

STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 2, 1959¹

[During 1959, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America held discussions in Geneva for drafting a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. They observed a voluntary suspension of testing.

In the second half of the year the Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America agreed on the establishment of a ten-nation Disarmament Committee with equal representation from the two sides and this was welcomed by the Disarmament Commission.

Later that year, the General Assembly considered, on the proposal of the USSR, an item entitled "general and complete disarmament." The USSR, the United Kingdom and France submitted proposals or suggestions. After discussion, the Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution - 1378 (XIV) of November 20, 1959 - sponsored by all 82 members of the United Nations. It called upon Governments "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution" to the question of "general and complete disarmament" which "is the most important one facing the world today."

The following is Mr. Menon's statement on the 82-nation draft resolution.]

I CAN DO NO BETTER TO PLACE THIS SUBJECT IN ITS CONTEXT than to read out to the Committee the most recent statement of our Prime Minister, after this item was placed on the agenda:

"There are few problems that call for more calm judgement than the issue of war. Yet, the approach to, and consideration of, this problem is more often than otherwise in the context of emotion, passion or prejudice, or at best in terms of pious virtue and sentiment. This is true whether it be of its causes and, as some argue, its justification, or, as humanity ardently desires, the abolition of war."

It goes on to say:

"It is unrealistic, and indeed perilous, to rest in the belief that this world of ours will be rid of the scourge of war and that war will be abandoned as a method of settling disputes and problems, merely because there is a general desire for peace. Too often this desire is coupled with placing the onus of existing tensions and threats to peace and of their calamitous

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prospects on others - individual national leaders, nations or groups of them. The plea for peace has thus become inseparable from political acrimony, and almost the language of war is used to promote peace! All this is part evidence that possibly the desire for peace, though well nigh universal, is not yet an informed and instructed desire, nor is it free from some of the very factors that threaten civilisation with a holocaust.

"We have to use our informed thinking to understand and assess these causes, and their relation to war and war institutions, their place in national and international politics, economy and thought, and seek to adapt and orient them in terms of our evaluation in relation to war or its avoidance."

It is in the background of this way of thinking that my delegation seeks to present its views to the Committee.

For two years prior to this session there was no discussion of disarmament in the organs of the United Nations proper, since the Disarmament Commission was not able to meet except to perform its formal functions or to pass on whatever there was. But although there had been no discussion in these buildings or in what is called the narrow context of the United Nations, there perhaps has not been any period at which more intensive discussions have taken place than in the last two years between the people who are in the best position to deliver the goods. This is not to say that disarmament or the establishment of peace is the responsibility of a few Powers, however great or small, or however important in one way or another. But it is to point out that the method of direct discussion represents, on the one hand, the realisation that one way or another, irrespective of the channel through which communications take place, results must be achieved.

As a result of this, there have been talks in Geneva, as we all know, on various items and aspects of this problem, and some practical agreements or progress to agreements have been reached. This progress, the pace of it, quick or slow, as we look at it, and what has not been reached, are all reflective of the present state of the problem and its difficulties.

I would like to say however - and from the point of view of our delegation it is very important - that the present debate procedurally does not emerge from the Geneva talks. We are not discussing either the progress or the report of the Geneva discussions. They proceed procedurally and therefore on merit from the item put before the Assembly by one of the delegations, the delegation of the Soviet Union, after the Assembly met and after it was thrown together with another item, and therefore it has political meaning. We are discussing an item which has arisen from the context of factors that emerged after we met here. In other words, we in the discussion of this matter may not water it down back to our

old controversies and also forget the newer elements and approaches imported into it.

But at the same time, I think it would be wrong to suggest that this main problem of a warless world, as my delegation termed it in the discussion in the general debate, is a new thing to the world or indeed in the context of modern debates. One can go back to antiquity and refer to theological phrases:

"They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift sword against nation. Neither shall they learn war any more."

That is in the modern world, the last 2000 years. But if we go further back there are references in the same way. But for the purpose of our present controversy, apart from the history of the previous age in Europe, even in recent times, that is since the Disarmament Commission was set up, there have been definite proposals placed before us through the various organs, principally by the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

Now, if I will not tax the patience of the Committee, I should like to read two or three of these small extracts - and perhaps go a little backward. It is usual in these halls to speak rather cynically about what has been called the "Geneva spirit." That is because we approach things with spirit-like approach in a desire to count the material advantages that come out of them, or we are unable to assess the effects of that spirit upon action.

On July 28, 1955, President Eisenhower, speaking on war at Geneva said:

"I came to Geneva because I believe mankind longs for freedom from war and rumours of war. I came here because of my lasting faith in the decent instincts and good sense of the people who populate this world of ours. I return home tonight with these convictions unshaken and with the prayer that the hope of mankind will one day be realised."

He went on to say about the same time:

"I want to give you a few reasons for hope in this project. First, the people of all the world desire peace, not a peace of the mere stilling of the guns, but a peace in which they can live happily, tranquilly and in confidence; in which they can raise their children in a world of which they will be proud. That common desire for peace is a terrific force in this world, and one to which I believe all the political leaders in the world are beginning to respond."

If I may say so, with great respect, we do not pay adequate attention to that last sentiment in this extract which I read out to you.

Now, we come to a more recent statement of the President of the United States, that is, only a few days ago on September 17, 1959, he said:

"The basic principle is that we have the conviction, first of all, that mutual disarmament, universal disarmament is really the one great hope of the world living in peace in future years."

The following day we heard the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union say to us:

"The peoples are thirsting for peace; they want to live without fear for their future, for their destinies, without fear of losing their loved ones in the conflagration of a new war... For centuries the peoples dreamed of getting rid of the destructive means of warfare."

"We say sincerely to all countries: To counter-balance the slogan 'Let us arm,' which is still current in some quarters, we put forward the slogan 'Let us completely disarm.' Let us rather compete in who builds more homes, schools... for his people, produces more grain, meat, milk, clothing and other consumer goods; let us not compete in who has more hydrogen bombs or more missiles."

At the end of their historic interview, which is not merely a matter for the United States and the Soviet Union, but for the world as a whole in view of the subject, they stated:

"The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States agreed that the question of disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. Both Governments will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem."

I will not read these any more because the members of the United Nations are familiar with most of them.

There have been statements of this kind right through history, and our effort in the establishment of peace is still in the midst of a mental conflict and confusion. Taking the modern world, and if I may briefly survey, going back to the time of the Roman empire, they established what Mahatma Gandhi called "the peace of the grave." That is, they conquered the empire of the Greeks, then they went on to conquer others, and conquered Britain and Gaul, even though the Teutons and Asiatics united against them. And they said, "There is peace." That kind of peace is the peace that comes out of a doctrine of balance of power. That is the kind of peace established by negotiation from strength, as it is called - a very badly

coined phrase. Also, that is the kind of peace where we regard powerful instruments of destruction as deterrents and agents of peace. Here again if I may go back to Mahatma Gandhi's ideas, you can never get peace out of war. We are to equate means to our ends; and out of wrong means we never get good ends. So from that time onwards, there have been attempts.

Coming near to the statements of President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchey, and the others, about a world that is rid of all arms, and we live in a condition, I hope, where disputes and problems between nations shall be resolved not by the instrument of war. There have been many attempts at peace making... And each time the establishment of peace has been based upon the balance of power. Introduced into it is one of those doctrines that appeals to the national spirit of peace and also the desire to survive, the doctrine that is called "self-defence" which has appeared in our time by, in our opinion, a misrepresentation of the Charter and Article 51. Self-defence will exist only in conditions where nations, fully armed, are living in a state of peace by some sort of uncomfortable agreement. Self-defence in the conditions of a disarmed world would become unnecessary because the defence of any part of the world will become the competence and the obligation of the entire world.

I intended to go through these various attempts, which have failed, because reference has been made about the sentimental character of this approach - and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, for example, was quoted as one of those attempts that became abortive. Well, first of all, just because we have tried and failed, is not a reason not to try again until peace is established. But what is more, conditions have changed so much, not merely in degree but in kind, going to the basic quality of it. The current of history, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia to the various treaties and conventions resulting in the Hague Conventions and the establishment of the League of Nations, all that was based upon the previous ideas.

But now we have this situation: Right through modern history, in between two wars, the statesmen of the world get together and say "Let us have peace." And they spend the inter-war years preparing for the next war - quite unconsciously, perhaps - in case peace does not come. So much is their faith in removing mountains that they open their windows in the morning to see if the mountain is still in front of it. Therefore, while it was possible in past years that in the intervening periods of the wars we could discuss peace in order to establish it, and do it again after the next war, we have different circumstances now in that we will not have the facility to discuss peace if there is another war in modern times. There will be no ruins to repair in the same way. This, of course, has changed the entire situation, even discussing peace.

My country is convinced that there is no half-way house between peace and war. That is why we want to devote some of the time that we take at this meeting to

point out that there is a fundamental difference of approach in these matters, and while it is necessary to talk about control and disarmament, the size of guns and the reduction of troops - we shall have something to say about all these things - it is equally necessary to understand that the objective we have in view is not the balanced limitation of armaments. The balanced limitation of armaments is only a method of being able to throw away all arms. There is no possibility of achieving any of the things we have spoken about unless we have a world in which there are no national forces for so-called national security. This is not again either a new thought or something that we managed - my delegation or my part of the world.

On April 24, 1952, the United States of America - which I suppose represents in a very typical way Western civilisation - presented a document in the Disarmament Sub-Committee. Since the document is available, I will not read it all out. But it says here:

"The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible as a means of settling disputes between nations."

My delegation submitted the same type of thing in so many resolutions and also made its appeal on behalf of the Government of India in our commemorative session at San Francisco. But it is one thing for a comparatively underpowered nation - economically, politically and militarily - to speak about this; it is another for the Heads of two Governments of the most powerful countries, to put that forward as a problem of political policy.

"To achieve this goal," said the United States, "all States must cooperate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world; (a) in which its armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no State will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war, and (b) in which no State will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other States having knowledge of such preparations..."

Again, it goes on to say:

"To reach and keep this goal, international agreements must be entered into by which all States would reduce their armed forces to levels and restrict their armaments, types and quantities necessary for (a) the maintenance of internal security, (b) fulfilment of obligations of States to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

"Such international agreements must ensure by a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme..."

My delegation does not necessarily agree with all the details set out, but we have read them out in order to point out that from the beginning of time there has been this attempt to try to talk about the bringing down of arms. Even conservative statesmen such as a British Conservative Prime Minister said years ago:

"Is not the time come when the powerful countries of Europe should reduce their armaments... when they should be prepared to declare that there is no use in such overgrown establishment. What is the advantage of one Power greatly increasing its army and navy? Does it not see that other Powers will follow out its example? No increase of relative strength will accrue to any one Power. The true interest of Europe is to come to some accord so as to enable every country to reduce those military armaments which belong to a state of war rather than of peace."

This was said as early as 1841, and we are still discussing the same problems.

To come nearer to our time, with regard to the First World War, which was the war previous to the last one, the British Foreign Secretary, who had the responsibility of declaring war at that time, said a few years after the war:

"What was the underlying cause which had been working for years to bring about war?... It was, in my opinion, the great growth of armaments before the war. Before the war, it was often said that great armaments were a protection against war. Now, if we were wiser after the event" -

this is 1922 after the 1914 War-

"we should never say that again... The moral of the last Great War, and the state of Europe before it, was that great armaments did not prevent war; they brought war about. That was one lesson. Another lesson was that if war came on a modern scale no victory would enable the conqueror to escape from the awful suffering which war caused. And the next war, if it ever came, would be far more terrible than the last."

All this looks elementary today in the context of atomic destruction.

I think it was the representative of Greece who, in speaking to us, said:

"It is necessary for us, while discussing this matter and speaking about a world without war or even universal disarmament, to look at the thing in a realistic fashion and consider what are the reasons."

But before we do that I would like to refer to the fact that we are discussing this item in the context of a draft resolution sponsored by eighty-two countries. It is a good newspaper story. I am sure it warms the corners of our hearts to feel that for

the first time the co-sponsoring of a draft resolution by all the countries of the world represented here is on this subject. But it has more than one effect and more than one reaction. When everybody cosponsors it, it may become nobody's business. Apart from that, it is likely to be regarded that the whole of this debate is a kind of shadow boxing or going through the motions of debate.

So far as we are concerned, the universal support of this draft resolution is not without precedent, and a precedent which did not have the consequences we desired it should have. In 1957, we had a resolution in this Assembly, after an acrimonious debate which, even though it was not sponsored by the eighty-two countries, was carried unanimously. After 1957, the result not of the resolutions but of the general turn of events was that there had been no progress in the Disarmament Commission. Therefore, this resolution should not be merely dismissed by us with the thought that here is a universal agreement. In that case, we need not discuss anything at all. I submit that it represents, on the one hand, the anxieties of Governments and States in regard to this problem. It represents also encouragement, support. If it were the beginning, I would say that it represents a good send off, a good push to the ten-Power efforts that are being made, to the discussions that are going on at Geneva, to the coming together of two great countries with their friends on either side. All this is represented by this draft resolution.

Therefore, we do not approach this merely from the point of view that we are one of the eighty-two countries and, consequently, the result must be a foregone conclusion from the point of view of obtaining a vote. In fact, we have hardly ever made speeches here with a view to influencing votes. They are decided in other ways. But in this particular case, the decision of the Assembly is a foregone conclusion. This is the opportunity for us, for those who are outside these discussions in their narrow context and those who may not have had the opportunity to present their views in the course of the discussions in this Committee, to express our views. Repeatedly in the speeches of the great Powers or the participants in the ten-Power meeting and indeed in all the other speeches, it has been said that whatever is said here may be communicated to the ten-Power meeting. Of course, this is an old story. This also indicates that world Governments, large and small, have become very concerned.

But if we could be satisfied with a resolution of this kind, we could go back to the history of the United Nations in regard to the disarmament business. As early as January 24, 1946, this Organisation, at its first session, passed resolution 1(I), the first resolution that was passed. It appointed an Atomic Energy Commission and said that it

"shall proceed with the utmost dispatch and inquire into phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible."

These were the concrete things it had to do: exchange of scientific information, control of atomic energy, elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and other major weapons of mass destruction, effective safeguards against violations.

In resolution 41 (I) of the same session, the Assembly recommended to the Security Council

"that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connection with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments."

Resolutions have been passed in this way. Similarly, smaller delegations, less significant delegations like mine, have repeatedly submitted proposals. While one has no desire to refer to them from any point of view of selfish nationalism, it is as well for the Committee to be reminded that the Disarmament Commission was repeatedly asked by resolution 704 (VII), resolution 715 (VIII), resolution 808 (IX) and resolution 914 (X) to consider proposals made in this Committee in their Commission. So far as we are concerned, resolution 808 (IX) and resolution 914 (X) of two separate sessions were specifically referred by name to the Disarmament Commission. The only result it produced was a certain amount of encomium and praise from leaders of the disarmament movement like Jules Moch, who said that they were very good, but we heard no more about them. What is more, it took two years before the Disarmament Commission found out that there were now procedural difficulties in allowing the delegation of India to present its proposals.

This is not said by way of complaint but only to point out that these proposals, proposals of the character made in this Assembly, have taken several years in order to reach a point of more practical consideration. Since there is no time, I will not read them but merely state what they say. These resolutions referred to an armaments truce, a United Nations peace fund, the enlargement of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, the cessation of tests, budgetary reduction, the stopping of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and a ban on the use of fissionable materials for military purposes. So it is not as though the topics were not discussed. All this has been referred to. But we approach this from a different point of view as well.

My Government desires attention to be drawn to some of the problems that have been discussed in this debate, largely with a view to presenting our view as to their inapplicability or applicability. Reference has been made to the fact that only if we remove these causes to a considerable extent would it be possible to take effective steps. We are not attempting any psychological examination or

academic discussion of this matter. But the main problem, as the representative of Greece pointed out, was the problem of national security.

So long as this problem of national security is considered as an exclusive concern or, very largely, of national concern, then we are bound to have the problems of keeping arms, increasing those arms, as said by Lord Grey, and afterwards making those arms themselves the cause of war. In our opinion also, this lack of security arises on the one hand because of the egoistic feelings of nations with regard to their cultural, racial or other superiorities, or the conception that some people are born to rule and others are not, and that great nations and small nations are to a certain extent eliminated by the composition of the United Nations itself, in status but not in function. It also arises from the fact that nationalism often outflows its national frontiers and, not satisfied with flying aloft the flag of that country in their own territory, they desire to plant it in others.

That is why people like ourselves are unashamed to repeat, time after time, that empire and colonies are the cause of wars, even in their attenuated state, because of the desire for expansion, the desire and search for other land; what is more, the necessity to raise the size of national arms, not merely to protect their borders but to protect territories that are far away from them, calls upon them to demand more and more armament.

Thirdly, comes what is now very fashionable and more current, and that is the ideological conflicts. These ideological conflicts are not new to us. In more modern times there were the Crusades in the Holy Land against the Infidel. The Infidel is the fellow whom you do not like, and the Holy man is oneself. Ideological conflicts, therefore, are not new. But in the view of my delegation, the ideological conflict is largely a propaganda instrument, largely a motive power perhaps to already other existing factors and very often used by those who want to retain certain ideas or interests in order to get mass support.

Ideological controversies will disappear only when we begin to respect the human mind and realise that there is no conquest of an idea, bad or good. If it is a bad idea, as we see it, it must be counter-balanced not by another bad idea but by a good one. Therefore, we are likely in this time, largely on account of the propaganda that has gone on from either side, to give a place to the ideological controversies which to the future historians will appear rather exaggerated.

Then, of course, there are the economic conflicts. The economic conflicts, in old times, regarded part of the world as the producers of raw materials, and the other manufacturers, where it was thought that the invisible exports from a country in the way of services would in some form be used as an economic hold on the others, where in order to retain one part of the world as prosperous, another part must remain poor and, what is more, those positions being stabilised or buttressed by the building of heavy barriers in the way of trade; coming in the way of traffic

between nation and nation, euphemistically called "tariff walls." All these things have been responsible for creating rivalry between peoples.

However - and we may congratulate ourselves in so thinking - there is one course which nobody now speaks of in respectable society, and that is what is called "war muscle," that war is necessary in order to make people what they are. I remember seeing a show some years ago in New York where the father tells a son that he must be a cannibal. And he said, "I will not eat a man." Then the father says: "What has happened to you? You cannot eat a man! Have you gone soft?" So the wars must have appeared to Mussolini. He is no longer prevalent and that is one great advantage we have gained.

We say, therefore, that security must not merely be a national affair. It should not merely be a question of, in the name of self-defence, getting together in order to form great war groups and accumulating arms to cause further wars. The idea of expansionism must go, and where large areas of the world are today in the possession of groups of people, which on the one hand creates controversies and, on the other, makes necessary the retention of arms either to suppress unwilling populations or in order to prevent the territory from being taken by somebody else, that will also have to go.

Therefore, the emerging action, in order to be possible, must accept this view of a warless world.

It is not possible to give commands to national States' sovereignty unless you can back it with the power of sanction, and if the power of sanction is present in some one, that power must effectively be greater than those against whom the sanction is exercised. If there are groups working together, other groups come in. Therefore, in the submission of my delegation, so long as it is thought that peace can be established by methods of war, there will be no peace, there will be these arguments about disarmament.

The new item which is called "General and Complete Disarmament," which as I have said, has respectable support from all quarters, in our view means a world without war, which lives under a world law where it is possible not only to bring down the size of armies, but to abandon them altogether. This calls for a degree - not an absolute one - of economic equality as between peoples in the world, looking upon disarmament as a significant step towards peace and not using the resources of a nation in order to arm countries which do not require arms for their own defence but only require them for purposes of alliances and what not.

This attempt has a rather sordid history in the past. Nowadays we talk about arms that will fire only in one direction. When we say to our friends, "These war alliances are threatening to us," they turn around and say, "They are not intended against you." Our answer is that the guns that fire only in one direction have not

been made. But then, in older times, it was even worse. If one looks at the Patent Office Library in the United Kingdom, one will find that there was a gentleman who patented a weapon in 1870. He said: "I have a new type of gun which is a gun that fires automatically and prevents invaders from boarding ships." The Turks at that time were a powerful people and he claimed great advantage for this war-like invention. He said that it was

"a new type of gun or machine, called 'defence' that discharges so often, and so many bullets, and can be so quickly loaded as to render it next to impossible to carry any ship boarding."

Its peculiar virtue lay in the fact that it was constructed with two sets of magazines, one for round bullets for fighting Christians, and the other for square bullets with sharp edges to be used against the Turks.

This was the old days. I read this not because of morbid interest, but because we have moved on. We are not after all so bad as humanity; we have moved on to the idea that there must be some equality in offensive weapons and, therefore, we have banned some of these things, and introduced new ones, of course.

Then there is also the idea that if weapons are made, they must be sufficiently respectable for innocent people to carry. Therefore, it is interesting to recall that one of the armaments which were wielded by soldiers in this olden time was an old mace made of iron or steel, capable, in skilled hands, of breaking the strongest body armour. A point about this mace was that it might be properly used in war by priests and Bishops instead of a sword, so that it might conform to the canonical rule against their shedding of blood. Apparently, if you knock your head, you do not shed blood.

I well remember my history master explaining this difference and pointing out with ironic gusto that Bishops and maces could take effective part in hand-to-hand warfare by breaking a limb or battering out a brain. So that humanity has gone through all this foolishness of trying to camouflage something.

The alternative to the mace today - and I hope that nobody will take offence at it - is a clean bomb; that is, instead of a dirty bomb, you have a clean bomb; instead of a sword, you have a mace. All this leads to the following. It is not, as a great man said, a matter of physics, but a matter of ethics. How well arms may be abandoned, so long as war is not banished from the world as an instrument of policy, depends to a certain extent on individual minds. To the mind of my delegation the main purpose of this debate must be, as we shall point out later, to create a change of climate where we are no longer aiming to be killed by nine-inch guns and not by nineteen-inch guns, but already to avoid the whole purpose of killing.

Therefore, in the modern version there are various humane weapons where radiation does not come out and, what is more, there is the idea that these instruments are not intended for the purpose of war. I beg to submit, I presume to do so, that if children have toys they will play with them. Unfortunately, the vast capacity of man in the field of technology, particularly between the days of October 4, 1957, and today, has advanced beyond all known limits and has not been matched by his growth in culture or imagination or even by the idea that if he hurts somebody he will hurt himself. It always reminds me of what the great British general, Lord Montgomery, once said. He said that the safest place in the next war would be that nearest to the enemy because the radiation would go away from him and not towards him.

Therefore, this problem as it is presented to us and as we must present it before the world, has a different orientation, that we are not looking to a number of people who will be like a protection squad in order to use physical force, and unless this is done we are not likely to get anywhere.

Apart from anything else, the reason, of course, is this. With modern weapons, and I do not only mean atomic weapons; to a certain extent the danger is greater when it is agreed that we rely only upon molecular weapons, because we may go back to the wars of those times. In modern times, even without any deliberate attempt at waging war, the mistaken judgement of somebody, the Machiavellian policy of someone, or the conveying of wrong news, purposely or otherwise, can lead to difficulties.

I will not refer to any more recent instances because it might arouse feelings, but it is possible today, for example, that an aeroplane which is carrying atomic bombs for practice purposes may pick up phenomena in the sky on the radar screen which might be mistaken for an aircraft of some other country, yet it might be a large bird or a meteor, and the pilot would drop his bombs somewhere. Again, there may be such a situation as that which precipitated the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, when King Frederick William of Prussia, aided by Bismarck, was endeavouring to ensure that Prince Albert would go to Spain in order that France might be beaten out of the business. What he did was to edit a press telegram so that it appeared as something different from what it was. He thus created a war mentality and precipitated the war, even though Napoleon Bonaparte might have waged war without that. Therefore, we have to create this climate of peace if we are to get anywhere.

We have before us the Soviet proposal which contains this main objective, which is what moves us the most, in spite of what is called "the lack of realism." It has tacked on to it certain proposals which some may think rather vitiate it, but, on the other hand, the Russians claim that they are being realistic. And there are certain specific proposals, all of which we have heard about in this room so many times, but since time is going on, my Government desires its views to be expressed on

these matters, not in order to have a premature discussion, but because we will have no other opportunity of presenting these views in this way.

I will first take the United Kingdom proposals. Now, as is known, the United Kingdom is very close to us and usually there are consultations, not on matters of defence, but generally speaking. At least we know their mind and they know ours, which is a great advantage. What is more, the British people, as they would all admit, have a very pragmatic view of things, what Lord Dickenson called "a sense of fact." Therefore, I am personally rather disappointed that my good friend, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, has put forward these proposals on which we have to make remarks and observations which he might not accept.

The programme is divided into three stages, and we would say that these three stages would only take us to the beginning of disarmament. That is the first point. The second point is that the first stage and the second stage really does not carry us far at all, because we are told that we must find methods of cut-off, and then there is some talk about outer space, something about nuclear weapons, which is already being discussed and something about surprise attack. My delegation does not say that all this is not necessary; all we do say is that the first stage, as a milestone even as conventional type of disarmament discussions, does not take us very far, but it does represent an attitude and an approach which desires to see a beginning made. We therefore hope that this first stage will be taken as something that is already taking place or has taken place.

Next we come to the position where it is sought to implement this. Here we have certain observations to make, particularly in regard to proposal D, and I hope the United Kingdom delegation will try to appreciate our point of view in this. In the first stage, under proposal D, we would pursue the idea of handing over specific quantities of designated types of armaments to the custody of an international organisation. I find it difficult to describe my consternation at this proposal that Mr. Hammarskjold must have a large armoury where all these weapons that other people have discarded, not because they are useful, can be placed. Field Marshal Hammarskjold will be in charge of this large quantity of arms to convert him into a new Napoleon. This is not a laughing matter; it is a very serious matter. This is going the wrong way. The orientation is wrong. It is the way of trying to establish peace and abandon war by a collection of arms.

What are these arms of specific quantities and designated type? They would include the hydrogen weapon, the atom weapon, flame throwers, napalm bombs and what not. Presumably they would include all the poison gases in the world and all the bacteriological weapons and I fear, also the instruments of psychological warfare. While this is not the time to analyse proposal D in detail, my delegation wishes the ten-Power Committee to take this particularly into account. This is not a question of difference or of variation in detail. It is an entirely different and in our view an erroneous method of approach to collect

these large arms and place them at the disposal of an international organisation. That will become clear when we speak about the international police force.

With regard to the question of outer space while we hope that a study of that will be pursued, it does not come in the way of progress in what is called the first stage.

I turn now to the French proposal. As usual, Mr. Moch presents novel ideas with great sincerity, and everybody would support anything that would stop the use of weapons. But we are not looking at the matter purely from the point of view of disarming an individual. What we are told is this: if the vehicles, the carriers, which deliver all these terrific weapons were made difficult to obtain by their non-manufacture, if we tackled the problem of the carriers, then we would get somewhere.

My delegation was at first impressed by this idea when we heard about it, but then we thought about the matter and we found that while the highest speed vehicle that today carries atomic weapons would be out of the way, we would still have passenger aircraft travelling at 1,500 miles an hour, and, to start with, that would be adequate. After a couple of days, others would be produced. The history of Germany in the interwar years and its capacity to put Messerschmidts and what not and, ultimately, their V-bomb into the sky is an indication that a cutting out of these vehicles would not be sufficient.

What we want is not to abolish the carrier, but the carried. It is the atom bomb that is carried which must come off. We would not make any objection to the abolition of vehicles intended for this purpose but we say that this should not be regarded as being effective enough to prevent the delivery of bombs because there would be vehicles fast enough for this purpose.

Another aspect is that among the vehicles must be included the bases because the base is probably the most potent carrier. It is from there that these intercontinental or other weapons would go out; and now we are told that these bases may well be under water and, therefore, unless these proposals are viewed from that point of view, we shall be in difficulties.

Then there are the Soviet proposals, which are well-known to this Assembly. But here we want to say that my country stands fully for the necessity of organisation, of inspection, control and all those things that appear, unfortunately, essential in an imperfect society like ours. But at the same time, this controversy as to which should come first has always appeared to us as unreal - the chicken or the egg. We think that any disarmament proposal carries within it the whole machinery of control. One could agree with the idea that a control machinery should be established and left there in the hope that disarmament will come afterwards. In our view, therefore, whenever any disarmament, however small or large, takes

place, it should not even wait for the control machinery; the progress towards it should not be lax or slowed down because the other is not ready. It was for that reason that, several years ago, we suggested that the Secretariat might draft, even if it were not accepted, the blueprint of a disarmament treaty so that discussions would be on specific problems instead of saying which should come first and which should not.

To a certain extent we have discovered, by Mr. Lodge's phrase, built-in systems, and when he explains that you will probably understand. If it properly goes along with the disarmament proposals - that is to say, if we are abandoning guns of such and such size and this is the way we shall inspect it - then I do not think that any reasonable person can object to it.

Mr. Lodge has asked us three categorical questions. They are not quite in place here, but, since my time is getting on, I shall take them out of turn. One is with regard to the international police force.

To a certain extent, my delegation has expressed its views in a statement before the General Assembly. The Government of India is totally opposed to the formation of an international police force by allocating units of a national force for that purpose for these various reasons.

First of all, a police force that functions in the context not of a warless world, but of a world with national arms, would have to have at its disposal all that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd would give to Mr. Hammarskjöld. That is to say, this police force would at least have to be as big or powerful as all the national armies put together. Therefore, we would have to create a super-leviathan for the international police force, which would be a menace to mankind, apart from its heavy cost; and it would also try to improve its weapons, so that the competition, instead of being between the Americans and the Russians, would be between the international community of the United Nations and the Americans and Russians put together. That is a very fine spectacle. Therefore, the idea of an international police force composed of a lot of soldiers and equipment and everything else, and this great project of peace converted into an armoury with all that goes with it, is not an idea to which my Government can lend its support. I submit that an international police force is what it says. It is not only international; it must be police and its force must be used for that purpose.

A police force by definition is a force that is used against people who are under certain common law and, what is more, are not people whom one faces with the same arms, unless they are brigands. Even then, a burglar or house-breaker - or whatever you have these days - probably has much smaller weapons than a policeman. So, an international police force, on the one hand, can function only in the context of countries which have subscribed to international law of some kind where there are no national armies. For these national armies, small as they

may be, if put together become very big and, what is more, these small national armies will be tempted, as they are now, to intervene in the internal affairs of other people, either in order to make them good people or in order to assist them against bad people. Whichever it is, if you have all the problems of war in as small a context, nothing can be saved.

The proposal is made that each country must set aside units of its own national army to create an international police force. That would be at least the best way to make it international. Then as we have here, the geographical representation, canvassing, arm-twisting and what not to be able to see whether a Patagonian or a Laplander would be the Commander-in-Chief, would follow, and international rivalries would come in...

Therefore, we are against national units being kept in reserve for these purposes by law-abiding nations; and, of course, whether law-abiding or not, it would be decided by the majority of people here, who may or may not be law-abiding in all circumstances, as we have seen in recent times.

Secondly, it is not a practical proposition. I have some acquaintance with this matter. How do you keep units of a national army earmarked for a certain purpose? And if the Secretary-General cannot find a special job for them, what do we do with them? We would have a lot of soldiers or equipment earmarked for this purpose - obviously paid for by the United Nations - and what would they do in times when there was no trouble anywhere? - which always tempts Secretariat officials to find some trouble somewhere in the world in order to make use of an international police force. Therefore this idea of earmarking units in a particular country is entirely impractical. We found it impractical in having to send out units to Gaza or anywhere else. The only way to find the units is to take them out of the regular army as it stands and replace them by other forces, or by territorials, or go without them. Therefore, the conception that you can have an international force of this kind - a super-force armed with all the terrific weapons of international war, on the one hand, or having units in a particular country, not international but still national in character - and I would like to see the superman who would command these forces - that is, in our opinion, out of the question.

They would be of such a size as not to relieve the world. The Secretary-General finds it difficult to persuade the Assembly to provide the \$60 million, the large fortune that is required to run this Organisation. We still have trouble in dealing with the commitments which we have undertaken; so, in a warless world, if the preparation for war is going to cost so much, then the disarmament and the peace are not worth much. And that is why you cannot obtain peace by methods of war.

Then Mr. Lodge asks: what sort of international law would prevail? International law has been described - some people say inaccurately - as international morality. This international law would not be enforceable in the municipal courts of any country. The international laws that would govern the police force would have to

be above the national laws of various countries. At the present moment, if Indian troops go to Gaza, as far as they are concerned they are governed by Indian military law, which may be totally opposed to the law in Israel or to the law in Egypt. Supposing, for example, in our military law there were punishments which offend the conscience of these countries in which they are living, then a serious situation is created. Therefore, in my opinion, the international law that pertains to the international police force would have to be a law equally accepted by every country, and as in Korea during the last few days and not as in Gaza. What is more, in these international police forces, being composed of units drawn from different countries, under the command of a particular national, usually the national of a country that has a smaller army and has probably not used it for a long time, the administration would be found very difficult.

But that is not really Mr. Lodge's question. His question is: who is going to enforce this law, and will they conform to certain difficult standards? This, I think, is a problem in which the Disarmament Commission, the United Nations and everybody, as we shall find out later, should do some work in research and find out how these forces would be governed.

In our humble submission it would be much simpler when the element of sanction becomes as low as in the case of a policeman. If, even in a municipality, all the citizens are armed and are permitted to take the law into their own hands, then, in the enforcement of the law, the case of even a burglar would become a civil war. It is because the offender is not armed, on the one hand, and people around are willing to support the authority of the police force, even though sometimes one may give succour to a hunted criminal, that enforcement becomes possible.

My country does not believe in security forces for the purposes of internal order. What does it mean? These security forces are for the purpose of maintaining internal order. If it is suggested that armies are necessary in order to obtain the assent of citizens to a government, then that kind of government should not have international sanction. Security forces of national army character become necessary only in the context where they are going to be used against people across the border. If security forces are only for the purpose of dealing with civil tumult with drunks or other offenders, then it is not necessary to have security forces. Therefore security forces to the extent of international armies, in our opinion, have no meaning.

But that is tied up to another problem, and I can understand most of these countries raising the question of security forces because national armies today are not over-sized and, in a great many countries, are not intended and necessary for the defence of their frontiers only, but in order to keep the whole of 4 or 5 million square miles of land in other parts of the world because they are, by some strange logic and by some interpretation of law, made part of the territory of the mother country, so-called.

So then, if security forces are intended only to keep order in the homeland of a country against their own people, then, if in any community it becomes necessary to use the army to rule - that is, if there is no consent - then they are not security forces; we are discussing and giving support not only to a police State, but a State that is unarmed helotry. Therefore, security forces in that way are not something that we can support.

To talk about an international police force being organised in the way often suggested in these rooms is to put the cart before the horse. The police force comes only after there is a law. Police are intended to enforce the law and not to make the law. Police are not governed by anything which they think is necessary at any particular time, and they are not under the command of commanders. Therefore, for an international police force to emerge, we must first of all establish the international community.

This is not an argument for delay, but rather the reverse. Since we think that international wars - wars between nations - can be avoided by the use of forces which are neutral, or which are objective, or which have no interest in the matter, then since we all want to establish such a force, I think national armies must go. As the Minister of Defence, I would be the happiest person in the world if I had the work of demobilisation.

My Prime Minister has a reputation of being extremely realistic, and this is what he said about the Soviet proposals:

"It seems to me as a proposal a brave proposal, which deserves every consideration. Whether humanity, that is, various countries concerned, is brave enough to put an end suddenly to armies, navies and air forces, I do not know. But the time will come, will have to come, when something of this kind will have to be adopted, because in this era of atomic and hydrogen weapons and ballistic missiles, war has become an anachronism."

My delegation says these things because, if humanity is to survive, it would have to have at least intervening periods of abandoning arms. In other words, to put it in rather an exaggerated way, disarmament to a certain extent is inevitable today. Because for one thing, people cannot afford to pay for it, big countries are afraid of small countries - they have rivalry in that way - and what is more, even if more weapons can be built they are not necessary, because each of these atomic Powers presumably has enough weapons to destroy the world ten times over, so why should they destroy it an eleventh time? Therefore, the whole problem of disarmament from that point of view, to my humble mind, has an element of inevitability.

But having disarmed, we will go back again, and this is where we want to mention another factor which we have in mind. Let us suppose there was a disarmed world, by which we mean a world where there is a limitation of armaments. That is the same kind of idea which one of the countries concerned put forward some time ago, that both the Soviet Union and the United States have a limited number of atomic bombs in order to protect the peace of the world. Let us also suppose there should be a limitation of armies to this size, that size, and the other size. Now, we say that if there are molecular weapons in the world, enough to start a small war, that war carries the momentum to become a big war. A small war is started, and each side wants to improve its weapons, and those weapons will keep on improving. We may throw away, we may dismantle and destroy - I am told we cannot destroy - but we may dismantle and prohibit the present deadly weapons, but the people who make them would still be there, because no one is suggesting that all these great geniuses and technicians of science should be destroyed. Even if they were, others would come in their place. So that if you start a small war with small weapons, mankind having known the great advantages of civilisation and having the capacity to make these deadly weapons in a short time, from the molecular weapons we will proceed to other weapons. This has been the experience of wars in the past.

Even if countries who have armies were disarmed, as they were after the First World War, this situation could arise in the normal course of industry. Let us take the example of Germany after the First World War. Happily, there was a Nuremberg trial, to which I shall refer in another context. Let us take case number ten. In December 1947 the head of the Krupp organisation and his eleven co-defendants were indicted by the Allies, who won the war, with the crimes of planning, preparations, initiation and waging of aggressive war. A company is waging an aggressive war! They were also indicted with plunder and spoliation, crimes involving prisoners of war and slave labour, and common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace, but that is not material. Captured documents proved that after 1918 Krupps duped the Allied commissioners into believing that their products were such peaceful objects as padlocks, milk cans, cash registers, carts, motor cars, and locomotives.

In a memorandum of Gustav Krupp it was said that after the assumption of power by Hitler he had the satisfaction of reporting to him that Krupps stood ready shortly to begin the re-armament of the Germans. Krupp made it clear that because of his conviction that Germans must again fight to rise, his companies had from 1918 onward maintained at their own cost - they are a patriotic people - developments in production of war material, and that they had to maintain these activities for the future. It was boasted that the demolitions consequent on the present of the Inter-Allied Control after the armistice were not real but only apparent. The most important guns that were used from 1939 to 1941 were already developed in 1933, having been tested secretly, and the ordnance organisation had stood ready for mass production on Hitler's orders.

The Krupps, not satisfied with this, wanted to export their enterprise into the neighbouring and the peaceful country of Sweden; but the Swedish Government came to the rescue, and as soon as they discovered it, in less than two years they passed laws prohibiting the employment of foreign money in armament concerns. This is one of the things we will have to consider with regard to preventive measures. The Krupps also, by ingenious financial accountancy, were prominent among those who enabled Germany to conceal expenditure of 12 billion marks, extending over a period of several years. Therefore, if any attempt is to be made to cut down the size of these arms and say "You shall not do that," and so on, unless the treaties are observed, in the case it is better to abandon arms totally. That is to say, if you are relying on the ethical quality in man, there is no reason why the ethical quality should stop short of a capacity of killing. Therefore, you either take it as a whole or we play at this business.

The Soviet Government had examined the situation and had come to the firm conviction that the way out of deadlock should be shown along the road of general and complete disarmament. Even at the risk of being called not sufficiently non-aligned, my Government would say that was a correct statement. But it is also supported by the Government of the United Kingdom when Mr. Ormsby-Gore tells us:

But I assure you that this single adjective 'comprehensive' has the same meaning for us as the two adjectives 'general and complete'...."

There is for my Government nothing novel in the concept which lies behind the formal title of the item. This thing we cannot agree with, because if we try to water this down after there is no new entry in the new field, then we shall be discussing the same old thing we have been discussing before.

