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} A C E G !` k bjbj\\ . > > D % 8 8 8 j L *, *, *, 8 b, f- T V - < 2 " $2 6 Z3 Z3 B V iB B U U U U U U U $ V h 7Y j U VD @ N B VD VD U Z3 Z3 k
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Q vO VD U vO vO vO Z3 - 1b *, G vO P $ U 0 V vO Y M ~ Y vO Y vO p B Z B @ vO /C 4 cC B B B U U O j B B B V VD VD VD VD $ &! &! The Knowledge Argument
and the Inadequacy of Scientific Knowledge
Elizabeth Schier
Department of Philosophy
Adelaide University, Australia
elizabeth.schier@adelaide.edu.au
Recently a number of authors have responded to the knowledge argument by suggesting that Mary could learn about new physical facts upon release ADDIN EN.CITE Flanagan19924826Flanagan, O.Consciousness ReconsideredconsciousnesssubjectiveNagelknowledge argument1992 MIT PressMandik2001113317Mandik, P.Mental representation and the Subjectivity of ConsciousnessPhilosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology179-202142representationphenomenalsubjectiveknowledge argument2001Stoljar2001652417Stoljar, D.Two Conceptions of the PhysicalPhilosophy and Phenomenological ResearchPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research622materialismreductionphysical def2001Van Gulick1985937517Van Gulick, R.Physicalism and the subjectivity of the mentalPhilosophical TopicsPhilosophical Topics51-70133materialismconsciousnesssubjecivity1985(Flanagan 1992; Mandik 2001; Stoljar 2001; Van Gulick 1985). A key step in achieving this is a demonstration that there are facts that can be known via color experience that cannot be learnt scientifically. In this paper I develop an account of scientific and visual knowledge on which there is a difference between the knowledge provided by science and that provided by vision.
Frank Jacksons ADDIN EN.CITE Jackson1982656517Jackson, F.Epiphenomenal QualiaPhilosophical QuarterlyPhilosophical Quarterly127-13632Iknowledge argument1982Jackson19866617Jackson, F.What Mary Didn't KnowJournal of PhilosophyJournal of Philosophy291-29583knowledge argument1986(1982; 1986) knowledge argument is one of the most popular arguments for dualism. It is based in a thought experiment about Mary, a super neuroscientist. Mary knows all of the scientific facts. In particular she knows everything science can tell her about what goes on in our brains when we see ripe tomatoes or look at the sky and use terms like red and blue. Jackson ADDIN EN.CITE Jackson1986103291617Jackson, F.What Mary Didn't KnowJournal of PhilosophyJournal of Philosophy291-29583knowledge argument1986(1986, 291) suggests that this complete scientific knowledge equates to complete physical knowledge. So Mary supposedly knows all of the physical facts. But Mary has never had color experiences. The question is whether Mary learns anything when she is released from her black-and-white prison and sees, say a ripe tomato. It seems that when she sees a ripe tomato for the first time, Mary would learn something, namely what it is like to see red. But if Mary learns a new fact, then it seems that there are non-physical facts that are beyond the reach of science.
Most replies to the knowledge argument deny that Mary learns a new fact. Some claim that Marys knowledge is about a fact that she already knew and that what she gains is simply a new way of knowing an old fact ADDIN EN.CITE Bigelow19902914917Bigelow, J.Pargetter, R.Acquaintance with QualiaTheoriaTheoria129-147561-31990Churchland1995897476Churchland, P. M.The engine of reason, the seat of the soul : a philosophical journey into the brainxii, 329Brain Philosophy.Neurosciences Philosophy.Cognition.1995Cambridge, Mass.MIT Press0262032244BRD 612.8201 C563e
BMM 612.8201 C563e
BMU 612.8201 C563eHorgan1984955017Horgan, T.Jackson on Phenomenal Information and QualiaPhilosophical QuarterlyPhilosophical Quarterly147-15234knowledge argument1984Loar20041084515Loar, B.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, YStoljar, D.Phenomenal States (Revised Version)There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT PressPapineau19931885217Papineau, D.Physicalism, Consciousness and the Antipathetic FallacyAustralasian Journal of PhilosophyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy169-182712knowledge argument1993Pettit20041082535Pettit, P.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, YStoljar, D.Motion Blindness and the Knowledge ArgumentThere's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT PressTye20041083545Tye, M.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, YStoljar, D.Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge ArgumentThere's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT Press(Bigelow and Pargetter 1990; Churchland 1995; Horgan 1984; Loar 2004; Papineau 1993; Pettit 2004; Tye 2004). Alternatively, others claim that Marys new knowledge is not factual, rather that it is an ability ADDIN EN.CITE Churchland2002899476Churchland, P. M.The engine of reason, the seat of the soul : a philosophical journey into the brainxii, 329Brain Philosophy.Neurosciences Philosophy.Cognition.1995Cambridge, Mass.MIT Press0262032244BRD 612.8201 C563e
BMM 612.8201 C563e
BMU 612.8201 C563eLewis19901101105Lewis, D.Lycan, W.G.What experience Teaches usMind and Cognition: A Readerknowledge argument1990CambridgeBasil BlackwellNemirow19901761765Nemirow, L. Lycan, W.G.Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of AcquaintanceMind and Cognition: A Readerknowledge argument1990Cambridge, MABasil Blackwell(Churchland 1995; Lewis 1990; Nemirow 1990) or non-factual knowledge by acquaintance ADDIN EN.CITE Conee1994666617Conee, EPhenomenal knowledgeAustralasian Journal of PhilosophyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy136-148722knowledge argument1994(Conee 1994). However recently a number of authors have argued that materialism can still be true even if Mary learns a new fact ADDIN EN.CITE Flanagan19924826Flanagan, O.Consciousness ReconsideredconsciousnesssubjectiveNagelknowledge argument1992 MIT PressMandik2001113317Mandik, P.Mental representation and the Subjectivity of ConsciousnessPhilosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology179-202142representationphenomenalsubjectiveknowledge argument2001Stoljar2001652417Stoljar, D.Two Conceptions of the PhysicalPhilosophy and Phenomenological ResearchPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research622materialismreductionphysical def2001Van Gulick1985937517Van Gulick, R.Physicalism and the subjectivity of the mentalPhilosophical TopicsPhilosophical Topics51-70133materialismconsciousnesssubjecivity1985(Flanagan 1992; Mandik 2001; Stoljar 2001; Van Gulick 1985). This paper falls into the latter category.
Demonstrating that materialism can be true even if Mary learns a new fact requires three things. First of all it needs to be demonstrated that experience and science provide different ways of knowing. That the content of experiential and scientific knowledge is different. Secondly it needs to be shown that these different ways of knowing are about different things. That Mary gains not just a new way of knowing, but also knowledge of a new fact. Finally, it needs to be shown that what is known in experience is physical, even though experience provides knowledge of a new fact that cannot be known scientifically. That is, it needs to be shown that facts that can be known only via experience can nevertheless be physical. This paper is concerned with achieving the first step, namely demonstrating that science and experience (in particular visual experience) provide different ways of knowing. Call the (putative) facts that can be known only via color experience the color facts ADDIN EN.CITE Schier20071080see , for an account of the facts that are represented in color experience717Schier, E.The Represented Object of Color ExperiencePhilosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology1-27201colorrepresentation2007(see Schier 2007, for an account of the facts that are represented in color experience). In this paper I develop an account of scientific and visual knowledge on which there is a difference between the knowledge provided by vision and that provided by science. The aim is to get us one step closer to demonstrating that materialism can be true even if Mary learns a new fact.
In the first section I will sketch an account of the facts that are represented in color experience. In the second section I develop an account of the difference between scientific and visual knowledge. I suggest that although science can provide Mary with complete knowledge of the constituents of the facts that are known via color experience, having this complete scientific knowledge does not entail that she can represent any of these color facts as a whole. In the third section I will argue that this suggestion is consistent with what we know of the cognitive science of science. In the final section I will examine two examples in order to make the suggestion more concrete. We will see that the problem with Marys pre-release scientific knowledge is that it is fragmented.
