be dealt with in the next five, six or seven months.

I come now to another aspect of this question, namely, world morality and world law. We have had wars ever since humanity has existed. But at no time has it ever been justified to wage war in such a way as to inflict damage on a neutral country. To do so is a concept of international law that is entirely new. No nation has the right to contaminate the earth, the air and the seas of the world. These do not belong to any nation at all.

Therefore, I raise this question most seriously: Is the United Nations, devoted to the principles of the Charter and respect for law, going to permit individual nations to use the wide seas of the world for non-peaceful purposes, even though those purposes may be intended in the long run according to their own calculation, to preserve peace? Are we going to break the sound and reasonable canon of international law that war activity must leave the neutrals alone? In using the term "neutrals" I am referring to non-belligerents.

Because these bombs cannot be exploded in someone’s private garden, they must be exploded in the seas or in the open deserts - but wherever they may be exploded, even in a private garden, the wind can take them all over the place - and such action corresponds to what the lawyer would call in municipal law a tort. This constitutes an international tort. It is like keeping a wild animal in your own
house to the prejudice of the next door neighbour, an act which is not permitted by the laws of our countries. I say, therefore, that this is against international law and international morality. That brings me to the conclusion of the first part of the observations.

The General Assembly resolution 914 (X) relates to another aspect which has broadly been called the armaments truce. I confess that the words are not very apt. They simply mean that some attempt must be made to reverse this process of what has been called in United Nations resolutions "competitive armaments."

The present situation is that in spite of the best and devoted efforts of the Disarmament Commission, in site of all the speeches that have been made, in spite of all the clever formulae and counter-formulae, in spite of all the objections that may be found - and all those who sometimes find a difficulty for every solution instead of a solution for every difficulty - in spite of all that has taken place during the past ten years, the armaments of the world have increased and not decreased. Therefore, some effort has to be made in the opposite direction.

We believe that any attempt in this direction that is made in any sphere, whether it be in the sphere of propaganda, psychological warfare, warfare with guns or bows and arrows or conventional weapons or nuclear weapons, is a valuable attempt. We are not prepared to reject an attempt because it is not big enough. But we shall never lose sight of the objective because of the immediate desire to achieve what is good. Therefore, the controversy which certain others might engage in about partial and wholesale disarmament is to us entirely meaningless. It was George Bernard Shaw who said, "All revolutions are gradual"; you cannot do anything in an instant of time. We believe that certain steps should be taken so that the engines of war-preparedness may be reversed.

The first of these steps would be that no more fissionable material should be made available by those countries that possess it for the purpose of making bombs. If the experiments are stopped and if no new bombs are going to be made, then it is unlikely that there will be any new demand for them. The existing models will be outdated, and nobody buys old models. One thing leads to another.

In his letter of March 1, 1956, President Eisenhower stated:

"The United States would join with other nations to work out suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that fissionable material anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase stockpiles of explosive weapons."

He proposed further, in the words of Mr. Lodge, to combine these arrangements with the programme of contributions from existing stockpiles to the international atomic energy agency when it is established. The President hoped in this way, "to
reverse the trend toward a constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the world."

We would submit, therefore, that once having agreed to the stopping of experimental explosions, the first important step would have been taken. There would be no need to make any more bombs because they would be of the old type, of which these countries already possess enough.

Secondly, we must take some step, even if it is a token step, toward positive nuclear disarmament.

We are going to submit an observation which does not fall within the meshes of the debate on control; and, that is, that the two great powers who are now in possession of these very considerable weapons should, by mutual agreement be willing to dismantle a limited number of them, even if it is one, two, or three, as a token, and pass on the fissionable material in them for peaceful purposes, so that, instead of the current going forward towards building more bombs, we would have reversed it. Our suggestion in this regard does not require control because it would be done only under supervision. And it does not mean that, by dismantling them, the striking power of either country has been safely, or safeguardedly, limited. It simply means that a token effort has been made; that from the bombs, the fissionable material goes to positive purposes. If a step of that kind could be taken, it would contribute considerably towards that lowering of tension, towards that great gathering of public opinion which is, in the final analysis, the determining factor.

We should like to express our concern with regard to the maintenance of the present level of arms or the level of the lowering of it. This morning statements were made before this Commission agreeing to some limitation on what we call conventional armaments. The distinction will soon disappear, but whatever it is, wherever we find a limitation of this character, we are happy and, therefore, I want to say, without intervening in any political debates, that I am instructed by my Government to say that we welcome the unilateral reduction that has been proclaimed by the Soviet Union in regard to arms. That is not to say that control or agreement is unnecessary. What is more, we do not stand alone in this. Just a few days ago the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth met in London and this is what they said:

"The Prime Ministers considered the recent decisions of the Soviet Government to reduce the numbers of their armed forces, their willingness to facilitate increased contacts between the Soviet Union and other countries and their expressed desire for improved relations with other Governments."
"They welcomed these developments. A progressive improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the other great Powers would help to remove the fear of war and serve the interests of world peace."

The next step which we would like to see is some reduction, however small, in the military budgets of countries, including my own. And if it helps disarmament, I am sure, in spite of all the special circumstances in which we live and the very small armed forces that we maintain, we would make a contribution to peace in the same direction.

Again, under this particular heading, it should be possible for information in this respect - and I use these words deliberately - to be "internationally held." That is, if countries would voluntarily submit to the United Nations, in all honesty and without allocation of budget figures to wrong departments, in the way Governments sometimes tend to do, the genuine incidence of military expenditure, and if it were possible internationally to hold this information, the impact on public opinion on any increases, or on the lack of decrease, would be considerable. This information is available in regard to great areas of the world. Our submission is that, irrespective of their political outlook or their economic organisation, every country that is a member of the United Nations should be invited to submit these figures so that the world would know who is spending the most on armaments. I am not saying that voluntary submission is not capable of many loopholes or that it would necessarily present a very adequate picture, because the values of our money in different places, and even the power of weapons, may be different.

That is the next step which we should like to suggest in regard to making a beginning.

I have already mentioned, in the nuclear field, with regard to the stopping of future production, the attempt to be made at least as a token, to transfer the fissionable material from even one of these weapons as a start, which would not require any control. Another aspect of this nuclear field is something that causes us all concern. I hope that it will be possible for the nuclear powers to assure the world that there will be no trade in these weapons, that there will be no supply of them to other countries, from where they can go to still other countries so that they will be distributed generally. That is, with the transfer of atomic or nuclear or other weapons, a large number of countries would spread the danger of war; and when one country outside this group has the weapons, other people will try to get hold of them.

I submit that all I have said so far are possible practical stages which do not cut into the conventional debates on stages, on controls, on which comes first or which comes afterwards. No one observation has been intended to cast a reflection on the lack of earnestness on any member of this Commission or on any nation which is too well supplied with arms today.
Therefore, to sum up, we ask for the suspension of all nuclear experiments for the reasons which I have set out. We ask that there should be a truce in armaments by budgetary reductions, by the publication of other internationally held information upon them, by some reversal in regard to fissionable material, by stopping future production and transferring fissionable material even as a token - I want to repeat this: even as a token - so that the confidence of the world would be increased.

Now I come to my next and almost final stage of the observations which I have to make...

We believe that the present negotiations on disarmament have to undergo changes in two directions which, on the surface of it, may appear contradictory. We believe that the main parties to disarmament are the United States and the Soviet Union and, therefore, it is the view of our Government in this, as in other matters, that direct negotiations between these two countries, without prejudice to their membership either of the United Nations or of the Disarmament Commission, without any deals behind anybody’s back - which will not happen anyway - are desirable. In fact, when my delegation, which was responsible for setting up this Sub-Committee, made the proposal, our hope was that the Sub-Committee would be largely a group rather than a committee, where it would be possible much more easily to function in a way of not being divided into main world parties.

I am well aware that inside the Sub-Committee there are various shades of opinion. I have had the advantage of speaking to members of the Sub-Committee, including the representative of the United States, the representative of the Soviet Union and others. I have no doubt at all that these conversations do take place, but I think that if there are two great Powers on which the world primarily places the responsibility of arming or disarming, then, in spite of their best desires, the world must primarily place the responsibility for any sparking of these fires that might take place. If they were to deal with this face to face, there would be some progress in some of these matters. That is one direction.

The other is a contradictory direction on the face of it. It is our belief that, having taken into review the functioning of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee in the last five years, it is necessary to so reconstitute it by additions in such a way that its opinions do not just fall for public and decisive purposes into two different schools. The possibility of reconciliation and of saying that something is not altogether bad or altogether good should be present. This is not an effort at mediation between the two blocs, but after all, the United Nations is

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15 In 1953, the General Assembly suggested, on the proposal of India, that the Disarmament Commission set up a Sub-Committee for negotiations on an acceptable solution on the disarmament problem.
dealing in this Commission with probably its most important problem. I submit that such an enterprise or undertaking should be, as largely as possible, representative of the world.

I said a while ago that the consequences of this present enterprise are largely visited upon the population of Asia in so far as the fall-out and radio-active effects are concerned. This is not a matter of claiming power or prestige or precedence for a part of the world. We are quite content to leave it in this way for the present and we expressed this to the General Assembly last year and will do so again next year. We think that the Commission and the purposes it has before it stand to gain from the introduction into it, without enlarging its size so that it would be unwieldy, of elements which would assist it from falling into two separate sides as to create a situation where, at any rate for public purposes, it becomes a question of polemics.

Our own approach to this problem is not bedevilled by this consideration of what is called "comprehensive" and "non-comprehensive." I think the words and the problem are sufficiently clear to us to believe that any idea of creating a pattern of disarmament that would probably spread over a generation, with the best of effort by any group of men in any one year, is an impossible and impractical task. All we can do is to set down objectives, and therefore attempts which aim at architectural symmetry and a sequence where, unless something is achieved, something else cannot be done, to our mind is not practical. This is not to say that we could leave deadly weapons and deal with others. It simply means that we should take advantage of reduction, restriction, agreements and surrenders, if you like - that is what unilateral disarmament means - and we are not ashamed to say that we have a great regard and admiration, arising from our own background, of unilateral action. Unilateral action against someone is not praiseworthy. But unilateral action in a constructive effort is, I think, to be encouraged because, after all, we have control of our own actions; we have no control of the actions of other persons.

In regard to control itself, I should like this Commission and those who are concerned to go back and look at the resolutions of the General Assembly. Each year the General Assembly, after laborious discussions and negotiations, reaches a stage where it looks at every nuance, every phrase and every clause in order to adjust opinions. Once the resolution is out all that is forgotten sometimes, and then we go on to something else. I would call your attention to resolution 808 of the ninth session dated November 4, 1954, which is the guiding resolution in this matter. Paragraph 1 (c) says: "The establishment of effective international control" - and we subscribe to this for the realms in which it is necessary - "through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces..." So the idea was that the control organs must be able to supervise agreed reduction. Not that we should pose the control in bar of agreement. It is something to enforce agreements.
STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 16, 1957

[Mr. Menon made two statements in the general debate on the disarmament question in the First Committee in 1957, on October 16 and October 30.]

...Although this subject is called disarmament, I think that it is important and useful for us at the very outset to reflect on it a little and see what we are really dealing with. I would submit that in discussing this subject which has been discussed year after year - not to much purpose but to some purpose all the same - we are really discussing the problem of human survival; that is what we are addressing ourselves to. In the few observations I intend to make to this Committee, I will take the liberty of appealing to the representatives here to approach this problem from that point of view.

In this Assembly since 1946, we have had every issue, every problem, every resolution, every topic discussed from the point of view of the various alignments in the world or the various relations that may exist either economically or socially or militarily. But here we have a vast human problem where what we are faced with is not the question of who wins in a resolution or who does not, but the problem whether humanity and civilisation is to survive at all.

The United Nations has made efforts since 1946. The United Nations was founded for the purpose of establishing peace in this world and also to rid the world of "the scourge of war" and that we may live in good neighbourliness. But unfortunately for us, soon after the war the very same emotions of mankind, the very same social factors that led to the war, began to exert themselves and from 1946 onwards we have had to address ourselves to the problem of disarmament.

I shall in a moment deal with the problems of disarmament, and whether it means that it is merely a means to an end or that it is an end in itself. However, let me deal first of all with the United Nations efforts in this direction, because there has been a change in some of the resolutions that have been put forward. There has been, in particular, one speech by one delegation which causes us great sadness of heart, to which I shall refer later.

The General Assembly, in its resolution of January 24, 1946, called for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. In resolution 41(I), paragraph 3, of December 14, 1946, the General Assembly again called for the prohibition of

16 Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi
weapons of mass destruction. In resolution 191 (III), of November 4, 1948, the General Assembly in paragraph 1 did the same thing. In resolution 290 (IV) of December 1, 1949 and in resolution 380 (V) of November 17, 1950, the General Assembly again interested itself in this problem and, without equivocation, called for the total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The same thing happened in General Assembly resolutions 704 (VII) and 715 (VIII).

At its ninth session in 1954 - that is only three years ago, after the Sub-Committee was appointed - the General Assembly adopted a resolution which definitely and categorically requested the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

In resolution 914 (X) of December 16, 1955, the General Assembly in paragraph (b) asked for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

Last year we did not refer to this in specific terms because we all tried to get a resolution which was compact, but we did refer to the previous resolutions. By recalling General Assembly resolution 808 (IX), we reiterated that position.

Now for the first time before the Assembly we have a resolution - for the first time in ten years - which is sponsored by the great Powers (and unfortunately it is supported by Powers which are not so great) in which this problem of prohibition is eliminated. Unless it is merely an omission, which I hope it is, to our mind it is a very regrettable fact.

Under the present item we are faced with four sub-items, the first of which is the report of the Disarmament Commission. The Disarmament Commission is made up of the members of the Security Council plus Canada. The Security Council is one of the main organs of this Organisation charged with certain functions under the Charter.

Each year, however - certainly during the last three years - all we received from the Disarmament Commission was the discharge of the functions of a post office. The Disarmament Commission met and passed on to us the report of the Sub-Committee. Therefore, all we have to deal with is the Sub-Committee’s report...

Two implications follow from this. Without any disrespect to anybody, the world should know that during the last two or three years, the Disarmament Commission, which represents the Security Council plus Canada, has paid very little detailed attention to this problem, no more than any other member of the world or any other member nation or government. I am sure they have all made studies on their own, but as a Commission they have paid no attention to it...

17 At the suggestion of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission established a Sub-Committee in 1953, consisting of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada.
So today we have before us not really the report of the Disarmament Commission - that is what it is technically - but the report of the Sub-Committee, the Sub-Committee which technically was supposed to be sitting in private, the Sub-Committee which was appointed, I say with humility, on the initiative of my delegation in 1953, for the purpose of close and private discussions, without importing the partisanship that normally enters into "cold war" discussions.

Since 1953 they have sat and laboured very hard. What we have today are the reports of that Sub-Committee, which was supposed to be sitting in private. However, we have the verbatim records of their meetings and therefore they cannot be regarded as private.

The resolution suggesting the appointment of the Sub-Committee, while it was stoutly resisted by certain sections of this Committee - in fact sections representing both schools of the cold war of that time - was ultimately passed unanimously, thanks largely to the support that came forward from the delegation of France. So, under resolution 715 (VIII), by unanimous decision, the Sub-Committee was appointed. The function of that Sub-Committee was to sit wherever it liked to sit, and it was supposed to sit at a round table and not to divide itself into schools, not to be pre-committed, in order that this stricken world, laden with the weight of armaments and threatened with atomic destruction, might find relief in some form or other.

We humble people, we members of small nations of the world, we members of new nations of the world, we who are not armed with atomic weapons and have no desire to be so armed, have the right to expect from the United States and the Soviet Union and from Britain, France and Canada some solution. It is not right that we should be told continually that because the Americans were intransigent and were warmongers, or, on the other hand, because the Russians were recalcitrant there was, therefore, no solution. A great Power has a responsibility to produce a solution, and I make bold to say so.

What is our position today? There is a draft resolution here presented by twenty-three Powers, but I submit that the number of people who sign a draft resolution is by no means an index of what is likely to happen to it afterwards. We have passed resolution after resolution with large numbers of votes, and nothing has happened. There is only one way we shall get disarmament, and that is when what President Eisenhower has called the atomic colossi agree. Unless the Americans and the Russians come to some agreement and unless they are prepared to save the world from atomic destruction, there is no hope of our reaching any disarmament.

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18 France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada and 19 (later 20) other countries
Therefore, to come before this Assembly with a draft resolution which represents a majority view but not a unanimous view of the Sub-Committee is not a solution. To obtain the endorsement of the Assembly to what is not a unanimous view is to create a deadlock, to tighten the situation and to make more difficult the work of the Sub-Committee which I hope will continue next year in spite of all the difficulties. To obtain the endorsement of the Assembly for what must be regarded by one side or the other as a partisan decision - a decision which is not a unanimous decision - is merely to make the flexibility of negotiation more difficult, because it is not possible to establish disarmament in this world merely by resolutions.

We are told that conditions have changed in this world and that, therefore, it is not possible for us to look at this matter in ways in which we looked at it before. We are told, first of all, that certain problems which have been referred to the Sub-Committee cannot be dealt with. Here I want to devote my attention to matters that concern my own delegation.

For three years this Assembly, by its unanimous decision, has asked the Disarmament Commission to give consideration - and last time it said "prompt consideration" - to the draft resolutions submitted by the Government of India. Each year this has come up, and we, in order to obtain unanimity in this Committee, in order that the work might proceed, and, what is more, realising that it is not possible to consider these details in this Committee of eighty-two members, and that this is really the work of the Disarmament Commission, have been only too willing for the matter to go back to the Disarmament Commission. What has happened? For the first two years nothing happened except that it came back...

Last year the Assembly said that our draft resolutions must be given prompt consideration. Thanks to the initiative of the representative of the United Kingdom, so we understood at the time, the representative of the Government of India was invited to appear before the Disarmament Commission in July of last year and presented our case...³⁹ It is not as though the Disarmament Commission - or even the experts, such as Mr. Jules Moch of France - regarded our submissions as not worth consideration. Much praise was bestowed on it, and it was said that it would be seriously considered, but nothing happened thereafter...

These proposals went to that body. We are not here to discuss them; we have no vested interest in them. My country has no particular vested interest in this matter at all. We have no atom bombs we can surrender, and we are not likely to have any. Such atomic power as we have in our country, such experiments as we make and such enterprises as we own are used for peaceful purposes. But our scientists

³⁹ Please see previous item.
tell us that if our national policy were not oriented in that direction it would be possible for anyone to use the material in those things for destructive purposes. Therefore, it is the approach that is made to this problem that is more important than any other.

I will deal, first of all, with the problem of test explosions. We were told by the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom that the suspension or abandonment of explosions is not disarmament. We heartily agree. No one said it was disarmament. I do not think that even disarmament has any value. Disarmament is not peace; disarmament is only a step to peace. Disarmament is for the purpose of abandoning war.