The United States Government told us that the road to complete disarmament is long and that the United States will be happy to travel to the end of it. That is what we would like to see. Mr. Jules Moch, the doyen of this movement, said that the plan is a straight and narrow path leading to total and controlled disarmament, which the people certainly dream about, but which cannot be total unless at the same time an international force is created among the States to play the same role that law enforcement agencies play among citizens. We subscribe to this. We certainly agree on the general considerations underlying the Soviet plan and with the advantages that all peoples will receive from total disarmament. Whatever may be the immediate necessities for finding formulas for the various problems put forward with regard to partial measures, the objective of our discussions should be this world without war. A world which relies on war, however limited, will become a world laden with war, knowing the experience of mankind. Therefore, we must not say with Milton:

"The remedy; perhaps more valid arms,
Weapons more violent, when next we meet

May serve to better us, and worse our foes,
Or equal what between us made the odds."

This doctrine we must discard, and adopt the other one.

We are told - and my delegation likes to face this as far as it can - that this idea is a dream, that it is utopian. If it is utopian, no thought is necessary; in Utopia there would be no war, and therefore it would be unrealistic. Now, I ask you, is it more realistic to spend a hundred billion - so we are told; in some other book it will say more than that - on the manufacture of weapons which we are told will never be used? - a doctrine with which I do not agree, since they are being used, if only for practice purposes, throwing them away, which is war use because these instruments of war, almost the moment they leave the drawing-table become obsolete, and they go on to something else. Therefore, this hundred billion of war expenditure is being used for war purposes, except for the fact that it does serve to promote technical developments, and so on. So, is it more realistic to spend a hundred billion a year, to keep the whole world keyed up to conditions of war, to seek safety only in the machines of destruction, and to say that you cannot trust your neighbour even when your neighbour is untrustworthy? Or is it more realistic to take away the weapons of war?

We are asked, how can this be accomplished at this time? I would like to submit, in all modesty, that if demobilisation is possible in a short time, why should not disarmament be possible? The United States of America - and I do not vouch for these figures as they have been published; the Americans do not let me into their secrets - the United States of America had a peak strength of 12,300,000 men under arms during World War II. That was presumably at the end of the European War in 1945, when the United States army numbered 8,300,000. In 1946 the army had been reduced to 1,900,000 and four years later in 1950, it had been reduced to 591,487. So it was possible, without any particular attempt at disarmament in this sense, in the normal course of administration to demobilise 8,300,000 people to 591,847 in less than five years; and what is more, practically all weapons of war used at that time were dismantled or thrown into the scrapheap or put into cellophane to be sold to people who are less sophisticated in the arts of war, and so they were withdrawn from commission. Therefore it was possible for the United States of America reduce their strength from 12,300,000 to less than two million. They reduced by ten and a half million in two years, and in another two or three years the 1,900,000 became 591,487.

It may be said that demobilising men is a very different proposition from demobilising establishments. Even with all the organisation that has gone on, if there are no men these weapons will not be used, and what is more, the people who produce them will go into other things.

Referring again to documents which are public and available, the Soviet Union had a peak strength during World War II of 12,500,000. I hope the representative of Soviet Union will not join issue with me on these figures, and that if he does he will supply me with other figures. But at the end of World War II they had a peak strength of 12,500,000. In 1946 this had come down to 6,000,000 and in 1950, 659,000.

The United Kingdom - usually but quite wrongly considered very slow in everything - had an army of 5,120,000 during World War II. Whether that figure includes the army of the Commonwealth, I do not know. This figure was reduced to 800,000 in 1948, and to 725,000 in 1950.

These figures are telling in more than one way. When they really wanted to demobilise vast millions were demobilised in two years. But between 1946 and 1950 the figures became smaller not because more could not have been demobilised but because it was not the policy to do so.

So I submit that it is not so fantastic to think that it is possible to dismantle the weapons of war. I do not say it should be done in four calendar years or five years or six years. That really does not matter. Time is not measured since Einstein's day by the calendar, but by events. It is occurrence that makes time, and as occurrence goes forward time will be bridged.

I also wish to repeat that once the process of demobilisation and dismantling and discarding starts, it acquires its own momentum. It overcomes resistances, political, psychological and mechanical; it will have produced devices whereby these things can be quickly done, the psychology of dismantling and demobilisation of resources in this way would become the accepted law of the world. I believe the slave owners of two or three hundred years ago must have said, "When these slaves are liberated what are the 'poor devils' going to do? They will be out of work. They do not want to leave their jobs and homes, and what is more, it will take a long time to send them away." But the decision was made, and if today anyone were to suggest keeping slaves, he would not be regarded as a person fit for decent society. So that these problems which we think impossible to solve or unrealistic, are more realistic.

I should like to ask, since the weapons of yesterday have already become obsolete, is it more realistic to make bigger, more efficient, more beautiful bombs than those that fell during the war years? Is that more realistic? Is it more realistic to contemplate the possibility of every country in the world making these deadly weapons? This seems to be the case, if you read the investigations conducted by a group of American scientists under the chairmanship of the American Mr. Davidon, where a number of countries, including my own, are listed as having the capacity to make atomic weapons within two or three years - as though we would make them. But how do we know? I say we will not make them, but I may not be there in two or three years.

Therefore the possibility of demobilisation is more realistic than the capacity for massing arms. We take time over this because it is the hope of our delegation that, if not the United Nations Organisation, then world public opinion will set in motion this idea, that we contemplate not merely less arms and less expenditure, but a method by which we outlaw war as an instrument of policy, a method through which differences between neighbours would be settled by invoking the councils of nations, by the impact of opinion, so that, since both sides would be without arms the actual precipitation of a large-scale conflict would be largely and remotely delayed. It is quite true that there are smaller problems, unresolved problems, in the world, but they would fall into their place.

And here we must all take courage from the fact that, while there have been failures during the last two years in the sense that we actually have no solution for the most troublesome problem of surprise attack, the main cause of war, apart from what I said before, is the reverse of the security idea, and is the fear that people have. That is why Yugoslavia, in company with my delegation, sponsored a resolution last year asking for the study of this question at Geneva. Actual studies are going on, and though no results have been reached we have received very welcome news from the leader of the United States delegation offering to resume these talks. When the element of surprise attack is removed, there will be some advantage.

Similarly, we have made no progress in regard to cooperation in outer space, but developments have gone ahead in outer space. There has been no progress likewise in the matter of a suspension in the increase of arms, as was asked for in the resolution submitted by my delegation some time ago for an arms truce. Likewise, as we must be reminded by the rumours - I don't know the facts - of further nuclear explosions, in the Sahara desert, there has been no progress in stopping what is called the "nth Power" problem, or the "fourth Power" problem.

With regard to chemical warfare, we are told by a research student in America that the ancient Hindus were probably the originators of chemical warfare. I do not take any responsibility for that. The beginnings of chemical warfare are lost in antiquity. References to particular nations are not intended to point the finger of blame; we are in the company of friends. Incendiary chemicals - I suppose the poor Hindus threw only a little bit of a candle, or something - incendiary chemicals have been known to be used since at least 1200 B.C. in Greece as also in India and by the Romans. Greek fire was invented in 600 B.C., with the property of spontaneously bursting into flame. (All this sounds very modern.) Smoke also has been used since early times to screen movements, so when in the First World War they created smoke-screens they were not being very modern, apparently.

Tear gases for harassment purposes were used by the French in August 1914, followed by the Germans and British later. The first American use of gas was phosgene against the Germans in June 1918.

This is not what should worry us.

In the total, both sides employed about 17,000 chemical troops and caused 1.3 million casualties, but only 91,000 were deaths. About one-fourth of the ratio was wounded and dead, as compared with other weapons. Something like 9 million shells filled with mustard gas were fired, producing 400,000 casualties, nearly five times as effective as shrapnel and high explosives.

So these days we are rather inclined to think that chemical warfare is no longer a danger.

I would request the United States delegation not to regard the next quotation as chosen with a view to making an attack of any kind. This is the purely military point of view. It was reported in the *New York Times*, under dateline 8 August:

"Leading military officials are trying to overcome public horror of chemical, biological and radiological warfare.

"Pentagon strategists fear that unless a formidable programme of public education in this field is carried out the country may suffer as significantly as if it were behind in nuclear-armed missiles.

"What the public must know, according to the highest Defence Department authorities, is that many forms of chemical and allied warfare are more 'humane' than existing weapons."

This is one of the ideas which we must get, not only in America but in every country: this idea of humane killing. It is rather a contradiction in terms.

In the *New York Times* of 30 August it was reported from Pugwash:

"Twenty-six scientists from eight countries who have been discussing the danger of biological and chemical warfare to humanity, animal and plant life, concluded a one-week-long session here today. They warned the world that only international control of such agents and weapons could ease heightened distrust among nations and eliminate 'the amnesia of secrecy.'"

"It was emphasised that while control of nuclear weapons is proving difficult, control of biological and chemical weapons is more awkward. The cost of the latter is infinitely less than that of the hydrogen bomb and

so places much less expensive instruments of mass annihilation in the hands of small nations."

So I should like to point out that limited agreements on non-use of this weapon or that weapon are not going to get anywhere. What is more, chemical warfare was not employed during the last war, my advisers tell me now, largely because it was ineffective in a system of round-the-clock bombing. But the great countries in possession of arms are still storing these chemical gases. I beg to submit that an agreement of an international character, though it has now lasted nearly thirty-four years, is not the most effective way of doing it.

In 1925 there was a Geneva protocol, to which some nations had subscribed and others have not, but I remember - I was a scholar in those days - that on August 13, 1914 the Germans published in Berlin that the British were using poison gas, and on 14 August, the next day, the British published that the Germans were using poison gas. So somebody knew about it. I do not know who started it first. So these gases will be used. The same applies to bacteriological warfare.

Taking all these rather diabolical weapons of various kinds, which are inexpensive and may be secretly concealed, there is no answer in the modern world except matching the power that is exhibited by man in so-called conquest of nature in this rather complex world, other than to refer to the ethical problem in the context of social organisation; as my Prime Minister rightly warned, not in terms of sentiment, not in terms of pious intentions.

I have said: "where no progress was made." But it would be very wrong for us not to refer to where progress has been made. One area is in regard to a subject prohibited in the United Nations: Antarctica. My delegation had the temerity to bring it up two or three years ago and upset the whole of the Latin American continent. But I am glad to hear by rumour - for nobody has told us - that in Washington on 15 October the twelve nations active in Antarctica pledged their determination to keep that continent free of war:

"Mr. Kuznetsov said the convening of the Conference 'indicates that its participants agree that a regime for Antarctica should be established on an international basis with due consideration to mutual interests and rights.'"

While we have no desire to go into the details of this conference, even if the elements of it are true, we have made the first step towards finding a place in the world - I believe it is about 6 million square miles of ice - which at any rate would not be a theatre of war or a base for operations.

The success of the Geneva talks is another area. We come now to the crux of this problem: the establishment of the ten-Power Committee. My delegation does not support this by saying that we cannot do anything else. We think it is a

development of great importance, and we raised this problem about seven years ago in the United Nations and repeatedly stated that direct negotiations between the Americans and Russians were the only beginning that would bring about effective talks in this direction. So we regard this ten-Power Committee mainly as direct talks between those who can deliver the goods.

This ten-Power Committee is nothing new. It is merely an expression of the diplomatic capacities and diplomatic facilities existing in people and it is in no way opposed to the purpose of this Organisation. But we think that if we agree, as we have, and wish this ten-Power Committee well, then we must leave it to make its own procedures and arrange its own composition, not upsetting the balances because, if it is to reach a successful conclusion, no impediments should be put in its way.

It is for us to devise ways and means by which the United Nations as a whole may be able to express its concern and make its contribution in other ways, but we regard the ten-Power Committee as self-sufficient, as coming into existence as a result of the Geneva agreements, as having potency for good. At the same time, in our humble submission, the usual diplomatic channels should not be confined to communications between these ten great Powers. They have their own representatives and chancelleries, and the world - not in this building, not in our committees, but in terms of governments - should have some knowledge of what is going on - I shall not say "should be informed," for that is the wrong word - depending upon the discretion, the desire and the willingness of these people to have communication with them. That must be left to them. In that way the problem would not be isolated.

I shall not quote the Eisenhower-Khrushchev communique, which everybody has read. I am sorry that so much time has gone by that I must omit many of the things I wished to say and come down to the actual proposals we should like to submit for consideration.

I have already spoken a great deal about the climate that should lead to the solution of this problem. We should like to see the people appreciate the difference between cutting down the size of armaments and coming to agreements with regard to their size and so on, and we should like public opinion in the world - not so much governments and chancelleries, but public opinion in the world - to realise that there is no alternative for survival in this world except a world free from war, where war is no longer an instrument of national policy. Since I have spoken so much about this, I shall leave it for the moment.

The second suggestion I should like to make is that this ten-Power Committee, we hope - we are not proposing this, but we hope - will function generally under the umbrella of what is usually called the summit. That is to say, if it gets into a deadlock, the world will not hear merely about a deadlock, but the great ones will

step in and try to resolve it, so that it is not isolated from what is now called the new atmosphere arising from the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting, the visit of Mr. Macmillan to the Soviet Union, and the impending visit of the Soviet Prime Minister to France and so on. If in this more or less specialised technical committee there arise difficulties, either because the meetings are too long or the speeches are too long, or because of getting involved in previous history - and we must not forget that out of the ten Powers on the ten-Power Committee at least six or seven will be the same that have been dealing with this for ten years and know each other too well, sometimes knowing what is good and sometimes knowing what is bad - and if there is a conflict of this kind, we hope that the ten-Power Committee will resort at once to asking the bigger Powers to step in to resolve the particular problem.

Then I want to make a suggestion, which at the present moment I will make on my personal responsibility because it involves many matters of principle on which I have not been able to consult my Government. Often it is asked: how do we enforce agreements? How are agreements in regard to violation implemented? The Nuremberg trials do put forward ideas which are worth considering. Suppose there was in the world a code in regard to scientists, shall we say, or in regard to soldiers or in regard to statesmen - whatever it may be - the violation of which would be regarded as a violation of peace treaty. Suppose, for example, technicians and scientists together made an atom bomb in secret. That would be a violation of an agreement. There is no way now to enforce that agreement, except by going to war or making the country adopt some other method. It is worthwhile considering, and we put it forward only as a suggestion, whether the Nuremberg method in this matter, of making the individual violator subject to penalty under the national laws of his own country, again by treaty, would not be the right thing to do.

That is to say, if a scientist is hired for the purpose of violating the law in regard to the banning of weapons, that scientist - apart from the country - becomes individually liable for an act of the kind I read out a while ago. Therefore, if individual responsibility can be fixed by way of agreement in an international treaty, then it becomes obligatory on the part of the municipal power to execute the law of that country or to hand the individual over to an international tribunal, as the case may be.

Whatever may be the controversy about the Nuremberg method, it brought to the forefront for the first time the idea of fixing individual responsibility for crimes against humanity. A crime against humanity cannot be perpetrated by a nation in the abstract. It is morally responsible, it is politically responsible, but the actual hands and the brains must be those of individuals. If, as in the case of Nuremberg, punishment hangs over people who violate the laws of men, as set forth in a treaty and sanctioned by this Organisation, that may well serve as a deterrent.

Fourthly, we would suggest that the deep secrecy which is spread about, which really leads to the leaking of information to a considerable degree and to espionage, and, what is more, the spreading of erroneous scientific knowledge in order to mislead one's opponent, is not only against the laws of civilisation but also contributes to all those fears of disguised experiments and what not.

I have already said that the ten-Power Committee, in our opinion, while it should be entirely the master of its own procedure, will have diplomatic connections with various governments, and the use that it may make of any party on its own responsibility to resolve matters would be a very healthy way of dealing with some of these problems.

Then we would suggest that there should be a ban placed by the industrially advanced countries on the export of capital equipment and technicians to other countries, which are not manufacturing arms, for the purpose of establishing arms industries. We read in the newspapers the other day that these things were beginning again. I read out the extract about what happened in the mid-war years. If, therefore, arms industries are to be established in countries which are not members of the United Nations or are not properly represented here by the government whose writ runs in the place - if in those areas, if that situation should unhappily continue, arms establishments were to arise - then there would be a leakage which would make any agreement useless. Therefore, it would be a point of honour, a point of international understanding and agreement, that the promotion of this particular kind of enterprise and traffic is not in the interests of humanity.

Finally, I should like to submit that the world today spends billions and billions of dollars, of rubles and of pounds in research on weapons of war. I think that the Secretariat should submit papers and we should consider whether the time has not come, and whether it is not urgent, to do some research in the other direction - not to make policy, but to give facts - instead of war research an inquiry into peace research problems. This may well be a part of the work of the Disarmament Commission. It should include the great scientists of the world, who, in their public pronouncements and in the efforts they make when they are not strictly employed by governments for this purpose, are very emphatic about all the matters we have been speaking about. The great scientists of the world, perhaps the main statesmen of the world, should participate in this vast organisation, so that the money that may be available for this purpose may be spent on other things than investing in methods of war.

Suppose, for example, that we were told, as we were told two or three years ago that it is possible to explode an atom bomb in one's pocket and that therefore any suspension is of no value. Then the scientists who would be international servants with no particular allegiance to national policies, would be able to come forward either to contradict that or, if that were the case, to find some other method.

The same applies to the resolving of certain disputes. No one is suggesting the establishment of a new machinery of conciliation. Some vast research of this kind is called for by an Organisation whose main purpose is to rid the world of the scourge of war and to be a centre for the resolving of disputes.

If this Assembly makes no other decision than to turn our hand to this more constructive purpose, it will have accomplished a great deal.

My purpose in making these submissions is in no way either to anticipate what the ten-Power Committee will do or to advise it. We trust its competence in these matters, we wish it well. Even though the representatives on that committee will represent their countries, by the very fact of our endorsement of their establishment, by the functions they have taken in hand and the great hopes they have aroused, and, what is more, through the faith that this Organisation places in them, they have really become the custodians of the pursuit of truth and the establishment of peace.

While, therefore, the ten-Power Committee is not a sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission and owes it no organisational responsibility - the only organisational connection we will have with the committee is that it will be serviced by the Secretariat in many ways - I hope it will take into account the fact that, while there are great national loyalties, there are even greater loyalties to the idea of peace and to the purpose of this resolution. The resolution should be the charter of that committee. It is a resolution not only endorsed, but sponsored, by the eighty-two members of this Organisation. It is a resolution which has evoked great hope in the minds of men in every part of the world.

Finally, my delegation would like to suggest that the Disarmament Commission of eighty-two nations, which did not meet last year except to pass on information, will meet around the middle of the coming calendar year, in order to be informed and educated and equally in order to give encouragement to the ten-Power Committee. That, in our submission, would be a very good way to keep the United Nations well informed and intimately concerned with this matter, apart from the referral to chancelleries. We would like to hope that the great Powers themselves, those who are involved in this and who must be the deciding factors in this matter, will give consideration and lend their support to this suggestion, so that the Commission would meet again in six months or so. It would not be a matter of sending out a notice overnight to the permanent representatives to meet in New York - distinguished people though they may be. The meeting would take place at governmental level, after the difficulties had been considered by governments in the chancelleries. Thus, when we gather here, we will not be putting forth our own ideas - bright as we always think our own ideas are - but there would have been a real delegate conference, and the disarmament business would have become much more broad-based and with roots striking deeper into the people. It would also be a method whereby this controversy would be carried

from council halls and chambers into the market place and would become part of the national politics of every country.

It is our hope that the suggestion we have made will not be thought of as intended to displace other ideas or to constitute a reflection on the ten-Power Committee. But to have a target in this way, and a comparatively near one, where proposals would be considered in this vast world assembly by delegates accredited for that purpose with their technical advisers, would be a great step forward.

We believe that the proposals we have submitted are not unrealistic. We firmly believe that it is possible to disarm this world. We firmly believe that it is possible for man to throw away his arms. For thousands of years, men have talked about turning their weapons into plough-shares. But the time has now come when, if they do not turn them into instruments of peace, they will no longer be here to turn them into anything.

We must therefore recognise that, as the poet said:

The moving Finger writes, and having writ
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line
Nor all the Tears wash out a word of it.

That should be our outlook in this matter.

STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 6, 1959²

[In 1959, the General Assembly considered a complaint by Morocco on the nuclear tests planned by France in the Sahara.

On November 20, 1959, it adopted a resolution 1379 (XIV) - sponsored by 22 countries, including India, expressing grave concern over the intention of the French Government to conduct nuclear tests in the Sahara and urging it to refrain from such tests.]

...So far as my country is concerned, we have been interested in this problem (nuclear tests) and indeed brought before this Assembly in 1954, after a statement by our Prime Minister in our Parliament on 2 April of the same year, the idea of

² From: *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi, November 1959, pages 361-74

the suspension of nuclear tests, the tests of these weapons of mass destruction, these nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. During the years it has gained gradual currency and countries that thought that this did not belong to the disarmament problem, that it does not affect humanity very much - and indeed at one time it was argued that it was in their interests that there should be explosions of this kind in the world - and we are at last moving to a situation when at Geneva, largely by the process of direct negotiations, the main Powers concerned, popularly called the nuclear Powers or the members of the "Nuclear Club," have made some progress towards agreement.

While this Committee has no cognisance of the advance reached by any communication to it, so much is published and is not contradicted that we find in magazines relating to this matter that seventeen points of agreement have been reached. While at first one thought that these were insignificant ones, looking through the contents of them they do represent substantial advance, and what remains is with regard to the staffing on the control posts, on site inspection and the veto. While these are formidable subjects, the very fact that agreements have been reached on other matters gives one the hope that progress is being made. This is a very relevant consideration.

The application of France to join the "Nuclear Club" comes at a time when we hope the club will be wound up. Therefore, the idea of giving oxygen to this particular animal is not so welcome to everybody concerned. The delegation of India at a later stage introduced in this Committee a resolution which it thought would assist the advance of this project of the cessation of nuclear tests by suggesting that there should be talks on a technical basis because the United Kingdom delegation at that time, with the knowledge it had at its disposal, advised the Committee that while it had a great deal of sympathy with this idea, with the hope of suspending nuclear tests, the question of detectability was difficult and therefore the suspension must wait or could not be carried out, apart from other objections.

It was at that time in 1957 we proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.176/Rev. 4, Annex I, that a scientific committee should be established, and requested the States concerned, in view of the doubts expressed about the detectability of explosions and the need to dispel those doubts and also to provide against possible evasions, to agree forthwith to the nomination of a scientific-technical commission consisting of scientific-technical experts representing the differing views together with other eminent scientific-technical participation to be agreed upon by the aforementioned representatives.

The Assembly in its wisdom did not find it possible to carry this draft resolution, but its fate was 38 against, 22 for, and 20 abstentions. But the ideas were incorporated, as usual, in a little more anaemic resolution which was adopted - we voted for it - by 79 to 2, on the general principle of getting the best we could in the hope that it would be improved, and that is resolution 1148 (XII).

So, various aspects of progress have taken place, and it is at this time that the question of the explosion in the Sahara arises. I think the simplest and the briefest way of dealing with it would be to look at the presentation of this subject by its sponsors on the one hand, and the reply given by the representative of France.

We have, for the purposes of brevity again, tried to summarise Mr. Jules Moch's answers to them. He says, first of all, "the matter is exaggerated." Now, here we want to place this, so far as we can, in its proper context. The issue here is not the exploding of one bomb - whether it be a baby bomb or other bomb - because in the context of the Hiroshima bomb, the present bombs are giants - and that was a small one. But it was a small bomb that released all this trouble, that created the whole chain of development in this direction. So, when the representative of France says "the matter is exaggerated" we are going to take the following things into account.

First of all it has to be taken from the point of view of those who are against the explosions on general grounds, and as a danger to the world. It has also to be taken from the point of view of the people who live nearby. Indeed the Indonesian Government at one time made serious protests with regard to the explosions in Christmas Island, in which they were more concerned than in the explosions in Siberia. Therefore, we cannot agree with the fact that "the matter is exaggerated" because any more development at all in this field is something that must be regarded as deplorable.

But over and above that, is it suggested that the Government of France is going to explode just this one hundred thousand ton bomb, and no more? If that is so, then this problem assumes an aspect which is even more deplorable because the experimentation is merely for the purpose of letting off one firecracker as a demonstration. Then, all that it does is to exacerbate feelings in the African continent, and the worst part of it, to reverse the process which this Assembly has at last set in motion and accepted by the Powers concerned, and the process which has made some progress in Geneva. Therefore, small as the bomb may be, limited to one as it may be - it has not been so stated - and with all the precautions the French Government proposes to take - the very idea of taking precautions implies that there are dangers - and therefore, however small it is, it is a move in the reverse direction. And this argument that the French test would be negligible in quantity of fission energy is therefore one we cannot accept.

We also have the repetition of the usual arguments, already introduced by the then representative of the United Kingdom at that time that there is plenty of natural radiation, and therefore a little more does not matter. My delegation has always answered it by a parallel. We merely pointed out that normally the human body carries on it, for every square inch, about 300 pounds of weight. For that reason, would any one of us agree to carry another square inch? That would be a burden.

Therefore, it is not correct to argue that there is plenty of natural radiation, and that proportionally to that radiation a little more does not matter. Nature makes allowances for that; we have grown accustomed to that; our genetic conditions and processes are all adapted to that. So this argument which has been put forward over and over again by the United Kingdom in the past, before they became active participants in the processes of disengagement in this matter, is now adopted by France.

But, as against that, since it has come from such a distinguished source, it is necessary for the Assembly to repeat that we cannot agree to the minimisation, the presentation of these facts as though it does not matter. Any explosion of this kind, anything that leads to more ionising radiation, is harmful to the people around, to those who are handling it, and to the world as a whole.

I make no apologies for again quoting documents which have been published and which have been released since our last meeting. The first of these is from the hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States:

"It was generally agreed that in considering acceptable exposure limits in the context of world-wide environmental contamination from fall out, the best assumption that can be made at present concerning the relationship of biological effect to radiation dose is to assume that any dose, however small, produces some biological effect and that this effect is harmful."

Nothing could be more categorical than that:

"The testimony made it clear that much difficulty now exists in evaluating the hazards of environmental contamination from fallout. This is because of the difficulty in attempting to apply to whole populations exposed to fallout the concepts behind 'maximum permissible dose' and 'maximum permissible concentration,' which were developed for occupational exposures to individuals under controlled conditions." (*Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests - Summary Analysis of Hearings, May 5-8, 1959*, page 7 - Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States.)

We get the same things from various other people. The National Planning Association of the United States refers to this and says:

"In problems of world-wide contamination, strontium-90 and cesium-137 are particularly important. Their half-lives are twenty-eight and thirty-eight years respectively, and so they do not die out in the long time required for distribution via the stratosphere. Strontium is similar to

calcium and is therefore concentrated in the bones, where it can produce tumours." (*A Special Committee Report*, May 1958, page 13)

Another American authority on this states that if a thermonuclear blast such as the one on Bikini in March 1954 had exploded during the Crusades between 1080 A.D. and 1299 A.D. it would have taken until the present century for the genetic damage to be erased out of the human population.

Another source, dated May 8, 1959, published in the *Washington Post and Times-Herald*, stated:

"A new danger from past atomic weapons tests was described at a Congressional hearing yesterday.

"It is radioactive iodine which concentrates in the thyroid. It is an atomic fission product which loses fifty percent of its radioactivity every eight days.

"Because iodine-131 concentrates in the thyroid, which is a relatively small gland, extremely small amounts can result in relatively high doses..."

Then we also have one of these statements coming from Oak Ridge in Tennessee:

"Female fertility has been found far more vulnerable to radiations than has long been believed, it was reported here today.

"The tests with comparatively low exposures to radiation sources, were done on mice. But there is no reason to believe the same sterilising effects would not occur in humans, said biologist Liane Russell of Oak Ridge, Tenn."

Then we have the Russians, who take second place in test explosions.

"Professor Lebedinsky of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences said human subjects who had received relatively small doses of gamma radiation from 'hot' cobalt for unspecified therapeutic purposes suffered observable depressions in their brain rhythms thirty seconds after the experiments began."

We come now to that source from which no exaggeration will come, that is, the British:

"It should however be evident," says Mr. Orbuck in *Nature*, "that in a matter like this - a matter of life and death for hundreds of thousands - one should act on the basis of the more pessimistic view until convincing evidence for the more

optimistic one has been furnished. This seems also the opinion of the Medical Research Council... 'In our view,' said the Medical Council 'it is not possible at this time to decide whether there is or is not a threshold dose concerned in the induction of leukemia and cancer, and the only scientific attitude to the problem at present is one of suspended judgement. Nevertheless, the significance of the alternative points of view in determining the ultimate assessing of risk should be clearly understood so that those who have the responsibility of acting on such assessments should be fully aware of the alternative possibilities that need to be taken into account.'"

I would like to say here that this is the most conservative British statement one can find. The bulk of British scientific opinion is far stronger than this. There are so many quotations that I do not want to read out at the present moment which refer to the harmful results that have already occurred and to the fact that these results are inevitable.

"The International Commission on Radiological Protection has issued figures - about to be made public - which indicate that the 'permissible' limit of strontium-90 in milk and food should be lowered about 60 percent.

"The National Committee on Radiation Protection, which sets limits for the United States, issued figures last Thursday which when applied to milk and food, raises the strontium-90 limit 25 per cent."

I will not tax the Committee with further extracts from my outside sources, but I will go on to United Nations sources.

The Secretary-General is responsible for this although he himself has not written these reports. Mr. Jules Moch relies on the United Nations Scientific Committee. India is a member of this Committee. This is what Mr. Moch said:

"All the figures that I have given have been taken either from the report of our Scientific Committee - which my colleagues will easily be able to locate..."

Then a part of this Scientific Committee's report is quoted, which incidentally, may I say, is already a year old. The Indian representative on this committee made the following proposal, which is relevant:

"The exposure of mankind to ionising radiation at present arises mainly from natural sources, from medical and industrial procedures, and from environmental contamination due to nuclear explosions. The industrial research and medical applications expose only part of the population, while natural sources and environmental sources, expose the whole population. The artificial sources to which man is exposed during his

work in industry, and in scientific research are of value in science and technology. Their use is controllable, and exposures can be reduced by perfecting protection and safety techniques." (A/3848, page 41, footnote to paragraph 54)

Now, if I may interpose here, Mr. Moch's argument is that protection can be introduced in other cases. But here the scientific people say that their use for research purposes is controllable.

"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels." (*Ibid.*)

This concludes:

"...these hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons. The physical and biological data contained in the report lead to the conclusion that it is undesirable to allow any general rise in world-wide contamination because of its harmful effects and that any activity which produces such rise should be avoided. Nuclear tests are the main source at present which produce such a rise." (*Ibid.*)

This was moved by the Indian delegation as an amendment to the resolution that was finally passed. The significance of it is that in favour of the amendment were Brazil, France, India, Japan and the United States of America. So the representative of France, in putting forward this view, is speaking against scientific opinion on behalf of his country submitted in the Scientific Committee by Professor Jammet, who was the Chief of the Isotopes Service of the Civic Hospital. He serves as an atomic, hydrogen and radio pathologist.

From France has come the greatest contributions in this field from the time the Curies first discovered radium up to the present time. We would not join issue with the representative of France about the scientific calibre or the place because he has said that he has consulted scientists and so on. My delegation still takes the view that in no circumstances can it be argued that the fall-out from the tests that have taken place, which now continues and will continue for many, many years, has not had just technical results but results in bulk on the populations and the generations to be born.

As against this report quoted, may we read another part of the Scientific Committee's report, which is in document A/3838 and is dated June, 1958, one year old:

"Many may prove to be unusually vulnerable to ionising radiations..." (A/3838, page 39, paragraph 37)

"...the opinion seems justified that even a very small dose to the human foetus may involve some risk of injurious effect if received during a critical period of pregnancy." (*Ibid.*, page 40, paragraph 38)

"Exposure of gonads to even the smallest doses of ionising radiations can give rise to mutant genes which accumulate, are transmissible to the progeny and are considered to be, in general, harmful to the human race. As the persons who will be affected will belong to future generations, it is important to minimise undue exposures of populations to such radiation and so to safeguard the well-being of those who are still unborn." (*Ibid.*, paragraph 49).

"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations; these hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons. The committee concludes that all steps designed to minimise irradiation of human populations will act to the benefit of human health. Such steps include the avoidance of unnecessary exposure resulting from medical, industrial and other procedures for peaceful uses on the one hand and the cessation of contamination of the environment by explosions of nuclear weapons on the other. The Committee is aware that considerations involving effective control of all these sources of radiation involve national and international decisions which lie outside the scope of its own. (*Ibid.*, page 41, paragraph 54)

In paragraph 55, the Committee definitely says:

"Even the smallest amounts of radiation are liable to cause deleterious genetic, and perhaps also somatic effects.

"It is clear that medical and occupational exposure, and the testing of nuclear weapons, can be influenced by human action, and that natural radiation and the fall-out of radioactive material already injected into the stratosphere, cannot." (*Ibid.*, pages 41 and 42, paragraph 55)

This last paragraph that I quoted is important because Mr. Jules Moch refers to natural radiation. We cannot control that but we can control this one.

"Even a slow rise in the environmental radioactivity in the world, whether from weapon tests or any other sources, might eventually cause appreciable damage to large populations before it could be definitely identified..." (*Ibid.*, page 42, paragraph 56)

Then this report gives a table, Table II, which says that an estimated total of 25,000 to 150,000 cases of leukemia will ultimately occur if tests are stopped in 1958 from tests already held and that an estimated total of 2,500 to 100,000 genetic effects will occur in subsequent years from tests already held. That is to say, the explosions that have already taken place have a progressively deleterious effect upon humanity.

From his own countrymen comes an appeal in regard to this matter.

On July 30, 1959, twenty-seven French scientists appealed to the French Government or made their views known in regard to the French bomb. This is what they said:

"Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the danger of nuclear war has been a source of constant concern to mankind. In France and throughout the world a very broad movement of opinion has developed to eliminate this danger. Hundreds of millions of signatures were collected to the Stockholm Appeal, launched by the World Peace Movement. Other groupings took action along similar lines and more and more scientists are speaking out."

This is part of the appeal made by these people that I am going to read out. I cannot read out the whole of it because it would take too long. But these are the relevant parts of what was said by the French scientists:

"Continued nuclear weapon testing is doubly dangerous in that it is an important factor in the arms race and involves grave biological dangers. There are perhaps differences of appreciation on the importance of the biological hazards, but no expert disputes that they exist, and it may be said that every nuclear weapon test damages the health and life of a great number of people. As new results are made known, it is becoming clear that the fixation of radioactive elements, particularly strontium-90 in the human body, takes place much more rapidly and in greater quantities than indicated by the initial calculations."

Another part of the statement of the French scientists says the following:

"Any act that tends to oppose the conclusion of an agreement on stopping nuclear weapons tests is a dangerous act. This would be true of the announced explosion of the French atomic bomb. It should, first of all, be pointed out that this would necessarily open the door to other tests, whereas one of the vital problems facing mankind is the stopping of these test explosions."

There we have scientific evidence from all the continents and all the countries concerned in this matter. I read out the French opinion not to pose one French opinion against another, but in order that we may not nurse in our minds a feeling against any particular people or any nation. There is far more opposition probably in France to this business than anywhere else in the world, because the sense of guilt might be greater.

As regards precautions taken about wind and weather, as I said, precautions always imply that there are dangers, and although science has advanced a great deal - it can burst clouds and make rain; it can split atoms and what not - we have as yet found no method of controlling the isotherms and isobars in the world which produce the movements of wind. When Mr. Jules Moch says something about the wind and that it will not move in that direction, it becomes extremely difficult to accept that position.

The uncertainty of the wind has been spoken of by American sources. On January 28, 1959 - and I am confining myself, as far as possible, to the expressions of opinion since we last met - the *New York Times* contained the following statement:

"Several specialists in the study of atomic bomb fall-out agreed yesterday that it was impossible at present to predict the drift of fall-out clouds more than a few hours in advance... R. Robert Rapp of the Rand Corporation, in Santa Monica, California, said that fairly reliable predictions could be made for only eight hours in advance. The uncertainty, beyond that point, is not merely owing to the whims of wind change, but it is also the lack of knowledge on diffusion of particles."

When we consider that it is not a question of eight hours or eight days or eight months, but perhaps eight or eighty years during which the results can take place, and the winds may change with regard to the particles that hang around in any part of the atmosphere, any suggestion that the winds will be in favour of the exploders, or, rather, not so much against them, would not be correct.

Then the next point raised is the question of the site in the Sahara. Here I want to say, first of all, that it is not the intention of my delegation to go into any political question. We have no desire to refer to the question of sovereignty, whether the Sahara is *res nulle* or French territory; or even if it is French territory, whether the sovereign Power has control over undefined miles of atmosphere, stratosphere and the sphere beyond. That is a question which future international lawyers and international agreements must settle.

But the suggestion was that the site was one which was not likely to create much of the consequences that were feared by the African populations around there. The answer to this was given by the Moroccan delegation itself. But since they

are the movers of the draft resolution, I think it would be safer for us to go to some French source. In the *Observer* of London of 2 August, a report was carried by a Paris correspondent, Mr. William Millinship. This is what he says:

"The 'atom city' built at El Hammoudia, south of Reggane, is not in the centre of a bleak desert."

Because the popular conception of the Sahara is that it is no man's land and that there is nobody there.

"The population of the Saoura Department, which includes Reggane, is close on 200,000.

"A French archaeologist, a specialist in Saharan research, informs me that the Touat and Tidikelt Valleys which converge on El Hammoudia from the north and east are among the most fertile regions of the Sahara. From Reggane to Colomb Bechar in the north an almost unbroken avenue of palm trees lines what is known as the 'date-highway'. The string of oases has been irrigated for centuries by a complex system of underground channels known as 'foggaras'. The French have sunk wells to supplement the water supplies.

"The archaeologist feels that the oases may be contaminated by fall-out from the bomb, and that radioactive substances may be carried from well to well along the subterranean waterways."

I am not suggesting that an archaeologist is an authority on radioactivity, but he certainly knows about these other matters. Mr. Jules Moch said in this matter that, not contrary to the short geography read out earlier, the sector within this range is totally uninhabited. Either the representative has been misinformed, which cannot be the case, or there is this element. We should like some clarification. Both the Moroccan delegation and all the other independent sources speak of this area as being inhabited, and, if I may say so, as in the case of the Marshall Islands, it is not necessary for the particular spot of the explosions, the particular platform of the explosion, to be inhabited. But our evidence is that it is one of the richer areas of the oasis in the Sahara.

The Times of London, on July 17, 1959, wrote an article about the Sahara bomb. The British are the allies of the French. The French are seeking admission into the nuclear club, of which Britain is a recent entrant. But this is what *The Times* says:

"Both the Ghanaian and Liberian Government have protested to France, and Nigeria has requested the British Government to convey its apprehensions. These protests are undoubtedly genuine. And indeed these West African States have logical cause to protest... the West African

Governments are protesting against the setting off by a foreign Power of a bomb on their borders which to their mind, apart from any harm that may be caused by radiation or fall-out, is as likely to be used against them as for their protection. Throughout Asia and Africa the bomb is a white man's weapon, used, on the only occasion when it was used, by white men against Asians."

I did not say this, *The Times* said it. It goes on:

"The Sahara is large, but it is surrounded today by States which are neither part of France, nor even part of the community. What are the effects of the bomb likely to be on France's neighbours?"

Again, this last extract does not come from an Arab paper or from an Asian paper; it comes from *The Times* of London, with its aura of respectability.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, speaking in this Committee, said the following:

"The United Kingdom has a very special interest in ensuring that no action which is contemplated could do harm to those peoples living in Africa who have not yet attained independence and for whose welfare my Government has a special responsibility. We have taken every step on their account as well as that of other nations to satisfy ourselves that the measures to be taken by France will ensure the safety of all concerned."

Now what interests us is the first part, that is, that they have responsibility in regard to those populations that precautions have become necessary because there is danger. Nobody takes precautions unless there is anticipation of danger.

But the reaction of the Nigerian State and the African States not necessarily represented here are even more important. It has been stated that:

"The following views were expressed in the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives in Lagos on July 14, 1959, by the Federal Prime Minister of Nigeria: 'That the people of Nigeria had the right to protest against the explosion of an atom bomb in the Sahara by the French Governments.' The Prime Minister recollected that the House of Representatives on February 24, 1959, had clearly expressed the general feeling in Nigeria towards such a test. The text of the resolution then debated was subsequently sent to the Secretary of State by the Governor General with the request that the apprehension felt in Nigeria should be brought to the notice of the French Government."

