Some points to put AIR 6000 Phase 2C options and particularly the UCAV option into perspective.

AIR 6000 Phase 2C: “Phase 2C intends to investigate acquisition of *complementary* systems and possibly acquire the final tranche of new *multi-role* combat platforms.”

Phase 2C – Year-of-Decision FY 2014/15 to 2016/17

Phase 2C – In-service Delivery 2018 to 2020

Source: Defence Capability Plan 2006-2016 (Public Version)

What might this entail? Some expect F-35B, SH-B2 + G, or UCAV mix. At this point I think none of these will be part of an acquisition.

F-35B OPTION:

Recent thread discussions at T5C (and many preceding it, there, and other places) failed to detail a compelling role or need for F-35B STOVL that would justify acquisition and operation from LHDs, or RAAF bases. Other capabilities and tactics when properly developed will allow F-35B capability to be dispensed with. Consequently I think Phase 2C is very unlikely to entail F-35B.

Reference T5C thread discussion in; ‘Targeting the armada’ (page ~8 to 10)

http://www.thefifthcolumn.ru/forums/showthread.php?t=5290&page=8

F/A-18F BLOCK II + G OPTION: (Growler conversion requires F)

Given cost comparisons and significantly lower baseline performance, further SH-B2 won’t be acquired. F-35A has substantial performance advantages plus excellent flexibility (for an initial variant) and a compelling array of initial PGM munitions. Another thing is F-35A will have at least 30 years of integration options to follow, whereas SH-B2 will have 10 years continued USN capability improvement at the time of Phase 2C delivery window (2018-2020).

F-35 will clearly remain current with contemporary systems far longer and suffer reducing survivability at a much later timeframe. So why F/A-18F when it’s not cheaper to acquire or operate? This is without even considering the passive LO advantage of the newer aircraft. More new SH-B2s for Phase 2C will definitely not occur.

As for a Growler conversion possibility, this was also discussed at T5C recently but an ADBR table posted within the link given below, which fired discussions, refers to an Electronic Attack DCP project that doesn’t exist within open-source DCP program information.

i.e. AIR 5439 Phase 3 EA (Electronic Attack)

http://www.thefifthcolumn.ru/forums/showpost.php?p=8178&postcount=5

This ADBR table seems to be a speculative interpretation of what such a program’s acquisitions plus the AIR 6000 acquisitions combined could look like for 2025 RAAF air power. Of course Growlers are opposite to passive stealth, transmitting a warning of hostile intent. The dedicated EA role came to the fore in Vietnam, as multi-type strike packages were developed to reduce the mauling by effective radar SAMs and AAA.

Networked awareness and true multirole flexibility de-emphasises the need for mixed packages of dedicated aircraft. F-35A comes with significant EA, AEW, SEAD/DEAD, ISR and self-escorting capability so it’s not clear how Growlers offer more benefit than high frontal hemisphere LO. But more to the point, who would want a slower cruising and more range limited non-LO aircraft in F-35A strikes? So what would such an EA project role be for? Not to enable strikes, as it wouldn’t be needed to enable them given F-35A and JASSM.

In the circumstance where deployed ADF had been attacked Growlers could degrade AEW, naval and SAM radars, enabling counterstrikes where an opponent is already on alert. This would raise the noise-floor that enemy sensors and comms receivers must overcome before F-35A and its weapons could be effectively tracked and targeted by SAMs or interceptors. EA could also play a decisive role in offensive and defensive Counter-Air to assure electromagnetic spectrum control and achieve tactical supremacy, as required. That will certainly serve to reduce losses and require less weapons to obtain necessary effects, plus enables more effective use of fuel, aircraft and pilots, taking pressure off logistics supply, maintenance, aircrew and ground forces, allowing more optimal battle and resource management, while reducing network load.

EA could also be insurance where the other side uses heavy broadband jamming to degrade ADF performance within the battle area. All EM energy reduces with distance, as per the inverse square rule, so Jamming has range limits plus attracts attack. Hence the new ALR-67(V) passive precision targeting capability on RAAF Hornets. Strong jammers won’t survive long and the networked ALR-67’s passive geolocation data is claimed to allow precision cuing—such as for a deployed Army NLOS PAM or LAM missile as required (and not over-working or risking Tigers and aircrew unnecessarily).