This is the first time in the history of this Assembly that a distinguished delegation has come forward and stood openly against suspension of tests. And, what is more, the whole speech that was made, only two days ago, was not merely a case for the non-suspension, but the advocacy of the continuance of tests. We are told that, if the tests are not continued, the bombs will be worse. What is more, we are told about the sovereign rights of nations. I am glad that imperial nations are now sometimes willing to discuss the sovereign rights of other people. We are told it would be very wrong to deny to other sovereign countries the right to make bombs. Well, there are other things that they can do with their sovereignty rather than destroy the world. That is our submission.

We are told first by the Secretary of State of the United States that there are such things as clean bombs. There are "cleaner" bombs, probably; there are no "clean" bombs. I would like, therefore, with such scientific knowledge as is placed at my disposal by my Government, to discuss this matter, because there is nothing so dangerous as to mislead the world on this question.

There are no such things as clean bombs. These "clean" bombs are hydrogen bombs, fusion bombs, which are exploded high up in the air both by the Soviet Union and the United States. It is quite true that they do not churn up enough earth and therefore do not produce secondary radiation. To that extent they are cleaner bombs than the bombs that were exploded at Bikini or in Siberia. We admit that. But I request the representative of the United States to tell us how these bombs are exploded. These bombs are triggered by fission bombs. Every fusion bomb that is exploded in the air is triggered by a fission bomb. And those fission bombs are of the Hiroshima type, but they have twenty times the explosive power. So each of these "clean" bombs produces at least as much radiation as a Hiroshima bomb. We speak about "Hiroshima" bombs; it has become a popular expression. At any rate, when we talk about a "clean" bomb, we are really speaking about a cleaner bomb, not a clean bomb. I use the words "clean" and "cleaner," but I have simply borrowed them; it is not my expression. I do not think there is any way of cleaning death. The extermination of humanity is an unclean business, in any case. There is no possibility, then, of exploding these
thermonuclear bombs, which are produced by fusion, except by triggering them by fission bombs - and those fission bombs produce radiation in the same way.

Secondly, we are told - I have no desire to refer to any delegations, because nothing is gained by it; you can refer to your papers - that it is quite true that these fission bombs produce radioactive material, but it soon dies out. There is no scientific evidence to show that the products of fission do die out. The main harmful products of fission are strontium-90 and other material which has a half-life of twenty-nine to thirty years. It is very wrong, in our opinion, to suggest that these are innocent bombs which are being experimented with.

What are these bombs for? Are they for the Fourth of July or for Guy Fawkes Day? No, they are for the preparation of atomic war, for the destruction of this world. And the time has come when, outside this Assembly, there are vast millions of people - two or three thousand millions of humanity - who will have something to say about it. And the time has come when the large majority of world opinion is asserting itself even against its own governments. Placed as I am, it is not for me to quote opinion or go further into this matter. This is a matter that goes much further than any political discussions, any alignments, any groups, anything of that kind.

We were told by Mr. Lodge, the representative of the United States:

"While some leading medical and genetic authorities differ on the effects of radioactive fall-out at low levels" - and that first part is correct - "all agree that the effects are small compared to the effects of radiation from other sources. The present levels of radiation exposure from weapons testing fall-out are extremely low."

This is a lay opinion - a lay opinion provided by official scientists. I said in this Assembly last year that the scientists of today are like the bishops of the seventeenth century: they have produced the maximum that the governments want. You may remember that, when the divine right of kings had to be supported, they produced the clericals of the day.

Now I have here a scientific opinion - and I am going to read quite a lot of them. This is by Professor Charles C. Price, Director of the John Harrison Laboratory of Chemistry, University of Pennsylvania. By the way, every opinion that I will quote is American opinion. Professor Price wrote a letter to the New York Times which was published in the issue of 10 October, and this is what he said:

"I am deeply concerned about the distortion of information reaching the American people about the great question of nuclear weapons testing.

"In the first place, the American people have been led to believe there is a
serious difference of scientific opinion concerning the seriousness of the radiation hazard. Actually, with the exception of a handful of scientists who are almost entirely Atomic Energy Commission employees, consultants or contractors, the overwhelming majority of informed scientists, including those who do work for the Atomic Energy Commission, agree on the hazard involved. A score of well over one hundred to one should certainly be classed as `no contest', not a serious divergence of opinion."

Professor Price then continues:

"The failure to reach agreement in London on atomic controls is hard to understand. Both sides profess deep concern. But why do the Russians refuse to accept a cut-off of production of nuclear materials for bombs - and why does the American Government refuse to accept an inspected ban on nuclear weapons tests?"

In other words, this is an impartial opinion: he hands it out equally to both sides. He then goes on to say:

"The American people have been led to believe that our Government favours a ban on nuclear testing and that this is barred only by Russian intransigence on adequate inspection.

"Actually, at London and in Washington, our responsible officials, including Secretary Dulles and Harold Stassen, have clearly stated we would accept a limited ban on nuclear tests only as part of a far more comprehensive package deal.

"Again, a great majority of informed scientists agree that an inspected nuclear test ban is entirely feasible," -

This is the view of the scientists who advised the Government of India, and I propose to go into this in detail -

"could readily be achieved, and would be a highly desirable first step toward more comprehensive international control of the armaments race.

"The American people should be informed" -

I should say that "the people" should be informed -

"that our Government is flatly opposed to a nuclear test ban, no matter how thoroughly inspectable - and we should be told the reasons for this position.

"Government leaders have uttered noble words indicating their belief that
the only real hope for salvation from the utter tragedy of atomic war is to make the United Nations an effective instrument for justice, law and order in the world. It seems to me high time that these noble words be backed up by some real effort commensurate with the importance of the task - and at least equal to some small fraction of the immense effort now going into preparing for atomic war."

He refers to preparation for atomic war. The world spends $100 billion a year on engines of destruction - not one country alone, but all of them together - while millions of people in the world go without food.

About two or three years ago, Sir Pierson Dixon of the United Kingdom delegation first put forward this idea: "We are getting so much radiation normally. A little more will not hurt." At that time, my delegation answered as follows: "It is said that every human being carries on his body an average of 300 pounds of atmospheric weight; suppose one were to add 100 pounds that will not matter." That would not be an argument.

There are parts of India where people are accustomed to a high degree of radiation on account of the nature of the soil; that matter is now being investigated.

There are, however, no safe dosages of radiation. The report of the Committee on the Genetic Effects of Atomic Radiation of the United States National Academy of Sciences states, in part:

"Any radiation dose, however small, can induce some mutations. There is no minimum amount of radiation dose, that is, which must be exceeded before any harmful mutations occur...

"Additional radiation (that is, radiation over and above the irreducible minimum due to natural causes) produces additional mutations...

"The total dose of radiation is what counts, this statement being based on the fact that the genetic damage done by radiation is cumulative."

(Join Congressional Committee Report, pages 1838-39)

Once it is admitted that the effect is cumulative, once it is admitted that either the good or the harm is cumulative, the slightest dose becomes significant; it is not a question of the aggregate amount, but a question of what is added.

The report of the National Academy of Sciences also states:

"It has sometimes been thought that there may be a rate (say, so much per week) at which a person can receive radiation with reasonable safety as regards certain types of direct damage to his own person. But the concept
of a safe rate of radiation simply does not make sense”-

I would remind the Committee that this is a scientific statement -

"if one is concerned with genetic damage to future generations. What counts, from the point of view of genetic damage, is not the rate; it is the total accumulated dose to the reproductive cells of the individual from the beginning of his life up to the time the child is conceived.” (Ibid.)

The United States representative has said that radium-dial watches emit radiation. I think that the answer is to ban such watches, to forbid their use. Of course, it has not been proved how much damage is done by radium-dial watches, but what I have just quoted is evidence given by scientists before a Joint Congressional Committee.

In our part of the world, we are more susceptible to radiation than are people in other parts of the world. Large numbers of people in our part of the world, either by habit or as a result of economic circumstances, feed themselves on vegetables; that is to say, there is no filtration, no secondary process of absorption.

Dr. Miyake, Director of the Geochemical Laboratory at Tokyo’s Meteorological Institute, has said the following:

"In Japan today contamination of rice and milk, Japan’s staple diet, as a result of fallout is increasing. The increase rate is two times after five years and four times after ten years. In another ten years most of the food in Japan will be unfit for human consumption and the effect on the population will be cumulative. If tests continue at the rate of the past three years there is tragedy ahead not only for Japan but for the whole world. Already now the situation is alarming. Even an immediate halt to all tests could not undo the hidden damage already caused by contamination to air, sea and land."

It has been said that these views regarding radiation damage are minority views. Now, it so happens that over 2,000 American scientists have signed appeals that these tests should be stopped. If 2,000 scientists in this country - all of them reputable persons, whose names and titles and qualifications are known - can sign such appeals, I would submit that the benefit of the doubt must be given to them.

Speaking at the opening of the Tenth World Health Assembly, the President of that Assembly, Professor J. Parisot of France, said:

"The curious minds who will, later, think about the history of present times could ask why so much investigation was done and so many studies made with the idea of reducing the eventual dangers of the pacific utilisation of atomic energy, while doctors and hygienists did not appear to give more than a very restricted attention to the possible pollution of the atmosphere in
which the people of the world live as a result of experimental atomic explosions."

Professor Parisot also said:

"Who can give the guarantee that, in a domain still so unknown, these experiments, financially so costly, will not be one day much more costly for the human resources of the world?"

A study group was convened by the World Health Organisation to study the effects of radiation on human heredity. The World Health Organisation is a specialised agency of the United Nations; we in this Committee cannot function in compartments; we must take into account what such a principal organ has said. The study to which I am referring was published by the WHO in 1957. One of the papers was contributed by Professor Sievert of the Institute of Radiophysics, Karolinska Hospital, Stockholm, and in it we read the following:

"After some bomb tests, iodine-131 is easily detectable in the thyroid of growing cattle. The contents of this element in Swedish cattle during September-October 1956 are shown in Figure 11"-

and we all know that the Swedes are neutral; even their cattle must be neutral; hence, Mr. Sievert's opinion must be impartial. The paper goes on:

"The maximum dose per week was 0.04 rad, or about twenty times the dose due to the average natural radiation, which can be considered to be about .002 rad per week. It is to be noted that the effects demonstrated in Figures 10 and 11 are due mainly to atomic bomb tests carried out in August and September 1956"-

presumably in Siberia -

"but that even before that time the foodstuffs were contaminated to an easily detectable extent."

I turn now to the statement about harmless strontium made by the United Kingdom Minister of State. Strontium, quite like calcium, gets into the bones either through milk or through vegetables and produces bone cancer.

The fall-out of strontium-90 and cesium-137 has been carefully studied during the past years by the World Health Organisation. These elements are probably comparatively evenly distributed over the whole world, with the possible exception of the polar regions - that is the only place they are going to inspect from the air. At present, large amounts of them remain in the upper atmosphere, but strontium-90 and cesium-137 on the earth’s surface will eventually be
increased by a factor of 3-5, even if the firing of atomic bombs is stopped. It does not yet seem possible to estimate the doses to human tissue due to fall-out, nor their distribution in time, which are necessary data for judging the possible biological significance. Experience during the past year is, however, likely to raise doubts as to the lack of biological importance of the tests of nuclear weapons, at any rate if they are continued on the present scale.

According to Professor Arthur Holly Compton:

"Though the level of radiation from atomic explosions may be extremely low and harmless to people now living, it is sure to affect to a greater or less extent unborn generations."

I should like to ask the representatives sitting here, whether they represent Governments or whether they are just human individuals, what right have we to subscribe to anything that affects unborn generations? Professor Compton is Professor Emeritus of Physics at Chicago University.

There have been considerable expressions of opinion in various Parliaments, including our own and the Japanese Parliament, asking for the suspension of these explosions. Professor Alexander Haddow, director of the Chester Beatty Cancer Hospital, told the Parliamentary Association for World Government in the dining room of the House of Commons:

"The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union have all been guilty of underestimating the hazards of radiation from atomic explosions to the genetic future of humanity."

In his opinion, there was no justification for British and American statements that genetical damage from nuclear tests to date was exceedingly small...

"For example, if the incidence of leukemia, a form of cancer of the blood, is directly proportional to the radiation dosage, then atomic explosions will already have been responsible for a few hundred hopeless cases of this incurable disease in the American and British populations."

I would say to every representative in this Committee, whether representing a large or small country, if there was one case of an incurable disease as a result of these man-made causes, said to be in the interests of humanity, then we have a collective responsibility. Dr. Haddow also said that the case for the international prohibition of nuclear weapon tests was a humane one.

Again, the Joint Congressional Committee of the United States Congress said there was general scientific agreement that even the smallest amount of external radiation was harmful because it increased mutation of the genes. But the Committee noted large difference of opinion on whether there was a threshold, or
safe level, for internal radiation from such isotopes as strontium-90 that can cause leukemia and bone cancer. These isotopes are absorbed with milk and food.

We have not tried to hold back anything that might be as strong evidence against. Year after year before this Committee, the Indian Government, to the extent that it is possible, has produced the evidence. I have also quoted the evidence read out before the Secretary-General. All that I have quoted now is on the basis that the present rate of bomb explosions continues. Three years ago, only two countries were exploding bombs. Now another country has been added, and who knows that in the next year there will not be four, five, six or seven?

The Radiation Hazards Committee of the United Kingdom Atomic Scientists’ Association stated in its report in April 1957:

"If H-bomb tests continue at the present rate, the dose of radiation to the reproductive organs, which may cause damage to future generations, has been estimated in the Medical Research Council’s report to be of the order of 1 per cent of that resulting from the natural level of radiations."

So that blows to smithereens the United Kingdom argument that we have radiation inside us, so why not? We normally have food, so why not stuff a man with twenty tons of it so that he will be healthy? That is the argument, but here is the answer from the Radiation Hazards Committee’s report:

"Of greater import, however, is the damage which may result to the present generation, mainly from one radioactive substance - strontium-90... Depending on the assumptions made about the distribution of strontium in bones, we calculate that by the year 1970" - not so far away, that will be another thirteen sessions, if we survive -

"the radiation dose to bone from all the tests carried out up to the autumn of 1956" -

that does not take account of any tests carried out between September of last year and September of this year, of which I will give a list in a moment -

"will range from 9 percent to 45 percent of the dose received from all natural sources, including the radium which is normally present in bones."

Is it suggested that all these scientists are just charlatans, that they have no basis for this opinion? Have we no responsibility in this matter? If the bomb tests carried out up to 1956 are likely to increase the bone content, how can anybody with any sense of responsibility believe that this thing dies away? From the advice that is given to the Government of India, I am entitled to say that this radioactive substance has a half life of from twenty-nine to thirty years, and this is
supporting evidence.

The Radiation Hazards Committee’s report continues:

"The calculations given in the appendix show that an H-bomb of the type tested at Bikini in 1954, if exploded high in the atmosphere, may eventually produce bone cancers in 1,000 people for every million tons of TNT of equivalent explosive power."

Here we come to the "clean" bomb. Supposing the Bikini bomb had not been exploded as at Bikini, and therefore did not produce secondary radiation by throwing up earth, but it was exploded two, three or five miles high. What would happen? The strontium-90 released would thereby produce bone cancers in 1,000 people for every million tons of TNT of equivalent explosive power. The report also stated:

"It has been stated that the bombs hitherto exploded" -

by the Russians, the British and the Americans -

"were equivalent, in aggregate, to 50 million tons in so far as their strontium-90 fall-out is concerned.

"On the other hand, if this hypothesis is correct then the figures may be an underestimate of the damage since they do not allow for the radiation dose in children before or after birth."

That, again, is something that must sink into people’s minds. What body of adults can sit down and cogitate on these matters, deliberate on them and make decisions when these statements are before them? The report continues:

"Children are known to take up much larger quantities of strontium than adults and the likelihood of producing radiation damage in them is probably much greater for the same amount of radiation."

Scientists testified before the United States Congress, and they said that in genetics there was no such thing as a "safe dose" of radiation. They also told Congress that they might have underestimated previously the genetic damage caused by radiation. Therefore, it is not as though it was an alarmist report; the previous report underestimated. According to these scientists, the damage to reproductive cells would pass on to future generations in the form of harmful mutations which would persist for hundreds of years. Dr. Crow, of the University of Wisconsin, said:

"We can be sure that several hundreds of thousands, or tens of thousands, or perhaps more persons will be diseased or deformed or will die prematurely,
or be otherwise impaired, as a consequence of fall-out if the present rates of testing continue."

It may be said that just as there was radioactivity in the air, there was strontium-90 in the air and, therefore, it was not explosions that created them. But Dr. Libby, who is a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, was cross-examined by the United States Congress - and he appears to have been tumbled about quite a lot because the representatives asked him a number of questions. And this was his final answer to their question, "How can you be sure?:

"I will tell you how we can be sure. We looked for it before the atomic bomb was invented, and we could not find it, Sir..."

This calamity for humanity is a man-made one.

"...That is how we know and we can still look for it by taking old material. As a matter of fact, the other day I got a can of old tuna fish from a neighbour of mine, which was canned before July 16, 1945, and we will look for strontium 90 in that. Dr. Langham has been collecting milk samples...."

Dr. Lapp, again a distinguished American scientist, testified before the Joint Congressional Committee as follows:

"This Committee has heard a fairly wide range of opinion from its expert witnesses on the probable biological effects of strontium 90 in man. But it seems to me that even in this area some agreement was reached, especially when Dr. Shields Warren stated on June 3:

"I would be reluctant to see the average strontium 90 content of bones, particularly in children, go much above 10 times the present level.""

I have read all this because, although my delegation has placed before the Committee the evidence of radiation long before, the answer that would be anticipated from the great Powers would be: "We have appointed a Committee on Radiation." They have appointed a Committee on Radiation, but they did not suspend explosions. The Committee is taking three years to investigate, while other people are able to do it more quickly. I make no reflection on the Committee, but the fact does remain that while the Committee cogitates, radiation and the cause of ruin to civilisation and the future of mankind continues.

Therefore, it is not sufficient to analyse these things, we have to find what we can do about them. My Government does not think that there is any insurmountable
obstacle to suspending these explosions. And this is not a new invention of ours. In 1954 our Prime Minister made an appeal in Parliament to this effect and it was communicated to the General Assembly. For the last three years we have been requesting Committees, Assemblies, individual governments, individual statesmen, to use their influence to bring about suspension of these explosions. I want to repeat that this should not be looked upon as a matter of small party politics. But we are told by the representative of the United Kingdom:

"...There is no conceivable chance, in any foreseeable future, of instituting a system of controls so detailed and extensive that it could account for all these existing weapons..."

Then the representative of the United Kingdom went on to quote from the proposals tabled by the Soviet Union Government in the Sub-Committee on Disarmament:

"Thus there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control..."

Part of the speech of Mr. Noble\textsuperscript{20} seems to suggest that the difficulty of control and the difficulty of detecting explosions are equally great.

When it was first proposed in 1954, at the beginning of the year until the autumn there was no opinion expressed by anybody, least of all by the United Kingdom, that there was any difficulty about detection. Towards the end of 1954 the United Kingdom advised us publicly and privately that its scientists had advised that it was possible to have secret explosions. It is quite true that a bomb can be exploded inside a mountain, or probably right under the depths of the earth, but it is well known that there are new methods of detection by sound which are known to the United Kingdom. We think that it is entirely legitimate in the conditions of the world, with the tensions that exist and, what is more, with the suspicions that there are between the great Powers, and also the fear of surprise attack and their consideration of the necessity for preparation, that they should try to avoid evasion. Then the representative of the United Kingdom quoted as follows from the proposals of the Soviet Union Government:

"Thus there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organising the clandestine manufacture, etc."

