/continues…
But then Dr. Stevens made the following point which totally demolishes Kopp’s straw-men, obfuscations and ridiculous cheap shots at ADF and RAAF force-planing and investment;
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Parliamentary Hearings:
“Mr EDWARDS—Yes. I have one more question. What distinguishes the JSF to such a degree that you believe that no other manned aircraft in the region will be comparable in network-centric warfare for the next 30 years?
Dr Stephens—Again, that is a central issue. What has not been stressed sufficiently this morning, in my opinion, is the fact that the JSF has been designed from the ground up for network-centric operations. It is going to benefit considerably from developmental work done on the F22—it already has. Previously, the question was asked: in what domain is the JSF superior to the F22? It was not sufficiently emphasised, in my opinion, that it will be considerably superior in the ISR—information surveillance recognisance—domain. For example, it will have a much superior optical electrical ISR system to the F22. It will have a transmit-receive data link. At the moment, the F22 has only a receive data link, which will inhibit its ability to network fully with ground forces. I would also maintain that within the dispersed non-linear modern battlefield, in which the exchange of information is just as important as the application of firepower and manoeuvre, that ISR capability assumes an importance of the highest order.”
Source: Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Friday, 31 March 2006, Canberra. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm
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Consequently, not only does Carlo Kopp’s pet F-22A Project AIR 6000 ‘alternative’ candidate not have any of the extensive ISR sensor capabilities every F-35 will have it also doesn’t have a two-way network datalink capability (forget about coordinated electronic attack). In other words, even if a new RAAF F-22A received a very expensive sensor upgrade it still would not have the capacity to share data with the network until the communications suite and computing power had also been comprehensively upgraded and the aircraft’s software expanded by literally a few million lines of code.
Doing that would entail considerable precision machining modification to mount the new sensors internally (assuming there’s suitable room and airframe real estate available to do that), whilst maintaining stealth. Stealth, in part, requires extremely close machining tolerances for fitting surfaces together. If the tolerances are not exact a loss of stealth will result for each sensor fitted. The F-35 was designed for the sensors to go in the optimal locations from the beginning, but the F-22A never was intended to receive them. In other words, it would be hideously expensive, and a very high-risk upgrade. On top of that, the comprehensive software integration would take years, and cost billions of dollars to complete and test, incurring further protracted major development risks. There is no realistic prospect that Defence could do this and not end up with a disaster, and it all assumes the US would supply either the Jet, or the core software code IP. (The first is possible, but the second is unlikely before 2020)
So why would the ADF seriously consider doing that, when it can buy the F-35A with everything it operationally requires, full stealth and more, plus it can get the software coding access it requires for specific RAAF operational needs?
In summary, Kopp first falsely asserted (to a formal Parliamentary Inquiry) that the ADF’s network and its development lacks operational capability and substance. But we now see that his own alternative proposal for an RAAF F-22A, plus evolved-F-111C/G, within an ADF network, would have marginal to partial 4th generation fighter network capability levels. So not only would a RAAF F-22A be a blind dumb-bomber it would also be an incommunicative blind, mute dumb-bomber, where the pilot is restricted to 4th generation radio voice communications! This is an exquisite example of why no politician or member of the public should listen to a word of the irrational dribble issuing from Carlo Kopp (et al). If anyone tells you the F-22A would be ready to go, and will not need a major upgrade, prior to RAAF operational service, read on;
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Parliamentary Hearings:
“Air Marshal Shepherd— … So why not the F22? In our view, it is expensive and the limited numbers provided by the budget would not be enough to provide adequate air superiority coverage. Analysis and commonsense show that 30 to 40 airframes, no matter how capable they are, will not be enough to defend Australia. Buying it would distort the balanced defence capability plan. Even if we could afford it, and even if—I repeat: even if—it is released by the US government for export, it is primarily focused on the air-to-air roles. It is essentially a single purpose platform. It has a limited utility in strike and even less utility and capability for offensive air support. It will most probably require an upgrade to address obsolescence issues and there is no Australian industry base to strategically support the platform. …
Lt Gen. Hurley—I think it is important to stress that there will be an upgrade program required for the F22, so if you look at the alternative model you have two aircraft fleets in upgrade [i.e. F-111C/G/RF and F-22A – concurrently!].”