1. The Color Facts
Before we can develop an account of the difference between the knowledge of the color facts provided by science, and that which is provided by vision, we need to have some idea of the nature of the facts that are known in color experience. There is no simple answer to the question what do color experiences represent? This is mainly because color appearance is determined not only by the reflectance of the surface, but also by the spectral spatial and figural properties of the entire visual field. Elsewhere, I have argued that if we adopt a molecular scheme of representation, it is possible to develop an account of the facts that are represented in color experience that can do justice to the psychophysical data ADDIN EN.CITE Schier20071080717Schier, E.The Represented Object of Color ExperiencePhilosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology1-27201colorrepresentation2007(Schier 2007).
The psychophysical data on color suggests that the appearance of a surface depends not only on the spectral nature of the surface, but also on the spectral and spatial nature of the surround. For instance, in simultaneous color contrast, two identical surfaces can appear to be quite different colors because of differences in their surrounds. Spatial properties also play a role in determining color appearance. Increasing the size of a surface relative to its surround can make the surface change from appearing black to a very light gray ADDIN EN.CITE Li199970570517Li, X.Gilchrist, A.Relative Area and Relative Luminance Combine to Anchor Surface Lightness ValuePerception and Psychophysics771-85615color1999(Li and Gilchrist 1999). Figural cues determine how the surfaces are contrasted ADDIN EN.CITE Agostini2002698917Agostini, T.Galmonte, A.Perceptual Organisation Overcomes the Effects of Local Surround in Determining Simultaneous Lightness ContrastPsychological SciencePsychological Science89-93131color2002(Agostini and Galmonte 2002), as do three-dimensional cues concerning light and shadow ADDIN EN.CITE Williams199861461417Williams, S.M.McCoy, A.Purves, D.The Influence of Depicted Illumination on BrightnessProceedings of the National Academy of Science USA13296-1330095colorcontrast1998Williams199861561517Williams, S.M.McCoy, A.Purves, D.An Empirical Explanation of BrightnessProceedings of the National Academy of Science USA13301-695colorcontrast1998(Williams et al. 1998a; 1998b). This suggests that color appearance depends not only on the spectral nature of a surfaces surround, but also on a surfaces spatial relations to its surround. A change in the spatial or spectral properties of a surfaces surround can lead to a, sometimes drastic, change in the appearance of the surface.
This dependence of the appearance of a surface on the spectral, spatial and figural properties of its surround is not mysterious. The information the visual system receives about the light being reflected from a surface is fundamentally ambiguous. Two surfaces with the same reflectance can reflect light with different spectra because they are illuminated with light with different spectra (think of moving a white piece of paper from a blue to a red spotlight). Moreover, two surfaces with different reflectances can reflect light with the same spectra if they are illuminated with the appropriate lights (think of looking at a red piece of paper under a white spotlight and a white piece of paper under a red spotlight). Nevertheless we are able to achieve quite a high level of constancy ADDIN EN.CITE Gilchrist199968279668217Gilchrist, A.Kossyfidis, C.Bonato, F.Agostini, T.Li, X.Cataliotti, J.Spehar, B.An Anchoring Theory of Lightness PerceptionPsychological Review795-8341064color1999(Gilchrist et al. 1999, 796). Taking into account the spectral, spatial and figural nature of the surround is an important part of the visual systems constancy mechanism ADDIN EN.CITE Rock1975503136Rock, I.An Introduction to Perceptioncolorvision1975New YorkMacmillanWallach19487611417Wallach, H.Brightness Constancy and the Nature of the Achromatic ColoursJournal of Experimental PsychologyJournal of Experimental Psychology310-2438achromatic color1948Williams199861461417Williams, S.M.McCoy, A.Purves, D.The Influence of Depicted Illumination on BrightnessProceedings of the National Academy of Science USA13296-1330095colorcontrast1998Williams199861561517Williams, S.M.McCoy, A.Purves, D.An Empirical Explanation of BrightnessProceedings of the National Academy of Science USA13301-695colorcontrast1998Lotto20006161517Lotto, R.B.Purves, D.An Empirical Explanation of Color ContrastProceedings of the National Academy of Science USAProceedings of the National Academy of Science USA12834-99723colorcontrast2000Lotto20024481617Lotto, R.B.Purves, D.The Empirical Basis of Color PerceptionConsciousness and CognitionConsciousness and Cognition609-2911color2002Land19717061717Land, E.H.McCann, J.J.Lightness and Retinex TheoryJournal of the Optical Society of AmericaJournal of the Optical Society of America1-11611color1971Gilchrist199968268217Gilchrist, A.Kossyfidis, C.Bonato, F.Agostini, T.Li, X.Cataliotti, J.Spehar, B.An Anchoring Theory of Lightness PerceptionPsychological Review795-8341064color1999Agostini2002698see 917Agostini, T.Galmonte, A.Perceptual Organisation Overcomes the Effects of Local Surround in Determining Simultaneous Lightness ContrastPsychological SciencePsychological Science89-93131color2002Schier20071080717Schier, E.The Represented Object of Color ExperiencePhilosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology1-27201colorrepresentation2007(see Agostini and Galmonte 2002; Gilchrist et al. 1999; Land and McCann 1971; Lotto and Purves 2000; 2002; Rock 1975; Schier 2007; Wallach 1948; Williams et al. 1998a; 1998b).
Importantly, adopting a molecular scheme of representation provides representational way of implementing this idea. Cummins introduces a distinction between what he terms molecular and lexical schemes of representation. A molecular scheme of representation is one in which the minimal semantic elements have no meanings independent of their occurrence in a containing complete representation ADDIN EN.CITE Cummins19962676186Cummins, R.Representations, Targets and Attitudesrepresentationresemblancecontent1996CambridgeBradford Books(Cummins 1996, 76). In contrast, in a lexical scheme, the minimal semantic elements have meaning independently of their context in a larger representation. Consider the two different schemes for constructing the simple picture in figure 1. The elements in the boxes on either side of the picture are the basic representational building blocks out of which the picture is constructed. We can see that for the molecular scheme on the left, the basic representational building blocks only have their meaning in virtue of their place in the larger representation. For instance, the circle only represents a head or a wheel in virtue of its relations to the other shapes. In contrast, the representational building blocks in the lexical scheme on the right do have a meaning independently of their place in the larger representation. The house represents a house independently of its relations to the car and the person. In molecular schemes, individual vehicles have content in part in virtue of their relations to other vehicles, whereas in lexical schemes vehicles have content independently of their relations to the other vehicles.
Molecular Lexical
EMBED Word.Picture.8
Figure 1: Molecular and Lexical Schemes for constructing a simple picture. The scheme on the left is molecular whereas the one on the right is lexical ADDIN EN.CITE Cummins199626after 76186Cummins, R.Representations, Targets and Attitudesrepresentationresemblancecontent1996CambridgeBradford Books(after Cummins 1996, 76)
The crucial aspect of molecular schemes of representation is that, because a vehicle has its content partly in virtue of its relations to the other vehicles, it is a mistake to ask for molecular schemes what an individual vehicle represents. The difficulty with developing a representational account of color is that if you vary the conditions, just about anything can look, say red. The fact that there does not seem to be any simple mapping from red experiences to some objective property of surfaces (redness) in the world, has lead some to claim that red experiences do not represent anything at all ADDIN EN.CITE Mollon19898251917Mollon, J.D."Tho' She Kneel'd in that Place Where the Grew": The uses and origins of primate colour visionJournal of Experimental BiologyJournal of Experimental Biology21-38146color1989Thompson19958202017Thompson, E.Colour Vision, Evolution, and Perceptual ContentSyntheseSynthese1-321041colorrepresentationcomputationevolution1995Thompson2000828215Thompson, E.Davis, S.Comparative Color Vision: Quality space and visual ecologyColor Perception: Philosophical, psychological, artistic, and computational perspectivescolorrepresentationdirect realism2000OxfordOxford University Press(Mollon 1989; Thompson 1995; 2000). But if color experiences are molecular, then it is a mistake to look for a mapping from an individual experience to some feature in the world. Individual experiences would not represent in and of themselves. There is no simple mapping from the circle in figure one to objective properties. In one context it represents a head, in another a wheel and in another leaves. But the fact that the circle can represent many different things doesnt mean it doesnt represent anything at all. Rather it is simply a result of the fact that it represents partly in virtue of its relations to the other vehicles. Similarly, red experiences can represent something even though there is no mapping from red experiences to some objective property.