That must be taken in a reasonable way. Our own view is that if it is possible for science to produce all these wonderful machines and inventions, it should also be possible for it to find a method of detection, and that is why my delegation has put forward a solution which suggests that, instead of one saying that it can be done and the other saying that it cannot be done, we should try a tripartite agreement. This was successful in Korea and, to a limited extent, successful in Indochina.

\textsuperscript{20} The representative of the United Kingdom
There is no prestige involved in this matter; it is purely technical. It is therefore possible, according to the draft resolution which we have submitted and which we shall explain later, for each of the differing views in this case - it is not a question of countries; there are two schools of thought - to appoint scientific technicians and to find a sufficient number of uncommitted people; then it would be possible to find methods of detection. We think that if there is suspension there must be possibilities of evasion. If there is suspension, and then if there is evasion and that evasion cannot be disproved, then the suspension will go by the board. I think that the demand to see that suspension is carried out by all concerned properly is a very legitimate demand and, what is more, a demand without which it is not possible to think of suspension.

We already have the situation in which the United States has told us that for twenty-four months they are willing to suspend. Of course, that is tied up with other things. If, for twenty-four months, there can be suspension, there is no reason why a standstill agreement should not take place. After all, the General Assembly meets every year, and then it will be for whoever feels aggrieved about suspension of these terrible weapons of mass destruction - and in this we include not only the bombs, but missiles or anything else that involves mass destruction - it will be safer for humanity, and we shall have taken one step towards disarmament.

We disagree with the representative of the United Kingdom in the essentials of what he has said. But it is a step towards disarmament in the sense that it is a reversal of the engines of armament. It creates an atmosphere in the world. It creates, to a certain extent, the machinery of inspection, the machinery of give and take, of looking at each other’s affairs to a certain degree; and that would work in other ways. Therefore, we believe that in regard to this question of suspension, if this General Assembly does nothing else beyond requesting the great Powers to suspend their explosions, to inform the Secretary-General that they are willing to do so and immediately proceed to the setting up of a tripartite body which would be able to prevent evasion and establish a system of inspection, then we would have taken a great step forward. That would be the beginning of disarmament. It is not right to call the reduction of troops to two and a half million for the USSR, China and the United States and 700,000 for France and the United Kingdom any considerable disarmament. In some cases - I would not say which country - it might be an accentuation of troops.

But whatever that may be, once these explosions are stopped, once a brake is out on the whole of the atomic business, then we shall get somewhere. That is the substance of the first draft resolution. It is in no way inimical to the 23-Power draft resolution.21

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21 The Indian draft resolution, submitted on September 21, 1957, and later revised, was rejected by the General Assembly on November 19, 1957, by 34 votes to 24, with 20 abstentions.
I submit that any resolution passed by this Committee which does not represent agreement has very little value. This is not because one recalcitrant person has a permit put on him or her, but simply because the state of the world is such that unless we can get agreement we cannot get anywhere. Therefore, for the Committee to endorse a decision adopted by part of the Commission is for this Committee to become a party to the impediment of the progress of disarmament. We would be contributing to a deadlock, instead of resolving one; and the function of the Committee is to be a centre for harmonising interests and not the reverse.

The twenty-three countries that have submitted this draft resolution have a right to put forward their point of view, especially after four or five months of discussion and laborious work by the Sub-Committee. It is our submission that that draft resolution like the draft resolution of the Soviet Union should go back to the Disarmament Commission.

We have been told so many times that not only is it not possible at the present time to do anything but also that a statement was made by Mr. Gromyko or by some member of the Russian delegation sometime that it was possible to manufacture bombs clandestinely. I dare say it is possible to manufacture most things clandestinely. But if one statement is to be taken, then other statements are also to be taken. This year the Russian delegate said - and I hope it will not be said that I am pleading their case:

"It is necessary to deal with one further aspect of this case, which was also dealt with by other representatives here, namely; the effectiveness of a positive agreement with regard to the banning of nuclear weapons. Nobody who is more or less conversant with the facts can deny that under present technical and scientific conditions it is impossible to carry out tests of atomic and thermonuclear bombs without their being disclosed by appropriate apparatus.

"Therefore, any violation of an international agreement would be known; it could not be concealed."

If one statement coming from one source of a character is to be accepted, then a similar statement coming from the same source also ought to be accepted.

We are not saying for the moment that there are not possibilities of evasion. We have been told that it is possible to explode these bombs inside a mountain or somewhere else and, if that is done, it will do more harm than the present explosions because probably the radiation will seep down to subterranean sources and contaminate for-off places outside the countries in which the explosions take place. Countries have not shown any consideration in regard to open skies or
open seas. But if they were to explode these weapons in the subterranea layers of the earth - we have no idea of the subterranea communications that lie inside - it would contaminate a great part of the world. We would be setting in motion currents of destruction which would be impossible for man to control. Therefore we hope that when the time comes the United States and its colleagues who have submitted this draft resolution will kindly take into consideration that this is not against anything they have said because they have said they are prepared to suspend explosions under conditions of proper inspection which may be made possible, thus bringing it down to the practical. If that is so then this shuttlecock between saying, "It can be done" or "It cannot be done," "inspection first, disarmament afterwards," "discovery first, disarmament afterwards" or vice versa will not come about.

With regard to the main problems of disarmament, the differences appear to be between the two sides so-called. I am sorry to speak about the "two sides," but this is into what the Disarmament Sub-Committee has resolved itself. We did not expect it to be so. In 1953, I myself moved this resolution. We said a great many things about it. We did not expect that there were going to be two sides; that it was not going to be one side going to its friends and getting agreement, saying, "This is our point of view." But that is how it has come about.

The issue appears to be the cut-off date with regard to manufacture. My Government stands fully committed to prohibition on manufacture - that is to say, no nuclear material should be used for the purposes of manufacture (of nuclear weapons). But why should anyone manufacture unless the product is going to be used? It is not possible to go at half cock with this. If you do not manufacture it, do not use it. Therefore, we say in the same way that on the political or other level we ought to get tripartite bodies to go into this question of the cut-off date. Where it is possible to stop manufacture, it is also possible to stop use. Our scientific advice on this matter is that if there is development of the industrial use of atomic energy - which happily is taking place - there will be large quantities of material that can go into explosives. And human ingenuity does not know the limits to which it can be extended. It is quite possible that the shell in which it has to go may be clandestinely manufactured. Therefore, it appears to us that if the stopping of manufacture is to be effective, the resolutions which I have read out from 1946 onwards, the abandonment of use also ought to come. In other words, we ought to abandon atomic war.

In 1945, when the Americans exploded the first atomic bomb in New Mexico, the atomic age began. For ten years, although attempts were made by one side or the other - may be more by one side than the other -- we arrived at no agreement. On 4 October we entered a new age - the interplanetary age. I have no doubt that the Americans will supply satellites, as will anybody else. It is a question of perseverance, money, energy, scientists and anything else, and they have it. Another competition will come.
But the time for cooperation has come. If it were possible to make one step towards it without in any way sacrificing any prestige or any principle - all we are asking is that on these points of new manufacture, on the whole question of use and on the question of conventional arms, let there be the same getting together instead of there being two camps, with one saying, "What you say is wrong," and the other saying, "What you say is wrong."

It is no easy process to get tripartite agreements. We found out, of course, in Korea. This is especially so for people who do not come out of it well for the time being. But in the long run, it does work.

We agree fully that war waged with modern conventional weapons, whether with napalm or whatever it is, is as cruel and as gruesome and almost as devastating as any atomic war you can think of; and all these great nations are very great in their equipment in these matters. What is more, with political conditions that prevail in the world, the arms are distributed all over. A leading statesman who is head of a great country of the Western camp once told me: "There was a time when we used to speak of the merchants of death, that is to say, private manufacturers of armaments trying to promote war in different countries of the world. Nowadays, that period is over. Governments distribute arms for nothing." That is what has happened. Not even money is required.

We are not people who think that atomic destruction is the only form of destruction. We do not want to separate conventional weapons from any other weapons. My country will make the necessary contribution toward any form of disarmament that may take place in the world. I am not here referring to countries which have to come in, like China, for example. That is a question by itself. We hope it will be possible in terms of the second draft resolution that we have put forward for the United States and its friends and for the Russians and their friends to consider whether it is possible for them to get down to the practicability of these cut-off dates on use, on manufacture and on conventional arms.  

It may easily be said that that is what the Sub-Committee is doing. I submit that this is what the Sub-Committee has not been able to do, because the Sub-Committee, while it was conceived for that purpose, on account of its composition, has fallen into two camps. Therefore, the proposal we make - and I want to submit this particularly for the representatives of the great Powers, for the Assembly and for the Committee as a whole - is in no way to supersede or to displace existing machinery. The existing machinery deals with the main principles of how much to cut-off, this, that or the other. But there must be a way of doing it, because there is no trust, there is no confidence. Everywhere in the world the main thing is a crisis of confidence rather than anything else. The only

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22 This second draft resolution, originally submitted on September 26, 1957, was not pressed to the vote.
way you can create confidence is by creating the machinery whereby it can be
done in practice.

Therefore, what we have suggested is not to displace the Sub-Committee and not
to displace the Commission, but merely to function in such ways that the Sub-
Committee would say: Yes, we shall cut it down, this way or that way, or we may
consider this; and to produce a method where one side will not say, "Well, that is
a paper agreement," and the other side may say, "How can we trust them; there
may be clandestine ways of manufacture?"

I would like to say that just because there may be evasions, that would be no
answer whatsoever to saying that there should be no machinery for enforcement.
In all our countries we have systems of law and we have policemen. They vary
and their systems vary, but still there are crimes. Burglars escape and criminals
escape because there are evasions of the law. We do not abolish law.

If anything I have said has sounded as though it is repartee or debating, I am very
sorry. The desire of my delegation is to make an appeal to this Committee,
particularly to the great Powers. Here we are not faced with a question of saving
face for prestige. We are a people who believe that it is only the great Powers,
particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, which can save the world
from this atomic and thermonuclear danger. What is more, in the day that is
dawning, with what may be called the interplanetary age - which has put the
atomic age almost into the stone age - a great era of cooperation can dawn. It is
surprising how cooperation can develop and it is worth while trying.

We can never move towards faith by opening the window in the morning and
seeing if there is earth there. There are risks of peace which have to be taken. We
have not suggested anything romantic, we have not suggested anything
impractical. We shall come back to these resolutions in due course. In our part of
the world, opinion wells up so much that I had to say what I have said - and even
this would not satisfy them - because the peoples of the world are also aghast at
what is likely to happen. Humanity has no right to do things which they cannot
put right themselves. We have no right to set in motion forces over which we
have no control. Who knows some scientist may discover something whereby his
explosions may go on forever without stopping. It sounds chimerical today. In
fact, it was discussed at Geneva in 1955, namely that there may be chain
explosions and you may never be able to stop them.

In our part of the world, particularly in Japan and India, irrespective of the
resolution that has been moved here, there is unanimity with regard to this. Only
two days ago, after this debate began, on 13 October, the Prime Ministers of
Japan and India said:

"...the Prime Ministers consider that the suspension of nuclear tests, the
frequency of which has greatly increased during the past two or three years, must be the first step towards the creation of conditions in which the prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and disarmament in other fields may become possible.

"They recall in this connection the unanimous appeal of the Afro-Asian nations in Bandung in April 1955 to the Powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with nuclear weapons as well as to realise disarmament. They decided to instruct their delegations at the United Nations to cooperate with a view..."

Therefore, our position here is that we are out as far as we can. Our opinion in this matter, or capacity for functioning in this matter, is very small. We can only make an appeal. We make our appeal to the United States, to the Soviet Union and to the other great Powers. I once again beg to say that once and for all we have to realise that this year we have entered into a new situation; and if we had been able to restrain these forces two years ago, we would have been in a better position. We have created more problems. We are asked, "Why suspend tests?" We are told that this is not disarmament.

First of all, I explained at great length the harmful effects that these tests cause to people by radiation and by other effects. Secondly, it is these tests that will enable other countries to go into manufacture. We heard the Secretary of the State of the United States, either at the United Nations or somewhere else, talking about tactical weapons. I quite frankly confess my country’s alarm at this question of tactical weapons. The time may come when the scientists will manufacture an atomic bomb the size of pellets. If the Swiss can manufacture watches that are about the size of 3 millimetres, then I suppose scientists can do the same.

Then you will have these atomic bombs spread all over the world. And these atomic pellets are not just table ornaments. They are of same size as the Hiroshima bombs. Let us, for argument sake, take it that one atomic pellet is not a fourth of a Hiroshima bomb but only one-thousandth of a Hiroshima bomb. But if atomic weapons were to be supplied for machine guns, tommy-guns, revolvers and rifles, then you would have radiation spread all over the world. What is more, knowing the arms trade and its history for the last hundred years, it will get into every country as part of the machinery of subversion.

There are those here who are not interested in subversion, who want to see stability established in the world. Therefore, we are today not only against the danger of the great Powers exploding these huge bombs that cost two and three billion dollars, but we are also on the eve of the era when atomic weapons will become conventional weapons in the sense that they will go into ordinary revolvers and ordinary machine-guns. Then what do they do? They do not just kill one individual or two individuals; they spread radiation. I am prepared, for the
sake of argument, to say that the radiation that emits out of one of these conventional tactical bombs, as they are called - why "tactical" I do not know - is only one-ten-thousandth of a Hiroshima bomb, but once they are tactical, they would go out by millions. If they are by millions, as one scientist has said here, they will spread all over the world. And now, in the world of today, we sit here and discuss these things, the points of order and all the conventions of debate, and how one man’s resolution can get over the other. But we are faced with a special situation, as I said at the beginning. What we are discussing is not a resolution on disarmament, not only a limitation of arms, not this device of eliminating the idea of prohibition, which has existed in every resolution - and I think the Assembly would be going back on its resolutions if it took away the question of prohibition - we are not discussing that; what we are really discussing, though it is not here, is the problem of human survival.

It may be that humanity does not deserve to survive but individually each of us wants to survive. There are a great many people who do not want the other fellow to survive. What we are discussing is survival, and it is our duty as representatives of our countries not only to represent ourselves but to represent our generation and the generation that is unborn.

There comes a time in the lives of people when it is necessary to take the risks of decision, where it is necessary to get over the small inhibitions that have been caused by partisanship in one way or another. And no country can do it better than the great countries. If great countries are not great enough to be great, then what are they great for? Therefore, we appeal to them. It may be that you will pass this resolution by fifty-five or seventy-five votes, but I tell you that nobody will bother about that. But if from this Assembly, with the support of the two great Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, a resolution for the suspension of nuclear explosions went forward, it would change the face of the world and we would move towards disarmament. The whole world would stand up in gratefulness to the men who are gathered here. Otherwise, we are living in an ivory tower, isolated from the opinion of the world, unrelated to the future of mankind, with little care for posterity, without realisation of the dangers we are facing. We are dealing with small politics when the survival of man is at stake.

STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 30, 1957

When I made my first and preliminary intervention in this debate on disarmament, I felt it my duty to mention that it is to this Assembly that the world looks for some progress in the direction of disarmament. There were many

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23 From: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, October 1957, pages 187-203
speakers during the general debate in the General Assembly, notably the Prime Minister of Canada, who expressed the hope that this Assembly might be known in future years as the "Disarmament Assembly." In my first intervention I also said that my delegation would have preferred to intervene in the debate after it had heard all the representatives on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, particularly the representative of France. I wish to express my regret that I was not present in the Committee when Mr. Jules Moch made his statement. This was not due to any lack of courtesy, but because I was engaged in another place. However, I studied his speech very fully.

A great part of the statement from the French delegation was addressed to the arguments which I presented to the Assembly, and it also went to the root of the problem of disarmament and discussed how we should tackle it at the present time and also the role of the General Assembly, which is a significant one. Therefore, I hope the representative of France will forgive me if I make very full use of his statement. Much of that statement was in favour of what has been presented by my delegation; at least, the arguments were but the conclusions were not always so. Mr. Moch said:

"The need for a disarmed peace has never been as deeply felt as at this time when, in the case of a conflict, the advanced lines of former times would stretch across the whole world. Disarmament was never so meticulously studied as it was during the last six-month session of the Sub-Committee in London, nor has there ever been as much hope as there was then to turn into reality the spirit of Geneva. Therefore, never was the disillusionment as great as it was on the morning after our recent adjournment."

I ask with very great respect, if the need for disarmed peace has never been as deeply felt and if in the case of a conflict the advanced lines of former times would stretch across the world, is the disillusionment the answer or the contention that should be put before this Assembly? The two parts of his argument somehow do not seem to fit in together. My delegation in its initial statement said that what we were really discussing under the item of disarmament was really the survival of civilisation, as we know it. That is putting the same statement in another way.

From there the statement went on to refer to our debates here, and this is a matter of very great importance because in the submission we originally made we stated, with respect to all members of this Assembly, that here was an issue in which we must if necessary think in fresh terms, not merely in terms of party or political alignment. The issues were so vital for the survival of the human race that even at the risk of changing our original view, it was necessary for us to make a fresh approach.

24 Jules Moch, representative of France
In all that, my delegation took the view that the Disarmament Commission itself had ceased to function and had become merely a post office. The Sub-Committee on Disarmament had laboured long and zealously, and it had not produced agreement. But, at the same time, as Mr. Lodge pointed out, areas of agreement had been reached at various times. It was as though they met on a level plateau near each other and that drifts of suspicion came between them and separated them again. But the main point which we made was that this is one of those occasions when world public opinion, Governments large and small, irrespective of their prestige, irrespective of their economic or political power, had the same responsibility, not to find a solution, not in order to produce the knowledge that the great Powers have, but the same responsibility towards pressing forward and not sharing in the disillusionment.

But what are we told?

We are told that because of the work in London, according to Mr. Moch, "all this necessarily limits the role of our Assembly." The role of this Assembly cannot be limited by anybody except the Assembly itself. "We must examine the situation objectively, and not as we would have it," said Mr. Moch. That is what the Assembly is supposed to do. Mr. Moch continued:

"One fact is immediately apparent: seventy-one official meetings of the Sub-Committee and many private meetings between heads of delegations have been unable to bring about the draft of any agreement... even after the different points of view had been brought considerably closer, as Mr. Cabot Lodge correctly stressed. Among the five members of the Sub-Committee are the four Powers which alone must bear the responsibility for taking the first disarmament measures..."

My delegation has time after time, year after year, stated that unless these great Powers agreed, there could be no disarmament in the world. Therefore, we do not disagree with it. It may be true that they should take the first disarmament measures, but at the same time, is it not the Assembly’s responsibility to have a policy and the necessary expression of opinion and the influence which it might exert in that way? Mr. Moch went on to say:

"...none of us can reasonably expect an agreement, provisionally deferred after lengthy negotiations between five States, suddenly to emerge after a brief discussion between eighty-two States..."

