Decentralization of power was promised in Thailand's new constitution, promulgated in 1997, but measures to implement it have been slow in coming, say many Thais. "It looks good on paper, but the reality is the old vested interests in Bangkok really don't want to relinquish power to the people," says Uaychai Watha, chairman of the Assembly of Small-Scale Northeastern Farmers, which represents farmers in 19 of the country's poorest provinces. "The only way real change will come is through more protests. Only then will the government understand this has become a political war--a war for people's democracy it cannot win."

Uaychai's battle cry is gathering resonance. The Bangkok protests are only the most visible of hundreds of disputes brewing upcountry over land rights, forests and dams--the legacy of decades of rural-development policies imposed from above without local input. In many cases, frustration with the Bangkok bureaucrats who handed down those policies is reaching breaking point. The concern among academics and others is that amid the country's current political uncertainties, more street protests might prompt a conservative or military backlash.

Yet more unrest is almost certainly in the pipeline. A recent survey conducted by Prasit Kunurat, associate professor of sociology at Khon Kaen University in northeastern Thailand, recorded over 500 conflicts similar to the Pak Moon dam case in nearby provinces, 81 of which have flared into violence over the past decade. "Society is changing very fast--many conflicts that have been quiet could break back into the open," says Prasit. "We desperately need local conflict-resolution mechanisms that create win-win solutions."

To date, though, the situation remains lose-lose. Decades of centralized rule have stifled the development of provincial institutions now needed to mediate conflicts between the state and local communities. That institutional vacuum is starting to matter as the new constitution opens a Pandora's Box of grievances over Bangkok's rural-development policies. "We are living in a vicious circle," says Surichai Wun' Gaeo, of the Centre for Social Development Studies at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University. "We cannot have decentralization overnight because of the multilayered, centralized structures we created during our rapid development era. Yet people are demanding change now."

Just as worrying is the gulf in perception between the government and the rural population over how decentralization should be carried forward. For many villagers, the constitution's promise of local empowerment has opened political space to air grievances about past development projects--and in many cases demand financial redress. To the government, however, the constitution merely promises to grant local communities more say in future development projects, and according to strict regulations. Critics blame this officious insistence on the rule book for the government's failure to reach a settlement with the Pak Moon dam protesters during a nationally televised hearing on the dispute on August 17. "There is a dire need for a more differentiated government understanding of the rural poor's plight," says Surichai "Unfortunately the government still sees things in black and white."

Indeed, many government officials continue to view rural protests with suspicion, either as politically motivated or as opportunistic attempts to wrest funds from state coffers. "Many of the so-called social reformers offer only unrest, not their partnership for finding systemic solutions to the problems we are facing," says Anek Laothamatas, who heads the committee charged with drafting a decentralization action-plan. "Most social activists have no grounding in the history of social change--they don't understand that an over-rapid transition will result in societal suicide." Other critics say Thai non-governmental organizations need to create "big bangs"--in the form of ever rowdier protests--to boost their negotiating positions for a piece of the foreign funding pie.

But many rural activists consider Bangkok's cautious approach to decentralization mere footdragging. "All the power is still in the hands of the Ministry of Interior," says Sanae Vichaiwong, a leader of the NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development in the Northeast of Thailand. "But we are finished with asking the government for help, we now demand it."

Without the devolution of even basic decision-making authority, local governments are unable to mollify local protests. "Until more powers are given to the provinces, we cannot solve the people's problems," says Khon Kaen province's deputy governor, Thavat Satiennam. "How many more Isan [northeastern] protests can Bangkok handle?"

Social activists and NGO workers in Khon Kaen agree that further delay on decentralization will mean more rural anger erupting onto the streets of Bangkok. Many fear that escalating street protests could, in turn, provide a pretext for right-wingers or the military--whose interests have been eroded most by the new charter--to step in and impose order. Chulalongkorn University's Surichai and other academics are looking for ways to stave off a national crisis as rumours of military intervention circulate in Bangkok.

Jackboot intervention, though, would be out of step with the democratization sweeping Thailand. Since the 1980s, Thais have witnessed a burgeoning civil-society movement of NGOs and community organizations, usually led by a middle class demanding more democracy. Since then, the forces of old in the Thai bureaucracy have tried to guide the movement in directions that minimize the damage to their entrenched interests. In 1997, for example, the government announced a new "people-centred" approach to development. But in traditional top-down fashion, the Interior Ministry then directed district officials to "create" civil society. In Khon Kaen, local councils were instructed by the governor to disburse 10,000 baht ($245) each to approved civic organizations, paving the way for old-style patronage-based relationships. And in 1998, the government ordered the creation of "civic assemblies" in the provinces.

The Khon Kaen Civic Assembly has become "a tool for the government to co-opt and control civil society," says Ratana Boonmathya, a professor at Khon Kaen University and member of the assembly. The project has already "broken down," she adds. She believes Thai civil society is increasingly dominated by an emerging partnership between the government and a more empowered provincial middle class that still leaves the poor on the margins of local decision-making.

Wanchai Vatanasapt, former director of Khon Kaen University's Dispute Resolution Centre, is among those who see more conflict on the horizon. He believes the "government needs to look at such conflict constructively as a means of building representative democracy," but concedes that uncontrolled conflict "provides the background for a military coup."

History has a nasty habit of repeating itself in Thailand, where democratic flowerings have been nipped in the bud many times before. So long as Thailand's traditional government institutions fail to effectively mediate the democratic demands being unleashed across the country, grassroots frustration will mount. So too will the threat of a conservative backlash. The road towards political reform in Thailand looks set to get bumpier.