The point is that one is asking the wrong question when they ask what red experiences represent. It is more accurate to ask: what do visual experiences represent? The answer is they represent, at least, the interaction between the spectral, spatial and figural properties of the world. In visual experience we build a model of the co-dependence between the spectral, spatial and figural properties of the world. On the molecular view of color vision, the facts that are known via color vision are complex facts concerning the relations between the spatial, spectral and figural properties of the world. In having color experiences Mary would gain a more detailed and precise model of the visual world.
The claim that color vision represents is molecular and that the spectral spatial and figural properties of the world are represented together seems to be at odds with our color phenomenology. In particular, my blue experience of the pen on my desk seems to be about the surface of the pen, not about, say the spatial relations between the pen, the desk, and the light coming in the window. In answering this objection, the key point to appreciate is that on the molecular account of vision there is a sense in which a particular color experience at a particular time can represent something about a specific surface. It is just that the same experience in a different context can represent something very different because what the experience represents depends on how the rest of the visual scene is represented. Phenomenal colors are (often) used to represent the nature of a particular surface. But at the same time, if the spectral, spatial or figural nature of the visual scene changed, the same surface under the same illumination can be represented with a different phenomenal color. On the molecular account of vision, this is no mystery.
Consider again the circles in figure 1. Although in every instance what the circle represents depends on its relation to the other shapes, it is nevertheless the case that in any individual instance, the circle represents something specific, such as a head or a wheel. Similarly, within the context of a visual experience, an individual color experience may represent something specific about a surface. It is just that it only represents the surface in virtue of its relations to the other experiences. Similarly for color experiences. Consider for instance the image of the box of mints and the bowl in figure 2. Examine the reflection on the bowl and the highlight on the edge of the box of mints as indicated by the two arrows. These highlights look the same, yet the real-world stimuli that produced these two regions have very different properties. The region indicated by the lower arrow is the result of a surface that reflects predominantly long-wavelength light being illuminated by an illuminant with wide distribution of photons. The region indicated by the upper arrow is produced by a surface that reflects light of all wavelengths being illuminated by an illuminant with a predominance of long-wavelength photons. Two completely different sources, two (relatively) identical appearances. The point is that we cannot ask what that type of red experience represents independently of its place in the larger visual scene. In one place it represents a white surface under red illumination; in another it represents a red surface under white illumination. However, within the context of a larger visual scene, we can specify what the red experience represents. In one instance it represents a surface that reflects predominantly long-wavelength light being illuminated by an illuminant with wide distribution of photons. In the other instance it represents a surface that reflects light of all wavelengths being illuminated by predominantly long-wavelength photons. However, take away the larger context, and you have taken away the mapping from the experience to the objective arrangement of surfaces and illuminants. The red regions only map onto the objective properties that they do in the context of the larger representation.
EMBED Word.Picture.8
Figure 2: The two regions indicated by the arrows appear to be the same even though quite different combinations of surfaces and illuminants produce them.
Color experiences represent simple features, in a complex, relational way. There is a limited sense in which an individual color experience may be about the spectral properties of a surface. This sense in which color experiences in a particular representational context are about particular surface seems sufficient to respect our color phenomenology. But because it is primarily the color visual experience as a whole that represents, and because color vision models some of the non-spectral properties of the world as well as some of the spectral features, it is more accurate to say that color experiences are part of our visual model of the world and that this visual model represents (at least) the spectral, spatial and figural properties of the world.
Now that we have a general understanding of the nature of the facts that are represented in color vision, it is time to consider whether there is a difference between the scientific and visual knowledge of these facts. In the next section I will consider why scientific knowledge of the color facts might be inadequate.
2. A Suggestion
My general suggestion is that the difference between science and vision is that scientific representations are fragmented and temporally extended whereas visual representations are integrated and synchronous. In vision we can represent the complex interactions between the spectral, spatial and figural properties of the world all at once. Using science, it is possible to represent all of these features, but it has to be done sequentially in fragments.
In talking about fragmented representations I have in mind the Gestalt notion that perception is not atomistic, but rather holistic ADDIN EN.CITE Palmer1999246226Palmer, S.E.Vision Science: Photons to phenomenologycolor1999Cambridge, MAMIT PressHochberg19741264235Hochberg, J.Carterette, E.C.Friedman, M.P.organiszation and the Gestalt TraditionHandbook of Perception. Volume One. Historical and Philosophical Roots of Perceptiongestaltperception1974New YorkAcademic Press(Hochberg 1974; Palmer 1999). According to Gestalt theories of perception, whole perceptions have their own structure that cannot be reduced to that of their parts. Consider for instance figure 3. The octagons by themselves have perceptual properties such as colour, size and position. But as a collection they have other properties, such as curvature, that are not possessed by any individual octagon ADDIN EN.CITE Palmer1999246226Palmer, S.E.Vision Science: Photons to phenomenologycolor1999Cambridge, MAMIT Press(Palmer 1999). Importantly for us, because the curvature is only a feature of the collection of octagons as a whole, a set of representations of the parts, such as that on the right of figure 3, will not capture the curvature of the whole. Even adding in the individual relations, such as that each octagon is next to those preceding and following it, seems insufficient to capture the curvature of the whole. To capture the curvature, we need to present all the octagons at once.
SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT
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Figure 3 A perceptual gestalt: the octagons on the left as a whole have properties (such as curvature) which individual elements on the right lack.
What I want to suggest is that the difference between the scientific and visual representations of the colour visual facts is similar to the difference between the representations on the left and the right of figure 3. The collection of representations of each octagon on the right of figure 3 is fragmented; it represents each part, but not the parts in relation. In contrast, the representation of all of the octagons together on the left is integrated; it represents the parts in relation and therefore captures the curvature of the whole.
It seems plausible that scientific representation is fragmented. Think about what happens when learning the facts of any science. When you walk into the lectures at the beginning of the year you are lead slowly through what we know about a phenomenon, investigating different aspects at different times. You dont (and perhaps cant) learn everything at once; rather you learn different bits at different times. For instance, when learning about magnetic fields you may start by learning about their causal powers, then move on to investigating their mathematics, and finally you may learn about the virtual photons that underlie magnetic fields. Similarly, when learning about the autonomic nervous system you may start by learning about its structural divisions, then work on the chemistry of each of the divisions, and finally learn about the function of each division as it relates, say, to controlling heart rate and digestive function. This breaking-up of a problem into smaller parts that are thought about successively also occurs in investigations of the colour facts. Color scientists do not look at a whole fact all at once. Rather, they think about different bits at different times. For instance they will look at the effect of the spectral properties of the surround on the appearance of a surface. Then they may investigate the role that spatial features of the stimuli play in determining colour appearance. Finally they may examine why it would be the case that the spectral and spatial properties of the surround determine the appearance of a surface. This suggests that our scientific knowledge in general and of the colour facts in particular, is fragmented.
In contrast, if the molecular account of colour vision is correct, then vision does represent the whole all at once. It is not the case that the experience represents the spatial properties separately from the figural properties, which are represented separately from the spectral properties. Rather colour vision represents the interactions between the spatial, figural and spectral properties all at once.
So the suggestion is that scientific knowledge is fragmented whereas visual knowledge is integrated. Now that we have some general idea of the suggestion, we can turn to consider whether it is consistent with what little we know of the cognitive science of science.
3 The Cognitive Science of Science
We are a long way from understanding the content of the representations of scientific thought. In fact, we dont even understand in any great detail, what is involved in scientific thought. In light of our ignorance, we will have to settle for the much more modest task of arguing that the current evidence suggests that the neural substrates of scientific thought are diverse. In the following section I examine what we know about the neural basis of scientific thought. We will see that scientific cognition is varied and is most likely carried out by a number of distinct areas of the brain.
Scientists do a variety of different things depending on what they are trying to achieve. For instance developing a new theory is quite a different task to designing an experiment. But it seems that even for particular tasks, such as designing an experiment, quite a wide range of neural resources are used. Unfortunately, the sorts of cognitive processes that probably play a central role in scientific thought are those which are least studied.