The document goes on to state:

"The Prime Minister is most unhappy to learn from Press reports and from news bulletins that the French community at their meeting in Madagascar have proposed that the tests should be proceeded with regardless of the Nigerian protest and he hopes that the United Kingdom Government will renew their representation on the subject."

In the same assembly another Minister of the Nigerian Federal Government said:

"It appears that efforts made by the Ghana Government to stop these tests have failed, and the appeals, genuine as they were, had fallen on deaf ears. And so it becomes necessary for all other West African countries to make their feelings known in no uncertain terms and protest most strongly against these atomic tests."

The Acting Prime Minister of Nigeria, who spoke at a later date, said:

"The Northern Government is strongly opposed to the proposed atomic tests in the Sahara. We urge the French Government to use its influence and see that this dreadful proposal is not carried out."

There are many other Nigerian protests and protests from Ghana that have gone to the French Government. A group of scientists of the Nigerian University warned that in a country like Nigeria:

"where much of the population live directly on cereals and vegetables, the intake of radioactive material may be higher than in countries where meat and dairy produce form the staple diet."

The Trade Union Congress of Nigeria stated:

"In the name of the working classes and on the mandate of organised labour in Nigeria, the undersigned hereby register strongest protest against France's determination to use the Sahara or any part of the African continent for the purpose of conducting her atomic tests.

"In the name of Nigerian workers and in the interest of future Franco-Nigerian relations, the workers of this country call through you, on General de Gaulle, as President of the French Republic and head of the Franco-African community, to use his authority to withdraw France's decision to use the Sahara for her proposed atom tests."

I hope that organised labour in the world will take notice of this strong expression of opinion from the African workers.

From religious sources comes the following. The Christian Council of Nigeria stated:

"Although the short-term effect on the inhabitants of Nigeria seems likely to be negligible, the Council feels concerned for those who live nearer wherever the venue of the test may be, and also for the long-term effects of radioactive fall-out, particularly in countries whose main foods are cereals and root crops."

The Roman Catholic Church of Nigeria through its Archbishop, also spoke about the proposed test. He expressed the hope that it would be "as far removed from human life as the American test in the Pacific and perhaps farther than the Russian test in Siberia." But he says that does not matter.

I will conclude this set of quotations with another one from a French source, because my delegation is most anxious that this issue should not become a matter of political controversy and lead to a deterioration of relations in the African continent. With the problems in relation to Algeria and the difficulties in the transition of Trust Territories to independence, and with the continuance of colonialism, mainly by Portugal, on the African continent and the remains of the British and French empires which are progressing towards independence, it is our very fervent desire that, regrettable as this is and with the hopes that it will be abandoned, especially in view of the circumstances I shall later mention, this will not become an issue between white and non-white, between Africa and France, or introduce questions of a different character. *Le Monde* stated:

"In some months perhaps, one bomb will be exploded in French silence. It depends upon us" - that is, Frenchmen - "to stop it. Because one has chosen an African desert for this explosion, shall we be slow? Shall we leave only the unquiet voice of Africa to raise a protest in the middle of the suspicious silence of the big atomic proprietors? Explosion without danger of contamination... precautions taken... negligible risks... We are being reassured. That which reassures us above all is that these atomic tests are to take place near Tamanrasset rather than near Dunkirk. The great France a little polluted towards its south, Europe a little dirtied from the direction of Africa, who should be disquieted by this?

"Fourteen years ago, the bomb which we manufacture today `for the prestige and the defence of the community' (speech of General de Gaulle) hit Hiroshima and then Nagasaki. In some seconds 300,000 died, men, women, and children. They were yellow in colour it is true. We should thank Japan."

Those are not our statements. The article ends:

"If France carries out the tests that have been announced, she will only be speaking for herself, a mediocre atomic Power of the fourth order, detested by Africa, and responsible exactly with the same rights as the

three others, for the poisoning of the skies, the earth, the sands and the seas. France will be no more nor less than the victim of an improbable atomic conflict where there will be none other than victims, and France will simply be a non-innocent victim.

"The day when the blinding flash of Hiroshima exploded over Japanese soil, let us remember our horror, our anguish and later, when we understood it, our shame. The day France becomes, by her first explosion, an atomic Power, we will become at that instant, if we do not agitate now, the accomplices of Hiroshima."

The comments with regard to Hiroshima and France are not ours.

There are two other aspects in the argument put forward by the representative of France to which my delegation wants to apply its mind. First of all, why does France want this test? The main argument, put forward by the President of the French Republic, is that of non-discrimination in terms of prestige, and this perhaps has been overstated by the Moroccan delegation. What did Mr. Moch say? Mr. Moch is respected in this Assembly and would not be expected to give any support to the idea that arguments of this character should be enlisted in support of the promotion of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Moch stated:

"We do not accept any indirect discrimination. We do not accept any tacit monopoly. Our precise, permanent and fundamental objective is nuclear disarmament for all, for that alone will bring about the full equality of peoples. If the fact that France is the fourth State to liberate the explosive energy of the nucleus of the atom - if this fact should cause the other three Powers to turn towards the necessary and urgent elimination of nuclear weapons, then the present efforts of France and the research of its scientists would, without fear of the verdict of history, have served the cause of peace."

That is one approach to it. The other approach of Mr. Moch is as follows:

"So long as there remains the agonising insecurity of a world dedicated, as it is, and despite ourselves, to the arms race, each State has the right - and each government the duty to ensure the protection of its country, France as well as all others."

He went on:

"During nearly ten years we have been faithful to that declaration, hoping thus to set an example which, alas! has not been followed. Ought we, in the insecure world of today, to remain without modern weapons?"

Without any disrespect, I should like to apply myself to that paragraph. I am sure that Mr. Moch did not mean what is implied by his statement. The first part of it is an appeal and a sanction to all the Powers of the world to become nuclear and thermonuclear Powers, because he states that each government has the duty to ensure the protection of its country by this weapon; it was said in that context. It is said that for ten years France has desisted. That is quite true; France, with its great scientific abilities and resources has not produced the atomic bomb. That is all to their credit, but it cannot be said that in ten years the contribution made by France in the Disarmament Commission, despite Mr. Moch's great dedication, has been of a character which has not been the same as the other Western or Eastern Powers, that is to say, it has not contributed to progress until the meetings in Geneva began.

I now come to the argument that France must proclaim its determination to have no discrimination; the law must be the same for all; it must be the same for the Africans as well. If everyone is to conform to it, since France is not creating any risks for the rest of the world, nor is France creating a risk for Africa, is France, from the point of view of its own interests, right or wrong in equipping itself with nuclear weapons? This I believe, is a matter which concerns only the French, which Frenchmen discuss among themselves, on which they alone have a right to hold different opinions - but which is a matter that has no place in a debate of this nature.

What I am going to try to do is to restore to its true perspective a matter emotionally exaggerated by the propaganda of people making capital out of the nervous state of public opinion. I shall be as restrained as possible in my comments on this matter.

First of all, it is raised for the first time; in the history of the General Assembly a delegation has raised Article 2 (7) by implication, in regard to nuclear tests. Never has anybody contended that the United Nations is intervening in this matter just because tests were taking place in Siberia on Russian territory, or in the Pacific, which the United States has claimed is under its administration by the Trusteeship system, or in Australia, which is British territory - none of them has argued on the basis of Article 2 (7), partly because, I suppose, of general world opinion and the recognition that the effects were not confined to the populations among whom the explosions were taking place. But, in all humility, I should like to address this set of arguments to the representative of France.

How can this question be posed on the basis of discrimination? Does France desire to be equal to all other people in all matters? Does France, with its great level of culture, with the contribution which it has made to the volume of liberty in the world, want to be equated down to the others who have not risen to that level?

Secondly, is the restriction that the General Assembly likes to see enforced in regard to what is a necessary evil a discrimination? Does liberty lie in the capacity to inflict harm equally? That is the issue.

Discrimination cannot apply to these matters. It can apply to the advantages that accrue if it proceeds from racial or other circumstances. To argue on the appeal to the Assembly, on the one hand, and the protests of the African people or others - and my delegation denies that this is particularly African business; it is everybody's business - is not acceptable on the ground of discrimination. It is not only misplaced, it is entirely misconceived and I hope that we may pay no attention to it. There can be no question of discrimination.

That takes us to the other point: What is the purpose of this? Mr. Moch has been good enough to show the Assembly that just one little bomb is involved - by implication, there will be no more of it. If that is so, it would not add to the atomic prowess of France from the point of view of equipment. In the power alignment of the world at present France is aligned with the United Kingdom and the United States, both of which are in possession of plentiful stocks of atomic weapons. For the defence of the frontiers of France, or even for waging colonial war in Africa, it is most unlikely that the atomic bomb would be used. Therefore, the possession of this bomb really is merely a way of finding a place in the atomic club. That is all therein to it. And if the representative of France is going to tell us that because France projects the explosion of the bomb, thereby, it may have an influence on the three other atomic Powers to come to some agreement, that is a very specious argument.

Are we to suppose that France has no influence other than this on its two close allies, the United Kingdom and the United States, and, by the power which those two hold, could not exert the same pressure on the Soviet Union? Therefore, the argument put to the Assembly that it is a blessing in disguise, that if the French explode the bomb it will speed up the talks in Geneva, and that is the argument that is put forward somewhere, that if it is exploded it will be a good thing - if we start exploding these bombs there is always a hullabaloo going on here and, therefore the talks in Geneva will be speeded up - that is a very specious argument to put forward: that France would have to use that kind of pressure factor as against the United States and the United Kingdom to achieve the intimate and close alliance. And what is more, in the whole disarmament discussions, not only has France participated equally but France - and Mr. Moch especially - has been the spokesman of the West.

If the argument applies to the Soviet Union, then, of course, it should be considered whether the combined capacities of the United States, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, on the other, of explosions which have taken place - in the proportion, I believe, of 130 for the United States, 55 for the Soviet Union and about 23 for the United Kingdom - should be of far more pressure than this baby bomb that is to be exploded in the Sahara.

Therefore, as far as we can, we have tried to apply to the various justifications produced by the representative of France, largely out of our respect for him and his desire to assure us that there is no ill-will, no last words in the matter.

We are told that France will give up tests if all the other Powers agree to give up tests. How can it be that when the General Assembly, France itself, the world as a whole, want three Powers to give up tests, that a fourth Power should emerge? That is not a step in the direction of stopping tests.

I quote the following paragraph from Mr. Moch's statement of 4 November:

"I come finally to my conclusion. It is a repetition of my statements made in 1957 and 1958. France unanimously wishes for peace with disarmament. With enthusiasm, on the day that the first three atomic Powers renounce their nuclear armament, France will forego all military tests. Let these three Powers agree to halt, under international control, the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to begin the reconversion of their stockpiles, to eliminate the vehicles for these explosives - in short, to renounce a monopoly in fact - and that very hour France will adopt the same measures. Seriously and solemnly I reaffirm this stand."

We are grateful to the French representative for at least implying that if there was an agreement on suspension of nuclear tests, there would be no difficulty in France in acceding to it. But when we read the latter part of this paragraph it is not so clear because what is said is, we will stop these tests when production of fissionable materials will be halted, stockpiles reconverted, and the vehicles for these explosives eliminated - that is to say when war is outlawed. It will be difficult for any country, in those circumstances, to be the law-breaker. Thus, on the one hand, one welcomes the first part and, on the other hand, the second part is a little bit of a double-edged weapon.

My delegation would not like, even by implication, to express disagreement with those who have spoken in opposition to this, but we should like to disassociate ourselves from any statement which says: if you want to explode it, why do you not explode it in France? That may be rhetoric. In so far as it is rhetoric, one does not object to it, but we stand quite clear on this matter. Whether these bombs are exploded in Siberia or in the Pacific or in Australia or in the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, or in these buildings of the United Nations, the issue is the same. The explosion anywhere is an explosion against humanity, against humanity present and of generations to come. Therefore, if apart from the rhetorical side of it, if there is implication in this that the objection is because of the fact that it is in the Sahara, the urgency is there, but we should not like to say that if it is exploded somewhere else we do not mind. I am, however, instructed by my Government to

disassociate ourselves from any idea that this particular menacing evil, this diabolical weapon, is more acceptable in one part of the world than another. In fact, perhaps to a certain extent we would have reason to be more sad if it were to be exploded, as suggested by a French newspaper, in France itself, because, apart from committing mass murder on a large scale, France would also be guilty of suicide.

Another suggestion that is made is that, instead of exploding the bomb, France could be consoled by the allies sharing their atomic secrets with France. That is a matter between them. We do not know what they share - we know that they share a great deal, but that is a matter between those allied Powers - but certainly it would not be a step in the right direction because what the Assembly seeks to do, what world opinion seeks to do, is to restrict and to end for good and all the menacing qualities of this weapon itself and, therefore, any idea that it may be done somewhere else or that, instead of having one yourself, you may borrow someone else's - that is no answer to this problem.

I should like to say a word about this draft resolution. We have co-sponsored this draft resolution; we make no apologies in regard to this. In fact, considering the enormous amount of feeling and emotion to which Mr. Moch has rightly drawn attention, it is composed in the most restrained terms.

It is an appeal to the French Government, even at this late hour, to abandon this experiment, if it is an experiment. It is not going, in our opinion, in any way to contribute to progress of the discussions at Geneva. It is a proclamation, in terms, by a great Power, that the current may be the other way. It comes too late to be more effective than at present in the negotiations themselves. As one of the great Powers concerned with disarmament, they have all the influence they can have in the Geneva discussions.

If it is suggested that these discussions are closely confined to the three atomic Powers, then I believe the Sahara explosion, which will not take place tomorrow - or at all, if France willed it - will not have any great bearing, because it is our hope that these discussions at Geneva, which according to published information have already reached the stage of agreement on seventeen articles, will conclude with complete agreement. The three subjects which remain are important from the point of view of the general approach which is being made by the so-called two sides in this disarmament discussion; but one expresses the hope that progress will be made towards agreement, or even if there is no agreement, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union and I am quite sure in my own mind the United Kingdom, will embark on any tests while these negotiations are going on.

I would like to call attention to the statement I believe of 29 October or so, from the Russian Prime Minister to this effect:

"The Soviet Union said tonight (August 28) that it would not conduct any nuclear weapons tests as long as the Western Powers did not resume theirs." (*The New York Times*, August 29, 1959.

Britain announced on 27 August that its ban on tests would go on as long as talks among the three nuclear Powers on a general suspension of tests showed some prospect of success. The United States announced on 26 August, before the General Assembly commenced this session and before the two statements I have just mentioned, that the United States would not carry out new tests of nuclear weapons for the rest of this year. The statement goes on:

"The President has directed that the unilateral suspension of nuclear weapons testing by the United States currently in effect be extended throughout the calendar year. This decision was taken in the light of the agreed six-week recess announced today by the negotiating parties at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests... The United States wishes to allow a reasonable period of time for the negotiations to proceed..."

But yesterday, the President of the United States further stated that it will not be the first to restart nuclear weapons tests. So that the process - if I may say so, not with an attitude of "We told you so" - which led to the suspension of tests, namely, unilateral, voluntary action, and which when it was submitted to the Assembly was not acceptable - it was treated with a certain amount of ridicule - is to continue.

We also have the correspondence that has gone on between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union in order to find interim ways of agreement in regard to the continuance of suspension. We all know that there are arguments going on with regard to underground tests, overground tests, and so on, but all of these circumstances point to some progress being made in this matter, and one prefers to be optimistic about this. Therefore, this statement coming from such a source, almost a pacifist source, being the doyen of disarmament in this Assembly and spokesman for the Western Powers, himself having suffered bereavement, as he tells us, in the wars, and having, what is more, the capacity today to call upon the nuclear powers of allies, it is all the more reason why, if the world embarked on this suicidal project, we cannot understand it.

My delegation refuses to believe that a country with a background of the French Republic, with its great humane traditions, would simply embark on a project of this character inimical to world peace, against the trend of progress being made in this matter, merely for the purpose of establishing prestige. There is no more prestige today in being in the atomic club than, I suppose, owning slaves in the twentieth century. That might have been the case two centuries ago. Therefore, no question of prestige arises. Our respect for France and her traditions, as well

as for certain tendencies which we hope will come to fruition in Africa - we dare not say any more - will not be diminished. In fact, the prestige of France, certainly on the continent of Africa, certainly in Japan, certainly in my own country, and in great parts of Europe which I have said nothing about, such as the Mediterranean-European countries closely related to France, would be affected by this explosion. There are large numbers of countries of one nationality or another on the Mediterranean borders who cannot but be affected by the results of this explosion, which is the explosion of a bomb, incidentally five times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. Therefore, when we talk about baby bombs, let us not forget that; this bomb which is to be exploded is about five times the Hiroshima bomb.

Finally, my Government and my delegation would like us all to be aware of the fact that one of the greatest misleading arguments is about the minimal danger, as is the argument about "clean" bombs and humane killing. These arguments are far more ominous and difficult to meet than straightforward opposition. In any event, nobody wants to be killed humanely. It reminds me of a cartoon I saw once saying, "I want to cut your honourable throat." So just because the throat is called honourable, it is still cut.

We therefore appeal to the French Government - we cannot appeal to the Government, but we express our hope - that the volume of opinion which will be expressed in the world is such that if they listened and responded to it, it would not be interpreted in any quarter - I am sure Mr. Moch wants no assurance of this - as yielding to pressure of any kind. It would be regarded as a very noble gesture, the response of a country of the traditions and responsibilities of the French Republic; and particularly in view, as I have said, of the attitude in regard to certain African problems which we hope will go in a particular direction, it would not be interpreted in any way as an attitude of submission, of yielding to pressure. It would be regarded as an attitude of recognition of the feelings of people in the world. What is more, in reply to Mr. Moch's argument that their attitude would perhaps speed the progress of discussion in Geneva, the fact that it is announced that the project has been abandoned would make that speeding even more speedy than otherwise.

For all these reasons, my delegation supports this resolution, not merely just to put it to the vote and gain a large number of votes. I have not the least doubt that the resolution will go through. But that is not enough, because this Assembly, with all its votes, cannot stop this explosion. The vote we require is the vote of France, and if France would vote for this resolution, then we can all afford to abstain.

STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 27, 1960³

[The question of disarmament attracted special attention during the fifteenth session of the General Assembly in 1960 because of increased international tension and the presence of many Heads of State and Government at the session.

Negotiations at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests continued in Geneva earlier that year, but no final agreement was reached.

The Ten-Power Committee on Disarmament, set up by the joint decision of the four great Powers, also met in Geneva from 15 March to June 27, 1960, when USSR and its allies withdrew from the Conference stating that the United States proposals did not pursue the goal of disarmament and that the aims of disarmament would be furthered by discussion at the General Assembly.]

...War itself, as historians tell us, is somewhere about 6,000 years old. I do not know why they left out the 600,000 years before. Anyway, there has always been war since people were people. Even their ancestors, even more remote than the chimpanzees, started scratching each other's eyes out. But we have at least come to the situation when civilised humanity does not regard it, I hope, as inevitable, and that it is only an aspect of the development of the human race. As Lord Russell said the other day, the ancient institution which has existed for at least 6,000 years was always wicked and usually foolish, but in the past the human race managed to live with it, and, I would like to add, outlive it.

Modern ingenuity has changed all of this. Either man will abolish war or war will abolish man. To secure this in an end which results in peace, we need to persuade mankind to look upon international questions in a new way - not as a contest of force when victory goes to the side which is most skilful in massacre, but by arbitration in accordance with the great principles of law. Unless such drastic changes in policy take place, fairly soon the march towards mass suicide will continue with blind momentum.

In the general debate, my delegation put forward the elements of the approach that we intend to put forward this afternoon, which has been another consideration of my Government. I am asked to put it forward.

Ever since the beginning of this century, at least with regard to more recent history, there have been conscious efforts between nations, particularly among the nations of the Western world, to establish relations between nations on the basis of what is called pacific settlement... So at the end of the century when Czar

³ From: *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi, October 1960, pages 225-46

Nicholas went to the Hague and said, "We must have pacific settlement of disputes," that appeared to some people as the dawn of a melanoma. But afterwards came other factors which ended in the first World War, and the process continued in the second; and now we are in the process of trying to avoid a third.

But pacific settlement is composed of two concomitants, one being that nation-States must enforce settlements through collective security, whether regarded by the possessing Powers during the inter-war years that they had a security - and here I refer to the Italians in Abyssinia - to collect. But that should not be the position. The position is not holding the reigns for the more powerful nations of the world.

Over and above that, collective security in modern times - I referred to changed conditions - must of necessity take on a new meaning, because it is not possible in modern conditions to leave nations armies, however disarmed, however low that level be, because that would not lead to conditions of peace, but only to a world balanced on the horror of the weapons. That, therefore, is the second concomitant of collective security. The third is the disarmament of the world. This power is concomitant unless we are going to pursue the laws of the jungle.

The moment we decide on pacific settlements, there is no alternative except to use community force in order to maintain those settlements and to give up individual arms as in a municipal community.

That being the position, while the first still remains our ideal because it is embodied by more than one clause in the provisions of the Charter, it is not sufficient at the present moment merely to sentimentally and romantically refer to the clauses of the Charter but to see how it makes an impact upon modern conditions.

There is a general tendency to think that if some resolution is put forward from one country to another - East, West, Middle, North or South - this is something new, which has been thought out by someone, and therefore, there must be something in it. Therefore, it is not the content of a resolution but where it comes from, quite legitimately, that creates trouble.

It is for this reason that I would like to draw the attention of this Committee to the first resolution of the General Assembly, Resolution 11, which calls for a disarmed world in this day of atomic development.

My own country and government, the Government of India, has, from the earliest times, participated in disarmament discussions. The two things which they have always urged - from 1948 to 1949, in the third session; in 1950 in the fourth session; in the fifth session; and afterwards, in 1951, in the sixth session - have

been the conclusion of some kind of convention of agreement between nations to disarm and the utilisation of human resources in the pursuit of peace.

But these earlier stages were left behind in the years 1952 and 1953. We met in the eighth session, devoting a great deal of time to disarmament. Now, this year 1952 is more important than some other aspects which concern us today. As I said a while ago we are going to put forward ideas, not proposals, which I hope, will find expression in the way of proposals from the General Assembly whereby the Assembly will give directives for the information of the world, for the information of member Governments, the Powers principally concerned and the parties who may take part in negotiations.

It is interesting to remember that in 1952 the earlier disarmament commissions were deadlocked in the same way as we are deadlocked today. We had come to a stage where there was no movement forward. And I would like to draw your attention, therefore, to resolution 502 of the sixth session, dated January 11, 1952. It is not important to read the contents of it because, as I say, conditions have changed. At that time disarmament had been translated and paraphrased into what was called the "balanced reduction of arms," that is to say, war and the methods of deciding disputes by war, were a part of the mechanism of social organisation and of nation-States. Therefore, the content is related to that even though it refers to the elimination of major weapons.

But the relevant point here is this: that in this resolution - and in that situation we were trying to resolve deadlocks which could not be resolved by the parties concerned - the Assembly, on January 11, 1952, formulated a resolution where each paragraph began with the word "Directs." There were six "directions" given in that resolution to those concerned. This was followed in 1953 on the initiative of our delegation at that time. This was very strongly supported by the delegation of France. This resolution called for the establishment of the machinery for negotiations in the Disarmament Committee.

We have something of a parallel today. It is necessary, therefore, for the Assembly to give serious consideration to the necessity of taking its responsibilities very seriously - not only taking them seriously, but seeking to pronounce upon them with courage, and place our responsibilities to the Charter over and above any other smaller consideration.

With regard to the resolutions to which I have referred, this was the situation up to 1951. In the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth sessions of the Assembly, the delegation of India put forward various suggestions. They were not put forward with any sense of egoism, but they have become relevant in the context of today's discussion.

I believe it was the delegation of Canada who pointed out that the suggestion made in this Assembly must be noted by others. There are operative or

procedural resolutions in the Assembly year after year which ask the Disarmament Commission, the Secretariat and the Powers concerned to take these proposals into account; and later on, instead of saying, in jumbled terms that these proposals had been taken into account, the resolutions, by number, were noted. But there has been very little attention paid to this and that is why one refers especially to the role of the United Nations, because no longer are the two great Powers and their near allies - I specifically said "their near allies" - probably more immediately concerned because they have the arms to give up, which we have not - thank God - that these resolutions were so referred.

For example, in 1956 there was referred to the Disarmament Commission a resolution involving our request to deal with the suspension of nuclear tests and an armaments truce - the budgetary reduction and voluntary submission of information - I say this because this is not a Soviet item - budgetary reduction, prohibition of the further use of fissionable material, token public destruction and dismantling of bombs. There are various other things. I will not go into details about them. Ultimately, our resolution had been referred to the Disarmament Commission around 1954. The Disarmament Commission could not find the procedures for two years to call upon the proposing party to explain its position.

Ultimately the delegation of India, in 1956, was invited and the proposals were put before it, and it was met with the position that while the statements were made, as I am making them now, without a script, the answer was made immediately afterwards from a script, which means that no consideration is given to these matters. I am not saying that any country, and least of all ours, has either any extraordinarily wise ideas or anything of that character, but since this is a matter which makes its ruinous impact upon everyone else, and since, as members of the United Nations, we carry the responsibilities, it is only right that there should be a collective approach to this problem, and we tried, as a last attempt, to put everybody on the Disarmament Commission. The Assembly did that, and there is a Disarmament Commission of eighty-four, but I am afraid that it always remains in a state of hibernation. It meets only to forward documents.

Therefore, this is the position, and today I want to take all this into account and seek to deal with these matters one after the other. Towards the end of my observations I intend, on behalf of my delegation, to go into this question of what we understand by general and complete disarmament and what the position of the Assembly is in this matter.

We have had in regard to this the work of the Disarmament Commission and of sub-committees, deadlocks, attempts at compromises and technical studies - which it is important to say because it is not a new idea. Technical studies have been undertaken and there is a vast amount of literature on this problem, particularly from the early days of the Sub-Committee of five, and there are the two special problems of nuclear disarmament and the spread of atomic weapons, and the later one of surprise attack.

All this has been studied and dealt with in various places. There have been conferences at summit, in the foothills, midway between, on the top of the hill, in the plains and everywhere else, and now we are back here before the Assembly and the Assembly cannot abdicate its responsibilities.

Therefore, we come to the resolution 1378 (XIV) of last year, and that resolution, in our humble submission, was specific because it said that it arose from this striving to end completely and for ever the arms race. It went on to express the desire "to promote the creation of relations of trust and peaceful cooperation between States," and to state that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today," and to call upon governments - governments, not merely these Powers - to make every constructive effort.

It would be entirely wrong for us to place an undue amount of responsibility - and certainly it would be wrong to place blame - upon the Powers immediately concerned in these discussions because the responsibility must be equally shared by the world since the consequences of failure and success have their impact on the survival or otherwise of the world.

My Government, through the voice of our Prime Minister, set out only last week the position of the Government of India. What is the objective? Before you start thinking of ways or means you should know where you are and where you are going. I think it reminds one of the saying of a great President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, who said, "So long as we know in what direction we are going we can afford to make mistakes now and then." But is the direction right?

The objective, according to the Charter of the United Nations, is to have a world without war, and I would like to say that, irrespective of whatever else he said this morning, Mr. Wadsworth has given expression to these words from which we may go somewhere else. But this is something more than reducing armaments or doing away with armaments, although disarmament is the first part of it. It has become necessary that a world without war should be created, for a variety of reasons. Quite apart from idealistic reasons it has become necessary because of the consequences of modern war, which can yield no substantial results for any party and can lead only to very widespread destruction.

I think it was Mr. Winston Churchill who said the other day, talking about the balance of power, that he had learned as a schoolboy that when numbers were added beyond infinity the plus became minus. Security positions are like that. In this connection we were glad to hear the Minister of the United Kingdom speak on 24 October in this way:

"I do not know whether the prophet Isaiah was the first apostle of a disarmed world," -

nor do I -

"but the need to find a way to 'beat our swords into ploughshares' is essentially the same today as when those words were first spoken; only it is now infinitely more urgent and the price of failure vastly higher. The history of successive unsuccessful attempts in the League of Nations, the fifteen years of abortive discussion in this Organisation, is common knowledge. This knowledge should only spur us on to greater effort for I agree with the representative of Poland - and, indeed, with much of what was said by the representative of Yugoslavia this morning that science and technology have changed the whole character of war in a revolutionary manner. It was still possible even in 1939 for some people to think that a war deliberately embarked on could gain a material advantage for their country. With the advent of nuclear weapons, only a mad man or someone unaware of the true facts could possibly believe in such a proposition. No one could gain a material advantage. No one would gain a victory. All humanity would suffer a defeat. The failures of the past are therefore largely irrelevant. The stakes for which we are playing are quantitatively and qualitatively of a totally new order. We must, therefore, bring about a reversal of present trends, and that is why we must all feel a sense of deep disappointment at the story of events since this Assembly met last autumn."

Apart from the last phrase about disappointment - that is none of our business - may I say, with great respect to the United Kingdom, which has vast experience in these matters, that here is the statement of a conservative statesman from the United Kingdom and we entirely agree. We will only ask him to follow this to its logical conclusion. This is an analysis. What does it mean? It means that all talk about balanced reduction and about finding a situation where people, if it were a municipal society, would be permitted to duel with lethal weapons - that should go, and we have to interpret the content of the world of "general and complete disarmament" as a world in which war is no longer possible and, what is more, is outlawed as an instrument for the settling of disputes between nations.

So Mr. Ormsby-Gore's analysis is one with which my country heartily agrees, and we retain the hope that the great influence of the United Kingdom will be thrown behind this idea of a break from the past. The British have a history of bloodless revolutions - at least, one of them - and this revolutionary outlook is what is required in this matter. While we may quote resolutions of the past in the conditions that existed, we have today an entirely different situation on account of the technological advances. The armaments race today is not between one country and another, but each country is competing with itself in the armaments race because the weapons it makes today are out of date before they leave the

production line. Therefore, it is competing with itself because technology and the fear of man that his weapon may be weaker or less efficient than the others leads on to this competition of a country with itself.

Therefore, in the directives that the Assembly will give, we have to take account of this fact, not because it is idealistic, not because it is the better of two alternatives, but because, in the submission of my Government, there is no alternative. There is no hope of the survival of this world in conditions where the instruments of war are retained by nations, however much they are reduced. The previous resolutions, from 1952 onwards, at various places talk about reduction to a level which will not endanger the peace of the world. Our submission is that there is no level of armament today which does not endanger the peace of the world, except in regard to civilian production, because supposing, as an argument, we reduce armaments in the European world - or the whole world if you like - to the level of 1870, or to the level of the time of the peace of Westphalia, in 1670 or whenever it was. It would not take more than six to nine months before the countries were armed not only with the modern weapons of today but with what will be the modern weapons of that time.

There is no instance in recent history where peacetime generals have conducted a war or won a war or faced failure in a war. That is to say the generals who command in peacetime are soon replaced by other generals. The same is true of weapons. The weapons that are in operation at the beginning of a war are soon replaced by others. At the beginning of the Second World War there were no V-2 bombs or explosives of the kind that ultimately were used in that war.

Therefore, if we retain this idea of balanced reductions as the end and perimeter of a disarmament, we run up against the difficulty that although this type of disarmament - if exercised in a good way - may do some good, may create a degree of confidence and understanding among people, the position remains the same: trust in God but keep your powder dry.

Hence, we must keep in mind the havoc that modern instruments of death can create - not for individuals, not for nations, but for the entire world. No nation can stand still; its armaments race must go on with a degree of inevitability in the present world. That is why we say that an entirely new look at this matter is necessary.

We must examine and take into account the reasons why we are in this position. It is no use our saying that an institution that has existed for at least 6,000 years has had no objective and no purpose. Therefore, we must look into this point.

We find that the reasons for the retention and increase of armaments are the following. The first is national security and national ambition. The second is the desire to expand. To national security considerations must be added considerations of what has mistakenly been called prestige. This is one of those

things that ought to be defined under the United Nations Charter. The third reason is ambitions of colonial expansion. During the last 200 or 300 years the advance of civilisation has meant the advance of arms. Trade has often been followed by the flag, and not, as it should be, the flag by trade. As the fourth reason, people would give - historically incorrectly - the fact that there has always been war in the pursuit of ideologies. Whether it has been to rescue the Holy Land, as in the case of Crusades, or for other reasons, the Gospel has been carried at the point of the sword. Therefore, there have been conflicts of ideology in the past, as there are today - although there are perhaps not so many today as in earlier days. Fifthly, there are economic causes - the scramble for markets, the scramble for raw materials, the idea of creating monopolies, and so forth.

We are in the happier position today that, as regards the retention and utilisation of armed strength for national purposes, for colonial expansion, the area has become increasingly limited. The liberation of large areas of Africa and Asia and other parts of the world, the realisation through the example of countries like the United Kingdom that it is more profitable to be without an empire than with one, the increasing dissemination of ideas of that kind, the operation of the Trusteeship System, the effect of publicity by the United Nations itself, the expansion of constructive ideas of education, health, and so forth, through the work of this international organisation and its specialised agencies: all this has resulted, not in liquidating, but in increasingly removing this particular factor. We hope that the time is not far off when colonialism, like slavery, will be not only out of date but a rather horrid memory.

I do not want to dwell on this point. I would merely point out that there is no longer any justification for all the King's horses and all the King's men to be used for retaining empires on which the sun never sets. There is no requirement today - and there should be no requirement today - for the retention of armed forces for colonial expansion.

We then come to this question of ideologies. It is true that ideological conflicts are promoted by the modern methods of publicity. Nevertheless, through trade, commerce, cultural and other relationships and the resolutions adopted year after year by this Organisation itself with regard to coexistence, even the most fanatical will gradually come to realise that this planet is a compulsory society; one cannot escape from it in spite of the latest discoveries, practically speaking. To go out of one country we have to go into another. We escape from one ideology, one fanaticism, only to find another. Ideologies are often mistakenly used, as the extract from the Carnegie publication mentioned, to find a reason for certain actions.

So far as my country is concerned, we would leave the ideologies to the disciples of ideologies. We would hope that with the electric nature of the human mind, the impact that an idea must take upon another idea will in the course of time make

reconciliation possible, make people willing to live side by side and agree to differ. Only two years ago at the midnight hour, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution calling for coexistence - what an ugly word; I prefer "neighbourly relations."

Thus, this ideological basis for the retention of the instruments of war also disappears. We then come to the economic causes. The peoples who were formerly hewers of wood and drawers of water, whose lands were regarded as dumping grounds for cheap manufactured material and for the production of raw materials under sweatshop conditions of labour are evolving. Things are changing with that evolution of mankind, through the dissemination of political institutions and social ideas, and, what is more, through the competition between the producing countries themselves. To a certain extent organisations like ours and the specialised agencies are bringing about economic agreements. The economic causes have not been entirely eliminated but people are realising that they should not lead to the use of the instruments of war.

Hence, all that remains of the reasons for retaining arms is what is called national security; that is still the real cause. Now, it is quite easy to say that if one wants one world or a free world or an open world national sovereignty must be surrendered. To a very considerable extent national sovereignty has been surrendered. This is an open question. I, myself, think that the exercise of national sovereignty in the interests of international cooperation is an instrument of strength rather than of weakness. After all, any decision that is reached has to be implemented. It can only be implemented in areas where that implementation makes a proximate impact upon the people concerned. Therefore, in the present conditions of the world - and particularly in the context of the United Nations - we must accept this position of nation States. Whatever we may do to bring about cooperation, whatever we may do to make their personalities such as not to mar progress, we must accept this position of nation states and we must consider this question of national security.

This idea of national security has, in the nuclear age, led to new ideas; that is to say, national security can only be retained by what is called the balance of power. My delegation has repeatedly stated in this Assembly, and in various places that, contrary to the schoolboy conception of "balance of power," the balance of power is not a happy equilibrium. For those who conceived "balance of power," the word "balance" was used as an accountant uses a balance; that is to say, the person concerned must have a favourable balance. That was the idea of balance of power. And we have good authority on this matter. In the United States, for example, there have been Presidents in the past and the present who have talked, not about a balance of power but about a community of power. Today we do not talk about a community of power, but a world community where power is not the most important matter, but cooperation.

As early as 1919, when the discussions of the League of Nations were going on and the Treaty of Versailles, and European countries were still insisting upon a balance of power, these words occur:

"There must be, not a balance of power but a community of power," -

a community of civilised nations, at that time

"not organised rivalries, but an organised, common peace."

That, unfortunately, did not come about. I go back to the authority on which, on account of one's background and education, one largely relies; that is the history of the United Kingdom. I am sure Mr. Ormsby-Gore will regard this as a compliment or otherwise. One of the earlier Conservatives, a more progressive one - not a philosopher - Sir Robert Peel, said:

"Is not the time come when the powerful countries of Europe should reduce their armaments... when they should be prepared to declare that there is no use in such overgrown establishments? What is the advantage of one Power greatly increasing its army and navy? Does it not see that other Powers will follow out its example? ...no increase of relative strength will accrue to any one Power; ...the true interest of Europe is to come to some common accord, so as to enable every country to reduce those military armaments, which belong to a state of war rather than of peace."

Considering this was said 120 years ago, and since then there has been the Franco-Prussian War, the First World War and the Second World War, we still have not moved towards what some great men predicted and saw. Then there were statements of this character also coming from the United Kingdom, which at that time led the world in diplomacy and was also regarded as probably the greatest Power in the world. Lord Gray was the Foreign Minister, the predecessor of Mr. Ormsby-Gore, at that time. Speaking soon after the end of the First World War, he said:

"What was the underlying cause which had been working for years to bring about war? From one aspect it was, in my opinion, the great growth of armaments before the war. Before the war it was often said that great armaments were a protection against war. Now, if we have grown wiser after the event, we should never say that again."

That was only in 1922.

"They might be a protection against defeat; they were not a protection against war. The moral of the last Great War, and the state of Europe before it, was that great armaments did not prevent war; they brought war

about. That was one lesson. Another lesson was that if war came on a modern scale, no victory would enable the conqueror to escape from the awful sufferings which war caused. And the next war, if it ever came, would be far more terrible than the last."

And we have all had experience of that one way or the other.

He went on to say:

"I would ask the people to consider to what consequences the growth of armaments has led. The great countries of Europe are raising enormous revenues, and something like half of them is being spent on naval and military preparations. You may call it national insurance, that is perfectly true, but it is equally true that half of the national revenue of the great countries in Europe is being spent in what is after all preparation to kill each other."

It is quite true that in that age and time these things were probably largely dictated by sentiment and by budgetary and other necessities. But today we have come to the situation when, as Bertrand Russell said, "Any attempt to use armaments would be sheer folly." Therefore, we look at the position as it is. Is it not some commentary on modern times that I have read publications during this week where no one is talking in terms of millions of people killed? Just as the book talks of megatons, it talks about mega-corpses; sixty mega-corpses means sixty million corpses. If humanity has reached that way of looking at things, then the time has come to call a halt.

In this matter there are various factors which you have to take into account, some of which are probably close to the items under paragraphs (c) and (d); that is, with regard to the spread of these weapons. In the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee in the United States - I have not got the date here: it was the year before last, I think - Mr. Colin Davidson said:

"If we believe that our civilisation must not be interrupted, then progress towards disarmament is essential. Yet the failure to make such progress and the growing world-wide reliance on nuclear weapons each contributes to the other. It is the absence of progress toward disarmament which drives men to the belief that security can be achieved only by their having control of more destructive weapons; and the acquisition of these weapons by more Powers makes progress toward disarmament more difficult."

I will deal with that matter later on:

"As a result, the world situation is spiralling downwards towards destruction. To avoid this, it is necessary for us to be concerned with more than the immediate effects of our actions upon a world which is

otherwise static. Instead, we must also consider the effects of our acts upon others, and upon the stability of future events. It is for these reasons that we oppose the proposed agreements."

