Aussie F-35A verses F-22A debate
A place to thrash out basic operational capability differences and implications of F-35A verses F-22A in RAAF service.
Entry for May 7, 2007

What RAAF thinks? Might be nice to know. I had to post this in two blog-entry parts, please forgive layout issues, still trying to get the hang of this blogging.


 


Because PROJECT AIR 6000 is a critical national defence project, it understandably is a controversial one. Of course, elements of the general public are thinking about it and its implications, and some of them are taking a direct approach to attempting to shape and obscure the issues of debate, to obtain the outcome they want. If people have a ‘cause’ that they feel strongly about, this always occurs.


 


The question is; who is a genuine air power specialist, whose views are rational, logical, valid, insightful and worth listening to, and who is not just a phoney play-acting their alleged and invariably self-appointed and unaccredited status in the area of air power?


 


How do you tell?


 


Let me be clear, this writer is no ‘expert’ of any sort. I’m a civilian who listens to experts on air power matters. Any one can do that and reformulate it and publish it. Indeed, that’s exactly what generally occurs. Carlo Kopp (et al) has been doing it for many years and all of his ‘expertise’ is second-hand reprocessed fodder that has been spun for specific publication effect. The effect desired buy air power expertise re-formulators is first and foremost, mercantile. There’s nothing wrong with that, we all have to pay the bills. If people are also ‘informed’, that’s terrific, but there is no guarantee on the veracity of the information propagated in that way. There doesn’t have to be veracity. Of course, the better ‘expertise’ reformulation writers try to ensure that the information published is actually accurate and consistent with known facts and logic, in as much as that’s possible, and often it isn’t, when dealing with classified technologies.


 


Then there are the re-formulators who have forgotten that all of their alleged ‘expertise’ is second-hand, sourced from elsewhere, or else speculatively contrived from within their own mind or the mind of another. These are not air power experts at all, they have never flown missions and they never will but have convinced themselves that they’re an authentic military air power expert. Carlo Kopp is the clearest example of that behaviour, though there are others. However, most air power expertise re-formulators don’t engage in that sort of behaviour at all, because their actually more interested in humbly getting it right, rather than claiming they are right, and arguing from that presumption.


 


For the average interested-party, only a review of real data and listening to the views of actual practitioners of air power reveals who’s making sense and who’s making it up. Invariably I’ve found that the people who do make valid sense and rational commentaries are those directly involved in defence at a high level of responsibility. They are not about to make a goat of themselves in front of all their colleagues so they take great pains to make careful measured statements that are accurate and insightful. It’s very rare to find any civilian commentator, even ex-RAAF, who understand present-day air-power issues or are willing to presume they don’t know—they tend to assume they do comprehend it all, when that clearly is not the case. I find that civilians, who say or insinuate that they do know what to do with regard to AIR 6000 choices or force-structure options, almost invariably don’t understand the operational limitations and implications.


 


I’ve always presumed the ADF know what they’re doing, mostly because it’s been my direct experience that they do. It’s a far more reasonable presumption than the opposite, which seems to be the starting point of the more tedious and uninformed critics of this project (it’s such a smart-arse shallow attitude, anyone can do it, and the general media are riven with it). Consequently, I examine what Defence does and listen to what it says about that, then try to deduce why this was the operational way to go, and not some other perhaps more obvious way.


 


I’ve continually found very shrewd and calculated thinking behind what is actually done. This is the point where the cynical reader rolls their eyes and internally recounts the number of times things went wrong in defence acquisitions. For example, the Super Seasprite fiasco is a prime and current example. But really, is Defence to blame if it defines a capability need, the government awards a contract, the contractor muffs it and can’t supply the contracted product, and the government fails to catch it early and make the appropriate decisions?


 


Digression: RAN and the ADF desperately need as many high-capability naval helicopters as it can get, and that’s why successive Defence Ministers allowed the SH-2G project to run-on far longer than it otherwise should have or would have. The capability always was dangling just out of reach, or so they were lead to believe. Certainly RAN should have seen what was occurring and piped-up that the SH-2 airframe was no longer necessary and an evolved MOTS option would have been suitable for ANZAC frigate helicopter requirements. It appears RAN became fixated on the idea of a super-duper lightweight mini helicopter that could smash a frigate hundreds of kilometres from an ANZAC (well beyond Harpoon II range), plus provide comprehensive ASW capabilities. They would have been brilliant networked platforms (and still might be) if they had worked and been delivered on time. According to Kaman they do now work as advertised they just need to be recertified (which is ridiculous when you look at it). RAN will pay for a long time for becoming fixated on that platform and a loss of naval helicopter capability is what we can afford least right now. Clearly there should have been a fully worked-up Plan-B to cover the possibility this did not come off, it would be more expensive, but at least we would not be facing the current situation.