Causal reasoning, for instance, plays a central role in scientific thought. Arguably, one of the main goals of science is to uncover the causal structure of the world. Observations of scientists at work suggest that they engage in a lot of causal reasoning; that the types of causal reasoning are varied; and that there is not one type of cognitive activity involved ADDIN EN.CITE Dunbar19951114245Dunbar, K.Sternberg, R.J.Davidson, J.How Scientists Really Reason: Reasoning in Real-World LaboratoriesThe Nature of InsightSciencecreativity1995Cambridge, MAMIT PressDunbar20021136255Dunbar, K.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.Siegel, M.The Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethought2002CambridgeCambridge University PressDunbar20011129265Dunbar, K.Crowley, K.Schunn, C.Okada, T.What Scientific Thinking Reveals about the Nature of CognitionDesigning for science: Implications from everyday, classroom, and professional settings.sciencethought2001MahwahLawrence Erlbaum Associates(Dunbar 1995; 2001; 2002). Dunbar suggests that A causal episode will involve dozens of deductions, problem-solving techniques, analogies and inductions by generalizing over particular statements. What happens in causal reasoning is that the entire cognitive machinery is put together in the service of a goal ADDIN EN.CITE Dunbar20021136157255Dunbar, K.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.Siegel, M.The Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethought2002CambridgeCambridge University Press(2002, 157). Unfortunately, there has been very little neuroscientific study of causal reasoning ADDIN EN.CITE Satpute200511862717Satpute, A.B.Fenker, D.B.Waldmann, M.R.Tabubnua, G.Holyoak, K.J.Lieberman, M.D.An fMRI Study of Causal JudgementsEuropean Journal of NeuroscienceEuropean Journal of Neuroscience1233-822causalreasoningNeurosciencedecision making2005(Satpute et al. 2005). What evidence that exists implicates the prefrontal, frontal and occipital cortices ADDIN EN.CITE Satpute200511862717Satpute, A.B.Fenker, D.B.Waldmann, M.R.Tabubnua, G.Holyoak, K.J.Lieberman, M.D.An fMRI Study of Causal JudgementsEuropean Journal of NeuroscienceEuropean Journal of Neuroscience1233-822causalreasoningNeurosciencedecision making2005Fugelsang20051189118917Fugelsang, J.A.Dunbar, K.Brain-Based Mechanisms Underlying Complex Causal ThinkingNeuropsychologia1204-1343sciencereasoningcausalthinkingNeuroscience2005Fugelsang20051189118917Fugelsang, J.A.Dunbar, K.Brain-Based Mechanisms Underlying Complex Causal ThinkingNeuropsychologia1204-1343sciencereasoningcausalthinkingNeuroscience2005Fugelsang20051187118717Fugelsang, J.A.Roser, M.E.Corballis, P.M.Gazzaniga, M.S.Dunbar, K.Brain Mechanisms Underlying Perceptual CausalityCognitive Brain Research41-724causalperceptionneuroscience2005(Fugelsang and Dunbar 2005; Fugelsang et al. 2005; Satpute et al. 2005) and the cerebellum ADDIN EN.CITE Fugelsang20051187118717Fugelsang, J.A.Roser, M.E.Corballis, P.M.Gazzaniga, M.S.Dunbar, K.Brain Mechanisms Underlying Perceptual CausalityCognitive Brain Research41-724causalperceptionneuroscience2005(Fugelsang et al. 2005).
Although probabilistic and inductive reasoning are almost certainly important in scientific thought, they have not been studied in detail either. What little evidence there is implicates numerous structures including the prefrontal, frontal and occipital cortices and the cerebellum ADDIN EN.CITE Blackwood200411483017Blackwood, N.ffytche, D.Simmons, A.Bentall, R.Murray, R.Howard, R.The Cerebellum and Decision Making Under UncertaintyCognitive Brain ResearchCognitive Brain Research46-5320probabilistic reasoningNeuroscienceinduction2004Goel200411763117Goel, V.Dolan, R.J.Differential Involvement of left Prefrontal Cortex in Inductive and Deductive ReasoningCognitionCognitionB109-2193inductiondeductionreasoningNeuroscience2004Osherson199811583217Osherson, D.Perani, D.Cappa, S.Schnur, T.Grassi, F.Fazio, F.Distinct Brain Loci in Deductive versus Probabilistic ReasoningNeuropsychologiaNeuropsychologia369-76364reasoningNeuroscienceprobabilistic reasoningdeduction1998(Blackwood et al. 2004; Goel and Dolan 2004; Osherson et al. 1998). Likewise, although the generation and testing of hypotheses plays an important role in scientific thought, it has not been studied in scientifically plausible tasks ADDIN EN.CITE Nersessian20021135136335Nersessian, N.J.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.SiegelThe Cognitive Basis of Model-Based Reasoning in ScienceThe Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethoughtanalogymodel2002CambridgeCambridge University Press(Nersessian 2002, 136). Rather, the only data we have is from idealized laboratory tasks such as Wisconsin card sorting test. However transferring results from everyday reasoning to scientific reasoning is not too problematic. It is generally accepted that scientific thought and everyday thought are continuous ADDIN EN.CITE Thagard19921119346Thagard, P.Conceptual Revolutionsscienceconceptual change1992PrincetonPrinceton University Press(Thagard 1992). The Wisconsin card sorting task seems to utilise the lateral prefrontal cortex and the parietal lobe ADDIN EN.CITE Buchsbaum200511493517Buchsbaum, B.Greer, S.Chang, W-L.Berman, K.F.Meta-Analysis of Neuroimaging Studies of the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Task and Component ProcessesHuman Brain MappingHuman Brain Mapping35-4525reasoningNeuroscienceprefrontalparietal2005Monchi200111563617Monchi, O.Petrides, M.Petre, V.Worsley, K.Dagher, A.Wisconsin Card Sorting Revisited: Distinct neural circuits participating in different stages of the task identified by event-related functional magnetic resonance imagingThe Journal of NeuroscienceThe Journal of Neuroscience7733-412119Neurosciencewisconsisn card sorting2001(Buchsbaum et al. 2005; Monchi et al. 2001).
Analogy also plays a central role in a lot of scientific thought including: conceptual change ADDIN EN.CITE Nersessian20021135335Nersessian, N.J.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.SiegelThe Cognitive Basis of Model-Based Reasoning in ScienceThe Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethoughtanalogymodel2002CambridgeCambridge University Press(Nersessian 2002); construction of new concepts ADDIN EN.CITE Nersessian199211303717Nersessian, N.J.How Do Scientists Think? Capturing the Dynamics of Conceptual Change in ScienceMinnesota Studies in the Philosophy of scienceMinnesota Studies in the Philosophy of science3-4415scienceanalogyreasoningimagery1992Darden198211153817Darden, L.Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy of Science: Reason by Analogy in Theory ConstructionPSAPSA147-652scienceanalogy1982(Darden 1982; Nersessian 1992); in explanation and decision making ADDIN EN.CITE Holyoak19951118393Holyoak, K.J.Thagard, P.Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thoughtcreativityanalogyscience1995Cambridge, MABradford Books(Holyoak and Thagard 1995); as a part of inferences to the best explanation ADDIN EN.CITE Holyoak19951118175393Holyoak, K.J.Thagard, P.Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thoughtcreativityanalogyscience1995Cambridge, MABradford Books(Holyoak and Thagard 1995, 175); and in problem solving ADDIN EN.CITE Clement19911116405Clement, J.Voss, J.F.Perkins, D.N.Segal, J.W.Nonformal Reasoning in Experts and in Science Students: The Use of Extreme Analogies and Physical IntuitionsInformal Reasoning and Educationscienceanalogy1991HilsdaleLawrence Erlbaum Associates(Clement 1991). There are relatively few neuroscientific studies of analogy, but what little evidence there is mainly implicates the prefrontal cortex ADDIN EN.CITE Bunge200511514117Bunge, S.A,Wendelken, C.Badre, D.Wagner, A.D.Analogical Reasoning and Prefrontal Cortex: Evidence for Separable Retrieval and Integration MechanismsCerebral CortexCerebral Cortex239-4915Neuroscienceanalogy2005Morrison200411474217Morrison, R.G.Krawczyk, D.C.Holyoak, K.J.Hummel, J.E.Chow, T.W.Miller, B.L.Knowlton, B.J.A Neurocomputational Model of Analogical Reasoning and its Breakdown in Frontotemporal Lobar DegenerationJournal of Cognitive NeuroscienceJournal of Cognitive Neuroscience160-71162analogyNeuroscience2004Wharton200011464317Wharton, C.M.Grafman, J.Flitman, S.S.Hansen, E.K.Brauner, J.Marks, A.Honda, M.Toward neuroanatomical Models of Analogy: A positron emission tomography study of analogical mappingCognitive PsychologyCognitive Psychology173-9740analogyNeuroscience2000(Bunge et al. 2005; Morrison et al. 2004; Wharton et al. 2000). There is also some evidence that the inferior parietal cortex ADDIN EN.CITE Wharton200011464317Wharton, C.M.Grafman, J.Flitman, S.S.Hansen, E.K.Brauner, J.Marks, A.Honda, M.Toward neuroanatomical Models of Analogy: A positron emission tomography study of analogical mappingCognitive PsychologyCognitive Psychology173-9740analogyNeuroscience2000(Wharton et al. 2000) and temporal lobes ADDIN EN.CITE Morrison200411474217Morrison, R.G.Krawczyk, D.C.Holyoak, K.J.Hummel, J.E.Chow, T.W.Miller, B.L.Knowlton, B.J.A Neurocomputational Model of Analogical Reasoning and its Breakdown in Frontotemporal Lobar DegenerationJournal of Cognitive NeuroscienceJournal of Cognitive Neuroscience160-71162analogyNeuroscience2004(Morrison et al. 2004) are involved in analogical thought.