Source: Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Chief of Air Force, Department of Defence - Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Friday, 31 March 2006, Canberra. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm
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RAAF know the F-22A is not even close to being ready to go, off-the-shelf, and is a very long way from being what the ADF needs for the jobs ADF needs it to do. It will require a long and detailed high-risk multi-billion dollar upgrade just to get it into suitable operational configuration. If you thought the F-111 was a long-delayed nightmare to bring into RAAF service, that was a walk in the park compared to the hurdles of evolving a unique RAAF variant of the F-22A. ADF and RAAF do know what they’re doing on all these issues—some people just don’t want to accept that possibility might be true.
ADF know precisely why they don’t want the F-22A in RAAF service before at least 2020. It’s because it’s actually an immature aircraft variant, but the F-35A Block III will come off production lines in a much more mature configuration and will actually be pre-configured specifically for RAAF operational network needs. That is why the ADF has invested almost half a billion in its design and development since 2002. That’s why that money was invested at an early stage, to make sure it would be what we need. ADF are not beginners at this, they are the real experts, and anyone telling you otherwise is either on-the-make, on the take, or pushing an agenda that has little to do with Australia’s air power capability developments (or just plain half-witted).
For example, in Kopp’s dream RAAF force structure the F-22A may receive data from JORN and Wedgetail (like the HUGs will), but the F-111 will not, and neither aircraft will be networked at a fifth generation integration level. As a result, neither can be effective in a strike role, until at least 5 to 10 billion dollars (perhaps more, no one knows the costing, they just know it will be colossal) more is invested in upgrades, over the best part of a decade! But the fact that the AIR 6000 budget is $15.5 billion (max) means RAAF would afford no more than ~50 F-22A, but the Chief of airforce says this sort of level is nowhere near enough to provide sufficient coverage and sustainment. This means the AIR 6000 budget required to provide a sufficient number would be closer to $25-30 billion. If the F-35A will be the most expensive peacetime procurement ever, you haven’t seen a thing if the F-22A were to be ordered instead. Ultimately you are looking at 35 billion with the upgrade, and this does not even include RAAF’s rough estimate of $5-8 billion needed to upgrade the F-111 to make it survivable and sustainable.
AIR 6000 thus blows out by almost 300% and we get our capability around 2020-2025 time frame instead. So the HUGs have to cover this huge capability gap until then! Or else, we could just do what we already plan to do for ~$15 billion. Thank goodness we have people with real calibre and brains in ADF capability development planning (if only some of our politicians and ‘expert’ media commentators were half that good).
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Parliamentary Hearings:
“Senator Johnston— … What do we need to do to make sure we [F-111C/G/RF] can go to 2015?
Group Capt. Davies—The things that I believe we need to do to the F-111 to make it viable to 2015 to guarantee that extra three years—if I can use that time frame, Senator—of insurance, is along the lines of the networked development that the F-111 needs. At the moment it is not a networked aeroplane, as the F/A-18 and the JSF certainly will be. So developments in communication, the ability to get data and situational awareness into the cockpit, would be one of the necessities to make it a useable platform in the Air Force we are going to have in 2012 to 2015.
Senator Johnston—Is that a major drama?
Group Capt. Davies—In our ability to fly the aeroplane for a crew to train on a day-to-day basis it is perhaps not so dramatic, but I would say it is a necessity for our ability to be a viable force multiplier in a coalition or for any sort of conflict that we are likely to be involved in.”
Source: Group Captain Gavin Neil Davies, Officer Commanding, Number 82 Wing, RAAF Base Amberley, Royal Australian Air Force - Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Wednesday, 5 July 2006, RAAF Base Amberley, Ipswich, QLD. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm
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But there is more to this basic upgrade picture, because as I said earlier, the network brings more than situational awareness aids and digital plumbing, it brings new combat capabilities and major deterrent effects in its own right. A refreshed HUG Hornet on its own is nowhere as impressive a capability as a networked HUG Hornet. For example, with regard to the 24 new Super Hornet Block II;
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Flight International (excerpts), March 13th 2007
“The Raytheon AESA [radar] brings the capability for simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground operation [using the same A2A/SAR/GMTI radar—at once!], and starting with Lot 30, two-seat F/A-18Fs will have the advanced crew station, which decouples the front and rear cockpits.” [RAAF thus gets two fully functional networked cockpits within a single aircraft, with the same comprehensive independent multirole capabilities within each—in avionics and network terms its like having the network functionality of two separate multirole aircraft instead of just one, and survivability is thus drastically increased as a result, for instance;]
"The front-seater can sanitise the airspace while the rear-seater conducts an air-to-ground campaign". [That allows the front-seat pilot to attack fighters with off-board-cued passively launched BVR AMRAAMs, while the back-seater attacks any fighters or A-2-A weapons or SAMs with intensely focused AESA radar beams to dazzle electronics, but with networking this process can be automatically and seamlessly coordinated with your wingman’s AESAs as well, so you can direct an electronic attack using four APG-79 AESA radars or more simultaneously.]