If this is the case, then what was the purpose of submitting the report of the Disarmament Commission, because what is said here is that for three months, at seventy-one meetings, the matter was discussed in great detail; they are the people who know all about it and they could not reach agreement, and therefore we cannot reach agreement. Therefore, the representative of France, with all his
experience, and in his wisdom advises us:

"...let us regretfully discard the idea of unanimity on the substance of the problem...

"This year, the Assembly will have to decide by a majority vote despite the serious difficulties inherent in the absence of unanimity that Mr. Krishna Menon so appropriately brought out."

If we are told that on the four Powers alone rests the responsibility of disarmament, and if, at the same time, we are told that the four Powers do not agree and, therefore, we must depend upon the three of them in order to bring about a decision, how do we square these two things? On the one hand, we are told that there must be agreement among the four. We have not got that agreement and, therefore, instead of putting any barrier to further measures towards reaching agreement, the Assembly is asked to take the view that there cannot be unanimity; we must discard this idea in regard to the substance of the problem.

No one has a higher respect than I have for the representative of France, for his very steadfast and devoted work in this cause and the great knowledge and experience which he brings to bear upon it. He tells us that in this matter, in spite of the political vicissitudes that may happen in a system of democratic government, he has conducted these negotiations for years and his own person lives, therefore, in the continuity of French policy in regard to that. I do not question all this. But let us be clear about this one thing, that it is not possible for the Assembly at any time to consider that there are not occasions when deadlocks can be reached which may be resolved one way or another. The General Assembly has many experiences where this has happened. To this I shall refer later, with concrete instances. This is the approach that is made.

Then in the next part of his speech, the representative of France prescribes to the General Assembly what is its role. What is the role of the General Assembly? There are three roles as prescribed to us by Mr. Moch:

"First of all, each of its members individually can submit his own suggestions..."

That, I think, is the right that rests in us as sovereign States. In any case, any communications will be received by the International Postal System. The paragraph continues:

"...We shall receive these with rejoicing because we are aware that, despite our seventy-one working meetings, undoubtedly we may have overlooked certain aspects of the problem."
That, Mr. Moch, does not square again with the idea that no other influence should be brought to bear upon the considerations between Assemblies in regard to this problem. Mr. Moch continued:

"Secondly, the Assembly collectively must soothe human fear with a note of hope, of confidence in the wisdom of man..."

How would the General Assembly "soothe human fear with a note of hope, of confidence" when we are told that there can be no unanimity and no agreement and that, therefore, one must vote with majority? On the other hand, we are asked to endorse the non-agreed findings of the Sub-Committee, and then we are to go to the world and "soothe human fear with a note of hope, of confidence in the wisdom of man." Mr. Moch went on to say:

"Finally this year the Assembly must make a choice: at least two roads are open to us..."

I submit that there is only one road with regard to this, and that is to disarm. And then comes the most tragic sentence of all:

"For the moment, a synthesis seems to be impossible..."

The representative of France was the author of this idea of synthesis two or three years ago. The sentence goes on:

"...and I say this sadly since in the course of our long years of work I have always done everything in my power to bring about the necessary conciliation. I am not giving up. Still, to continue with it, a better time must be awaited than that which follows the long London session. Our first task is to make known the feelings of the United Nations, that is to say, to choose between the two main concepts, to take a majority stand..."

With very great respect for the 24 countries that have sponsored the draft resolution and for Mr. Jules Moch himself, I submit the view of my Government that it would not be a contribution to negotiation to get the endorsement of this Assembly to a non-agreed view of the Commission. This has nothing to do with whether one proposal is more meritorious than the other. The essence of success in disarmament work is agreement. Therefore if the power of the Assembly is rallied behind one view - whether it be the view of the majority or the minority makes no difference... the next stage of negotiation becomes more difficult. The representative of France questions this and thinks that if the Assembly endorsed a non-agreed view then that non-agreed view might become an agreed view later on. We feel, on our part, that it would be unwise to tighten this deadlock and put the weight of the Assembly behind disagreements. This is a centre for harmonising interests and not for disharmonising them.
This is not meant in disrespect of the labours of the Commission. This is no final disagreement with regard to the proposals put forward, but simply to point out that the work we have to do here is not in any way to put the Disarmament Commission in cold storage or to make its further meetings more difficult by being met with an initial objection, that is, an Assembly mandate to proceed in a particular way.

In the statements we made, I submitted to you, Mr. Chairman, that this was not the time to deal with resolutions, but generally with the main sub-headings so that the general debate will cover the whole issue. The first of these items to which we address ourselves is the draft resolution of Belgium. My delegation is in sympathy with this draft resolution, but we should like to say this: that while we are in sympathy with this draft resolution, if the dissemination of knowledge simply means another period of delay and, what is more, from all the discussions and the contradictions made by the representative of France himself with regard to the scientific data that is put forward, if the dissemination of knowledge becomes only another instrument for saying that armaments are no danger and that disarmament is not necessary, then the dissemination of information will serve little purpose. With that reservation we should like to express our support for the view that is put forward by the Belgian delegation because in the last analysis it is the public opinion of the world that will bring pressure upon all of us.

The next item I would like to deal with is the question of these explosions. We are told that we have now "come to the crucial point." The representative of France states:

"...the isolated suspension of nuclear tests, the supreme hope of the Soviet delegation... a battlefield wisely chosen where the passionate and the rational meet... He has received the support of Mr. Krishna Menon who, I hasten to add, has not taken upon himself to repeat all those imputations and whose ardent address calls for the most careful reflection."

I am most grateful for the kind references to me by the representative of France. But I think it is my duty to state the position of my Government.

As early as 1954, this proposal for a moratorium on tests was made, long before the Soviet Union had agreed or had agreed tentatively or had expressed its view on a suspension of tests. What is more, by itself, one country supporting or opposing a proposition is not a measure of its merit. If support of the suspension

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25 A Belgian draft resolution on dissemination of information on the effects of modern weapons and of the necessity for a disarmament agreement with effective controls was adopted by the General Assembly on November 14, 1957, as resolution 1149 (XII).
of explosions is regarded as a political move then I think we shall stand in this Assembly with the great majority of opinion in the world. We shall take first of all the United States of America where recently,

"in a nation-wide survey just completed by the American Institute of Public Opinion, a dramatic change in the public’s thinking on calling a halt to further hydrogen bomb tests is noted. Sixty-three per cent of those questioned believe that this country should agree to stop making any more tests of nuclear weapons... if all nations, including Russia, agree to do so.

"When the issue was first raised in April, 1954, only 20 per cent were in favour of calling off tests."

We read the following in The New York Times of May 19, 1957:

"Throughout Scandinavia just about everybody wants to see an end of nuclear explosion tests. In Norway’s larger cities such as Oslo, Bergen and Stavanger, people have been standing by hundreds in queues awaiting a chance to sign a public round robin saying simply, ‘We think Albert Schweitzer is right.’

"Norwegian newspaper editorials have been saying for weeks now, as did Oslo’s Arbeiderbladet - a Government mouthpiece - recently that the increasing rate of nuclear explosions is proof enough that they must be stopped - now and while there is yet time."

There are similar opinions expressed in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries.

Then we come to what may be called a totally non-political opinion in a statement made by the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches on August 5, 1957. I am not saying that the World Council of Churches is an expert on atomic science, but we are now talking about public opinion. This statement reads:

"We are bound to ask whether any nation is justified in continuing the testing of nuclear weapons while the magnitude of the dangers is so little known and while effective means of protection against these dangers are lacking. We must ask further whether any nation is justified in deciding on its own responsibility to conduct such tests when the people of other nations in all parts of the world who have not agreed may have to bear the consequences.

"But we urge that as a first step Governments conducting tests should forego them, at least for a trial period, either together, or individually in the hope that the others will do the same, a new confidence be born, and
foundations be laid for reliable agreements."

I read these out because it is always possible to draw across any argument of a political red herring in this way.

The position of the Government of India in regard to suspension of tests is something which is fundamental, which India regards as necessary in view of the danger and in view of its importance in relation to the whole of the disarmament problem on which we hold views diametrically opposed to those expressed by the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom, and because we think that any step in this direction will be a contribution towards disarmament itself. Further, we do not think that any of the objections raised in this regard are any longer true.

Nor does the suspension of tests handicap one group of countries as against the other. The handicaps are even. In regard to all this, I propose to place before the Committee such evidence as we have.

The representative of New Zealand, speaking in the debate said:

"We need no reminding that many earnest people throughout the world feel that the possible hazards from test explosions should override all other considerations in determining the attitude of Governments and of this Assembly towards the testing of nuclear weapons. Their genuine apprehensions arise from uncertainty about the long-term effects of radiation if tests are not brought to an end. We have heard the eloquent exposition of this point of view from the distinguished representative of India. On the other hand, Mr. Moch, with all his experience, reassured us yesterday as to the effects of radiation, and I must say that I found his statement very convincing."

This reaction that has been created in the Assembly neither in full or in part has imposed upon me a responsibility, in spite of all the respect I have for the representative of France, to answer each of the points that have been raised. The representative of France says:

"Let us dwell no longer on the possibility of chain reactions destroying the planet as the result of peace-time test explosions. All this has been scientifically proved and I shall not harp upon it again. At any rate, the most powerful nuclear explosions release a thousand times less energy than the most powerful earthquakes, and only just about as much as the tropical cyclones, with which I am sure members are acquainted. Therefore, their danger need not be taken into account at all."

Here is a member of the Disarmament Commission saying that the danger need
not be taken into account at all and that therefore it is not a question that tests should be suspended now or later. I should like to say that I have read through what I have said and I do not recollect my saying that explosions are likely to create a chain reaction and destroy the world. I said that it is possible to conceive of a situation in which the advance of knowledge and the success of further experiments might mean the finding of methods whereby whatever they do with the atom can create chain reactions, as was said at the scientific conference in Geneva that was convened by the United Nations itself.

Be that as it may, we are told that an atomic explosion is much less powerful than a powerful earthquake. But we do not make the earthquakes; we have no control over them; they are natural calamities. However, we make the explosions. That is the difference. The same thing applies to cyclones. Earthquakes and cyclones are not man-made affairs. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the advice given me by our scientific advisers is that one of these big bombs that is exploded either by the Soviet Union or by the United States has as much explosive power as all the explosives used by humanity during all time. Therefore, to suggest that a powerful earthquake is more powerful than one of these weapons and that therefore their danger need not be taken into account at all comes to me as a great surprise.

If we are to apply this argument logically, this could equally apply to war. All the explosions in war, whether atomic or otherwise, would be less powerful than the powerful earthquakes, if the statement is true, and therefore we could equally apply this argument in this way... Each of the test explosions conducted by the United States in March 1954 and 1956 and by the Soviet Union in November 1955 produced far more explosive energy than the total explosive energy released by mankind in all its history.

Because one reads out this kind of evidence one is charged with what has been called science fiction stories. I shall come to these science fiction stories, but let me quote again responsible opinion.

The Chairman of the Special Sub-Committee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress says the following:

"My Sub-Committee heard a great deal of testimony from eminent scientists on the probable biological damage to be expected from various amounts of internally deposited radioactive substances... As a layman I was somewhat shocked to find out how much the experts admitted they did not know. In fact, when I thought over how little is known for sure, I wondered how some Government officials could be so positive that bomb tests were so safe...

"The Atomic Energy Commission has continually given out assurances that we had nothing to worry about and yet we find, from testimony of
their own experts, that there is reason to worry."

Now we come to what I am sure the representative of France will consider it my duty to deal with. Because he regards the presentation of the effects of radiation and the effects of these explosions, apart from all the political consequences, as not being as calamitous as I might have presented them, he suggests that we have not got to the scientific reality. I am not trying to contradict him because we have been criticised. We have to get down to the root of this matter.

The representative of France says: "I am not awed by science fiction stories." I shall not read the rest of it. What are these science fiction stories? Who are the fiction writers? I shall not name all the authorities I have quoted before this Committee, but the following are some: the Committee on Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, a committee of eighteen members including one Nobel Prize winner in genetics; the Radiation Hazards Committee of the United Kingdom Atomic Scientists Association, including one Nobel Prize winner in physics; Professor Price of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor Miyake, Director of the Geochemical Laboratory of Tokyo; Professor Parisot of France, President of the ninth World Health Assembly; Professor Sievert of the Karolinska Hospital, Sweden, whose evidence I read here the other day; Professor Compton of Chicago, a Nobel Prize winner; Professor Haddow of the Cancer Research Institute of London; Professor Crow of the University of Chicago; and, finally, Dr. Libby, of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, on strontium-90.

I read out Dr. Libby’s name because I had to place before the Committee a contradiction of the contradictions submitted by the French representative.

So these are the fiction writers. I say this because my delegation has not sought to trade on fear or on the passions and emotions that have been aroused in this matter. We have, as far as we could, used the approach of a layman to this problem, and I think that in this particular matter a layman’s approach is more important, because the majority of the people in the world are laymen, and we have tried to present to the Assembly what are the known and the unknown hazards arising from radiation, either biological or otherwise. We never suggested that there should be any panicking in this matter. Panic is no answer, we entirely agree.

These are the main contradictions. I hope the Committee will bear with me for going into this in detail because the details have been dealt with in both these speeches.

The main substance of an injurious nature that has been referred to year after year is strontium-90. The representative of France has done me the honour of reading quotations from what I said in regard to this. He said:
"Mr. Menon is dismayed by the fact that by 1970, radioactive fall-out resulting from nuclear explosions will have raised the amount of radiation in human bones from 9 per cent to 45 per cent higher than is normally present owing to natural background radiation. But to this we must add - and Mr. Menon did not do so - that in the view of the experts the amount of strontium present in the bones is at present so far below the margin of safety that, even in 1970, after the addition which will have occurred by that time, it would still be forty times less than that limit...

"I want to say that Dr. Libby, the American scientist quoted by Mr. Menon, ends a lengthy study on strontium-90 by indicating that the entire increase in the absorption of this element by man, following all the explosions already carried out, is equal to the natural radiation increase resulting from an insignificant elevation in altitude of a few hundred metres."

I should like to submit that it is not the whole of the story. First of all, there are no established safety margins in regard to this. If I may, I would submit with great respect that there is some confusion here with regard to the radiation effects of strontium and the effects of strontium on bones and blood, and we were referring to that at that time.

With regard to Dr. Libby’s own opinion, that seems to have changed a little. Dr. Harrison Brown, Professor of Geo-Chemistry at the California Institute of Technology, who was associated with the Manhattan Project during the war, has the following to say about the so-called small risk:

"The Atomic Energy Commission is convinced that continued testing of H-Bombs is necessary for the defence of the United States. Upon Dr. Willard Libby’s shoulders has fallen the task of assuring the world that continued testing is safe. It has been next to impossible for anyone of any consequence to voice doubts or fears concerning radiation hazards of H-Bomb testing without a new letter or article from Dr. Libby quickly appearing, assuring the reader in carefully-worded sentences that everything will be alright. Dr. Schweitzer is the latest addition to a long list of distinguished individuals who have received such reassurance.

"For a long time Dr. Libby contended that there were no dangers of any consequence involved in H-bomb fall-out, if we continued testing at the present rate. Recently, however, there has been a change of tone. In his letter to Dr. Schweitzer he admits that there is some risk, although he hastily adds that the risk is ‘extremely small compared with other risks which persons everywhere take as a normal part of their lives.’"

Dr. Libby’s letter to Dr. Schweitzer begs at least two major questions. Do we
really know what the risks are in sufficient detail so that we can be as confident as Dr. Libby appears to be? And what does he mean when he says that the risk is ‘extremely small’?

Dr. Libby has stated that the present concentration of strontium-90 in children in the United States is somewhat less than 1 per cent of the maximum permissible concentration for the population. The latter in turn is one-tenth the permissible amount of strontium-90 for atomic energy workers in the United States. If we assume that 20 per cent of all existing leukemia has been induced by radiation, then it can be shown that in the absence of further explosions, the leukemia rate will go up about 0.1 per cent.

If testing continues at the present rate for the next few decades, the leukemia rate may increase by about 0.5 per cent, the number appears small. But when we say that 10,000 individuals are killed each year - individuals of all nationalities who work, love and laugh and who want to live as much as do you and I - the number suddenly seems very large.

We would not dream of lining thousands of people against a wall and shooting them down in order to test a new machine-gun. But this, in effect, is what the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom do when they test these fantastic new weapons. We do not know who the people are who are afflicted, but we know that with little question many people are killed as a result of these actions.

I believe that in this area we must be guided as much by our ignorance as by our knowledge. That is to say, when we do not know what harm we are doing, we have no right to inflict that harm.

There is as much yet to be learned concerning both the immediate and long-range effects of radiation fall-out. And I cannot help feeling that as the testing nations follow their present path, as their actions result indiscriminately in the deaths of persons all over the world, and as they continue to pursue an elusive security, they lose what is perhaps the most important element of true security - their human dignity.

There is another bit of confusion which is cleared up by the evidence given in the summary of the hearings of the Joint Committee of Atomic Energy of the United States, from 27 to 29 May and from 3 to 7 June of this year, on the nature of radioactive fall-out and its effect on man. In this official record there will be found another version of Dr. Libby’s views. It is not as though the increase in strontium-90 deposits is one-fortieth of the permissible margin, but according to him it varies from 3.5 to 9 if stratospheric fall-out is uniform; 5 to 12 if existing fall-out pattern is maintained, and 10 to 25 if predicted increase in banding of stratospheric fall-out in latitudes of North-eastern United States occurs.
Therefore, the increase is not one-fortieth, as suggested, but one-fourth; and that is considerably more. The rest of the information points to the fact that if this increase is one-tenth, that will be dangerous.

In this document which is submitted by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, there is a summary of the key points made. In that summary there was general agreement that any amount of radiation no matter how small the dose, increases the rate of genetic mutation population. There was, on the other hand, a difference of opinion as to whether a small dose of radiation would produce similar increased incidences of such somatic conditions as leukemia, bone cancer, or a decrease of life expectancy.

We have to make a difference between somatic effects and biological effects in regard to this. I would submit to the Committee that there is no such thing as a safe level as far as genetic effects are concerned. What the Committee has to take into account is that any dose, any increase of radiation, however slight, has some effect. Therefore it is quite true, as Mr. Lodge pointed out, that there is radiation out of radium dial watches, and what not. That is true, but there is no reason to add to it, where consequences are not known, and therefore we cannot accept the fact that there is nothing to worry about.

There were differences of opinion on how to forecast the consequence of further testing effects of radiation. Then this document goes on to say that pending a resolution of the differences, it would appear from the information presented that the consequence of further testing over the next several generations at the level of testing of the past five years could constitute a hazard to the world’s population. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to forecast the real position of the number of people that will be so affected. No one has suggested that we could forecast the position.

Another aspect of this which has to be thought of is that especially in view of the emergence of what are called "clean bombs," which are exploded from great heights, the fall-out of this particular substance will take many years to come down. Therefore, to speak about its somatic effects, as we know it in a month or two afterwards, does not appear from the scientific evidence to be warranted.