Imagery seems to play an important role in scientific thought. For instance Kekuls discovery of the structure of benzene famously relied on the image of a snake swallowing its tail ADDIN EN.CITE Rothenberg199511964417Rothenberg, A.Creative Cognitive Processes in Kekule's Discovery of the Structure of the Benzene MoleculeThe American Journal of PsychologyThe American Journal of Psychology419-381083sciencecreativityvisionimagerybenzene1995(Rothenberg 1995). Similarly, Einstein reported that it appeared to him that his creative thought occurred in visual imagery ADDIN EN.CITE Miller19841117221456Miller, A.I.Imagery in Scientific Thought: Creating 20th-Century Physicsscienceimagery1984BostonBirkhauser(Miller 1984, 221). Imagery also appears to play an important process in conceptual change ADDIN EN.CITE Nersessian20021135335Nersessian, N.J.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.SiegelThe Cognitive Basis of Model-Based Reasoning in ScienceThe Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethoughtanalogymodel2002CambridgeCambridge University Press(Nersessian 2002). For instance Miller ADDIN EN.CITE Miller19841117456Miller, A.I.Imagery in Scientific Thought: Creating 20th-Century Physicsscienceimagery1984BostonBirkhauser(1984) argues that a transformation in the type imagery used was essential for progress in twentieth century physics. Note that it is not only visual imagery that is used in creative scientific thought. For instance, Poincarr reported that his imagery seemed to be sensuous or auditory ADDIN EN.CITE Miller19841117456Miller, A.I.Imagery in Scientific Thought: Creating 20th-Century Physicsscienceimagery1984BostonBirkhauser(Miller 1984).
The fact that imagery plays a role in scientific thought immediately opens up a tantalizing possibility. If visual imagery is used in scientific thought, then by preventing Mary from having colour visual experiences we may be stopping her from having the mental images that are necessary to represent some scientific facts. In other words, in preventing Mary from having colour visual experiences we may be stopping her from having complete scientific knowledge. Perhaps Mary is ignorant of some facts until she has had colour visual experiences because she needs colour visual experiences to have complete scientific knowledge.
An immediately obvious problem with this hypothesis is that imagery is most commonly attributed to creative scientific thought. In contrast, Marys job is not to advance science, but simply to learn it. Nevertheless, imagery also appears to play a crucial role in learning a science and in the communication of scientific facts in general ADDIN EN.CITE Miller19841117456Miller, A.I.Imagery in Scientific Thought: Creating 20th-Century Physicsscienceimagery1984BostonBirkhauserNersessian20021135335Nersessian, N.J.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.SiegelThe Cognitive Basis of Model-Based Reasoning in ScienceThe Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethoughtanalogymodel2002CambridgeCambridge University PressTweney19891197465Tweney, R.D.Gholson, B.Shadish, W.R.Neimeyer, R.A.Houts, A.C.Framework for Cognitive Psychology of SciencePsychology of Sciene: Contributions to metasciencesciencethoughtimageryanalogy1989CambridgeCambridge University Press(Miller 1984; Nersessian 2002; Tweney 1989). So the hypothesis cannot be ruled out simply because Mary is only learning science.
Assessing this hypothesis is quite difficult. This is simply because although it seems to be the case that human scientists do use visual imagery, this does not establish that they must. Even if it is demonstrated that scientists normally use colour visual imagery in order to learn science, this need not be decisive against the claim that there are some facts that we can represent only via colour visual experiences. First of all, in having colour visual imagery, scientists may actually be representing those facts that can only be represented via those experiences. Secondly, the demands of scientific thought are great, and it thus makes sense that we will use any mental resources we can in order to achieve the task. So perhaps scientists would be using colour visual imagery, not because they have to, but because it is easier to do science if they do. In other words, it is not necessary to deny that scientists usually use visual, and perhaps even colour visual experiences, in order to support the claim that scientific knowledge is independent of colour experience. This is because the issue is not what scientists with colour vision find easy. Rather the issue is whether it is possible to know the relevant scientific theories without having colour visual experiences. The fact that there are congenitally blind scientists (such as Geerat Vermeij, a marine biologist) and even a colour-blind colour scientist (Knut Nordby), suggests that it is not necessary to use visual imagery to do science.
I think that a deeper challenge is presented by Paul Churchlands ADDIN EN.CITE Churchland1995897476Churchland, P. M.The engine of reason, the seat of the soul : a philosophical journey into the brainxii, 329Brain Philosophy.Neurosciences Philosophy.Cognition.1995Cambridge, Mass.MIT Press0262032244BRD 612.8201 C563e
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BMU 612.8201 C563e(1995) suggestion that in scientific thought we apply our perceptually acquired models to new domains. The reason why this suggestion is a problem is that it might be the case that all scientific knowledge actually requires one to have experiences and therefore perceptual models that can be applied to scientific domains. If Churchlands account of scientific thought is correct, then in preventing Mary from having colour visual experiences, we may be preventing her from developing the perceptual models which she would re-deploy in her scientific thought. In other words Mary may not be able to represent all of the scientific facts in her black and white environment. Scientific knowledge may not be as experience-independent as we are initially inclined to think.
However Churchlands account may also be consistent with Mary being able to have complete scientific knowledge in her achromatic world. The worry raised by the knowledge argument is not that knowledge of what it is like may depend on experience. Rather it is that such knowledge depends on a particular type of experience. What Churchland argues is that we need some sort of perceptual model to redeploy when doing science. He does not argue that we need any specific type of model, such as the human colour visual model. For instance, a Martian, which uses echolocation rather than vision, may be able to understand physics by redeploying their echolocatory models. Similarly, Mary has many perceptual models, including her achromatic visual model, which she could make use of in order to understand the physics and cognitive science of colour. Unless it can be shown that there is something special about our visual models, such that there are some scientific facts that the normal human being can only understand by utilising those models, then Churchlands account of scientific knowledge is consistent with Mary being able to know all of the scientific facts prior to her release.
Ultimately all of this is speculative. Perhaps the best thing to say is that this is one of the many places in which further research may raise new and unexpected problems for our intuitive take on the Mary thought experiment. It may turn out that scientific knowledge is not as independent of experience as we initially thought.
In general, it seems that scientific thought is subserved by diverse neural machinery. Of course this evidence is nothing but suggestive. The neural machinery that underlies visual representations is also diverse. Nevertheless, the evidence reviewed above suggests that many of the tasks scientists engage in are diverse and that each task may utilise diverse pieces of neural machinery. So what little evidence that exists is consistent the hypothesis that scientific representations are fragmented in a way that visual representations are not. In the next section I will to consider some concrete examples to clarify what the difference between scientific and visual knowledge may be.