“… to allow sensor information such as Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery to be manipulated rapidly. The first increment will be built of the AESA and ATFLIR targeting capability by geo-registering imagery to an inboard database to generate precise target co-ordinates ….” [In other words, GPS and radar jamming techniques won’t prevent precision strike weapons working, or prevent the derived geo-locations being shared to every member of the ADF network (it has uninterruptable comms datalinks as well), to provide target data for Army Tiger attack helicopters or precision artillery or rapid naval attack with SM-2 or Harpoon II. Many people don’t realise the RAN’s new SM-2 will have a Mach 3+ >100 km indirect-fire land-attack mode, combined with a 250 lb warhead. The AWDs and ungraded FFGs will provide a considerable rapid-reaction ground support capability via the ADF network, and more if VLS SM-2 cells were added to new LHDs. For example, such a networked SM-2 capability, cued by precise Super Hornet ATFLIR geolocation data could interdict and defeat a platform attempting to engage ADF ground forces, day or night. It no longer matters if the Super Hornet is out of weapons, because as long as it’s on station it remains lethal (Army tactical UAVs could achieve similar when Super Hornets are not overhead)]
“…The ALR-67(V) is a digital cued receiver [RWR] , and under the Flightplan [that’s the USN’s Super Hornet Block II upgrade program that RAAF has budgeted for as part of the included ~$6 billion RAAF program cost allocation, which includes incremental block-upgrade to remain current and fully interoperable with the bleeding-edge of USN integration out to about 2020. RAAF clearly intend to develop these aircraft for maximum network capability, so they also seamlessly interoperate with F-35A when they arrive, immediately after the Super Hornets enter service] its capability will be enhanced to allow single-ship geolocation of emitters with enough accuracy to cue the radar fir targeting, says Matthews. The capability for multi-ship geo-location using three F/A-18E/Fs, accurate enough for passive targeting will also be introduced. …”
Flight International, March 13th 2007
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In other words, this network integration level is providing an entirely new form of passive precision attack targeting capability (plus simultaneous ID classification, subsequent auto-cuing of other relevant systems and weapons etc). This is purely an emergent and exploitable combat capability of highly integrated networked digital avionics. Many people think “integration” means just integration of the avionics and sensors on the aircraft itself plus some C4ISR, but what it really means when fully applied is cockpit and weapon integration with every sensor type in the whole ADF inventory.
The above example is not mere “digital plumbing” or “more firing opportunities”, it’s an unprecedented emergent precision attack capability that the individual aircraft themselves do not and can not exhibit, outside a networked service context. RAAF HUG Hornets can already achieve geolocation with passive IR targeting pods (in a much more limited form) but that method only scans one very narrow directional field-of-view (like looking down a straw), and largely only detects targets when the video image is actually being viewed and manipulated by the aircrew.
But this newer networked ‘passive’ sensing detection and precision targeting method is not a narrow view-down-a-straw, it’s a 360 degree omni-directional virtual ‘view’, that can be used to precisely and almost immediately cue the ATFLIR and AESA sensors. It’s also automatic and continuous regardless of where the aircrew is otherwise directing their attention. With this system, as soon as an emitting contact appears and is classified, all aircraft and other allied forces in the area will know it’s there, through tactical displays. Precisely where it is located, what it is, what it is doing, and where it’s going (if it is moving and emits) and what threat priority level it represents. Of course, battle commanders and any one else monitoring the tactical situation will also be able to see this contact pop-up in near real-time.
The leap forward in capability this avionics integration will produce will revolutionise both air-to-air and air-to-ground doctrine and tactics. The contacts and emission types will be pre-classified, friend/foe or unknown. Appropriate sensors (any digital sensor, not just Hornet sensors) will then immediately be cued, dependent upon classification status, to either obtain a positive ID, or to attack, or to disregard. This process once took minutes to work through, but will be reduced to a second or less before the contact can be comprehensively evaluated with several sensors—passively and/or actively, manually or automatically.