Twenty of the world’s famous scientists, including Professor Lacassagne of the Radium Institute of Paris, three Nobel Prize winners - Professor Muller of Indiana, Professor Yukawa of Japan, and Professor Powell of England - as well as other scientists, including Dr. Chisholm of Canada, former Director-General of the World Health Organisation, after a meeting in Committee, came to the same conclusions:

"A principal effect is due to strontium-90... We estimate that tests conducted over the past six years will be responsible for an increase of
about one per cent over the natural incidence of leukemia and bone cancer
during the next few decades. Over the next thirty years, this increase
would amount to about 100,000 additional cases of leukemia and bone
cancer. The correct numbers may be several times larger or smaller.
These additional cases could, however, not be identified among the 10
million or so normal cases of the same diseases."

It is true that when you take ten million cases in the world, 100,000 cases would
appear small. But then, if you are continuing these tests in this way, to what
extent they can increase no one can forecast. Their report continues:

"A second principal effect of global fall-out consists of genetic mutations.
We estimate that these cause serious injury to about as many individuals
as those in whom leukemia or bone cancer will be produced...

"With regard to fall-out effects from tests, it should be recognised that the
effects are global, and exerted upon citizens of all countries; regardless of
whether they or their Governments have approved the holding of tests. In
these circumstances, the usual criteria as to whether a given hazard is
justifiable cannot be applied.

"It should also be realised that appreciable areas of the world will
experience higher than average effects from fall-out.

"In this age of atomic weapons, the objective of all nations must be the
abolition of war and even the threat of war from the life of mankind. War
must be eliminated, not merely regulated by limiting the weapons to be
used."

Of course, that is not a scientific conclusion, but there it is.

Therefore, when my delegation is regarded as having submitted material that
relies more on passion than on rational elements, it is only right to point out that
as regards the scientific evidence that we have submitted, as the representative
of Mexico said, there is only one test to apply to it: how many people say it is so
and how many not? As Professor Charles Price of the University of
Pennsylvania said: When the difference of opinion is one-hundred to one then it
should be declared no contest. It is mostly the scientists that belong to these
atomic energy organisations, from whom official opinions come, he says, that
give these contradictions.

The Radiation Hazards Committee of the Federation of American Scientists has
published a document entitled, *The Biological Hazards of Nuclear Weapon
Testing*. The Committee has as its Chairman, Professor Selove of the University
of Pennsylvania, and has a very distinguished membership. Its report says:
"The quantity of strontium-90 in human bones has been measured both by the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the British Atomic Energy Authority observers... the largest value observed was 0.2 times background."

This is one-fifth of the background and not one-fortieth.

"It has been estimated that if no further explosions take place, the average radiation concentration of strontium-90 in human bones will rise, by about 1970, to a maximum which will give a dose of about one-tenth of background."

This does not conform to what came from the representative of France.

"If nuclear explosions continue at the rate of about ten megatons a year, the strontium-90 concentration will gradually rise to an average, by the year 2000, of about six times the level predicted for 1970... The radiation level reached by 1970, if there are no further tests, will cause about 1,000 deaths per year throughout the world (estimates based on United States statistics and on Lewis` work); the level estimated for the year 2000, if the present rate of testing continues, will cause about 5,000 deaths per year... If the cancer-producing effect is proportional to the dose, as it may be, the average exposure of about one-tenth of background that will result from all tests conducted up through 1956 may be expected to result in leukemia or bone cancer in 60,000 persons."

Therefore, from what I have read out it is quite clear that whatever Dr. Libby might have said somewhere about one-fortieth, it is not borne out either by the evidence presented to Congress or by these other British, American and Scandinavian scientists. The increase is much greater than it was supposed. I would submit that we should not mix up the somatic effects of this question with the radiation effects. It is quite true that the increase in the radiation effects are small, but since the substance has a half-life of many years and it comes down little by little, since it is eaten by cattle or goes into vegetables and enters into the human body, it becomes a menace to humanity as a whole.

We have said so much about the actual effects of radiation because, apart from all other considerations, there is the one of what it does immediately to people who are in no way responsible for the explosions - indeed, their countries might be against it - and they are the sufferers in this way.

What are the other reasons why there should be a suspension or a moratorium on these tests? At the present time, only the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom are conducting these explosions. We were told the other day: "Who can deny to other countries the sovereign right to explode bombs?"
Our answer is, theoretically no one, but I suppose there are other ways of exercising one’s sovereignty. In this connection, it should be remembered that these three countries are well advanced in these experimentations and that they are continually adding to their knowledge and, thereby, according to their own statements - according to the United States statement - bringing down the effects of radiation. Although the effect is being brought down it is, as I pointed out the other day, still considerable. If there is no suspension of tests and other countries come into the picture, they come in without that experience and they would therefore experiment with more crude bombs. If there is to be any use of them, there would be greater harm caused by the fusion effects and by the larger quantity of fall-out.

Dr. Selove, Chairman of the Radiation Hazards Committee of the American Federation of Scientists, and Associate Professor of Physics of the University of Pennsylvania, said to the Joint Congressional Committee on 5 June this year:

"As new nations enter the nuclear testing programme, it can be expected that they will be interested in testing bomb types which produce a great deal of fall-out. There are two dominant reasons for this: First, about the most economical way possible to increase the yield of a large bomb is to use an outer shell of natural uranium. This leads to an inexpensive large energy release, but also to a large release of fission products - the worst kind of fall-out. Second, a large amount of fall-out increases the devastating power of a nuclear bomb. The addition of a shell of natural uranium to a large thermonuclear bomb can increase the devastating fall-out to a very much greater degree, for example, than the addition of cobalt to make a 'cobalt bomb', and, moreover, can at the same time increase the energy release by a large amount, which a cobalt shell will not do."

If there is no suspension of explosions, experimentation by other countries can increase, and that experimentation will lead not only to an increase of radiation of the same rate as that produced by the advanced countries, but, according to the evidence which I read out to the Committee, it is possible and highly probable that they would experiment with bombs of a different character which will add disproportionately in terms of the improved bombs to the amount of radiation.

That takes us to the next issue, which is partly political but which certainly must be judged from a scientific basis as well, namely, whether it is advisable to pursue our desire for the suspension of thermonuclear and nuclear bomb testing except in the context of an entire disarmament programme.

I submit with great respect that I have not been able to understand point that, if we get disarmament and the abandonment of the atomic weapon, then why bother about these explosions because nobody will test the bombs if they cannot
make them. The idea is neither logical nor does it make sense. When it was first put forward it was with the idea that it could be done quickly with the amount of control that is easily possible so that some beginning could be made in the field of disarmament. Now, for the first time this year, thanks to the initiative of the United Kingdom, we were told before the Assembly that the abandonment of nuclear testing is not disarmament and, what is more, that it should not be done. The speeches made from that quarter were not only that they should not be discontinued, but that they should be continued in the interests of policies. But on this matter there is a considerable body of scientific evidence which must be in the minds of the politicians who have to deal with this question.

It is natural and legitimate to expect that any country would take into consideration the fact whether the suspension of bomb testing and the evasion of it by anybody else, or the suspension of bomb testing at any particular time, would prove a handicap to itself and not to others. Here I wish to cite the evidence of the Council of the Federation of American Scientists, given in February this year:

"The Council of the Federation of American Scientists urges the Administration to seek world-wide cessation of nuclear weapon tests without making this contingent on achieving more far-reaching goals in arms limitation. Because stopping these tests would slow down the development of even swifter and more easily hidden weapons for devastating surprise attack."

We have never presented this argument. One of the legitimate fears that a country would have is that other atomic countries may launch a surprise attack. But here we have the scientists saying that the more you allow them to test these weapons the more you will enable them to produce weapons of surprise attack.

"And because it would further contribute to world stability by helping to confine the production of nuclear weapons to three nations (Britain, the United States, the USSR), this alone would be a substantial step toward a rational solution of the world crisis brought about by nuclear armaments! All available evidence assures us that this constructive step would handicap the military preparations of our competitors at least as much as our own, and that a test ban could be adequately monitored by a United Nations monitoring agency without requiring free access for inspectors within national boundaries."

I shall deal more with this when we come to the question of detection.

Therefore, the Federation of American Scientists and another body of 2,000 scientists who have also pronounced on this all point out that it does not impose a handicap on the side which is discriminatory as against the other. Secondly, it
has the merit that it prevents further development and production of bombs which will be potent for surprise attack. This second body of 2,000 scientists from California says:

"An international agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs could serve as a first step towards a more general disarmament and ultimate effective abolition of nuclear weapons, averting the possibility of nuclear war which would be a catastrophe for all humanity.

"We have, in common with our fellow men, a deep concern for the welfare of all human beings. As scientists, we have knowledge of the dangers involved and, therefore, a special responsibility to make these dangers known. We deem it imperative that immediate action be taken to effect the international agreement to stop the testing of weapons."

Then we come to the question of detection. When the Government of India first submitted these proposals in the Disarmament Commission - not this year after the Soviet resolution, but in 1954 - there was, as we understood it, a fair degree of sympathy and support for them as a possible idea. But a few months later we were informed that it was possible to have secret explosions of these bombs. In fact, one could explode them in one’s pocket and they could not be detected. This did create problems because if the bombs could be so secretly exploded then each country would suspect the other of conducting the explosions while having itself, in honesty, to pass a self-denying ordinance.

All the evidence that my Government has - from its own sources and as the result of its own investigations - is to the effect that atomic, nuclear and thermonuclear explosions, under proper arrangements, are detectable. While I have no authority to disclose the source of this information, it is now well established by European investigation that it is possible to construct reliable stationary instruments for convenience in location and recording of very low radiation levels with an accuracy permitting changes of a few per cent to be detected.

Such an instrument, constructed for gamma radiation by the institute of radio-physics in a particular country, consists of a flashlight device giving one flash per micro-roentgen - that is, about one flash per five minutes - in the case of normal background radiation. The records are made on a circular core, which has to be changed either weekly or monthly, etc. A world-wide system of control by means of battery-driven, hermetically enclosed apparatus, sealed by some kind of international organisation, seems not to involve any serious technical difficulties.

Therefore, not only from such investigation as we have made ourselves and from such advice as is given us, but also from the experiments that are made in
countries in Europe where atomic science is considerably advanced, although they are not making the bombs, we have every reason to think that there is the possibility of detection. No one can say that it would be 100 percent detection, but the evasion of detection today is almost impossible. That is why we have suggested that, instead of one side saying that the bombs can be secretly exploded and the other side saying that they cannot, there being so many doubts, it should be possible for those who have differing views to provide scientific and technical experts to go into this question and establish the kind of machinery against evasion that is required and put it forward.

I am sorry to say that the answer to that from the representative of France is, to me, very confusing. He says that he does not agree to this tripartite division of the world, and I quote him as follows:

"It would be difficult for me to agree to the tripartite formula of India: first of all, because I cannot resign myself to the present three-way division of humanity, nor to its being given legal existence in the United Nations; furthermore, because a committee thus set up could not supplant the Powers primarily concerned, nor could it impose upon them any line of conduct."

I want to make it perfectly clear that any submission we have made is not intended in any way - and this has been very carefully and fully pointed out without any ambiguity - to supersede the Disarmament Commission or its Subcommittee. What we propose is purely a machinery for assisting the decisions which the Commission wants to reach or which it could have reached. Therefore, there is no question of supplanting the Powers primarily concerned. And, if I may say so with respect, if we could end these explosions effectively and satisfactorily to all I am sure the powers would not mind what may appear like supplanting them in this way.

Then comes the statement by Mr. Moch: "I cannot resign myself to the present three-way division of humanity in any way, but it so happens that the world today is largely divided between two power blocs and other people who want to keep out of it" - not keep out of it by saying, a plague upon both your houses but keep out in the hope that by their non-commitment they may make more or less a contribution to a peace area in the world, and that the friction as between the others themselves might not be as sharp as otherwise.

Therefore, there is no suggestion that there should be a tripartite division of the world. In fact the very idea of the introduction of a tripartite element to the extent of preventing a head-on collision between two points of view - an idea which Mr. Jules Moch himself has referred to, saying that there could not be any synthesis but that there must be support of a majority view - is to remove that danger, and it was put forward in the hope that this could be done.
Now this is purely an academic exercise, and as such has very little value. But I would like to ask the Committee, and particularly the delegation of the United States of America, to look into the history of the International Atomic Energy Agency. When first the proposal was brought here that body was to be an exclusive club of eight countries, selected by whomever was to select them, and no one was to enter it unless they themselves agreed. In the first session the exclusion was given up, thanks largely to the wisdom of the initiators of the proposal; but that is not the most important point. When the twelve or fourteen countries which formed the preparatory commission for this purpose sat week after week, and month after month, to produce the Statute of the Atomic Energy Agency, it was found that it was the lack of that body’s division - in the way in which, unfortunately, the Sub-Committee has found itself divided - into a majority and a minority view that enabled the overcoming of a large number of problems from day to day. Though the difficulties were serious, they were surmounted.

There the question was not whether a country was large or small. Sometimes a small country is able to function in a way in which a large country cannot. India was a member of the Preparatory Commission of the Atomic Energy Agency, the experience of which has been one where this introduction of what may be called a more representative element of consultation, and of giving and taking in this way, has led to results.

In this particular suggestion we have submitted, on the one hand there is no attempt to supersede either the Security Council, the Disarmament Commission or the Disarmament Sub-Committee. There is no attempt to suggest to the great Powers, "you do not know what you are doing; we will find you a way." That is not at all its meaning. It simply means that there is a deadlock, and the experience of the Commission for a long time has been that of presenting two points of view and the difficulty of resolving them. Sometimes they are resolved after a long period of argument. I do not say that it cannot be done in that way. But, as I say, there is no attempt here as far as we are concerned to disregard the authority of the Security Council or the Disarmament Commission, or in any way to suggest that any body of people but the great Powers - notably the United States and the Soviet Union - can really bring about disarmament. We therefore regret that there should be any suggestion that this is likely to lead to any further division of world opinion. Its purpose is altogether to the contrary.

I have dealt with this matter again briefly, and have not used all the material that is at hand with regard to the considerable harmful effects and the fact that the suspension of these tests is not open to the objection that there is non-detectability and, therefore, a handicapping in someone’s favour. On the other hand, I have produced scientific evidence to point out that the suspension of tests would lead to prevention of the development of weapons which might be more formidable than those which exist today, and which might be more
dangerous, particularly to the Powers which suspect the others - that is, for surprise attack and things of that character. I have also drawn attention to the great danger of large numbers of countries, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, engaging in such manufacture. After all, the manufacture of arms has been part of the industry in the world for a long time, and it may spread with disastrous results.

Finally, I have pointed out that, while we do not regard the suspension of nuclear tests as disarmament itself, we think it is a first step towards disarmament. It creates that hope and confidence in the world to which Mr. Moch has referred and which he says it is the function of this Assembly to transmit. It makes public opinion of the world think that at least something is moving not in an illusory way. And, what is more, when there is the process of inspection and the functioning of the machinery of detection, and consultations in regard to all these matters are carried on from day to day, we will have created something like a pilot plant in the way of working together on this matter. So, even from that point of view, the suspension of tests has a political value and a very serious contribution to disarmament.

My delegation has not suggested that we should just suspend these explosions and sit back and do nothing. The question of the suspension of explosions - in the same way, for example, as the submission of military budgets of countries - was regarded as an item which could be brought about more easily than the others. We have never at any time suggested that it is a substitute either for the abandonment of fresh manufacture or for the dismantling of existing bombs or for the cut-off of use - that is to say, eventual elimination of the nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, which is the declared policy of the United Nations.

The main objection to this is that the only thing that is concretely asked for is the suspension - that a commitment on suspension is asked for while, with regard to all the others, there is merely an expression of sentiment. To a certain extent, if this is a characteristic, it also appears in regard to the main proposals that are before us - that is, there is no suggestion that the cut-off date in regard to further production should be effective before the suspension of explosions. Mr. Lodge, speaking on behalf of his country, said they were prepared to agree to suspension provided that there was agreement in principle - or words to that effect - in regard to the other. I submit that the proposal we have placed before the Committee - that in the same way, by having some other views added, they should work for cut-off dates in regard to fresh production, in regard to dismantling of bombs, and also toward finding a cut-off of the use of this thing altogether, because that is in consonance with the declared policy of the United Nations from the time we began dealing with this question.

The main objection to this has been that we are asked to rely on faith. "How can you trust somebody else if he is not to be trusted?" - that is the question. Well,
that is a very logical question to ask. If you know that the other person is bound to break his promise, then it would be very foolish to trust him. There is no doubt about that. But, if those are the premises on which we are arguing, then the whole of the disarmament question, including the 24-power resolution is out of court. Every proposal that is made, however large or small, does rely in contract, does rely on commitment. Therefore, if it is possible to accept a commitment - if it is possible, as the representative of the United States himself pointed out, to get areas of agreement in some ways - and the other side can do the same in some fields, there is no reason why it should not be extended to another.

This is not to suggest that a mere element of blind faith is sufficient. As the representative of France rightly points out, the establishment of control and the machinery of inspection cultivate this faith. That is why we have suggested that, instead of merely saying that there must be inspection and there must be control, we must, as in the case of the Preparatory Commission of the Atomic Energy Agency, try to work out these details in this way.

Therefore, it is not as though the suspension resolution hangs in the air by itself and the rest of disarmament is forgotten. All that is sought to be done is that the fact that we do not have comprehensive disarmament should not prevent us from doing anything at all. There is every reason to believe that, once some progress is made in this way, then it is possible that further progress may follow.

We fully believe the position taken up by the representative of Ireland: that, despite all procedural methods that you might try, unless there is a lowering of world tension, it is not possible to get to disarmament. I do not think that anybody can quarrel with that proposition. But it is possible that, if there were agreement in one sphere, as we said two years ago, there might be agreement in another. That is possible. It is quite true that there must be a change of heart, a change of approach, a willingness to negotiate, and that one must remove those elements which, in the mind of the representative of France, have created this great disastrous disillusionment. We therefore appeal particularly to the two most powerful countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, that in this particular matter the time has come to give the world a lead where a beginning is being made. We do not ask that any proposition that is put forward by either of them has to be rescinded here. We believe that the marshalling of the force of the Assembly behind a non-agreed proposition is likely to jam the machine more than anything else. This is not in any way a surrender to a minority view or a triumph of a majority view. It is sheer commonsense that, if a matter has been discussed fully, the members of the Sub-Committee, the Powers concerned, know quite well what is the majority opinion in the world. The registering of a decision would not in itself do anything but create a kind of restriction upon ourselves.

Therefore, it is our submission that, while these resolutions do not represent and
cannot represent an agreed view, and are not an attempt towards that, they
should not be pushed at this time but should be further considered by the
Disarmament Commission.

We have submitted these other propositions not as a substitute for them. They
are not full and complete suggestions in regard to the bringing about of
disarmament. They are, in our view, practical steps toward accomplishing the
initial achievements toward bringing about disarmament.

There is another matter on which my delegation spent some time the other day,
and that is the emergence of tactical weapons. Here, I believe, I may have laid
myself open to misunderstanding. I did not say at any time that it was possible
today to produce tactical weapons of a small kind such as machine guns or
revolvers or anything of that character. What I said was that, once you move
from this in the tactical field, the advance of science is such that the time may
come - how soon we do not know when they will be so small and so portable
that they will be all over the world. That was speculation - legitimate
speculation, in view of the advance of humanity.