 


Lots of potential people to blame in there, but it was the lack of appropriate responsible action by former Defence Minister Peter (children-over-board) Reith, that provided the current Seasprite debacle. He either didn’t get the information he required, or he didn’t act on it. I think Reith got the information he just didn’t comprehend what it meant if he didn’t act. If you have the wrong bloke in the job things can go spectacularly wrong fast. Australian politicians need to realise that Australia must never take a half-hearted approach to ASW capability projects.


For example; have a look at a map, our country is more vulnerable to submarines than any other precision strike platform and with cruise missiles they can do catastrophic damage to ADF facilities and capabilities. How would Australia go if RAAF maintenance facilities were demolished? How long could RAAF maintain its shiny new air power in operation? How about opening the salvos negate the ASW Orions and upcoming HALE UAV fleets? What does Australia do then? To say the least, that sort of attack would be equivalent to a mini Pearl Harbour for ADF capabilities. The sort of submarine threat in our region is not to some economically irrelevant LNG fields on the NW shelf, not at all, the threat is to Australia’s ability to remain self-reliant and a thus sovereign. Increasingly it seems most federal politicians are oblivious to that looming strike potential.


In just a decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has acquired about 25 Song, Kilo and Yuan conventional and two second-generation type 093 Shang nuclear powered attack submarines, with more Yuans and 093s to come.” Defence Today; "Australia and Maritime Power", John Armstrong and Paul Johnstone, March/April 2007, p. 12


That is an impressive force structure, and force growth rate. I’m sure an intercontinental opponent like China would be thinking along these lines, because that’s what we would tend to do, if ordered to negate the ADF’s reach and make Australia largely a toothless minor threat. JORN may remain working but we can’t do much that’s effective and timely with it, but pipe regional contact data to Allies.


We need far more investment in RAN airborne ASW and especially persistent underwater early-warning, rather than considering RAAF F-22As. It has to be fast airborne ASW, because AWDs, LHDs, frigates and helicopters, although all brilliant for localised ASW work will never exist in even a fraction of the required sustained coverage densities necessary for such platforms to be credibly deterring and effective against SLCM strikes. Plus it negates these platforms for other roles and deployments so these ships are not any sort of answer, though AWD and FFG sonars and extended range missiles could be important elements of it. A high performance anti cruise missile SAM system is needed to deter and negate SLCM attack on high value defence and strategic targets. Persistent early-warning technology is now essential as well, because the SAM defence will need to be alerted and cued to a Submarine’s presence when one comes within SLCM firing ranges. Persistent cheap early warning is also essential to deter and interdict sea mine-laying missions because once modern mines are sewed in ports and major shipping channels they will be a nightmare to discover, locate and remove. It will take months or years. Early warning investment can potentially prevent the massive economic disruption even a handful of mines can generate. A manned shore-based fast-reaction ASW aircraft force, with sufficient coverage densities and sustained presence is required more than ever before.


RAAF has the air power situation well in hand. If air power attracts ~25 billion in new investment (yes, it’s at least 25 billion when you count it all up), then anti-submarine warfare deserves at least this much economic and political commitment but is not getting nearly enough, and certainly not soon enough. The endless Super Seasprite mess is a symptom of that lack of sufficient commitment, and lack of recognition of why it is so necessary. There should have been a Plan-B, as AIR 6000 warranted and got Plan-B development and funding—digression ends.


 


Telling the difference between worthwhile air power commentary and time wasting is a task several members of Federal Parliament have been engaged in for more than two years. This is a very complicated task made all the more complex by the steady stream of spurious and alleged professional air power ‘experts’. Consequently, I thought it best to post, in condensed form, some of the formal statements of RAAF on AIR 6000. Specifically, why RAAF thinks the F-22A is entirely the wrong aircraft for Australia, in its present guise. It may seem surprising to some of its critics but RAAF is adamant it doesn’t want the F-22A—at least not in its current technically immature networking and strike configuration. Then RAAF’s view on precisely why the F-35A is without question the appropriate and only suitable AIR 6000 new air combat capability (NACC) aircraft for the ADF.