On top of these abilities the networked RWR will be able to automatically and instantly cue up the AESA radar to either track, or else, electronically attack a new emitting RWR contact (like a BVR active radar missile seeker as it attempts to lock-on for instance). Thus providing instant situational awareness, but also instant responses to the new threat as it reveals itself via emitting. The AESA’s powerful and focusable x-band electronic jamming capability can degrade even a high-power SAM radar, via dazzling it, to cause it to loose track or target lock. The result of frontal-aspect low-RCS and avionics integration makes the Super Hornet Block II an intimidating BVR fighter and strike aircraft, with far higher survivability and lethality than any previous Hornet (and HUG Hornets are not dissimilar). A Flanker is unlikely to catch a RAAF Super Hornet by surprise sue to JORN, and a Flanker can not possibly compete with the avionics and C4ISR agility and network cuing advantages, and the almost immediate targeting process and countermeasures responses.
Even an F-15E, Typhoon or Rafale would be forced to go defencive, almost immediately—Super Hornet Block II+ is a far more capable networked package than people like Kopp and Peter Criss would like to give it credit. They think a Flanker without comprehensive networked digital avionics integration, without OTHR, without AEW&C, and without tanker support can win BVR battles, using just BARS radars (if they have one), an IRST and R-172 missile (if they have them).
For Peter Criss (ex-AVM who was sacked by RAAF in 2000, with severe personality issues cited as the reason—so expect some sour-grapes and payback etc) to strenuously assert, on 60 Minutes, and again on ABC 7:30 Report, that a Flanker would have a realistic chance against an “obsolete” RAAF F-35A is pedigree agenda-driven BS, at best. This is what Criss said;
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Reporter: You’ve spent a lot of hours in the cockpit of fighter planes. If it came to war with one of our regional neighbours, would you be confident that you could beat them, in the air, behind the controls of the Joint Strike Fighter?
Peter Criss: No … no … because already in our region there are formidable, very formidable, predominantly Russian, err, mainly Sukhoi family variants of, of aircraft
Reporter: Yep … let me get this straight, you’re saying most of our regional neighbours, will have Russian made planes, that can potentially beat the Joint Strike Fighter?
Peter Criss: Yes! … That’s what I’m saying.
Reporter: That’s alarming isn’t it?
Peter Criss: Well that’s … that’s why I’m alarmed. … we’re going to go buy an aircraft, throw it into a region, that may or may not be hostile to us, and say, well, good luck boys, err, hope you come back …
Sixty Minutes, 18 March 2007 - verbatim
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Peter Criss: I’ve been around long enough to smell a rat, and I believe we tried to take a short cut … that … has damaged … the national defence, in the long term!
Reporter: So we’re buying the Joint Strike Fighter [the final decision has not been made yet] … how many other planes have we considered? …
Peter Criss: … no others
Reporter: none?
Peter Criss: no, … no others
Reporter: not one? … none?! …
Peter Criss: The process was shut down. Very early on, a close friend of mine was … was head of the team … to, to, look at the acquisition, under Project AIR 6000 … he started the process, was told, nah, stop that, we’re not going to do that this time, we know better.
Sixty Minutes, 18 March 2007 – verbatim
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Peter Criss: "I am absolutely astounded … that we are going to spend six billion dollars of the tax payers money, on an interim aircraft. … I have a problem with the word ‘Super’ … err … and Hornet … err … perhaps, I’d call it … Super Dog? or Super Bug, but certainly not a Super Hornet. The sting in the tail is … er … is not there. … This thing, will not survive, in a fight, now, in our region—now! RIGHT NOW! Not…in…ah, another five years down the track, ten years down the track … IT… IS … A … DOG!"