May I at this stage dispose of the two other items for this particular purpose. As I said in the beginning - at least, I should have said - my delegation reserves the right to intervene on the resolutions taken on these matters. So far as nuclear weapons testing is concerned, the first proposals were made in the Indian Parliament in 1954 and were brought before the Assembly the same year, and the majority of members will recall the derision with which these were received. The United Kingdom delegation held at that time, and for successive years, that the suspension of explosions was no part of disarmament. But anyway, the Assembly, after appointing large numbers of committees and everything else, first made the suspension, and now I hope the permanent abandonment of the testing of explosive weapons, necessary.

We are all glad to think that progress has been made in the talks in Geneva. We think that, even if all the explosions stopped, it would not be a measure of disarmament; it would be a measure of arms control. Even the control of arms would be an exercise in cooperation, and if the arrangements made were carried out it would also create a degree of confidence. My delegation, therefore, will request that these negotiations must be brought to a close very soon; and the two items on which there is no agreement, to the mind of any person outside that Committee does not seem to be a thing that should bring about this degree of delay.

We are, therefore, in general support of the sentiments expressed in the Polish resolution,⁴ while at the same time we think that it is not necessary to call the Assembly again to consider this, because agreements would be reached, and after all it is better to approach these propositions saying that what should be done is something that is not done, rather than to take the view that it will never be done.

Therefore, my delegation congratulates the people concerned, though it has been delayed. At least we have moved towards a difficult matter. At one time it was said that it was not possible to discover whether anybody had weapons or not, and so on. I shall deal with that matter when we come to the question of controls.

But we want, at the same time, to enter a reservation on behalf of the Government of India. The Government of India does not support the idea of the retention of explosions underground. It may appear at the present time that this matter is impracticable. So was the suspension of nuclear weapons. We believe that for industrial, economic or other advance there should be methods which in the long run do not create the harm to humanity which explosions would create, and if the

⁴ Draft resolution on the "establishment of conditions conducive to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament (A/C.1/L.252)

progress of humanity depends upon a regression on the other side, then we should think twice before adopting them. Therefore, the Government of India, while welcoming the progress made, does not subscribe to what appears to be the agreed position between the two sides, for continuing underground explosions.

Secondly, we should like to say that, while any method of control, inspection or safeguarding may not be water-tight, in the sense that any laws, even income-tax laws, can always be evaded, while there are always evasions of one kind or another, for all practical purposes it is possible today, with the knowledge we have and through whatever further research is conducted by scientists, to stop this kind of testing of these explosive weapons, for the reasons which have been set out year after year in this Committee - not merely because of the damage to the health of humanity and of generations to come on account of genetic consequences but also because the stopping of these tests is a step in arms control, that is to say, it reverses the process, as we said three years ago, of nuclear armaments. That is why we put this forward.

The second item is in regard to what has been usually called the "nth country" problem. There is, I suppose, a potential queue - or a line, as it would be called in America - for entering the "nuclear club." It is regarded as a great distinction to have a little bomb so that one may go about and say, "I have also got a bomb." So we think that our world is in very great danger.

This Committee of Mr. Davidson referred at that time to the fact that ten countries in the world, including my own, were capable, if they so desired, of producing nuclear weapons and had sufficient fuel and all other material knowledge required for the purpose of doing so in a few years - three, four, or five years, as the case may be. Our studies in this matter lead us to the conclusion that this year there are not ten but probably twenty countries capable of doing so. It would not be right in the United Nations to say that what is good should be the monopoly of a few people, and those who pursue evil will say that evil also should not be the monopoly of certain countries. Therefore, on the basis of national sovereignty, it would be quite impossible to restrain any country from having these diabolical weapons if it wanted to have them.

This Assembly, almost unanimously, has reiterated our position. Only two years ago, I think, it appealed to France not to carry out atomic explosions in the Sahara in the proximity of African communities. It was not successful. But here my delegation wants to put certain factors forward. Three years ago, when it was submitted that, with the progress of technology and science, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would become more portable and more available and become capable of private manufacture, an important delegation whose exponent we all treat with the highest respect characterised the remark as scientific fiction. Today we are told that, while the baby bomb that was dropped at Nagasaki, was supposed to be a 20,000 ton bomb, such a bomb is now used only to trigger bigger

bombs. At the same time, science has discovered that it is possible to make nuclear weapons of a fifty-five ton capacity and now, as further evidence of it, it has brought it down to a ten-ton capacity or a five-ton capacity. This means that these nuclear weapons will become available, I suppose, even for gang wars. That is to say, they can be reduced so much that they can become very much widespread.

While great countries like the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States and so on that are now the great nuclear Powers can be expected to exercise restraint - if nothing else, by the consequences that the release of these bombs would bring to themselves and to the world - the same thing may not be expected of countries which probably may use them not for international purposes but for other purposes. The capacity for the production of these lower-capacity type weapons as tactical weapons and for the use of destructive nuclear power in other ways in the world makes it necessary that there should be a complete abandonment of them, the destruction of stockpiles, the prohibition of their manufacture and their use and everything else.

We should like to say, at the same time, that there are three or four concrete matters that must be considered by this Assembly. One is the news - though I do not have accurate details here, it has not been contradicted - that a process has been found by German scientists which shows promise of being able to produce appreciable amounts of fissionable material at acceptable costs.

This report states:

"A once-discarded process for producing atomic weapon materials is threatening to complicate efforts to control the atomic race as well as to stir up the test ban issue in the Presidential campaign... The process, based on the principle of a cream separator, uses a centrifuge to separate enriched uranium for manufacturing bombs."⁵

The net conclusion we draw from that is that, through the ingenuity of German scientists, who were among the first pioneers in the world in this matter, before the Allies captured them - before they could produce the bombs - and had them comfortably interned in England, it is said that they are on the way to finding methods of producing these weapons more cheaply and, no doubt, in smaller sizes.

If it is the case that even the fifty-five ton bomb is only one-four-hundredth of the Nagasaki bomb, and if such bombs become widespread, it is not a prospect to which we can look with equanimity. I submit that there is no way of prohibiting a free country, a sovereign State, whatever may be its internal organisation, whether it is a member State of the United Nations or not, from utilising its own energies and its own resources and capacity for whatever purpose it wishes, unless there is

⁵ *New York Times*, October 11, 1960

a world agreement to which that country would have become a party against the use of those weapons. Therefore, any argument to the effect that there is so much radiation - the argument that used to be used here always - that there is so much natural radiation in the body that a little more really would not do any harm, is beside the point. This has now become a universal menace to mankind, and therefore we must deal with it accordingly.

Further - and we may not find the same degree of agreement with regard to this - there are countries that still have vast colonial possessions. There are countries that are waging colonial wars, that are prepared to wage wars in order to retain their colonies. If they possess not necessarily all these very big megaton bombs but a degree of nuclear power so that they can argue in the same way as that in which the war with Japan came to a close, on account of the use of atomic weapons, some colonial Powers that I will not mention by name can also be drawn in, in the same way, by the use of these weapons. Then we are in a situation where the less-developed peoples, the under-privileged peoples of the world, are at the mercy of these atomic weapons.

I think it is not a bad reflection but a good one, as regards the United States and the Soviet Union, that it is most unlikely that they would provoke a world war because of some breaches of this character, because one thing has to be weighed against the other. While they may not say so, it would be most unlikely that these countries would be deterred by the fear that the great instruments of death would be operated against them.

Thus the nuclear weapon will practically become a conventional weapon. This is a matter which we cannot very well ignore: the spread of knowledge of new techniques. While at the beginning, when Baruch was talking about atomic materials and so on, there was a scarcity of them, now there is no question of a scarcity of raw materials. There are other raw materials, and I believe we may even come to the time when the fusion processes are of such a character that, unless there is a total ban, it would be impossible to control the devastating effects of these, wherever there is a surplus of plutonium or other atomic fuel. Therefore, the spread of these weapons and the control of them have to be a concern of ours.

While we have not made detailed studies of the matter, my delegation is not only in sympathy with this idea set forth in this item but will give general support to it and will support any draft resolution that helps to prevent the spread of these weapons to other places.

We have also read in the newspapers that France has also talked about atomic isolation. Atomic isolation has been made possible because there is no atomic agreement. If there were an atomic agreement and if this thing called 'gamesmanship' had not been used in the past, it would not be possible. If there is to be atomic isolation, then the danger when any country indulges in it becomes greater.

My delegation will again propose, as it has done before, that there must be some halt to this armaments race. There must be some halt to this armaments race, partly by arms control in the ways mentioned - by not extending the area of potential war in the colonial and ex-colonial areas, by preventing the spread of the capacity for waging wars to those areas.

In this connection my Government wishes to appeal to the new, free countries not to allow their freedom to be limited by any persuasion of any kind, not to allow their territories, by any appeal to their fear, to be used in that way.

Therefore, the arms truce in this way can take various forms. One form could be by arms control, by, for example, the abandonment of these tests and not spreading nuclear weapons. Another, awkward as it may sound, would be by the agreement on the part of the great Powers that the designs on the drawing-boards shall not be used; that is to say, that the arms race come to a dead halt where it is, because there is enough killing power in the world to destroy it once. There is no need to destroy it twice over; nothing is gained by it. Therefore, there should be a halt in the development of weapons of any kind pending agreement in a general way.

As I said, my Government would look to the newly liberated countries particularly not to allow their territories to be used for this purpose. We have held this view for a long time. That is why my Government would not be a party to a common agreement in the peace treaty with Japan, because there we thought that they should be at liberty to do it themselves in their own way.

Secondly, we should like, if it were possible, to see the extension of the areas of military pacts limited. We should like to see the "pactomania" come to a halt somewhere. If the great countries did not project their pact apparatus into the proximity of the uncommitted areas, their uncommittedness would be more secure - and in the last two or three years even the committed countries have found uncommittedness in certain parts of the world for the promotion of cooperation or of peace, or even for their purposes in that which they intended.

We also support the motion that has been put forward by various countries, including Ghana, through its President, Mr. Nkrumah, that Africa should be regarded as a zone free from the employment of atomic weapons. Perhaps they have already forgotten that bombs have been exploded in the Sahara.

We likewise support the suggestion put forward by that young and very brilliant statesman from Asia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, who, in the small number of years he has been here, has contributed many good ideas - the suggestions that that part of Asia should be a zone free from the operations of the cold war. This would mean that if the great Powers, with all their other troubles,

would keep out of these areas and not involve those populations in their competition but go elsewhere, and if they would try to assist them, if they can, in their development, then the existence of that free zone would be a factor contributing to peace.

We also would welcome the proposals put forward by the representatives of Poland with regard to a free zone in Europe. Wherever free zones can be established - though we realise there is no limiting of ionised radiation - these areas would at least be prevented from becoming bases of operation. All this, perhaps, would be conducive to a climate of peace, to what is called the lowering of tension.

My Government has often spoken in this Assembly about the lowering of tension, and in a small way has made whatever contributions it has been able to make by whatever influence it can exercise. But I think we have now come to a state of affairs in the world where the mere stopping of intemperate language or the sending of cultural missions, or anything of that kind, is insufficient to bring about this climate. The only thing that would bring about a climate of peace or a lowering of tension is a cessation, or at least some retardation, of the armaments race. Therefore, if there was a cessation of nuclear tests, if there were no more bases, or perhaps the dismantling of one or two, if there were no projections of the war apparatus in the uncommitted areas, then perhaps this would all lead to the lowering of tension and the creation of confidence. All this would mean that we would have to re-write all our conceptions in regard to what is called general and complete disarmament.

I hope it will not be considered that what we are now going to put forward is either utopian or unmindful of the history of the past. As I said, we have to take a new look at this problem. We cannot achieve our goal, we cannot accomplish what is required to guarantee the survival of this world, merely by the limitation of armaments. Therefore, to us "general and complete disarmament" means just what it says. It does not mean merely a balanced reduction of armaments unless as a step to something else. It is not sufficient to agree only to partial measures and phases with the final details to be decided after the agreement. When we come to the matter of these directives, we shall try to spell it out more. But we think the whole of this perimeter must be agreed to; there must be an engagement by the great nations, those that are powerful enough - and, we hope, have courage enough - to come forward and commit themselves to a totally disarmed world, because the alternative is not to have faith in the whole of this scheme, which will not give rise to the confidence that is required that any path to disarmament will not put our people in great difficulty. What is more, the alternative will not rid the world of war and it will make the work and even the survival of this Organisation very difficult.

But if the content of general disarmament is spelled out -and I am glad to say that many speakers whom I have not time to quote have gone into this question

thoroughly - it is necessary that the member States of the United Nations, and more particularly the nations most involved in this matter, the great Powers, should engage themselves to a total commitment. Those nations should engage themselves to a disarmed world, to a world without war. I was very glad to see Mr. Wadsworth using these words this morning. A world without war naturally means a world that cannot make war, because if you have limited armies, under whatever guise, with the growth, as I said, of technology, with the technicians remaining, with the advances that go on in the world, it is easily possible to become very fully armed. Therefore, with the disarmament - I do not mean a full disarmament treaty, but a disarmament agreement or convention - there must be an engagement by the member States, between them and the United Nations and among them, each with the others, to the effect that they are committed to bringing about a general and complete disarmament, which would merely be working out what Mr. Ormsby-Gore said this morning. That is why I said that this analysis must be pursued to its logical conclusion.

This does not mean that anyone in the world who has any common sense believes that it is possible within a very short time to spell out all the details in connection with this matter. The difference is this: one is an agreement for a phase, however substantial it may be, in the hope that it will lead to another. But that is not the goal; that is merely an agreement to pursue a path which, if it takes us to the goal, makes us happy. But that is not sufficient. Today, in view of what I have said - in view of the state of nuclear armaments, in view of the fact that war can come by accident or because a small nation thinks it probably an advantage to promote a big nation in a war - for rational or irrational reasons there are so many things that can happen in this world. Therefore, the engagement must be with regard to a world without war where war is no longer possible and is not to be utilised as an instrument for the settling of disputes. And that commitment should, at the same time, guarantee that the first phase of it is sufficiently large, sufficiently attention-arresting, to create confidence. We would not be satisfied, for example, with the first phase that was put forward by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd last year, which amounted to no phase at all. We would like to see in this first phase an agreement for the preparation of reduction on a large scale, with each of these stages directed towards the final end.

We think that this requires the negotiation of an agreement by the great Powers and others to which we must stand engaged. We are equally clear that this directive must include the fact that no implementation of disarmament is possible without the full machinery of inspection and control. But, at the same time, while for political reasons, while for reasons of confidence, the fullest machinery of inspection and control without any reservations has to be accepted and enforced, it must be equally clear that there can be no machinery of inspection and control which any scientist or mathematician can say is 100 percent perfect. What is required is for practical purposes.

Secondly, we also have to take into account the fact that technological advance is so great and the speed with which destruction can be brought about is so vast that today it is not the inspection that catches up with the weapons, but the weapons which catch up with inspections. Therefore, while we in no way abandon our insistence upon inspection and control, because all eliminations must be maintained, similarly I would submit there has to be some provision for creating a degree of confidence with regard to the Powers that are fully armed committing depreciations in the form of what I call surprise attacks.

All this has to be limited and conditioned by the time factor. It is not the desire of my Government at this stage to state that time in terms of years. My Prime Minister has mentioned something like three or four years. I was happy to hear Mr. Wadsworth speaking this morning about five or six years, and saying that this could be reduced. I would ask this Assembly, if it is possible to collect all this material for large-scale war in a shorter time, it should be equally possible to get rid of it. If it is possible for the United States, for example, to demobilise something like 12 million men in less than eighteen months, given the agreement, given the understanding and, what is more, given the great technological knowledge, this should be possible.

We have been told that inspectors are not available and that machinery cannot be put into operation. I must say that my Government stands unconvinced. These men do not have to be sent to universities or technological institutes to be trained to be inspectors, they exist in the armies, the administrations, the laboratories and everywhere else. It is only a question of enlisting them for this purpose and establishing them in the machinery that has to be created.

The procedure we follow in this Committee is that of a debate on the subject and then a stage for resolutions, and this was originally intended - and I hope the spirit of it will be continued - so that ideas could be put forward without too much rigidity with regard to phraseology, so that like-minded people could approach those others who were also interested so that resolutions would come up which would not incur unnecessary hostility. There are three or four draft resolutions on the table in which there are many common items, but in the draft resolutions of the great Powers there is the proverbial joker. But, in any case, we would submit for the Assembly's consideration the following thoughts.

First of all, it is necessary for us to remind ourselves of the resolution of last year. If this Assembly really means business, if it is to keep the confidence of the world that the United Nations is not merely a talking shop which passes resolutions because it dare not go away without them, then last year's resolution, 1378 (XIV), is, in the view of my Government, a full and complete commitment for us to engage ourselves to create a world in which war will be a thing of the past, that is, in which war will not be part of the normal mechanism of international relations or the way of settlement of disputes.

Secondly, that directive should contain a request, or whatever it is, to take steps towards the ending of what has been called the armaments race. And, as I said a while ago, the armaments race is not merely a race in armaments between countries, but the country racing with itself, or, as they used to say in the last war, producing bigger and more beautiful bombs. Therefore, this great haste to improve armaments also will have to come to an end, realising that even from the point of view of the fallacy of the security of what is called negotiating from strength, the positive deterrent and what not, there is enough power in the world between the contending parties to deal with the other, if that is the proper method. Therefore, comes the step towards the ending of the armaments race and towards peaceful cooperation.

There, again, we have to remind the Assembly some time of the resolution it passed only a few days ago where the nations committed themselves without any dissent whatever to refrain from action that would lead to lack of cooperation in the world.

Only the other day, just a few days before the General Assembly met, the Disarmament Commission, in which not a few countries but every member State is represented, also expressed itself in this way. After recalling its resolution of September 10, 1959, welcoming the resumption of disarmament negotiations, it went on to state:

"Noting with regret that these negotiations have not yielded the expected positive results,

"Reaffirming the continuing and ultimate responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

"Taking into account resolution 1378 (XIV)...

"Recommends to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly" -- to us --
"to give earnest consideration to the question of disarmament;

"Considers it necessary and recommends that in view of the urgency of the problem continued efforts be made for the earliest possible continuation of international negotiations to achieve a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

The resolution also recommended to the General Assembly that the Disarmament Commission should continue in being.

We supported this resolution. This means that we are to implement the fullness of general and complete disarmament. General disarmament means that it applies to

all weapons. Complete disarmament means that there are no exceptions. In view of the circumstances I have mentioned, we all know that what was possible last year is not possible this year. What is possible this year may not be possible next year. My Government, as has been expressed by my Prime Minister, is of the opinion that if disarmament of the complete and general type is not achieved by the discipline of humanity and by the work of this Assembly in the next four or five years, it may well nigh become impossible to achieve it. Therefore, it is a matter which is not only imperative, but urgent.

Then we also have to take account of the fact that in the negotiations that have preceded, there were certain areas of agreement before deadlock was reached. It is quite true that in those areas of agreement there are certain aspects on which there is no agreement, and we should call upon the parties concerned, encourage them or whatever it may be, to implement those areas of agreement and to add to those areas of agreement whatever is required for implementation.

Pending a disarmament convention, pending an agreement on disarmament - and my delegation does not merely say this this year, it has said it from the very beginning - there should be a complete prohibition of the manufacture and the use of weapons of mass destruction. We have never had any reservations on this matter; there is only one thing to do with nuclear, thermonuclear and similar weapons. We cannot mend the situation, only end it.

We also have to realise that all these delays and deadlocks in this matter constitute a serious threat not only to the peace of the world as it stands today, but also to the future in the sense, as I said a while ago, that it might not be possible to bring about disarmament at all.

My Government yields to no one in stating, without any reservations whatsoever, that the implementation of disarmament requires full inspection and control, and we do not quite understand the conundrum of which comes first and which comes afterwards. Inspection and control can only be after we have decided what is to be controlled and what is to be inspected. My Government does not call for the throwing away of weapons or their removal until that throwing away and removal be inspected. An agreement on disarmament does not necessarily require the completion of the inspection machinery, but there can be no implementation without full inspection and control of a character that will not only bring about reduction or abandonment, but also will maintain it.

If some weapon is by agreement and on instruction removed, and then brought back because there is no adequate inspection, then the purpose of disarmament is lost. Therefore, we would like the General Assembly to recall what was done in 1952 in a similar situation, when the position was deadlocked. The Assembly took a hand and it gave directives. It gave directives for general and complete disarmament which would involve the elimination of all war materials, war

personnel, war production, and war preparation of various kinds. We shall spell it out later if the time becomes available. We were committed to a treaty, and all nations were committed to this treaty.

We are engaged today not merely in a pilot project, however big it may be. We committed to bring about a disarmed world, and immediate measures, therefore, have to be adopted also to work towards a substantial phase, to create confidence and also to bring about the kind of relations that make further negotiations possible.

We also point out to the Assembly that in the negotiations which have taken place in Geneva and elsewhere both parties agreed that no phase or part of the discussions should give a military advantage to the other side and that control should equally apply to every stage and phase so that there cannot be any loopholes - because the strength of this chain of disarmament is as strong as the weakest link.

We are, therefore, fully committed, as a Government, to the idea that each of these phases, even if they are small, must be covered by the machinery of inspection and control. The various other details will have to be worked into this directive - that is, the means of delivery and the placement of weapons, which would include the bases of the world. There should be a commitment on the part of those concerned, by the nations that have the land and the facilities not to permit the use of those bases by themselves or others.

We suggest that whatever machinery exists for the purpose of negotiations - whether it be the Ten-Nation Committee, bilateral negotiation or whatever else it is - a report should be made to the full body of the Disarmament Commission at a fairly early period, so that we do not wait until the sixteenth session of the General Assembly for the Disarmament Commission to function as a post office. Therefore, in the next few months, when political conditions are perhaps better, in important parts of the world, the full Disarmament Commission should receive a report in regard to the implementation of those directives. In the meanwhile, the agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests - not to supply those weapons to other parts of the world, to other peoples, or the means of making them - should go on.

We have also thought in terms of a proposition which, perhaps, should be thought over by the great Powers and not be regarded as something which does not have any meat in it. That is to say, they all agree on this problem of surprise attack on which they have been working; and it is quite true that a surprise attack can be prevented only - if it can be prevented - by properly organised and agreed upon machinery; and it is also true that it will take some time. But since, in spite of all our conflicts, we are living under certain kinds of international relations - a degree of international law, international action, whether it be regarded as territorial waters or freedom of the seas or the skies, or whatever it is - nations should

engage themselves in the United Nations and should not indulge in or prepare for surprise attack on other countries. The preparation for surprise attack should be regarded as a serious violation of international law. And if that understanding comes about, then even today a certain amount of machinery exists for the implementation of it. We would make an appeal to everyone concerned in this regard. All of this, of course, requires that the United Nations, as an organisation, has to be able to deal with this problem.

I have expressed all along, on behalf of my delegation, the view that the responsibilities of the United Nations cannot be abdicated. What is more, at the present time, in a disarmed world there must be machinery for keeping order, or what may be called in modern conditions, collective security. In the opinion of my Government, this cannot take place by the retention of national armies but by police forces which are not of an armed character. If that is so, considerable organisation is required.

Here, may I say, the general conception is that disarmament of this character has to be undertaken because it saves money which can be spent in feeding under-developed countries. In spite of being misunderstood, I would like to say this: that is not the main argument because no Government keeps a lot of money somewhere, it raises money for particular purposes. Therefore, if it does not want it for arms, it does not raise it. No taxpayer is going to give the government a lot of pin money for contingencies. Therefore, the idea that governments will have surplus money which can be made available is entirely wrong.

But over and above this economic consideration, in my view, in the submission which I am making at this time - which is perhaps worthwhile considering - world disarmament, the outlawing of war, the creation of a community where nations are afraid and disarming the world by complete and general disarmament perhaps will cost more, in terms of expenditure and effort, than the maintenance of arms, because it requires large number of people, enormous quantities of machinery, a great deal of propaganda - that is the education of the populations - the conversion of existing plants of production for other purposes and, what is more, finding avenues of occupation for various people who purvey arms. All these things are necessary.

Therefore, in this session of the General Assembly we should not accept, formulate or take shelter under illusory statements. We should not go around the world and say that if the world is disarmed, the underprivileged people of the world will be better off. They will be better off because there is a greater sense of security, there is a greater sense of hope, there is less neurosis in the world - all kinds of things like that. However, national budgets will not immediately be reduced, because administrators, technicians, engineers and offices of various kinds have to be maintained, whether it is for one purpose or another.

Therefore, I would like to put this in a very realistic way. It is not a question of saving military budgets. This may happen in the far future, but right now it may cause further demobilisation of arms which is not far less expensive than recruiting armies. Therefore, let us face this fact. This is an expenditure that is worthwhile. It is an expenditure for peace and not for war. Let us not put it on a lower ground, that we are going to run the world cheaply if we have no war. That is not the issue.

Secondly, we should not believe that scaring people is going to bring about the abandonment of war, because the whole of the war apparatus, the whole of all the accumulation of these weapons, is based upon fear; and the stronger the nation, the more afraid it is of somebody else. I don't know why it is. I must ask some prize fighters about this, whether they are afraid of their opponents. The stronger the nation, the more afraid it is. Therefore, it is no use appealing to the fear of people and saying. "If 'X' country sends a missile to 'Y' country" - under the new phraseology - "16 'megacorpses' will be produced in so many hours." That is not going to scare anybody, because after all, that is just statistical.

As one person said to me yesterday, "When one man is killed, it is a great tragedy. When a million people are killed, it is statistics."

It is no use appealing to the people of the world, talking about leukemia and cancer and about the destruction of the world, and so on. It may appeal to some people. No nation today can be scared into coming away from what may be called a "fortress nation" concept. I would not use the name of any particular nation. It is like the Maginot Line which was found to be so extremely vulnerable when the war broke out. It is "Maginot Line" mentality to think that it is possible to protect a country by the accumulation of armaments. Surprise attacks certainly cannot be prevented through the superiority in arms of another country. What is more, the whole concept of a deterrent is the defensive weapon, and if it is only going to be produced for defence purposes - that is to say, not be used at all - then it has no value.

It is an idle threat. You place your confidence in the other side that they will not be so foolish as to go to war. And if you have sufficient confidence in the other side to think that - for the sake of humanity, for the sake of their own kins, or for the sake of their prosperity - they will not go to war, why do we not use that confidence in negotiation? On the one hand, we develop confidence to think that nobody is likely to do it, so the deterrent theory, in my humble submission, is played out. It has passed infinity, when plus has become minus. The more deterrents, the more the country is a target.

The more deterrents, the more the country is a target. The more deterrents, the greater the accumulation on the other side. What is more, I was reading the other day that if country X is in possession of powerful instruments, and if one of its own submarines, shall we say, releases these weapons by accident on the home

land, then that itself may lead to international war because the other countries will begin to think that the release of weapons has begun. And there is no time to wait - they push the button and there is war. Or, on the other hand, if a mistake has been made they will not want the other fellow to think that they were ready to make a mistake. Therefore, whichever way it happens the possibilities of mistakes and errors in this matter are so great, as are the possibilities of comparatively chauvinistic countries or self-seeking countries driving other big countries into positions where they may use intemperate language or be forced into their commitments, that what may be called cataclytic war is a great possibility. For all these reasons we should address ourselves to this idea with great urgency.

As I was saying, the United Nations has to be able to meet these contingencies. Whereas in 1945, when it was established at San Francisco, we had fifty members, today we have over one hundred members. The Organisation covers many more millions of square miles of territory than it used to before. Its activities, whether it be in the field of atomic energy or in the fields of health or education, or whatever it is, are considerable.

For the first time in the history of the United Nations the Organisation has intervened - I do not say by force - in the form of forces in a dispute not between countries but within a country, that is to say, in Gaza, in Korea, and in Indo-China, although that was not under the United Nations. But in Lebanon and various other places, emergency forces have gone in to keep the peace between two nation States. For the first time in our history, circumstances have come about in the world where these forces are now in evidence in the territory of one country which is not in dispute with any other country. This phenomenon may spread and the Organisation's responsibility will be greater.

Those who formulated the Charter envisaged a situation where the machinery of the United Nations would have to meet these contingencies, and I think that this development is a healthy development which must respond to the geographical and other factors, including the political factors, in the world, and the aspirations of the peoples. The negation of racial and other considerations in these matters, the idea that there are some people who are fit internationally to administer others who are not - these things will have to disappear. And it would be a great pity if it were lost in the cold war controversy or in "gamesmanship," because it is plain to the common sense point of view that if the world were really to disarm, and if some 30 million troops were to be demobilised, the vast panoply of war, which is costing \$100 billion a year would mean, if it is to be reconverted or otherwise engaged, that millions of people in very expert occupations would have to be engaged. As has been envisaged in the resolutions submitted by a number of countries, including the United States, in the past, and by publications of the United Nations, it will require very considerable organisation of its own, and, subject to what may happen here, the view of my country now is, and ever has

been, that this is a matter of world security, which is the responsibility of the Security Council.

The Security Council, therefore has to respond to this new situation, and we think that the American statesmen who met at San Francisco built better than they knew when they insisted, perhaps against logic, perhaps against the idealistic views of their own people, that the United Nations could survive only on the basis of all-Power unanimity which is now called the veto. Therefore, while the Security Council takes charge of this Organisation, it is my submission - and we make no secret of it - that this veto will be at a very high political level, which would obtain in any case. That veto can be exercised only in the terms of the Charter, but the general operational disarmament machinery will go on, and therefore it protects the great nations and the small nations against a rush vote of any kind, and at the same time does not deadlock administration by processes which build in deadlocks into the machinery itself. But that is a thing for the future. All we say is that this old bottle will not take all the new wine, and therefore it is necessary for us to consider the matter seriously.

And I hope that the countries, particularly the Soviet Union which has for the past several years in the Special Committee and so on - I do not say for bad reasons, and we have supported in this because we have balanced the good with the evil in this matter - been against the alteration of the composition of organs such as the Security Council and other bodies, will take a new look at the situation and will not become the victim of their own initial ideas. I hope that they will realise that this operation cannot be carried out either by the existing machinery or even with what is called the Military Staff Committee - a few generals, and so on, who have been here for a long time. That sort of thing will not work because it is a great world operation involving millions of people, as I said, and millions of dollars worth of equipment, together with large numbers of agreements which require lawyers, doctors, and all kinds of others, because people become very neurotic in this. All the doctors in the world also would be required. So, in the security function, there are provisions of the Charter which deal with this vast machinery.

It is a very interesting exercise to make an analysis of what has been said by the United States, on the one hand, and by the Soviet Union on the other. It is a good thing they do not remind each other of what was said in different years. I believe that in 1928 the then United States Government made a proposal to the League of Nations which is identical with what the Soviet Union has been proposing for a long time. But then that was in a different period.

Anyway, here in document A/C.1/L/250 the United States speaks of "an international disarmament organisation within the framework of the United Nations" and of "the maintenance of international law and order in a disarmed world by strengthened international peacekeeping machinery within the United Nations." And within the United Nations there is only one machinery for security - that is, the Security Council. The Security Council operates under what, I am

sorry to say, has been called by the newspapers a veto, but is a healthy principle of great-Power unanimity. In the exercise of this veto the Soviet Union, the people who take the place of China in the Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have participated, except that when the United States exercises the veto it does so in common with the United Kingdom and France, and therefore it does not look like a veto. That is all there is to it. But it is a veto just the same.

So, we are ardent advocates of the veto. It is our safety for small nations. After all, history in the past is replete with instances of arrangements between the great Powers to carve up the world. Therefore, we cannot just sit back and say that it is none of our business.

On the other hand, the Russians also have said "an international control organisation shall be established under the United Nations." It is the same copy, I am sure. One did not copy from the other. That would be very bad, would it not? But there it is. This is document A/C.1/L.249, the other was document A/C.1/L.250. I do not know whether the numerals have any significance...

Then the Soviet Union draft resolution goes on to say,

"...in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations... to make available to the Security Council... contingents of police (militia)."

As the United Nations, however, we are concerned with Charter provisions, and in this respect the Charter says:

"All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council... armed forces..."

"Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council..."

"There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council..."

Thus, the Charter is quite clear on this matter.

My Government thinks that there are no practical difficulties in this respect. As I have said, scientists and others talk in terms of "megacorpses," of profitable atomic weapons and things of that character. We have come away from the highly explosive stage. First there was the Nagasaki-Hiroshima type of atomic bomb. Then came nuclear weapons and thermonuclear weapons. Fusion processes were played around with. And now we are in the space age. What is left? I hope that there will be no conflict between the Soviet Union and the

United States in regard to the possession of Mars. If there is such a conflict, however, I hope that they will wage their war on Mars and not on the earth. Unfortunately, the present position is contrary to the theological doctrine that the troubles in Heaven are solved on earth - the problems of the earth are not solved in Heaven.

The fact is that we have come to a position in which thinking people are seriously writing of such things as "doomsday machines" - I do not want to read out the entire extract to which I have referred; it is pretty gruesome. The idea of these "doomsday machines" is that a country buries a large quantity of explosive material and if it is attacked by another country it blows up the world. Another method is called "mutual suicide arrangements." These are things that are an outrage on the conscience of humanity.

The time has come for us to realise that we are here not merely as representatives of Governments but as human beings interested in the opportunities and perhaps the responsibilities of enabling human wisdom to match its ingenuity. Today power has become limitless. There is no question of the exhaustion of oil, or of fuel, or of coal, or of anything of that kind. It is said, I believe, that every gramme of matter contains 23 million potential kilowatts of power. Thus, there is limitless power; there is limitless ingenuity; there is limitless capacity to make use of peace instruments for war purposes. After all, no aircraft has been manufactured that could not carry bombs. We are told by the people concerned in military blocs, "You know, these weapons are not intended to be used against you, but against somebody else." Our answer is that guns which fire in only one direction have not been made; it all depends on who is behind the gun.

So, with Einstein, we would say:

"Science has brought forth this danger, but the real problem is in the minds and hearts of men. We will not change the hearts of other men by mechanism, but by changing our hearts and speaking bravely."

The appeal here is mainly to the United States and the Soviet Union, which have the great moral responsibility, and to the United Kingdom because of all its past experience in the liberation. As a great philosopher has said, the Englishman has a great sense of fact, if he has nothing else. And the fact is that it is not possible to have a world of balanced armaments. If the world is to survive it must get out of the context of war.

Einstein went on to say:

"We must be generous in giving to the world the knowledge we have of the forces of nature, after establishing safeguards against abuse."

"We must not be merely willing but actively eager to submit ourselves to the binding authority necessary for world security.

"We must realise that we cannot simultaneously plan for war and peace.

"When we are clear in heart and mind - only then shall we find courage to surmount the fear which haunts the world."

There are only two aspects of this question to which I would still refer. The first is the role of the smaller nations. We are a smaller nation; we have only 400 million people. As I have said, the smaller nations are equal beneficiaries of destruction; that is to say, destruction makes its impact upon us. But if the smaller nations think that this matter can be settled by others and that they can just reap the profits, or otherwise, they are making a great mistake.

I think that both the United States and the Soviet Union are taking note of the fact that the area of uncommittedness is increasing in the world today. Every single colonial country that has been liberated says, "We do not want the spectre of a cold war on our territory." The uncommitted nations can play a part in this question if the conditions are favourable.

The second aspect with which I have not dealt is that of the machinery to break the deadlock. This takes us into somewhat smaller politics. So far as my country is concerned, we should like to see these negotiations carried out in any way and at any place. They can be carried out on the summit. We have a few high hills - although there may be some other people there at the moment. We do not care whether the negotiations are carried out at the summit or in the foothills. We should be delighted if the Ten-Nation Committee would meet again whether outside the United Nations or inside the United Nations.

If, however, it is the desire of the parties to draw into the negotiations people who are not directly concerned, I think certain principles have to be observed. First, these must be people who are not directly or indirectly committed to one of the great power blocs. Secondly, they must have a certain amount of experience in this question and must have taken part in the discussion of the disarmament problem over the last years. It would not do just to pull names out of a hat. These people must be able to serve competently. They must have a tradition of courage and impartiality. They must be able to act courageously, according to their own convictions, whether it is the Soviet Union or the United States which is involved. To act in such a way is also good business. We have made better friends with the Americans and the Russians by insisting on our own views rather than giving way. Equally, these people should be able to command the confidence of both sides that they will not be carrying tales from one side to the other but will be a repository of doubts and difficulties. Another function that these people could have would be to bear witness to the bilateral conversations so that there would be

no recriminations in this Committee. And then there is the function of finding ways of reconciliation.

I have deliberately refrained from going into details concerning the machinery. Our hope is that there will be agreement on a directive to member states - and we are responsible to the world - that the functions of the negotiators are as I have set them out. Once the purpose and the directives are known, all the smaller difficulties will, I think, disappear. It may not even be necessary for the uncommitted nations to come in. If the parties know the job they have to do, they will probably do it.

In any case, so far as we are concerned the function is clearly understood. The function is not to promote the purposes of the cold war or to establish a new political theory or to go into academic arguments. The function is a practical one. The two sides, which hold rigid positions, have come into head on collision, to the detriment of our purposes. Therefore, the main problem relates to the adoption of a directive by the United Nations that member States shall undertake the engagement to carry out complete disarmament. We should not merely leave it in the air as a hope that this disarmament will be attained, while thinking that it never will be attained. It must come within the perimeter of an engagement, and then all other things will be possible.

Speaking for myself, on the basis of the limited contacts I have had with the great people, I have not the slightest doubt that the amount of concern in their minds is far greater than the amount of concern in our minds. They have a greater understanding of the potentialities of good and evil in this matter. I also have no doubt whatever on the point that there are no people in the world who are not influenced by factors, by arguments and by the desire to make common progress.

It is in that spirit that we have submitted these observations. If any of these ideas find favour in the eyes of a great number of member States, that will be the time to bring forward more concrete proposals. It is not part of conciliation and of service to the Assembly to multiply the number of resolutions merely in order to add confusion. I say quite frankly that unless the United States and its friends, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its friends, on the other, are in general sympathy with the approach I have set out, it will be futile to submit resolutions and to have them adopted by even overwhelming majorities. What is required is agreement, an agreement by the parties which alone can make a solution possible.

It is right to submit proposals here, including the one made by Prime Minister Macmillan with regard to technical experts. But in this connection I would say that it is my Government's view that no technical committee can substitute for the political decision. We must resolve what we are going to be technical about. We cannot examine all the instruments and so forth. This is not a new conception; we ourselves have introduced it in the past; it has a history of its own. A technical

committee, however, is no substitute for the political decision. That decision must be to disarm wholesale - that is, to commit ourselves to a world without war, a world where war is not possible in practice and has been outlawed by agreement. The decision must also be that this disarmament shall take place within a measurable time, within a time that has been specified; it shall take place in phases and at no phase shall any side have an advantage; each of the phases shall lead to the completion of the project - I do not say "goal," because that is a misused word. We must realise that this is not the better of two alternatives, but is the only choice - and not because my delegation says so, but because the facts point in that direction.

If it is possible for the Assembly to be convinced that there is some salvation for this world in the retention of arms, which may begin a war quietly but then automatically increase it to something bigger, then the Assembly in its wisdom must do something. Our submission is that these directives should be given and then private negotiations should go on both in regard to fitting our Organisation to these purposes - and I personally do not see any insurmountable difficulties - and in regard to reconciling past and present difficulties with a view to breaking what looks like a deadlock.

My Government has specially instructed me to say that in regard to the existence of a gap, a break in the continuity of negotiations, this would be catastrophic, because once negotiation stops the reopening of it creates a fresh problem and a large number of questions either put on one side or already solved may be reopened. It is possible that Governments may find it difficult to take any steps in regard to a fresh start as such. Therefore my Government is of the view that however progressive it has to be, in whatever way it may begin, in whatever form, there should be no gap in disarmament negotiations. It was for this reason that a draft resolution was presented to the General Assembly on behalf of five Heads of State and Government but unfortunately while it gained a majority it did not gain the necessary support from the whole body - not in order to prove that one country or the other was wrong, but that there should be no kind of freezing of relationships.⁶

There should be a flow of understanding, however small, and I therefore make this submission. Perhaps I have repeated some of my points because the matter of these directives, the matter of finding the machinery, the matter of our objectives, all are of great importance; if my delegation finds there is any support, if it finds there are any other like-minded people in regard to these directives as shown by the draft resolutions, it may be to the profit of the General Assembly that these proposals should come before it. This is not in order to have priority by an hour

⁶ On September 29, 1960, the Heads of State or Government of Ghana, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia presented a draft resolution to express the hope that the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR would renew their recently interrupted contacts "so that their declared willingness to find solutions of outstanding problems by negotiation" might be progressively implemented.

or so; my delegation does not subscribe to the view that the great countries, with all their facilities, should formulate these resolutions even before the Assembly meets in order to establish a place for them. Our procedures are devised in a different way. We discuss this matter and then comes the resolution stage. That is the proper way to do it, although it is not for me to lay down the law in regard to this, but that is how we understand it. I do not wish to say anything more about that, because if there is understanding the procedures will fall into their place.

STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 15, 1960⁷

[On November 15, 1960, India, together with eleven other countries, presented a draft resolution to set out a number of directives which should form the basis for an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and to urge that "negotiations be resumed for the purpose of the earliest conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control." The following is a statement by Mr. Menon on disarmament, in which he introduced the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was not voted in 1960 as discussions on all draft resolutions were deferred in December 1960.]

...We proceed to the question of the suspension of nuclear tests. My delegation has been connected with this item for a long time. We first brought it up here after a decision of our own parliament. It has passed through various stages, from total scepticism to defensive arguments about its impracticability. From there we proceeded to the examination of ways and means by which these test explosions could be brought to an end. Finally, we are in the stage at Geneva when we have been informed by all persons concerned that, while no agreement has been reached in spite of protracted negotiations, considerable advances have been made and the area of disagreement has now become limited to a small sector, however important it may be.

We must also point out that there are reasons for apprehension, which I do not propose to take up at the present moment, but will when I come to the disarmament item. So far as the nuclear weapons tests are concerned, I am not going to go into a great deal of detail about the consequences of ionised radiation, the fall-out, and what it does to the human body. I think the harmful effects of the aforementioned are very well known, and since neither the Committee nor I have the time, I do not propose to go into all of that except to say that, based upon all current information that we have concerning these tests, whether they be in the

⁷ From: *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi, November 1960, pages 297-315

sky, or on the ground, or underground they are all harmful to the populations in varying degrees.

Of course, I am aware of the fact that some scientists are in favour of continuing tests, not for scientific reasons, but for political reasons - and no doubt well-conceived notions of national security - have sometimes said that some of these tests are not harmful at all or as harmful as others.

I have before me an analysis of the positions reached between the Western Powers, between the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, the two Western members of what is called the "nuclear club," and the Soviet Union on the other. When one refers to these three it is well for us to reflect upon the fact that at present we can deal with three major Powers who certainly, from the very fact of their "majorness" would exercise a responsibility, but when nuclear weapons are spread around the problem becomes more difficult; so looking through it, we find that the differences in this matter are between what is called the scope of the proposed threshold in regard to the underground explosions. Having accepted the purpose, there shall be a treaty under effective control, and that they undertake the obligations, and if there is a comparative agreement in general terms with regard to the duration and also with regard to the organs to be created, the points of difference lie between what is called the threshold, the Control Commission, the apparatus of administration and direction identification systems.

Then, of course, there is also serious disagreement about the duration of moratorium in regard to the underground tests themselves, I do not propose to trouble the Committee with a great deal of these details, but it appears to us that the advances that have been made are of another character; they do not justify any return to the practice of exploding these weapons for those purposes of research. We are told on the one hand that they have no armament value. That is to say, the suspension of these tests is not disarmament. We agreed with this completely, but it is a form of arms control, and what is more, so far as world public opinion is concerned, it is the creation of confidence. Any reversal of this tendency in this way will be of great value.

Now, the disagreement between the Western countries and the Soviet Union in this matter is set out in the notes of the discussions at Geneva, and while there may be disagreements, even in the categories or the measurements given they are still a small margin which shall be worked out.

Then we come to the Control Commission. In the Control Commission the Western side wants an arrangement, namely the Big-Three, one ally of the West, one ally of the Soviet Union, and two neutrals. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would like to have more equal voice on a pattern of three of them, the members of the nuclear club, three from Eastern Europe and one neutral. No doubt, there is some difference between the two, but it is for the Committee to

consider whether it is impossible to arrive at the composition of this Control Commission, and it is our submission that, considering problems of this character which the United Nations itself or the Powers concerned have overcome, that it is not impossible.

At the present moment there is a difference between these two sides in this way: the Soviet Union is asking for three from the West, three from Eastern Europe and one neutral. The Western side suggests three of them, one committed country from each side and one neutral country. We ourselves make no proposals about that, for more than one reason. The more the proposals, the more confusion there will be in regard to this. What is more, we all agree that this should be a matter of direct negotiation between the Powers concerned, and perhaps in the next few months we shall get agreements in that way.

Then we come to this problem of detection. There was a time when it was said in this Assembly that it was not at all possible to detect these explosions, and therefore there would be cheating by one side or the other. It was expected that explosions would take place and the side that would honour the agreement would be at a disadvantage. The position in Geneva is largely in regard to the number of control posts which number, so far as the Western demand is concerned, is larger than the Soviet Union is willing to admit. Now again, we have come, so far as we can understand this - may be we are amateurs and therefore do not understand it - so far as we can understand it, the apparatus and the ideas concerning this, the difference is in the quantity, not in the category itself. That is to say, the Western side wants twenty-one control posts in the Soviet Union, twenty-three in the United States and one control post on the high-seas. The Soviet Union has said that they objected to having twenty-one posts in their own country, that fifteen would be sufficient. Surely this agreement is not going to break down on this difference. One could go on and on in that way.

There is also a disagreement in regard to the seismographic reading which also is a matter which may yield itself to agreement.

We have deliberately refrained from going into a great deal of detail about this because it is still, in a sense, *sub judice*, and we hope that the resolution that we have put forth, which is A/C.1/L 258, is submitted by a number of delegations. It is very much the same as last year, and I would like to submit, that after all these years of labour, the work done at Geneva, the increasing concern in the matter of nuclear weapons - when it is said that even so far as the United States itself is concerned its terrific consequences would be to increase the number of deformities in birth from 4 per cent to 5 per cent; those are large numbers when you take the whole population into consideration - we hope there will be no delegation that will decline to support this.

We recognise the fact that the kind of agreement we would like to have cannot, perhaps, be attained now, but at any rate the revival of these explosions will be a

great setback to the cause of peace, to the whole cause of negotiations in the field. It has been repeatedly said in this Committee room that any advance in the matter of test explosions will present a distinct advance in the whole field of disarmament. Therefore, while we waited patiently - and I have no doubt these negotiations have been very patiently carried out - we hope there will be no break in them as in the others, and while these negotiations are continuing and there appears to be this hope of reaching a settlement both sides have agreed that an agreement on this matter would make some contribution to the relief of tension. The world does not expect a renewal of this character which reverses the easing of tension. We submit this resolution A/C.1/L 258 with full confidence that it will have the unanimous support of the Assembly.

There is, however, one point we would like to make so far as our Government is concerned. The negotiations at Geneva have gone on the basis that by compromise and agreement, what are called underground explosions should be permitted and should be arranged as between the members of the "nuclear club." I would like to submit that, in spite of its meeting other complications, my Government does not subscribe to this view. There should be a total suspension, a total abandonment of these explosions. There is no evidence - that is, evidence so far as the government scientists are concerned - that the purpose of these explosions is not to develop weapons. They are not merely for scientific purposes, and even if they were, their consequences are to be taken into account in this matter. There is no secrecy in this matter - after all, it comes over the radio and on television, and everywhere - and as late as March 6, 1960, Professor Edward Teller said, on the CBS Television Network:

“... we must be prepared with powerful, mobile, selected weapons, weapons which can be used for defence and weapons which are so constituted - and they can be so constituted - that they will do minimal damage to our friends while we are trying to defend their freedom...

“...it is extremely important to continue not nuclear tests - it is not tests but the increase of knowledge, which I call nuclear experimentation and which can be used for the safety of our country and for the safety of the free world...”

Now, no one can take any exception to this; no one can have any difference with the view that people must be concerned about the safety of their countries. But we are dealing here with a problem that affects the population of the world as a whole and becomes an international problem, not merely one of national defence.

Professor Teller went on to say, only three days ago over the NBC Television Network:

“I think that by developing smaller nuclear explosives, which can be reliably hidden” -

it is surprising it should come out when the concealment is in difficulty -

“so that we have a second strike force that the Russians cannot wipe out, and by pledging ourselves never to strike an all-out nuclear blow first, we can indeed increase stability.”

It is not the business of my delegation to quarrel with these arguments or to put them out in such a way that the responsibility is on one side. The fact is that this is the published information, and it is published to millions of people over the radio, the television screen and so on. Therefore, there is no gainsaying the fact that the purpose of these tests, whether conducted by the Russians, by the British or by the United States, is the perfecting - as it is called; a very bad word to use - of these nuclear weapons. It is not an academic, scientific experiment. It is not for the purpose of advancing the cause of humanity in peaceful ways. It is necessarily, essentially, basically and fully a war project.

Senator Clinton Anderson, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* of March 1960, said:

“During these continued negotiations and while a ban would continue to be in effect, we should continue, however, to develop and improve our nuclear weapons.

“Testing is not in my opinion essential to advance our technology. It is, however, the easiest, the fastest, and the most certain method of developing new and improved weapons...

“I would support the resumption, as directed by the President, of our underground test programme for final development of certain of our weapons before they go into production.”

So far as my Government is concerned, while we welcome any agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, we regret that they should have come to an agreement with regard to underground tests only, but I suppose it would be a very wrong thing to sacrifice what is good in trying for the best.

It must also be pointed out that the work done at Geneva has been of a character not only involving the discovery of formulae for bridging some small difficulty, but rather the working-out in detail of the whole problem of control in regard to this matter. I think it is for the world to consider whether at any time at all, in Geneva or anywhere else, it would be possible to elaborate a system of inspection and control that is 100 percent proof against mistakes, against overcalculation or

undercalculation. Therefore we can go only by some sort of optimal measurement whereby the control is of such character not merely in regard to a particular explosion, but as to what goes before and after, that there would be the fear of apprehension or discovery.

It also touches on another problem - the general feeling that one of the main purposes of disarmament is to release enough money or resources for purposes of reconstruction. In my submission in an earlier statement, I pointed out that this is a mistake and I think that we should tell people that disarmament cannot be done cheaply, and economy is not its main purpose; that it is done in order to save humanity from the disastrous consequences of atomic conflict. It is interesting, therefore, to find out that in hearings before the United States Congress in April 1960, evidence was given that:

“The estimated cost of the complete Geneva control system was reported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defence to be \$ 1 billion; in round numbers, with an annual operating cost of about one quarter of a billion dollars.”

That is to say, for this one purpose of controlling tests under this vast system of inspection, the nations of the world - I suppose we would all participate in our small ways - would have to expend a minimum of \$ 1 billion in capital costs, and a quarter of a billion dollars annually thereafter as the price of our distrust of each other. Continuing to quote from the above source, we note that:

“A contractor study presented an estimate of \$ 1 billion to \$ 5 billion for installation of 22 stations of the Geneva system...”

These are rough estimates, I suppose; there are other matters.

Concerning these underground explosions, we are told - in congressional and parliamentary systems of government, such evidence is readily available - that there was evidence before the United States Congress that these explosions underground - without this information one might get the idea that these are something like the little blasts we hear when buildings are put up here in New York - we are told that each of these "little holes" is going to cost about \$ 30 million - small holes only, but as high as \$ 30 million each. I have the figures on the dimensions, and it is a very large operation, whether underground or above ground. Unlike doctors' mistakes, they do not lie buried underground. That is the trouble with them. Therefore, our objections to underground explosions are as serious as to anything else, but our country will not stand in the way, and if it has to vote without reservations, it will do so.

We still think, however, that the carrying on of this sort of business - which is more or less the licensing of evil - is not going to get us anywhere. We should now proceed to be satisfied with the fact that there are enough weapons in the

world now to destroy the world five times over... It is said that the quantum of atomic weapons available to them (the United States and the Soviet Union), at the present time, would work out to fifteen tons of the explosive power of TNT per capita of population. Some people say twelve, others something else, but it does not make much difference which it is.

I go on now to the consideration of the main subject of disarmament, and here I would like to make some supplementary observations. My delegation, along with others, has for the past several weeks been engaged practically on this one point alone, without being able to discharge our duties in other committees and things of that kind, because my Government, in common with a number of Governments including the Powers concerned, regards the question of disarmament, peace and war as the over-all problem without the solution of which all our discussions are of not much value.

On 27 October, on behalf of the Government of India, we pointed out what were the main factors connected in this matter, what should be our objectives and what are the fallacies of the present position regarding, in thinking, that this large-scale quantum of armaments, affording no security to anybody - the failure or, rather, the no longer validity, if you would like to put it that way, of the deterrent theory, and the unfortunate position of non-committed areas such as Cambodia, Laos, the African continent, and so on, who pleaded in this Committee that their parts of the world at least should be kept free from these matters, and therefore we suggested that this year in the Assembly we have reached the situation where it is necessary to have an entirely new look at the whole of the disarmament problem and get away from the idea of the balanced reduction of arms as solving anything at all, because, if the arms level of the world - for example, the Soviet Union and the United States - were reduced in their arms, shall we say, to the 1870 level, or even to the level of the second Hundred Years' War - the first Hundred Years' War - even then, in six or nine months, they would still be in possession of all modern weapons, because the people who make them, the technology that can produce them, the material that is necessary, the hatred and the fear and the apprehension and the desire to win a war, as they would think, is all there, and therefore the mere taking away of arms in that way, or coming to a balanced reduction, so-called, and arranging a kind of tournament or preparing for it - that is not going to solve the problems of the world, in view of modern technology. And in this it is not as though countries like ourselves, which are charged with not having great responsibilities, were alone in thinking so. Here, a few days ago, Mr. Wadsworth⁸ was telling us:

“We want a world in which nations no longer will have the power to settle differences by force of arms, a world in which international order will prevail, a secure world in which all people will be free from the fear of

⁸ James J. Wadsworth, United States representative

war. In short, we would like to see the total disarmament of all nations under law.

“In my personal opinion, if we were to start now and work at good speed, the step-by-step process to this goal should be completed in the neighbourhood of, say, five to six years, and with good faith and a real sense of urgency on both sides, it could take even less.”

This view is contained in many statements, and I would like all of us to be seized of some of what is being said. It would be very interesting to get hold of a transcript of the recent broadcasts and the recent television interviews in regard to the consequences, the policies and the various views held. I think it would be a libel on the scientists to say that all scientists are alike. Usually, Government scientists are hybrid creatures: they are half scientists and half politicians. They harness scientific knowledge for the purposes of political policy, and they correspond to the bishops of the eighteenth century, who always produced theology in support of divine right. So, if you do not have one scientist, you can get another scientist. If you are practising in a court of law, you always find one psychiatrist or one doctor to put up against another doctor. Fortunately for us, in the United States the overwhelming body of scientists are on our side, that is to say, on the side of throwing away these weapons.

From the scientists, we go to a soldier and a writer on military affairs - not an American this time, but an Englishman. I suppose he is; he may be a Scotsman, for all I know - Captain Liddell Hart. He is not a leftist; he is highly conservative. He said:

“Old concepts, and old definitions of strategy, have become not only obsolete but nonsensical with the development of nuclear weapons.

“The development of long-range rockets, to replace the manned bomber aircraft, makes the absurdity even clearer.

“To aim at winning a war, to take victory as your object, is no more than a state of lunacy.”

I think that is strong language.

“For a total war, without nuclear weapons, would be fatal to both sides.

“There is no sense even in planning for such a war - for a World War III, as it is often called. In the present state of scientific development, the destruction and chaos would be so great within a few hours that the war could not continue in any organised sense.

“In the H-bomb era in which we live now, miscarriage or disregard of signals to bombers in the air would have immensely worse consequences.

“To live under the shadow of a foreign dictator’s power to threaten us with H-bomb attack is perilous enough. But it is far more perilous to live under the shadow of a multiplicity of H-bombing airmen, on either side, who are keyed up to an extreme pitch of alertness, and some of whom may be feeling intensely bellicose or even may lose control of themselves.”

I quote next from the Chairman of the Federation of American Scientists, which I am told is an extremely responsible and respectable body. He said:

“On this fifteenth anniversary of the nuclear arms race, let us recognise that while time is short, time still remains. We must no longer fail to do our utmost toward seeking arms control. The tragedy of ultimate failure is so great that we must make survival the first order of business and devote generously to the study of disarmament whatever talent and resources may be usefully employed.”

Let us look at the poor English - what they think about this. Writing of England, he says:

“They calculate that in this event a total of 2,000 megatons would, as a result of fall-out alone, kill 55 per cent of the population of the United States of America; 5,000 megatons would kill 80 per cent; 10,000, 99 per cent; and 20,000, about 100 per cent.”

You cannot kill any more than that.

“Is an attack on Britain of this magnitude likely? The American stockpile has recently been put as equivalent to 28,000 megatons, and Russia cannot be far behind...

“If this is so, then this country’s entire population would be killed by two percent of the bombs in either stockpile, and 95 percent of the population would be killed by one percent of the bombs. The prospect of eliminating America’s major partner in NATO and perhaps five or ten percent of all NATO bases by the use of only 1-2 percent of the bombs available, and without any necessity to deliver them accurately, would seem a tempting proposition [to the mad people] in a war.”

This is the position so far as the United Kingdom is concerned - and I have read to you some of these other statements.

Now we come to what must necessarily be accepted as extremely responsible statements. One is the former Minister of Science in the United Kingdom, a

person who is well-known for his progressive views and who is a distinguished Conservative - Viscount Hailsham. Speaking in the House of Lords, I think, he said:

“When I contemplate the hideous weapons on both sides which even in my partially informed state I know to have been invented, I regard either a world authority or total disarmament in the long run as the only rational objective.”

I read that because that is the basis on which our proposals are going to be made.

Now, here are a number of statements which I hope it is proper to read, Mr. Chairman - and, if it is not, you will give me some guidance. This is from the President-elect of the United States. In June of this year, Senator Kennedy said:

“No hope is more basic to our aspirations as a nation than our hope for the day when our bombs can be converted into reactors - our rockets can be devoted to exploring space - and the funds now in our defence budget can be used to build a better, happier, healthier nation and world.”

“The engines of death are multiplying in number and destructiveness on every side - the institutions of peace are not.

“The galloping course of our weapons technology is rapidly taking the whole world to the brink...”

I want to say that this is not from one speech; it is taken from various different places - and long before there was an election fever.

“No issue, in short, is of more vital concern to this nation than disarmament; no issue could demand more priority of top-level attention than disarmament...”

“However, even with such system, there will be risks. Peace programmes involve risks, as do arms programmes, but the risks of arms are even more dangerous. Those who talk about the risks and dangers of any arms control proposal ought to weigh - in the scales of national security - the risks and dangers inherent in our present course...”

“...there is no greater defence against total nuclear destruction than total nuclear disarmament.”

This was said in the legislature of the United States in the introduction of proposed legislation for the establishment of an Arms Control Research Institute.

Now we turn to the other side, the Soviet Union. Since I do not read Russian and it is not necessary to go into translations and arguments as to whether the translations are accurate or not, I have not the material to quote from. But we heard Mr. Khrushchev telling us the other day that rockets were being turned out like sausages. I think that sausages are bad enough, but rockets are worse. But the only difference is this, that in the case of the sausages the poor animal absorbs the rays of the sun through vegetables, and then, since we want sausages - not I, but human beings in general want them - they consume the animal, and the animal absorbs 90 per cent of the carbon content and passes on the 10 per cent. But in this case there will be no carbon left after an atomic explosion. Mr. Khrushchev said that Russia was producing rockets like sausages. This is no laughing matter; it is not a case where we could say, here is a country with vast powers of achievement. We all hope and think that the world, with all its vast knowledge, should use it in some other way; but it points to something, and that is that this vast power of destruction is no longer now confined to smaller methods of production but is of a character which, if put into operation, would mean that there would be nothing left for us to think of or to say.

So whether you take it one side or the other, there is this problem that the power of destruction is so terrific - I do not say this in order to appeal to the apprehensions and fears of the people, because it is my view and the view of my Government that you cannot conquer fear by fear - and the reason for this great armament is the fear of the people. The stronger the nation, the more afraid it is. Therefore, by arguments which are directed towards creating a feeling of apprehension and fear, we are not likely to get anywhere. Ultimately, disarmament has to be achieved by self-interest because no nation wants to be annihilated - it may want to annihilate others, but no nation wants to annihilate itself.

During the last few days there have been debates on this matter, and when I submitted our statement to the Committee I pointed out that it was not the intention of my delegation at that stage to put down draft resolutions, or to support any, or even to formulate something that was of a very rigid character. There are several draft resolutions before the Committee and we do not intend to express our opinions in regard to any of them, although it is pretty well known that, having regard to their content and their origins, they are not likely to receive unanimous support. Therefore, following the discussions in the Assembly, my delegation said that if, as a result of the outlines we have proposed, there was in the General Assembly a certain degree of receptivity, that would be the time to formulate proposals. A few days afterwards, some delegations which held more than others perhaps similar views gathered together, and when we look at their proposal, we find that there is considerable, not necessarily endorsement of what we said but considerable drift of thought in that direction - take Mr. Wadsworth in the first instance, because, with his support, anything can go through this Committee.

That is the situation in which we find ourselves today. We hope that this debate, in which all members of the United Nations can express their views, will mean an early resumption of the disarmament negotiations among the Powers principally concerned and will help to give the necessary guidance for the negotiators. I think it is true that, year after year, the Assembly adopts resolutions which are, as St. Paul said, all things to all men - and I interpret it differently. We have come to a stage now where this attempt at finding words which mean different things to different people is not going to solve problems, and my Government as stated by the Prime Minister, takes the view that time is not with us.

But from the United States we go to our friends from the United Kingdom. Mr. Ormsby-Gore speaking in this Committee on 24 October, said:

“...if the General Assembly can agree on a resolution embodying the basic principles with which any disarmament agreement must comply, if it is to work, this alone will be a great stimulus to the negotiations which we hope will shortly be resumed... we... should... try to give our negotiators a touchstone to guide their future work.”

My understanding of principles in this context is something that gives concrete, direct guidance, something that does not completely bind people down, but at the same time is not so vague as to be differently interpreted. Mr. Ormsby-Gore went on to say:

“...I hope that we can agree on certain principles which are applicable to any disarmament plan and which will help us in later negotiations.”

Now, the difficulty in this matter was with regard to the nuclear Powers themselves. I have not quoted any extract of the statements made by the Soviet Union in this matter because the Soviet Union has repeatedly stated the same position in regard to directives.

We come now to what may be called the Powers that are not committed to power blocs - or even if they are, they are not quite committed in their relations one way or the other, but they are not part of a nuclear pattern.

The first is the country and the delegation represented by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. Mr. Padilla Nervo⁹ brings with him a reputation in this matter and carefully weighs his words; he has had experience in the Disarmament Commission and, perhaps, of the frustrations under which it functions. He most certainly feels that here was a body over which he was presiding, which, in the submission we made last year, was intended not merely to be a narcotic to public opinion so that they would think something was being done, but to guide the Ten-Nation Committee, to receive reports from it and, in a

⁹ Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico

sense, as we said last time, be the umbrella under which it functions. Speaking in this Committee on 2 November, Mr. Padilla Nervo said:

“First we must make an effort in the direction indicated by the representative of India; that is, to prepare and formulate a series of directives that are acceptable to both groups of Powers, which will serve as a point of departure for the immediate renewal of negotiations.”

That is what we seek to do and hope to gain unanimous support for in the General Assembly in due course...

Then we come to another statement which I take the liberty of reading out in full. It comes from a distinguished statesman, the previous President of the General Assembly, Mr. Belaunde:

“...the General Assembly would be remiss” -

I have never heard the old gentleman using such strong language although I have heard his strong voice -

“in its mission, it would be violating the spirit and the letter of the Charter, if it were not to assume consideration on the problem of disarmament and if it were not to adopt recommendations as to the main lines for disarmament, outlining the means and procedures for the solution of the problem of discrepancies, and announcing, on behalf of humanity, that, in view of the process of negotiations which must be undertaken, the Assembly must outline the means of bringing together diverse points of view and co-operating in the elimination of contradictory opinions and positions...

“The General Assembly has the specific function of defining the principles referring to peace and, therefore, disarmament, and its power to recommend is so wide that it covers all members in their powers to contract. It might direct such treaties. It might guide these negotiations and make such recommendations to the Security Council also. In a word, we might say that as regards disarmament our competence has but one limitation, the precise terms of negotiation, which must be agreed upon by the parties to the negotiations. However, the Assembly must make known its position” -

and this is our view, also -

“on the conditions for the maintenance of international peace and security. It must create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. It must determine and lay down the principles that must guide such negotiations.”

One cannot attend every meeting of this body, partly for the reasons which I gave earlier in this statement. But I have been at pains to read the verbatim record of most of the speeches which have been given on this subject. We are aware of the fact that the United States delegation has stated its position quite frankly. It has asked: Is it possible to obtain agreements, and so forth, which would actually be carried out? On 27 October, Mr. Wadsworth said that, having heard Mr. Zorin's¹⁰ speech the previous day, he was perhaps justified in thinking - he did not say that he thought - that the United States delegation had reason to hold the view that the Soviet Union was asking for all or nothing; that is to say, the Soviet Union would not discuss disarmament until the last word of a treaty had been agreed to and signed and until all armaments had been laid down. I suppose that that is only a manner of speaking, because if all armaments were laid down there would be no need to discuss disarmament.

I do not want to be unfair and read more into Mr. Wadsworth's statement than was intended. But Mr. Wadsworth did refer to certain remarks made by Mr. Zorin.

On 27 October Mr. Wadsworth said:

“No country in the world would welcome more wholeheartedly than the United States a change in the world situation that would permit us to lay down the grievously heavy burden which armaments impose upon us. We want a world in which nations no longer will have the power to settle differences by force of arms,” -

those are practically the words we have submitted -

“a world in which international order will prevail, a secure world in which all people will be free from the fear of war. In short, we would like to see the total disarmament of all nations under law.

“In my personal opinion, if we were to start now and work at good speed, the step-by-step process to this goal should be completed in the neighbourhood of say, five to six years, and with good faith and a real sense of urgency on both sides, it could take even less. Mr. Zorin may tell us again, as he has in the past, that our statements are not to be believed. The fact is that in making these statements I speak from certain knowledge of my country's desires and my country's official position whereas the sceptical reaction of Mr. Zorin can spring, not from knowledge, but purely from suspicion, a totally unjustified suspicion.”

I have read out the last part of that quotation from Mr. Wadsworth because it reflects the precise trouble in this field.

¹⁰ Valerian A. Zorin, representative of the USSR

Looking through the statements of the Soviet Union delegation, I find that the Soviet position appears to be - I may be wrong - that negotiations can take place, and the question of "all or nothing" does not seem to arise. Mr. Zorin said:

"The Soviet Union fully shares and clearly understands the desire of many states to the effect that, even before a treaty on general and complete disarmament is concluded" -

and I stress those last words -

"some measures should be carried out which would contribute to enhancing confidence in relations between States and creating a more favourable atmosphere for the practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament..."

Mr. Zorin then went on to speak about the measures he had in mind; I shall not go into detail in that respect. One of the measures he mentioned was the abandonment of nuclear weapons. He also mentioned atom-free zones of the world, such as have been proposed by President Nkrumah, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other; the subject was also discussed in the General Assembly by the Cambodian and Laotian delegations. Mr. Zorin said:

"Lastly, the Soviet Government supports all the proposals on urgent measures for stopping the arms race and creating a more favourable situation..."

Perhaps I have missed some of the points, but I think I have referred to enough of them to justify the view that, however large things may appear in the heat of controversy, there is much that is common in the approaches of the two great Powers which bear the primary responsibility in this field. My Government believes that both the United States and the Soviet Union are anxious to bring about disarmament and to establish peace in this world, and are more aware than anyone else of the consequences of the non-attainment of disarmament.

After the above-mentioned statements had been made in the Committee, the representative of Romania spoke. Romania is one of the countries on the Eastern side in the Ten-Nation Committee. I recall the fear expressed by the United States delegation - and it is a legitimate fear - that the Soviet view is that there must be all or nothing; that the "all" will take a long time to obtain. As Bernard Shaw once said, all revolutions are gradual - in the sense that no revolution can take place in an instant of time. On 27 October Mr. Wadsworth said:

"...what I do wish to stress is that if Mr. Zorin's statement means, as it says, that certain measures can be taken now, or very soon, which will reduce tensions and help to create a better atmosphere for reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective

international control, there is an urgent need to start negotiating on such measures.”

I think that that was identical with what Mr. Zorin said.

Now, as I have said, there was a statement on this from the Romanian delegation. From our experience in the Assembly we have no reason to think that the Romanian statement would be inconsistent with Soviet thinking on this matter. And this is what the Romanian representative said:

“We do not want ‘all or nothing.’ We want general and complete disarmament...

“We rule out no initiative whatsoever what could improve the international climate.”

In other words, measures that will contribute to general and complete disarmament and to relieving tension are not only not ruled out, but are welcomed and are described as necessary.

It is part of the agreement already reached that disarmament would have to be undertaken in phases, as a practical matter. The difficulty arises when what is called a partial measure is pleaded in bar of a general measure - that is, it is like a man pleading a pardon beforehand, when he is being impeached before the law. That is the real difference.

I now turn to the question of suspicion, to which Mr. Wadsworth rightly referred. Here I think it would be best to quote again authorities who cannot be regarded as irresponsible. I refer to Mr. Teller and Mr. Szilard, and their debate on 12 November. Incidentally, these are two people with two different views; they should not be confused. Mr. Teller, in the debate to which I have referred, pointed out that the whole trouble in regard to an agreement was the question of doubts and he discussed how far such doubts were justified from the scientific point of view.

Then, because it was suggested that he is also opposed to entering into negotiations with Russia on test cessation, he was asked about the way of dealing with this matter.

“We have been in negotiation with Russia on test cessation. And the question is now should we break off these negotiations on the grounds that the Russians cheat?”

These are not my words.

“I would say, [says he] this, that I recognise and I agree with Teller that there is such a thing as irresponsible distrust.”

That is to say, just be sentimental and it will be all right. But he goes on to say:

“There is also such a thing as irresponsible distrust, and I think that those who advocate - at least, what I see in the newspapers - I don't mean Dr. Teller; but what I see in the newspapers - those who advocate that we should take up testing now because the Russians are undoubtedly cheating, since they would be capable of cheating, come very close to irresponsible distrust.”

And then he goes on to say, what is the reason for thinking so? The reason for thinking so, apparently, if you read the whole of this text, is that the Russians have made these rockets like sausages, as they are called, and the great advance which they themselves now claim in the long-range missiles, and all this has been developed in secrecy - at least, the Americans did not know about it, according to these people. I doubt it very much; but anyway, they did not know about it - and therefore, if it was possible to develop rockets in secret, it must also be quite possible to make explosions in secret.

There is a very strange logic to this. It is almost like saying a cat has got three tails, because no cat has two tails - that is common ground - every cat has got one tail more than no cat, and therefore, every cat has got three tails. That is the logic of this argument. But it is the pronouncement of one person who is in favour of not only the continuance of tests, but tests ought to be taken up immediately. But as I say again, I am not now talking about nuclear tests. It is related to the whole problem.

Then we come to what my delegation and, I am sure, the whole of this Committee, including our Secretary-General, think would be a matter of very grave concern. When these two gentlemen are asked what is the answer to all these things, how do we bring about a situation where these weapons are not a grave danger, and so on, it is almost like some doctors trying to cure a poison by the same poison. Sometimes it works, sometimes it does not; it depends upon the quantities. Doctor Teller goes on to say:

“Machine-guns in today's world are a minor weapon. If we try to base our security on machine-guns only, then soon, in case of a crisis, quickly or slowly, in secret, other bigger forces may arise which may neutralise, which may nullify the machine-guns of the United Nations police force. I don't know that it's a good idea. I don't know whether the United Nations will work. I hope it will, and I think we might try.

"If it works, let's give some thought of giving tactical nuclear weapons to the United Nations," -

that is a gift for our Secretary-General -

“and thereby, at one stroke make it completely possible for the United Nations police force to become a major force in most of the countries.”

I have never seen such a megalomaniacal expression of power.

“This much can be said, I believe. Disarmament would not automatically guarantee peace.”

This is from Doctor Teller.

“Let’s try to visualise what kind of a world a disarmed world be. Well, I should say that a disarmed world is a world where you have only machine-guns which cannot be eliminated. In such a world, an army equipped with machine-guns could spring up, so to speak, overnight. Now, what kind of a world is this? If America and Russia would be secure, no improvised army equipped with machine-guns could conquer America or Russia.

“America and Russia, even in such a disarmed world, would be strong enough militarily to dominate their neighbours. America could not protect Turkey against Russia, and Russia could not protect Cuba against America.”

These people are very tactless, are they not?

“This does not mean that Turkey, without American protection in a disarmed world, would be less secure than it is today, or that Cuba in a disarmed world, without Russian protection, would be less secure than it is to day. The danger to peace could, however, come easily from the disturbed areas of the world. America could not control any area remote from our territory, nor could Russia. And if two nations in a disturbed area of the world resorted to arms, there would be a war.

“And if America and Russia were to intervene on the opposite sides, there would be a great war which would start out with machine-guns, but not long thereafter, there would be heavy guns turning up. And it wouldn’t take very long until the war would be fought with atomic bombs - for we can eliminate the stockpiles of bombs, but we cannot eliminate the knowledge of how to make bombs. I should say that for a disarmed world to be a world at peace, we would need police forces operating in the disturbed areas under the auspices of the United Nations. These police forces could not coerce America or Russia, but they could keep smaller nations from going to war with each other.”

So now the proposal is - if you read the whole of this script, which I have not got the time - that not only should there be explosions, not only should there be these big bombs, which only a few people can have, but one of the methods of security for the world is - no doubt the same thing is being said on the other side, this is the language of power, and powerful nations very often speak in the same language - the proposal that countries of the world should be armed with these tactical weapons, that there be distribution, wider distribution of atomic destructive power. That is the safety of the world - so far from disarmament, far from controlling armaments. As my Prime Minister said, we have now reached the position of how best to rearm the world if this is to be taken, and that is why, as was seen reflected in the talk of Mr. Wadsworth, it is necessary for us to proceed to a world without war, and whatever might have been justification in the past for finding ways and means of balanced reduction, these things no longer provide us any security. Not only are they so destructive in their capacity, but one must also fear the time when, in spite of the great wealth and resources of the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, even the wealthiest might sometimes feel that the bill is too large and there may come a time when, either on account of misunderstanding or on account of smaller nations trying to canvass one another, or for various other reasons, these things would operate.

The English poet who wrote the other day, "Let us make these bombs and write on them, 'these are not for use'" - then what are they for?

So we have submitted this resolution, sponsored by a number of countries, including ourselves, which is a result of patient talking to everyone concerned. I want to say here and now, the resolution is the responsibility alone of the sponsors, and nothing that my delegation submits here should be regarded as apportioning blame or praise. We postponed the request of the Chairman for the convening of this meeting for this purpose time after time in the hope that we might be able to come here and say, "Now, here is a resolution for which we ask priority." And we would hope that it would go through without a dissenting voice, if not totally and positively unanimously. I regret to say that is not the position today, and I think the nature of the problem is history. The suspicion that exists on both sides, the context in which this Assembly has taken place, some certain circumstances that are probably not strictly germane to the working of the Assembly itself in literal terms, but really politically are - all these may have contributed to our not reaching that position. But we still, our collaborators and ourselves, have not brought this resolution before the Assembly without a great deal of searching of our minds and our hearts to discover whether it is the right course to follow.

The Assembly has before it a large number of resolutions. They will either be voted upon or something will be done with them. When we examined this problem, we thought, first of all, that we have seen difficult situations of this kind

in the past, and we have one basic thing to go upon: that the United States, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, are anxious that the world should be rid of this incubus and the dread of this particular situation, and they are assisted by their allies and collaborators in the West and the East in the same way.

Therefore, this desire for disarmament and the recognition as I have quoted in these various passages, that no longer could it be done in the old way of trying to balance reductions, but they must proceed all together for the total elimination of war and whatever phases have to come into it, are part of this general unfolding of this thing.

That is to say, we do a little and hope that it will be all right and trust the fate that moves mountains and open the windows in the morning to see if there is a mound of earth outside. We should not proceed in that way but should take the whole ambit, a world in which we can live, where war would become impossible not for sentimental or pacifist reasons, as some people would say, but purely for practical reasons.

People like ourselves are often accused of not being realists. What realism can there be in a world where these terrible powers of destruction exist and can easily be operated without much organisation, where the very basis of their existence and fear of their use might deter other persons? If fear of their use might deter other persons at some remote time, however minimal the calculations are, it should be used. If it is not going to be used, why should they be made at all? If you have mere possession of them and the other person is sure that you will not use it, then it is not a deterrent. So we come to the position that there is no defence against them...

But however that may be, countries like ours are in a fortunate position in the sense that in the event of a great conflict there is no question of preparation arising. I do not know whether the representative of the United Kingdom feels that he is in a different class from some smaller nations like ours, but I think I told this story to the Committee before: It is like the scoutmaster who told the little boy scout, "What do I do in the jungle if I see a tiger?" He said, "You give the tiger a scout salute and the tiger will do the rest." That is the position with regard to atomic war.

We have therefore submitted this draft resolution. I want to preface my observations by saying that my collaborators and I are extremely grateful to the parties on both sides - and I would not like to mention them individually - who have given us a patient hearing, who have gone through various details and difficulties, made suggestions and tried to meet, as far as possible - and I think that if you look through the draft resolution carefully you will find that the vast areas of this are areas of agreement, far more than have ever been reached before. The draft resolution also tries to place the onus on the General Assembly, whereby the General Assembly will take the responsibility of telling the people

concerned what they are to do - and that is what most people have been saying in their speeches: "Tell the Powers concerned, tell the Committees concerned, what they are to do." That is to be their directives. As I said the other day, in 1952 or 1953, when we read of similar circumstance, similar but not exact, there was a deadlock and no disengagement, and the Assembly took it upon itself to give directives in regard to the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and the balanced reduction of arms.

Now we have reached the situation at a different level where, as I said, there is no escape from the fact that the world has to abandon war and resolve its disputes, if they still continue, by other methods. Therefore, the whole of the preamble that you have before you deals with previous resolutions and it also deals with the situation hitherto reached or not reached. There are certain common areas of agreement between the two sides. We have not spoken about the common areas of agreement because again it might delude the world into thinking that these people have reached agreement. But there are certain principles on which they have agreed; that is to say, there have to be phases and these phases each have to lead to the next phase; but it is not a conditional thing. What we are trying to do here is to say: "While there must be phases, those phases cannot be pleaded as obstacle in bar of a general approach."

Then we come to the declaration of the directives in paragraph 1. We read in paragraph 1:

"Declares that the following directives should form the basis of an agreement on general and complete disarmament."

...Thus we have tried to spell out what this means, and this is by no means trying to draft a disarmament treaty in this Committee. My Government would be the last to subscribe to the idea that twenty or thirty of us could sit down and do this. At one time it would have been possible to have it done by the administrative machinery of the United Nations and brought before us and the Powers concerned could have modified and adjusted it later. However, in the present circumstances of the world that would not be possible, and therefore this declaration tells in paragraph 1(d) what it should consist of. Paragraph (a) states:

"General and complete disarmament should result in a world in which the method of war for the solution of international problems and the continued existence of all the instruments and machinery of war should stand eliminated."

I should like to explain that the word "continued" covers the point that where inspection and control is established it is not to be abandoned. It is part of the world administration. That is why I pointed out the other day that disarmament cannot be achieved, certainly not for the first fifteen years because the whole

machinery would continue. The resolution continues: "war should stand eliminated." That is to say, there should be no recurrence of it.