 


Firstly, serving Chief of RAAF made some forthright comments on the matter to Parliament hearings in March 2006 along with some blunt comments by Project AIR 6000 advisers. This is where the critic’s air power fictions meet RAAF air power operational facts and implications.


 


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Parliamentary Hearings - opening RAAF statement:


“Air Marshal Shepherd— … Thank you for the opportunity, once again, to speak with you today about the way ahead for the Australian Defence Force in the area of regional air superiority. We welcome the process whereby we can engage with the committee, as we do regularly with government. The defence capability plan makes sufficient provision to maintain Australia’s air combat capability at a level at least comparable qualitatively to any capability in the region. Air superiority is extremely important and underpins all other military operations. Air superiority is my business, and it is my professional opinion that we have currently, and will continue to develop, the right balance between enhanced and network platforms and a highly skilled workforce to ensure that we remain the best air force in the region.


 


The government continues to monitor developments in the region, and were there a need, the defence capability plan would be adjusted accordingly. We acknowledge that we are already seeing the introduction of more sophisticated military equipment in Asia, but we assess future growth to be more in north-east and South Asia rather than in South-East Asia. In our region, we will see limited developments in fourth generation fighter aircraft, ground based sensors and weapons systems, and enhanced command and control and information capabilities. To ensure air superiority in this future environment, Australia will continue to develop our network enabled force to exploit advanced air systems centred around a fifth-generation combat aircraft and the associated communications and information technology.


 


With regard to the current force, the F/A-18 is going through a series of upgrades that will provide a similar avionics capability to the new Super Hornet. These upgrades, when combined with new all-weather precision and stand-off weapons and supported by the new airborne early warning and control aircraft and multi-role tanker transport, will provide us with a formidable networked air superiority system of systems that is, without doubt, second to none in the region. The F111 capability has been discussed extensively at previous committee hearings, and our current plan remains to retire it once the F/A-18 upgrades are complete, and before the new air combat capability is introduced. We need to do this in order to free up people to safely and efficiently introduce the new air combat capability.


 


The future air combat capability, currently envisaged to be the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, will be a quantum leap. The F35, as you have heard, will be a highly capable fifth-generation stealthy multi-role air combat aircraft. Defence is confident that this aircraft will cost effectively provide Australia with the most sensible air combat solution and, when integrated into the networked force of AEWC and upgraded ground command and control systems, will mature to meet Australia’s future air superiority requirements.


 


Let me stress again why the F35 is the right choice: it is a true multi-role stealthy fifth generation strike fighter. It will be, as you have heard, as much a sensor as it is a shooter, and it is well-positioned to achieve effects based outcomes. We are testing and modelling every aspect of this program to ensure the JSF meets our needs. We are a smart and informed customer. It has a high degree of interoperability with our allies, providing a plug and play capability into the wider coalition network. In short, we are convinced that it is the best aircraft to do all the jobs that Australia needs. And it will be at a cost that will allow the balanced development for the ADF of a broad range of capabilities in all environments—land, maritime and air—from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping through to high-end war fighting.


 


There is a view presented by some defence enthusiasts and commentators who believe that there are other options available to provide a viable air superiority capability. Central to your inquiry today is the discussion on the F22 and keeping the F111 alive. So why not the F22? In our view, it is expensive and the limited numbers provided by the budget would not be enough to provide adequate air superiority coverage. Analysis and commonsense show that 30 to 40 airframes, no matter how capable they are, will not be enough to defend Australia. Buying it would distort the balanced defence capability plan. Even if we could afford it, and even if—I repeat: even if—it is released by the US government for export, it is primarily focused on the air-to-air roles. It is essentially a single purpose platform. It has a limited utility in strike and even less utility and capability for offensive air support. It will most probably require an upgrade to address obsolescence issues and there is no Australian industry base to strategically support the platform.


 


Clearly, if we bought the F22 we would need to have another aircraft for the vital and complementary strike and offensive air support roles. Some have proposed an upgraded F111 to fulfil those roles. I have over 2½ thousand hours flying the F111—that is where I got this grey hair and a few stories. As the sole operator of the F111 in the world, we have an excellent understanding of what it takes to operate and maintain it. We know there are significant issues to be addressed to extend its life. Importantly, we need to look at the total risk involved with extending the operational life of the F111. There are increasing and unknown structural and systems risks with the wings, the airframes, the electrics and the hydraulics as the platform nears the end of its fourth decade of life. There is an avionics and capability risk with respect to obsolescence and the ability of the aircraft to be competitive in the complex future air defence environment. We would need to do a massive avionics, weapons and electronic warfare upgrade to make the aircraft even adequately operationally capable and survivable. Importantly, even then, it would not match the strike capability of the JSF.