We are told that these weapons - I mean, 150 tons or something like that -
cannot be moved, and so on and so forth. Now, I have here a whole list of these
weapons: guided missiles - surface to surface, air to air, ground to air, and so on,
with all double-purpose weapons. They all carry atomic warheads. The USSR
has announced that it has an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a nuclear
warhead that is capable of delivering a nuclear warhead at any point. The New
York Herald Tribune of May 16, 1956, also reported that the Russians have a
203-millimetre gun which can hurl an atomic shell sixteen miles, while they
have a heavy 24-millimetre mortar which can use atomic warhead.

I do not intend to go into speculative reports in this connection. Anyone who so
wishes may study the particulars of these weapons, which are all published; in
fact, I believe that some of the weapons are on exhibition and even on sale.

The fact is that, while at the present time these are heavy guns, they are still
tactical weapons. If tactical weapons become the order of the day and if, as an
Army commander has stated somewhere, they become part of the normal
equipment of an army, then the danger arises of a wider spread of atomic
radiation, with all its consequences.

The British, too, have developed some of these weapons. Their atomic test at
Montebello Island in Australia in May 1956, was a test of a tactical surface-to-
air missile.

General Magruder of the United States Army said, in February this year, before
the Senate Armed Services Committee that in three to five years the United
States Army would have enough tactical atomic weapons to reduce the use of conventional weapons by 25 per cent.

This brings me to some of the statements which have been made here concerning these scientific aspects of the matter. The representative of France said:

"No Minister of Defence - and I have been a Minister of Defence - will arm his troops with the atomic machine guns and revolvers cooked up by these (science fiction story) writers or mentioned here by Mr. Menon because, taking into account the critical mass below which the chain reaction is no longer brought about, each projectile for these devices would have to weigh about 10 kilogrammes."

I am not a physicist; the representative of France is. Nevertheless, I submit that he was in error, scientifically speaking, in making the above statement. He went on:

"Therefore, for sixty seconds of machine-gun fire, approximately ten tons of ammunition would be required, and the magazine of a revolver would alone weigh approximately 100 kilogrammes..."

I shall not go into the second part of the above-quoted statement by Mr. Moch, because, as I have said, it relates to the realm of speculation. With regard to the question of critical mass, however, I would say this: no direct evidence in this field can be obtained, because no government will publish details concerning the size of a critical mass. In a country like the United States, however, it is not possible to withhold information from the public, and, therefore, a certain amount of information has appeared from which inferences can be drawn.

The United States Atomic Energy Commission has invited comment on a proposed regulation to guard against accidental conditions of criticality in the shipment of special nuclear material. Limits would be placed in the proposed regulation on the amounts of plutonium, uranium-233 and uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-233 which a licensee might transport or deliver to a carrier for a single shipment. In the case of uranium-233 and plutonium, the limit for transportation by a licensee would be 200 grammes - not 10 kilogrammes - and the limit for delivery to a carrier would be 60 grammes. It will be noted that the proposed limits on amounts which might be delivered to a carrier are considerably lower than the amounts which might be transported by a licensee. The distinction is based on amounts of material needed to create a critical mass.

If the critical mass of uranium-233 or plutonium is nearly 200 grammes, as would appear from the above-mentioned Atomic Energy Commission release, it would sooner or later be possible to produce weapons of weights much smaller than 10 kilogrammes.
We have other scientific information concerning the attainment of the critical mass - and, again, the authority is the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Actually, there is no absolute size or weight in this respect. The critical mass depends on a large number of circumstances. For a nuclear explosion to take place, according to a publication of the Atomic Energy Commission, the weapon must contain a sufficient amount of uranium or plutonium for it to exceed the critical mass in the existing circumstances. The critical mass depends, among other things, on the shape of the material, the composition and the presence of impurities which can remove neutrons in non-fission reactions. By surrounding the fissionable material with a suitable neutron "reflector" the loss of neutrons by escape can be reduced and the critical mass can thus be decreased.

When we referred to the dangers of these tactical weapons, we were not drawing upon our imagination; we also had obtained advice. These weapons can develop in a large way. While, today, some of these weapons are 40 and 50 feet long and require several freight airplanes to transport them, the time will come when smaller weapons can be produced.

In any case, I have already referred to the Atomic Energy Commission publication which states that the critical mass depends on a number of things, including the shape of the material, the composition, the presence of impurities, the provision of a suitable neutron "reflector" and so forth. Thus, we have no idea to what extent science will advance in this respect. There is, therefore, some justification for the warning that to enter into the field of atomic tactical weapons is to create the danger of greater, more widespread atomic warfare than that involving the use of these bombs about which we have been speaking.

Furthermore, the newspapers the other day contained reports about atomic depth charges which go several thousand feet under the sea and the impact of which spreads, presumably, for miles. Now, no one is living under the sea except the fish, but these depth charges irradiate the water. We have heard evidence from United States sources, both in this Committee and in other Committees, concerning the explosions which took place in the Marshall Islands. The material in this respect which has come from Japanese sources refers to radiation that must have largely been caused by bombs exploded in the Soviet Union. However that may be, the fact is that, in addition to the old type of bomb exploded on the ground and in the air, there is now talk of these depth charges for bringing out submarines, and the widespread use of such depth charges would contaminate the oceans of the world as well. This cannot be regarded as a "panicky" argument, because we have had evidence of the number of square miles of water which were contaminated after the Bikini explosions.

It is not my delegation’s intention to go into greater detail now with regard to the draft resolutions before the Committee. We have already submitted our views,
with great respect, to the members of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, whose labours have been so prolonged. So far as we are concerned, we do not think that any country deliberately wants to jeopardise disarmament. The obstructions which exist in this field arise from all the considerations of distrust and fear and, in our view, the mistaken conception that peace can rest on what is called a balance of power. Despite these difficulties, however, we do not take the view that these great nations which bear the responsibility for the survival of the human race and the prevention of atomic warfare will turn a deaf ear to submissions from any quarter.

We make this submission, just as we have done in previous years, to those who alone can achieve results in disarmament. There is no doubt that these draft resolutions which are supported by members of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament can obtain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. But it is not majority votes that will bring about disarmament. That is not in any way to say that a minority can hold others to ransom. But that minority will have with it the pressure of other countries which are not under any obligation to respect views with which they are not in agreement.

Therefore, in this second intervention in this matter I should like to submit to the Committee that we are now in a critical phase, especially since the world has made further advance in the field of science with the opening up of the interplanetary regions. It is time for us to seek the ways of cooperation and to end the ways of competition in this matter. Some day there has to be agreement if we are not to destroy each other. If there is no agreement, then the piling up of armaments will remain the kind of baneful enterprise which deprives the world of much of the substance it requires to make it more happy and comfortable...

I hope that the Committee will give the proposals submitted by the Government of India the consideration they usually give to them, and we hope that a step forward, however small, will be taken by this Assembly so that we may convey to the world that message of hope and freedom from fear to which Mr. Moch referred. We would then have made an advance, but otherwise the proceedings of this Committee and of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly that will follow would not represent progress on disarmament, but would be the beginning of the chapter to which the representative of France referred when he said we must leave synthesis on one side and we must rely on the majority view.

We cannot get disarmament by legislation or passing resolutions; we must seek agreement. That is not to put a premium on obstructionism of any kind, it is to put a premium on the capacity for preservation and for patience. However well-intentioned may be the resolutions, to argue against that can only lead to a tightening of the deadlocks.

It is this view that led my delegation to take the time of the Committee in order to go into a large number of details in this matter and, perhaps, to repeat some of the
arguments, but we hope that we have met some of the objections that were raised. I have deliberately refrained from going into the argument about the clean bomb - we have not heard a great deal about it lately - but we do think that as each day goes on the danger increases. World public opinion is far more advanced than we appear to be in coming to decisions, and in every country in the world today there is an increasing desire to see some steps taken in this direction. If the United Nations were to disregard that opinion, were to be more concerned about their alignments and more concerned about their fears than their hopes, then it would not be likely that we should take a step forward. It is in that spirit that I have made this submission.

[The General Assembly adopted the 24-Power draft resolution and rejected the Indian draft resolution on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet Union announced on November 6, 1957, that it would no longer participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee as the bodies were then constituted.]

STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 17, 1958

[During 1958, the Disarmament Commission could not function as the USSR announced that it would not take part in it as the majority of the members of the Commission - increased to 25 in 1957 - belonged to Western military alliances.

But following an exchange of letters between USSR and the United States, a conference of experts from eight countries met in Geneva in July-August 1958 to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible suspension of nuclear tests.

The experts reported that it was technically feasible to establish a workable and effective control system. The USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States subsequently agreed to begin negotiations to reach agreement on a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The USSR had announced a unilateral and conditional discontinuance of nuclear tests on March 31, 1958; the United States and the United Kingdom announced in August a conditional suspension of nuclear tests for one year from 31 October. But on October 31, the Soviet Union declared its right to continue test explosions on a "one-to-one ratio" to the number of explosions carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom since 31 March.

26 From: Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, October 1958, pages 207-222
Meanwhile, after another exchange of communications, the USSR and the United States agreed to convene a conference of experts in Geneva on November 10, 1958, to study possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack.

The discussion in the General Assembly session in 1958 centred mainly on the question of discontinuance of nuclear tests.

India, along with 13 other countries, moved a draft resolution calling for an immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests until agreement was reached by the States concerned on technical arrangements and controls considered necessary. This draft was rejected by the General Assembly on November 4, 1958, by 41 votes to 27, with 13 abstentions.

Ten years ago the United Nations ventured on this issue of disarming the world after the great re-armament of the war. What is the picture today? It is very wrong to take a few countries, but whether one takes the United States, the United Kingdom, France or the Soviet Union, military expenditures have reached phenomenal figures, and in order that our imaginations may be impressed by this, let us take, for example, the United States, not always as wealthy as it is today.

In pre-First World War days, in 1913, the United States, spent £64 million - probably less than it would spend for building a large edifice today. This expenditure rose to £5,113 million in 1947, and today it is £15,750 million, that is to say, from the end of the Second World War expenditures have increased by 300 per cent.

Let us take the Soviet Union. The pre-First World War figures were above those of the United States because at that time Russia was an imperialist country under the Czars. It spent £92 million at that time, rising to £8,594 million in 1958. It is necessary to take into account the fact that its economy is of such a character that it is not possible for us to make real assessments of the value or significance of these figures.

The United Kingdom, in spite of its vast far flung empire before the First World War, spent £77 million. In 1947 it spent £1,653 million. Last year it spent £1,525 million. They are a very economical and frugal people, so they must have received from these £1,525 million far more than other people received from their greater amounts of money...

This is the picture which Commander Noble asks us to consider as a hopeful picture.
Let us now see what has been done during the past ten years. Since the first atomic explosion in New Mexico, civilisation has gone on from one progress to another. When the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima of 300,000 people, 100,000 were killed; 100,000 more were injured. Even today, 99,000 people are under clinical examination and 6,000 of them receive clinical attention. During the period of the last twelve months, more than ten years after the explosion, 185 people died as a result of the atomic attack.

I shall not refer to the Nagasaki affair, as the one at Hiroshima is sufficient. I do not do this to single out the United States in this matter, because I am sure that it must have been thought - and I gather this from reading Mr. Truman's memoirs - that the dropping of an atom bomb was not different from that of any other war weapon.

Compared with the weapons of today, the Hiroshima days appear as child's play. Today we have weapons which do not even require a man to guide them. We have progressed to the point of being able to launch weapons under the sea, on the surface, in the air - in fact, we have almost got to the position where, if a politician sits down and thinks somewhere, everything can go off. We have the development in the field of atomic power under water, in the field of long-range missiles, and so on. What is more, we have come to the stage - and I say this with great respect to my colleague from France, who chided me last time on romancing on scientific fiction - where we now have the possibility of portable atomic weapons. This is not scientific fiction, unless the leaders of the United States Army, or the Russian Army and their statesmen are all writers of fiction.

We have come to the stage where we now have what has been called in United States publications by the term portable atomic weapons, which may be carried somewhere to blow up bridges and to carry out sabotage. We know a great deal more of what takes place in the United States than of what takes place in the Soviet Union, but there is enough evidence to believe that the same thing goes on there. What is more, we have been told that these portable weapons, or tactical weapons - I do not know where tact comes into this - which, when we spoke here last time were sixty feet long, can now be carried all over the place and, during the recent Chinese developments, were spoken of as being under use.

The worst side of the picture is this: while my colleague from Ireland states that these weapons should not be given to anybody, there is ample evidence to show that they are being given or are on the way to others. In other words, one can no longer speak - and this is the point I want to make - of three nuclear Powers; one can no longer speak of this exclusive club of "three hydrogen gentlemen." It is now spread all over the world. Its distribution has become so wide that the capacity of destroying the world has become decentralised. Many speak out against authoritarian and monolithic forms of government, but the decentralisation of the capacity of destruction in this way presents a far greater danger to the world than otherwise. That is the picture as we look at it.
I am quite prepared to look at the picture even from the short-term point of view. It is quite true that progress was made at Geneva so that we can now say that it is technically possible to detect explosions and to impose degrees of control. With great respect to the representative of the United Kingdom I wish to point out that this is more in the nature of a declaratory act than a creative one. Everybody knew all about this before. It has been repeatedly stated in the Assembly, not only by my delegation but by others as well, that there was no insurmountability about the obstacles in the way of detection. Now there should be no difficulty about inspection or control. And that enables me to lay stress on another aspect of our approach to this problem.

It is entirely fallacious to think that the Government of India, or anyone else who lays stress on the question of cessation, is unmindful of or places less stress on the question of control. We do not think that any agreement in the present day conditions of the world, with all the imperfections of humanity, and with all the suspicion and lack of faith in each other, can ever be effective without the machinery of control any more than a municipal community, in which we are all supposed to be civilised and not wanting to take each other’s lives or steal each other’s property, can get on without policemen and laws.

Therefore, my Government stands fully for the establishment of the machinery of control and inspection. But where the rub comes in is here: we should never plead control at the bar of disarmament; that is to say, we should not make control anything more than a device for effecting an agreement. We could not say that people should not live free because there are not enough policemen. We must work towards established control, for without control we can have no assurance that the agreements would be kept. Looking through the records and examining all the statements made by both parties to this controversy, there seems to be agreement on the establishment of control. We have the statements here of the Western side from the United States and the United Kingdom, and of the other side from the Soviet Union, that there is no difference with respect to this point.

My delegation wants to make this clear. Since we are not one of the military Powers, and in any case we are not a nuclear Power, people tend to believe that we speak in a vacuum so far as this point is concerned and that we do not take so-called tactical questions into account.

In looking back over the resolutions - and for the sake of brevity I shall take those of the tenth, eleventh and twelfth sessions of the General Assembly - I want to say that there has never been a climbing down on anybody’s part, and certainly not on the part of my delegation, from the general purposes of the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission; that is to say, we all stand committed to comprehensive disarmament and to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. We have agreed to an approach by stages, which is sometimes
remembered and sometimes forgotten. But in all that has been said and done in
this Assembly, I think there has been progress. The sentiment was expressed by
my colleague from the United States, Mr. Cabot Lodge, when he said that these
debates have the effect of bringing about flexibility: that is to say, it is not the
view that some proposition should be put forward and accepted, and no more.

That, I think, is a great advance on certain positions held in previous years, and it
is there that lies the hope, because it springs from the realisation not of the
effectiveness of argument but of the realisation that the most important party in
this world is the people of the world as a whole. That is the reason for the
expression of this sentiment.

From that, I should like to take these items one by one. You will remember that
when we began there seemed to be very hot controversy about the priority of
items. Now, is it not a commentary on the whole of this business that, whether
deleagations held one view or the other about the priority of importance,
practically all the speeches in this Committee have been either fully concerned
with the cessation of test explosions or mainly so? Therefore, irrespective of what
positions may be politically held, what is uppermost in the minds of delegations,
reflecting the sentiments of the world - and that is what is most important, that
they reflect the sentiments of the world - is the immediate necessity of regarding
test explosions as the proximate issue not unconnected with anything but
unrelated in the sense of one hinging upon the other. We regard this matter as of
great importance, and we make no apology for that.

The situation, as I have said, has deteriorated. In the last ten years, while we have
spoken about disarmament, in effect we have had an armaments race. Two years
ago when my delegation, almost by inadvertence, put into a draft resolution the
words "armaments race," it was very strongly objected to from either side, and it
was said that we ought to make it "competitive armament." I thought a race was
competition, but there it is. What we have in the armaments race is the
development of these new formidable weapons, not only in size but in their
potency and, what is more, in their portability, which is greatly important. Next,
the area of this has so widened as to include the open seas of the Pacific, the
Polar regions north and south, and vast expanses of countries which for this
purpose cannot morally be regarded as exclusive sovereign territory. These have
advanced the capacity for discharging them with very little human guidance from
day to day. That has increased. Even the continent of Antarctica and its possible
use is a cause of great apprehension.

All these developments in a reverse way - and the fear, which seems to be
reflected in some of the items put down, that even so-called outer space may
perhaps be pressed into the service of war - that is dominant in people’s minds.
When first this problem was brought before the Assembly, there was a general acceptance or a general disposition to regard this as a possible thing, because comprehensive disarmament had been discussed year after year and had been bogged down by rival propositions which, from an analysis of them, seem very much alike, though it may be that our imperfect minds do not grasp the subtle differences. The Assembly came to the conclusion, through the Disarmament Commission, that on the one hand it had to be done by stages, that any step in this direction, as one of the resolutions said, would be something that would lead to progress in other directions. In that way the idea of the suspension of explosions came about. Since Geneva we have spoken about discontinuance. In fact, the Geneva item itself, so far as I understand, is discontinuance. The reason for being allergic to this word "suspension" is that suspension has become associated in fact with preparations.

To save time, I shall try to think aloud on what is the case against this, why we must not do it and why we should. The representative of the United Kingdom has told us that the cessation of nuclear tests is not disarmament. With great respect, I agree. I hope it does not stop there. The first step that you take in a race is not reaching your goal; but that is no argument for not running at all. We have not said at any time that if we suspended nuclear tests there would be disarmament as the night follows the day. All we have said is that it would have certain consequences that would help towards this.

The second argument against suspension is this. It is now argued not only that suspension may be dangerous, not only that suspension is not effective, but that non-suspension, non-cessation, is necessary. The most categorical advocate of this is the Government of France, that is, that there should be no cessation of atomic weapons tests. The Foreign Minister of France, talking to us only a few weeks ago, ended his statement by saying:

"That is why the ending of tests is conceivable only within the framework of effective nuclear disarmament. We shall never weary of repeating this, for the very safety of mankind is at stake."

In other words, the continuance of these tests is necessary if this argument subsists. But, happily, the trend of the discussions here from every side has shown that this is a view that may be subject to modification. It is argued that if tests are suspended humanity might get a feeling of comfort and that under the general atmosphere of satisfaction that would be created those who are capable of making these bombs will continue to make the old type of bombs without further tests. It is argued that tests are not necessary for development. If tests are not necessary for development, then why have tests? We have it both ways. We are told that it is necessary to develop these weapons and that therefore we must have tests. Then we are told that you can develop them without tests and that therefore, if you suspend tests, the developments will take place without being known, that there
will be no bang and that therefore people will think there is no nuclear arming going on. That is another argument that is put forward.