A very legitimate doubt has sometimes been raised in the West, sometimes in the East, as to the continuation of these things, that somebody may throw away or demobilise a number of people and bring them back the next day. That is sought to be removed by this particular declaration. Ever since I have come here I have heard this, whether it be in cease-fire discussions or in disarmament discussions: "If you take this step, Party A is going to be better off than Party B or the reverse will take place." As we read the situation and as our own views correspond with it, disarmament should not - it is set out in the American resolution - at any stage give any party an advantage over the other, meaning a relative advantage... The draft resolution goes on to say in paragraph (c):

"In respect of each phase and step there shall be established by agreement effective machinery of inspection and control of its operation and maintenance."

That is to say, it is not true that disarmament can be brought about by this machinery and that then they will retire. This is kept going so that there will be no question of running away from the arrangements reached.

I should like to say here that if those who are interested would read the resolution through, they would find the reiteration of two matters; first, general and complete disarmament and the other, the maintenance of effective machinery under international control.

My Government believes and has repeatedly stated that there cannot be disarmament in this world as it is constituted at the present moment without effective machinery of control. But we cannot substitute control for disarmament. We have always said that, and I believe now that the controversy is getting like the quotation I cited the other day, that of the American author who talked about "gamesmanship." This has somewhat gone away and once what is to be controlled is agreed upon, they should operate simultaneously.

I hope that what I say is not going to create any more difficulties. The draft resolution states in paragraph (d) what general and complete disarmament would consist of and there it talks about "elimination of armed forces and armaments and of armament production." Certainly if armament production is eliminated in certain parts of the world, then I think that war as a business would also disappear. It is fortunately the condition of the world today, probably due to the sophisticated nature of arms, far less than what it was in the First World War when people wrote books like the "Merchants of Death."

Then we come to paragraph (d) (ii):

“The total prohibition of the manufacture, maintenance and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and of bacteriological and chemical weapons of war.”

We have had that as a goal long ago, but now we are saying that there should be a directive about it. It has been our goal for ten years. It is time that we come close to achieving it. There is no radical change about this in that way.

Then we come to (iii),

“the elimination of all existing establishments and training institutions for military purposes.”

Naturally, if you train athletes they will want to perform. If you train generals, I suppose, they will at least want to conduct manoeuvres. I have some knowledge of this. Therefore we say that that shall be taken away. It is also taken away in (iv), which is rather an important clause, by

“the elimination of all equipment and facilities for the delivery, the placement and the operation of all weapons of mass destruction within national territories and of all foreign military bases and launching sites of all categories.”

The draft resolution, therefore, does not take one side or the other, and we say that where the facilities for this are inside a territory - whether it be in Florida or Siberia, or in India or Pakistan, or in Cyprus - makes no difference. If they are national territories they will go with national disarmament. We have not called them bases because you cannot have bases in your own country. They are foreign bases and launching sites of all categories - which includes the submarine in the estuary of the Clyde, and means that whether they are under water or on the surface they all should be treated equally.

We come then to the question of the maintenance of the establishment of peace. It may puzzle some people that, in connection with disarmament, we have included a paragraph relating to the retention of forces - the retention of certain kinds of units - and the explanation is this. You cannot disarm unless at the same time you provide for the maintenance of international security and for operations on behalf of the United Nations. So, in (v), with great difficulty, we have overcome various obstacles in this matter and have stated this:

“the maintenance by each member State of necessary security units and training establishments, arms and their production as are agreed to be necessary exclusively for the purposes of internal security and of placing at the disposal of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”

Thus both the placing and the maintenance will be in accordance with the Charter, and the Charter provides certain things which, of course, would have to undergo revision in all the circumstances.

Then we come to the question of the organisation of the United Nations. This has very little to do with particular views held by one person or another. I said a while ago that when there is disarmament on the scale that we have suggested, and a world without war, it will require millions and millions of people - technicians, administrators, scientists, inspectors and so on - and in fact they will be the peace army of the world. In order to do that, in order to create confidence and in order to be able to feel that whatever machinery was at the disposal of the United Nations would not be used in an improper way, it would be necessary that the United Nations should undergo such agreed changes. That is the present position, namely, that

“the United Nations should undergo such agreed changes for the implementation of this resolution and for the maintenance of peace in a disarmed world which would exclude the possibility of the international police force being used for any purpose inconsistent with the Charter including such use in the interests of one State or group of States against another State or group of States.”

This last would not be necessary if we were not living in a world of power blocs - that is to say, if we were not dominated by the notion of balance of power and holy alliances, and if the idea of negotiating from strength had not become part of the cardinal policy. And no doubt it reflects a certain amount of our own subjective attitude of uncommitted nations in relation to this whole problem.

Sub-paragraph (vii) is about outer space, and then we come to the operative part on the treaty, which states:

“A treaty on general and complete disarmament embodying the terms and provisions set out in (a), (b), (c) and (d) above shall include the time-limits and schedules for the implementation of each successive step and phase of general and complete disarmament; the completion of each stage shall be followed by the implementation of the next stage.”

That is to say, there is no suggestion here that there should be anarchy or any helter skelter way of doing this. The phasing and the stages are agreed to, and one follows upon the other.

Then the draft resolution urges that negotiations should be resumed for the purpose of accomplishing these objectives. And it must be common sense and a matter of agreement that when there is a resolution of this character which urges negotiation, then the negotiation must be for the purpose of attaining those ends.

It may be that in attaining those ends something else would have to be done, but that is a different matter. The draft resolution urges that negotiations

“should be resumed for the purpose of the earliest conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and taking into account the provisions of this resolution.”

Paragraph 3

“*Considers* that, without prejudice to the directives on general and complete disarmament, set out in this resolution as well as to paragraph 2 above,” -

that is, urging negotiations -

“the possibility of putting into effect either agreed or unilateral measures which would create more favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament and would help the fulfilment of these directives is not precluded.”

I would like to submit both to the United States and to the Soviet Union that this meets all their legitimate suspicions. It would include any desire on the part of anybody to say, "This is an expensive and wasteful business. We are giving up this, that or the other base." It would include the suspension of nuclear tests. It would include any agreement not to give arms to anybody. It would include any agreement on balanced reduction, so called. But it does not say that that agreement should come in such a way as to be a handicap to the attainment of the directives.

I cannot speak for others, but, after all, one gains a certain amount of experience by talking to people with different views, and we have been persuaded in this matter, because I believe that it is not possible to persuade anybody else unless one is willing to be persuaded oneself. And I want to tell you, Mr. Chairman, in all seriousness that those who have had the opportunities and the responsibility of negotiating in this matter, my co-sponsors and myself, have at no time taken rigid positions except in relation to the maintenance of these directives and the attainment of what may be called a warless world.

This paragraph completely covers any fear that nothing can be done until the whole world is disarmed. At the same time it does not give any reason for fear on the other side that this is a method of saying, "Now we shall transfer 10,000 kilogrammes of atomic material," or anything of that character. I am not referring to particular conversations. This also not only does not exclude, but very legitimately includes, such measures as that proposed by Poland, on the one hand, of a free zone in Europe - which was suggested also by Mr. Anthony Eden some

time ago in this Committee, and is, as far as we know, still the approved policy of the United Kingdom Government, which we shall hear later - or by small countries in Asia such as Laos and Cambodia, which unfortunately have also come into the context of the cold war and its conflicts, and which pleaded with this Assembly to declare their territories atom-free zones, or by President Nkrumah, who appealed that the newly-liberated continent of Africa, with its vast populations and vast wealth, excluded perhaps by the sea but not from radiation, should be protected in the sense that these territories should not be made, as was done by France two years ago, the scene of atomic experiments or atomic adventures. The Assembly appealed to France at that time against the explosion in the Sahara, but it nevertheless took place. However, it is not my desire to drag in smaller matters when bigger matters are to be settled.

Therefore, all these proposals, whether it be the Laotian-Cambodian proposal or the Polish proposal - the idea formerly stated by Mr. Anthony Eden - of a corridor where either disarmament or freedom from the atomic business could be practised, or the position of Africa, or the abandonment of bases which are only a threat and an irritation, or their stripping down, whether unilaterally or by agreement, would be greatly welcomed if they could be put into effect. If this could be done no one would welcome it more than the world - all the nations here, those doing it and those whose suspicions would be allayed.

Therefore, I speak here, to both the delegations of the East and the West and their leaders and appeal to them to consider paragraph 3 as a genuine, honest and reasonable effort to meet both their suspicions.

Only a fool or a knave could say, even with the best of resolutions, that it would be possible to go into negotiation tomorrow and that everything would run smoothly. The purpose of this is to create a basis in the world where the principles, as Abraham Lincoln once said, would, if they were really worthwhile, be so wide as to accommodate different points of view, and there is nothing here which precludes any reasonable, any legitimate or any desirable attempt that can be made. It does preclude the idea that something small cannot be pleaded in bar for the main objective.

Therefore, it is our hope that, with all the endeavours which have been made by both sides in this matter - at least mentally - and by the submissions which we have made, the Assembly will throw its weight behind the world attitude that one side or the other cannot expect its own viewpoint to prevail in such a decision and, equally, that it will be recognised that the Assembly is bending over backwards, so to say, in order that decisions may be agreed upon between them to accomplish this purpose.

We also have paragraph 4 which is merely an appeal to create confidence, so that countries should refrain from preparing for surprise attacks or from attacks

themselves. We cannot make an appeal to refrain from attacks without appealing to refrain from preparation for attacks. This paragraph serves as another reminder about previous resolutions.

I have made this submission in all humility, on behalf of my Government and on behalf of my colleagues, since I am the first speaker since the resolution was tabled. I cannot speak for all of my co-sponsors, although, I believe, to a certain extent, I can.

It has been the firm policy of the Government of India to reiterate in this Committee, time after time, that an attempt to pass resolutions by the mobilisation of votes, in one way or another, would not achieve disarmament. Therefore, that is the reason why we have entered into this matter. It is also because we are an uncommitted nation, that we are equal sufferers as a result of the arms race, and also the kind of reception which large numbers of representatives have given to the general outline which we have proposed, encouraged us in the belief that if some form - not a mere form of words, but some meeting of minds - of ideas were proposed, that would be acceptable.

At this time I am not in a position to tell the Assembly, as we have sometimes done in the past, that the great giants have to behave themselves in order to restore friendly relations.

But we are not without hope. We submit this resolution in the full confidence that, with the submissions we have made and with the opinions that will come from the Assembly in due time and, what is more, with the inexorable pressures of public opinion, which must ultimately sway the governments and nations of the world, humanity will be redeemed. With the statements I have read of the great statesmen of the world, who are either in power or are about to assume power, with their pledges to redeem humanity, and with the alternative - the dire alternative - which we must face if we do not abandon war, it would be possible for the Assembly, possessed with the quality of patience, to find in a comparatively short time a further improvement - not a change - but a further improvement in this situation, and it will be possible for the Assembly to adopt this resolution unanimously.

At the present moment, therefore, we are not putting this forward - because of the changes in the composition of the Assembly - with the hope that it will be carried either by a majority or a two-third majority.

My delegation, and perhaps all delegations, have had experiences with other resolutions which have been carried by considerable majorities but which have had no effect whatsoever. There was a time when, after the Korean war, we had sixty-one clauses in an armistice agreement signed, and yet the guns could not be silenced because there was no agreement on the sixty-second clause. The delegations tried very hard. Proposals were submitted in order to make the sixty-

second clause operative and to bring the war to an end. In attempting this, fears and hostilities between the East and the West were occasioned.

The great mistake is, if I may so submit with humility, to think that one side is partisan when it supports the resolution and that the other side, which disapproves of it, may not change its mind.

At present moment, we have not put this forward with a view to separating the sheep from the goats because any resolution or decision made by this Assembly must be made with the consent of those who must disarm in order to ultimately have any effect.

I hope that what I have said will not serve as an encouragement for delay. I make this request and appeal with all sincerity. I am sure that it reflects the over-all sentiments of the United Nations and of the world. I say this both to the representative of the United States and to the Soviet Union: many countries have just gained admission to the United Nations and they - even more, the peoples which they represent - are, perhaps, charged with a greater degree of idealism than some of the older members of this Organisation because they have passed through some cynical phases.

The world expects something from the United Nations and from the leaders of Governments.

It would be true that this submission would be a foolhardy proposition if no provisions were made for inspection and control and if it said "all or nothing." If it had said that it was possible to establish world demobilisation by waving a magic wand of some kind, then you would be entitled to ridicule it or to laugh at it and you would certainly be entitled to reject it. But I submit that while these proposals are not made by atomic or military Powers, they are made and submitted in all sincerity. I believe that if these directives are endorsed unanimously by the Assembly, these Powers will be able to find a way out of their difficulties because, as loyal members of the United Nations, they should be able to find a way to overcome their difficulties. There is no doubt about the fact that there are difficulties. But if we proceed on the basis that we must find a solution for them we are bound to find that solution.

I submit, therefore, this draft resolution on behalf of my co-sponsors and myself. I trust that this statement has made very clear that it is almost a matter of principle with my Government that particularly in matters of this character we do not simply seek majority decisions and thereby add greater confusion to the problem.

STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 20, 1961¹¹

[On October 16, 1961, India presented a draft resolution on the suspension of nuclear weapon tests. It was subsequently revised and co-sponsored by five other non-aligned States, amended during the voting and adopted on November 6, 1961, by 72 votes to 21, with 8 abstentions, as resolution 1648 (XVI). Both the major Western Powers and the Soviet Union voted against.]

The resolution expressed "deep concern and profound regret that test explosions have been resumed" and earnestly urged "the States concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to them."

The following is the statement of Mr. Menon during the discussion of two items: one proposed by India on suspension of nuclear tests and another proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States of America on the need for a treaty to ban tests under effective international control.]

...YESTERDAY MR. STEVENSON¹² SAID:

"There is still time to halt this drift towards the further refinement and multiplication of these weapons. Perhaps this will be the last clear chance to reverse this tragic trend, for if testing is stopped"-

Mark these words:

"the terrible pace of technological progress will be decisively retarded.

"A ban on tests..."

It does not say, "A treaty on tests..."

"A ban on tests, of course, is only the first step, and the control and destruction of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is the ultimate goal..."

Apart from taking away the word 'ultimate' I would agree with every word of it: that is to say, a ban on tests is what we want, and that is the purpose of my delegation's intervention. It has been made clear on so many occasions.

¹¹ From : *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi, October 1961, pages 299-320

¹² Adlai E. Stevenson, representative of the United States of America

I should therefore like the Committee to have before its mind's eye what our objectives are in this matter - that is to say, not the long-term objectives in a world context but in the context of this debate. What are we trying to do here? Is it possible for this Committee to sit down and conclude a treaty within the time and with the expertise at its disposal? Or will it speed the conclusion of a treaty by refusing to pronounce itself on the necessity of the stopping of these explosions?

At a later stage, the United States delegation, with characteristic optimism - very, very commendable - has said that the negotiating committee which apparently must do the work, a negotiating committee of these three countries, should report back to the Assembly in March of 1962. So we are supposed to be resigned to the fact that between now, mid-October 1961, and the beginning of April 1962 - during these five months or so - there should be no attempt to put a brake on tests. That is, if tests go on at the present rate - and I will develop the argument as I proceed - there will be a five-month period in which children can play. That is what it comes to - a five-month period in which there is not only no control but even no appeal of the world to halt. That is the position.

I have no doubt that the Committee will vote according to the instructions of the various Governments and various other considerations. But it is the duty of my Government to make sure, however long it takes, that we place before you such material as we consider relevant to this problem, so that it should not be said, as Mr. Stevenson said yesterday, that this opportunity is lost. Particularly when we hear from both sides, more particularly from the Soviet side, that they are in a state of preparation to explode bigger bombs, is it necessary for the public opinion of the world to go out from here, whatever may be its consequences.

Our own approach to this problem is not as it has been presented or understood by certain members of the Committee, particularly some of my colleagues from Latin America who have spoken. We are not against any binding obligation - and I want to say here categorically, without any reservation whatsoever, that, if our attitude is so presented, it is a misrepresentation of the position of India. What is more, it is not only a misrepresentation of our position today; it is a misrepresentation of the position we have had for a number of years.

What we are saying is not that there should be uncontrolled suspension forever. What we are saying is that these things must stop. Just because there is going to be a treaty, which has taken three years to negotiate and which will take further time, are we to allow no expression of opinion to go out, no attempt to be made, along the lines I have read out from the United States speech of yesterday, to have a halt to these things? That is our position. Therefore, to have a juxtaposition - treaty or no treaty, uncontrolled ban or controlled ban - this is not, if I may say so with great respect, intellectually an honest position to present. It is a total misrepresentation of the opinion of my country in regard to disarmament, in regard to anything at all - just because we ask that these horrible things must stop,

both on account of the time and our desire not to disturb feelings- not referring even to published documents on these questions which show the enormity of the catastrophes we are likely to face.

The issue is presented, as I said, as though, on the one hand, we want uncontrolled suspension depending only on the goodwill of the people concerned, and, on the other hand, that what is being sought on one side is difficult for the other. We are here as the victims and as the victims we cry out. That is all there is to it.

Furthermore, it is also thought that this matter concerns only the two great Powers, or the three great Powers, as the case may be. Now that is not the position, because so long as there are other countries either exploding bombs or capable of doing so, there will be no agreement. In such an event each side will suspect that the allies or friends of one side or the other will be used as an alibi for themselves. Therefore, in our submission, any binding international agreement would have to be of a character which is open for signature to every member of the United Nations, even if they are not making bombs today. After all, there are countries today which are capable of making bombs today but which were not capable of making them last year. Therefore, it should be of a character that does not leave any loopholes.

Equally, we think that any agreement of that character is merely a prelude to the total prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. That being so, no classification of explosions can be excluded, because while they may appear small in relation to something else, their consequences are the same. As will be seen in our revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.1), we think the two things go together: "to refrain from further test explosions pending the establishment of internationally binding obligations." The form of those obligations is a matter to be decided upon. But it goes without saying that no internationally binding obligations can ever come about except by the hard and difficult process of negotiation, the pressures of world public opinion and the exposure of unreasonableness at the particular time.

It is also necessary that all the facts with regard to this question should be available to the United Nations. Since the meetings of the Ten-Power Conference on Disarmament, the meetings on surprise attacks and the nuclear test ban negotiations, the "Disarmament Commission" has practically become a name, a label - it consists of all of us. At least last year it served the post-office function of submitting the report, but even that has gone out. Therefore, the Assembly is completely out of this business. I should like at this stage, therefore, to refer to the position of the Assembly in regard to the whole of this matter.

From 1946 onward the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted resolutions in regard to the total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Here I think it is only fair to say that objection has come in one year from one side and

in another year from another side. Nevertheless, that has been the central policy of the General Assembly in its resolution 41 (I) of the first session, resolution 191 (III) of the third session, resolution 290 (IV) of the fourth session, resolution 380 (V) of the fifth session - all these resolutions without equivocation call for the total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction - resolution 502 (VI) of the sixth session, resolution 704 (VII) of the seventh session, resolution 715 (VIII) of the eighth session. At its ninth session in 1954, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which definitely and categorically requested the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. In 1956, while it did not go into this matter in specific terms, it recalled the previous resolutions. So there has been no going back on this question. Any view which says that in the interests of national security or in the interests of protecting somebody else it is necessary to prepare weapons of mass destruction, is contrary to the decisions of the General Assembly.

In 1958 the General Assembly urged that the States that had tested nuclear weapons - there were three countries at that time - should undertake negotiations and should make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests under effective international control. At the fourteenth session the General Assembly urged the States concerned to continue the present voluntary discontinuance of nuclear tests and expressed the hope that the States would undertake further effort to reach an early agreement relating to the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

Now in all humility I ask whether we are going to go back on the General Assembly resolution of the fourteenth session which requests the voluntary discontinuance of nuclear tests and expresses the hope that States will continue to observe that discontinuance? Are we going to say that we shall not repeat the request for the voluntary discontinuance or the suspension or the attempts to reach agreement?

At the fifteenth session last year we took note of the progress made at Geneva. As I said on the last occasion, that has no organisational or constitutional relation to the document that is now circulated, because this document is dated April 1961. In resolutions 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV), the Assembly took note of the progress made in the Geneva negotiations and urged the States concerned to make every effort to reach agreement as soon as possible. Those of you who were present here will remember that we took it from both sides that there were certain points of agreement and disagreement but that it was likely that agreement would be reached. We did not at that time go into the contents of the points of agreement or disagreement. Now as we examine the contents of these points, we find that the disagreement was far wider than we had thought and that the contents of agreement was more general. The two Assembly resolutions also urged the States concerned to continue their present voluntary suspension of nuclear testing.

Now I would like to ask my colleagues who spoke with great eloquence on the last occasion when we asked for these two items to be treated separately, and the United States delegation and the Soviet Union delegation repeated their attitudes with regard to the draft resolution submitted by us - do they want this draft resolution ? The two resolutions urge the States concerned to continue their present voluntary suspension of testing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. It is quite true that a violation of them has occurred on both sides, first by the Russians and afterwards by the Americans, but the fact that there was a violation of something good is not an argument for abandoning it.

So far as the suspension, or rather what they call a "standstill" agreement, is concerned, my Government has placed this matter before you from 1954 onwards. I do not say this in any sense of criticism or bitterness, but from the very beginning the United Kingdom delegation has put all its strength in the opposition to suspension. As I pointed out, at first we were told that this is not disarmament and that therefore there was no point in discussing it here. Then we were told that there was really no danger, that it was all alarmist, that the radiation effects were small. There may have been some justification for it at that time because the explosions were fewer in number in 1954. They said that "the radiation effects are small, there is natural radiation anyway, so why not have a little more." We were also told that detection was impossible. I have no doubt that these arguments still continue. One year it is adopted by one side, and the other year it is adopted by the other side, as I will point out in a moment.

I will not go into these papers which cover the whole history of the matter. Thus, the great Powers concerned in this matter, after the discussions in the Assembly for two or three years, did nothing about them. The Assembly insisted on the consideration of these matters and passed a resolution calling upon the Disarmament Commission to consider them in an appropriate manner. Even then it lay there a long time. On March 16, 1955, we again reminded the Secretary-General of the direction by the Assembly that the view of all States, including India, which are not members of the Commission, be further considered by the Disarmament Commission in accordance with such procedural arrangements the Commission would find it possible to make. I find this hard to believe, but the Disarmament Commission found it difficult to find a procedure to listen to anybody else for a long time. Then we were asked to go there.

At the tenth session of the General Assembly we again submitted draft resolutions. At that time the opposition came from the same quarters. Ultimately there were compromises or various amendments, and Mr. Anthony Nutting, the representative of the United Kingdom, who was an expert on this matter, said on December 9, 1955:

"Operative paragraph 2 has been expanded to meet the chief points of the Indian draft resolution. Along with the proposals of the Prime Minister of

France and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom it now includes the two proposals of the Government of India for negotiations looking towards a suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons and an armaments truce. It includes provision that these joint proposals of the Government of India should be added to those which the Sub-Committee is to take account of in its further work. It places them on an equal footing with the proposals of the Prime Minister of France and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom."

By that time the Assembly had got into the position of regarding the suspension of nuclear weapons tests as an extremely important matter for the survival of humanity, because it could then no longer be considered as disarmament or anything else. An enormous amount of literature had appeared on the effects of radiation; we had discussions here on the effects of radiation; we had discussions here on the effects of radiation. Even though they had not reached the present dimensions, there had been more and more explosions and therefore public opinion had had this effect. But still nothing very much happened. Ultimately the Disarmament Commission, which had heard the various views, did not do very much or did little about it, and we came back here again to the Assembly.

The Assembly at its eleventh session adopted a unanimous resolution on disarmament which was sponsored by India and other Powers...

To come to the end of all this history, the Assembly definitely asked the States concerned to seek a solution for the remaining questions so that the conclusion of an agreement could be achieved at an early date, and asked them to continue the voluntary suspension. Thus our position on this matter has remained constant and it will continue to do so. We will stop asking for suspension only when the situation is such that it is beyond any discussion or if a treaty is signed or by disarmament or if, whatever it may be, we find it no longer necessary.

I should like to say at this stage that a large number of new countries that have joined the United Nations from Asia and Africa, and those who are not committed to the power blocs have always stood by this position. These resolutions have been co-sponsored by large numbers of countries and even in the recent debates this was quite clear. I think it was the representative of Senegal who said that when they came here they looked to the United Nations for guidance and help in these matters of moral concern and now they find themselves at the other end. This is rather a sad state of affairs.

If I were to go through all the papers I have, I would find myself in difficulty.

The Soviet Union takes the position that suspension cannot be a matter of a separate treaty. I presume it takes the position that not even a voluntary suspension is desired but that it must be part of disarmament. So we look back

into the history of this again. But if I were to take you through the whole of this history, we should be here all afternoon. But what happens? Here on October 14, 1958, Commander Allan Noble, the representative of the United Kingdom tells us this:

"Now the Soviet Union objects to our desire to link the continued suspension, and final cessation, of tests with real disarmament. They want the test problem settled finally in isolation from anything else; they want us to agree now to renounce all nuclear weapons tests for ever, whether or not there is ever any real disarmament or agreement on a control organisation.

"I believe that most of us here recognise that the suspension or cessation of nuclear weapons tests is not in itself disarmament, in the sense of a real reduction of armaments; on the contrary, it will leave a number of Powers to go on to amassing nuclear weapons as much as they please. In itself, therefore, it can do little to assure greater peace and security. The suspension of tests may, however, be valuable and may contribute to peace and security because it may increase confidence and may help to bring about real disarmament."

Mr. Noble continued:

"We cannot commit ourselves now to the final and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests without any real assurance of real disarmament, because we cannot be sure whether in those circumstances peace and security could be maintained."

That was a position of one side at that time, that is, that there cannot be abandonment of tests without disarmament. They wanted the two things linked. He also said on another occasion:

"The United Kingdom suggested that the Sub-Committee should explore the possibilities of an agreement on the limitation of nuclear test explosions, either as part of a disarmament plan or separately. While the United Kingdom preferred to have the limitation and prohibition of such tests included in a comprehensive disarmament agreement, it was ready, in the absence of a disarmament agreement, to consider the possibility of limiting tests in consultation with the Governments concerned. Great public anxiety had been caused by scientific reports."

This, you may remember, was established when the Scientific Committee itself was a matter of controversy. Ultimately its existence has enlightened the world a great deal. Mr. Noble said that the Sub-Committee should study the problem concerned.

One year one side puts forward a proposal. It is finally opposed. The next year it is taken up the other way. This goes on in this jigsaw puzzle. It is what they call gamesmanship. That is, each proposal looks very good, but there is some devil in it somewhere the other fellow cannot take, and then he turns around and says he is responsible for rejecting it.

There again you know it is the commonplace in this Committee, or at least in certain parts of it, to try and cast doubts on an argument by saying either "the Americans agree with it" or "the Russians agree with it," but on account of the cold war "each one is a poisonous embrace for the other people."

Let us see what is stated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which I believe is a highly respectable organisation:

"Among the nuclear Powers themselves the initiative in seeking a test ban agreement came from the USSR."

I do not say this; and I do not care where it came from. I only regret that, having made that initiative, they have gone away from it and committed what is a great disappointment to humanity and a reversal of the whole process.

"Discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests was included in its May 10, 1955, proposals before the Disarmament Sub-Committee as one of the first measures in a disarmament programme. Later, on March 27, 1956, the USSR called for a test cessation forthwith.

"Independently there came into the agreement other problems of disarmament. Premier Bulganin, in his extensive correspondence with President Eisenhower during 1956, continued to press for an independent agreement."

This is what Mr. Bulganin said:

"I should like also to direct your attention, Mr. President, to so important and pressing a problem, one which is part of the atomic problem, as the continued tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. It is a known fact that the discontinuation of such tests does not of itself require any international control agreements, for the present state of science and engineering makes it possible to detect any explosion of any atomic or hydrogen bomb wherever it may be set off.

"In our opinion, this situation makes it possible to separate the problem of ending tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons from the general problem of disarmament and to solve it independently even now without trying an agreement on this subject..."

Now I am only quoting. These are not my opinions.

Then came the discussions here. The representative of the United States, Mr. Cabot Lodge, said that public opinion in the world was so exercised over this matter that, irrespective of our own individual opinions, we must do something about it. I cannot remember how one delegation or another voted, but anyway the resolutions on which agreement had been reached were the result of that situation. I say that for two reasons: first of all, to be objective in this matter and, secondly, that we may not forget that, however much the opposition may be and however much some of our friends, from whom one would have expected a different reaction, might not regard moral foundations of themselves as important or as conclusive, we have to keep on hammering at them. Otherwise between now and 1 April there is a long period of time, and I will show you what can happen in a moment.

That takes us to Geneva, and I will go through this very rapidly, because we wanted to avoid referring to this in this phase of the debate. I am not saying, "We told you so." However, by tying these two items together you have compelled us to go into this. We did not want to go into this. All we want to say is, "Suspend these explosions and go on to come to an agreement quickly." That is all this Assembly can say, because we do not have the time or the expertise; nor can a hundred people reach quicker agreement than three people. However, the Assembly in its wisdom has decided that we must consider these together. I accept that, and therefore we will go into it. If you find this rather wearying, I can only say that I am not a primary culprit.

On December 1, 1958, as has already been pointed out, the Russians offered a draft treaty for an immediate and unconditional ban on tests. I am not saying this to show who was there first. In the consideration of the draft resolutions submitted we have to take into account that we cannot as an Assembly disregard the fact that there is no agreed text by anybody. What we have is a draft by the United Kingdom and the United States which they are asking the other people to accept. I have no doubt it is a good draft, if the other side accepts. But all treaties necessarily must be matters for negotiation. If the other side is unreasonable, it must be persuaded. If the other side is likely to submit to other pressures, then normally those pressures are applied, but certainly we have the right to make an appeal.

Soon afterwards the United States offered a working paper. That was a healthy state of affairs. That is to say, there was one paper from one side and another paper from another side. Since I was not at Geneva, I cannot say which one was not taken as the basis for discussion. Possibly the United States paper was taken as the basis for discussion, because that is what has happened here. Anyway, what happened in the first place was that there were two of these. Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Dean who, as you know, were such good friends, went on talking about

this, with the British intervening in this matter whenever they had anything to offer. They reached agreement on four articles providing for the prohibition of tests, the establishment of a control organisation, which would include a commission, a detection and identification system, a single administrator and a conference of parties to the treaty. That was the time when we all felt optimistic. We thought we were very nearly getting there. It was also agreed that the commission would consist of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and four other States chosen by the conference. It all looked too good to be true.

However, then came the second phase when the government scientists entered - the Rand research people - and there was an enormous amount of literature published at that time pressing the United States Government not to give in on testing. This is not the occasion to look at it, but if you read the literature on the subject it may answer a few questions. It was at this time that the government scientists entered. From January 1959 to March 1959 the Nevada tests took place, and the position that was commonly held in Geneva by both sides that all tests should come under the ban underwent revision, because the back-room boys advised - perhaps they were right but, as you know, government scientists usually have a different view from other scientists - that identification of underground tests was more difficult than was previously believed. I think it was common talk at Geneva that some miscalculation had been made in the mathematics or something of that character. Consequently, in October 1958 it was stated by the Western side that identification of underground tests was more difficult than previously believed, thus casting doubts on the reliability of the proposed monitoring system. If new knowledge came to people's attention, that must be taken into account and examined.

It was at that stage that there entered the factor to which I referred the other day, which is a vicious factor in this whole business, when the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom visited Moscow - I believe it was about March 1960 - when it was sought to make a dent in this general ban on tests, when it was put to the Russians, "Let us have an extension in regard to underground tests." You may remember all the argument about the clean bomb and the dirty bomb, about how clean the clean bomb was, how it only killed a certain number of people and so on.

By that time, the Soviet Union had taken a more rigid and difficult and, if I may so, what looks like an inconsiderate attitude, on this matter. That is to say, they kept on saying that we must have a total test ban - which is the position they are now taking in regard to the offer made by the United Kingdom and the United States in regard to the total banning of all atmospheric and underwater tests.

But at that time, the United Kingdom and the United States made a further advance. They dropped the demand that this should be linked to the general question of disarmament - I suppose they were preparing the way for the Russians

to take over. But they insisted that an effective inspection system must remain. Then there was considerable discussion in regard to staff and so on.

That takes us to the third phase of the discussions, where the Russians opposed the proposal to limit the ban to atmospheric and underwater tests - that is to say, the proposal made after the new, most regrettable and catastrophic resumption of tests by the Soviet Union in September - made by the United Kingdom and the United States to the Soviet Union to impose, even without control, a ban on atmospheric and underwater tests.

The Soviet Union said that it would accept a gradual system of inspection and control if the West would agree to abolish foreign bases and withdraw their troops from foreign soil. So, gradually, the Russians brought in the disarmament issue.

Then there are various details with regard to inspection. As usual, the Russians demanded unanimity in the control commission, and then made concessions in which they said that they would agree to inspection if it were made with the consent of the country concerned. On this point the position of the United States is noted in the *Congressional Record* of 1960. Senator Humphrey, Chairman of the Committee said:

"Since the Soviets reluctantly accepted the principle of on-site inspection, they have to trim it down, they have to circumscribe it. They feel compelled to limit it to a point where its effectiveness or its usefulness is sorely affected. Isn't that about it?"

Dr. Ramney replied:

"Yes."

Then said Senator Humphrey:

"Why didn't you recommend the inclusion of unmanned stations, Dr. Fisk or Dr. Panofsky, or did you? The Berkner report said that you could improve detection by increasing the number of manned control posts or by adding unmanned posts. Did you make any such recommendation to this second conference?"

And Dr. Fisk replied :

"Not explicitly, Mr. Chairman."

This is not so complicated as it may appear, because the argument between the Russians and the United States is that the Soviet Union suspects that inspection conceals espionage. The Western side thinks that any objection to the perfection of inspection would mean an attempt to escape it. This goes on all the time.

Therefore, it was said by the scientists at that time that it is possible to have unmanned inspection - that is, inspection by remote control. Therefore, Senator Humphrey asks:

"Did you make any such recommendation to the second conference, Dr. Fisk?"

and the answer was:

"Not explicitly, Mr. Chairman."

So we are entitled to look into this question of whether everything possible had been done; and, naturally, there are two opposing sides... At any rate, there was another important factor.

Then the Senator finally asks:

"And your failure to bring it up is no indication, and should not be taken as an indication, that you do not consider the unmanned station concept worthy of study?"

This is an important factor in the United Kingdom-United States paper before us. Dr. Fisk answers:

"No, by no means."

"This seems to me something that ought to be looked into very thoroughly and carefully. All we can do is to appeal to these parties to come together in speedy agreements."

Now I shall proceed to the fourth phase. This is a rather important one because, at that Conference, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, who was the first to oppose this whole idea of suspension when we proposed it in the Assembly, proposed joint underground tests on which to base the control system. This is not an unusual thing. There is the experience, shall we say, of countries not within military alliances, which, when they make protests about military aid to other countries, are told: "We will give it to you also." Mr. Selwyn Lloyd proposed underground tests on a military base control system. The idea was that these underground tests were for the purposes of the advancement of scientific knowledge, or whatever it was. Technical conferences failed to agree on detection of underground tests.

The Soviet Union agreed to accept the United States plan for a limited test ban, provided the West agreed on a moratorium on small-scale underground tests. At that time we expressed our disagreement, both to the Russians and to the West, in

regard to the acceptance of underground tests, at the Assembly and before, because we thought that this was vitiating the whole thing.

Then President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed to join the Soviet Union in such moratorium, provided the Soviet Union accepted international inspection and control. But this was towards the middle of July 1960.

In May 1960 President Eisenhower announced what is known as the Vela project for a series of nuclear and non-nuclear blasts. That upset the whole of this arrangement, and the Soviet Union objected to the unilateral plan for Vela, because underlying it was the idea of the United Kingdom proposal of joint tests, which presumably was on behalf of the West. That is where a counter-factor comes into it. The United States attempted to assure the Soviet Union that Vela has no military goal. The Soviet Union insisted on the right to examine the devices if the United States conducted nuclear tests without Soviet accord - that is to say the idea of breaking the so-called moratorium. This is not a word which we use; it goes back to 1960. That is, one party or the other tries to break it, and the other person says: "If you do, we will do the same."

That takes us to the fifth phase, from July 1960 to August 1960. The United States accepted the principle of a fixed quota of on-site inspections. That is one of the principal difficulties - the number of inspections that should take place. As I said, the Russians are very allergic to this idea because they keep on objecting to more inspections. Ultimately, there is agreement on the quota. The parties agree that a control system should be fully operational six years after it is effective. Therefore, there is considerable agreement on that.

That takes us to the last phase, from March to August 1961. During that period the President of France proclaimed what has been called "atomic isolation." He does not come into these discussions. There were atomic explosions conducted by the Republic - as I said, in the territory of the Africans, in the Sahara. Four explosions took place, and, for a country with the resources of France, in comparison with those of the United States or the Soviet Union or the United Kingdom, that was quite a number of tests. They may have been small tests, but they were conducted in Africa - a fact against which this Assembly also passed resolutions.

On May 15 this year the Soviet Union declared that it would resume nuclear testing unless the United Kingdom and the United States induced France to give up its testing programme. My Government cannot say, although the United States and the United Kingdom are military allies of France, either that they have that power or that it is part of their practice to use such compulsion, but the fact does remain that one of their allies was outside the bargain. So even if the other three parties came to an agreement, France could still continue testing, especially since its testing was taking place in Africa and public opinion would not, perhaps, be

exercised in the same way. In Africa it is possible to do more things without exercising public opinion because of that region's comparatively under-developed character. That is less so now, but it was the position.

At that time President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev met in Vienna, and Mr. Khrushchev made it clear that there could be no neutralist administrator for the control of tests. Inspection in the absence of total disarmament, he said, would be a subterfuge for espionage.

This, or at least part of it is, I must say, taken from newspaper reports. The conversations were private. In a memorandum handed to President Kennedy, Mr. Khrushchev suggested that if an agreement on a test ban could not be reached speedily then this matter should be taken up as a part of general and complete disarmament. That is where the trouble started.

After the Vienna conversations, when the two great statesmen met and could not come to an agreement, the Soviet Union said, "Now let this become part of disarmament." That was opposed by the United States because, by that time, the "*troika*" and various other factors - the whole armoury of instruments of the cold war - had come into existence and the Geneva Conference was floundering. On August 29, 1961, the Soviet Union announced that it was going to resume tests because of - on its showing - the military threat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the intransigence of the Western Powers and their menacing attitude concerning the German peace treaty, the continuation of tests by France, and the interests of Soviet security.

First of all, it is quite clear that this argument means that these tests are neither scientific nor innocent. They are military, and they are intended to advance military power on either side. The argument is there. They say, "Because something happened in Berlin there must be more tests - for the sake of security, and so on and so on."

The question has arisen how the Soviet Union could conduct these tests unless there had been preparation. From what I have read out to the Committee there is no doubt that there had been preparation for tests on both sides. In six weeks they conducted twenty tests of the megaton variety, and the United States had initiated project Vela.

At the risk of boring the Committee, I shall first read the Soviet statement. I cannot find the American statement at the moment, but I will find it as I pursue this. It will be found that arguments advanced are identical, and I want to point out that I do not put this forward for rhetorical effect. The fact is that these two great Powers think alike on this question - in power terms. Mr. Khrushchev says:

"If every people, be it the people of a big or a small country, of one with highly developed industry or one only beginning to develop its economy, of a country which is a member of military blocs or following a neutral policy, demanded in a full voice that the military machinery of States should be at last smashed and mankind be delivered from the danger of destructive nuclear war, that would have been achieved. Expressing the vital interests of the Soviet people and, as it is convinced, the interests of all sincere champions of disarmament and peace, the Soviet Government addresses the peoples and the Governments of all the countries of the world with its appeal for increasing ten fold the efforts in order to practically implement the idea of general and complete disarmament and to forever eliminate the danger of nuclear weapons from the life of humanity. It reaffirms the readiness of the Soviet Union to sign at any time an agreement on general and complete disarmament..."

But he goes on to say that the renewal of these tests is intended for the purpose of ensuring the security of other peoples and their own. Mr. Stevenson said the same thing yesterday here.