NOTE: It should also be mentioned here that a flight of 3 x MQ-9 Reapers would better provide precision triangulation of battle area emissions, plus active surveillance and search plus effective interdiction. MQ-9 would be considerably more suitable in the role than SH-B2, or F-35A, and could be controlled directly by Army if based in Townsville or Darwin. The role is not for scarce and very expensive fast jets. A fully combat loaded MQ-9 can cruise at commercial jet IFR altitudes (clear of most GBADs) at an economical ~150 Kt for 14 hours, providing fully combat-loaded and ready deployment ranges out to 3,900 km (!), or a fully combat-loaded continental-based strike radius of 1950 km! This provides considerable self-deployment, plus ability to operate from well-protected airfields. A future addition of automated in-flight refuelling would further add to this very compelling UCAV platform. Even without in-air refuelling, Reaper will have sufficient pylon capacity to deliver two (still developmental) JSOW-ER LO cruise missiles to ~2400 km radius from its take-off point. This is comparable to the LGB radius of an F-111 (!), it just takes four times longer to get there and back. ADF should seriously consider Reaper as it offers much to enable and leverage a Hardened-Networked-Army’s firepower especially providing excellent network services and battlefield control while maximising Tiger’s potential. It’s an extremely impressive force maximiser that would reduce the need for high-end manned fast-jets over high-risk battlefield environments, leaving them available for roles they’re better optimised for. Namely, genuine strikefighter warfare that can seriously undermine an opponent’s economy, energy supply, and the physical ability to project military force by land, sea and air, or to adequately defend and resupply a deployed force. However, MQ-9 will definitely not cruise at 50,000 feet with any useful combat load and fuel loading. That sort of claim is obvious nonsense—perhaps 30-k ft with a combat load. The MQ-9 is not an operational HALE UCAV. - END NOTE

The ramifications of effective EA, and distributed passive targeting are numerous, however, to maximise EA energy concentration against high energy radars the growler needs to get in closer, and *LOITER*. This implies considerable tanking support that under the current DCP plus acquisitions *WILL NOT EXIST*.

I think there’s no doubt ADF will need enhanced EA capability, as a sensor and comms dependent force structure, but it remains to be seen if an EA SuperHornet is the platform for this, in geographical context where Australia has excellent regional picture, high mobility, speed and precision standoff munitions. A large platform (P-8A, RQ-4, Wedgetail...) with far more wattage could provide sustained loitering standoff and comprehensive theatre EA services.

As large numbers of powerful AESAs are introduced into ADF between 2010 to 2020, EA capability will rise sharply from 2010—either as individual platforms or as integrated systems that can attack the same targets simultaneously, applying many kilowatts of focused combined energy on several targets. F-35A flights could themselves mount a powerful ad-hoc tactical EA capability as necessary, so given this, would a dedicated RAAF SH Growler make much sense? Along with this loitering HALE UAV, Wedgetail and P-8A could take care of comms spectrum denial, and pass targeting forward to ground forces, to address detected geolocated emissions nodes.

The one thing RAAF absolutely must resist, above all else, is to over commit limited tanker resources to support fuel-inefficient platforms that can not loiter when loiter is required (and consequently spend most of their time in transit rather than on station). If such platforms do not provide indispensable operational capabilities, that can’t be had in other ways RAAF must not acquire them. (which makes a UAV or UCAV more compelling...)

UCAS-D OPTION:

This is by far the least likely or viable option for AIR 6000 Phase 2C. The problem is that the only current developmental US transonic UCAV project is UCAS-D, and it’s at a stage of slow carrier-specific operational development and testing, that is of little relevance or interest for RAAF.

High performance European UCAV competitors remain intangible, if not conceptual, or in an expensive high-risk early prototype development stage. Regardless of marketing blurbs, the risk in terms of LO performance and technology integration is *HUGE*. Any European system would have to be a fully evaluated FOC platform before RAAF could even consider it seriously. There is no such viable Euro candidate on the horizon, before Phase 2C decision time, between 2014 to 2017.

USN UCAS-D project holds a clear advantage here as its prototype(s) have flown scores of times, and exhibited impressive range performance and speed. However, Phase 2C also specifies a *multirole platform* and despite assumptions of many, the available details make it very clear UCAS-D is not a multirole UCAV. There are no current plans to develop it in that direction either—USN does not want it for that. UCAS-D is a tail-less LO airframe, designed specifically for CV operation, with just two integrated roles.