ABC 7:30 Report, 15th March 2007 - verbatim
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AC Ted Bushell (Engineering/Maintenance Planning Specialist – retired decades ago): "It [Super Hornet] can’t effectively perform in the role that the Minister and the Dept of Defence have given it" … They’ve said, the er, … the Super Hornet will maintain our air superiority in our region, for the next decade … not a hopping hope in hell of doing that! … it it, you know, if it wasn’t so serious, you’d have to be, you’d have to laugh at it … that I sat down and I thought, I can’t be, … I can’t be, er, … hearing properly, … he’s talking about the F-22 … which some of the leading USF…USAF Generals [that was General John Jumper, see the last blog entry about his F/A-22A classification and its being countermanded by his more conservative successor] have said, … is the best bomber we have seen in years. …"
ABC 7:30 Report, 15th March 2007 – verbatim
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Which begs the rational question, if the SuperHornet Block II is such a hopelessly outclassed "dog", and the Malaysians have just bought 18 evolved Flankers, then why are the Malaysians also seeking to acquire the F/A-18Fs to replace their still quite young F/A-18Ds? Why would Malaysia invest or waste scarce air force funds on such an outclassed and outmoded heap of junk, when they allegedly have a far superior fighter coming into service? … Ted? … Peter? … Carlo? … I’d love to hear all their ‘rational’ answers to that one simple question. And why won’t the US export it to Malaysia if the F/A-18F is such an uncompetitive heap of junk? The answer is simple; Malaysia (and several other Flanker operators) need to obtain a far clearer picture of what a Super Hornet Block II can do to a Flanker. I can immediately name five countries that would pay Malaysia extremely large sums of money and trade offsets (like a potential free gift of 18 new flankers for instance—Russia or China would be more than happy to finance such a scheme if they could get such insights) to learn exactly what the latest USN fighter fleet can do. The USN does not fill its decks and hangers with aircraft that are not absolutely bleeding edge technology, when it has the world’s largest naval air power budget, a long-term global conflict, plus an emerging credible strategic competitor. It’s a safe bet the USN will block exports to all but its close Allies, until the F-35C enters on-deck operational deployment status. A non-aligned country has very little hope of gaining access to the USN’s best air power technologies.
Realistically, a Flanker is unlikely to survive, or even to get a shot off, before an active missile is homing on it. Some people will not accept that statement. The interesting aspect of the ALR-67(V) integration capability is that if a Su-30 continues to use its BVR radar modes, or emits in almost any way (including thermally in the case of the 360 degree F-35A IR DASS array and laser tracker/ranger capabilities) the ALR-67(V) RWR(s) will locate it and precisely track that emission source in 3D, and determine its vector, and use that vector data and location data to continuously update the AMRAAM’s fly-to point, where upon it enables its terminal-homing seeker(s). This means the Super Hornet that fired the AMRAAM is now free to turn away, immediately, and rapidly open the distance, while the networked RWR(s) automatically provide missile navigation needs to its terminal phase. No longer does the Hornet pilot have to sustain a frontal-aspect illumination of a radar-locked target, in order to provide updates to the AMRAAM missile’s mid-course guidance, so it is no longer any where near as exposed to BVR counter attacks. This is a genuine fire-and-forget capability that the AMRAAM always aspired to provide, and now it finally routinely will.
The Su-30 pilot is now in a real dilemma, if it does not turn away, it will almost certainly be hit on the nose (and the pilot dies), but if it turns away the Hornet pilot will also immediately realise this and can turn again to pursue. The Hornet can then fire a further AMRAAM to keep the Su-30 defensive (a maximum rate turn perpendicular to the missile, or else, a turn away at about 135 degrees to the missile’s position) thus preventing the Su-30 getting off an effective missile launch. From that point the Su-30 is very unlikely to survive the Super Hornet attack (and the F-35A will be several times more deadly in this role). The Su-30s only hope is to use its IRST and an IR missile, so that it is not emitting, but even this will not work, because JORN will see it coming, and even JORN can provide bearing and range data with sufficient resolution to cue a long range AMRAAM launch. This is minus altitude data but the JORN data can be used to cue the passive ATFLIR to scan in the correct direction and derive the altitude data. The ATFLIR pod can generate a very precise 3-D missile fly-to coordinates in the air, using the laser track/ranger facility, in which case, early passive lock-after-launch AMRAAM shots can be taken with high confidence and will throw the Su-30 into using defencive BVR tactics early.
Sudden surprise ambush or else making an alerted opponent go defensive is the key to winning a BVR engagement. Once defensive, no matter what missile or sensor combo the Sukhoi has available, or its relative agility, the Su-30 is severely disadvantaged and will probably be hit by the first, or by the follow-up missile shot. Add to this situation the fact that JORN can continuously monitor time aloft, so RAAF battle commanders will have an excellent idea of when a particular Su-30 flight is getting low on fuel, and most vulnerable to BVR ambush. Even if they escape the first missile shot, they don’t have the fuel for sustained high-energy BVR manoeuvring, or to run away at sustained high speed. RAAF is not going to blunder into unforseen contacts and say, “Tally-Ho chaps, let’s have at the blighters!”
Kopp, Peter Criss and Ted Bushell (and others) seem to imagine a BVR battle would occur randomly, or in an unmanaged way, but that couldn’t be further from RAAF thinking (as seen in the comments of AM Shepherd and colleagues above). Any and every time there’s a BVR engagement it would occur when the RAAF are practically assured of a kill, and to survive—with the latter taking doctrinal and tactical priority over the former.