 


Add to this the ongoing costs of maintaining a dual fleet, half of which would be an orphaned system, and the associated training and logistics systems supporting both types. When we did the avionics upgrade program on the F111 in the 1980s and 1990s, we piggybacked on the similar US Pacer Strike program. This time we would have to go it alone, and that introduces industry risk. We know completely the ability of Australian industry to support this aircraft now, and we are not sanguine at all that a major upgrade would be achievable and supportable within Australia. Any upgrade would also be expensive—in the order of five to eight billion dollars possibly—and would require additional funding on top of that for the F22. It would bring with it the strategic risk of a distorted and non-balanced Australian Defence Force.


 


In very simplistic terms, what is being proposed by some can be likened to taking an EH Holden—a good car in its day—reworking it from the ground up, calling it a V8 Commodore and expecting it to win first time out at Bathurst. When you add up the structural risk, the system risk, the support risk, the financial risk and the overall risk to capability, you have a clear and undeniable question about the viability of the F111 beyond the period when we plan to withdraw it. And all these risks increase as the aircraft ages. At the end of the day, my job and the job of all of us here is to minimise strategic risk for Australia. Clearly, to go down such a path with these sorts of costs is irresponsible, and the funding pressures would put at risk our balanced land, maritime and air capabilities. We need to decide when to retire the F111 so that we can manage the transition to the new air combat capability without risk to our overall capability—not be forced to do it at an indeterminate time of the aircraft’s choosing. We need to confidently plan for our future, not leave it to chance.


 


As Chief of Air Force and the senior professional airman in Australia, and with an extensive fighter and strike background, it is my professional opinion that the government’s plan to enhance the current air combat force and to then acquire a cost-effective fifth-generation system is the smart and responsible way to ensure a strong air superiority capability. Importantly, the coupling of the proposed capability with effective land and maritime forces will ensure a balanced ADF into the future—an ADF that is capable of responding to all contingencies from humanitarian assistance through to high order war fighting.


 


I have introduced our panel of Defence members, and they are all experts in their field. We will answer, within classification constraints, any questions you might have. I will now ask Mr Michael Pezzullo, Deputy Secretary, Strategy, to set the strategic scene.”


Source: Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Chief of Air Force, Department of Defence - Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Friday, 31 March 2006, Canberra. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm


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After that opening RAAF statement Mr. Pezzullo (Deputy Secretary of Strategy - Defence) formally and concisely responded to the co-written ‘enthusiast’ submissions of Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon in the current Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority. Mr. Pezzullo had the following to say about Kopp’s (et al) submission propositions and the falsely premised basis for it. As you will see Pezzullo was concise, precise, caustic and blunt;


(See Submission 20 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/subs.htm)


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Parliamentary Hearings:


“…The scenario—and it is scenario based—that ultimately is embedded in the alternative submission [that of Carlo Kopp (et al)] is predicated upon a massive erosion of US military and strategic capability. It is predicated upon Australia having to operate independently beyond our immediate regions as I have defined them in my earlier remarks. It is predicated upon a radically different set of strategic circumstances which, I must say, I do not necessarily see even in the most speculative parts of my crystal ball. The scenario sketched out in the comprehensive submission that you have before you from another party would require, and therefore by definition there would be, a strong element of lead time and warning time be available to us. It would require government of whichever persuasion to radically rethink the scale of its defence budget and the level of investment, particularly in capital. It would require Australia to become self-reliant in a much larger force. It would also require—and I think this is the most problematic set of assumptions—that our access to the alliance capability and interoperability that we seek to have with our US alliance partners, in a whole range of scenarios and contingencies, be extinguished almost to zero. The only basis upon which I could see that arising would be through a massive political rupture in the relationship. It would also require a massive erosion of the US military capability edge which, again, I do not foresee even in the most speculative parts of my crystal ball. …”


Source: Mr Michael Pezzullo, Deputy Secretary of Strategy, Department of Defence - - Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Friday, 31 March 2006, Canberra.


http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm


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In other words, Kopp’s formal air power proposal is based upon fantastically improbable irrelevant nonsense that no serious professional strategist, analyst or capability planner or doctrine developer, nor ADF/RAAF insider could take seriously, or use as a basis for decision making, or even for profitable discussion. Mr. Kopp clearly doesn’t want to hear what actual professionals are saying about it, why they are saying it, and why they are ignoring his delusional drivel. Kopp is not an air power expert, he is a time waster, and RAAF was making sure they got that view formally entered into the committee’s Hansard.