UCAS-D’s principle optimisation is ISR (much to supporter’s frustrations) with a secondary optimisation described as “limited strike” capability. Integrated air combat capability and performance is not a performance or system requirement. The propulsion, aerodynamics and resulting frugal fuel usage is optimised for high-speed cruising over long distance. The sustained high-G manoeuvring capability and thrust needed for air combat is absent.

See: Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration Presentation to Precision Strike Association 25-26 July 2006 CAPT Rich Brasel USN UCAS Program Manager)

Even so, the new (experimental) JDRADM-T multirole missile could eventually provide a limited air combat role but again, such programs are high-risk and often get axed (as do experimental UCAVs). But if JDRADM survives development and production funding challenges most successful missile programs take ~15 years to be deployed in significant numbers. Thus we must assume UCAS-D won’t have an air combat capability to meet Phase 2C needs, and certainly won’t have the excess thrust for sustained high-G agility and climb performance, or the integrated sensors for it. The optimisation is economical fast cruise with low IR and radar signature and ISR ground targeting sensors.

Documentation makes clear UCAS-D’s ISR role is what USN really wants out of it. USN is pursuing an ability to discretely penetrate IADS from long-range providing up-close observations to apply specific effects. Given this, it’s clear UCAS-D was envisioned to provide a role not dissimilar to the F-117A, i.e. a thin-end-of-the-wedge platform, providing limited discrete strikes on key C4ISR and IADS targets prior to cruise missile and manned aircraft ingress. Essentially this is a Cold-War era F-117A role replicated as a more capable, mobile and globally deployed USN UCAV for deep penetration and target data gathering sorties. It’s a capability a superpower might need to use one day, to fight a high-intensity war.

What is also clear is that UCAS-D does not represent a capability that can replace USN or USAF (or RAAF) manned tactical supersonic multirole aircraft.

Despite what has been speculated on in recent years, there’s no UCAV in development that has potential to do this. Commentators should recognise this fact and not be co-opted by blurb and pleading for higher UCAV funding priorities. Evidence for a pronounced move to replace operational manned air power platforms with UCAVs is almost non existent. Only the MQ-9 Reaper exhibits a clear potential to replace a significant number of manned battlefield aircraft. The impression that there is, is being helped along via marketing blurb mixed with techno ‘vision-thing’ attempts to attract billions in on-going funding, but despite limited successes, the concerted push for a true high-performance UCAV has been a rather dismal failure (some conspiracy fans go so far as to assert it’s due to a ‘fighter Mafia’).

But there are very good reasons why true high-performance UCAVs are not in the pipeline in a big way.

For example, the USAF MQ-9 derived Reaper UCAV is a low-subsonic mid-altitude reconnaissance and loitering ground support platform with target-of-opportunity and suppression options using external weapons and sensors. This is the *only* niche where USAF plans to employ UCAVs—the area most vulnerable to MANPADS and SHORAD GBAD.

In this niche MQ-9 could conceivably displace manned A-10s (A-10 ‘Mafia’ go bananas at the suggestion...).

Drag doesn’t impinge much on performance at 150 kt loiter speed, so a cheap design exhibits acceptable aerodynamic efficiency and performance. But as speed and height requirements increase, the price of acceptable UCAV performance, requiring low-drag and lots of fuel and internal space, means a very sophisticated and expensive design becomes necessary. UCAV costs then quickly approach and pass very capable older manned designs, but unfortunately, to achieve the multirole capabilities of F-35A or F-15E, in a small UCAV production commitment (the first will have to prove its benefit before production numbers rise...like what happened with the RQ-1 UAV), means you’re up for many billions of investment, over at least 15 years of sustained development to achieve it.

Not surprisingly, the USAF don’t seem interested in am expensive high-performance UCAV program, and actually nor is the USN sold on them. Money speaks louder than words, and the money is not flowing to *high-performance* UCAV programs like it was. Competing with established manned multirole systems, let alone replacing them is not going to be easy, fast, or cheap, and realistically, it’s unlikely to be feasible before 2030. Some think the whole aim is misdirected, and is based on theories and not operational and combat needs.

Certainly USN CV aircrews think UCAS-D won’t be able to cut it in on-deck operations, hence service ambivalence toward its capability promise.