There are many other yieldable capabilities but that sufficiently illustrates the outstanding combat advantages the ADF network will provide, when using an aircraft platform and avionics that were specifically designed to leverage comprehensive network connectivity. So, contrary to Kopp’s assertion above the ADF network is not just the sum of all sensor situational awareness enhancements, plus the sum of baseline platform performance capabilities, there is more to it than that flip technical characterisation would suggest.
NOTE: It occurred to me some years ago that this sort of stealth ambush BVR strategy RAAF is pursuing, very strongly resembles what a salt-water crocodile does in tactical terms. The older crocs get smart and very crafty as they age. They usually hide and watch, allowing prey to feel safe in an area, sometimes for several days, then it strikes explosively and without any warning using incredible speed and energy levels. It attacks in this style for good reason. They are stealthy and very patient in attack style because they learn that if the prey gets away from a botched attack it will be alerted the next time. The prey will learn from the near-miss experience and be much harder to attack again, plus it will observe the tactic used and the surprise circumstances utilised, and it can transmit the presence of this hidden danger to its fellow animals. This knowledge can quite seriously impact on the croc’s ability to get a regular feed in the area. Consequently, the croc makes sure that in almost every attack it launches that if its going to reveal itself an expend energy launching an explosive attack it must wait until all of the factors and probabilities practically guarantee a kill (and in that sense the croc’s very high-energy ambush attack style is developed in order to manage information, firstly about its presence, secondly what it can do, and third to not needlessly display its full range of tactics and physical capabilities). An experienced croc only attacks when confident it has a very good chance at getting a clean kill. If it is not sure it’ll get the kill, it’s in the croc’s interests to remain completely hidden to await a better circumstance. Statistics prove that this tactic works, for example; in opportunistic shark attacks on humans a little over 2 in 3 survive the attack, but with the crocs a little less than 1 in 3 people survive, because crocs are generally not opportunity predators, they plan their attacks in a dynamic tactical manner. If attacked by a salt water crocodile its because the odds are already stacked against you getting away, and if you do, you’ll have major soft-tissue trauma, multiple deep puncture wounds, and usually at least one torn-off limb. Buy a lottery ticket, because this is your lucky day. Crocs have been around longer than dinosaurs in the fossil record, so that basic strategy seems to work long-term. END NOTE
Having said the above, I personally consider BVR combat to be very unlikely to occur within RAAF’s regional context, for the foreseeable future, for those and many other previously stated reasons. But even beyond these, without question, a modest Flanker force would be almost suicidal to initiate BVR battles with RAAF fighters. Our SEA neighbours are not irrational, or suicidal, or retarded. They likewise will have no intention of demolishing their own airforce via a hasty rush to BVR engagements. If RAAF won’t engage in attrition, what makes Kopp and others think the Malaysians or Indonesians or someone else might ever consider that tactically bankrupt approach? They are every bit as clever as ADF strategists and are not going to throw away their small deterrent air force on a pointless flourish they can not win. They have far more to loose if they are defeated in even one such battle. In other words, they are not going to be even remotely interested in BVR air combat as a primary air force combat tactic. Iraq and Yugoslavia both avoided or abandoned the BVR option, once their IADS was compromised and degraded, and instead relied upon the cheaper option of SAMs which were more effective in getting hits and kills, and generally making life very dangerous for pilots.
Without a major change in regional air power balance I estimate BVR combat is an untenable tactic for Individual SEA states. A change in balance would be preceded with more than sufficient warning for countering. Consequently, the quantitative air power theories Carlo Kopp and others indulge in is fiction, at best, and profoundly out of step with rational qualitative considerations, that make BVR combat in SEA an unthinkable and almost irrelevant air battle consideration. However, this general conclusion does not mean to say RAAF doesn’t always need to maintain the top-most shelf of BVR capability and a sufficient quantitative BVR advantage, because it is that sustained ADF BVR advantage, combined with daunting geographical depth, that makes BVR attrition battles almost an irrelevant regional potential.
Consequently, it’s time the ‘public-debate’, trash-media sludge and political sound-bites moved-on from this senseless AIR 6000 bun-fight, over purely theoretical and largely irrelevant relative BVR capabilities within the SEA context. Attrition air warfare is out for both sides, so Flankers are not a significant realistic or practical threat against Australia, and are not likely to become one any time before they retire.