 


It’s air power non-professional Kopp’s ego-maniacal stance of “I’m right, and you all know it” combined with his childish refusal to countenance the very possibility that he could be powerfully deluded—that marks him a fool. He has extremely limited relevant data or information access on the topic and certainly no access to restricted data that RAAF has. The people who have that data all say he is thoroughly wrong. Kopp has single-handedly promoted himself (in the most pitiful form of that word), to the imaginary position of being the foremost air power expert in Australia (who knows, perhaps the whole world). Yet has never flown combat missions, or participated in air combat training exercises, has never been a RAAF pilot, nor had any access to classified data, not to mention, current tactical information or operational evolution.


 


Yet, Kopp is the bloke who supposedly knows it all, That’s what he expects everyone to believe about him, and about his madcap proposals. And a surprising number of lesser-lights have been swayed by this incessant nonsense and likewise tethered their camel’s to Kopp’s caravan to the land of hapless delusion. Even a scan through the public submissions to the Inquiry reveals this to be so. (See: http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/subs.htm)


 


When I read writings of Carlo Kopp and cohort I get a distinct impression he’s not interested in this, but is driven by entirely other motivations—more domineering, unnecessary and counter-productive to engendering a pleasant atmosphere of trust and cooperation in our region. But the point is, Kopp is beside the point. I may focus (overly) on his propositions but I don’t think he matters at all, he’s just a symptom of some deeper issues.


 


Far more worrying is that when I examine the recent 12 months of Opposition Labor party statements on RAAF and ADF acquisitions and force planning I get another distinct impression they are about a billion light years away from competence in basic air power matters. They’re obviously nowhere near being able to make important national defence decisions of that sort (at present). No one expects politicians to be perfect, or to know everything they need to know, that’s what professional and competent advisers are for. The problem is not with defence adviser’s, it’s with the lack of professionalism in recent and current Labor politicians, who seem to have unilaterally decided not to listen to such professional and competent advisers.


I can’t fathom why they would do that, but they are doing it.


Indeed, Labor appear to be listening to the errant crap continually issuing from Carlo Kopp at the expense of formal professional, focused and consistent advice from Defence and from RAAF, in particular. That is why I’m writing this. I don’t want my Government or opposition to think that behaviour is suitable or tenable when so much is at stake. Why would any political party that claims to be acting in Australia’s best interest discount ADF and RAAF views on national defence matters? Do ASPI or APA actually know more than serving ADF about modern air combat?


What are the chances of that being true?


Ultimately, the lack of communication of critical ideas between the defence apparatus and the political apparatus is what causes me to write this, otherwise, I wouldn’t do it. This to me is the deeper problem that allows an unaccredited partisan dimwit like Kopp (et al) to get a counter-productive foot-in-the-door. Think not? Let’s see; the former leader of the Labor party, Kim Beasely, stated publicly his AIR 6000 position that ran totally at variance with RAAF and ADF studies, advice and briefings. Instead Beasely seemed to adopt the idiotic propositions of Kopp (to keep the F-111 and buy F-22As instead of F-35A). I don’t want an arrogant fool who totally ignores ADF (yet parrots a simplistic dangerous amateur like Kopp) to become Australia’s next Prime Minister.


 


I was relieved when Kevin Rudd took Beasely’s job, yet Kevin Rudd has never stepped away from what Kim Beasely proposed and all of the statements coming from the shadow minister of defence since seem to give little indication much has really changed in Labor’s superficial contemplations. Labor is still ignoring what the ADF and RAAF are saying on this issue. Her Majesty’s Opposition is paid to listen to professional advisers, by Australian taxpayers, but this is a clear case where Labor are not doing their job at all, nor taking their responsibility seriously, for example, maintaining an excellent working-relationship with ADF. So my writing this is inextricably linked to the federal political cycle, because if there were no election pending before this key AIR 6000 decision, there would be no need to even go over this topic.


 


All is not lost, as recently Labor released their ‘Defence Policy’, or, how to use a lot of words to say nothing much. It was largely was ignored which appeared to be the desired aim, to ruffle as few feathers as possible. It was reported thus; “Fitzgibbon endorsed the F/A-18F Block II purchase as it gave "breathing space" on air combat capability so they could reconsider all the options. However he said they were not critical of the F-35A JSF just wanted to re-look at it all.” - April 25th 2007, Press Speech.