4. An Example
A complication that arises from the suggestion that colour vision is molecular is that it is very difficult to give a detailed but general characterisation of the nature of the facts that are represented in normal human colour vision. Just as there are so many different pictures that can be built out of the shapes in the molecular scheme of representation in figure 2, so too are there many different complex visual representations that the normal human visual system can construct. Given the nature of the input on the retina it is possible to home in on the spectral and spatial properties of the world. The psychophysical data indicates that colour vision plays an important role in the representation of the spectral, spatial and figural properties of the world ADDIN EN.CITE Schier20077717Schier, E.The Represented Object of Color ExperiencePhilosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology1-27201colorrepresentation2007(Schier 2007). But it is difficult to be more precise than this when talking generally. Instead, it is easier to talk about specific examples. So I want to examine some examples in order to make more concrete the suggestion that scientific and visual representations of the spectral, spatial and figural properties of the world are different.
Lets start with a simple example. Consider the two coloured squares and the spectral reflectance distributions for them in figure 4. Now consider the sort of information about the two coloured squares which, according to the molecular account of vision, is represented by the visual system. First of all, some information about the percentage of photons reflected by the surfaces at different wavelengths is represented by the visual system. The spectral distribution curves included in figure 4 provide a sense of the quantity of information that could be obtained about the SSRs of the two surfaces.
According to the molecular account of vision, our colour visual experiences do not just provide us with information about the distribution of light leaving a surface. We also need to compare the spectral reflectances of these two surfaces, perhaps by calculating the difference in the percentage of light reflected by each surface at various wavelengths. Given that the two coloured squares are surrounded by the white page, it may also be necessary to include a comparison of the SSRs of each the squares with the white page, as well as a comparison of all three together. To do this scientifically would be quite laborious in comparison to vision. We would need to compare the SSRs of the surfaces at various points, then represent the results, say in another graph. If the visual system does both the pair wise comparisons between the red, white and blue regions as well as a comparison of all three together, this would require another four graphs.
On the molecular account of vision it is also necessary to describe some of the spatial and figural properties of the stimulus, such as that there are two coloured rectangles which are touching each other on a white background; that the blue square is to the left of the right, and so on. To do this scientifically would require a number of geometrical descriptions. What we can see is that even for a simple stimulus (two coloured rectangles on a white background), there is a lot of information that the visual system is representing. Moreover, in order to represent the same information scientifically a great number of different representations would be required.
Blue Red
Figure 4 Two surfaces and their spectral reflectances ADDIN EN.CITE Lindbloom20051265485Lindbloom, B.Color Checker Calculatorhttp://www.brucelindbloom.com/200515/1/2007Accessed 15/1/2007(Lindbloom 2005)
When we move to a more realistic example, the complexity of the information is almost overwhelming. Consider the picture of the bowl in figure 2. There is a wealth of data in this picture, concerning not only the spectral properties of the surfaces, but also the material properties of the surfaces and the spatial relations between the various objects. For instance shading information helps us to determine that the bowl and the box are both curved, that the bowl is concave and that the illumination is coming from above and behind the photographer. We can also gain information about the textures of the surfaces such as that both the bowl and the box are shiny and relatively smooth.
Representing such information non-visually is a mammoth task. Even the number of curves to capture the spectral reflectances of all of the different surfaces, is enormous. We also need some way to capture when the changes in reflectance are due to illumination changes and when they are due to changes in the nature of the surface. For instance we can immediately see that the table top on which the objects are sitting is the one material, and that it just looks different under around the bottom of the bowl because there is a shadow being cast upon it. The non-visual, scientific description would need to include not only information about the change in the nature of the light being reflected from the table top, but also information about how the change is due to a change in illumination and not in the reflective properties of the surfaces. This would require some representations of the spatial relations between the desk, the bowl and the light source in order to indicate that they are in positions such that the bowl is casting a shadow on the desk.
Information about the interreflections between the bowl and the box also needs to be included. For instance we can see that the top of the side of the bowl is a uniform material and that the change in the light leaving it is due to it reflecting light that is being reflected from surrounding surfaces. It does not look like the bowl has a red spot on it; rather it looks like it is acting like a mirror. In order to capture this information non-visually, it is necessary to include information about the spatial relations of the bowl, the box and the illumination. We would also need to include information about the material properties of the various surfaces, such as that the bowl is made of a material that can act like a mirror. According to the molecular account of colour vision, beyond spectral information we also need to capture all of the spatial and figural properties and relations. For instance we would need to capture not only the shape of the bowl and the box, but also their shape as they appear from the particular perspective.
What we can see is that the amount of information that is encoded in the image is enormous, as would be the quantity of non-visual representations that would be required to capture the information. Certainly it seems it would be impossible for us to represent all of this information all at once, except in a visual experience. There is just too much to capture. What this image makes clear is the richness of the information that is represented in colour visual experiences and the difficulty of representing such information as a whole at a point in time without using colour visual experiences.
We need to be particularly careful when considering the differences between scientific and visual representations. It seems that scientifically it is possible to represent not only the individual elements of the states of affairs that are the colour facts, such as surfaces and light sources. It also seems that science can enable us to represent the relations between the elements, such as their spatial relations, or the relations between the surface spectral reflectances. So the suggestion is not that Mary cannot represent the parts or their relations. Rather, the suggestion is that she cannot represent the parts in relation. Consider how it is possible to represent not only the individual octagons in figure 3.1, but also their relations without capturing the curvature that only exists in the parts in relation. Similarly, for the color facts, it may be possible to scientifically represent the parts and their relations without capturing the parts in relation. At one point in time the scientist may be able to represent the spatial relation between a surface and illuminant, at another time they could represent the surface spectral reflectance of the surface, and at another time they could represent the nature of the light being reflected from the surface given the nature of the illumination. The claim is that what we cannot represent, without having colour visual experiences, is the spatial relation between a surface and an illuminant, the surface reflectance of the surface and the nature of the light leaving the surface all at once. This is just too complex to capture without using the highly specialised resources of colour vision.
We can now begin to home in on precisely why scientific knowledge may be so inadequate. The colour facts are incredibly complex. Presumably representation of such facts takes a lot of specialized representational resources: a complex represented object requires a more complex synchronic representing model. Given the complexity of the colour facts and therefore the complexity of the mental representations of those facts, it is plausible that the neural resources available to scientific thought are inadequate to represent the colour facts.
A rather considerable amount of the cortex is devoted to the processing of visual information ADDIN EN.CITE Palmer199922226Palmer, S.E.Vision Science: Photons to phenomenologycolor1999Cambridge, MAMIT Press(Palmer 1999). This suggests that visions computational task is particularly complex. Why else would considerable valuable neural architecture be devoted to it? The fact that a substantial proportion of the cortex is devoted to processing visual information suggests an explanation as to why we cannot represent scientifically what we can represent visually. My speculative hypothesis is that only the visual cortex has the specialized resources to capture a colour fact in its entirety. Scientific thought is like the quiz show champion. It knows many different things, but not in any great detail. In contrast, vision is like an emeritus professor. It has a deep and comprehensive knowledge of a particular domain. If this is the case, then Marys problem may simply be that, because she has been prevented from having colour visual experiences, she does not have the resources to build the requisite representations. So Mary's problem may be that she does not have enough "room", or enough "blocks", to devote to the construction of a complete model of the colour facts by using those parts of the brain that represent scientific knowledge. She may have to, say tear down her model of the interaction between surface spectral reflectance and angle of illumination, in order to model how comparisons of surface spectral reflectances of adjacent regions can help to discount the effect of illuminant. In contrast, vision has the resources and luxury of becoming specialized for one representational task. So using vision Mary would have enough room and enough blocks to build a bigger more complex model of more complex phenomena. Perhaps Marys problem is simply that the resources available to scientific representation are insufficient to represent something as complex as a model of the colour facts all at once.