Producing secondary emergent combat capabilities with seamless electronic integration is what the ADF is most interested in as this makes BVR a much lower order threat potential. The Super Hornet Block II (and HUG Hornets, for they also will get ALR-67 RWR and integrations) represent an initial leading edge of fifth-generation style of fighting. Some people assert the Super Hornet Block II is more than a highly evolved 4th-generation aircraft. I disagree, but it does incorporate some fifth generation integration aspects, that drastically alter what it can do, in a networked context, for which it clearly was specifically designed.
The F-35A will incorporate many more of these sorts of emergent capabilities, but the F-22A largely will not exhibit these, due to that aircraft’s lack of bi-directional broadband data links (unless the AESA is utilised as a broadcast comms element–though that would only communicate within its forward arc). The F-22A does not have the sensors or the data send an relay capabilities necessary to enable newer multirole strikefighter ways of fighting. The F-111C/G/RF, are of course completely outclassed in this type of combat environment and can not see what’s going on around them. They could not survive it, or even be used in it. If the mighty F-22A is the wonder jet that will (theoretically) deliver maximised networked capabilities, then there is almost no written or tangible evidence within the public domain that supports that in any way—on the contrary, RAAF has point-blank said the F-22A can’t do it.
When are the sludge-media and certain politicians going to finally listen to the ADF? It’s not as if Labor can say in 2013 that they didn’t realise the problems of the F-22A, because there’s now a firmly established historical paper trail of RAAF and ADF saying in clear terms that the F-22A is unsuitable for ADF service. So when are Labor finally going to wake-up to this? I hope they and the media have the honesty and professional dignity to face up to this.
Of course, regardless, of RAAF’s revealing comments to date, Carlo Kopp is sure that he understands the ADF network, and what it will provide, and appoint himself, “…probably the best qualified person in Australia to comment on this. …”
I doubt he doubts that. I’ve read many incredible things from Mr. Kopp since he graduated, but I think this particular statement is perhaps the dreariest swill from him so far. It goes to the heart of Kopp’s credibility and standing within any debate or formal inquiry process. It’s clear to me Kopp is a B-grade amateur shock-‘n-awe journalist who is a part-time computer science lecturer and programmer. His claim to fame is a 2000 doctorate in civil mobile microwave broadband networks.
How that qualification then translates into Kopp being Australia’s foremost qualified expert on ADF military networking, I can not possibly imagine. Mr Kopp did not design, construct, develop, use or even maintain it, or its elements, and he doesn’t know its labyrinth growing extent and functions, so how could he possibly be Australia’s most qualified expert on what it can do? But more to the point, how could he be any sort of ‘expert’ in that area, or understand what its future potential is?
The mind boggles—I’m at a loss for a sufficiently scathing comment to this incredibly arrogant and demented self-promotion. Kopp continually makes such a complete twit of himself in this way and wonders why serving RAAF have an extremely low opinion of him. For example, Kopp paints himself as some sort of RAAF adviser within his monotonous propaganda website.
“…His other professional and academic interests include air warfare strategy, doctrine, network centric and information warfare. His work in this area has been published by the Royal Australian Air Force and the United States Air Force. He produced extensive contributions to the 2000 Defence White Paper debate, testified to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit and the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (federal parliament) on fighter replacement issues …” http://www.ausairpower.net
Yet, within this same committee’s hearing Hansard we see what Defence really thinks of Mr. Kopp’s ideas;
“Mr Edwards—…There is considerable criticism of the Air Force’s attitude in relation to many matters to do with the JSF. I would be appreciative if you could tell me, for instance, why it is that many people in the ADF appear to be so hostile to the arguments put by Kopp and Goon, and why it is that many people in the ADF appear to be hostile to both of those individuals. What is it that they are saying that gets up the nose of ADF?
Air Marshal Shepherd—I would rather not have a discussion around personalities. We in the Air Force share your concern for this vital aspect of our endeavour and vital aspect for the nation, and we in the Air Force believe we are professional in what we do. We know the value of the capability we have now; we also know its weaknesses and the threats that are before us in the sense of maintaining that capability into the future.”
Source: Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Friday, 31 March 2006, Canberra. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm
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It’s also instructive to examine the attitudes of Government and the RAAF Chief, then contrast this with Carlo Kopp’s view with regard to SE Asia (SEA) and NE and South Asia.