 


Which is exactly what the above parliamentary Inquiry have been doing for the past year or so, if Labor and Mr. Fitzgibbon in particular had bothered to follow that formal processes (For goodness sake! What the *%#$ do you have to do to get these lazy sods to pay attention?!). However, four weeks prior Fitzgibbon said the Super Hornet Block II buy was; “…another ad-hoc on-the-run purchasing decision that threatens to undermine Australia’s national security”. (March 6th 2007, ABC TV News)


My question is; how would he know that?


What are we to make of Mr. Fitzgibbon’s policy speech when he first condemned the Super Hornet acquisition decision then decided he would endorse the Super Hornet procurement decision? Is this so his ‘Defence Policy’ does not come to grief on the first day of release? It’s nice that he now realises his attack on it was wrong, but this diametrical reversal of rhetoric is revealing, to say the least. If he had been listening to the ADF and RAAF advice he would not have made this screw-up. So the question is one of trust and track record, and the recent 12-month track record is abysmal, incompetent, self-inflicted and entirely unnecessary. This was generated by amateurism combined with apathy and partisan politicisation of Defence issues.


It is not a right to govern, oppositions are supposed to earn that right, via knowing their stuff and inspiring confidence.


I don’t want Labor thinking that bumbling Kim Beasely had any clue at all regarding air power—he doesn’t, and he never has, even as a Minister of Defence. So, getting back to strike and air-to-air fighter capabilities of the F-35A with respect to the Sukhoi and MiG fighters;


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Parliamentary Hearings:


“ … ACTING CHAIR—That is quite likely in the future. One thing we know we will face—and this is another part of this argument—is Sukhoi 29s or 30s. There are insignificant numbers in the region. We know that they are advanced, that they can be flown and that the pilots who will train on those will become increasingly capable. Defence’s argument is that, if we get the F-35s, we can run through with that package—if we can afford it. Defence will take some Raptors as well—if they would sell them to us—to add to that package. But we are up for 100 or so JSFs, and that is a networked package. The underlying question that has been put in terms of the capacity of that is that we seem to be relying extremely heavily on the fact that it is network-centric. There are a number of vulnerabilities already there because of refuelling and so on, but an argument has been put that those Sukhois are simply a superior aircraft on their own and could do us great damage. Is our fundamental defence not only the network-centric approach but also the stand-off missiles and others and the capacities of our pilots to operate in that more difficult situation, or do you think we need a bit more in the package to deal with that if we can afford it?


 


Group Capt. Davies—The answer to that question is largely based on the supposition that the Su-30 or MiG-29 is a significantly superior aircraft and that we should be prepared and, therefore, growing ourselves to another level above that again. My understanding of the MiG-29 and Su-30 is that they are good aeroplanes, but they are not fifth generation. JSF, from my reading of the publicly available information, is the only fifth-generation [strikefighter] aircraft out there. It has been designed to be fifth generation and, therefore, superior in almost every aspect to an Su-30 type threat. Our forces have smart commanders and smart battle managers in all three environments. We would be going to the battle of our choosing. So we intend, more through a networked ADF than a networked Air Force, to be able to go to battle at the time of our choosing with an outcome that is almost predetermined. I personally as an aviator—and again talking of opinion in the crew room—do not subscribe at all to the opinion, ‘There are four Su-30s and four JSFs out there, so we’re in for a heck of a battle.’


 


ACTING CHAIR—That is despite the fact that the argument has been put strongly that the 29s and 30s are in fact fifth generation and that the closest equivalent would be the Raptor, which is as well, but the JSF, because it is slower and there is still a question about how visible it would be—because we do not know whether we are going to get the full technology transfer in terms of its radar signature—is really a fourth-generation, not a fifth-generation, plane.


 


Group Capt. Davies—I cannot answer that on a purely technical basis. My understanding is that it is fifth generation. From the point of view of an aviator at my level, I would suggest that it is actually the Su-30 [that is fourth generation], since it is already flying and operating. The Su-30 and even the Su-35—those variants—are flying now. They are F15 style airframes. They are getting modern technology, modern radars, modern missile systems—that is true—but their genesis was on a third generation airframe, upgraded perhaps to fourth generation, but they do not have the ground-up development of the JSF.”