Finally, there is the theory, to which my Government is irrevocably opposed, that these atomic weapons are the instruments of peace. That is what is called the theory of deterrent. The theory of deterrent is logically, philosophically and practically fallacious. The theory of deterrent on the one hand is based upon fear: the whole of its foundation is fear. At the same time its effectiveness is dependent upon faith. You may say that the weapon deters because the other side may be afraid of being killed. But at the same time, if it is to remain a deterrent and not to be active, then you have to rely on the other fellow not using it. So you have some faith in the man on the other side saying that when it comes to that he will not destroy humanity. It is very difficult for us to reconcile these two contradictory positions.

My Government is irrevocably opposed to the conception that the peace of this world can be balanced on two, or now three, hydrogen bombs. They are a definite menace to humanity. They ought to go out of use altogether. Their stockpiles ought to be dismantled in whatever way is possible. There ought to be no further manufacture of them, and they should not be regarded as instruments of war.

We thought that, when the great move initiated by President Eisenhower in regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy gained so much public support, while it was not a step towards disarmament, the emphasis would be shifted. But, if we were to be realistic and truthful to ourselves, far greater attention has been paid in the last two or three years to the war uses of nuclear energy than to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

It is quite true that developments have taken place - might have taken place in my own country - but the whole conception of this deterrent theory, is the fear that it will keep. Then it is said that these tests are required to eliminate the evils of radiation, because one of the reasons for giving up these tests is the contamination of the air and the consequences it will have on humanity as a whole. So we at last hear a great deal of emphasis on what is called the "clean" bomb - a contradiction in terms; a "clean" bomb, one gets a "clean" death somehow or other.

The head of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States has said that these tests are required for developing relatively clean and accurate weapons for defence against bombers. Well, I do not say that it is an argument for continuing tests but that statement is contradicted by another responsible quarter, namely, the Secretary for Defence of the United States. He has informed the American Congress only some time ago that "some nuclear weapons in the national stockpile have been altered in a way that increases radioactive fall-out over a local area." Then he goes on to say "we are stockpiling bombs which are essentially 100 percent fission and have never made any statements to the contrary. In our
terminology these are ‘normal’ weapons." He went on to say that "when he referred to ‘normal’ were those in which an attempt had been made to cut down on fall-out as opposed to ‘clean’ weapons." Therefore, the idea that these tests are in order to evolve "clean" weapons does not hold water. The Russian weapons are also called "non-clean" and there are dirtier and dirtier weapons - so we are told by these statements. And now we have the Secretary of Defence of the United States telling us that what he calls a normal weapon is a non-clean weapon.

Dr. Teller told the United States Senate Disarmament Sub-Committee that by suspending nuclear testing now "we may be sacrificing millions of lives in a ‘dirty’ nuclear war later." Therefore, all these arguments tend to justify a kind of apprehension that is created in the minds of people who have no desire to attribute motives to any statement that is made.

If the representative of the United Kingdom, the United States or anyone else tells us either privately or publicly here, my delegation would not say that it means something else. We would say that it means what it says. But it says a great deal. And that is, that there can be cessation of nuclear testing, and of these explosions until there is effective disarmament. Well, of course, if there is effective disarmament, they themselves will not want the tests, it would be a useless occupation. They would not use these bombs anymore.

Now, I say again, there has been no progress, and Commander Noble said to us that the picture looked more hopeful. Now let us look at these explosions. In 1957 the United States had to its credit twenty-four explosions, the United Kingdom six, and the Soviet Union twelve, thus making forty-two explosions in all. In 1958 there have been eighty-seven explosions - in the last twelve months there have been eighty-seven major thermonuclear and nuclear explosions - in the way of fifty-six and thirty-one. So while the technical discussions are going on in Geneva, while we think we are getting a better picture, in the last twelve months the explosions have increased by 100 per cent. There were forty-two last year; there were eighty-seven this year.

Now, the case that there would be a clandestine manufacture of weapons, there would be more other destructive weapons. I think it is only fair that we should try as best we can with limited knowledge to deal with this element. There is a legitimate apprehension that once these nuclear tests are suspended, one or the other side may devise weapons that may not come into this category; that is to say, we stop explosions. In the meanwhile other weapons of mass destruction may be devised, thereby leading to consequences which are graver than they are.

My Government is of the view that any kind of suspension or cessation of this character must apply to all weapons of mass destruction; because so far as we know these weapons of mass destruction can only be weapons of this category, of this thermonuclear, nuclear or any other development arising from that and could
not be the old conventional war type. Therefore, there is no question that this cessation refers not only to the kind of explosions that might take place in Siberia or in Christmas Island only, but any other kind of development, whether it takes place between countries in the way of inter-continental missiles or from anywhere else, from outer space or whatever it is. This ban must apply to the whole lot of them if there is to be a step towards peace in this world.

Having put this in this negative way, then it is our duty to state before the Committee what are the positive results of cessation. We say first of all, the immediate positive result of cessation would be to decrease the danger to humanity. I should have said that in the expansion of the destructive potential of the world, not only have we increased the size of it and the quantum of it, not only have we increased the variety of it, not only have we increased the area of its use, we have also increased the destructive potential in the other dimension - in time. That is to say, in former wars you killed, and I suppose you buried the man who was killed if you could get him, and that was the end of it. But now, the destruction is towards generations yet unborn. And in that dimension also it increased. We say therefore, if there is cessation of these tests, there will be less radioactivity in the world harmful to humanity.

There has been a considerable amount of argument in this room. The main exponents as against the position we take up, being the representatives of France and the United Kingdom saying that these radiation results are not so important; in any case we carry a certain amount of radioactive elements within ourselves, and so on and so on; therefore, it is not too bad. Fortunately, the Committee on Radiation which we shall discuss later, while its report is couched in very cautious language, makes it quite clear that any further increase in this would be harmful to us.

The Committee, in its general conclusions - I do not want to go into great length, because we shall be discussing this afterwards - says:

"even the smallest amount of radiation is liable to cause deleterious genetic and perhaps traumatic effects. Natural radiation fallout involves the whole world population and to a greater or lesser extent only a fraction of population with medical or occupational exposure. It is clear that medical and occupational exposure in the testing of nuclear weapons can be influenced by human action and that natural radiation already injected in the stratosphere cannot."

What we cannot prevent, we cannot prevent. But what we are causing we can stop from causing.

Paragraph 54 of this report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation states:
"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations; these hazards by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons." (A/3838, page 41).

In other words, all that the majority of the peoples of the world can do is to just await atomic annihilation. In the same paragraph there is this statement. "The Committee concludes that all steps designed to minimise irradiation of human populations will act to the benefit of human health." Now, there is another factor that we ought to bear in mind, that this Committee has assumed that there will be no increase in radiation levels because there is all this talk of suspension and so on - set out in tables - that if there is no further radiation, then perhaps we can keep at this present level of danger.

They already say that an estimated total of 2,500 to 100,000 of cases of leukemia will ultimately occur in subsequent years from tests already made, if they are stopped in 1958. Their effects are not now known, and each year from 2,500 to 100,000 people will suffer from these genetic effects.

Naturally a scientific committee does not go into the political issue of whether or not tests will be continued. All this is written on the basis of what has happened. Since then, we have the continuance of these tests.

My government and a great many other governments in the world received with great relief and feeling, which we did not disguise, the news that the Soviet Union had unilaterally decided to stop exploding these bombs. There were two reasons. First of all, it was because this was a beginning in cessation. Secondly, my Government rightly or wrongly thinks that, in a contest of this kind and generally in the case of all conflicts and unilateral action undertaken with the realisation of danger has not only political but good moral effects on the world as a whole. Therefore, when the Soviet Union suspended these tests five months ago, not only my country but a great part of the world, particularly Asia and Africa, responded very generously. It would be wrong - in fact, we would not want to do so - to disguise our feeling of disappointment at the fact that these tests have been renewed. That the United States and the United Kingdom have not discontinued the tests is, in our opinion, no justification for their renewal by the Soviet Union. We understood that the tests had been given up unilaterally and this was a recognition of the dangers inherent in them and a denial that no amount of capacity for nuclear war as a possible deterrent would in any way make up for the results against humanity.

When I have said this, I want also to refer to the other side of it. The representative of the United Kingdom said here that his delegation had said in August that they were prepared to stop these explosions if there was agreement on
it. I submit with great respect that greater than all agreement at that time was the fact of cessation and the interest of cessation as a whole required that there should have been a general stopping on all sides.

From August to the end of October time has elapsed. In the meanwhile, instead of proceeding towards cessation we have moved away from it in the sense that one party that had stopped has already restarted and, what is more, restarted not only with the consequence of increasing radiation but also throwing some doubts and suspicions on the \textit{bona fides} of suspension as a whole.

We have tried to state as objectively as we could the results of this action as we saw them. After all, if there is a crime against humanity, if it is an anti-social action, if it is a deleterious action, it does not appear right to say that we shall stop this on a particular date. We believe that a great opportunity has been missed and therefore the responsibility to recreate it arises very strongly.

We have the other side of it. We are very happy to see that at this session of the United Nations and preceding it, the call for the giving up of these tests has come from quarters from where it did not come before. We had the privilege of having present with us one of the veteran statesmen of the world in the person of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, a great advocate of the cause of peace over the years whether or not he was in government. He told this Assembly categorically - and this does not come from an uncommitted nation or from a nation that belongs to any unnecessarily critical group of the present nuclear Powers on his side.

\begin{quote}
“For reasons of overwhelming cumulative force” - \\
this is Anglo-Saxon understatement - \\
“the cessation of nuclear tests is essential.”
\end{quote}

He does not say it is desirable.

\begin{quote}
“First, it would end the problem of radioactive fallout from test explosions of nuclear weapons...

“Secondly, it would, if it were universal in its application, rule out the danger that efficient atomic weapons will be developed by an ever-increasing number of countries...

“Thirdly, it would establish for the first time a world-wide inspection system...

“The fourth benefit of an early agreement... is more general and more tangible, but potentially the most important of all: confidence and trust between the nations.”
\end{quote}
So states Mr. Nash. These are the four reasons that have been set out by him.

We also have an appeal from another Western country not committed to the Western group as such, that is, from Sweden, to ask for the cessation of tests in spite of a certain section of opinion in that country not being so much in favour of it. Mr. Unden told us only a few days ago:

"The Swedish Government supports the proposal for a universal discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests."

I wish I could be as brief and as effective as Mr. Unden.

I return to the reasons why there should be a cessation of tests. First of all, I have referred to the reasons of lesser radioactivity. I have said something like this in the Assembly previously. But I think it is well for us to remember that publications in this country - one of them by groups of men who are engaged in big business and therefore cannot be regarded as being uncautious, to put it very mildly - have all referred to this enormous destructive potential of these weapons. And to make it more graphic and more real to our imaginations it is calculated that, shall we say, the power of a twenty megaton explosion, one of these big explosions that either the Russians or the Americans have set off, we are told, if it was to be equated in terms of TNT, would require as much of that material as would cover wagons that would stretch from here to Los Angeles and back. And one of these smaller ten-megaton explosions would require more explosives than were used in the whole of the last two world wars.

That being the position, I think that when we deal with these matters we may not simply look to our sights as such, as to what are our immediate political advantages. And we say definitely that if there are risks in this, there are risks of peace and of human survival which we should take.

The second cause for cessation is this: It is quite true that we are representatives of our Governments. But we do not live in isolation. We are here, we are heard, we are able to speak, because, whatever our forms of government may be, we represent the enormous public opinion of this world, and there is no doubt that in every country, irrespective of their forms of government, irrespective of the freedom of press or otherwise, irrespective of their economic organisation, the overwhelming volume of world public opinion is in favour not only of the cessation of these tests but of the non-use of nuclear and thermonuclear power for destructive purposes.

Only recently, nearly ten thousand scientists, who ought to know something about this - I wish they had all taken some sort of binding oath upon themselves that they should not use their talent for the purpose of destruction - sent out a
memorial calling for the cessation of tests, and said:

"Each nuclear bomb test spreads an added burden of radioactive elements over every part of the world... We deem it imperative that immediate action be taken to effect an international agreement to stop the testing of all nuclear weapons."

I spoke of them simply as ten thousand scientists. But they are not just new graduates of universities. They include some seventy or eighty Noble Prize winners. Since we know that these distinctions are not conferred upon men with small ability or men of small stature, we know that this is an expression of opinion of what may be called the intelligentsia and the scientific knowledge of the world. This does not come from science fiction.

I have here another quotation, which reads:

"Two Japanese ships showered with radioactive rain in the Pacific returned home today to a nation showing increasing bitterness towards American nuclear weapons tests. But Japan, the only nation to know first hand the horrors of atomic bombing, feels any radioactivity at all is suspect."

This is from an American paper in 1958.

I want to refer to another expression of American public opinion, and I am sure that my colleague from the United States will not regard it as interference in domestic affairs, because these are published documents. They are public documents of an organisation called the National Planning Association, which I understand is an organisation of comparatively conservative people. They say:

"We believe the test control issue should now be separated from others, and that our country should take prompt initiative for a world-wide test control programme."

This is not along the same lines as the remarks of Commander Noble.

Again, I say that we entirely support the idea that controls should be effective. But we would not say that, because controls are not yet effective, we cannot do this. We should not plead machinery in bar of an objective.

In this way, the enormous volume of world public opinion that is welling up, expressing itself in different ways, is something that we cannot ignore, because world public opinion really represents the side that is most affected, namely, the victim.

The third argument is that other weapons cannot be developed if there are no
tests. Well, for myself, I would say: "Thank God that they cannot be developed." But, since the ban should be on all weapons that carry nuclear or thermonuclear power, I do not see the force of this argument. If the argument is that we can still manufacture the kinds of weapons that have already been manufactured even if there are no tests, we say that in addition there is the matter of the radioactivity that is spread - and, what is more, it is only another argument to push us on toward obtaining the total prohibition of these weapons of war.

Fourthly, my Government thinks that a decision by the great powers concerned, endorsed by the Assembly, as it would be - an appeal to other countries not to make these things and to explode them - would reverse the trend towards war.

In all that I have said, I have tried to show that in the last ten years, instead of disarming, we are rearming, and what the world wants most is to reverse that. Even if we agreed, for the sake of argument, that cessation of tests is not disarmament, nevertheless its political and psychological and emotional effects would be such that there would be a wave of feeling away from war. As Mr. Walter Nash has pointed out, that would probably be the most important consequence of such a step.

Moreover, once the test question is out of the way, with all the feeling that arises from the immediacy of its possibilities and other factors that surround it, it would be easier to take up a comprehensive disarmament programme - and I am here to commit my Government to any effort that pushes all the other aspects of disarmament.

We therefore say that not only is there no case against cessation, but everything is in its favour.

So much for the cessation of tests.

There are two other items on the agenda that I want to discuss, one relating to the disarmament problem as a whole and the other to the problem of military budgets. But I should not like to proceed to that without referring to another topic that is to be discussed at Geneva and that is included in the Western resolution - that is, the matter of surprise attacks. I am free to confess that countries of our size, situated as we are, are not motivated very much by these considerations. But I dare say that those who think in these terms have to do so, because they pay attention to it, and we are therefore happy there is agreement to consider this problem. But may I say, without being cynical, that a surprise attack about which there is so much talk and discussion can hardly be a surprise - a surprise prepared over a generation. But, on the other hand, if the fear is about another Pearl Harbour, I think it is a legitimate one.

We therefore hope that the attempt will be made to reach agreement and to
establish machinery of inspection and control, without unnecessary and mischievous interference in one another’s affairs or in such a way as to violate not only the sovereignty but the sense of dignity of people. We think that would be a great advance, and my Government would welcome any development that takes place in that way, because the consequence would be the removal of fear and the creation of confidence. It would remove another argument against disarmament, and it could also be another nail in the coffin of the "deterrent" theory. We therefore welcome the meeting in November to discuss the question of surprise attacks.

We also have a secret hope that all these discussions about surprise attacks will lead to a method of discovery of stockpiles. It is true that it has been said that there are no known methods of detecting stockpiles. However, the data that each side would have to place before the other in order to ensure that there would be no surprise attack would also lead inevitably, to some measure, to some statements with regard to existing stocks, and that would be a contribution toward disarmament. For that reason also, we welcome the November talks.

That takes us to the general problem of disarmament...

The Disarmament Commission has been functioning for many years. My delegation, during the sessions of the General Assembly, has been associated with the endeavours to make progress in that way. In 1954 a Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission was set up - first in the face of opposition, when the proposal came in here, and afterwards by general acceptance, proving what the representative of the United States has said, namely, that these debates do have the effect of creating flexibility.

Before the Disarmament Commission proposal after proposal has been made. I want to say this in no way of petty complaint, but these proposals are discussed; they are not thrown out of the window. And delegations such as ours agree to the practical idea that they should be referred to the Disarmament Commission for discussion, but year after year that has been opposed. The opposition, I am sorry to say, has come mainly from our friends of the United Kingdom. Equally, it was the United Kingdom which suggested in this Committee that those proposals, including the Indian proposal, should go before the Disarmament Commission.

So, after nearly eighteen months of argument, and continued representation by the Government of India, India’s proposals were received by the Disarmament Commission in 1956. I had the privilege of representing my Government on that occasion, and I am glad to state before this Committee that all the members of the Disarmament Commission, and not least of all the representatives of the United Kingdom and of France, welcomed the suggestions that we made in terms so embarrassing to me that I do not want to quote them. But at any rate they agreed to grant our request to be allowed to appear before them. They paid tribute to the
suggestions that we made, but nothing more came out of it.

We made many suggestions at that time, one of which was that there should be technical consultations on these matters. Those proposals and others made by various delegations had been sent time after time to the Disarmament Commission. Now this is the occasion to look at the whole of the disarmament problem and the disarmament machinery, because what we have is a situation where, in between sessions, there is discussion - in the last three or four years mainly in the Sub-Committee. Commission meets in order to forward the documents, they come here, there is a general debate, and the matter goes back to the Disarmament Commission. That was bad enough, but during the past twelve months the Disarmament Commission has stopped altogether. That is to say, the machinery of consultation, the machinery of what is euphemistically called connection with the United Nations, has disappeared altogether.

My Government, for one, welcomes the direct talks between the Powers mainly concerned which are in a position to stop these tests, but we think that it has to go on two lines - or several lines if you like. On the one hand, there should be these direct talks, but the general competence and the influence of the General Assembly ought to be upon them.

My Government, for one, welcomes the direct talks between the Powers mainly concerned which are in a position to stop these tests, but we think that it has to go on two lines - or several lines if you like. On the one hand, there should be these direct talks, but the general competence and the influence of the General Assembly ought to be upon them.

We regret that in the last twelve months the Disarmament Commission has not met and that there has been no progress in that direction. This brings to mind one or two matters. One is the matter which was put very much better than I can put it the other day by Mr. Noble when he said that no resolution that is passed, whatever the majority has any effect unless it has agreement. I believe he said this last year, and it was not a statement which met with much approval.