On the cost front, many have argued that UCAVs don’t need to be flown much, due to detailed simulation training methods. However, this cost saving does not alter the fact that a reliable distributed LOS and NLOS broadband comms infrastructure plus sufficient redundancy and attrition overhead is required, if you actually want to deploy somewhere distant and fight with full capability. If the aircraft is too reliant on external systems the capability could reduce with increased deployment radius from Australia.

A big issue is if UCAVs are trotted out in full numbers during a conflict, as are thousands of smart weapons and sensors (i.e. basically every gizmo in the ADF bag of tricks). Can the ADF network cope, or will it log jam? You won’t really know until you do it. Imagine having numerous F-35A, UCAVs, Wedgetails, Globalhawks—all working just fine—plus numerous Army and Navy systems. Now add hundreds of PGMs that start communicating with each other, and the launch platform, and sending back high-res imagery and BDA, as well as requiring near real-time comms.

I’m sure it would more-or-less work but the cost will be very large to provide it, and a multirole UCAV will be a very demanding user of network bandwidth and EM spectrum bandwidth. The necessary network infrastructure overhead implied plus the people needed for it is expensive to develop and maintain. So how much will a high performance UCAV really cost to provide assured continuous network throughput overhead out to ~5,000 km radius during peak operational network demand levels?

How long is a piece of string?

No one knows for sure. Claiming it will be ‘cheap’ is quite useless. There are hidden secondary operating costs that are impossible to quantify until you actually use the platform, in each role, with each system and weapon, for a few years.

You need the complete system operating, before you know how much it will really costs to own. And even if you leave the UCAVs in the hanger the network costs for the operational capability do not shrink because you rarely fly them outside a simulator, or only exercise with limited numbers. The rational outcome is ADF has to presume high-performance long-range multirole UCAVs will not be cheap to either buy or operate. No point simplistically denying it or glossing-over this—the risk is real and substantial.

We don’t really know what a secure and redundant comms infrastructure will allow. A fully featured JASSM strike using GMTI engagement and near real-time BDA out to 5,000-km radius—can a UCAV do it? Satellite solutions would consume the fat of the DCP budget and are vulnerable to ASAT operations, and an ad-hoc HALE comms relay over long distances is yet to be proofed and acquired.

What is needed does not exist, we are getting way ahead of ourselves.

Any genuine UCAV multirole strikefighter capability would be slow to bring to full operational capability and it would have to be done incrementally and experimentally (like the recent Northwest Shelf UAV trials and earlier testing phases). ADF is going to have enough issues providing sufficient bandwidth for manned F-35A and SH-B2 plus rapidly growing Army and RAN demand. If ADF gets into high performance LO UCAVs it’ll have to do so very slowly.

Buying a substantial batch of new LO UCAVs for AIR 6000, to plop in our lap at 2019, would be an integration disaster that would make SH-2G Seasprite look like a well-run Project.

A small initial capability of F-35‘D’ UCAVs, with more fuel and up-rated LO performance might be a good start, for an initial lower-risk multirole capability, if we were to jump without looking, but UCAS-D would be disastrous. Regardless, ADF will have to become proficient operating a large range of complex UAVs first, and a less demanding UCAV like the MQ-9 Reaper would be a reasonably low cost experimental introduction to UCAVs, as well as a brilliant capability addition.

Whatever UCAV project RAAF finally takes on it had better be involved in its production development phases like with JSF (and be prepared to cut it losses and bail if it looks suspect).

Having said all this, poster AGRA, at Fifth Column forum recently pointed out benefits to be had from a UCAV platform that knows where it is, where everything else is with respect to it, and can optimise its flight performance, attack range, tactics, refuelling and timing etc.

http://www.thefifthcolumn.ru/forums/showpost.php?p=10701&postcount=20

It’s brilliant technology, of course, however it must also be pointed out that USAF does not currently intend to mass acquire *any* supersonic LO UCAV multirole platform.

The J-UCAS program’s dissolution made it clear USAF is not sold on unmanned air power operations at present. The accelerated USAF sub-sonic LRS bomber requirement will likewise be manned. The implication of these decisions is that USAF has decided unmanned strikefighters and bombers are not going to be fielded before 2025, at the earliest, ... unless they opted for an F-35 UCAV variant (but why bother...?).

That fact is why USN reconstituted a much more modest UCAS-D CV-based system from the J-UCAS program’s detritus. So the question to be addressed is does the USN’s UCAS-D program offer any suitable and fully developed and tested AIR 6000 Phase 2C candidates?