As I have argued elsewhere ADDIN EN.CITE Schier20077717Schier, E.The Represented Object of Color ExperiencePhilosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology1-27201colorrepresentation2007(Schier 2007), it seems that the facts that are represented in color vision are complex facts concerning the co-dependence between (at least) the spectral, spatial and figural properties of the world. It appears that Marys pre-release scientific knowledge of these color facts is distinct from her post-release color visual knowledge of these facts in that scientific knowledge is fragmented whereas visual knowledge is integrated. In particular, it seems that only vision has the representational resources to capture the parts in relation. It is plausible that the less specialised resources available to science can only provide Mary with diachronic knowledge of the parts and their relations.
It is important to note that this is far from a demonstration that materialism can be true even if Mary learns a new fact. As I suggested at the beginning of this discussion, what is required in order to show that Mary could learn a new physical fact is not only a demonstration that science and vision provide different ways of knowing, but also that they provide knowledge of different, physical facts. The latter, metaphysical question has not been addressed here. All that I have argued is that science and vision provide different ways of knowing about the spectral, spatial and figural properties of the world.
This means that the current account is consistent with the old fact reply to the knowledge argument, which holds that Mary gains a new way of knowing facts that she already knew ADDIN EN.CITE Bigelow19902914917Bigelow, J.Pargetter, R.Acquaintance with QualiaTheoriaTheoria129-147561-31990Churchland1995897476Churchland, P. M.The engine of reason, the seat of the soul : a philosophical journey into the brainxii, 329Brain Philosophy.Neurosciences Philosophy.Cognition.1995Cambridge, Mass.MIT Press0262032244BRD 612.8201 C563e
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BMU 612.8201 C563eHorgan1984955017Horgan, T.Jackson on Phenomenal Information and QualiaPhilosophical QuarterlyPhilosophical Quarterly147-15234knowledge argument1984Loar20041084515Loar, B.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, YStoljar, D.Phenomenal States (Revised Version)There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT PressPapineau19931885217Papineau, D.Physicalism, Consciousness and the Antipathetic FallacyAustralasian Journal of PhilosophyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy169-182712knowledge argument1993Pettit20041082535Pettit, P.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, YStoljar, D.Motion Blindness and the Knowledge ArgumentThere's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT PressTye20041083545Tye, M.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, YStoljar, D.Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge ArgumentThere's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT Press(Bigelow and Pargetter 1990; Churchland 1995; Horgan 1984; Loar 2004; Papineau 1993; Pettit 2004; Tye 2004). To go back to the analogy of the curve created out of the octagons in figure 1, I have hopefully made it plausible that our scientific representations of the colour visual facts are more like the set of representations of each octagon on the right hand side, whereas the colour visual representations are more like the representation of the curve as a whole on the left hand side. But the set of fragmented representations is only inadequate because it is plausible that the collection of octagons as a whole has a feature, namely curvature, which the individual octagons lack. In order to show that Mary could learn about a new fact I would need to show that the same is true for the colour visual facts. That is, I would need to show that there is something about the facts as a whole, as they are represented in colour vision, which makes them metaphysically distinct from the elements that are represented in scientific thought.
Accounting for why comprehensive, but fragmented, knowledge of the parts and their relations is insufficient for knowledge of the whole would require us to delve into deep metaphysical issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, demonstrating that science and vision provide different kinds of knowledge is an important step towards demonstrating that they provide knowledge of different facts, and ultimately that they provide knowledge of different, physical facts. Although the story is far from complete, we are one step closer to demonstrating that materialism can be true even if Mary learns a new fact.
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See Nida-Rmelin ADDIN EN.CITE Nida-Rmelin200264645Nida-Rmelin, MZalta, E.N.Qualia: The Knowledge ArgumentThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophyconsciousnessrepresentationknowledge argument2002URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/qualia-knowledge/>(2002) and Van Gulick ADDIN EN.CITE Van Gulick200467675Van Gulick, R.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, Y.Stoljar, D.So Many Ways of Saying No to MaryThere's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT Press(2004) for more on the various types of reply to the knowledge argument.
There are numerous variations on this basic theme. For instance some claim that Mary gains not only a new way of knowing the color facts, but also new concepts ADDIN EN.CITE Loar20041084515Loar, B.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, YStoljar, D.Phenomenal States (Revised Version)There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT PressPapineau19931885217Papineau, D.Physicalism, Consciousness and the Antipathetic FallacyAustralasian Journal of PhilosophyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy169-182712knowledge argument1993Tye20041083545Tye, M.Ludlow, P.Nagasawa, YStoljar, D.Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge ArgumentThere's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argumentknowledge argument2004Cambridge, MAMIT Press(Loar 2004; Papineau 1993; Tye 2004). In contrast, others claim that Marys new knowledge of the color facts is knowledge by acquaintance ADDIN EN.CITE Bigelow19902914917Bigelow, J.Pargetter, R.Acquaintance with QualiaTheoriaTheoria129-147561-31990(Bigelow and Pargetter 1990). The key point for the current discussion is that despite important differences, all these replies share the core idea that the new factual knowledge that Mary gains is not about a new fact ADDIN EN.CITE Nida-Rmelin20021051645Nida-Rmelin, MZalta, E.N.Qualia: The Knowledge ArgumentThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophyconsciousnessrepresentationknowledge argument2002URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/qualia-knowledge/>(Nida-Rmelin 2002).
It is standard to hold that what Mary learns about is what color experiences are like. So it would be tempting to think that the color facts must be the phenomenal color facts. But this need not be the case. The knowledge argument is supposed to demonstrate that phenomenal qualities cannot be physical because they can be known only via experience. To answer this challenge, the materialist does not need to demonstrate that phenomenal colors are physical. Rather they need to demonstrate that facts that we can know only via experience can be physical. The aim is to do this by developing an account of color vision on which there are physical facts that we can represent only by having color experiences. Whether these facts are phenomenal facts is a question for another day.
McGinn ADDIN EN.CITE McGinn1989686817McGinn, C.Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?MindMind326-366933911989(1989) examines and then rejects the idea that dualism is an illusion produced by the fact that experiential knowledge and scientific knowledge are distinct mental faculties. In particular the suggestion is that we need to use distinct mental faculties when thinking about consciousness scientifically as opposed to experientially and that it is this shift from one faculty to the other that produces in us an illusion of inexplicability ADDIN EN.CITE McGinn1989683606817McGinn, C.Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?MindMind326-366933911989(McGinn 1989, 360).
For now, the important point to appreciate is that the current suggestion is distinct from the one that McGinn rejects. In particular, the position that McGinn rejects claims that science and experience are both about the same thing (namely the property of the brain that is consciousness). They just provide irreconcilably different ways of knowing about consciousness. In contrast, the current suggestion is part of a line of thought which holds that science and experience provide not only different ways of knowing, but also knowledge of different things.
Note that the fact that I am drawing a distinction between scientific and visual knowledge should not be taken to imply that I think that scientific knowledge does not have a phenomenology associated with it. In fact, there is evidence that suggests that imagery plays an important role in scientific thought ADDIN EN.CITE Miller19841117456Miller, A.I.Imagery in Scientific Thought: Creating 20th-Century Physicsscienceimagery1984BostonBirkhauserNersessian20021135335Nersessian, N.J.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.SiegelThe Cognitive Basis of Model-Based Reasoning in ScienceThe Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethoughtanalogymodel2002CambridgeCambridge University PressTweney19891197465Tweney, R.D.Gholson, B.Shadish, W.R.Neimeyer, R.A.Houts, A.C.Framework for Cognitive Psychology of SciencePsychology of Sciene: Contributions to metasciencesciencethoughtimageryanalogy1989CambridgeCambridge University Press(Miller 1984; Nersessian 2002; Tweney 1989). However the fact that there are blind scientists (such as Geerat Vermeij, a marine biologist) and even a color-blind color scientist (Knut Nordby) suggests that color experiences are not necessary for scientific knowledge.