In another part of this correspondence it is definitely stated - and they make no secret of the fact - that they believe that the renewal of these tests is in the interests of their security, in the interests of world peace and calculated to prevent the greater harm of nuclear war, for the protection of smaller peoples, and this, that and the other.

We had the same thing yesterday here. Yesterday, Mr. Stevenson, speaking to this Committee, said:

"...I must inform the Committee that the United States is obliged, in self-protection, to reserve the right to make preparations to test in the atmosphere as well as underground. But my Government stands ready to resume negotiations for a treaty tomorrow. We will devote all our energies..."

But he went on to say, in another place, that this would be done in the interest of security as well as in the interests of other nations.

So both sides say that they are renewing tests in order to protect us. All we can say is, "God save us from our protectors."

I have looked at this very carefully. I find that it is rather like ladies' fashions. If you wait long enough the old fashions come back. The argument that is rejected by one side this year is accepted by the next, and it goes round and round in that way.

Then we come to preparation. I have to take one after the other, but I want to tell the Committee that the order in which I take them has no relation whatsoever to who prepared first, who did not prepare, and so on. I want to get this out of the way before I deal with as much current information as we have on the effects of radiation.

On July 20, 1959, more than two years ago, *The New York Times* published a report from Washington, dated July 19, 1959, which said:

"The Atomic Energy Commission is quietly preparing for immediate resumption of nuclear testing if the negotiations with the Soviet Union for a ban collapse."

And, as I have already read out to the Committee, other people said the same. So the idea of preparation, if any, goes back two and a half years almost.

Then we come to the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, and he predicted on August 5, 1959, that the United States would resume testing of atomic weapons after 31 October...

I am not prepared to say that this is a governmental statement. He says: "Other nations could be expected to follow suit." If "other nations" means the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, then I think that the United Kingdom can be relieved of this business because they are one group; therefore, there is no necessity for them to do these tests. That means they must know that the Soviet Union is also preparing - unless they know of other countries. Then, it goes on to say:

"...no one should be surprised if testing within the atmosphere is continued on a limited scale."

Then, he concludes that particular statement by saying:

"Most important, I am not sure that the Government of either the United States or Russia" -

this is not my statement, Senator Anderson says -

"really wants to cease nuclear testing."

If I had said that, my friend, Mr. Belaunde,¹³ would attribute motives. But I do not say this. It is said by the Chairman of the Congressional Committee, a man with a responsible position who says that neither of them wants to stop testing. Is that the position? If that is the position, then what went on in the last week or so was not a procedural wrangle, as it was called; it was something worse; it was

¹³ Victor Andres Belaunde, representative of Peru

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something in which the Assembly was not taken into confidence. If it is true, I said "if."

The same Senator goes on to say:

"I would support the resumption as directed by the President of our underground test programme for final development of certain of our weapons before they go into production."

Therefore, let the Committee have no illusions about the scientific character of these tests: underground, overground, on upper ground, on the moon or anywhere else, because I read out to you the other day about plans for a destruction station, or a bombing station, whatever you call it, on the moon.

"These weapons, which currently are in a state of partial development" -

The weapons are in a state of partial development, and we are told there is no preparation -

"and the details of which for obvious reasons I cannot discuss will decidedly improve our nuclear defence capability when fully developed. While such underground developmental tests would make it possible for us to get these weapons to production sooner, the tests would not result in any radioactive debris being injected into the atmosphere and hence would not result in any additional radioactive fall-out."

The main difference of the underground testing is not that it would not produce more destructive weapons, but that it would not have immediate radioactive fall-out effects.

But as against that, Dr. Corliss Lamont, author and philosopher said in a radio broadcast on September 25, 1961:

"...the underground tests the United States began after Moscow broke the three-year moratorium on testing were 'not as dangerous' as the Soviet explosions in the atmosphere, which produces radioactive fall-out. But they are dangerous just the same because of the possibility that sources of water supply may be contaminated by the contamination of rocks subject to explosion."

I am not quoting this authority, but there it is, the other view, so far as you want to know it.

I quote parts from an American scientific journal of September 1951:

"Pentagon officials have also expressed wishes to resume testing of some specific weapons; improved warheads for Atlas, Titan and ICBM's less bulky for given explosive energy than those tested before the moratorium - 'bantam' A-bombs for battle use in limited wars" -

I do not know what a limited war is -

"- Davy Crockett"- nice names - "'bazooka' shells, about the size of a water melon" - they do not say about the size of a bomb, but about the size of a water melon - "more powerful atomic warheads for Polaris submarine missiles and the Minuteman ICBM; a neutron flux warhead, to 'neutralise' enemy missiles; the neutron bomb; and fission-fusion bombs of a larger yield than have ever been tested."

This is what the Pentagon wants.

"Proponents of resuming testing argue that the urgency of having up-to-date weapons counterbalances the propaganda advantage the Russians would gain if the United States resumes testing first."

May I read another of these American quotations before I go on to the Russian. This is by Thomas E. Murray who was a member of the Atomic Energy Commission for seven years, and later was a consultant to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of Congress. In a memorandum to the Joint Committee, Mr. Murray said in June 1959:

"The stopping of United States tests would be disastrous in the present state of our nuclear armament programmes."

He goes on to say:

"Limited nuclear weapons have always been the stepchild in our armament programme."

I must say this is a very well-nursed stepchild.

"Our programme in this range has hardly begun to move beyond the development stage; and in this stage, tests are absolutely necessary..."

He goes on to say:

"There is another alarming aspect to the matter... the results of... tests have been sufficient to raise grave questions about the effect of nuclear explosions in outer space on the operation of American weapons systems, communications system and early warning systems."

So that is what is coming now.

Mr. Murray continues:

"We must assume that the Soviet Union has conducted similar experiments and may be in a position to exploit their effects to its own advantage in the event of war. Given the meagreness of our knowledge in this area, it is imperatively necessary that the United States should conduct further tests in outer space. Delay is dangerous."

It is not the tests that are dangerous, but the delay in conducting them, that is dangerous. That is a different point of view from what we hold.

Mr. Murray also predicted that an agreement of the type now being considered in Geneva "would not necessarily put a stop to Soviet nuclear tests" because:

"The Soviet Union could very easily evade the extremely limited capabilities of the proposed system of 'occasional' inspections."

So, this is the position. Naturally, there is more material published in this part of the world. I do not read Russian anyway. These are various translations that have come in of statements made. On June 21, 1961, Mr. Khrushchev said:

"Quite a few devices which need practical testing have been developed in the Soviet Union. This testing, of course, will increase the fighting power of our armed forces and enable us to develop even better atomic and nuclear bombs and improve the technology of their manufacture. If in reply to the resumption of nuclear tests by the Western Powers we did not start testing our weapons, we would damage the defence potential of our country and of the entire socialist community."

Now, so far as the army of the Soviet Union and their preparations for it, in fact, the Soviet authorities have been at pains in the last two or three months to give considerable publicity to it. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to go on. At the end of my observations, I shall refer to the last of the statements made about this fifty megaton bomb.

I think that it is necessary to give this information, despite the fact that for four or five years the Committee has been hearing about and has become familiar with the effects of radiation. Of course, there has been no end to the propaganda used in an attempt to minimise what is going on, particularly in view of the fact - as Mr. Dean pointed out - that the increase in radiation at present almost equals the radiation caused by all the explosions which took place in the past; and this must now be considered in the light of Mr. Stevenson's statement yesterday.

I shall again take the United States statements first.

Mr. Libby, a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, has said:

"Fall-out is the major danger in atomic and nuclear warfare. Cities can be washed off..."

I read this out so that we may be able to assess for ourselves the extent to which it is possible to protect people. It is not my business to discuss any national programmes; that would be interference in the internal affairs of others. But if Mr. Libby says that cities can be washed off, that is what he means.

There is a statement by the National Planning Association, which, I am assured, is a United States body of considerable reputation. It has been studying this subject for several years now, and I have been told by my American friends that it is regarded as very objective in its investigations. This is a statement which it has made regarding fall-out casualties in nuclear warfare:

"The Federal Civil Defence Administration has computed the hypothetical fall-out for an attack on the industrial complex and the air bases of the United States under typical weather conditions. In the exercise, about 250 nuclear or thermonuclear weapons having a combined yield of 2,500 megatons with damage zones ranging from three to five miles were dropped on cities, industrial projects and airfields throughout the United States. The following are some of the general conclusions which were drawn by the Federal Civil Defence Administration:

"On the first day, 36 million dead, 57 million injured and 58 million uninjured. On the seventh day, 51 million dead, 42 million injured and 58 million uninjured" -

these apparently, were people who were in shelters. The statement goes on:

"On the fourteenth day, 61 million dead and 31 million injured. On the sixtieth day, 72 million dead and 21 million injured.

"These numbers are based on 1950 population figures.

"It is assumed that 93 million people will be stricken, and among these, 36 million people will die on the first day. Others will be injured and will die on subsequent days. Those who died on the first day were presumably killed by the immediate effects of the bombs, mainly blast and thermal effects. The subsequent rise in fatalities among the injured group reflects the delayed effects of radiation damage" -

that is, these people gradually burned, as was the case with the people in Hiroshima -

"coupled in many cases with external injuries."

Another document states:

"Dr. Edward Condon, atomic scientist, predicted today" -

that is, March 29, 1958 -

"that many thousands of persons would die in agony because of poisons released by hydrogen bomb tests."

Here, I would note, the reference is not to a war, but to the hydrogen bomb tests.

"Mr. Condon, Head of the Washington University Physics Department and a controversial figure in the field of atomic science, said that deaths from bone cancer and leukemia would stem from tests that already had taken place."

That was in 1958; since then we have had large numbers of tests, including the present major ones.

Here is another statement, by the French Academy:

"More than 1 million persons will die and 1¼ million abnormal children will be born as a result of radioactive fall-out from nuclear bombs already exploded, five prominent American, Japanese and French scientists said today" -

that is, October 3, 1959.

"About 140,000 abnormal children have already been born as a result of experimental nuclear tests."

We have been told not to worry because there are normal radiations around us anyway. But this is what we have to think about: 140,000 abnormal children have already been born as a result of experimental nuclear tests. The scientists, who included two Nobel Prize winners, made that statement in a memorandum submitted to the French Academy. The report was made at a time when several African countries had criticised French plans to conduct nuclear tests in the Sahara. The scientists said that elementary calculations showed that fall-out from each superbomb caused the birth of 15,000 abnormal children. They gave more details, but I shall not go into them.

A *New York Times* report in 1958 stated that fall-out from the latest two stratospheric nuclear explosions above Johnson Island would rain down on the entire world for the next ten years. This was a statement by Mr. Libby, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. When asked whether he thought that the accumulated fall-out from such bomb testing would be injurious to peace, Mr. Libby said that he did not think so. He contended that the advantages of tests to the free world were worth the increase in the fall-out.

Another report states that human populations could recover from the effects of heavy radioactive fall-out from thermonuclear bombs, but that might take 500 to 900 years. Two University of Texas scientists reached that conclusion on the basis of their study of fruit flies; these scientists were Mr. Wilson S. Stone and Mrs. Florence D. Wilson. They said:

"For example, if a thermonuclear blast such as the one at Bikini on March 1, 1954, had exploded during the Crusades between 1000 A.D. and 1299 A.D., it would have taken until the present century for the genetic damage to be erased from the human population."

In other words, even one bomb of the Bikini type - that is to say, the type that existed before the present Soviet explosions - has genetic effects on the human race for over 1,000 years.

This is another report from the *New York Times*:

"For the first time the Atomic Energy Commission disclosed how much radio-active debris has been created since the first atomic weapons were exploded in 1945" -

that is the New Mexico explosions -

"and how much had been contributed by the Western Powers and the Soviet Union before the halt in testing last fall" -

in other words, before the moratorium. The report goes on:

"A table was supplied to the Sub-Committee by Dr. Charles L. Dunham, Director of the Commission's Division of Biology and Medicine. It showed that since 1945 the three atomic Powers had exploded atomic and hydrogen bombs with a total fission yield of 91,460 kilotons" -

and if that is multiplied by 10,000, one gets so many millions; I think that Mr. Dean gave the figures the other day. The report continues:

"Of this total, 65,900 kilotons were contributed by the United States and Britain, and 25,560 kilotons by the Soviet Union."

These were the previous figures; they are not the current figures.

"The Commission gave no breakdown for the United States and Britain, but it was obvious that most of the Western radioactive debris was created in United States tests.

"A kiloton is the equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT. It is the fission process in atomic and thermonuclear bombs that is primarily responsible for creating the radioactive debris of atomic fall-out, such as strontium-90 and cesium 137...

"The rising level of radioactive debris created by both sides prompted an expression of considerable concern by Representative Chet Holifield, Democrat of California and Chairman of the Sub-Committee. He noted that the radioactive debris being created far exceeded the safety limit of 10,000 kilotons annually, which was recommended by scientists during the Sub-Committee's fall-out hearings in 1957."

This is from another report in the *New York Times*:

"The explosion of fifty kilogrammes (110 pounds) yields an explosive energy equal to 1 million tons of TNT, or one megaton. Hence the term 'fission yield of one megaton' means the explosion and release into the atmosphere of fifty kilogrammes of fission products, radioactive elements of various types, such as strontium-90 and cesium-137, which constitute a hazard to health.

"Information developed at the hearings shows that the test programmes of all countries - the United States, Britain and Russia - have released to date a fission yield of ninety to ninety-two megatons. This corresponds to the explosion of 4,500 to 4,600 kilogrammes (9,000 to 10,120 pounds) of the fissionable elements."

I shall now pass over all the other American authorities and deal only with one of the latest. This is in regard to food:

"What should the average citizen do about the news that the Public Health Service is finding radioactive iodine in fresh food supplies at various points around the country? The answer from Surgeon General Luther Terry and from nuclear experts consulted...is: Present levels do not warrant undue public concern... The only food importantly involved is milk. The radioactive fall-out on the surface of fresh fruits and vegetables is readily removed by washing them. But the cow eats unwashed grass and"-

I suppose we ought to train the cow to eat washed grass hereafter. The report continues:

"it takes a whole lot of grass to make a quart of milk - so fall-out products are naturally concentrated in milk. The first tests announced were for iodine-131 which is one of the easiest forms of fall-out to test. Strontium-90 is also being checked, but has not been announced. The peak iodine levels in the six cities during the period between September 20 and 29 ranged from 140 micromicrocuries in a litre of milk in Tampa to 530 in New Orleans... Iodine-131, a product of atomic fission which does not exist in nature, is worrisome because it has an affinity for the thyroid gland, and doctors say that excessive doses too long continued can cause cancer or other damage to thyroid.

"Whether the high levels recorded last month continue depends entirely on whether nuclear testing continues. Iodine-131 has a half life of only eight days, meaning it loses half its radioactivity in that time,"-

Unfortunately, cows eat grass before then:

"half of the rest in the next eight days."

Then we come to the genetic effects:

"Female fertility has been found far more vulnerable to radiations than has long been believed" -

This is not family planning propaganda: it refers to the effect of radiation:

"it was reported here today."

That was in Washington:

"The tests, which are with comparatively low exposures to radiation sources, were done on mice. But there is no reason to believe that the same sterilising effects would not occur in humans, said a biologist... of Oak Ridge, Tennessee."

"In problems of world-wide contamination, strontium-90 and cesium-137 are particularly important. Their half lives are 28 and 30 years respectively" -

This means that, after the explosion, the strontium and cesium effects last for thirty years, or at least, their half strength:

"they do not die out in the long time required for distribution via the stratosphere. Strontium is similar to calcium and is therefore concentrated in the bones, where it can induce tumours. Cesium is similar to sodium and is mainly a genetic hazard."

Then we come to one of the most dangerous of the effects of the chemicals that come out. I refer to carbon-14 - carbon is such an innocent thing, but not when it comes to this:

"C-14, while not a true fission product, is nevertheless about the most abundant radiostroke produced. While some fraction of it may come down as insoluble calcium carbonate and not cause any serious trouble for many years, if ever, the balance oxidises to become CO₂ and enters the atmosphere. Part of it eventually enters the biosphere.

Carbon-14 Problem

	<i>Approximate r/yr</i>
<i>Current background radiation</i>	<i>0.1-0.2</i>
<i>Normal C-14 dose</i>	<i>0.0015"</i>
<i>Possible increase due to tests</i>	<i>0.0008</i>
<i>Small war might add</i>	<i>0.01-0.1</i>

I do not think we need worry about what a large war might add. If there is a large war it does not matter very much:

"Currently we receive approximately 0.0015 r/yr from C-14. As a result of past tests the amount of C-14 in the atmosphere has probably increased by about 75 percent, but most of this is in the stratosphere and currently out of harm's way. Some of this stratospheric material will eventually find its way into the troposphere and then into the food we eat."

This is what happened to the Japanese fishermen, and to the fish that were sold in Japan after the first Bikini explosions. The statement continues:

"It is quite possible that this process could result in additional radiation to the whole body, including the reproductive glands, of about .0008 r/yr. While .0008 r seems like a very small amount, if one multiplies it by 8,100 years, which is the average lifetime of C-14" -

None of us may live for 8,100 years, but the race continues:

"one gets about 0.7 r, which is an appreciable dose if one is trying to calculate the damage a genetic line will receive over the next 10,000 years. (Such a dose could, for example, cause about 1,000,000 serious defects). A war in the early 1960`s might cause an increase in the amount of C-14 of at most one hundred times that produced by the tests, but probably it would be somewhat less. This could mean an additional 0.1 r/yr, or about a 67 percent increase over the current background radiation... A war in the more distant future could cause an increase over past tests by a factor of 1,000" -

This is the scientist's way of saying one thousand times:

"but it also would probably be much less. A factor of 1,000 might result in an additional 1 r/yr which is small compared to industrial levels... While this situation would be serious, it clearly would not prevent post-war reconstruction.

"Unfortunately, as already mentioned, C-14 has an average life of about 10,000 years. A dose of 1 r/yr for 10,000 years would mean in effect that the average background radiation for the population had been increased by close to a factor of five or ten..

"While we could live with this problem, it would still be an immense toll to pay for the next five or ten thousand years."

There is some significance in my reading this extract. It is from a statement by Herman Kahn, one of the Rand boys. He is one of the foremost advocates of the suggestion that nuclear war is not so bad after all - a lot of people will live; also, one of the main advocates, I believe, of the continuance of these tests. I will go no further than to say that his scientific view is that we could live with a nuclear war.

Now we come to the Russian scientists. Whatever views we may hold on the various sides of this Committee, there is no doubt that the Soviet scientists are held in great respect by the rest of the world. Their achievements from October 4, 1957, have staggered the world; so there cannot be any question of the value of these documents; and they are not very old. In fact, one of them, by our own Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation, has been signed by Soviet representatives, along with others - about the effects of recent fall-out. This comes from a Soviet publication:

"Soviet scientists are deeply concerned over the fact that to this day there is no international agreement on the unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Our scientific community has unequivocally called for a ban on nuclear weapons."

I think we should remember that: scientific opinion is against them, whatever country is involved:

"Our scientific community has unequivocally called for a ban on nuclear weapons."

I wish we could say the same thing of Herman Kahn, or Dr. Teller:

"This is also the stand taken by such world famous scientists as Niels Bohr (Denmark), Linus Pauling (the United States of America), Heisenberg (Germany), Yukawa (Japan), Powell (Great Britain), the late Joliot-Curie (France) and many others."

Of course, some of these people have been called political names: I am not denying that. But that does not alter their scientific position.

Academician Kurchatov goes on to say:

"Tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons not only hold the world in the grip of constant anxiety as the portent of a possible future atomic war, but are (and in future will be still more) a hazard to the health of humanity. Calculations show that if tests are continued at the 1956-58 rate several million persons out of each future generation will contract hereditary diseases due to the fall-out of the radioactive isotopes of strontium, cesium and carbon that are produced in nuclear explosions and that spread over the entire globe."

I think my delegation pointed out the other day that the average of explosions over these three years is five per month. But we have had twenty a month in the last month.

Then we have Academician Sakharov, Soviet scientist, who says:

"Thermonuclear warfare carries with it the potential danger of a lethal dosage of radiation being delivered to the whole of humanity. This danger is apparently absent in the case of nuclear weapons tests inasmuch as the present rate of the testing will never deliver to any single individual a dosage exceeding one roentgen. However, thousands of millions of people are being subjected to this radiation in addition to the natural background radiation and other noxious things, and in the case of carbon-14 this will continue over the course of hundreds of generations. The number of victims of additional radiation from nuclear tests is determined under these conditions by what is known as non-threshold biological effects."

May I interpose here that one of the leading British scientists has said that there is no such thing as a biological non-threshold. That is one of the arguments going on between the Russians and the West in Geneva.

Academician Sakharov goes on:

"The number of casualties is proportionate to the over-all dosage to mankind, irrespective of the dispersion of radiation to various groups of people and in time.

"The simplest non-threshold effect of radiation is that which it has on heredity. The material carrier of heredity is the gene - a special structure in the chromosomes of cellular nuclei. To bring about an irreversible alteration of a gene (the so-called gene mutation), one act of ionisation is sufficient; for this reason, genetic changes can result from the very smallest doses of radiation with a probability that is directly proportional to the dose."

Then we have another quotation from Sakharov:

"Utilising the data given by Leipunsky, we can assess the effect of bone damage due to strontium and the effect of external radiation due to cesium at 0.5 of the effect of C-14. For the sake of completeness, we shall give a brief review of the estimates. If testing is continued at the present rate, the amount of strontium-90 in bone will come to about 65 strontium units, which is a radiation dose of 160×10^3 . Thus, the total losses from a one-megaton explosion will come to 10,000 persons, while the total losses from all past nuclear explosions will amount to 500,000. This is a minimum estimate, since an account of the other radio-isotopes, other pathways of contamination and a fuller account of all non-threshold and threshold biological effects will produce an increase. One should not forget that the total number of victims is already approaching one million and that each year of continued testing increases this number by 200,000 to 300,000 persons."

This was before these recent tests started, I believe - but, at any rate, that is the increase.

He goes on to say:

"The cessation of test explosions will preserve the lives of hundreds of thousands of people" -

this comes from the Russian side, and this is what I would like to submit to the Committee -

"and will have a still greater indirect effect by helping to lessen international tension and to reduce the possibility of a nuclear war - the greatest danger of our age."

Then, we have a quotation from General Gavin, Chief of Army Research and Development in the United States. When testifying before a Senate Committee, he was asked:

"If we got into a nuclear war and our Strategic Air Force made an assault in force against Russia with nuclear weapons so that the weapons exploded in a way where the prevailing winds would carry them southeast over Russia, what would be the effect in the way of death?"

To this question, General Gavin replied:

"Current planning estimates run on the order of several hundred million deaths. That would be either way, depending on which way the wind blew. If the wind blew to the southeast they would be mostly in the USSR, although they would extend into the Japanese and perhaps down into the Philippine area. If the wind blew the other way they would extend well back into Western Europe."

So it all depends on the wind.

I have read out at great length these statements about the results of radiation. I know it is rather tiring to the Committee. But that is what you are asked to do: you are asked to discuss the details of a treaty. Now, if it is not possible to absorb material that goes with it, how do we do the other business? We have a responsibility in this matter, and we will go all the way towards asking people to sign a treaty, but it is not possible for us to make a treaty here or to say "You shall make a treaty" - so and so - except in so far as we have already said it, because there are two views put forward, each one saying that "If you don't have a treaty"...

I hope the Chairman will forgive me - I know it is not the resolutions stage, but there has been no hard and fast rule in this Committee in regard to the presenting of resolutions, although you cannot take it for voting purposes - since I have to leave the country today, I have to submit it to you now:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling resolution 1577 (XV) of 20 December 1960, which urged the Powers concerned to continue the suspension of test explosions, and also resolution 1578 (XV),

"Further recalling resolution 1379 (XIV),

"Bearing in mind both the grave and continuing hazards of radiation resulting to humanity from test explosions as well as their adverse consequences to the prospects of world peace through heightening rather than lessening of international tensions,

"1. Expresses its deep concern and profound regret that test explosions have been resumed;

"2. Considers that such tests should stand totally prohibited;

"3. Earnestly urges the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the establishment of internationally binding obligations for their cessation and prohibition;

"4. Calls upon the Powers concerned to engage themselves with urgency and speed in the necessary efforts to establish such internationally binding obligations."

This is the submission that we make.

Now it has been said that an appeal for the cessation of tests either means nothing or it means that there is more or less a desire not to introduce any control or anything of that character. The main contention of this, which I believe was repeated in another way by Governor Stevenson, was that while a treaty would be binding internationally, a cessation would not be binding.

First of all, I want to say that a cessation is a first step, just as a treaty is a first step of disarmament. The other day Mr. Dean referred to the inaccuracies of my statement, but he has not pointed out what those inaccuracies were. Article 22 of the draft treaty submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States of America reads as follows:

"Duration. This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, subject to the inherent right of a party to withdraw and to be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the treaty and its annexes, including those provisions for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system are not being fulfilled and observed."

That means that if one party says that another party is not observing these provisions, that party may renounce the treaty and withdraw. In this particular treaty it is understood that it is based upon the suspicion that the other party may not carry it out. As we have already said, we believe that this treaty is one which should be signed by every member State of the United Nations. We have seen that since testing started one new Power has come into the explosion field; and

there has been talk of others. All of these tests have been exploded over other people, therefore we all ought to be bound equally by a treaty of this character. The Pacific has been used as a testing ground - it is a world sea but it has been used for this purpose. The northern part of the Soviet Union has been used, and even though it is their own territory the atmosphere is contaminated and many countries are likely to be affected.

In submitting this draft resolution I want to state my difficulty with regard to the United States draft. According to the practices of the Assembly, while the person who submits a draft resolution has exercised, in the past, the liberty of submitting it and talking about it, he does not have the same liberty with regard to the other draft unless it is present. It may be that it will be revised, and therefore I do not want to be unfair in the sense of dealing with the United States draft resolution at the present time.

We would go all the way with anyone who was making an appeal for a treaty, but I definitely say that we cannot wait for this Committee to sit down and draft treaties before we make our appeal to the countries concerned to stop these explosions. The representative of Mexico or the representative of Peru has said that this is not the time for that. When a 50-megaton bomb is to be exploded and when Mr. Khrushchev says that he has a 100-megaton bomb but that it would probably break their window panes - if that was all it would break it would not be so bad - can it be said that this is not the time? Governor Stevenson said yesterday:

"There is still time to halt this drift towards the further refinement and multiplication of these weapons. Perhaps this will be the last clear chance to reverse this tragic trend, for if testing is stopped the terrible pace of technological progress will be decisively retarded."

My delegation has said time after time that the suspension of nuclear weapon tests is the reverse of nuclear armament. As I said the other day, it takes about seven years for these ideas to get down to certain quarters. If the banning of tests is the first step and the control and destruction of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is the ultimate goal - ultimate may mean something very remote. There are two ideas of a goal: one is something that you try to reach, and one is the goalkeeper's idea of a goal, namely to prevent anybody from reaching it. That is his job. He stands at the goal to prevent anybody from getting there.

Governor Stevenson went on to say at yesterday's meeting:

"Accordingly, I must inform the Committee that the United States is obliged, in self-protection to reserve the right to make preparations to test in the atmosphere as well as underground. But my Government stands

ready to resume negotiations for a treaty tomorrow. We will devote all our energies..."

What do we have now? Twenty-four explosions have taken place plus a number by the United States. If the 50 megaton explosion occurs, it will be that much more. We have a promise from the United States that if the Russians stop they will stop. It is like the man who says there is not too much earth, there is too little water, so he puts some of the earth into the water and some of the water into the earth, and it goes on that way without end. It is a vicious circle.

Now we talk about preparations. There again I have read out this matter of preparations with regard to the Russians. Now let me read out something else. I shall read out to you a White House statement on the testing of nuclear weapons, which goes as far back as October 26, 1956:

"If your Government were to suspend research and preparation for tests - as well as the tests themselves - and resume such preparation only upon knowledge that another nation had actually exploded another H-bomb, we could find our present command lead in nuclear weapons erased or even reversed. For the preparation for such a test may require up to two years.

"If your Government were to suspend only its tests, while continuing precautionary research and preparation - if that were feasible - we could still suffer a serious military disadvantage, it requires a year or more to organise and effect such tests as those conducted at our proving ground in the Pacific Ocean."

The last paragraph refers to overground tests. Governor Stevenson tells us that they may go on with tests, but how can we accept this statement and that statement at the same time if it takes one year to prepare them?

Then we come to these underground tests. I think I read this statement out at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, but it ought to go in the Committee's records. In this matter too it is sought more or less to imply that it would not hurt anyone. In a United States Senate inquiry, Senator Humphrey asked the following questions:

"Senator Humphrey: How long would it take?

"Dr. Panofsky: The length of time has been estimated to be between two to four years to make a hole for 70 kilotons.

"Senator Humphrey: Two to four years?

"Dr. Panofsky: Right. Now, let me make one other remark. We keep focussing our attention on salt. Now there is nothing magic about salt. The reason one talks about salt is because that is the medium in which engineers believe it would be the easiest to make such a big hole. It is not the properties of salt which make the muffling better, but it is just the fact that salt appears to be the most economical way of producing such a hole.

"Senator Humphrey: It would take two to four years, in other words, in the salt area -

"Dr. Panofsky: Yes.

"Senator Humphrey: And if you happen to run into something a little more difficult than salt, it would take longer.

"Dr. Panofsky: It would take longer and cost more.

"Senator Humphrey: Where do the salt areas of the world predominate?

"Dr. Panofsky: Everywhere. We know the Russians have large solution-mining operations and they are therefore familiar with the technique. Actually the question of natural occurring holes is not so critical because the natural occurring holes we know about are small... They are only useful for concealing explosions of 1 kiloton or so, which are difficult to identify anyhow.

"No really thorough engineering studies have been made which give reliable cost figures, but just as rough guidance, several hundred thousand dollars per kiloton for the hole is the kind of figure which the engineers discuss.

"This means that for 50 kilotons you might end up with figures in the general order of 10 to 30 million.

"These were figures which were produced by a rather brief study of the Atomic Energy Commission."

There is very much more material on this which gives something more than that. It is said in another place where the detection question comes up, if the concealed test cannot be detected by anti-nuclear devices, then what is the position? What is the engineer's answer? The answer is that

"there is the purely engineering aspect of the problem - it would require colossal land removal to create a cavity sufficiently deep to cushion a nuclear explosion. For instance, a hole to cushion the explosion of a 100-

kiloton bomb would have to be deep enough to accommodate a dozen or so skyscrapers.

"The volume of work would be fantastic to dig a hole in hard rock deep enough to carry out a concealed explosion of a 100-kiloton device, would involve the extraction of 25 million tons of rock and earth, or enough to fill 5 million trucks... it takes 21,000 American miners to extract 19.5 million tons of anthracite, or less than the amount needed to dig 'a big hole.'"

Therefore, that cannot be done quietly at night. These are public operations requiring a very long time and a great deal of expenditure. I must now read to the Committee the preparation made under Eisenhower's direction in regard to the Vela Project, only part of which is in operation. This is taken from the *Christian Science Monitor* by a writer named Neal Stanford on August 12, 1961:

"Project Vela has been under way for some time. It includes three sub-projects - Vela Sierra, Vela Hotet and Vela Uniform. The first two of these are concerned with problems of detecting nuclear blast in space. The third, Vela Uniform, deals with the thorny problem of underground explosions. It is Vela Uniform that is at issue here.

"The Vela Uniform programme calls for 13 nuclear and 22 chemical experimental blasts to provide information both on how to detect nuclear testing and how such testing might be concealed by a designing aggressor.

"The nuclear phase of this programme has been held up on the hope the Soviets would resume realistic test-ban negotiations...

"Actually those ready to put the Vela Uniform nuclear tests into operation have the facilities, caves, tunnels, etc., ready for use. These include a quarter-mile-long tunnel out in New Mexico, a huge salt cavern in Mississippi, a variety of huge holes in the ground in Nevada.

"And there are explosives at hand for the detonations. Thus it would be only a matter of days, or weeks at the most, before this phase of Vela Uniform would go into operation, once the President gave the signal.

"Sixty million dollars has been spent already setting up Vela, and another \$ 50,000,000 has been earmarked for these underground tests. But few informed people believe it will end there. The general expectation is that nearer \$ 200,000,000 eventually will go into Vela."

We are not concerned about the expenditure of the money; that is a matter for the country spending it. However, this project will take time and great preparation as

these are not small devices for laboratory experiments. They are merely what is necessary for nuclear weapons intended for nuclear war.

There is another passage from Governor Stevenson's speech yesterday - and I do not want to read more into it - where he refers to what secret science might reveal, in the attempt to stop these bombs which people who know about it will perhaps understand. It refers to more deadly weapons. More deadly weapons will perhaps provide safety for those that have them and destruction for the other fellow. That only makes the danger of war greater because there is less risk for the perpetrator. Unfortunately, from the time that humanity began to scratch each other's faces or our worthy ancestors the chimpanzees did it, we have always discounted our opponents; we have always thought, "two can play at this game," so that we have now come to the position where we appeal for unanimous support for this resolution.

We hope that the United States - which has led the opposition to it and which repeated this yesterday - will recognise that we are not here on a party wicket of any kind; we are not here to score a point, we are not here to allocate responsibility. It is quite true that when I leave this room a certain crowd of journalists will turn around and ask me, "Why did you not abuse the Soviets?" That is the usual question. I do not want to use abusive language. At any rate, there has been no pulling of punches so far as our information goes. It is not in order for us to allocate blame. We have tried to place before this Committee the objective realities, irrespective of the irritation it may cause, knowing very well that both the Soviet Union and the United States know that this is a great political issue and that the people of the world have to know its consequences.

We are now at the stage when Mr. Khrushchev has announced a 50 megaton explosion. May I say that President Kennedy has made an appeal to him in one way or another. He has said, "Please do not explode it." Now if the President of the United States can say this, could not some of those others here, who think they should not say so also, say the same thing? Why should his appeals not be of a character which goes for the United Nations as a whole? As I said, we now have all that we have from these two speeches. The Soviet Union says, "It is necessary for our protection, we have been provoked into it, we know what is going on and we are not going to be caught unawares, we are not going to be caught unprepared, we are here to protect our people as well." We heard the same thing from Governor Stevenson in another kind of phraseology. He said, "I want to tell you, we want to be frank with you, that we are going to have big explosions." I think Mr. Dean said the other day that if the Soviet Union completes this series of tests, then the United States would start and that when these close others will start. They are going to take it by turns like baby-sitters.

So what we are concerned about is that we should be seized of the enormity - I do not want to use any word that may be offensive - of the situation. This is not a separate position where we try to say, "We voted with this camp and we voted

with that camp." We have had ten or twelve years of this. We have seen this issue pushed from pillar to post, with each side saying today that it is disarmament and tomorrow that it is not. None of us will be able to count the losses. We have a moral responsibility, apart from anything else, not to be a party to a delaying action, a delaying action being something that this Committee cannot be party to. Do not tell me, but ask yourselves in your private minds: is it possible for you to sit down here and even lay down the restricted blueprints on a treaty to which there are two parties who never see eye to eye and who are allies only in war - and not in peace so far.

Therefore we say that a treaty must be concluded and concluded as quickly as possible. If the Soviet Union says, "No, before that we will have disarmament," then good; nobody is stopping it. Then I suppose these treaty provisions will go into the disarmament provisions. At any rate what we say is that here and now, pending this treaty, there should be no further explosions. It may be that one is not sufficiently realistic, but I feel that there is no country in the world, no government in the world, no statesman in the world today that is not responsive to the voice of world public opinion. Even such countries as the thirty or forty of us here that are not so powerful, either economically or militarily or in political experience, as our friends in Europe, North America or Latin America - even our voices carry, because they are human voices. Far more, we are more likely to be the victims of this in normal times, in the absence of nuclear war, than a great many others. The only country that sits around this table and that has had first-hand experience of an atomic bomb at the wrong end is an Asiatic country. Even after that suffering, the only countries that have been the victims in this way of food poisoning on a large scale have been the countries in that area. I am not saying this particularly to direct your attention to the geography of the world. However, all those things would disappear.

There is no protection against large-scale radiation. We hear a great deal about being shielded from it. You can shield yourself for twenty-four hours. I do not have time to give you all the details or the statistics about these methods of protection. For how long can one sit in a protective shield? For three days, three years or thirty years? There is no protection against this. The challenge is not to us only. It is a challenge to human wisdom. It is a challenge to human responsibility, to our own responsibility to succeeding generations.

We are told that these effects last for 8,000 years in some cases and for 1,000 years in other cases. If they had dropped atomic bombs to win the Crusades, the genetic effects would still be here. I will not mention the name, but in one of the most advanced countries in the world today in normal times four percent of the children born are deficient, and that will go up, even at the present rate of radiation, by one percent a year. Are we going to allow the human race to go on in this way? What its psychological or other effects are, I have not gone into.

I thank the members of the Committee for their kind indulgence in listening to me all this time and putting up with the large number of quotations I have read out because I am not a scientist. According to some people, I am a scientific ignoramus, which means a person who reads only some of it. At any rate I put before you the facts that are available. I submit that it is for the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation... which is an impartial committee and a committee consisting of different countries from both sides - to put forward to these contestants the kind of blueprint on which they can work.

You cannot get a treaty by delivering an ultimatum. You cannot get a treaty by saying, "This or nothing else." It may come from one side or the other. We are not against a treaty. Not only are we not against a treaty; what we state here in the proposal we are making is "pending the establishment of internationally binding obligations" - which may be a treaty or anything else - and we urge them to do it with speed. We may not say that we should not make any effort, that we expect them to go back to where they were this time last year or a few months ago in order that these things may be done, because we want something better. As I say, it is a great human responsibility, an international responsibility. All our other talk will have no meaning whatsoever. It is a responsibility which we may not dare to cast aside because of some political or other inconvenience at one moment or another.

After all, there have been times when nations and individuals have been minorities of one. We believe that it is right and proper that our voice should be raised in order that the continuing hazards of radiation, the genetic effects and the continued contamination of the air, should be brought to an end. As has been stated, these effects can last for thousands of years, and the effects of fall-out may last for anything from ten to thirty years, because contaminated food may be consumed by cattle which in turn are consumed by large numbers of people. In this way a situation is created in the world which is irreversible. The essence of civilisation is that we do not create circumstances which we cannot reverse. We should not do evil which we cannot undo.

So at this stage I submit this draft resolution for your consideration.

STATEMENT IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 20, 1961¹⁴

¹⁴ From: *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi, November 1961, pages 363-69

[On September 20, 1961, the USSR and the United States of America issued jointly a statement containing general principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. But their positions on the implementation of the principles differed widely.

On November 20, 1961, India presented a draft resolution, later sponsored also by Ghana and the United Arab Republic, to: (a) urge the two Governments to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body, which both they and the rest of the world could regard as satisfactory; (b) express the hope that such negotiations would be started without delay and lead to an agreed recommendation to the General Assembly; and (c) request the two Governments to report to the General Assembly on the results of negotiations before the end of the current session of the General Assembly.

The draft resolution was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November as resolution 1660 (XVI).

The following is the statement by Mr. Menon introducing the draft resolution.]

For fifteen years now the United Nations has been discussing the problem of disarmament. It so happens in history that such discussions reach a certain peak and then arrive at a state of stalemate, and then some new hopes arise. After these discussions had led nowhere, in 1954 a sub-committee was appointed and the Assembly as a whole, and indeed the world, thought that there was a new departure which would, by private negotiations bring about the settlement that was required.

In 1959, by resolution 1378, the fourteenth General Assembly of the United Nations accepted general and complete disarmament as the objective and culmination of our disarmament efforts. Since that period there have been discussions here with regard to its achievement.

Last year, that is in 1960, my delegation along with eleven others submitted a draft resolution, the basis of which was that we had come to the stage when this Assembly ought to give some directives to the great Powers concerned or to the Disarmament Committee, as the case may be, to produce the principles on which negotiations could proceed. It so happened that neither that resolution nor a large number of other resolutions which shared the same aspects were brought to the point of voting.