Source: Group Captain Gavin Neil Davies, Officer Commanding, Number 82 Wing, RAAF Base Amberley, Royal Australian Air Force - Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Wednesday, 5 July 2006, RAAF Base Amberley, Ipswich, QLD. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm


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In short, serving RAAF pilots and active senior commanders generally don’t think the F-35A will be in any way inferior to Su-27/30s in air-to-air combat situations, nor do they think there’s BVR capability parity. An besides this, these aircraft will never meet unless ADF decides they will (you can tactically decide that with JORN), and if they did, the F-35A is considered, “superior in almost every aspect to an Su-30 type threat”.


 


For Mr. Kopp to continue to claim otherwise is absurd. ALP need to make sure they do not allow consideration of such an important decision to be coloured in any way by the contrived straw-men and myths that Kopp’s been propagating, for almost a decade. A Rudd government is Kopp’s last hope, as the window is closing fast on his pet air power follies.


 


Even his fellow academics realise how far removed Kopp is from tactical and operational realities, when comparing capabilities of Su-27/30s to F-35A;


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Public Submission 1 - Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority:


“Presently, substantial numbers of Su-27/30s are entering the inventories of the Chinese and Indian air forces, and operationally insignificant numbers are being acquired by Indonesia and Vietnam. Should Australia ever find itself in direct military conflict with either of the nuclear-capable, emerging superpowers China and India (in itself a near-ludicrous proposition) without American support, then the capabilities of the respective combat aircraft are likely to be academic. And in any other hypothetical defence contingency, the ‘platforms equals capabilities’ mentality is some forty years out of date.


 


An air platform has not amounted to a capability in its own right since at least the time of the American-led war in Indochina, … … The key question at this stage is: what kind of performance can we expect from the networked air superiority system the ADF is assembling? The answer lies not in simplistically comparing the flight performance of individual platforms but, rather, by assessing the total system.”


Source: Dr Alan Stephens, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University Canberra, ACT, January 23, 2006. - Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/subs.htm


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It’s unfair to suggest Dr Alan Stephens might be in the same ‘intellectual’ category as the likes of Kopp, as Stephens is intelligent, thoughtful, tactically oriented and operationally and strategically realistic. Stephens is proof that the level of public debate does not have to be as appalling as it is (the media can talk to persons that have a clue).


 


Beyond this undeniable fact that baseline aircraft performance does not equate to actual capability, it is also clear that Kopp believes the ADF network, or at least the air power elements of it, are only about increased situational awareness for pilots and battle commanders. But as will soon be shown, it’s more than merely a leap in situational awareness when combined with digital avionics integration and serious CPU power.


 


Firstly, I’ll give Kopp’s formal opinion/belief about the ADF network from the current Inquiry process. My comments are added in square brackets [].


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Parliamentary Hearings:


Mr HATTON—Dr Kopp, you may be able to assist me with my fundamental question in all of this—that is, Defence’s response to the arguments with regard to the F22 Raptor, which is a true fifth generation plane, has far more legs than the JSF [the F-22A in reality doesn’t have “far more legs”, the unrefuelled air-to-air combat radius is only a tad more than an F-35A], which is still of course a paper plane [Not so—it’s an LRIP production aircraft, that’s now also started flight testing]. Its fundamental argument is that a new network-centric defence capability with air refuelling, AWACS, some satellite and JORN as a package will allow the JSF to be as capable as we can get. I cannot understand why, at the centre of that network-centric defence, you would not have a more capable platform, which I think is the centre of your argument. In all the reading and preparation I have done for this, I cannot find an answer to that, and Defence do not seem to address it [This is because the air-to-air threat is minor and can be soundly defeated by an F-35A, and because the cost of an even more capable air-to-air F-22A capability is ~3.5 times more expensive, whilst delivering perhaps 5 times less overall attack capability per airframe, and Defence did address this later that day].


 


Dr Kopp—To put this into context, I am one of the few people in Australia who has performed genuine academic research on network-centric warfare and also the technology from which these networks are built, to the extent that my doctoral thesis was actually on the adaptation of fighter radars for long-range networking. I am probably the best qualified person in Australia to comment on this. [which is astonishing as he understands it’s potential and tactical implications so poorly]


 