Last year the Indian delegation brought three draft resolutions before the General Assembly, one of which, appearing in document A/L.232 dated November 14, 1957, was to the effect that the great Powers, with such other assistance as might be required, should conduct a technical examination, with a commission to be set up for the purpose, of the one impediment to the cessation of test explosions, which was - if the speeches made are to be accepted at their face value, as they must be - the inability to detect them. The draft resolution came before the General Assembly, and it was rejected by 34 votes to 24, with 20 abstentions.

I think these abstentions are not only increasing but are becoming increasingly significant. The defeat of the draft resolution had minority support, taking the membership as a whole. But, in any case, we are happy that practically that suggestion is now before Geneva. The work has been done in that way, and the results are as they are set out. The Swedes had at that time conducted experiments which made the discovery of explosions possible even to the extent of the slightest consequence to the atmosphere of the world, and, without the consent of the Swedish Government, we produced that evidence before the Assembly last year.
As far as the Disarmament Commission is concerned my delegation wishes to submit that, on the one hand, we should not divorce this problem from the competence of the Assembly. I do not mean the logical, official or technical competence, but the Assembly’s generally having its hand on it. Secondly, in view of the experience not only of last year but of previous years, the time has come, perhaps to have a de novo approach to this problem in our opinion. We think that the only time when disarmament really gets any attention is when the Assembly meets. We believe that, as Mr. Lodge has pointed out, it has a very healthy effect on those who are thinking about this problem. It leads to flexibility, it leads, if you like, to some sort of light on any rigid position which may have the effect of ameliorating that situation. But where we differ from the representative of the United States is when he equates any assistance of a technical character which the Secretary-General may give with the United Nations as a whole. This is what Mr. Lodge tells us:

"Fourthly, there is the role of the United Nations. The United Nations has a vital responsibility in the field of disarmament."

No one could disagree with that. He then goes on:

"The last section of the draft resolution states explicitly how the conferences and the United Nations can assist each other. Operative paragraph 5 invites the forthcoming conference to avail themselves of the assistance and services of the Secretary-General. We are pleased that both sides in these conferences have in fact already been working with the Secretary-General to this end. This paragraph also calls for the United Nations to be kept informed about the forthcoming conferences. This is obviously important. Operative paragraph 6 reflects the significant role that the Secretary-General can play. He is invited, in consultation with the Governments concerned, to give such advice not only as may seem appropriate to facilitate the current developments, but also with respect to any further initiatives on disarmament. Finally, operative paragraph 7 assures that the deliberations of the General Assembly and the proposals made here should be taken into account by the States concerned.

My delegation yields to no one in connection with the part which the Secretary-General has played in the promotion of peace efforts during the last three years, especially in the Middle East, but the whole of this relates only to this particular conference in Geneva, the technical parts of it, and so on. It would be quite impossible to accept the contention that the views of Governments have to be communicated to the disarmament Powers or to the disarmament bodies second hand. We believe, therefore, that while all this may be subscribed to, and while it may be all-important, it does not exhaust the problem. The problem is that of the concern of the United Nations, expressed through the General Assembly, making its continuous impact upon these discussions to create a situation whereby the
separate conferences outside these meetings, whether here or anywhere else, must take place, with whatever the Secretary-General can do in this way being done. At the same time, the United Nations must be able to play its part, not for any reasons of what we call organisational selfishness or otherwise but because the impact of world public opinion comes only in that way.

I think, therefore, that - even forgetting the Disarmament Commission - instead of again trying these permutations of various combinations and various figures, we should get to a position where the United Nations General Assembly has more intimate contact with what is going on. Therefore, at the appropriate time when moving a draft resolution on our item - we have a draft resolution on one item only - we would suggest that full consideration should be given to this idea that the General Assembly as a whole should constitute the Disarmament Commission. Our permanent representatives live here the year round; disarmament is not a seasonal crop, but is with us always. And it is our view that, other methods having failed, the Assembly as a whole should have an interest in this matter.

This is not a suggestion that vital problems can be decided upon by public discussion or by debates. It gives the opportunity, for private discussion. It gives the opportunity to which Mr. Lodge referred, for the impact that brings about flexibility.

It gives the opportunity, if you like, of showing up those who are making difficulties. It gives the opportunity of the concern of various parts of the world to be more alive in the minds of those who have the responsibility than otherwise.

Therefore, we would, at the appropriate time, make a suggestion that the Disarmament Commission be composed of the eighty-one nations represented here; how it should function is a matter that will work itself out. Then there will be no question of some being left out or not left out. Even the smallest of us may have to make a contribution. We have heard a speech by the representative of Ghana a few minutes ago. Ghana is one of the smaller and newer countries of the world. Who would say, after hearing the representative of Ghana, that his concern, the part which he is to play in this, however different it may be from that of anyone else, is any less significant to his country and the world than any other?

The overall responsibility, said the representative of the United Kingdom, in referring to the preamble of the draft resolution, for disarmament still lies with us here in the United Nations. If I may say so, that word "still" is significant; as soon as possible we want to see substantive discussions on disarmament brought back into the United Nations so that the Organisation may be entitled to begin to discharge its responsibility. I think that any arrangements which we should make should not sort of isolate this problem and take it away and prevent the impact of opinion playing upon those concerned. At the same time it would be fatal that it
should prevent direct contacts between those primarily concerned or anyone else who would make a contribution. The efforts which we have made have been rather infructuous in the last two years. Any expansion of Disarmament Commission was totally opposed by the representative of France last year and the expansion as it was made caused the efforts to be infructuous because it did not work according to plan.

Therefore, we submit that the responsibility lies on the world as a whole and that the United Nations should be the Disarmament Commission. We believe that, in this way, attempts made in the very effective talks in Geneva, particularly in regard to inspection and control, will become transmitted to the general knowledge of the world and the growth of opinion in favour of effective inspection and control will develop; and inspection and control, instead of becoming a bar to consideration, will become an instrument of effective action.

There is also an item on the agenda in regard to military budgets. It is very difficult for us to pronounce on the most efficacious way of dealing with this, but in so far as it is an attempt to limit the quantum of armaments, I am sure that we are all in general agreement with it. It is not always possible to say what a certain quantity of money means in a country and, therefore, the actual detail of it must be left for study and discussion, but we would support any limitation in this way; and, while we are not one of the highly armed countries, I am sure that the Government of India would make its own modest contribution towards the scaling down of defence expenditures if there were any possibilities in that direction tending to lower tension in the world, particularly in our neighbouring areas.

I want to say here and now that when we are taking military expenditures into account, it is not sufficient to take into account the actual amount of money spent in the building of arms in a particular country; we must also take into account the expenditures incurred by providing arms to other people through the creation of armed stations elsewhere and by the whole system of military pacts. My country is definitely opposed to the system of military pacts, which not only has sent instruments of war, but has projected the machinery of war into otherwise non-warlike lands. We have been definitely opposed to this position always. Even in the last few years these pacts have shown definitely that they have no value. So, whether it be the line to the east or the line to the west, drawing in more and more countries to the so-called defence systems, they would become unnecessary in the general course of disarmament. But the continuation of the situation would, on the one hand, distribute arms more and more over the world and project the machinery of the cold war into areas where it should not. It creates deep concern in other areas, and while it would not affect us in any way, in many countries it would lead to greater armaments.

Looking at the proposals that have been made over the years, my delegation
finds that there are many proposals which are common, and if the idea of the General Assembly becoming the Disarmament Commission is seriously undertaken, then it should not be impossible to take either the greatest common measure of agreement in this or to take those items on each side, whichever contribute to the widest disarmament, and put them together. While it has incurred definite opposition from one of the great Powers, we should still have before us what may be called the abridgement of a disarmament convention. Then the discussions would be more concrete instead of always as they have been before. From 1955 onwards there have been various proposals, and we find that in regard to the reduction of conventional armaments there is a general degree of agreement. In regard to the second stage also there is general agreement, except that the question of political issues is tied up with it by one side and not by the other.

Our view is that disarmament will lead to the solution of political issues; and we should go back to the phraseology which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd put to us at one time, that progress in one field would result in progress in other fields.

There is a reference to disarmed manpower of other countries: all the more reason why those countries should be involved. Even the smallest country would hesitate to have an imposition on itself with regard to its military, civilian or other potential without consent.

With regard to nuclear disarmament, my Government wishes me to state that our position is and will remain unchanged. That is, there can be no disarmament in the world unless the world of nuclear Powers as a whole decides that the nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and their development for destructive purposes must come to an end. That is to say, we must implement the general decision of the Assembly in regard to the total prohibition and abandonment of nuclear weapons. But we do not say that it can be done without progressing from stage o stage; and small as it is, the stopping of these tests as the first stage, the introduction of control and inspection, and the confidence which it would create would lead towards that. Equally, we think that the development of long-range missiles is a greater danger and they would be checked by this process.

I made the proposal, on behalf of my delegation, that there should be a discontinuance of tests - and by discontinuance we mean discontinuance.

At this stage I might deal with the draft resolutions that are before us. His Excellency Prince Wan, the representative of Thailand, in discussing these draft resolutions, referred to the draft resolution submitted by India, I think almost alone. We have not had the privilege of knowing the views of the United Kingdom or others on it, but I believe they are probably sympathetically disposed to it, but do not want to say anything.
The main objection, in regard to the representative of Thailand - which is the only one I can take up at the present time - is that we have said here that there should be discontinuance "until agreement is reached." Two questions have been asked in the lobbies of the United Nations. What does the word "until" mean? It means "until," and nothing else.

Prince Wan asks us: Supposing there is no agreement at Geneva, then what happens? I would like to tell him what happens. What does he think should happen? If there is no agreement in Geneva, should there be continuance of these tests? The answer is that there should be agreement, if not in Geneva, then somewhere else. We should do everything to get agreement, and we say that tests should be kept discontinued until there is agreement. That is what it means. This would also mean, as a corollary, that if the discontinuance remains and one or the other of the three Powers should in spite of the discontinuance start explosions, then it would be for the Assembly to intervene.

That would be the occasion when there is a real breach, a real fear, that there would be no agreement at all. That is why we have said that we should proceed on the basis that there will be agreement that we should work for this agreement. The technical people have said it is possible.

We have heard statements of the United States and the Soviet Union that they are in favour of controls. The Soviet Union expresses itself as accepting the control position, and therefore all that remains on this is the devising of the machinery of control. The machinery of control has been tried in other contexts where there were great difficulties, and they have, if not one hundred per cent, succeeded. Even in the very difficult situation as between Israel and the Arab countries, we have had a degree of success in these arrangements, and we should try and pursue the methods either of direct balancing of positions as between the parties concerned or seek other methods.

Therefore, we say, in answer to the representative of Thailand, that what we mean is that there should be a cessation of tests, and not suspension which means that they will stop for some time and when something happens they start again. The only condition where discontinuance should be discontinued is where one of the parties starts all over again. It is agreed that a test explosion is not a surprise attack and therefore there is no danger involved. We therefore hope that the General Assembly will tell the great Powers concerned that there should be a discontinuance of these tests.

There is before the Committee the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) submitted by the United States and sixteen other countries. We have no objection to a great part of it. But we have certain objections to putting all these problems into the same draft resolution - not because they are not inter-related, but because we happen to be
discussing different items and this is not purely a procedural matter. The very fact that they are put together lends colour - not in our minds - to the fears that are entertained that it is intended to make the suspension conditional, interlinked, as it is called by others.

I say, with great respect to the representative of the United Kingdom, that there is some justification for this apprehension. If he will read his own speech, he will see it. In one part of his speech, he says that the suspension, as he calls it, can take place:

"Our ultimate aim is of course the final cessation of all nuclear weapons tests..."

There we part company. He says: "Our...aim is" - and that is what we are now trying to do - "cessation, because that is part of the aim of comprehensive disarmament..." This knocks the bottom out of the whole idea of cessation.

It is only in comprehensive disarmament that there can be a cessation, in the United Kingdom view. There is part of the aim of comprehensive disarmament which we hold constantly before us. We want the cessation of tests with real disarmament, because only thus will real security be achieved.

This word "with" is a very difficult word. It has the advantage that if the United Kingdom is so disposed, it can adopt for it a meaning which simply means "in the same direction." I looked up all the English dictionaries in the world on this, and I find that this little word has miles and miles of explanations. Therefore the word "with" can mean almost integration; it can also mean pointing in the same direction.

Therefore, if the representation of the United Kingdom would accept the view that the suspension points in the same direction, then we should all be happy. Thus, he does not abandon his word "with"; he remains with the "with." But if it means a condition precedent, the cessation is conditioned by the other fact; and, of course, if rearmament goes on in the world and there is no improvement in the position, a new situation arises. If anyone makes a breach of the cessation arrangement, then a cause arises for this purpose.

I would like, with great respect, to ask the representative of the United Kingdom whether a Government like mine has not reason to be apprehensive of this matter. When we brought this matter up before the General Assembly, with the United Kingdom itself, in early 1954, there was general enthusiasm. I submit that all the resistance to this has come from that quarter. First of all, we were asked to accept limitation of explosions, and some of our friends from Asia agreed with it to a certain extent. We were totally opposed to the idea of limitation of explosions because it legalised them and lent a colour of morality to it. A limitation of explosions, we thought, was licensing this evil - and that came up in 1955.
Then there are repeated statements that the suspension of tests must in the long run be conditioned upon the progress towards real disarmament. If there is no progress, then you use this as a lever to bring about progress. In our opinion, that is wrong.

Thirdly, we heard the position, after the first initial enthusiasm was over, that the main difficulty in regard to this was that the explosions could not be detected. At no time was the Government of India and its advisers of the opinion that there was any substance in this argument. Not for a moment did the people in Asia regard that there was substance. But from our point of view - and we have some knowledge on this matter, though very limited, and which now has been justified by the technical committee - I have stated this each time on behalf of my Government.

In 1956 we said:

"We have taken scientific advice, in our own and other countries, and we find that there is no valid reason to support the contention that large-scale explosions, explosions that could do the kind of damage which I have described, could take place in a concealed way."

I also said the following:

"No concealment of any effective character is possible in regard to this."

I further stated:

"...all the evidence that my Government has is to the effect that atomic, nuclear and thermonuclear explosions, under proper arrangements, are detectable... No one can say that it would be one hundred per cent detection, but the evasion of detection is almost impossible."

We went on to repeat this position. That enables me to say the following: If it is true that a one hundred percent detection cannot be assured, is it not also true that evasion would not be effective? We may not be able to detect explosions in a case - there may be a case where you cannot - but no country that commits an explosion will feel sure that they will not be found out. Is that not the basis of all law? Are there any policemen in any country who can prevent every misdemeanour or crime, a real crime or misdemeanour? The departure from law is prevented by the fear of that exposure. Non-exposure is not a certainty. Therefore, if it is true that all detection is not possible, it is equally true that all evasion is not beyond the bounds of detectability. I think I have made the submissions I have to make. We are not in favour of putting forward one resolution.
We hope the United States and its colleagues will consider this problem again. We hold no brief for every word that appears in the resolution that was put forward. There is no reference in the draft resolution of the Soviet Union to the attempts that will be made at Geneva, which we think is a great defect. We also cannot support that draft resolution for that reason. It creates suspicion in the minds of others because there is no reference to control. But in justification it must be said that any agreement means that there will be control; therefore, it is not necessary to state it. The two parties are not likely to come to an agreement unless there is control. Therefore, control is implicit; but, in our opinion, it should have been said.

The main defect from that point of view in both draft resolutions is that there is no reference to the return of this matter to the General Assembly. We think that whatever happens in Geneva - agreement, partial disagreement or disagreement - it ought to come back to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly which, so far as this item is concerned, should stand adjourned for the purpose, unless of course the idea of the whole Assembly becoming a Disarmament Commission finds acceptance in the minds of the Assembly as a whole.

Therefore, my submission is this: in view of the great dangers that face the world, in view of the fact that control and inspection is regarded by all responsible peoples as necessary and in view of the fact that suspension of these explosions would create a change in the psychology in regard to this and would bring hope to humanity, there is no alternative.

Prince Wan asks us, "What would you do if it were not effective?" I ask him the same question. Does he say that if there is no agreement in Geneva we should go on testing ad infinitum until the preparation for a more complete blowing-up of the world is in train? We are told that the present stockpile of weapons are enough to destroy civilisation as we know it. Why should we destroy the world more than once even though the once who think that when the contingency comes it must be met? If there is enough destructive power either to bring a war to a conclusive end or which will lead to total destruction, why should there be any more power than there is at the present time? There is no case whatsoever in the world for developing more massive weapons of destruction. I say this not in any sense which is beyond my competence, but this Assembly and the United Nations will live or fall by the contribution it makes in our time to the problem of disarmament, irrespective of political parties and affiliations and philosophies.

The world is tired of this conception of bearing the burden of arms. The world is tired of the idea of living under fear. The world is afraid that today we have the problem only of three Powers but that next year there may be four, there may be five or there may be six. Personally I do not subscribe to just six Powers; there might be forty or fifty because it will be purveyed to other people; whether they make it or not they will have it; we should have the imaginativeness to see the
consequences of these things as great as they are.

Perhaps even soon after New Mexico and soon after Hiroshima it would have been possible to use restraint with greater ease, but there is no use for us to go back, to look back into the past except for gaining experience. Therefore, the survival of this Organisation as a body that is in the service of humanity, the promotion of its objects, the prevention of evil that must come to succeeding generations is involved; even according to this conservative representative committee of the United Nations, which says that even the explosions that have already taken place can have genetic effects on from 2,000 to 100,000 people every year - that means that there is a progressive deterioration.

Even knowing that damage has been done, it is the appeal of my Government to these great and powerful nations which have contributed so much to humanity. Whether we agree with them in one way or another, they have brought full succour, shelter, sanitation and education; they have made great contributions to human knowledge in the conquests of space and time. They have helped the endeavours of other underdeveloped nations like ours to come forward. The masses of the people, from which are not excluded the statesmen who govern their countries, want to see an era of peace. But peace will not drop from heaven. We must be prepared to make an effort, this small effort that is now required to tell the world that we shall reverse this armaments race, whatever its cost.

We have been told they will suspend tests for a year and are prepared to continue. Why introduce into this act of faith that element of fear and suspicion which nullifies it? The appeal of my Government, therefore, to the United States, to the Soviet Union and to the United Kingdom is that they report to this Assembly before it rises that there has been an agreement in regard to the cessation of these test explosions; that is to say, the explosions of all weapons of mass destruction, which will bring relief and hope to humanity and, what is more, bring faith to us in the United Nations that in spite of all the failures of the last ten years, in spite of the many speeches we have delivered and the large numbers of resolutions we have adopted, the various ways of balancing the minority with a unanimous vote, which is like covering a crack in the wall with a piece of tissue paper - all that must belong to the past.

We make this fervent appeal to everyone concerned, and we hope that it will be agreed that in view of the very closeness of this problem, in view of the possibility of doing something and in view of all the consequences I have spoken about, we will be able to have a special resolution on these tests, to come to a decision of a character which will enable us to review the results of the decision very shortly. Then we can go on to the problem of disarmament in such a way as to make our functioning in this more operative. What is more, we all can do as Poland and some other countries have done, either in the way of denial of our space for these purposes or our voluntary desire to limit military expenditure - I speak of the responsibility in this matter. Through all this we will have taken a
step forward.