Then, we met here last March in resumed session. The situation then was that the United States, having elected a new Government which was committed to the position of general and complete disarmament,¹⁵ suggested that perhaps a little

¹⁵ John F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States in November 1960.

time should elapse for them to consider the whole problem. It is from that point that this new chapter opens.

From March onward the world and the United Nations looked to direct negotiations between the two countries in order to achieve some agreement. Today we are in the happy position that almost for the first time there is not only an agreement on a resolution but a joint statement between the United States and the Soviet Union accepting general and complete disarmament as the purpose of disarmament negotiations and also the principles on which they are to be based.

My delegation, which has taken a considerable amount of the Assembly's time at previous sessions both in discussing principles as well as modalities does not intend to do so on this occasion. The reason is that, as we said during the discussion on the proposal for a treaty in regard to nuclear explosions, we did not think it was possible in the Committee to formulate anything more than principles or directives. On the one hand, what we have to say in this regard is set out in the twelve-Power resolution of last year that is contained in document A/C.1/L.259. On the other hand, we already have the statement on these agreed principles which has been submitted to this Assembly in document A/4879. My Government desires to express its appreciation in regard to the emergency treatment given this document.

As has been stated by both the United States and the Soviet Union, no one is naive enough to think that a declaration of these principles or an agreed basis is disarmament. However, it is certainly a healthy beginning. During all the prolonged negotiations and discussions which have taken place during the past fifteen years this position was not reached. While armaments have increased, it has been the added vitiating factor at the present time on account of the renewal of explosions in violation of an understanding on a moratorium. And in spite of the fact that in the face of these agreed principles the speeches which we have heard from the main nuclear Powers have been couched in a language to which we have become accustomed, we have every reason to believe that we are at a higher level of negotiation. In other words, in 1954, when the Committee was established, we had moved to the position that the giving of certain directives was necessary. The Assembly gave those directives, and the negotiations proceeded along those lines for several years.

We have now come to a further higher position, where there is the acceptance of general and complete disarmament and, secondly, that war is no longer to be the instrument for settling international problems.

The Government of India, expressing itself through my delegation, has repeatedly pointed out that disarmament is but a step to something more important: namely, the outlawing of war. That is incorporated in this agreement.

It also says here that disarmament is to be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; that is to say, that something is to be substituted for arms, if arms are taken away, in order to maintain what arms are supposed to be doing: to keep the peace.

While we do not claim that these agreed principles merely paraphrase the document I referred to, A/C.1/L.259, so far as we are concerned it includes practically all the items set forth in the twelve-Power resolution submitted on November 15, 1960. At that time the two Powers mainly concerned did not oppose the resolution, and it still remains with the Assembly.

We are happy to think that in this agreed statement which is before us most of those things are incorporated. We have moved out to the position where we think of a world without arms, a world in which the stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction have been eliminated, including their methods of delivery - a world in which training establishments, defence ministers and things of that kind are abolished.

We suggested at that time that it should also be agreed that at no stage of the disarmament negotiations should any one group of Powers be put in a better position than another. I will not go into an analysis of these agreed principles, except to read into the record the fact that the Government of India welcomes this agreement.

For one thing, any agreement between these two Powers comes as a relief to the world and is welcome as a step toward progress. Secondly, they are in agreement on basic principles, none of which are merely words that are strung together, because their content is of far-reaching importance. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have since issued statements which do not contradict this but put interpretations on their implementation which require further elaboration from each side. It is common ground, I believe, between the two parties that in order to implement these principles negotiating machinery is necessary.

Although I do not say this will remain so, there is no agreement yet between these two nations as to what that negotiating should be. I believe that is the problem before us at the present time.

Again I should like to repeat that we do not think that any amount of discussion in this Committee is going to take us further than these agreed principles. Further, we have the fear that greater and greater discussion on these matters might likely result in the taking up of positions and the arranging of groups of States on one side or the other, or on a third, as the case may be, without making any further progress in regard to the implementation of these principles. Therefore, we think that our function now is to try and find a way to aid the emergence of this negotiating machinery.

It might look as though that although these principles have been agreed to, agreement on the negotiating machinery will prove a stumbling block. But this has happened before. When we adjourned in March there was no agreement between the two great nuclear Powers. Now they seem to have reached agreement on this matter up to this point.

My delegation does not regard bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union as something that derogates from the authority of the United Nations because the boundaries of the United Nations are not merely the organisational limits of this Organisation but also its purposes. If they are achieved in some other forum, and if more particularly they spring from resolutions and decisions made here, we do not regret it.

Our history on this matter is not a recent one. As early as the seventh session of this Assembly, my delegation submitted to this Committee that

"any solution (for the disarmament problem) depended essentially on agreement between the United States and the USSR, the States which had the most powerful armaments...

"The task was, essentially, to bring about agreement among the major Powers. The United Nations was based on the conception of the latter's exceptional responsibilities and powers. It was their duty to the entire world to reach agreement."

That position has been continued session after session. I will not read all the extracts that relate to them, but at the following session, the Government of India instructed the delegation to say that:

"the responsibility really lies upon the shoulders of the great Powers. There can be no real settlement of world problems except by agreement between the great Powers (the Soviet Union and the United States) which alone have the material strength and in whose hands largely lies the power of decision. Hence, we should like to submit to the Assembly, at the appropriate moment, that it is necessary for the Heads of these States - or whoever speaks for them at the highest level - to meet together in the context of an informal gathering, the kind of gatherings that made possible the emergence of this very body."

The body we referred to was the United Nations...

I have read all this out in order that people should not feel that they are tired of this discussion, that there is an *ad hoc* solution at the present time. There are the realities of the situation: that is, these two great atomic Powers have to come to agreement.

This year we approach this problem in the background of certain new factors. One is the emergence of the agreement which came as a surprise to some people - no doubt an agreeable surprise - but direct negotiations did produce an agreement on principles which was set out in somewhat great detail and the acceptance of various particulars which have a great bearing upon the implementation of them. For reasons which I have already set out, we do not think that the discussion of the details of the substance of the matter at this stage will make any additional contribution. We will not go into them. Therefore, my delegation has submitted a draft resolution which is contained in document A/C.1/L.299 which I shall read out to the Committee.

(Mr. Krishna Menon read the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.299)

We have put this draft resolution forward in all seriousness and sincerity because we do not think that we shall make any progress on these agreed principles unless these two great Powers are able to agree on this particular matter. As was pointed out by the representative of the United Kingdom this morning, we already have proposals on both sides which reveal the differences of approach they have. It is not the desire of my delegation to examine this in great detail except to say that we would accept anything as welcome if these two agreed because, after all, if their agreement comes in, then there is some hope of progress. At the same time we have said that the composition of that body should be such that they and the rest of the world would regard it as satisfactory. We must certainly hope - we have no reason to doubt - that these two great countries and their allies, whom they will no doubt consult, will consider that as a necessary condition.

In the proposals that have been put forward, the Ten-Power Committee has been rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. If it was only a solemn rejection, we perhaps might have asked them to reconsider it. But for the last year or more, the capacities of the ten-Power negotiations have been exhausted. Therefore, one side has said, "that will not do," and, as must be clear from what I have already said, one of the essential qualities of any committee or any body is that it has the agreement of both sides which must negotiate.

Then there is the proposal made by the United States of America about the addition of three chairmen to this ten-nation committee. We ourselves have no objection to this particular proposal. But as presently advised, my Government is not likely to agree to the nomination of individuals as distinct from their countries. We are dealing here with vast political issues and not with legalistic issues or questions of terminology or of giving an award as between two parties as though we might ask the judges of the International Court of Justice or somebody to decide on some interpretation. Since they are political issues which must be

backed by political power and political experience and, furthermore, since the other countries of the world, whether they be uncommitted or committed, cannot be excluded ultimately from this, it would not, so far as I have been presently advised, meet with the approval of our people and our Government. I believe the same to be true of many of my colleagues with whom I have had the privilege of working: That any body or group of this character which is composed of all individuals, however distinguished, would not carry the public opinion of their own countries necessarily or even of the world. I have no doubt that there are such eminent men in the world, but this is not a place where eminent men themselves have been able to bring about results because today we are living in circumstances where world public opinion as expressed and as set out in the Charter is the most important element.

There are other proposals that have been put forward. We do not want to go into the differences of quality between them. Any of those, if they are agreed to, would meet with our approval. We would, however, like to say that the so-called uncommitted countries are not a bloc, and the essence of non-alignment is that non-aligned countries should be free to be non-aligned with each other; otherwise they lose their independence. Non-alignment arises from the fact or the belief that bloc politics and the grouping of Powers and this ganging up in this way and dividing the world into armed groups or ideological groups is not likely to bring about world cooperation. Therefore, the addition of a third bloc will not be a solution.

Proposals on both sides contain the addition of countries of that character, but the balance has to be maintained in regard to both the geographical conditions of the world and the political outlook that will be brought to bear. So the position of my Government is that the next step that should be taken in this Committee, while some debate would certainly go on, is such that we would say very little to introduce elements of controversy into this situation.

Unfortunately, from the three nuclear Powers who have spoken we have heard a great deal about the race for peace, the race for arms and so on. Our experience, unfortunately, is that the usual invectives have figured in all these speeches. We are not a school of morality; we are not educating people as to the right way of delivery of public speeches; but we are concerned about the matter in the sense that more vituperation and more polemics, as was pointed out by the United Kingdom this morning, are not likely to get us any further.

While it would be very wrong to shut down debate on this subject prematurely, it appears to us that the businesslike way of dealing with this would be for the United States and the Soviet Union to get together, as they have been doing for the past few months, and solve this problem of finding agreed principles and get down to some agreement on a negotiating body. The negotiating body is necessary, because the Ten-Power Committee which was the negotiating body has not been able to get any further.

There is a proposal also that we should meet in the Disarmament Commission as a committee of the whole. Since the Disarmament Commission is composed of 103 nations now, we may not get very much further unless there is some elaboration of these principles in terms of implementation. Hence the draft resolution that my Government desires to submit to this Assembly, that we may now proceed, that we may now go on to request these two great countries to come to agreement - these countries which have each the largest amount of destructive power at their disposal and equally the considerable influence that arises from their military, economic and other positions.

Since we are not in this group of Powers, either in the sense of belonging to the armed blocs or in the sense of economic or military importance, it should not be thought that we are escaping our responsibilities. Our responsibilities only begin when the negotiating body gets down to the implementing processes, and then it would be possible for all of us, through the countries represented on this negotiating committee and later the Disarmament Commission itself, to be able to talk about them.

Reference has also been made this morning by the representative of Yugoslavia to the possible convening of a special session of the General Assembly or of the Disarmament Commission or of a world disarmament conference. The Government of India is in agreement with this in so far as that was the opinion that emerged out of the discussions between the non-aligned countries when they recently met in Belgrade. But all these decisions are conditioned by the events that happen at the time. Therefore we remain flexible in regard to this. We would support such a proposal, but it appears to us that even that proposal would have to be part of the discussions of this negotiating body whatever it may be.

Therefore the important matter before us is this. Having been faced with the very welcome situation of an agreement on principles which roughly correspond, in our submission, to the directives set out in this document to which I have referred, with one or two exceptions - about which we can argue, if it is still thought necessary, when the time comes - the next step is the creation of this implementing body. Otherwise our speeches would merely be expressions of views which do not lead to any particular results.

It has also to be considered that we proceed from now in the context of certain other decisions that we have made. That is, this Assembly itself has passed resolutions asking, on the one hand, for the suspension of preparations for nuclear war - that is, test explosions - pending the conclusion of treaties, and it has also asked that Africa be declared a nuclear-free zone and that explosions be not carried out in that area. If the Assembly little by little subscribes to these steps by overwhelming majority votes - I am sorry to say, not by unanimous votes - these are indications of the progress we have made in this field. So, while there is

considerable tension, which may be in regard to various localities in the world - and I do not want even to cite names or in regard to the vituperation and the emphasis of differences - there is also on the positive side the fact that we have passed certain resolutions and come to certain decisions and we have also the position that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on principles.

For these reasons we submit this to the Committee, deliberately refraining from going into details or the merits of this question or our own views with regard to the working out of these positions, except to say that we consider that there should be no departure from the doctrine of full and complete disarmament as a preliminary to the outlawing of war. Secondly, war has been found not only expensive - that is a very small matter - war has become, shall we say, useless. When all nations are engaged in war, it has not even the results we normally expect from war. I wished to quote from the speeches made in the past few days, first by Mr. Zorin, afterward by Mr. Stevenson and yesterday, I believe, by the representative of the United Kingdom, all of whom in different language say that war is no longer, in the context of modern technology and modern developments, possible, nor has it any purpose whatsoever. Perhaps it would be as well to look at them. Mr. Zorin, speaking to us on the first day, said:

"The revolution in military technology which has occurred during the past few years has stripped of their effective basis any disarmament programmes other than a programme of general and complete disarmament."

An American philosopher, writing one hundred years ago, began his statement on war by saying: "War is the gory nerve of nations; it gives them courage..." and so on - even as Mussolini used to say. Having said that, he went on in the next paragraph: "When that situation is reached when in war entire nations are involved and nations are to be exterminated, then war becomes futile." His forecast seems to have been prophetic. That is the position today. We have reached such a situation. Even if a small war were started somewhere, this small war might become bigger and nuclear weapons used. While we are not prepared to speculate whether or not any people would be left alive or whether or not bacteria would survive, civilisation as we know it today would not be able to survive. What is more, the long-term consequences of nuclear war are such that there would be very little in the way of victors and vanquished.

On the same day, the representative of the United States, speaking in this Committee said:

"...war in the future would differ fundamentally from war in the past as we have known it - not in degree but in kind."

That is the most important thing.

"It is this which seems so difficult to grasp. Thermonuclear war cannot serve anyone's national interest any longer, no matter how moral or immoral that interest may be, no matter how just or how unjust, no matter how noble or ignoble, regardless of the nation's ideology, its faith or its social system."

It is very difficult in the face of this to do anything less or to fail to do anything to ease the sense of urgency in any way with regard to the steps we must take to outlaw war altogether and bring about total and complete disarmament. As we submitted to the General Assembly last year, the kind of idea of the limitation of armaments, even to the extent of allowing national contingents for the purpose of international policing, has to be thought of from the point of view that if nations are armed down even to the level of 1870 or 1470, as the case may be, and we still retain war as an instrument for the settling of disputes, then in six months' time all the weapons that have been abandoned will come back, because all the technology and all the people and all the hatreds and the passions will return in the world. It will be only a question of time when all these abandoned weapons will be used, little by little, and we are again where we started.

The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking to us this morning, said the same thing. He said:

"My whole desire, my instinct and my overwhelming inclination is that we should get away from these polemical declarations and at the earliest possible moment establish a practical, workmanlike negotiating body, that we should address ourselves with urgency and determination to the task before us and with genuine goodwill and understanding on both sides, seek to produce a draft upon which we can agree among ourselves and which we can submit with confidence to the Assembly. If we can do this, we can give new encouragement to the whole world. We can replace anxiety by hope and we can give a new impetus to the United Nations itself."

The United Nations has to its credit, in spite of all the vicissitudes through which we are passing, many achievements, even in this particular session. We seem to have overcome the difficulty about filling the vacancy created by the unfortunate death of the late Secretary-General. We have, in spite of what would have been considered impossible two or three years ago, made considerable advances in the liquidation of the colonial empire and in the expansion of the freedom of mankind as such. We have also adopted, as I pointed out a while ago, several resolutions restricting the scope of nuclear warfare; and in other Committees, where constructive measures were considered, there are various positive suggestions in regard to world cooperation. Only this morning the General Committee, in its wisdom, very kindly accepted a submission made by the Government of India for

the inclusion of an item for the inauguration of an "International Cooperation Year" in 1963 and requesting the President to nominate a preparatory committee. At least that is our suggestion which will go before the plenary meeting in a short time.

Therefore, looking at this picture, both the positive and negative sides of it, we have every reason to be hopeful that the same spirit, the same compulsions - I will not say the spirit perhaps, but the same compulsions - which resulted in the agreement between these two great countries, in spite of all the vituperation, even in spite of the unwarranted breach of the moratorium some time ago and the threat of continuing explosions in the world, in spite of all that and in spite of the repressions that go on in the world, and in spite of the position we are in, shall we say, in the Congo, in Algeria or in all these places, have resulted in progress and there is every hope that in this method of direct negotiation by those who are most immediately concerned and who must speak with that degree of responsibility without turning to other people, there probably lies the solution.

Once more I would like to say that my Government has been of this view for a very long time, and I want to repeat that it is in no sense an escape from our own responsibilities. It is an acceptance in humility of the realities of this world. We are dealing with a problem of power. We are dealing today with the problem of the infinite capacity of destruction, and the destruction of that power. It is only those who arm that can effectively lay them down. We can appeal to them, we can argue, we can show the wisdom of it and so on, but obviously these arms have been amassed by the parties concerned for what we must assume are the desire to preserve their own security and for other good reasons. Therefore, they are the only people who can lay their arms down and the agreement between them is the vital part of any movement forward. In fact we may say, by definition almost, that the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is the key to the opening up of a new chapter.

The Government of India, therefore, wishes to submit to the Assembly its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.299) that these two countries now be asked by the Assembly to get together to submit both the composition and the modalities of this negotiating body to implement the purposes which they have agreed upon between themselves and which have been universally welcomed not only by the United Nations but by the entire world, and which, for most unsophisticated people, present not only a ray but a considerable amount of hope and expectation.

STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, JULY 24, 1962¹⁶

¹⁶ From: *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi, July 1962, pages 145-152

[On December 20, 1961, the General Assembly endorsed an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the composition of a committee on disarmament consisting of 18 States, including India, to undertake negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control on the basis of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, issued by the Soviet Union and the United States on September 20, 1961.]

The Soviet Union and the United States were permanent Co-chairmen of the Committee and the Chairman of the day rotated among all its members.]

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference and to you, the Chairman of today's meeting, for kindly allowing me to speak here at all this morning and to come before the other speakers whose names you have read out and who have kindly given way.

We opened this Conference on 14 March, and it is now entering its fifth month. Some of us have not been able to be here right through the session, and this gives rise to two observations which I make on my own behalf and that of my Government.

Firstly, we are appreciative of the very diligent and persevering work done by our alternates in this Conference. It has also given us the opportunity of sensing - in a useful way, I think - what the world generally thinks of what is going on here. That is to say, in our own countries and elsewhere, although this Conference is not open to the press, people's eyes are very much turned to it, and, therefore, we are able to react to public opinion very much more than if we were locked up in this Conference over here.

My Government also wants me to draw attention to the fact that we had at the beginning suggested that, in spite of the formalities that are inevitable in any international conference, a considerable degree of informal discussion as between the whole of us or any groups of us or any numbers of us should take place. On that basis we submitted a proposal in the earlier part of the Conference, which the Co-Chairmen after consultation accepted. While we are appreciative of this, it is the humble view of the Government of India that perhaps a greater degree of informal discussion will help the progress of this Conference. This is not at all said by way of criticism but because of the concern outside and the concern among Governments that the longer these problems remain the more difficult of solution they become. These problems of today did not exist two, three or ten years ago, and, if there had been wisdom on the part of mankind and a lack of suspicion among nations, and if the pressures of public opinion had been able to induce settlements, perhaps some of our difficulties would not be before us.

Secondly, it is inevitable that in a Conference of this kind there should be a considerable amount of paper - though there is far less than we are accustomed to in United Nations conferences or other international conferences and large numbers of proposals.

In the first statement I made before this Conference I said that we had a document from the Soviet Union and a proposal from the United States which we thought would soon formulate itself into more definite proposals. That has happened, and it is all to the good. There have been other proposals, mainly concerned with various stages and details. This is inevitable, but at the same time there is to our mind the danger that we may get lost once again, as in previous disarmament discussions, on the impossibility of agreement on some particular matter; therefore this fear of not being able to see the wood for the trees is very much in our minds.

Having said that, we would like to point out that we have gathered here on the basis of the acceptance by the United Nations of full and complete disarmament, and the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of the United States and the Soviet Union, which forms the basis of this Conference, has that same foundation. Therefore any proposals that may be put forward by one side or the other, any compromises or ways of conciliation, must have this one objective in mind - that is, that we are not really seeking the regulation and limitation of armaments, we are not arranging for controlled warfare, about which so much has been written in modern literature, but to establish in our own time and in a very short time a world free from war.

We now look at the situation. In the past five months there have been advances and it would be very wrong not to take notice of them. There has been agreement on the preamble; there has been no overt departure from the Joint Statement, although some of the proposals may give rise to concern; there has been agreement on two or three clauses of the draft treaty; and, what is more, if newspaper reports are correct - and we have no other source of full information on this matter - there has been considerable discussion between the two great Powers whose decision must finally settle the fate of armament or disarmament. So in this way there have been advances. As I have said, there has been agreement on the preamble, the first three articles dealing with general obligations have been more or less agreed and a significant phase has been reached as indicated in document ENDC/40; and then there are the two full and complete plans for disarmament.¹⁷ To a certain extent those complete plans are an obstacle because they represent positions already taken; on the other hand, they give a certain amount of definiteness and direction to the discussions.

¹⁷ The USSR Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament submitted on March 15, 1962, and the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, submitted on April 18, 1962.

But although these factors are favourable the situation in the world is that during this period there have been more nuclear explosions, in number and in quantum and intensity, than ever before. What is more, it appears from the recent announcement by the Soviet Union that we are caught in this spiral of explosions in one place followed by explosions in another, in which both the fear that other parties which have carried out explosions have gained advantages and national prestige come into the situation. So unless we are able to take a bold step in some way and the great Powers agree to stop this rehearsal for nuclear war in the air the world will be in a very bad way. During this year there have been more radiation, more explosions and more preparations for this than in any corresponding period in the history of the world.

We are also in a position in which, in spite of our best efforts, this Conference still remains incomplete on account of the absence of one of the nuclear Powers.¹⁸ I shall refer to this in a moment.

My Government regrets the decision of the Soviet Union to renew tests. This has nothing to do with who renews them or who does not; our position in this matter is exactly the same as it was when the United States unfortunately decided to renew tests. There is enough scientific evidence to show that even the radiation so far released in the universe is of such a character as to have genetic effects of highly deplorable dimensions. In the short time that is available to me, both on account of my own circumstances and because I do not want to tax the patience of the Conference, I have no desire to go into such scientific details as one has been able to gather, at second hand, if you like, but from both sides. There have, however, been advances in this direction.

I hope the Western countries - the United States and the United Kingdom - will not misunderstand me if I say that my country has for seven years taken the view that it is possible, by and large, to detect nuclear tests. Even when the first conference met for discussions in the United Nations this position was opposed. After this Conference began the eight unaligned countries put forward proposals in this sense, and my Government itself did so, on the basis of its being possible for all practical purposes to detect these tests through the monitoring by national stations of tests outside their territory, and by various other devices. I shall not go into the details of these, but I am happy to think that the document circulated by the United States on the Vela Project (ENDC/45) - and I hope Mr. Arthur Dean will not mind my mentioning this name, because he took me to task for mentioning it in other circumstances - confirms what has been said in this room and elsewhere - that it is possible for all practical purposes to detect tests of one kind or another. We therefore hope that with this advance the observations I am going to make hereafter will become a little easier.

¹⁸ France did not participate in meetings of the Committee.

So far as our own position is concerned, we would like this morning to lay stress upon three or four matters, largely because it is not possible for an individual, even if he represents a government, to come into one meeting and, in a short series of observations of the kind that I am going to make, go into the details of the first, second and third stages. I would only say that my Government is fully committed to the position that no country should be placed in a position of disadvantage by any sacrifices, restrictions or restraints it imposes on itself, and, secondly, that no step in disarmament is worthwhile if as a result considerable armaments are left in the world which can procreate themselves more or less and develop the equipment required for large-scale war. In other words, both the speed of disarmament as a whole and its quantum at each stage must be adequate to make an impact, and while it is true that it can be logically pleaded that there are some security holes in this matter, our wisdom should be addressed to the task of plugging these rather than just pleading them in bar of advance. This is the position of my Government.

May I interpolate here that it would be a great advantage if, before the next session of the General Assembly, some tangible advances could be made here, because otherwise, in the general trend of discussions in a much larger body expressing perhaps the greater emotional concerns of the peoples of the world, more difficulties may be created, in which public commitments cannot be made by the leading Powers. Therefore it is the considered request of my Government that before the General Assembly meets - that is to say, in the next five or six weeks - this Committee should make advances which will inspire confidence among the nations and not turn public opinion to cynicism. In other circumstances, and in days gone by, before things had advanced so far, we would perhaps have made greater references to the threat to the world of the knowledge of outer space in relation to war; but, taking the practical considerations into account, one can only say: "Here is another factor that has come. If we have disarmament beforehand then we do not need to be afraid of it." Therefore, I repeat, the sooner we get some agreements on some things the better.

So I take these items, not in order of importance, and first of all I take the dissemination of weapons. There is a very large degree of agreement on this matter. It has the endorsement of the United Nations in resolution 1665 (XVI) of the General Assembly.¹⁹ Now my own Government is not adequately satisfied with this resolution, because it provides for the dissemination of information though not for the dissemination of weapons. Having regard to the technical advance of certain countries, which it would not be proper to name, the dissemination of information is itself a danger but we hope that this Conference

¹⁹ In resolution 1665 (XVI) of December 4, 1961, the General Assembly called upon "all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons."

will find a solution to this problem, since there is a considerable degree of agreement in this matter on both sides. Again I do not want to spend time in quoting, but there is a considerable degree of agreement on the side both of the United States and of the Soviet Union in regard to this, and there is the urging by the United Nations. There is a real danger of these nuclear weapons getting into the hands of a larger number of Powers which are - if one may say so - less heavily burdened, and might, therefore, use them at smaller provocation than otherwise. So the non-dissemination of weapons, to our mind, must have greater priority.

We all live in conditions where, in our neighbourhood, there are symptoms of instability, where still the system of military alliances of one side or the other obtains, and, since there is a stockpile or storehouse from which they can be drawn, even the technique of using them without nuclear warheads would, if they were transmitted, create instability in the world. So the first point I would like to lay stress upon is that we should come to some definite decision, however difficult it may be, in regard to the spread of nuclear weapons.

In this connection once again my Government - and I am sure this view will be shared by all governments in the Conference - would appeal to the Republic of France and to its President to take part in our deliberations, because so long as one nuclear Power is outside the agreement the others, at least one or other of them, will not feel sufficiently safe, or feel that the agreement is free from holes and escapes. Therefore the adherence of France, which is the other nuclear Power and is in a position to transmit information, is of very great importance. The Government of India, although it is generally regarded as unrealistic, still makes its appeal to the nuclear Powers, in regard to dissemination to take unilateral action: that is to say, it should be an article of faith with the nuclear Powers, pending the abolition of nuclear weapons and their total destruction, at least not to spread this terrible evil all over the world and place it in hands less responsible than their own. Therefore the knowledge either of the manufacture or of the use of nuclear weapons should be restricted to those who have it.

May I say to my colleagues who are what may be called "smaller" - that is at least in relation to others - that there is no national pride involved in this. We do not claim national ego to possess atomic weapons. It has been asked now and then, "Well, if there are going to be nuclear weapons why should they be confined to the great ones?" There may be some force in this in the case of something that serves mankind but so far as my country is concerned we do not feel any national suppression, any national humiliation, any national backwardness in not being able to possess nuclear weapons. Non-dissemination is an urgent necessity. This is not a theoretical position. There have been investigations made in regard to this by at least twenty countries in the world, including my own, capable of making them. And, what is more, with the advance of science and the smaller size of these weapons, and their portability, their ominousness is increased.

It is interesting, in this connection, that President Kennedy said on 14 July:

"In the resumed negotiations the United States will continue to seek agreement which will meet the dangers of the nuclear threat. These dangers will only increase if early action is not taken to halt the growth of stockpiles of modern armaments (and) the spread of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of a widening number of countries..."

The Soviet Union has said the same thing in previous documents. So we have, so far as we can see, unless there are reservations in the minds of the parties concerned, a comparatively easy road to travel. But no road in international affairs, particularly in this business, seems to be easy.

Then we come to the test ban. Most people are inclined to look at this rather cynically. We have been saying this for eight years. My Government and Parliament made submissions to the United Nations in regard to the suspension of nuclear tests for the first time in 1954. For many years it was regarded as an unrealistic proposition, as something academic - in the same way that Antarctica was - but now it has become part of the most serious things that are being considered. We would assume, as comparatively ignorant people, that these tests surely are not for the purpose of national glory. They are not for the purpose of amusement. They are intended to perfect nuclear weapons: that is to say, it would be very wrong to say that they are not integrally connected with disarmament, because nuclear tests are the rehearsal for nuclear war. They are the rehearsal for nuclear war, apart from the definite and objective damage they do to the world, feeding the war mentality and feeding all suspicions. We have said all this so many times before that it is not necessary to repeat it.

Now we come to the stage of negotiating a test ban. It is not for us to say in what way this should be done, but this spiral is very ominous. The ban continued for some time. It was broken when the Soviet Union exploded its giant bomb, and this was followed by very considerable explosions by the United States. And now the Soviet Union is going to have more explosions, and I suppose then others will come afterwards, as things are. Our appeal therefore is that there should be some stop to this. After all, even the power of destruction reaches a point of saturation when it has neither moral nor psychological, neither physical nor lethal, value. Therefore we must now proceed to the conclusion of a treaty. There must be a treaty. I do not want to be misunderstood, we are not retreating from our position with regard to a treaty. What I am saying is that with the advance of knowledge and the advance of everything that has been done and the detectability that is available, wherein even non-nuclear countries can participate, this will lead to the development of some sort of international code of behaviour, the foundations of a future international law, it should be possible now to do something about a test ban in such a way that both of the great nuclear Powers will be able to commit themselves to it without reservations.

Now our own submission is that this test ban agreement will never be reached either in this Conference or in a Conference of four, five or six. This has to be agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it is very largely within the ambit of the capacity of the United States itself - I will not say its responsibility - to bring its other Western ally into the agreement.

On 16 April this year eight of the non-aligned countries at this Conference tabled a memorandum in this connection which today stands supported by the knowledge gained in what the United States calls the Vela project and the tests.

Now we come to two or three other matters which are on the one hand plus factors, a matter of congratulation to ourselves, but on the other hand matters which require further progress. One is with regard to accidental war and the other with regard to surprise attacks. My colleague of the delegation will naturally, when it comes to details, go into this more fully on behalf of my Government but I would like to say that both the Co-Chairmen seem to agree, according to the document ENDC/48, that these two or three items may be placed on the agenda.

Now, with regard to the danger of accidental war, considering that this apparatus is no doubt widely disseminated, that so many people are handling it and that there are so many places where accidents can happen, the fact is that, world politics being what they are, some accidents might not even be mere accidents but might, unbeknown to the principals, take place at the hand of interested parties. It would be wrong for me to go into further detail, but I am quite sure we are all grown up people who understand how these things happen. So the possibility of accidental war arising in this way, which is largely of a technical character, has to be avoided.

My Government and its Ministry of External Affairs, and I as a representative at this Conference, keep closely in touch with all developments that take place here, and we know that there has been progress in this matter. There have been proposals, on the one hand, by the United States and, on the other hand, by the Soviet Union in which - irrespective of the fact that there are other points which do not present a picture of concord - there are points on which agreement has been reached. We ourselves think that the agreement by the Soviet Union to an exchange of military missions, which is provided for in the United States draft, is a very considerable advance. It is a considerable advance not only in the way of what is intended but in the way also of allaying suspicion. The military missions of these countries can be in each other's places. Well, we may hope for the time when there will be no military missions, but in the conditions of the world as they are, they do represent at present from the point of view of the United States a step, however small, however great, towards what it calls an open world; and, on the other hand, it is a recognition by the other side that it for its part will accept the dangers and the risks of what it calls discovery or espionage in order to prevent a

greater accident to the world. As far as we are concerned we express our appreciation on this matter - we are much too innocent to understand what lies behind it - and of the fact that some beginning in this way has been made.

Equally there is the proposed system of reliable communication between heads of governments which also would be a contribution to what has been called an open world and which would inspire greater confidence in world public opinion. It would also be an example to smaller Powers and to those who have ideas of becoming nuclear Powers themselves, that, if they do those things, they would have to notify and to give information - which, to a certain extent, perhaps, might damp their ardour in this connection.

We therefore venture to make an appeal in this Conference that those who are in a position to do so - and as far as we are concerned we have already done it - should make further and more sustained efforts to obtain the cooperation of France in this because, if France did not come in here, we would have a greater obstacle to overcome in the way of confidence and in the way of creating agreements which are tighter and less likely to be breached than otherwise.

May I interpolate here somewhat left-handedly it may seem that in spite of all this, in spite of the fact that there have been explosions all the way round, this Conference has been sitting.

Ten years ago, I suppose, that would have resulted in an attitude of, "There have been explosions, there is no point in having a conference," and they would have shut down. That is an indication that, while we are not licensing evil, we all recognise as realistic people that, in spite of this, we have to get on. So, whatever happens, we must proceed with these efforts and strive persistently to obtain a total ban on these tests. That is tied up with the whole conception of the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

There have been also, I see from the newspapers, proposals with regard to our old friend known as "surprise attack." Of course, the main remedy for that problem of surprise attack is the creation of mutual confidence. And irrespective of the fact that there is not much agreement, apart from the question of Laos, on the various international problems outstanding outside this Conference - or even here except for these few clauses - there is the recognition that negotiations must go on. There have been many suggestions for notification of military movements, and we at one time suggested the publication of the inventories of arms, not in a very detailed way, but, whatever it was, the giving of greater information would be of some assistance in this direction.

There is one further matter I want to speak about before I come to general things. It is that we, of the smaller countries, are sometimes inclined to think, privately or publicly, that the devils in the disarmament business are the great countries. Very

often it is said: "If only the under-developed countries were more developed, there would be peace." There is no indication that that is so. We must take equal responsibility and blame in this matter. First, in our own lands we have to prepare our public opinion for the time to which Lord Home referred in his first speech, but the people have not become accustomed to the idea of a world without war. As I said, the English have become accustomed to a world where there are no king's horses and no king's men - in the sense of fighting troops. So, in our own countries, this has to come about, and in the practical sense, just as there must be restraint or abolition of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, so the idea that the great Powers are more sought for in the less developed lands in order that they may perhaps have greater access to armed Powers - that also has to suffer retardation.

To a large extent there would be a restraint on this factor if each nation had to find the resources to arm itself. It is when it is all *gratis* and post free that more armaments come in, but if nations had to pay for it themselves - if they had to tax their people, if they had to tighten their belts, to impose restrictions and everything else - then I think internal opinion would be greater. On the other hand, if it all comes as Christmas presents then, of course, it is a very different matter.

So, while I have no desire to go, as I may appear to be going, into another problem altogether, if the two great war blocs in the world could restrain themselves from the tendency and what they consider the necessity to distribute war weapons all round and bring greater and greater areas of the world into their zones, then the factors contrary to the possibility of disarming mentalities developing in smaller countries would be reduced.

I want to say something else here, although it will perhaps be misunderstood in some parts of the world. It is one of those problems we have not touched here. We are dealing with the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Empire and France cutting down their arms - bringing down their conventional arms to this, that or the other level. We all have armies. We all have troops, aeroplanes, navies and various other things, in our way, whether it be a few thousands or a few hundred thousands. But all the dangers of armament are not confined to the people against whom it is intended - because radiation cannot be stopped, nor can all the havoc, military, political or economic, be confined within the national borders of a country. And while it may appear, perhaps, a little in the distance at the moment, there is a necessity to create the mentality, the approach, the psychological receptivity for a world without war all over the world, particularly in the newer countries such as ours.

When you have so many new nations in Africa and Asia, on account of their desire for self-preservation - their desire that empires should return to their own places, or their fears of their neighbours, and this, that and the other, although they are assisted by one side or other of the warring groups - then, for all these

reasons, military power is stepped up. And that stepping up takes place largely, as I have said, because it does not require sacrifices internally. This factor has to be examined, and that leaves the position that while this Conference has to meet behind closed doors - indeed one good thing here is that the television cameras are absent - and while we have to consider, probably nationally, educating or, rather, preventing a tremendous cynicism and lack of faith arising in the world with regard to our work itself.

I lay great stress upon this because, although we may perhaps not realise it, the whole volume of feeling of all kinds in the world - irrespective of country, ideology, and so on - in regard to nuclear tests, nuclear war, and war itself, is today not what it was ten, five or even two years ago. Even in my own country we have always said, "There is no need for peace propaganda here because it is carrying coals to Newcastle." Even there we find that governments are hard pressed for information - which they may not well give - out of the degree of confidence we must exercise with regard to this Conference itself, and it would be a great tragedy if all this feeling which comes out of a good sense of humanity and basically out of a sense of human fellowship and the desire to survive were to be turned into cynical channels and people were to turn round and say: "Eighteen nations are sitting in Geneva. They will talk and talk, they will go home for a time, and then they will come back and talk again." That would be a great loss to us, because ultimately it is not the documents we write or the signatures which we put upon them which count: it is our ability to carry our own peoples with them. We must be able to carry the entire population with us. As I have constantly said here, "Our national procedures will not permit, our public opinion will not permit." All it means is that we have to carry our entire populations with us.

I have deliberately confined myself to making more general observations than I would otherwise have done. However, I should like to conclude by saying that this whole problem must be dealt with on the one hand without any lessening of the intensity of our concern for the main objective which is general and complete disarmament - not the regulation of war; not the regulation or the limitation of arms; not the licensed evil but the ending of it.

First, we believe that the intensity or impact which any stage can make, as well as the total period of disarmament, must be limited to a short period because it is the considered opinion of my Government, repeatedly expressed by my Prime Minister in Parliament, that either we must disarm in a reasonably short time or the problem will become far worse than before. Nuclear energy was one of those things in the early days of the United Nations Organisation which created a problem which was not dealt with at that time. Now it is outer space. Each time various ancillary problems arise which make the solution of the basic problem more difficult. Therefore the impact that any stage can make on the whole quantum of arms and on the world must be sufficiently heavy to make a

difference. I am not able to go into any details here without working out the whole theory.

Secondly, the period that each stage takes and the period which the whole programme takes must be comparatively limited because otherwise there will be sufficient time within the stages for nations to resume the process of rearmament. It is as though there were a poisonous tree in our garden; if we do not cut it out by the root so that it does not grow again - even if we do not get the whole of it out - then the cutting has no particular value.

Thirdly, it is necessary that there should be no intervals between stages; that is to say, it is just as in economic planning, where the third plan is thought out while the second plan is proceeding, and the fourth plan is thought out while the third plan is on its way. It is not as though we can finish one plan and then sit down to decide to go on to something else in the light of what has been done. In other words it has to be a continuous process, and there must be an element of vigilance and control - not necessarily because the great Powers may think the other party may do something wrong, but in order to inspire confidence.

At no time in the last eight or ten years of discussion has my Government ever departed from the view that, the world being constituted as it is, the factor of creating confidence on all sides calls for degrees of control. However control should not be pleaded in bar of the effort itself.

So in spite of the clouds on the horizon, in spite of the larger and more beautiful bombs that are exploded, in spite now of the overt statements that these are intended to perfect more weapons, in spite of the fact that more and more conclusive weapons - I will not use any other adjective - are available and, if I may say so to some of the partners in these great alliances, even though partisanship is still dominant in these discussions - and we ourselves, as a group of non-aligned countries, probably have not been able to achieve the impact, the degree of catalytic process, that is necessary in a deadlock - I hope that, as a result of the wisdom, the sense of responsibility and the greater knowledge possessed by the nuclear Powers, than whom nobody knows better what are the consequences of all this, the time will soon come when this Conference will be told by the great Powers that they have no objection to the disclosure of the quantum and location of nuclear stocks and that, after that disclosure, it will be easier to proceed towards the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

It is interesting to note that although the United Kingdom delegation has not communicated the information to this Conference at any time, and has not been asked to do so, the British newspapers published the quantum of stocks held in the United Kingdom and the reason why they cannot hold any more. Britain is a small island and so it cannot keep any more - and nowadays the British do not take any more islands. So there it is.

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The impact of facts will push us in this direction, but the part of wisdom lies not in being pushed by facts but in foreseeing facts and utilising them for mutual advantage and for the common advantage of mankind.