The root of the problem is that Defence have misunderstood the relationship between capability and networking. If you look at the capability of any package of military aeroplanes or any package of military equipment, the damage you can do to an opponent is primarily determined by the capability of your platforms—how many missiles, bombs or other weapons they can carry; how effectively they can punch through an opponent’s defences; how effectively they can defeat individual enemy platforms. [Networked electronic attack capability is an example of why Kopp is so wrong about this, as networked AESA radars, focused in concert, all upon the same radar target, at the same time, can degrade the target radar’s electronics, and this coordinated attack capability and energy level is something the individual aircraft generally can not achieve. That is effectively an entirely new networked ‘virtual-weapon’, and this can be extended to other platforms to bring to bare additional high-powered Wedgetail and GlobalHawk AESA radars. You can pour many kilowatts of radar energy precisely into an area measured in square meters, like a cockpit for instance. Even if this doesn’t destroy the aircraft, it’s certainly going to degrade combat capabilities and give the aircrew a shocking distraction when it needs it the least. Same for SAMs. Indeed, a tactical laser used in that way could make all Su-30s with R-172 missiles and BARS radars obsolete overnight. Forget about the PLAAF Kopp, it’s irrelevant.] What the network provides you with is what we call situational awareness or improved situational awareness. In other words, the network allows you to look at a bigger picture than the sensors on your platform alone would permit you to view. But that in itself simply gives you a few more firing opportunities or evasion opportunities when you are fighting an opponent; it does not fundamentally change the amount of firepower you can deliver. [It allows an F-35A or Super Hornet Block II to provide targeting data for a precision artillery strike, if the F-35A itself is out of suitable weapons, etc. so a target that otherwise would survive, can still be prosecuted within minutes or seconds. That is more than just providing “a few more firing opportunities” because this can have a major impact on the ground battle, namely, how many diggers are killed or suffer permanent injuries. The tactical effects and human effects and the psychological impact, plus the Strategic deterrent effects can not be simplistically characterised as merely “digital plumbing”. It is that, but it is clearly much more, as the electronic directed energy attack example illustrated.]


 


This is a very deep and fundamental misconception in how Defence think about this. I have raised this with them repeatedly in the press. In fact, I challenged them on this issue 18 months ago in the submissions that we put in for the Defence annual report, and I have published at least one research paper for a conference and one journal paper that deal with this in considerable detail. Defence as an organisation have simply not responded to this [Because it does not merit any response]. I find this just astonishing, because the mathematics here are completely unambiguous, and commonsense supports that.


 


To take this a step further: if you look at what the network is, it is intelligent, fast, digital plumbing. Think of it like a broadband network in the sky. Like any network, you have consumers but you also have to have content providers. If you look at the internet, you have websites, which are content deliverers, you have subscribers that are users and the network connects them all together. If you look at a network-centric system of the military variety, a network provides the connectivity but the intelligence surveillance reconnaissance platforms actually collect and gather the data that feeds the network. That is an area where Defence just do not appear to see the importance of making an appropriate level of investment. The only area where we have a reasonable investment is in the Wedgetail AEW&C. JORN has some capabilities but also a lot of limitations. [Pure nonsense, on page five of the current Defence Capability Plan 2006 – 2016, there is a pie-chart budget break-down that shows an incredible 46% of the DCP’s budget is for electronic systems, rather than platforms or weapons. The next largest budgeted item is for consolidated aerospace capabilities at 26%. For Kopp to claim the ADF is not fully committed to a major and sustained investment in comprehensive networking capabilities is ridiculous. Page 8 of the DCP shows the electronics spending growth per year. We are currently at the beginning of a very rapid ramp-up in ADF networking capability and sustainment.]


 


If we look at other areas of what we would call the network-centric constellation—that is, the area of passive electronic surveillance, ground surveillance with ground-moving target indicator, long-range high-footprint synthetic aperture radar and such—there is very little investment at this stage. [And it should be noted here that the F-35A provides all those sensor capabilities but the F-22A provides none of them! The Super Hornet, which Kopp so disapproves of, can also provide all of these functions—so what exactly is his problem with network investment planning?] I know there have been comments by Air Force in Aviation Week & Space Technology recently that they wished to pursue this, but we see no concrete force structure plans; we see none of this in the literature. The model that Defence are proposing cannot deliver what they believe it can deliver. I think that can be supported by hard numbers with no great difficulty. Now, there is another issue here. … [On and on it goes with this deluded misrepresentation and failure of understanding on Kopp’s part.] …There’s no question about it. Network-centric warfare is a necessity. My concern with network-centric warfare is that it is misunderstood in Defence. It is being presented as being capable of doing more than it can, and I do not believe that their implementation will deliver what they believe it will deliver. …” [A perfect example of why Kopp’s considered an irredeemable fool by people in Defence circles.]


Source: Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Friday, 31 March 2006, Canberra. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm


…continued/
2007-05-08 00:21:59 GMT
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