Note that the question being investigated here is not what are colors?. Rather the question is what do color experiences represent?. That these two questions are distinct can most easily be appreciated via an analogy with spatial perception. As Akins and Hahn ADDIN EN.CITE Akins2000829565Akins, K.Hahn, M.Davis, S.The Peculiarity of ColorColor Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, artistic, and Computational Perspectivescolor2000OxfordOxford University Press(2000) point out, things rarely look to be the shape that they really are. For instance the rectangular top of my table actually looks to be a trapezoid from my perspective in front of it. On the basis of this it has been argued that our spatial experiences represent not the objective shapes of things, but rather the shape of it from the spatial perspective of the perceiver ADDIN EN.CITE Mandik2001113that they are egocentric, not allocentric 317Mandik, P.Mental representation and the Subjectivity of ConsciousnessPhilosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology179-202142representationphenomenalsubjectiveknowledge argument2001(that they are egocentric, not allocentric Mandik 2001). If such an account is correct, then we need to distinguish between what our experiences of shapes represent and what shapes really are. Similarly, it is possible for there to be a distinction between what our color experiences represent and what colors really are. The crucial point is that, given that these questions can be given distinct answers, the focus of this discussion is not what colors are but rather what color experiences represent.
For further discussion of the role of spatial information in determining color appearance see also Gilchrist, Kossyfidis et al ADDIN EN.CITE Gilchrist199968268217Gilchrist, A.Kossyfidis, C.Bonato, F.Agostini, T.Li, X.Cataliotti, J.Spehar, B.An Anchoring Theory of Lightness PerceptionPsychological Review795-8341064color1999(1999), Kingdom ADDIN EN.CITE Kingdom20036225717Kingdom, F. A.McGill Vision Research Unit, 687 Pine Ave. W., Room H4-14, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1A1, Canada. fred.kingdom@mcgill.caColor brings relief to human visionNature NeuroscienceNature Neuroscience641-466Brain/*physiologyColor Perception/*physiologyContrast Sensitivity/*physiologyDepth Perception/*physiologyHumanPhotic StimulationSupport, Non-U.S. Gov'tVisual Pathways/*physiology2003Jun12740582http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&dopt=Citation&list_uids=12740582(2003) and Lotto and Purves ADDIN EN.CITE Lotto19996855817Lotto, R.B.Purves, D.The Effects of Color on BrightnessNature NeuroscienceNature Neuroscience1010-14211color1999Lotto20024481617Lotto, R.B.Purves, D.The Empirical Basis of Color PerceptionConsciousness and CognitionConsciousness and Cognition609-2911color2002(1999; 2002).
Note that these are somewhat unusual uses of the words molecular and lexical.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
Note that in examining scientific thought, I do not want to imply that the cognitive processes that scientists engage in are of a different type to those of the non-scientist.
Note that I do not want to in any way imply that the brain regionology that follows is good evidence in support of my hypothesis. It is just that it is the only (even slightly relevant) evidence that exists.
Many accounts of science hold that science is at least partially social and that that scientific knowledge it is distributed across many individuals ADDIN EN.CITE Csikszenmihalyi19951111595Csikszenmihalyi, M.Sawyer, K.Sternberg, R.J.Davidson, J.Creative Insight: the Social Dimension of a Solitary MomentThe Nature of Insightsciencecreativitysocial1995Cambridge, MAMIT PressDunbar20021136255Dunbar, K.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.Siegel, M.The Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethought2002CambridgeCambridge University PressThagard199311246017Thagard, P.Societies of Minds: Science as Distributed CognitionStudies in History and Philosophy of ScienceStudies in History and Philosophy of Science49-67241sciencesocial1993Faucher20021140615Faucher, L.Mallon, R.Nazer, D.Nichols, S.Ruby, A.Stich, S.Weinberg, J.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.Siegel, M.The Baby in the lab-coat: Why child development is not an adequate model for understanding the development of scienceThe Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethoughtdevelopmentsocial2002CambridgeCambridge University PressWestrum19891141625Westrum, R.Gholson, B.Shadish, W.R.Neimeyer, R.A.Houts, A.C.The Psychology of Scientific DialoguesPsychology of Science: Contributions to metasciencesciencethoughtsocial1989CambridgeCambridge University Press(Csikszenmihalyi and Sawyer 1995; Dunbar 2002; Faucher et al. 2002; Thagard 1993; Westrum 1989). This may very well be correct. However given the thought experiment that we are investigating, the focus is on individual scientists and what they know. So I am going to assume, for the sake of argument, that it is possible for one individual to know everything about some scientific field. However it should be noted that if scientific knowledge is distributed across individuals, then the claim that Mary cannot scientifically represent the facts that are represented in color experience may be true simply because no one individual can represent all that is scientifically known about an area.
In the Wisconsin card-sorting task the subject is presented with four key cards (depicting a single red triangle, two green stars, three yellow crosses and four blue circles) and is given a stack of 128 cards to sort. The subject is required to sort each card to one of the key cards (by shape, color or number) and experimenter gives feedback on the accuracy of each categorization. The subject is not given any instructions on sort criteria beyond the feedback of the experimenter. After the subject has completed ten consecutively correct matches by the first criterion the sorting variable is shifted (without the subject being given any indication that this is happening). The subject has to discover new sorting criterion. The experiment continues until all six categories have been completed ADDIN EN.CITE Varley20021134108-9635Varley, R.Carruthers, P.Stitch, S.SiegelScience Without Grammar: Scientific reasoning in severe agrammatic aphasiaThe Cognitive Basis of Sciencesciencethoughtlanguageaphasia2002CambridgeCambridge University Press(Varley 2002, 108-9).
It is still unclear what role spectral information plays in the representation of depth and motion ADDIN EN.CITE Cropper200585585517Cropper, S.The Detection of Motion in Chromatic Stimuli: first-order and second-order spatial structureVision Research865-8045colorvisionmotion2005Jimenez199786286217Jimenez, J.R.Rubino, M.Hita, E.Del Barco, L.J.Chromatic Channels on Stereopsis with Random-dot StereogramsVision Research591-6375colorvisiondepth1997Kooi199286386317Kooi, F.De Valois, K.K.The Role of Color in the Motion SystemVision Research657-68324colorvisionmotion1992Watanabe199286486417Watanabe, T.Cavanagh, P.Depth Capture and Transparency of Regions Bounded by Illusory and Chromatic ContoursVision Research527-32323colorvisiondepth1992Heywood199886786717Heywood, C. A.Kentridge, R. W.Cowey, A.Form and Motion From Colour in Cerebral AchromatopsiaExperimental Brain Research145-53123colorvisionmotion1998(Cropper 2005; Heywood et al. 1998; Jimenez et al. 1997; Kooi and De Valois 1992; Watanabe and Cavanagh 1992).
Note that I do not want to claim that the visual system represents as fine-grained information as is provided in the spectral distribution curves. How much of such information the visual system represents is an open empirical question.
Recall that it was argued that in order to achieve illuminant independent constancy the visual system takes into account the relation between the SSRs of adjacent regions ADDIN EN.CITE Rock1975503136Rock, I.An Introduction to Perceptioncolorvision1975New YorkMacmillanWallach19487611417Wallach, H.Brightness Constancy and the Nature of the Achromatic ColoursJournal of Experimental PsychologyJournal of Experimental Psychology310-2438achromatic color1948Williams199861461417Williams, S.M.McCoy, A.Purves, D.The Influence of Depicted Illumination on BrightnessProceedings of the National Academy of Science USA13296-1330095colorcontrast1998Williams199861561517Williams, S.M.McCoy, A.Purves, D.An Empirical Explanation of BrightnessProceedings of the National Academy of Science USA13301-695colorcontrast1998Lotto20006161517Lotto, R.B.Purves, D.An Empirical Explanation of Color ContrastProceedings of the National Academy of Science USAProceedings of the National Academy of Science USA12834-99723colorcontrast2000Lotto20024481617Lotto, R.B.Purves, D.The Empirical Basis of Color PerceptionConsciousness and CognitionConsciousness and Cognition609-2911color2002Land19717061717Land, E.H.McCann, J.J.Lightness and Retinex TheoryJournal of the Optical Society of AmericaJournal of the Optical Society of America1-11611color1971Gilchrist199968268217Gilchrist, A.Kossyfidis, C.Bonato, F.Agostini, T.Li, X.Cataliotti, J.Spehar, B.An Anchoring Theory of Lightness PerceptionPsychological Review795-8341064color1999(Gilchrist et al. 1999; Land and McCann 1971; Lotto and Purves 2000; 2002; Rock 1975; Wallach 1948; Williams et al. 1998a; 1998b).
For instance it seems to me that we would at least need to consider whether a fine or coarse grained conception of facts is correct and whether non-reductive materialism is viable.
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