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Air Marshal Shepherd—“…The government continues to monitor developments in the [SEA] region, and were there a need, the defence capability plan would be adjusted accordingly. We acknowledge that we are already seeing the introduction of more sophisticated military equipment in Asia, but we assess future growth to be more in north east and South Asia rather than in South-East Asia [no, not Democratic India Carlo, non-democratic Burmese Generals, they aren’t rebuilding their Capital inland for nothing…]. In our [SEA] region, we will see limited developments in fourth generation fighter aircraft, ground based sensors and weapons systems, and enhanced command and control and information capabilities. To ensure air superiority in this [SEA] future environment, Australia will continue to develop our network enabled force to exploit advanced air systems centred around a fifth-generation combat aircraft and the associated communications and information technology.”
Acting Chair—“…There are a couple of fundamentals that I still cannot work out: whether a government decision or a Defence determination drove this. There are two background questions here. One is a question of strategy and policy in two statements: in Defence 2000 [White Paper] and, Air Marshal, in your very first statement at the start of this. The gist of it was that the real challenges will be in north-east Asia and east Asia. We do not really see the close regional South Asia, and therefore our close region, being the fundamental problem.”
Dr Kopp—“There is a basic issue of how we define the region and how we plan our force structure. The idea that the near region—and this covers the South-East Asian nations—is virtually our sole concern because of geographical proximity is really predicated on the idea that this is the only land mass from which you can launch aircraft into Australian airspace. That assumption is no longer true. … It is dangerous to underestimate what we are seeing developing in Asia today [It’s also dangerous to overestimate that threat and unbalance the ADF force structure accordingly. JORN early warning is a powerful hurdle to intercontinental range air attack, that’s what it was designed to allow ADF to defeat. I’d use submarines.]. That is something that I find personally very deeply concerning; it has caused me many sleepless nights.”
Source: Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority - Official Committee Hansard of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - Defence Subcommittee, Friday, 31 March 2006, Canberra. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/hearings.htm
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It’s important to inject some strategic perspective here. If a country wanted to militarily attack or harass Australia, according to ANZUS, this would by default be considered equivalent to attacking the United States itself. The ANZUS alliance would be activated. A single USN SSGN could put an end to local issues, assuming the ADF needed that level of assistance. ADF probably wouldn’t need that for an air power threat but Australia would need sustained large-scale USN assistance with regard to a credible active submarine threat.
So where should ADF be spending heavily if it wants strategic defence self-reliance?
South East Asia understands this ANZUS relationship clearly—it goes without saying. Indeed, Australia has multiple Security and Defence arrangements with most countries in SEA and regards these relationships highly and considers them of great strategic merit. These neighbouring UN Member-States are not aggressive towards Australia. Australia is fortunate to have good neighbours and that did not occur by accident. It occurred because both sides of the regional equation wanted it and because each country actively put into place the Foreign Policy necessary for it, and developed productive relationships that have lead to the present levels of mutual trust and respect. From Australia’s perspective, if the rest of the world had such responsible, stable and mature neighbouring relationships, the world would be a much better place.
However, if a major Asian power external to SEA (i.e. China) were to attack Australia, there’s a cautionary example. Japan found it much easier to get within strike range of Australia, and did superficial damage, but it found it far more difficult to fight an effective attack campaign when its logistics train and energy jugular was exposed. This is a continent, not some little island. It’s at the junction of three major oceans, so it is a critical strategic partner for a global superpower that dearly wants to remain a global superpower. The US has a lot to loose if it lost the strategic relationship with Australia, so it is never going to let that occur while it can do anything about it.
Australia’s a very big place, easy to effectively defend, even with conventional weapons and mostly light forces. But it’s hard to do much about it from the perspective of a committed conventional attacker. The USN has to be demolished first (tricky, considering that might lead to nuclear response). All of the important Australian strategic targets (that really matter) are at the deepest range, and are hardest to get to. A modest modern expeditionary surface force has almost no hope of success against the ADF. But SSNs or SSGNs with SLCMs can do a lot of damage fast, with little problem, but even those can be independently deterred and defeated with a sufficient ASW commitment.
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In this, and the previous two-blog entries, I’ve made it indisputably clear that the general proposition that an F-22A is the solution to Australia’s air power needs is at best, misguided and confused. None of the comments posted so far disagree with that. I could continue to demonstrate this with yet another lengthy argument and quotes but I’ll leave it for the time being, unless someone disputes the conclusions of that examination. Obviously, now that the F-35A is in flight testing, the revolutionary technological and performance advantages of this aircraft will become increasingly apparent and highlighted, and it may be better to track those with respect to the F-22A, that to continue in this vein.
None of the proceeding even matters, so long as the next government-elect listens to Defence Professionals on defence issues.