Phase 2C – Year-of-Decision FY 2014/15 to 2016/17

Phase 2C – In-service Delivery 2018 to 2020

(DCP 2006-2016)

The problem here is UCAS-D is still a prototype at the beginning of dedicated CV service development and testing. The RDT&E program funding is modest and earmarked from 2007 to 2013, peaking at $376 million in 2010, and falling sharply to ~$135 million at program end in 2013. It’s only after 2013 that a follow-on decision might be made on a proposal to fund lengthy development and testing of a production variant.

Production development would take several more years so we’re already at 2018-19 at its end. Then LRIP production must be approved and funding secured (if USN wants the capability...and has a lot of cash gathering dust).

In which case, UCAS-D IOC could take place around 2022 and FOC at maybe 2024 if not delayed or suffers large cost increases, or gets canned (UCAS-D clearly will not be cheap).

None of which is known and most of it can’t be for many years so how can an acquisition decision be made within the DCP AIR 6000 timeframe? On top of this, how could the capability be delivered within the DCP schedule of 2018-2020? (which assumes no export restriction exists...).

If you think it won’t take this long, the think-tank study below makes it clear UCAS-D already lacks sufficient priority funding and service support, and will probably run late as a result, because it’s already starved for necessary funding:

“In brief, this study finds: ...

...Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense should consider funding an expanded UCAS-D and technology program to improve the chances that a safe, reliable, and effective carrier-capable UCAS can be introduced into fleet service by the end of the next decade.”

Source: The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn for Naval Aviation? - T P Ehrhard, R O Work - Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments - May 10th 2007

There’s also a lengthy funding justification argument made in the same document, that a carrier out of Hawaii could launch a 450 kt UCAV and have it loitering on station, for 5 hours, over Taiwan Straits only 10 hours after leaving harbour. It would achieve this using just two USAF refuellings outbound, one more on station and two more to RTB. However, UCAS-D has ISR capabilities and “limited strike” and no air combat capability so it’ll mostly be a LO eye-in-the-sky, with very limited means to shape events. Mostly it will act as a fast UAV.

Very useful, but not revolutionary or outcome changing—is it?

So, to the politics, when a production proposal is issued for UCAS-D USAF simply pipe-up that they can do everything this new technology provides, ten years ago, in far greater numbers and with a shirt-load more clout, within the same 10 hour timeframe. Oh, how, says Navy? Using expeditionary air power from continental US, Hawaii, Alaska, Japan, Guam (and northern Australia).

As for tanker support for the UCAS-D deep-strike paradigm, USAF say nope, sorry, all our tankers are busy supporting USAF heavy strikes and reconnaissance assets at the moment, call back in a few days when you get on station.

Little problem: To date, UCAS-D isn’t planned to receive an in flight refuelling capability!

Oops!

Long-range UCAS-D theories bump-up against operational and capability realities and lands squarely on its bum. Few believe it can deliver, and no one wants to fund it sufficiently, plus it already lacks broad-base service support, and it’s a very high-risk program for little capability (duplication of capability actually), and few in USN will go out on a limb and call it a core USN program.

So UCAS-D production funding remains elusive and program dies on the vine.

But besides this is it a capability ADF needs? You can’t use it on LHDs so it’s land bound, and therefore applied to our near region due to range limits of no refuelling option (as yet). It can’t pay its way in air combat so can’t meet basic AIR 6000 needs. Plus strike and air combat capability is in hand if we just procure more F-35A to withdraw SH-B2. So what’s the compelling operational rationale for acquiring UCAS-D?

No one seems to have one, but its a LO UCAV, and its new, so it must be better than an F-35A, right?

The primary role is covert ISR...or rather, spying on our neighbours...with a bleedin’ squadron of them?! But which IADS and C4ISR network and daunting fleet are we going to need to sneak up on, to zap with impunity? What airspace incursion is planned for collecting detailed targeting data before our attack? Doctor Strangelove could provide some ‘rational’ answers I suspect.

UCAS-D can not be taken seriously as an AIR 6000 Phase 2C candidate, and certainly won’t be acquired under that project.

Forget about *high-performance* UCAVs (for a decade or so) and focus on maximising options for what Phase 2C will bring. I think this is almost certain to be meat-‘n-potatoes F-35A plus a couple more A-330 and more PGMs than you can shake a stick at. Plus new “systems”...that are...“complimentary”.